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Iran. This event was held at the ol university of michigans ford school of a policy in ann arbor. Hello everybody and welcome. I would like first to add my thanks to the weiser family as well as to the American Academy of diplomacy with which weve been fortunate to partner to bring todays event together. The topic we will address is obviously timely and extremely important. Going to talk about us iran relations, the nuclear deal, politics and security y in the gulf more generally and of course those issues are linked to a whole range of other regional issues relevant to us Foreign Policy in the middle east from israel and the palestinian territories to the conflicts in syria, yemen and afghanistan and to have a discussion onsuch an important and wideranging array of issues we have assembled a dream team of diplomats with experience in the region. Im going to introduce them briefly and trust me, introducing them in a time efficient manner requires a lot of distillation of their icincredible accomplishments across decades in us foreign service. Im going to start on my left, youre right with ambassador Gerald Feierstein was a 41 year career veteran in the us foreign service, now retired. He was ambassador to yemen during the obama ministration from 2010 to 13, Deputy Assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs from 2013 to 16 and has had many other crucial close including deputy chief of mission in pakistan as well as senior post in the state departments Counterterrorism Bureau and post postings elsewhere in the region and saudi arabia, lebanon, jerusalem and tunisia and his now Senior Vice President of the middle east institute which many of you know is a leading think tank in washington. To his right is ambassador patrick barrowss president and executive director of the us qatar business council, he also has a 35 Year Foreign Service career with many distinguished posts including amas Us Ambassador to catarrh. And as advisor to the commanderinchief for Central Command which is the us military command with coverage of the middle east region. He is also an deputy chief of mission in jordan and the united arabemirates as well as economic and commercial counselor in syria among other roles. Ambassador Ronald Neumann is president of the academy of diplomacy and her three times as ambassador to algeria, bahrain and most recently to afghanistan from 2005 to 7 and served prior to that in baghdad for needing the legal aspects of the military intervention in iraq at the time. He was Deputy Assistant secretary in the bureau of Near Eastern Affairs during the Clinton Administration and hes had other senior roles in the United Arab Emirates, yemen, iran and senegal. You get the idea, theres a tremendous amount of collective expertise on the middle east and adjoining areas here and last but not least, closest to me to moderate todays discussion is ambassador Deborah Mccarthy served as ambassador to lithuania during the. During the obama second term. He was also principal Deputy Assistant secretary of state for economic and Business Affairs and serve among many other important roles as deputy chief of mission in greece and nicaragua and as deputyassistant secretary or narcotics law enforcement. She is going to take for me in a moment and moderate conversation about 45 minutes without expert guests before we open to all of you and for your questions, youll see people going around with notecards, ask your questions in writing to them and they will bring them down to us but chad will select questions that the representative postwar panel so thank you again to our guests and we lookforward to a great conversation. I feel privileged to be here and also to be directing and moderating the dream team m here. By the way, the dream team was the Basketball Team of lithuania but thats a separate issue. As you can see with the vast experience that they have all across the middle east, weve experienced young yearsin the Diplomatic Service and senior years. I wanted to start and the panel as follows. To talk a little bit about whats happening inside the region. Then we will get to whats happening between the us and around and then if we have time wewill put it in the bigger geopolitical context. So to draw on your deep history, knowledge of the history of the culture and obviously of bilateral relations, i want to ask each of you to talk for a couple of minutes on the Power Dynamics takingplace today within the region. And specifically to talk a little bit about how iran is perceived by its neighbors in the gulf. Tewould you like to start . Thank you debra and delightedto be here with all of you today. The basic elements of the Power Dynamics in the region are particularly because the fusion between iran and the major states of the gcc, of the gulf, saudi arabia, the United Arab Emirates and between iran and israel and so when you look at nthe reach of the region, what youre looking at really is the reaction of the other states to what is broadly perceived as irans expansionist programs and its search for a gemini in the region and the reaction of those states to what they see as a threat from an expansionist iranian state. And that of course plays into what were going to be talking about a little bit later on in terms of us and iran and the other states so three aspects of iranian behavior very quickly. One is the Ballistic Missile programs. And is iranian interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors in the gulf context, that means particularly yemen and bahrain and the third is iranian support for terrorism and how the region responds to those three perceived threats. Thanks again. While all those threats are real they are perceived on the gulf side and they have one thing in context and this is not a new development. I talked to many golf leaders all of whom say its not the same as the days of the shock. Weve been around in this area the last several centuries and weve always looked at iran as a predatory power, as someone trying to control us though this is not terribly new. In fact, if anything for the small states it would help the problem in the last century, theyve gotten more difficult because theres now two predatory powers. One is saudi arabia which both have a dispute with ran and is seen asexpansionist and hegemonic stick by the small states. All of whom have reacted in more or less the same way for the last centuries which is trying to find an outside protector. Early on it was the ottomans, it was british, the gulf states were prepared to as i say give up a certain amount of their independence in rereturn for their protection. After the british left there was a bit of a hiatus cause we were seeing the United States remaining western supercar was seen as supporting both saudi arabia and iran against their interests until the iranian revolution. They saw iraq as a valuable not ally but as a counterbalance to both countries for years. Saddam husseins iraq was seen as a plus or most of our state except kuwait and when we in effect took them out we disturb this tripod, their own balance of power so iran is the strongest country in the gulf far and away and without outside protection, would be the principal threat to the gulf states. However, this is not to say that they there are not other threats as well such as saudi arabia. Thank you. Iran definitely a threat although perceived differently in different countries. The uae, even when i was there 20 years ago with iran, they just moved up the ladder of paranoia but remember that even paranoia has real ends but there are things which are changing in the gulf. We the leadership of the states in several cases is changed