State acity of new york. Text and tradition make clear that new york city restricted premises license and accompanying transport bannekers constitutional. To transport the continuous and uninterrupted premised on a view of the Second Amendment as homebound right. With any ability to venture beyond the curtilage with the firearm even locked and unloaded a matter of government grace. That view is and can student with text history tradition and this courts cases. The text of the Second Amendment to protect rights to keep and bear arms. That letter right makes clear that the Second Amendment protect rights that are not strictly limited to the premises. There is no historical analogue for the citys prohibition on transporting firearms to places where they may be lawfully used. To the contrary, the Second Congress required the militia to take their own firearms from their homes to the training ground. The regulations on limiting where firearms may be discharged or training may occur that the city invokes both underscore that the general rule was that firearms can be safely transported between and among places where they could be used in discharge. The court recognizes this much in heller both by recognizing the long history of handgun possession outside the home and by recognizing the governments interest in limiting possession and sensitive places, not every place outside the home. The city of course has struggled mightily ever since the Court Granted abto make this case go away. Those efforts are unavailing and only underscore their continuing view not the transport of firearms is a matter of municipal grace rather than constitutional right. The standard a the city has now been blocked by a state law and the state has not been party to these proceedings. The state says the city does not enforce the regulations. Whats left of this case the petitions have gotten all the relief they thought they could carry guns to second home they can carry to fire, to Practice Range outofstate. Justice ginsburg, the petitioners have not gotten all the relief to which they been entitled. We would also be entitled to injunction that did three things, prohibit future enforcement of the transport ban, prevent the city from taking past conduct in violation of the ban and licensing decision. An injunction to transport meaningfully such that it would be limited to continuous and uninterrupted transport. As far as what you said about enforcing past violations, no plaintiff has alleged that they ever violated the regulations when they were in effect. Thats actually not correct justice ginsburg. If you look at paragraphs 12, 15, 17 of the complaint pages 28 and 29 of the joint appendix, all three of the individual petitioners alleged they regularly went outside the city of new york for firing ranges outside westchester and new jersey. All three of my clients are on the record as saying that in the past they engaged in conduct that is inconsistent with the transport ban. I believe that the city has forced warren any future prosecution for past violations. I thought that thats the representation they made to this court. In their latest letter they were very careful about what they represented. They represented that they wouldnt try to prosecute somebody from past conduct if the past conduct didnt violate current regulations. If the past conduct happened to involve a stop for coffee and not continuous uninterrupted a the business to do with the current law hasnt been decided by the court below. That is a complaint about the limits of the current law and not the limits of the old law. Youre asking us to mix apples and oranges now. I dont think so. I think what im asking you to do is exactly what this court did in the knox case. No, what you are asking us to do is to take a case in which the other side has thrown in the towel and completely given you every single thing you demanded in your complaint for relief and you are asking us to opine on a law thats not on the books anymore. And one thats not on the books not because of something necessarily the city did because the state, a party who is not a party to this litigation has changed the law and prohibited them from doing it. This is, i think, something quite different. You are asking us to opine on an old law, not the new law. The new law hasnt been reviewed the yet. I really think what we are asking to do is exactly annul before whats the court. In knox the thrust of the underlying complaint was that the supplemental fee assessment that the union imposed on the members was unconstitutional. Thats what the complaint framed. In terms of the continuous we dont know whether the city is taking the position that you cant stop for a cup of coffee. Presumably if you leave your gun in the car, im not sure how they would know you are traveling with a gun but put that aside. Before i put it aside, let me just say i do think we know the answer to that because in subsection 7 of the new regulations that are promulgated specifically to try to move this case they made clear that the kind of transport and they were allowing, at least within the city of new york had to be continuous and uninterrupted. I dont know what continuous and uninterrupted means of doesnt if it means you can make stops for coffee. I assure you i think the right way to think about this for article 3 purposes is if we had been successful in the lower court and proposed injunction i guarantee the words continuous and uninterrupted would not be in our proposed injunction. If the city had offered their proposed injunction and included that limitation we would have said we dont accept that with tickets inconsistent with the right we just prevailed on and that dispute would be continuing dispute that would render the case not moot just like in knox there was a continuing dispute about the sufficiency of the refund notice that the union offered in its effort to moot the case. The dispute that was still alive between the parties about the sufficiency of the refund notice wasnt the exact same dispute that initiated the litigation, but the case was still alive controversy for article 3 purchases and this a athis court could address the question presented here and leave the question of continuous and uninterrupted for the lower court if it wanted to but theres no basis for not answering the question presented. Im sorry, thats the oddest decision ive heard. Answer an old law thats no longer in effect and reserve consideration of the new laws interpretation for the lower courts . If they have agreed and you agree that everything but the continuous and uninterrupted has been resolved and that youve gotten everything