Director for center of american seapower. I hope you have a monograph, the subject of our discussion today. And if you do not, i believe we still have copies at the front desk. By all means, pick up a copy on your way out. We are very fortunate to have with us today, brian graff, this man, my friend and coauthor was also a retired naval officer, formal Deputy Director for american seapower. A prolific writer and also managing director, its a National Security and defense consultancy. Its also a pleasure to welcome david, this man. Also a retired naval officer and defensive uses best writer. I will offer some thoughts based on our monograph. Brian will follow. Then the three of us will discuss, we will conclude with questions and some answers. To the untrained eye, modern military Technology May seem to have eliminated the thought of war that defined premodern battlefields. Victory in historic conflicts relied on the coincidence of skill and luck. The great commander sought in a position to impose his will on a chaotic battlefield in a single moment of genius or a series of moments of genius. Reaching for that moment requires good fortune and the alignment of factors beyond his control. Intelligence traveled only as fast as a man could run or a horse could ride or pigeon can fly. Victory therefore required months, if not years of careful planning. Despite technological advancements, confusion still defines the titanics crashes of the 20th century scores. The u. S. Fleet at midway could only strike japans carriers as fast as it dive into torpedo bombers would fly. Buck proved instrumental. Commanders decision to continue searching for japans Carrier Force in the American Strike which rivals as they were refueling the army played a large role in deciding the issue. Today however, jets fly at hundreds of miles an hour where in the case of hypersonic reference, over 100 miles in two minutes. Travel light circle advanced radars track thousands of targets in the case of the combat system, hundreds. Laserguided weapons are accurate 2 feet and sometimes interest. Its tempting to believe conflict is now mechanical. Any enemy can be found and destroyed without much trouble but the key to victory is simply building faster and longer range missions. Missions and Delivery Systems where the aircraft ships, submarines or landbased launchers are, it can have victory but think that finding the enemy is easier than before and more specifically, the modern u. S. Military can locate and destroy adversaries at will. Temporary u. S. Intelligence surveillance and targeting is equipped to the demands of complication. Particularly in the western pacific. Without serious investment and overhaul, u. S. Risks peace time and defeated in war. Can sailors face the same difficulty as Ernest Hemingways fisherman. The sea is big and old. The u. S. Pacific commanders responsible for 30 million square miles ocean in the western pacific alone. Several island chains break up this fastness while civilian ships and aircraft between some of the world most prosperous nations. Moreover, the u. S. Pacific forces alongside their regional allies face the greatest threats since the soviet union. Peoples republic of china has spent the past 40 years increasing security wealth. In the last 20 undermining the Global Economic order. Over the past decade is transformed military from a force suited to internal Security Missions to one that can protect ours. The chinese have developed a military design to counter american ally capabilities. Transported a region defined by strategic chokepoints and large scale economic destructions could spark protests and threaten regime survival. Thus any conflict china fights must be short, intense, decisive. General secretary does not fear conflict, he worries about it for long competition there allies. Peoples Liberation Army possesses capabilities that will destroy local adversaries military while also forcing the u. S. And japan to choose the risky highvalue assets. Or risking taiwan. Deterring chinese ambitions requires a mix of americans and allies capabilities. The u. S. Military must have a specific set of tools. It needs longrange standoff weapons can penetrate defenses, strike aircraft to carry them, range extenders to enable strikes while keeping carriers secure. Their superiority fighters to defend highvalue targets, subsurface capabilities and infiltrate titles denial and air defense strike and commandandcontrol. These assets have dominated and diminished. Without enough intelligence, surveillance and targeting. China will deploy its missiles on aircraft, ships and landbased launchers. These are relatively small and in most cases highly immobile targets that will be difficult. The u. S. Must be able to identify these targets efficiently and at range. It must be enough space between forward position u. S. Surveillance tools and major fleet formations or longrange bombers to keep the ladder out of harms way. Otherwise, u. S. Must choose between deploying carriers within strike range of china longrange missiles thereby exposing them to risks not run since the second world war. Or backing out of strike range and allowing china to execute the opening stages at its plans. Intelligence surveillance targeting is of equal importance before conflict. Chinese geography gives