and is younger and is pursuing a more dynamic versus. And in some cases particularly in saudi arabia and the uae breaking away from the traditional very conservative almost passive defensive approach to power and sort of feeling their musculature and challenging much more so old dynamics. At the same time you have a real doubling down of monarchies defending markel assistance and theres a tendency particularly in the west to say monarchies, old news. Trash above history. Weve done that too. Back in the 60s when Arab Nationalism came in. It was these people are done for. They outlasted all the Arab National regimes. And they are bidding here to do it now and in some cases by doubling down. They become more repressive, lesstolerant, particularly the uae, saudi arabia. Various types of criticism while liberalizing the social norms. But its a mixture of in one respect liberal regimes, Christian Churches are open, Jewish Centers are open in various places and at the same time internal repression if you get out of line but they are all still pretty popular, i would say there are chances of remaining, are pretty good. You could get into various Different Cases and theres nothing is guaranteed what the chances of them surviving in this form of government rather they are not moving to democracy they are doubling down on not moving. And for them n, the lesson of the arab spring is this thing is awful, look what happened when you pull down these regimes. You got chaos, youve got bloodshed. If at all kinds of destruction still going on and a lot of loss of life and thats not a pretty picture, we dont want to go there and the last thing i would note in passing is with that trend of bringing it out is these countries are very different from each other. Theres a tendency in the us to see the smaller both states as being very much their little saudi arabias, there are a bunch of guys running around in their bedsheets but in fact, they are very different from each other. All monies have better relations with iranians, they have historical differences ineach other. And i would go through them except to say the notion that ow they are similar in how they regard their citizens and how they workwith each other and how they work with their own people, the idea that is the same is in fact completely incorrect. He turned out a little bit to the relationship the United States as with saudi arabia as we build up the other things. We have a Strong Defense and security relationships. Many have criticized the us for overlooking the political and human rights abuses in tthe u. S. Congress attempted to pass a cheese me, a resolution to an American Military involvement in saudi arabia war in yemen this was in reaction not only to the human suffering in yemen but also to the actual becoming. Jerry, maybe ill start with you. Give us an inside view of the us the relationship. W how does it work and in particular, how does our diplomacy is security interests with our support for human rights in that part of the world . Its actually a very difficult balance to strike the cause i think as ron said, were dealing with political systems, with systems of government and society are very different from ours. We are the ability of the two sides to understand one unanother and to coordinate and cooperate is limited. What we have with arabia is a relationship that really goes back at least to the end of world war ii and in some ways even before the end of world war ii that has been built around two core pillars. One is energy and recognition of saudi arabia as the paramount producer of oil in the world and therefore a major anchor for global. And then the other aspect, the other is have gone with the saudi the course of the past 70years in order to promote Regional Security and stability. Partially in terms of building up arabias own defense capabilities and the second aspect is how we work with the saudis to promote Regional Security in places like afghanistan where we work closely together all the way through to the gulf, to syria, to be ran. These have been Core Principles that every Us Administration has pursued going all the way back to the roosevelt administration. Republican, democrat, it hasnt reallymattered. We have a stressful situation right now where we do have some significant differences and those differences reflect particularly our different views about the rights of citizens, the interaction between citizen and state. The rights particularly of women for other human rights to the liberties where this has created real tension and friction between our bilateral relationships and so the question is how do you address that . How do you balance between the partnership that we have to prpreserve for all these years against what has been this kind of fractious. In our relationship and in my own view and in the view of the Obama Administration and now the Trump Administration, we need to look at what the court us interests are in the region which are primarily stability and energy pillars. The end of the day we do need to recognize that preserving a good strong saudi u. S. Relationship is important for us to achieve our broader objectives in the region. I just wanted to add a note i got in bahrain what is out there last because we tend to be very certain of our moral rectitude as a look at Something Like the murder of mr. Khashoggi. But when i was in bahrain when i got in the next group, sunni and shia, was, hey, wait a minute, we absolutely depend for our skewed on saudi arabia. This crown prince is undertake absolute Critical Reforms that are essential to the stability of this place by the way, you guys go on having to relations with russia even though putin goes around murdering dissidents in various countries. Why are you so hung up and in danger of destroying this relationship and bring us into danger as well over one killing care when you tolerate multiple killings over there . Thats not to necessarily say thats the view you should take. I just went out for you to understand that there are different senses and different views of ways of looking at this thing. I want to turn to view his relationship with iran. I its been four years since u. S. Hostage taking and iran. Since then way that no official diplomatic relations and no embassy and iran. Our interests are represented by switzerland. While there was extensive contact during the long negotiations for the jcpoa, most communication today is done via press statements and announcements. Ron, you live and a run as a officer and also with the direct of the iraniraq office. You are one of the few who actually come to live inside the country. Can you talk a little bit about how from the perspective with such limited contact how can we manage our relations . [laughing] we get the point. Next question. [laughing] its true. We didnt look at it very superficially. As they can look at us through this very long period and there is the ability that from the iranian point, there are great splits into within iran, and there are people for whom the revolution, a key piece of the revolution is death to americas meeting the ideological friction. Soe it creates, by the way hada great time and a renter i really enjoy the people. People continue to go visit iran tell me they fight iranians far more welcoming to americans passing through than many in the arab states although our relationships are much better. But one of the problems in our relations with iran is, in iran as in america, you have a deep onvision of people as to whether you watch of relations, as to what do you ought to prove the relations, but thats the thing. So when you get in negotiations you have there as you have here i need to show that youre really doing something