you wanted as demanded in your complaint, you can travel to a second home you can travel to any lawful firing range. Thats all you are original complaint demanded. If you got all that, thats the issue before us. A new question is, and youve agreed, we should leave that to the courts below with continuous and uninterrupted is. That happens we dont think weve gotten everything we have gotten including continuous and uninterrupted but with all due respect we would like given our five years of history in this litigation with my friends on the other side would like something more than their representations to protect us against the use in the future of past conduct licensing. I have one question, they try to give you a lifeline by saying you could get damages. But i read he representations to court and you said we could get damages. I dont see a request for relief where the damages are nominal in your complaint. You dont say we want damages in your submissions to us. Did you ask for damages . We asked for all other appropriate relief in our complaint. We did not make specific work quest for damage below. Im happy to confirm that we like damages but i also think a acourse you have to ask for permission to amend your complaint to seek that. Would have to do that. With all due respect to solicitor general. We were happy they recognize the case wasnt moot we did it feel like we needed to damage a lifeline because we think we had multiple strong arguments based on this courts press and including the knox case that said wholly apart from damage is to dispute is it moot. Just one more of the damages. As far as i know this court has never used a late, meaning in this court and not below, request for damages to save the case from moot. I dont know of any such case. Are not aware of one either, justice ginsberg. We think we have plenty of cases from this court that are now in the situation. With respect, i dont think the practice of getting the recognition after certiorari is granted that a certiorari grant might this not signal anything good for the defendant. Its quite common practice if they then come up with an idea to moot the case. If you think of a couple of recent cases not just knox, Trinity Lutheran and parents involved are all involved latebreaking efforts often by Government Entities to make the case go away. In each case this court said thats too little too late and this court starts accepting these kind of post certiorari maneuvers its going to be hard for the court to continue. I dont think its bad when people who have an argument settle their argument. Unless thus there is no longer argument. So i wonder if commissioner asked this question . You say this case is still alive because the city of new york might prosecute one of your clients because they stopped for coffee on the way to a firing range. I think im going to ask matt and i have a suspicion they will say no. We are going to prosecute that particular individual. So then what should i do . We have a dispute. That suggests to me that we have the kind of live controversy and the standard for mootness is whether its possible to provide a factual relief, i guarantee an injunction back attempt forcing those promises is going to give my clients more factual relief. Keep in mind what makes this case quite different from a lot of others is this a discretionary licensing process where the city makes judgments about good moral character. There are 79 officials in the Licensing Department of the city of new york. Where are they going to look for guidance . They could i think look for guidance to a Court Ordered injunction. Im not sure theyre gonna pull the transcript from this argument let alone a letter from the city to the Solicitor Generals Office for this. We think we are entitled to that kind of meaningful effectual relief. We think on the merits this case is actually quite straightforward because there is no historical analog for this kind of transportation restriction. As i suggested, if you look at the second militia act passed by the Second Congress they not only understood he could transport your firearms from your home to a place where they can be lawfully discharged but they required of the members of the militia. If you look at the history and traditions of this country there are very few laws that try to do anything like this and the few that tried to do this were invalidated by the courts. As i understand new york a new york has two kinds of licenses, permits his license a license. You are attacking the premises license scam on the ground that it doesnt allow you to carry. One of you just adapt the carry license scam if you want to carry, why didnt your clients get a carry license . I think what my clients wanted in this lawsuit and plenty of other lawsuits out there challenging carry restrictions. They wanted the right to transport, not the right to carry. Transporting is a kind of carrying. You take your gun and it goes with you someplace. Thats the kind of carrying. I think its also a bearing which i think this is such a straightforward case. Lets all im asking is, theres a premises scam in the carrying scam and your clients want to carry, which suggests you shouldve brought a challenge to the carrying scam. If you thought that was deficient. With respect higgins, my clients for years at least two of the three had with the city for a while called target license. It didnt give them a full right to carry but it did give them the right to transport their firearms to new jersey and other places probably wouldve allowed him second home though im not sure the issue squarely presented. My clients did not insist on getting a carry license either under the before this lawsuit was filed or in this lawsuit. What they want is to rule is to restore right, transport firearms between and among places where they can be lawfully used. Thats different from a license that says i get to have this firearm with me at all times loaded, ready to go. What they wanted was to restore their right to transport firearms, locked and unloaded between places where they could be lawfully used. Thats what they asked for, thats what there is no historical analog for. If i could emphasize, i think it would send a very important signal to the lower courts to say that when regulation like this is inconsistent with text and has no analog in history or tradition its unconstitutional,. If text history and tradition they will uphold the law but if text history or tradition are to the contrary, courts proceed to a watereddown form of scrutiny thats heightened in name only. I think this board should reaffirm that text history and tradition essentially is the