Nuclear issue still stuck in a stalemate. An optimistic prevail for some time after the collapse of socialism and during the post cold war period. But the stability of the world is now being seriously challenged. We have gathered here today in an effort to pull the business wisdom that would lead to peace and the world at large, including northeast asia and the Korean Peninsula. For starters, we hope the rivalry and conflict between the two superpowers, the United States and china will get resolved. The clash between these two powers by trade and customs conflicts, has spread to the fields of i. T. , military and diplomacy and is now working up to a competition to control Global Standards and global supremacy. Needless to say, this is very troubling and some have already cast a pessimistic outlook, saying that will follow the germany rivalry. But if you close your eyes and take a long good look back on history, you will gain a valuable insight that the United States and china have together played a role in preventing war and Armed Conflict in the Asia Pacific Region since they forged diplomatic relations. The era of the u. S. And china is completely different from the era of u. S. Japan and u. S. Russia rivalry, which resulted in multiple wars, big and small. The coexistence and operations between the two parties over the last 40 years have been the engine that prompted the collapse of socialism and dissolution of the cold war and made it possibly to realize prosperity and peace. Thats why i dare say, rather than focusing on their issues of contention, the United States and china should take on a broader perspective and Pay Attention to the history of the u. S. China cooperation. In fact, since modern times, there has not been any history of war or confrontation between the two nations. Their bilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region was the strongest in defeating japan and the communist tote totalitarianism and it can only be achieved through farsighted cooperation rather than confrontation, todays clash of interest can be easily overcome. Conflicts within northeast asia are also troubling. Although northeast asia boasts the worlds highest level of economic power, exchanges in cooperation in the areas of trade and tourism, conflicts over issues such as nationalism, history, territory and security have deteriorated to a dangerous point. The players in this region are running in opposite directions. In the areas of trade, economy, security and peace. So much so that it has reached a state of dysfunction or what some have called the northeast asia paradox. Along these troubling issues, the recent disputes over history and the economy between korea and japan is most regrettable. However, it is not impossible to adhere to the universal Guiding Principles in dealing with human rights issues, stemming from japans post colonel rule in korea and trade liberal to resolve the ongoing economic disputes. Ladies and gentlemen, what has been the most Important Pillar of prosperity and peace in northeast asia over the last 50 years, i believe it was the cooperation between korea and japan. The only two countries in northeast asia that are respected and stayed faithful to the values of the market economy and liberal democracy. This cooperation has also contributed significantly to the development and prosperity of two nations. Those two countries should bear in mind that the ongoing conflict will adversely affect peace and the Korean Peninsula and japan and throughout northeast asia. Korea and japan should come up immediately with a plan to resolve the issues and restore dialog between their governments. In particular, to foster a summit between president moon jaein and Prime Minister shin jae abe. While supporting universal human rights and free trade. The role of the United States is very important here. The United States must take proactive steps to bring forth regional stability and to continue and strengthen trilateral Cooperation Among korea, the u. S. And japan. With that, i strongly urged the u. S. Play a fair and appropriate role to prevent the situation from taking a turn for the worse. Ladies and gentlemen, lastly, i would like to touch upon a subject which our survival depends on, peace on the Korean Peninsula. As you will agree, the most serious threat to peace on the peninsula is the north Korean Nuclear issue. The decisive factor in resolving the Nuclear Issue and achieving piece on the nuclear peninsula is the alliance between korea and the United States. Conflict between korea and the United States should not exist in the first place as most powerfully undermines peace on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, negotiations and defense cost sharing, the transition of wartime operational control, joint military exercises. The strengthening of koreas military and Security Posture against north korea Nuclear Issue and korea and japan agreement should be discussed with close consultation between washington. Thats the only way to reach concrete and comprehensive agreements, as well as s substantial progress. We must not lose sight of the perspective, to further strengthen our alliance. Ladies and gentlemen, the trilateral Cooperation Among president moon jaein, President Trump and north Korean Leader kim jongun in addressing north koreas Nuclear Issue is a special lineup we may never see again. The three leaders should make their best efforts for dialog. Close consultation along the three leaders over the past two years led to the first ever u. S. North korea summit and transformed a dangerous situation that could spiral into war to regular dialog. It was a series of remarkable and dramatic moments that took the world by surprise. However, the current phase of repeated talks and deadlocks must end and we must now head towards achieving results in north koreas denuclearization. We look forward to a Bold Decision by north Korean Leader kim jongun, who places great importance on Economic Development. Theres no time for hesitation. I hope chairman kim realizes as soon as possible, the Nuclear Armament and Economic Development cannot go hand in hand. He must realize that sanctions against his country are Strong International agreements which even his countrys traditional supporters, china, and russia, are participating in. It is also important to have a program to guarantee the north korean regime, ease sanctions and improve u. S. And north korean in alliance with the programs in the process of denuclearization. Theres one thing to keep in mind. In any case, u. S. North korea dialog should not proceed at the expense of weakening the south koreau. S. Alliance or enter chretien korean relations. And south korea should never be left out. The korea and u. S. Government must clearly be on the same page on this matter. Chairman kim jongun must restore suspended intercreep talks for the sake of dialog with the United States and peace through the denuclearization. Needs to be aware that the negotiations with the u. S. Will not be