that works well in order to pacify the domestic critics. Of course the same situation exists here, that sets of the situation in which forde each se a successful negotiation is one in which they have to show that theyve done really well which usually means things the other side really cant afford to have you show, you have to pacify their critics. Thats not an impossible the jcpoa Nuclear Agreement showed but it is a very fraught situation in which to hold out negotiations, making it particularly fraught when you have an approach that says we will tell you what want and there then we dont need to talk to you again. Also you can ask questions about what its like to live there. The u. S. Pulled out of the jcpoa and other parties have made in all of the eu has warned they may start withdrawing from the deal. This past fall the was report that president rouhani and t President Trump with the support of the french president macron, were moving to an agreement which reportedly included lifting of the sanctions in exchange for irans agreement to remain a nonNuclear Weapons state. What do you think of the prospects of the u. S. And iran getting back to the table . Go ahead. And if you disagree come all the better. I dont think we can do it on our own. I dont believe the American Government by the iranian government have any formula whereby the two of us can get there. Its got to be what macron is trying to do but i suspect very strongly it has to be on a grander level than just france, despite its glory. The p5 1 is probably the only vehicle alone come all the principal members of the u. N. Security council and the eu in effect trying to gang up on both sides, ganged up may be the wrong term, providing cover for both sides to come to the table and Start Talking to each other because, frankly, i i dont believe that given the dynamics that ron was describing, that theres any leeway on each side to make the necessary, even cosmetic concessions that would permit us to come together and have a serious conversation. What would be worse would be coming together each site having expectations of the other and not having been met. And, frankly, without going into too much detail i think were headed for a train wreck with iran, which could be very damaging to the world economy, should that come in the gulf because what it would do to what the iranians demonstrated could do, so i think it behooves us and perhaps the iranians to try to get International Intervention make something work. Ill take a look at thehe ise with that and take a slightly more optimistic view. And that is if you look at the obama policy on iran and if you look at the trump policy on iran, what you would see are two policies that were pretty much diametrically opposed. The obama theory of the case that was affected in the iran nuclear deal, the jcpoa, was basically that if you address what was the Key International iranian behavior, and that was its pursuit of a Nuclear Weapons capability, if you put in place an agreement to addressth that, then over time i bringing iran into closer relationship with the International Community addressing the economic concerns, doing other things, you could then set up the possibility of getting the iranians to address these other issues that i mentioned earlier that were also a a broad conce, about the missiles, about interference, about for support for terrorism. The Trump Administration took basically the opposite view, which was we cant wait, were not quite a way for the iranians to come around on their own, he wont do it and, therefore, the only way to get them to move on those issues is to basically beat them with a stick until they cry uncle. Where we are right now is that we never really have w the opportunity to see whether the obama approach would work. The trump approach clearly has not worked. And what we saw with the Macron Initiative was an effort to basically begin the dialogue again and to bring the u. S. And iran together at a table where they could begin to work through some ofth these issues. I actually think that they can do that, and its very clear from both the position of donald trump himself and from what the iranians have said that both sides gingerly are interested in finding a way to get back to the table. Neither of them wants the train wreck that pat is concerned about, because both sides recognize that a train wreck kills a lot of people, including the engineers. So both sides would like to get back to the table, and what it. We are inth now is the maneuverg between these two sides to figure out who is going to be the Stronger Party when they said that at the table. But i do believe that they will sit down at a table, probably sometime before our president ial election next year. Well, optimism is free, someone might as well indulge. [laughing] but having said that, im not quite as optimistic as n jerry. I would just note two things. One is the legacy of suspicion and distrust. Its not only an american legacy. Its a huge iranian legacy going well back into they 50s when we overthrew an iranian government there. Something which they never forget. I can remember my friend talking, was one of the hostages but its been a real advocate of the two countries were together. He has a favorite store talking to an iranian who said, but you ever get have to get over that hostage stuff, you know, and he said yes, i , yes, i agree we st you have to get over most of deck. Never. In fact, from the a rainy point of view theyve had severalve initiatives of reaching out to the United States, both the First Bush Administration and later, in each case we walked away ever tried things. I do not think we well see. Its risk of english to make predictions with a type sure enough you can remember but you could see this come i think what is more likely, what im saying is there is a flinching, a recognition of what that was talked about, train wreck possibility and and i thought t having thickness also the saudis, the uae and tentative reaching out on various sites had we talk about this . How do we deconflict . I think it is, knock on wood, possible that we may avoid the ultimate stupidity of war. Because there is a recognition of just how dangerous that is. And so theres this kind of tentative reaching out looking for ways tor lower the temperaturean and deconflict bui am personally very pessimistic, particularly given the long history. Also this sense finally the iranians have a sense of we made an agreement and you walk away from it. So whats the point . You cant trust the americansns tool to an agreement they make anyway, and then of course accelerated when you look at syria and other things with this administration of, you cant even trust them to keep their own policy street. Why get into this . Im very pessimistic that you get to negotiations. Now, someday but i think it has to happen. Not in the last you before an election, i dont think. If i could just add to defend myself, i agree with your. I dont want to be pollyannaish but the one obstacle, the one obstacle to a rouhanitrump phone conversation in new york in september was a simple issue that they were not able to decide whether or not u. S. Reduction in sanctions would come before the call or after the call. But that you had agreed fundamentally to make the call. And again you are absolutely right, i dont think it will be an easy negotiation. We know it wasnt an easy negotiation 2015 either, but the reality is, whether you like it or not, w the one thing that maximum pressure has done is it has inflicted real economic pain on iran and, therefore, they have a strong incentive to try to figure out how to deal with us in a way that gets sanctions reductions. I dont think they were