test and can be administered in a way that provides real protection. How do we go back just one second, to the question presented, does new york citys ban on transporting a license locked and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside the city limits consistent with the Second Amendment . There is no new york city law for transporting a license locked and unloaded handgun to home or any other place. I think you will hear that. What new york very brief response. There is a question presented they say there is no ban and you say abyou can finish the question. That was the question. Mr. Chief justice, thank you. My answer in a nutshell is knox, my slightly longer answer is every time this court confronts a post certiorari maneuver to moot the case. In almost by definition will a athe question presented concerning the constitutionality of special assessment it did not concern the added woodsy of the refund notice but this court decided both. Thank you counsel. Mr. Wall . Mr. Chief justice and the court. One point on the merits and will mootness. On the merits text history introduction all condemning new yorks transport man. Such bands are been rare and commonly struck down precisely because of the right to keep arms keeping and bear arms must entail and have is always entailed the ability of a lawabiding citizen to carry a firearm unloaded and walked from one lawful place to another. On mootness petitioners pointed below to economic harms from the violation of the constitutional rights. If they prevail here the District Court could award them damages just like any other 1983 plan. But they never asked for it. Thats true but theres a specific rule on this federal 50 4c which says the prayer of relief binds on a default judgment doesnt bind on merit. The question for article 3, grant and there are questions about potential questions about whether under the rules the court should allow them to inject the hearing and weighed against citys tardiness in changing its theory the case as well but for article 3 purposes the question under abis it impossible for court to grant sexual relief . It is not. Its possible for a court to award them damages they have sustained as a result of the citys conduct. Has the solicitor general ever asked this court to allow such a late introduction of the damages question to save the case from mootness. Mr. Quinn said he was not aware of any such case, are you . I dont know of any case in which is directly come up or we weighed in on it. We participated on merits before the city suggested the mootness and we felt compelled to explain to the court exit didnt come up in ali john reno and it was decided the other way that the court said no we are not going to allow that to happen . That predates the federal rule. I think the facts are somewhat distinguishable from here where they got evidence in the record at the Summary Judgment stage of their economic harms. Do not focus on damages. What they wanted was to engage in conduct. Not focus on damages is an understatement. They practically want to take damages. It had every opportunity to say they wanted damages including today and for whatever reason mr. Clement has physically said this case is not about damages. Thats not why we think its not moot and its not what we want. I heard mr. Clement say im happy to affirm my clients want damages but we dont think we need that lifeline from solicitor general. I think the question under knox admission products is is it impossible for court to award damages . Theres evidence in the record of economic harm. If they get a declaration on merits that they are right in the matter of the Second Amendment there is no barrier to their receiving award of damages from a court. Would you remind me where in the complaint they said fourth damage . I think the best examples are pages 32, 33, 35, 36 of the joint appendix and again 52 through 54, 56, 57, 59 to 61 those are both pleading and Summary Judgment affidavit and rely on two kinds of harm. One is competitions they were not allowed to attend with firearms and the other is the cause of dues and membership fees to the in city ranges which i think implicitly are suggesting higher than the other city. They filed a complaint they filed a motion for Summary Judgment debriefed the case before the Second Circuit they filed this petition then in response to the suggestion of mootness they filed another brief they are ending none of those places today ask for damages. Damages has been injected into this case because of the solicitor general in a very latebreaking threepage letter. I will certainly grant that theres a lot of postgrant maneuvering on both sides. The city has withdrawn its law and the petitioners have come up with theories of why the case is not moot. As matter of article 3 argues that damages can change hands. He could also rest on future consequences and say the citys representations have come too late. I thought that in your brief in your letter brief you specifically rejected every other theory of why this case was lied. We think the court credits those kind of assertions by government litigants it did in diff units. The facts here are a little different. A scheme that expressly allows you to consider conduct. You dont have acknowledgment from the city that its former conduct was caught unconstitutional and representation that comes as mr. Corbett said in his letter at the 11th and and a half hour. On those facts could you say we are not going to take a look at the citys representation . You could its not our theory. Our theory is money could change hands here and they be entitled to that money. What you think mr. Comments theory . I take it you rejected mr. Comments theory about this continuous travel and stopping for coffee. I think its a close call in our view thats a new controversy that arises from the new law not the old controversy to the old law but i think its a hard question and i understand his point that they wouldve been fighting over the terms of the injunction in the District Court or at least potentially could have been. I turned to the marital moment. Why isnt that good enough . Under the prior law the plaintiffs would have sought relief that wouldve allowed them to take their firearms locked safely to range and stop along the way for a cup of coffee or bathroom break and that is still being denied if thats a proper reading they will ask new york about that im sure. If its still a proper reading of their existing regulations, why isnt there controversy remaining . It would seem to be adults of relief thats been denied. I think there is a lot of controversy potentially now but the meaning of