a strategic advantage particularly in a confrontational taiwan. The u. S. Must rely on communication lines spanning the specific Ocean Pacific ocean and having access to regional reinforcements. China can concentrate forces and foreign reserves much more quickly. Nevertheless, china cannot strike from a standing start. It must concentrate air and Ground Forces across taiwan and prepare for a surge to disable taiwanese defenses while warding off the u. S. And ally response. With enough warning from the u. S. Can increase across the chinese defenses. Even to submarines plus a surge in aircraft from japan and Pacific Carrier groups could make a real difference. But the Early Morning requires longterm surveillance. The u. S. Needs isr feedback and hopes to shake the battlefield and execute the strategy of deterrent by denial. Specifically it needs information on assets in positions within 200 miles of the chinese coastline along with chinas coastal garrisons, airbases and ports in the eastern military district. Its important to note similar thinking applies to Chinese Forces in south china. The u. S. Requires constant surveillance, po a navy and fleet chips. The Company Aircraft or units moving from parts of Southern China toward both the islands. Finance is recognized the importance of isr t. Even a decade ago, chinas military remained largely backward. It lacked centralized funding must did not rigorously simulate combat situations. Most of it Fighter Pilots did not fly at night. The poa primarily conducted Territorial Defense and internal Security Missions. Still, china has developed its antisatellite capabilities since the 1980s, a series of public tests from 2007 to 2018 and incorporating antisatellite capabilities research into a space program. Satellite capabilities are critical to the u. S. Complex. Not only do they provide valuable conflict intelligence, they also serve critical communication between u. S. Forces in multiple theaters. Tiny strike would disrupt operations globally while undermining american isr teeth, specifically in the western pacific. Currently, the u. S. Are properly monitoring chinese movements. This impedes the u. S. Ability to deter conflict, shake the battlefield and in the end, when a work. Open source analogies undertake the detail determination request by counterparts. Still, isr t has become so hollowed out that the lack of Coordination Development is evident. U. S. Ir t is comprised of inner craft, surfaced in Service Centers and sensors equipped with radio frequency electromagnetic and tools. Neither the navy nor the department of defense have made enough effort to centralize the deployment and isr t structure. Thus, i think its fair to say that no one really knows what is in the western pacific. By extension, no one really knows how current isr t actually relates to quantifiable u. S. Requirements. Im not making a new observation here but a fleet without eyes cannot fight. Policy steps should be taken to overhaul isr t. For one, the navy should bound the problem. Provide funding for the navy to conduct a classified study of pacific isr t capabilities. This would allow may be to develop targeted quickfix responses to capability gaps as it would plan future acquisitions. I think all u. S. Armed services should conduct a similar review. Some measures can have shortfalls in the navy acquisitions of mq foresee triton, uavs will boost capabilities by providing commanders with a high enduran endurance, information and platform. Full Operational Capability is an expected until 2023. The Defense Department can re task u. S. Air force and cube nine from Central Command and deploy them to the pacific in a similar role. Those who answer or might object that we should not have one strategic theater to benefit another are right. Both are essentially an intere interest. The navy should also consider increasing its projected and q4 c3 since the end q4 c3 program capability. Its unmanned platform. Inverting the unmanned carrier launched surveillance and Strike Program to the c bars, the carrier based. The navy has lacked carrier air wing or range extender since the early 2000s. Since our retirement of the asics and f14 carrier air wing strike strong. Any strategy employing standoff strikes would require an aircraft to show the mq25s role. By expanding its missions profile to include isr t would both increase capabilities and i believe weve already extreme cross. They emphasize longrange centers rather than speed. Thereby avoiding the difficulties the program encountered. Ironic characteristic of strategy, i will close my remarks here. Its cyclical nature. Operational methods would be obsolete and arrived with new technologies or strategies, the same deadly effect as before with initial decline. I think about the concept that fell out of practice and battleships. The navy should consider reviving this concept. Developing long endurance uab like the end q4 c or m cube nine to be deployed and recovered by u. S. Surface combatants. This would increase u. S. Irs coverage and making the use of weapons by Surface Combatants more feasible. This could direct the missions toward the targets while destroying the launching missile or whatever, launching the missile would remain strike range. The u. S. Must also coordinate redundant capability develop its for its regional allies, particularly japan. Pan selfdefense is sophisticated and highly competent. The Ground Forces, the ground force still receives most of the funding. Assets in which survive massive chinese strike. The suggestions of hudsons isr report apply equally in the defense of japan. Ill leave it at that for the time being. The podium is yours. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, everyone. Nice to see from the faces in the audience. Im not sure you all understand how fortunate you are today to be here because you get to see davids larder with his hair combed, his beard trimmed and in a suit and tie. Lets like i uniform siding here. Thank you for your invitation, seth. Its good to be here and i want to thank the third member of the team, harrison who happens to be one of the most insightful operation analyst that i know and he did all the math because seth and i dont do math. Why did we do this study . What caused it . Someone asked me about the other day. A couple of things. Number one, 2018 National Defense operation act that directed the navy to do Something Like this, to do a study sufficiency, specifically one of the things they asked for was that the study include operations in a satellite environment which i thought was interesting. To me, it seems as if congress were asking the navy to do such a study, smart people and the congress were worried it wasnt being done so we watched. We have been communicating engorged came out. We didnt see much coming out into the press, we decided we would give attention to it. Another reason to do this study was the National Security strategy that came up in the early months, january 2018. A very big idea in it. Is that the u. S. Posture for unconventional returns would move from that of deterrence by punishment to the parents by denial. They are very different ways of attempting to deter conventionally. The aggressor attains some level of success in their objectives and the threat of being pounded into submission by the calvary coming over the horizon is not to be enough to dissuade them. The other is deterrence by denial in which forces that are present are sufficiently lethal and capable to keep the opponent from the progression in the first place. When you look at the geography of the recent region in the western pacific, because there are so many possible targets of aggression so close to the chinese mainland where so much force could be marshaled in so little time, this decision by the Trump Administration to change the nations conventional deterrence i think was a very smart one. But it was these requirements, it has to be better. Has to be stronger, it has to have more weapons and more isr, more networks that link all of that together. These missile isr mismatch in the navy right now, in january 2015, issue of proceedings, the three in charge of the navy service force, admiral wrote an article where they put forth this idea of distributed the file. In this article under the section where they were suggesting things they needed, to operationally this concept, they write persistent organic Airborne Intelligence Surveillance isr and data relay something they need. An aspect of this, the ability for operations apart from centralized control networks, local, information that which are essential to achieving space awareness. The networks were more capable than those existing today, must be persistent in the environment. The current vertical takeoff Unmanned Aerial Systems have the persistent necessary to support operations remains to be seen. They met shipboard helicopters. The potential for them network and information sharing should be examined. Actions groups to launch and recover fixed wing or partially fixed wing will be pivotal to employing uavs in this world. I mention this because it was evident from the article for almost five years ago that the three cars in charge of Surface Warfare in the navy believed there wasnt isr problem. They believed it enough to put in proceedings and make sure everybody read it. As a young man, i did a lot of Cruise Missile certifications when i was on active duty. A bunch of experts from organizations would come on board and very intense the relation determined the degree to which you are able to employ surface to surface weapons. We used to have a weapon, anti mission. It had a range of 2150 miles. I remembered going through the certifications, discussing the employment of this weapon both with teams and wed sit around on our ship think about what would happen if we ever got to do that. Bottom line was, the weapons range greatly outstripped our ability to understand what we were targeting. It was a firing weapon, the area of uncertainty of the target as this weapon moved downrange. We got rid of it for many reasons. Some associated with treaties but i think one of the reasons the navy didnt fight harder, it was difficult to employ. We didnt have situation awareness. Now im looking at the navy that has tomahawk black for, with ranges at nearly 1000 miles. Looking at the sm six and a surface to surface mode with classified discussions of ranges of 200 miles. We spent the money we need to get the weapons we need out there. The question in my mind was, do we have the isr to support those weapons . In my gut feeling, it was no. We wanted to get