going to do it because they love us. I dont think they are going to do it because they really want to get back in our good books, but i think that both sides will make the decision to go back to negotiating table because both sides recognize that its in their interest to do. I prefer that you be right. Im going at one thing which is, i ran the sanctions he met the state department of the last time when we squeeze iran, we also got very, very, very, very good at sanctions. The capabilities today that we didnt have last time when they were pretty good. If i could we are very good at sanctions. The iranians stokely say they are offering graduate course on a to evade american sanctions, that they have more limited capacity to do that. We have dug ourselves, we collectively, we and the iranians both have dug a sauce into a public position. Pompeos ultimatum to the iranians resemble very much the austrian ultimatum to the serbians august 1914. It is surrender everything and then have the leadership commit suicide before we will talk to you. I dont see this administration easily backing off it, is my problem come at a dont see the iraniansia trusting as that if e have the conversation, that it will happen. I remember when we did have the first reformist iranian president khamenei in which collectively and a was and we decided that if we were nice to win it would work, and we might help the hardliners. This is partly the mindset that the iranians are working from, that they see on our side. Were going to come back here at yourr phone today and we will see who was right. [laughing] and if a year from today and i reckon we will not be able to afford the gasoline to get here. [laughing] we may have to meet in a bunker. The United States as a Strong Military presence in the region. We have troops in iraq, the fifth fleet is in bahrain, and in a sample of you have served in the gulf. Uae hosting 5000 military personnel, 10,000 in qatar on two basis, the the role of Kuwait International airport. We have announced we are sending or have sent more personal to saudi arabia and we also launched a new Maritime Security initiative in the region to protect shipping. But many of the gulf countries are increasing their own capabilities as well. How does this affect Power Dynamics in the region and our u. S. Interests . Just one quick one. Partly there are this rush to become the owners, not necessarily the users but the owners of thee biggest arsenals in the world, is meant to buttress their ability to do with the iranians, but i think even more important a it is a bit of a powerplay between the gulf states. They dont trust each other. The recent, when qatar was blockaded by its neighbors, the cadres felt i dont know how much justification but convinced themselves that the only reason this out is where i come across the border is the saudi had not wanted to telegraph intent by the board so they credit tillerson with stopping a ground attack. Saudi leaving aside the quality of military forces sipowicz on the books, saudi arabia is a much larger more powerful country than qatar and for the time being so is the uae. The qataris to the military as having two macro function can one is deterring attacks by the neighbors, long enough for the americans to get there, and secondly, dealing with the potential of a breakdown in order for example, they talk a lot about breakdown afford in saudi arabia. Their nightmare would be civil in saudi arabia something happened which is something they talk about a lot. I think the uavs buildup of military force is aimed at iran and building up of the uavs wait in the gulf cooperation council. And my experience the uae has a saying consort of dark look at saudi arabia own potential of the saudis have been chipping awayay at the border for generations. So i think a very large portion of that is p part of the jockeyg for power between the gulf states. U. S. Particularly about the military balance and how the buildup of gulf states changes that. The short answer is very little. These are fundamentally weak states. Who are very aware of the weakness, although the sound is got a little carried away. But the uae has made a real effort to expand the quality of its military to some extent i think has succeeded and shown a certain ability for power projection effectively. The saudi militaryt has shown very poorly. It went into yemen and it has really done badly. It reminded me when he went into something my father said to me years ago when the russians went, the soviets went into afghanistan that every country is entitled to the vietnam of its choice. [laughing] i think the saudis found theirs. But first of all, they are economically powerful and militarily weak, and we often tend to exaggerate and the one it exaggerate. They want a build up of supply so they dont have to use it. I remember reading once that the was a technique of writing your camels in a circle to stir up the dust so that the enemy would be frightened by the size of your force and you wouldnt have to fight them. There is some part of the still going on i think, but because look, they have enormous dependence on their desalinization facilities, on their oil refineries. These things are all extraordinary vulnerable as the iranians have just entered the ability of the societies really crippled very quickly in the war is very clear. They have a very small population. Hathey cannot have a large military. I can have a lot of equipment. They can have a certain number of mercenaries toer help them rn it but they do not have the population base to have Strong Military. And in several cases they have gotten used to foreigners doing the stuff. Theis saudi said that several military expenses including the first gulf war, and in none of them have they a shown any particular military ability. Uae is one exception which are talking less than 10 Million People in the p whole country. These are fundamentally weak states. Bottom line is they can get more powerful, to some extent for the own protection, not to the extent that we can use that as a change in our relationship. I would say that there are two critical developments over the last ten years that have driven these decisions, particularly again by saudi arabia and the uae, to build their own internal security capabilities. One was the perception, rightly or wrongly, the perception that u. S. Commitment, u. S. Interest, u. S. Willingness to carry through on our longstanding defense and security umbrella for the gulf is fading. And you can go back to the Obama Administration, you could even go back to the george w. Bush administration and see a declining level of interest and commitment to the gulf states that has played s out. The second issue is the collapse of the traditional sunni arab aleadership, particularly the internal focus that egypt has had since 20102011, the collapse of syria, iraq as part of a sunni arab world and, therefore, what you see are two things. One, the rise of the gulf states and their view that they are now responsible leadership in the sunni world, and that is exacerbated or compounded by the younger leadership, the more ambitious, aggressive leadership that we have, mohammad bin salman in saudi arabia, mohammad bin zayed in the uae and so, therefore, as a result of these two things we have seen, we have seen to developments. One is that they are no longer rely on the United States. You see that in both their turn toward more positive, more focused relations with russia, with china, but you also see it in terms of their decisions that theyre going to take on greater responsibility for their own security, their own protection than they did before. They are not going to wait for the seventh cavalry to come