this continuous and uncorrupted requirement i think arises from the new law and a why does it arise why didnt dispute still alive from the old floor effects form of relief that wouldve sought and still despite the new law being denied them . Is not classic definition of relief that was sought but now still despite . Herculean latebreaking efforts to move the case still alive . If the court wanted to say that, i dont think it would harm the United States as interest. You not aware of precedent that would close that and thats pretty much what knox did, isnt it . Except that knox wasnt governmental litigant. The resumption of voluntary this station work differently but to go to the question, i think in the District Court the fight was about whether they could do the thing at all. Now we have what strikes us as a different fight about the manner in which they can go and the legal restriction is different. The legal restriction is tied to the new law. Im not aware a sure, they have new relief. They granted new relief but not total really. I would agree with that. I think there is still controversy about the manner in which they can go. That seems somewhat different to us from the controversy litigated below and that this court agreed to hear but i dont think theres any case that would keep the court from going down that road. If i could turn to the merits for just a minute, i think all the petitioners are asking for and its a fairly moderate ask is for the court to reiterate what it said in heller that the lower courts have been corrected starting with text and history and tradition but they have created as mr. Clement said of sort of asymmetry where they find that history and tradition can give a thumbs up to a law but not a thumbs down. Im sorry, can i go back to that question end and what other area constitutional area, the First Amendment in particular, have we decided any case based solely on text history and tradition . This seems sort of a made up new standard. I thought heller was very careful to say, we dont do that, we treat it like any other constitutional provision. If i analogize this to the First Amendment, which is what heller suggested we should do, it seems to be a time and place and manner restriction it might not pass any of the standards of scrutiny but if youre looking at a First Amendment right to speak, its never absolute. There are some words that are not protected. We are going to have a different fight about that at some point. There are some weapons not protected. Just like there might be some words not protected. We know under the First Amendment that there are time, place, manner restrictions that a government can impose on the basis of safety and other things. On the basis of safety you can have a demonstration at will. You need a permit and you have to have certain equipment and certain protections and certain things. If i treated in that way, we might have a fight about whether text history and tradition prior apermits restriction on this time. But why thats a freestanding test. Two points justice, i understand manner restrictions. I understand the requirement you carry the gun unloaded or do it in locked container but a ban is not a tone place or manner restriction. Determining which category falls into and was permissible heller said you said will you start with text history and tradition and the court commonly does that. Even with respect to categories, seventh amendment for the jury trial right. Heller says you start here and starting here i think its a straightforward case there is no historical analog and contrary condition. Inkynk you counsel. Mr. Chief justice, contrary to how they are presenting it now, petitioners claim this case narrowly. They argue that a premises license specifically allow certain limited transportable license handgun to effectuate its possession and use in the premises. They sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to do require the city to allow the limited transport. That narrow framing intern has two applications now. First the case is moot because changes in state and city law have given petitioners everything they asked for and indeed more than that. Petitioners suggest these changes should be viewed skeptically but its a good thing not a cause for concern when the government response to litigation of resolving matters to the democratic process. Solicitor general agrees that all the objections actually raised by petitioners to mootness are unfounded but suggest that the court can proceed to the merits of constitutional questions anyway because petitioners might be in the future be able to add a new claim for damages that they have never asserted and still now only most reluctantly embrace. The court has never adopted that kind of reasoning under article 3 and it should not begin with this case. The second implication of the case its framing is that if the case worked moot, the only question presented on the merit would be whether a premises license must as an adjunct to include rights by petitioners. Though petitioners invoke general right to bear arms outside the home premises license is not addressed to that purpose. The premises license is instead issued for possession in a particular place and petitioners never challenge separate new york license that is addressed to caring weapons outside the home which is to carry license. Those broad questions are not properly part of this case. Turning first to the issue of mootness and i will go straight to the question of abthere are two levels to this response. The first is that there is no dispute on that question. The citys enforcement, the governing standard is provided by state law because the state enactment preempts local law. The continuous and uninterrupted language cited friend is not in the state law. The city acknowledged that in the citys enforcement position is that coffee stops, bathroom breaks, are entirely permissible. Its beyond a coffee stop or bathroom break. Suppose they had prevailed under and obtained a judgment that the old law was a violation of the Second Amendment. Suppose after that one of the plaintiffs had made a trip to a firing range and lets say new jersey and while they are decided to stop to visit his mother for a couple hours to take care of a few things for her. Would there be any law that would violate . Im not certain it would. I think that would have to be a question now to be litigated under the state law. We are back without the new laws city or state, would that have been legal conduct . If that had happened prior to the changes cannot. After a judgment that the old law was unconstitutional, prior to the enactment of