after this so we got this and started to think about it. Some of the things we thought about, i have relationships with them today, folks who have sailed through the South China Sea. We talked to them, talked to anyone who operates in western pacific today, they will tell you yes, we believe the chinese have us targeted. Its just the cost of doing business. If they believe all the time that some element of the peoples Liberation Army has been targeted. My position in starting this w was, why cant we create that same sense uncertainty in the chinese destroyer . Why cant we make them understand that they are always targeted, 24 sevenths, 365 in peace time . That those naval forces are operating under in the western pacific so to operate under that imperative my understanding the capability of the systems their ranges and sensitivity leads me to believe there is no way they could pull that off. There is a lot of discussion in the circles about National Technical means or overhead access you get into those discussions that greatly exceeds the room to the congressional direction into bound our study we decided we would not deal with National Technical means under them the control of the operational commanders in the navy and to task those systems or that they would be gone or doing other things. And it was one of the bounding assumptions but we focused on the Unmanned Systems for go the navy has a program of record to buy 68 operational models and to early models im not sure what they call them. The 68 aircraft are over the lifetime of the acquisition program. The operational requirement is for five orbits and four planes a piece. Twenty airplanes worldwide. And we started to think that the major isr platform to fill this targeting requirement or proble problem. Could they pull off this 24 7 365 day problem . We see no friendlier allied contributions to this. Thats probably not reasonable you will likely have friends and allies helping us locate aggressor platforms but for the purposes of inquiry to focus the ability to support the operational requirement that we think is useful. Received a representative level of posture for both the United States and china during peacetime. Peacetime. Remember that. Looking to bolster the conventional deterrence by denial of the United States navy and we do that by putting more and more powerful forces forward that are supplied by sufficient isr piece of the other guy does when they are under way someone is watching thats what were trying to do. United states continues its commitments in europe and elsewhere we assume the ongoing Maritime Surveillance requirements of the mediterranean and the indian ocean were not concerned with the performance of weapons and the analysis. I invite you to take a good dive into the monograph that we provided with charts and tables and graphs that describe the operational challenges associated with attempting to just do what harrison referred to to take an airborne radar of 50000 feet with a 287mile area of concern, if you want to look at one. 66 million square miles every 12 hours and thats just one time covering every one of those square miles, you need five in the air at any one time. Just to mow the grass. Mowing the grass is insufficient if you are looking at targets of opportunity because you know youll hit somebody and say that somebody we want to stay on. That target requires persistence which takes away from your ability to continue to mow the grass and we go into that into the discussion. We talk about the time to get to station does to the ability of airplanes and how many airplanes you need for go look at guam specifically i think i remember it was along the order of 2000 miles from the center of the South China Sea. Would have to fly from guam 2000 miles to get to the model thats one the middle thats a lot of fuel. But if youre going to maintain 24 7 365 environment , to the fidelity that i think we need the current supply will not get us there. It will not get as close to their. So then we decided whats called pilot math that has a couple ofs assumptions there are no false targets. You get every bit of the Horizon Limited radar range there is no weather problems. This is the very best possible case for radar surveillance. Obviously there are other ways to survey all those waters it helps in an important way so back in the envelope that led us to believe the emq c4 five is incredibly insufficient if we devote all 20 airplanes to the pacific all 20 operational airplanes we would have a difficult time meeting the objective of covering the chinese surface vessels. So to make a few recommendations i would like to drill down on a couple of those in my remaining time. First i would like to see the organization tasked to do this research that has the facility clearance necessary to really get at the merged environment that brings in the satellite characteristics of the centers that are in the region and on the airplanes to give a better view. I want someone to do this maybe the navy to participate but an outside organization to report on this. I want to bring your attention to two particular kinds of endurance uav. There was an idea that was called tern an aircraft with long gestation time and a variety of sensor packages to dramatically increase the isr capabilities. The marine corps currently