over the horizon anymore. They are going to take that on themselves. Now, we can talk about whether theyre good at it or not so good at it. It doesnt matter. The reality is that the decision they are making and theyre going to pursue it, and that has strong implications in terms of her own role and responsibilities in the region going forward. If i could add just one quick point to this. A number of times i have heard semiinformed american commentators say we dont need the gulf because where now an Oil Exporting Country merely reinforces this perception that goes up we will not come for it. Thats complete nonsense. Absolute nonsense, yes. I want to wrap up about putting this in a in a larger t before we getet to the question. What relevance does of the gulf region have in the broader geopolitical competition between the u. S. And china, ande betwen the u. S. And russia . Ill take a swing at china, because i dont think it has to be part of the competition. China is very, very dependent on the gulf. I forget the numbers, 60 of their energy comes from the gulf. If there is one country for home a major war in the gulf would be catastrophic to the economy, its china and i am simply speechless the chinese refusal to get involved. Chinese are simply, maybe its their whole political history in modern times. They simply dont want to get involved. They are sort of band to our sanctions, our blockade of iranianns oil exports. They are the country that has the most to lose, and they are not doing anything. I dont think they are looking for any sort of confrontation. I honestly do not believe that the chinese see themselves as the new hegemon moving into the gulf. Vladimir putin is a guy who has played we cant very, very well. Russia does not have either the economic or the military or the diplomatic capacity to really challenge the United States in the region, but he is a past master at identifying vacuums and figure out how russian can move in. And he is somebody who has a vision of russia as a great power, who believes that russia, by dint of its great power status should have a seat at the table with all of the security and political issues are debated in the middle east. So hes going to do that, but at the end of the day he really is not our competition. The competition that the u. S. Has in terms of great powers is china. China is eating our lunch, economically. They are becoming increasingly a number one economic partner for the gulf states. Thats going to continue. I agree with pat that the chinese are perfectly willing to let us take on the hard issues of security and stability in the region while they focus on building their economic relations and prospering through their relationships with the gulf states. But i think thats also changing. I dont think its an accident that the only two naval facilities that china has outside of Mainland China are and pakistan which guards the strait of hormuz, and djibouti in the horn of africa that sits on top of the battle mendez because they understand that their security and economic survival depends on access to those waterways. To the energy and also to the export markets. There are no chinas military forces there. There are in djibouti. They had the capability, nothing station but they have the capability of using qatar and military. So there are gingerly moving into some of these more aggressive positions. But youre absolutely right that what they want to do is they want us to take the headache and let them take the money. That works. I do think what you areou seeing though is overall a less stable world. Because i agree with my colleagues that the gulf states are less secure in their relationship with us here they are, looking elsewhere, particularly the russians. Thelaia problem is, and theyre looking for for the own defensd building them. These are policies which they feel they are forced to because they cant rely on the relationship they had with us. But they are not able to supplant that relationship. The russians will sell the arms but the russians will not come to their defense. Their own defense capabilities for all the equipment remain weak. So what you have is a relationship where we are not quite backing away, we have a lot of troops there still but they are unsure of us and its not very clear what we are actually prepared to do, where they are making better relationships with countries with which we are an easy, but which in the end will not solve the dilemma, and building up their arsenals but without the real capacity to deter the people they are most worried about. When you add that altogether, what you have is a less secure region and a more dangerous one. Because when you had the solid u. S. Relationship, clumsily as it might often have been, everybody kind of knew where you were. And, therefore, he didnt mess with it. Now you have one that is very shaky and in certain, and that has room for mistakes. Okay. We will now turn to questions. Ambassador, thanks for being you. My name is chad come on the first your Student Interest in international policy. Ill be giving you your first question. How do you see the increased wave of protests impacting the future of the Iranian Regime . The current ones, gasoline subsidy, removal. You know, its you want to predict the future. Its easy to predict the past. I know. This is tough. [laughing] they are posing threats. The regime is incredibly aware of the danger of these riots. You are stating the fact that their social cracks after these years of the iranian revolution. I personally doubt that ms. Period of bryant will lead to that much change this period of riot the older leaders of the revolution really learned from the revolution itself, it was how they gained strength as the shah vasily. You would this time in the revolution where the shah had put down the whole series of revolts before, but a in the revolution, he vacillated. He used force and 40 40 years r at the end of the first morning utep bigger demonstrations and then he wouldnt always. He moved back and forth. As he vacillated the demonstrations get bigger and bigger. If theres any lesson which i think the older revolutionary leaders have carried away,he its not to make the mistake of the shah. So ihe believe they will put the riots down, and they have a problem, they have a lot of force but they dont have leadership. The revolution had leadership in the wings ready to come forth and take old. I dont think they have. I think you something here that is analytically interesting entry how much satisfaction that is, whether or not after this you get something else, but i dont believe these riots themselves are going to lead to about the change. I would agree completely with that. The absenceab of, for example, a coherent or popular Iranian Revolutionary present a broad, i mean, right now the United States has chosen to support hobble be the single most hated iranian exile organization, as the substitute i mean, try to kill the people at giuliani and former general jones go off speeches. I think i saw something today which said that theyve already killed about 100 demonstrators in iran and i agree completely with ron that they are going to do whatever they need to do in order to stop these demonstrations. They have been very clear, and what you need to remember is that the methodology that the shah has used that basharir alassad is used in syria is he was taught by a range. Its the irgc that went into syria and really held helped bashar use extreme measures that is used in order to stop the syrian uprising. Iran and iraq have much more potential for political change. That wasnt the question. Okay. Thank you all again for being here. I am a junior in the for school, undergraduate