any new law . I dont think its all clear. Those kind of questions were never put at issue or litigated in the case. You dont know whether theres any law that would violate . If there was a judgment that said that our law had been struck down . Im not aware of any city law. Why is this case moot . They didnt get all they wanted they wanted declaration that the old law was unconstitutional, period. What theyve obtained as a result of new City Ordinance and the new state law is a rule that says yes you can take the firearm to a firing range outside of new york city but it must be a direct trip. It cant include an hour spent with your mother. I think the answer is that article 3 analysis is always focused on what the plaintiffs ask for. Not speculation about what mightve been injunction. The only thing that was ever put at issue here, you can see this by looking at the actual injunction that plaintiffs frame was the permissible categories of destination. Shooting ranges and second homes outside. Where is the injunction the plaintiffs frame . In a number of documentary and i dont remember the numbers off hand but there in the Summary Judgment in both motions for preliminary injunction, motions for summary and judgment across several different docket numbers injunctions were repeatedly proposed by the petitions. They are basically verbatim identical. What they say is, they want injunction restraining the city from enforcing its old rule in any manner that would prohibit or preclude plaintiffs from traveling to shooting ranges and secondhome. Why wouldnt that include a nondirect trip . The issue of directness was never litigated as part of the case. It was never in the complaint. We have no idea what the answer to that question might be if it had been litigated but its not abthe article 3 analysis focuses on what the plaintiff asked for and what they asked for dealt with permissible categories of destination and thats more than fully addressed by the state and city law. To turn to the question of future consequences, as i said, the issue of copy stops is entirely dispute we would not undertake prosecution or action now based on that or any other violation of the repealed law. Is there any way in which any violation could prejudice a gun owner . Not that i can think of. The city is committed to closing the book on that old rule and we are not going to take it in effect. Is there any way in which finding of mootness would prejudice further options available to the petitioners in this case . For example, seeking damages . I dont think so. Its possible they would have a time bar on damages but it would depend on the allegation they made. Theyve never made any allegations related to damages i think we have to assess that based on the allegations they make. I think the other key point on future consequences theres really no factual basis in the complaint for that. Mr. Clement for the first time today suggested that the complaint may allude to possibility of violation it certainly did not allege they have violated the rule in the past. The most important thing to know about the paragraph to the complaint is that the petitioners would have had their licenses renewed at least twice by now. Counsel let me make sure i understand to suggest there will be no consequence to anyone for violating prior ban. I think there is no basis to think there would be. And wondering abyou are representing the city. Im asking the city representative here that the city, there will be no collateral consequences from the city to individuals who violate the prior ban . Absolutely correct. There will be none. In making that representation to this court . And making that represented to this court on record on behalf of the city of new york. Am not going to because i want to be careful because ab you just not to prosecute them for any violation of this old law. Of the repealed provision of the law. Thats right. If there were other intentional acts, loaded guns, violent act, thats different. The repealed provisions of the old law we would not prosecute anyone for. My question and some of the others went beyond prosecution. The question is whether they would be prejudiced in any way, for example, with respect to qualifying for a premises lysis under the new law with effective violation of prior law be used against them . It absolutely would not. I think a deeper point is there is no reason to think there are such violations. If we refer back to the complaint as i noted before. These petitioners have been renewed, the licenses have been renewed twice. Do you have a way abi take it the licensing decisions are made by the office and office in the new york Police Department. Do you have a way of communicating to that office what they are not permitted to do, given your representation . Absolutely. We consulted that office, they are aware of this. If we communicate to them that no such consequences are to be imposed and the event the extremely unlikely and i think its not can happen event that anyone thought that mightve happened they should bring that to the attention of the Law Department and we will review it to make sure its addressed. I want to put a slightly finer point on the lack of factual basis in any event for the claim of future consequences. The petitioners only now have made this illusion to their complaint. They been renewed twice since then. The court ordinarily presumes individuals follow the law. Even before this case our practice was not to ask people to disclose past violations unless it resulted in arrests, summons, revocation or Something Like that. There is no suggestion that any petitioner has had any of those. Do think its really fair for you at this point to look for specific allegations in the complaint to defeat a claim of mootness that the plaintiffs had no reason whatsoever to anticipate until after we granted certiorari . In the city chase decided to try to move the case. That confirmed the plaintiffs got everything they asked for in this case. The issue of a if you say they didnt ask for a nominal damages completed and as for school, actual damages. They didnt specifically allege they violated old law. Really they didnt allege that they wanted to make nondirect trip. How could any plaintiff possibly have anticipated that until you took the quite extraordinary step of trying to mooch the case after we granted review . The state Legislature Passed a new state law. Ended the city have nothing to do with the enactment of that law . The city supported law as we do with money potential bills and most of them go nowhere. The state legislature and governor made their own decision about what to enact. Of