is working on a program of the Expeditionary Capability we provide the links in the report you dont look at the what the marine corps is asking for but i remember the brief they provided thinking this is what i want for the service force. It is a virtual overlap. The marine corps has a lot of different ways to get their requirements ship based could be one landbased could be the answer we are looking into which would work best. That they are putting real money against trying to fulfill this set of emerging requirements for isr to support corroborations and the commandants new vision of naval integration. I think we could buy them faster think we need to spend some money there is maritime version and to turn them into maritime assets. Somebody said should the navy or air force operate . I dont care. I really dont care. I do care that we get more assets to help. Before i turn this over, i recognize what im talking about is just the first several steps of the kill chain. I really havent spend time on the weapons or the networking. Those are important if you want to get into them, we can talk about that but thats my presentation i hope you enjoyed the report and i look forward to questions. [applause]. So one of the assets that you left out you see the p8 making it to the isr one of the constraints we put on ourselves is dealing with unmanned access because the manned assets have other missions. If we were added time of increased tension or serious with the isr of undersea assets of the Chinese Submarine fleet the understanding is it would be very busy with the submarine threat and less a factor in service contact. There is also an issue of cost and what threats it faces in that area. With the reduced uav. If somebody is brave enough and doesnt understand those acronyms we are using just raise your hand we will say what it is. In any case there is a cost issue there. Especially with those in abilities as they are now. You discuss some of the threats they are facing. With the global hawk shot down by iran 180 million. I hate to be the guy that brings up cost but that discussion afterwards is there was reporting and Foreign Policy that really freaked out dod they lost a 180 Million Drone to the iranian missile. There was discussion of canceling the whole program. But what would you say to people that say we are spending too much money on exquisite access thats too vulnerable quex. It is certainly an issue but its not as though there are alternatives that are lower cost and those are mentioned in our report. Yes. Its a lot of money to lose in a drone but fortunately is not the only way to deal with those capabilities and it does have extended range and not the only game in town. The two ideas to be bound up in the question getting back to deterrence if your desire is to maintain posture which is to keep that from happening, you spend money on more exquisite technology but if the other guy is not deterred it its always match to a certain level. If that desire exceeds your posture, then we talk about the shooting war and the things that are important. Sons since we get into a hot environment all of those concepts that are important were fighting but theyre just less important before the shooting starts. Before these more exquisite technologies are useful. One more thing. We really have to think deeply about how Unmanned Systems lower the bar for conflict. The iranians believed they could take shots and probably get away with it. Lo and behold they got away with it. Because we did not consider the loss a war inducing event. So will everybody just start to believe the unmanned vehicles of everyone else are fair games and thats just a cost of doing business . . Or whoever we are talking about had good reason to be freaked out but better reason to be freaked out not that the drone was lost but that there was no response afterwards because talking about deterrence if you want to deter that from happening again you have to make that clear theres a cost for doing it and that cost wasnt necessarily without most of the time going to war. This sets up an interesting deny on Dynamic Forces are in a constrained area we both have created these isr environments to know where the others are all the time. Then the distraction of the isr asset is different than other aggressive acts because at that point you have to ask yourself is the opposing force trying to poke my eyes out before they do something bigger and more aggressive . I refer to this in a meeting a conventional balance of terror in isr aware that helps provide stability a conventional stability to a region. One of the things you could get into from the pentagon is that if they could see my triton then we should go even further with the asset which of course will drive cost with the volume business so how do you guard against the drive to not be seen to put up the most exquisite thing in the air versus your need for a lot of coverage . Some of both. We need volume and low signature more exquisite stuff to do the serious missions we may not want the other guy to know you are doing it. I found one of the interesting things was the organic isr Surface Combatants one of the areas i was uncomfortable was the idea of targeting the harpoon missile to send the helicopter over the horizon and if you send it against a Surface