program focusing and diplomacy and international study. The next question we have for is, how do you was relations with the gulf interact with u. S. Relations with israel . In particular, how would a toy and u. S. Saudi relations, for with involvement in human impact israel . Yeah, there was the theory in the Trump Administration that, because the israelis and the gulf share the same concerns about iran, that there was, therefore, an opportunity to actually push forward this idea of whats called outside in. In otherer words, you can get te gulf states to take steps to normalize the relationship with israel on this basis and open diplomatic relations to do all of the other steps, regardless of where the israelis were in negotiations with theth palestinians. I think what weve seen over these past couple off years is that that expectation, that idea was vastly exaggerated. And that while the two sides, theres no doubt that quietly under the table, israelis and gulf arabs are working much more closer together, that the gulf states are more willing to be open about the nature of some of the relationships, take on the security side, then they were in the past. T nevertheless, nevertheless, there is a cap on how far theyre going to be willing to go in absence of some Movement Towards the revolution of the palestinian issue and p particularly whats called the arab peace initiative, which is basically full normalization between israel and the arab world in exchange for a twostate solution. Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This iss the position, still the position and i think that the reality is that unless there is something that addresses palestinian requirements, you are not going to see the gulf states still be on that. If i could at one point. Id seen this movie before in s the course of my career. I can think of three historical instances when american policy beginning with the momentary cental alliance that led to the overthrow of the market and iraq, where were going to get israel and the further arab states, iraq and the gulf states, allied against the soviet union. We tried it a couple more times when i was in abu dhabi with Alexander Haig who was building, trying to build an alliance against i forget it was soviet union or iran at that point, but it was soviet union again with the gulf states. So we have done this. We have done this several times. We think that if they have no memory is always a fresh idea. Exactly. [laughing] next question for you, what of the most effective strategies for combating iranian backed groups in the g middle east, suh as hamas and the quds force and iraq . Since we havent seen one yet, its hard to know what an effective strategy will be. Can i just say very simply one sentence. Doing our best to fix the problem so you drive up the swap in which theyth dwell. In other words, iff you try to dealo with them directly, this isnt their turf. They know their turf. They know howhe to survive in tt turf. Progress on the palestinian issue, i dont even know how to deal with iraq. I couldntal even begin at the smoke to suggest how we deal with the iraqis. Its an interesting case because iranians have gotten a lot of power in iraq. Iranians are notan wellliked ad i iraq. Americans make the mistake because its a lot of she and iraq that therefore somehow very close to the arenas. Om they forget the eight years of the reign iraniraq war with thousands killed at thehe foot soldiers in iraq were mostly shia. They never changed sides, they never win over against their own government. In fact, when i served and iraq after our invasion, it was not good for you if youre an iraqi politician to be seen as too close to the iranians. Now youre giving a lot of pushback. The iranians do best in iraq when the country is unstable, because then they can work with Different Power Centers for the own interest. They have always hadth the risk that a stable iraq would be a threat to iran again, as it was all the way back to the battle in the eighth century. Its not like a new thing. We keep reminding you that things are not new. Still, right now have a hard time. I think one can say that some things, things one should not do are much clearer than exactly have to affect it. Iraqis are really tired ofir foreigners messing about in their lives and their wars, making theirir wars. Right now we just got a lot of backlash against iranian pressure, its a good time for us to kind of shut up and sit down and not to be very heavily involved. You can consult quietly with people, but youve got a very volatile politics, you got some things going in the direction we kind of like. So dont try, you know, we have a desire usually to do something. This is one of thoseme places where you are much better off right now watch it go. You may see an opportunity to do something useful but dont assume you have to do something. One quick point. Just to set at rest this question of shia iranian shia control the influence of iraq. Looking at it theological terms, not just rome and constantinople, best canterbury and maybe not even speedy that requires a certain Historical Perspective to know what youre talking about. Exactly. I hope you all understood that. [laughing] ifat i can just add, the houi experience in yemen, and i think it kind of sharpens the point that ron and pat were making, and that is that each of these instances where the iranians have been able to establish relations to work, to build alliances, relationships, is really kind of unique to that particular set of circumstances. So in the case of yemen where you have the houthis, yes, they have relationship with iran. Yes,re they have explored the relationship, and the iranians have exploited the relationship with the houthishe in order to achieve an objective that they had,ct which is to stress and pt pressure on saudi arabia. But nevertheless, the issues that are unique to the conflict thats going on in yemen now are issues that are integral to yemen. The houthis are not fighting because they are partners or proxies iran. They are fighting because of their circumstances in human. And theth best thing that we can do to the extent that we can do it is to help resolve those internal issues. If you deny the iranians the vacuum that they have been very successful in exploiting, then you can deny them the error that they need in order to develop these relationships. And thats true i think with hamas. Th its true and iraq. Its true with hezbollah in lebanon, and its absolutely true with the houthis in yemen. But you know the basic point that underlies all of these is you have to actually know something, and you have to Pay Attention to the different situations andpa the difference, and you cant do this on the basis of kind of twodimensional policy and soundbites about iran, which is the course where we carry our public discussion. Next question. So next we have a question turning towards combating terrorism. Can the Arab Coalition of states be trusted to combat terrorism in a manner that is in line with u. S. And global geopolitical interests . May be sometimes no. Mostly no. It depends on what terrorist you are talking about. You know, i think that the sounds were good partnerse as, for example, in fighting against alqaeda in the arabian peninsula. We had a lot of success. And, in fact, there was one to get instance you may or may not remember called the printer cartridge bomb attempt was in 2010, right when i got to sonata were there was an attempt to smuggle explosives on board an airplane and come in printer cartridges. We would not have known about that. We would not have caught on to that had it not been for saudi intelligence and their tipping us off and also the british off about this plot. So there a bit instances where, inac fact, they were extremely important partners for us. There are other areas where we work closely together but they also have a larger issue frankly where saudi policy has, in fact, on occasion exacerbated terrorist threats and this made it more difficult for us to deal with, libya being a good exampl example. Next question for you. Ya how does turkey andle president erdogan fit into the equation . Badly. [laughing] turkey has a lot of its own agenda. Its feeling his oats as its moved into syria. It has again, turkey has helped in certain areas. It is helped combat extreme movements. At the same time in parts of scenery you have turkey being quite cooperative movements allied with the Islamic State. The turks are worried about other things. They are far more worried about kurdish terrorism than they are worried about the Islamic State. So if helping works, they will help. But if helping gets us, fight the Islamic State gets crossword with ac stronger threat are interested will not be helpful. Turks are really feeling their oats along the expansion of the influence. This is like turkish policy 2. 