course responsive to their statewide constituency and thats what happened here. That by the way is a good thing im not a bad one. The government should respond to litigation, should assess its laws or political subdivision laws when they are challenged. Lets say i agree with you, except that, its great when local governments respond to the constitutional constraints suggested by others. But it does seem a bit much to fault plaintiffs for not having a specific damages requirement in their prayer for relief in complaint thats framed years ago. This litigation i think has taken 5 years. Its become relevant only at this late stage after the city of the state have enacted a new law. Why isnt the prospect of allowing damages to be added to the complaint enough . In a 1983 action, damages are clearly available. The complaint long ago as it was filed did say they stocked all available relief. Typical prayer for relief. Why isnt there a Fair Prospect the District Court on remand would allow amended complaint to seek actual damages . Two answers, one is that thats not how the court is approached and Fair Prospect is not enough to sustain case under article 3. The prospect of relief isnt enough . Whether the claim is even in the case at all, whether the a aa decision about whether the claim is in the case most receipt the decision on merit. That question is a jurisdictional one. Solicitor general is mistaken that it can be deferred until later and the merits reached anyway. The prior point i think is equally important which is that its not a matter of faulting the plaintiffs but the plaintiffs chose the case they wanted to bring. As plaintiffs do. Demand for relief are taken very seriously they are crafted carefully and one of the reasons they are crafted carefully is that litigation demands are met to cause defendant to meet the demand. In this case the demand was crafted not just in the prayer for relief but in numerous paragraphs of the complaint. The case was consistently litigated in accord with that structure of the complaint and even after the mootness question arose the petitioners in their lengthy comprehensive response never suggested a you think its totally irrelevant that the state has at this late stage sought to mooch the case when we are assessing the prospect in the interest of the plaintiff in seeking damages commit. I think it is because the reason demands are made in litigation is to profit defendant to decide whether to meet them. Not to decide later if they do meet them to reinvent the case and make it something else. The clearest example a do you agree there would at least be Fair Prospect and District Court to reimagine might disagree with you and find that there is reasonable excuse for the plaintiffs introduction of damages at this stage . I dont think so. Im not aware of any case where anything like that is happened. Consistent decisions from the courts of appeals have said a if we disagreed with you, then what . Still not enough because the prospect of adding a potential live claim is not enough to sustain an article 3 case or controversy now and to allow the courts to reach the merit that claim in the case and the clearest example of alvarez versus smith thats the case where the complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief just like the complaint here. A significant difference in that case the plaintiff had a motion pending in the District Court. What you do about the fact that that was prerule 54 . Alvarez was not preroll. It was about a decade ago. Im sorry. Different case. Rule 54 i think is really a red herring. Rule 54 is a question that governs the District Court how remedial powers when a live controversy remains continuing before it. He says the District Court does not beholden necessarily to what is categorically beholding to whats included in the prayer for relief and can craft appropriate remedies. District court and lower courts do not look to rule 54 in determining questions for article 3. The right place to look at complaint, consistent litigation history and the courts below that determine whether the plaintiff asked for and has what they ask for been provided . And that has happened here. Are people in new york less safe now as a result of the enactment of the new city and state laws than they were before . I dont think so. We made a judgment expressed by our Police Commissioner that it was consistent with Public Safety to repeal the prior rule and move forward with that. If there not less safe what possible justification could there have been for the old rule which youve abandoned commit. It was a reasonable implementation of the state premises licensed to carry license division. And weve explained that there was a verification benefit to the way the rule was set up. That verification benefit perhaps not played out as much in practice as it had been predicted and we believe the police could work harder. Do you think the Second Amendment permits the imposition of instruction that has no Public Safety benefit . I think you have to look first to consider whether the type of restriction, how the restriction accords with the history under the Second Amendment before we answer that question. I think the right place to start and for our purposes may be starting with shooting ranges is the best, first key point is this must be viewed as an adjunct to the premises licensed. Its not just a general statute or generally applicable statute, its an adjunct to the premises licensed. If its viewed in the wake of the city would be consistent with the Second Amendment for the city to prohibit any trapped by a Person Holding a premises licensed to a firing range . I think that would be doubtful. The reason the city went beyond what state law says about premises licensed and authorized transport to shooting range in the city was because the city recognized that the training does intersect with and important to effective use of a handgun in a home. You are conceding, i take it doubtful means it would be unconstitutional . Tell me if you dont know the answer to that question but if thats what it means, you are conceding that the Second Amendment protects the possession of a firearm outside the home under at least some circumstance. I think what im conceding is that in the case of a premises licensed the Second Amendment has something to say about what effective possession in the home means. Sometimes that may mean that you need to be able to license holder needs to be able to undertake certain activities outside the home. If a person is taking the firearm, the handgun, from a home to a firing range the person is out on the streets of new york and