Combatant then theres nothing for them not to shoot down the helicopter then you risk the pilots life. The unmanned isr seems to solve that problem but you also run into the problem now to say to your friends and Naval Aviation we need a drone not completely out of business but to a certain extent so this coming together and wonder if you believe the navy is set up to have that coverage you are looking for. I am a consultant and i consult to the navy. So now what i will tell you normally not what i get paid to do. My opinion is that this is a very thorny bureaucratic problem and we alluded to that in the report in the first draft i did a hell of a lot more than allude to it. Then i back to the language out. Service people believe we need more organic isr something that takes off from a ship, under my control, completes my loop of fire control. Anything that takes off from my deck is paid for by the airplane guys in the navy and they have quite justifiably said for years you dont have a requirement for that. You have not showed your requirement and this is a function of missiles moving out the cave on capability faster than the isr could catch up. This is why the Congress Asked the navy to do it study to determine whether or not such a requirement exist because they have begun to move forward. I dont know if its a program of record. I dont know exactly if it is or not but there is a lot of talk about it. But there are bureaucratic problems between the surface people and the aviators and the isr people because aviators by trucks and then pentagon buys isr it also buys them from the satellites. So there is a question of what they consider to be efficient so these organizations have to come together to determine if they are out to lunch or if they have got it. I think the concern about this indicates they want to know if they have god it or not. Im looking for agreement ff one of the problems that stands in the way of the bureaucratic reordering and one of the obstacles is its very difficult to relate to a particular strategy. What is the navys role if there is a conflict in the western pacific what is the navys objective . And the difficulty here goes back to the idea as it is currently construed in the Defense Department of joint warfare and discouragement of individual services to present their ideas were to do anything about it because everybodys involved in the game. But that wasnt my central point. Would it be easier to reorder bureaucracy specifically this and if it were clear that reordering the bureaucracy serves a strategic purpose . You cannot get proxy within 30 minutes absolutely. So yes i want to move on a couple of other issues. This renewed push the last few weeks around 355 ships, acting secretary of the navy has been clear he wants a plan to get us there by 2030 and that was echoed by the National Security advisor just recently who said when President Trump says 350 ships he means 350 ships. So if you look at that situation in comparison to what was said recently that ohio would be 40 percent of our budget, it feels like there is a lot and not a ton of resources to execute that. So how do you make the case spending on extra isr capabilities to balance against political promises and the things that i navy wants to do or what it says it is required to do . To fulfill the National Security obligations. Its a really good question because the increases the administration has proposed and agreed to by congress are going to turn around two years from now. So we will start seeing decreases in the defense budget. So as difficult as it is to reach the 355 ship goal in 30 plus years its more difficult with the budget on the decline. Im afraid i dont have an innovative or imaginative answer to your question. I just have a very simple one that if the American People and their representatives want to be safe. The ship counts are the unsatisfying way of qualifying a navy. They work for two things. To compare the gross size to other navies of the world and work in comparison in comparison to previous navies. There must be a better way to quantify i just dont know what it is. Acting secretary has made it very clear how do we get to 355 in ten years . The National Security advisor made it very clear Administration Goal that if we continue to count ships the way we do today, where at 292 i believe, 355 is almost 22 percent larger and 40 billion a year to maintain a navy of that size. You cant just buy the ships you have to put people in them and maintain and food and fuel and parts. But the size of that is gigantic. I didnt want to be one of those and not to send the acting secretary if you count the same way we do today in the network naval force. With the unmanned surface vessels . To have 32 missiles on the piece we didnt count Coastal Patrol boats and increase the navy ship count. That that would be well advised and to the Conference Center that you all sign up on. Of those 8 billion a year those have the services larger and number two a serious strategic choices made on the elements of military power and i dont see that happening. And with the Strategic Decisions and those rocket forces. And then its not needed to compete. And with the current Political Climate and i agree the simple ship numbers are not an expression of power that searching for a better one. And