0 because they had the sort of saint you right after the breakup of the soviet union, all muslim countries in central asia and they found, it was, the lift was way heavier than they had the capacity to undertake. Now they are trying some of that again and again i think they are going to find that their ambitions, their reach i think exceeds their grasp. I would add theres an internal dynamic, president erdogan came to power his first seven seven, eight years in power were sort of pentasa, best ruler and modern turkey could imagine. He really did bring an enormous difference for turkey. Someplace along the line whether its miscalculation or something, he has had problems. Themselvess reflect in election results, oakley election results. Ct they have not gone well for him, and like most guys come most leaders want to stay m in power, the occasion for adventure is not necessarily a bad thing. So during your comments towards the beginning of the session, you commented on the potential of some sort of movement or lack of attention for movement and iranian u. S. Relations. Im wondering what does the recent rise in tension between israel and iran marked by the Israeli Air Force strikes against targets in syria a couple of days ago suggest about iranian ambitions in syria and what is the risk of this turning into a a larger conflict and hw is it impacting this potential for change . This is one of those places where i dont believe that the two countries really have an existential view of the other one as a threat. I think this is a large part of this is iran trying to maintain its controls or its influence in syria, and in large part this is israeli domestic politics because its really useful to have the iranians as the bogeyman sitting out there. I think this is more of a hype inside the United States. Both countries as hype rather than let me rephrase that. I dont think either country wants to have a war with the other. There is no doubt thatt the iranians were far more invested in the survival of the shot shd his regime in damascus than the russians are. Bashar. R. Wishart is an important part of. Access to lebanon and to hezbollah through syria is incredibly important. I think for their own reasons, the iranians see the ability to expand their military partnership with hezbollah, in syria as well as in lebanon, is useful particularly inn terms of threatening israel. The israelis have responded. I think an interesting thing is that the israelis have responded extremely aggressively against iranian presence. They have gone after iranian arms dapl. Theyve gone after iranians. They have killed a number of iranians in syria. They killed a number of now in iraq. The response from tehran has been zero andnd i think that is, its one of those situations frankly where the two sides have decided that this is a game they are going to play and theyre going to keep it defined to this particular battleground and they are not going to allow it to spill out into other kinds of conflict. All right, thank you. How does the current state of u. S. Iran relations affect u. S. Diplomatic efforts in the country to irans east, afghanistan . Whats happening in afghanistan, the iranians, its useful to remember, were initially quite supportive of our intervention in afghanistan. There is a big difference between the weight thehe iranias look at iraq and afghanistan. Iraq is an a. Re threat to iran. When i was in iraq with the shah years ago, every here in westn iran the troops had annual military exercise where they exercised on the basis of iraqis invasion either ran pushing the iraqis back. Afghanistan is not a strategic threat. They get nervous about this. The iranians were very helpful in the bonn negotiations in putting government in place in afghanistan. I think id probably the last meeting, we used to meet with the iranians and afghanistan up until 2005. I had the last such meeting but then was ordered to suspend is because iran put pressure on the Nuclear Weapons. Argued with secretary rice that was a bad decision. I lost. Anyway she was the boss. She was the boss. They remained very supportive but nervous when we put troops close to the board but basically supportive. They became a little more belligerent pushing on the afghans during the time of ahmadinejad and iran, but now the kicker is, they are very concerned about two things. When is the growth of the Islamic State presence in afghanistan, and the other is the perception that we are not going to hold up our continued involvement in afghanistan. They cant, situation is going to get worse. From their point of view the greater danger between taliban and Islamic State is the Islamic State. So if that means they need to warm up the relations with the taliban in order to prepare for the expected panic departure of the u. S. And the collapse of afghanistan, thats what theyre doing. You have a definite warmingg. Of relations between the iranians of the taliban as you have between the russians and the taliban. In both cases it is premised on the two perceptions, and islamic Islamic State is a bigger threat, and you cant trust the americans to hold up their end and afghanistan, they walk out and leave chaos. I have to have friends. Okay. Thank you. Turning to humanitarian issues. How concerned should we be about the human costs of sanctions on iran for ordinary iranian civilians . How much we should be or how much are we . Should be, should be. If youre looking at it from a purely moral and ethical point of view, its a little bit like our sanctions on iraq and the leader of to the 2003 war in which we frankly took a position that the humanitarian crisis that we created in iraq was the fall of Saddam Hussein and we tried to sell that domestically. I dont think we ever manage to sell it. If we try to sell the same story and iran, i dont think it will be sold. We have caused there was always been a bit of humanitarian crisis. We have exacerbated, aggravated the humanitarian crisis and iran, and with a few exceptions i think the iranian government will do a remarkably good job of convincing the iranian people that it isil the americans faul. Thats a really important point because, one, the official u. S. Position is that we are not interested in punishing the iranian people. We are interested in puttingng pressure on the regime. But the reality is is exactly the opposite, that, in fact, the weight of u. S. Sanctions is falling on the common people. As ron said earlier, and my wife is in the tourism business, up until, we got married a few years ago, she is to lead tours to