unless a total ban on taking it to firing range would be consistent with the Second Amendment and follows the Second Amendment under at least some circumstances, protects the possession of a handgun outside the home. Is that correct . I think thats a fair way to look at it. But from our perspective, the right question regarding premises licensed is, did the rule impermissibly burden effective use of the handgun and the promise. The same way that to get a gun to a premise you have to get it purchase it outside your premise and bring it there. But certain things that happen outside the home may be integrally related to the effective use of a handgun inside the home. When you look at a premises licensed not speaking about the Second Amendment at large but the premises licensed specifically the only proper lens to look at the question through is whether the restriction impinges on effective use of the handgun in the home. With regard to training we have two related reasons why it doesnt. The first is to look to historical restrictions which are not themselves directed at premises license but are eliminating historically the location where people were permitted to train was fairly extensively restricted provided the opportunity to train remain available. Thats the principle we distill from history and when you apply it to the premises license here the conclusion is the ability to train locally and circumstance where Market Forces are allowed to operate to allow how many facilities are present with no indication supplies and aand petitions here in their Summary Judgment affidavits never even said they wish to engage in any form of regular training outside the city. All they said as they wanted to go to shooting competition, regional shooting competition out of the city that on this record the former restriction the former rule implementing the premises licensed to allow training locally meets Second Amendment requirements. What methodology should the courts use in approaching Second Amendment questions . If they conclude that text and history protect the text and history of the Second Amendment protects particular activity, is that the end of the question or then did they go on and apply some level of scrutiny . I think first we looked at history and determine whether history answers the question one way or the other. Whether constitutional or unconstitutional and then a significant number of cases history will not speak with one voice or conclusively on that subject and then the right step is to move on to assessment of justification under means of scrutiny approach. But as history says its protected then thats the end of the question. There is no resort to some level of scrutiny . If history conclusively shows the restriction is impermissible, then, as in heller, heller is an example of that phenomenon. Heller determined without consulting needs and scrutiny that the law in question went to the core of and destroyed the Second Amendment right and therefore the ab. [inaudible] i am aware of that. Thats great. [laughter] a review is that history can answer some questions pretty directly and other significant number of cases history doesnt speak so clearly. The most reliable method of answering the question is most cases means and scrutiny. One problem with the prior regulation, if you wanted to have a gun in your second home you had to buy a second gun. What Public Safety or any of the room reasonable ends is served by saying you have to have two grown foods to wound . In one of those guns has to be maintained in a place that is often unoccupied and therefore more vulnerable to theft . I think the question on second homes, their petitioners have identified a difficult application of former rule that was it really contemplated when the rule was adopted. But still think if you look historically in the right way to answer a question about whether it was unconstitutional is to ask whether there had been historical tradition of enabling individuals to using handguns to protect two different homes. Our rules never spoke to the question whether an individual could have a handgun in a residence outside our jurisdiction thats completely we dont speak to. When you look at the question about what happened historically, there have been incidental burdens that wouldve burden similarly that kind of conduct in the past. This is why these things are difficult for you. I understand that. In massachusetts historically all the guns and ammunition were stored in a Central Place at night. I believe. At the time of the revolution. Not in anybodys home. Do we have a different law for massachusetts . I guess not. What history do we look to . We you did at one point or someone said i happened to notice theres a gun next to this person in the cars we stop at this point, i say, sir, what are you doing with this gun . He says im going to a firing range. Oh, i see. Where is it . If he says its in brooklyn i can find it. If he says it somewhere 14 miles northwest of utica in the adirondacks, i have a harder time. And i dont know who to believe. So its tough. So there are more guns in new york. What happened to that argument . The argument is the argument that is presented on the record we of course took a close look at the question and the Police Commissioner determined that the rule can be repealed without negative impact on Public Safety. I think the police will have to work harder to verify whats happening in those situations but we are confident if they can do it they will do it. Why will they have to work harder . Somebody who lives in midtown is stopped with a gun and the officer says, where you going . Im going to a firing range in jersey city which is right across the river. Dads tougher then, im going to a firing range in Staten Island. I think three of your seven regions are in Staten Island . Am i right . Two are in Staten Island. I think its a little tougher but of course the person might not say jersey city either. Somebody who lives in the north rocks set on going across the border to westchester county. That range is subject to the requirement to maintain a roster of individuals to use it. I agree with you that its enforceable as to jersey city or westchester and thats part of the reasons the city has determined to change the rule even ignoring the fact that the state came in and preempted it. I think its more difficult and that the judgment previously was that with respect to premises licenses of course not a carry license which is not an issue in this case never been challenged, the target license that mr. Clement referred to was understood to be a kind of carry license and if that was the heart