i agree without any question not counting those legacy ships to make a move towards unmanned vehicles on the surface absolutely to be counted at the same time. To build Unmanned Service vessels those are decent submarines. But we wont count them . And to change the frame of reference. Have a question for the audience but i am interested the chinese essentially with that assumption being so based on what you know and obviously thats unclassified and with that assumption to say that they know its also limiting what that sense is and that the chinese enjoy the targeting ubiquity and that is crap. But sunspots or are weather patterns and maintenance on facilities and attrition and the probability of detection at any one point in the point on the globe. Going out a thousand miles the seafloor about 100,000 feet thats not just the way it is. Its hard to do but the concept that they have it all in that concept with that first island chain is hard. But if we operate in that environment where are the weak spots of the isr complex . In the operate the weak spots but something you said before and of those vulnerability. And the question is how many minds is it create to create a minefield . If the ships captain thinks theres a mine he will act accordingly. And from participating in tabletop exercises several years ago and that they can see us and they can target us. When you see people doing things in the attempts to simulate. Tow to have time for questions so identify your organization and yourself. And then ask your question in the form of a question. Im a former diplomat i can pretty much promise you there are agents in every single port in the western pacific just like at pearl harbor. Is it okay to include the coast guard vessels . And what about surveillance and to take care a lot of our problems . Start with the coast guard. I dont believe the coast guard has a role in the South China Sea. And of story. Its not widely shared but they dont have enough things it to do with the missions that it has and when the assignment me tell ourselves a false narrative we are making a better. We are not that the coast guard is uniquely constituted to do. There are some interesting concepts and surveillance and in my view because of programs of record are those that were seriously under consideration by the navy right now. And of that classification. So with vietnamese americans in the era you have made it clear the number of ships does not guarantee but you made it clear we dont have adequate money to require the 40 billions. So my question is so in the view of the whole government and if you look at the budget that is required 750 million, the state Department Foreign affairs have 40 billion so if we are talking about distance in the South China Sea then why not talk about the distance of okinawa, vietnam, and taiwan to china. Is there a different calculus to increase the Navy Surveillance and not only that but to deter china. I am afraid when i heard the recent news with the assistant secretary just resigned because he is the top pentagon asia hand but he resigned because of what was proposed not being approved. With that direct confrontation idea to the current confrontation with the state department into allies and Human Resources in the state department and with that endo pacific strategy if at the heart of it and if the recent encoder had no presence. With that somehow work . Whole government approaches have been discussed at high levels of government and from this platform last year. There is a gap between distance and something we need to do and actually having it happen. It is important to begin to say this is needed. And that from which we operate the proximity question there is no argument with that geographically but still the bases have to be defended. And that supply and defense is something we rely on allies far four but for example thats just hours to defend so there are still limitations from the bases of japan that we operate and go on. Thank you for your question. Its very smart. I dont want you to think youre sitting in a room because we dont even value but the state department our alliances in that region are among the most important that we have with hardworking diplomats i am confident we they continue to do their very best to Carry Forward the message we are engaged and we care and that we have your back. Secretary shriver i think thats his name. I dont know him. I understand from people that i respect he is one of the best. I want you to know that there are a lot of very good and very smart people continuing to work and continuing the work he was doing and those who are ready to come back into government are they are. They are there. I dont thank you will see a big change in our policy or the effectiveness because of the loss of one person no matter how good he or she is at their job. The whole of government is absolutely essential. Is not just the navy but the military that will keep the pieces in the western pacific. To make sure that our network of alliances, i would not trade our friends for chinas friends. Specifically i like to be much more friendly with vietnam as a matter of fact. I share your fear of that network diminishing i dont think i have much of a fear that it will happen. I think we can keep our friends. Youre looking at the wrong