iran. I told her. To stop, but she usd to lead tours and she said that the americans on her tours were always amazed about the warp of the reception that they got. The fact that the common iranian people like americans and they like america, and they felt as though if it were not for the political differences that they would be able to have a Good Relationship with us. The risk that we write is where changing the perception and that we are building opposition, holding anger against the United States among the iranian population. Thats going to do two things. One is its going to strengthen the regime. Because it means as pat said, the regime could say its not us, we are not the reason that the economy is collapsing. Were not the reason that things, that your life is so difficult tickets because of those americans. The second thing is that when the day comes, and it will come, that we would like to normalize a relationship with iran, that we would like to get back to business with iran, that is going to be Popular Resistance within iran to doing that. Thats going to make it much harder to achieve our objectives. Let me add a comment on sanctions. Sanctions are in an effective tool if you outline clearly the behavior that you want to change. Invi the current, long list of sanctions on iran, and im not an expert on iran, there is no desired behavior that is enunciated. In other words, we do have a clear policy what we want to do other than denuclearize generally. Again, if you outline what you want to have those in behavior. Let me add another point. In fine tuning, we are able to allow exceptions and allow certain things to go through, et cetera. But the intent is really for the behavior of the state to change. The Trump Administration as i just said has not enunciated exactly what it wants to achieve. So the pressure is felt. Politically it is played up domestically, and the longer theyey run, the harder they hit. Actually, i would take the same point and take it further, because the deepest lack of clarity, andnd this has been tre for several administrations, not just for this one, america, is whether policy is not change in behavior or about regime overthrow. As long as and we send mixed signals. As long as the believe theres a possibility that what our policy is really about is regime change, then theres no reason to make the concessions necessary. Because you are just weakening yourself in order, youre setting yourself up for the next round. So concessions which we say we want, sanctions on behavior, it really only makes sense even if you wanted to at that agreement, if you believe in what the americans thats what the americans really about. Its not about a sea change. Way we talk about this means, lead to very uncertain what the policy is a what the policy will be two more. Some sanctions are very targeted. When we sanctioned, for example, some russians in the context of cyber, its very targeted, like stop hitting us here we will sanction and then we will have more offensive ways than cybercom. Any other questions . Last question. Is between this and cocktail time. [laughing] whats your advice on a a students interested in middle east diplomacy and best prepare to succeed . All right, gentlemen. With all your years of wisdom. Ill try the first one, which is succeed at what you doing right now. Come out of here, do well in school, do well, and then just get to know as much as you can about the middle east. There is no magic formula that simply a welleducated person who is educated himself on the region, who has a real interest, not just academic but you need to start developing a real interest in the area like all three of us got stuck with. Thats the best way. Did you choose it or stumble into it . I i stumbled. Also my life i stumbled into things and the stumbled into this. This one i chose. I had three and half a halfs after graduate school before joining the military and went out to visit my parents in afghanistan. That was really where i began to develop a strong interest in the muslim world. Youll never be fully expert. You have to recognize what a colleague told me. She said you will never understand this country is clearly as on the day you arrive. You think you have a perception. You get into the details. You learn more and more. It gets harder and harder to make simple judgments. Recognize this is a lifetime business. It means understand that what you come out here with is a basis on which to go forth and learn. It is not a basis of knowledge sufficient to already proclaimed how things ought to be. Prepare your self. These are countries that have an enormous sense of history. This is often an impediment to them. You need to understand the history. You need to understand where people are coming from. Then you learn to listen. My old boss who was very involved, really had an understanding that this was a logical dimension, he had a saying which was listen deeply y enough to be changed by what you hear. Enormous important point of scholarship and diplomacy. If you want to get other people to do it your way and like it, you have to do it their way. As well as the history and knowledge. Learning to listen. Spend a lot of time listening. A good thing to learn. Very early on i had to make a choice. I realize if i was going to study either these languages i would spend the next 1520 years of my life in that world. [laughter]ge i want to thank you, gentlemen. Thank you to the audience. [applause] our wiser Diplomacy Center launch. Please, one more of thanks for the American Academy of diplomacy. A look at Nuclear Security with assistant secretary of state christopher ford. You can log live coverage at 2 00 oclock eastern on cspan two. A look at the role china plays in the asia pacific region. Also at 2 00 oclock eastern. 3 00 oclock eastern, Energy Secretary secretary nominee later in the afternoon. The senate will also continue work on a number of judicial nominations. You can follow the senate live here on cspan two. Tonight on the communicators. The chair of board of directors and ceo of consolidated communications. Miles of fiber optic cable. Where exactly is that cable . It is everywhere. I mentioned those 23 states. Its typically outside of the urban markets. The largest towns that we are really in the downtown area are places like portland maine. Those are the places where we have networks in every street. Every neighborhood. Connecting directly to the customers. Watch a communicators tonight on cspan two. Our team traveling across the country asking what they should address. It has gotten so out of it feels like it doesnt matter. Sometimes it really doesnt. I really wish they would focus more on that. President ial candidate. They have basically so much control over the land in this country. Big real estate executive who are able to buy the land. I think we need more Community Control of things. A long history of being a force. I would really like to see the candidates focus more on the corruption in our system. A constitutional amendment. Citizens united. Different Solutions Regarding the corruption of politics. Money runs through d. C. Restoring our democracy. I want the candidates to focus more on Foreign Policy. Cutting back the military. Military industrial complex. I really think that is something that would fit our region. Forced into the military and they never come back home. I also think we need to cut spending in the military. We are at almost a trillion dollars a year. I also think it would help the emigration prices. We need to stop the act 70s of overthrowing. Replacing them as rightwing dictators. Voices from the road on cspan. President trump spoke to

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