of the complaint the claim should have been that the city needs to reinstate the carry license that was not the claim in this case the claim in this case was specifically articulated by the they have premises licenses about the scope of a premises license and the claim made frame by petitioners most clearly in their Summary Judgment papers at page 6 that the relief sought here is necessary to allow full exercise of the right of defense of heart and home in the home. They accepted the premises license framing in the entire case litigated. Counsel, i want to circle back to the direct and continuous travel requirement. Injustices question about ab is it the citys position that any reasonable stops are permissible . That is our enforcement. Reasonable necessary stops. Reasonably necessary, does that include stopping to visit your mother or use aa cup of coffee . His coffee reasonably necessary . Probably depends who you ask. The Police Department. [laughter] the Police Department has affirmed and we made clear that the enforce position is stopped for a cup of coffee is not a problem. So whats going to qualify . Im just a little unclear. The controlling standard here, im giving you the enforcement position of Police Department on the questions we considered that the controlling standard here should add that is provided by state law. We do not offer definitive construction of that law and i think the question about what that state law means is one that needs to be litigated probably in state courts. Before there is any dispute here for constitutional adjudication the meaning of the law of demand to be determined. We have no representations to us as to what is direct and continuous other than coffee is okay. What i can represent because it come up before, coffee, restrooms, food, gas, the kinds of things that you ordinarily would stop for in the course of travel had it considered the motherinlaw example before. I think its going to need to play out in the state court. The more important point is that none of those issues were ever part of this controversy. This controversy was about two things, as repeatedly emphasized by petitioners throughout a are asking us to say theres no controversy. Im trying to nail down exactly what is the delta if any remaining in the relief that mightve been sought and the relief you provided. This is all in short what im saying this is not relief that was ever sought. There might be a controversy here but its a new controversy it would need to be litigated in a new case in the relief the speculation about what an injection theoretically could have included is not the way the Court Analyzes questions under article 3. Thank you counsel. Three minutes mr. Clement . Thank you mr. Chief justice. A few points in rebuttal. First of all, justice kagan, we never got to the point of imposed injunction in this case, we didnt exactly succeed really well under current Second Circuit law so we never got to the point of proposing injunction. The only thing my friend is referring to our allusions to the kind of relief we wanted the Summary Judgment motion. If we got to that point we would have wanted clarity, the kind of clarity the federal court applying Second Amendment can provide. You dont have to depend on cities representation. Your complaint from relief states it in order preliminarily and permanently enjoined to defendants skip out whoever else who receive actual notice of the injunction from enforcing this prohibition from traveling beyond the borders of the city of new york to attend a gun range, shooting competition, or use a lawfully possessed firearm for the purpose of defending ones home, person, or property. You asked for clara tori relief with those same words. Thats right. I dont think we wouldve been tethered to those in a proposed injunction but if we go to the complaint i think we should look at page paragraph 41 joint appendix 36 where we ask for unrestricted access to common ranges and second homes. Unrestricted. I dont think it that with this late stage were still being offered unrestricted access. Justice alito said stopping at your awhen you say unrestricted, does that mean i can carry my gun for three days . Do you think a court actually would have crafted an injunction at all with hypothetical situations . It wouldve said you can carry a gun to the range and then would have left for further litigation specific applications of that general rule. I dont think so your honor. I think what wouldve happened as the parties would have their proposed injunctions they would have been huge delta between them and we wouldve disputed the same kind of questions that are still being disputed here. But we would have to rely on the cities representation about state law because we could have an injunction that enforced Second Amendment. It is important to understand how state law and city law a you want us to create the law . Continue proceed with the other points. I think the way city law and state law Work Together here is all the state law says is we will allow your transport is direct. It doesnt otherwise specify whats direct. The city took it on itself in section 7 of the new rags to tell you what they at least at that point but was sufficiently direct. Which is continuous and uninterrupted. Theyre now making representations that the right doesnt mean what it seems to mean and the like and i would say my client should have to rely on those representations, they should get that in writing and an injunction that would be enforceable that would be effectual really. I think the damaged on the point was not principal claim here but lets think about real time what would happen as soon as we filed the lawsuit the city wouldve turned around, dropped its case entirely and admitted to the court that it served no Public Safety purpose. I think my clients for years to try to comply with the law wouldve immediately sued for damages. I dont think they should lose that right just because the cities maneuvering happened post sir sherard. Thank you counsel, the case is submitted. After the oral argument, attorney spoke about the case on the Supreme Court steps. Leading off with paul clement, representing the new york state rifle and pistol association. My name is paul clement represented the petitioners in the Supreme Court today. I dont know if there will be questions from anybody but i wanted to quickly say that we are very gratified that the Supreme Court heard the arguments in todays case. This is a very important case. My clients have been litigating this case for over five years theyve been represented by a great team that goes well beyond me. Brian stapleton has been