guy to defend the personnel decisions of this administration. [laughter] i think thats fair. Good afternoon retired marine navy and for that Threat Reduction first of all thank you for the presentation you already answered one of my questions i dont know if you had that detection system for Early Warning in tethering those to see hunters surface vessels like Naval Surface vessels knowledge. So with your recommendations so i will make the assumption the navy will not increase manpower so with no increase of people power asking for an increase of procurement and also altering the 25s that means more technicians, more drone pilot pilots, et cetera what would you recommend to the navy to reduce or cut . If there is no increase overall. He can answer that specifically i will answer the way i want to. I am not the business of advising the navy or anyone else how they should make do with less money im here to tell you they dont get enough if they could get more they can make a better case and explain why seapower is different why they should be funded. Second with the airships and the surface vessels those are good ideas. We have that analysis to stay in programs of record and those that have institutional momentum that we are aware of of those that are classified. The last time i counted, to work for Central Agencies with the office of secretary defense a number that equaled almost the marine corps. And i think looking at the number of people and their functions to keep such a large force would produce some significant savings to be applied elsewhere and to combat itself. s is a Great Power Competition or not . If we do that with post cold war mentality we will never get there. We will never compete the American People have to decide if they are serious. Americas leaders have not made the case effectively that we need to get serious about it. We have a larger civilian bureaucracy and workforce today than during the cold war. Maybe we should but it should be looked at. So in this instance we dont have access at this level how does the uav fill a niche roll that doesnt duplicate the efforts i operated under the assumption the satellite overhead is looking down is this active or passive isr . Both the way they fill the niche you can do the focus search with the general area of interest with the maneuverable m q4 or nine that does the focus search two provides that data back through the network that you had that do that. But the false positive rule was as a way to say what we are doing in the study is the very best case because were not dealing with false positive positives, that we are giving you the very best ranges and numbers. Time for one more question. My question is quite simple. We have seen in the nineties missiles in the South China Sea and hong kong and my question is this landgrab with china so my question is why does of the us it would cause absolute chaos psychologically and then the helicopter to me with the maintenance of this little outpost. Thats not a bad idea. [laughter] there is a whole range of things that the United States could do but is not doing right now. That one we could certainly consider. I dont see why not. But the defense of taiwan is an area where this administration has improved over the record of his predecessor to have come this far that leaves between here and the other side of the room and we are not doing that. There are all sorts of things the administration could do if the Vice President approached not just china but to our alliances and more specific. But there is a lot left to be done. I applied the progress that has taken place and that this administration now takes the same view of our security interest of our world and act accordingly. Former Us Navy Service officer we are in good company. Your study focuses surface targeting with assets on surface vessels like to hear isr t because we know Chinas Nuclear attacks have stealth and endurance and attack capabilities that could threaten our communication or to keep our outpost light guam well supplied. So what are your recommendations for improving then a bs mom the Navy Strategy . To be really satisfied with things are. It is enormous. The asw system turn those ships into significant active and passive platforms i have even got to the worlds best submarine force yet. There is no military skill with the number one and number two nation is larger than submarine forces are just that good. I put those together with the unmanned searches that are gliders that carry the acoustic platforms we are doing quite a bit to ensure we have that mastery over china versus the submarines so one of the things we have to worry about is the arrogance that i just displayed dominance is not a birthright china has a lot of engineers to figure out how to make it less opaque our own submarine force tends to talk as if that will never happen as if they can understand the environment i think thats not a Winning Strategy for the long haul we have to take their capabilities more seriously. We have got to go. I saw the proverbial hook. Thank you for joining us this afternoon excellent participation from the audience hopefully well be here the next time we have another discussion thank you. [applause] and thank you to our panel. [inaudible conversations]
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