able to achieve any progress without south koreas participation. North kore north korean must put an end to the slander of the south Korean Leader and government. Its my belief that improvements and interkorean koorngs cooperation and denuclearization will be the prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Ladies and gentlemen, cooperation between the u. S. And china, as well as korea and japan and denuclearization of north korea, improvement in u. S. And north korea negotiations, to bring peace to the world and northeast asia and the Korean Peninsula. With our leaders and some determination, and a breakthrough in the current situation, i sincerely hope that all five countries, that is south korea, north korea, the u. S. , china and japan will be the vanguards of peace in the world. Thank you for listening. [applaus [applause] good morning, everybody. My name is john hammery. I want to welcome you, but first thank you for the strong and courageous speech. I mean, thats my american friends will not have unstood the strength and importance of what he said. So, go back and take a read at it again. A very important quote he shared with us today. Were very proud to welcome all of you. This is, i think, our 10th joint csis conference. We normally do these in seoul, but this time we thought it was timely to be in washington and i guess, i think all of the cameras here are probably evidence of that. Were very grateful that you could all be here. My role today is limited. Let me first say i want to say thank you to our ambassadors here, Kathy Stevens and mark l lipter and sandy so ably served as ambassador, grateful to have you here. Were very, very fortunate that john bolton is going to initiate this conference. You know, many times keynote speakers are rather ornamental. Thats not the case today. Hes going to be give us a deep and substantive discussion and victor chile is going to engage him in a q a that will bring out more of the content of his intellect as hes been thinking about these issues. He has a remarkable career having of course been the National Security advisor, ambassador the u. N. , undersecretary. A long and very distinguished career. If you were to give a label, however, to him, youd have to say hes an energetic patriot. This is a man who believes strongly in the fundamental civic values of american democracy and hes spent his entire career championing there. Were going to hear some of that today as he helps us think through one of the most challenging questions that we have to now face. I would ask you for your warm and sincere applause, welcome to the stage the honorable john bolton. [applaus [applause] well, thank you very much, john. I appreciate the kind words of introduction and i want to thank center for Strategic International studies and the host of todays forum for their invitation to speak. I think this is the 9th or 10th such forum and its a great opportunity, very timely, to discuss a lot of critical issues. And i also want to congratulate csis and john and victor cha for this is also the 10th anniversary of the korea chair at csis. And so, it marks a decade of contributions that the chairs nonpartisan objective research has made to the Public Policy debate on korean issues that are so important to the American People and to the korean people. Its really been a significant accomplishment for victor and john and all of csis. I am delighted to be here today. Im also sure the leadership of north korea is delighted im here today in a private capacity. At least thats what ive read. Perhaps theyll be a little less delighted now that i can speak in unvarnished terms about the grave and growing threat that the north Korea NuclearWeapons Program poses to National Security. Lets start with what i think are the main precepts of dealing with the north Korean Nuclear threats are. First, it remains unacceptable for north korea to have deliverable nuclear welcomes. By the word unacceptable, i dont mean some rhetorical flourish by a politician. I mean that our policy should be that we do not accept it. We will not accept it. Second, it seems to me clear that the dprk has not made a strategic decision to give up its Nuclear Weapons. In fact, i think the contrary is true. I think the strategic decision that kim jongun is operating through is that he will do whatever he can to keep a deliverable Nuclear Weapons capability and to develop and enhance it further. He may try to get relief from international sanctions. He may make some concessions. But under current circumstances, he will never give up the Nuclear Weapons voluntarily. Now, this is, if you will permit a personal observation, this question of whether theres a strategic decision to give up Nuclear Weapons is what the libyan model, 2003 and 2004, properly understood actually means. At that period, we saw Moammar Gadhafi make an unambiguous decision that he and libya would be better off without developing Nuclear Weapons. He came to that decision for a variety of reasons, because of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by u. S. Led coalition. The subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein and the ship, with the uranium rich components manufactured by the a 2 con proliferation network, that told him that we knew what he was up to and at that point he made the clear decision that he was going to give up Nuclear Weapons. We have seen not only nothing like that from north korea, as i say, we have seen the opposite and i think its important to understand that the current north korea moratorium on testing of Nuclear Weapons and testing of icbm intercontinental range Ballistic Missiles, tells us nothing about either north koreas intention or its strategy as its playing out. One reason, one very good, very troubling reason theres no more testing of Nuclear Weapons for the moment or of long range missiles is that north korea in its judgment finished testing and can produce Nuclear Warheads and long range ballistics missiles. Thats not an encouraging sign, thats a sign to be worried about. Moreover, the testing of shorter range Ballistic Missiles that weve seen in recent months doesnt give us any reason to think that those are not threatening because the capabilities, the technology, things like maneuverability of close range or short range Ballistic Missiles by definition can be adopted to longer range Ballistic Missiles, so that indeed, the testing going on now is not unthreatening unless you happen to be in south korea within range of these missiles, but those for the defensive capability of japan and even the United States when you get to the intercontinental range. Now, in the past we have been very clear what our expectations were of north korea, both with respect to Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile tests. If you look back to u. N. Security Council Resolution 1695, adapted on july the 25th, 2006, and security Council Resolution 1718, adopted on october the 14th, 2006, after the in the first instance, 1695 after north korea broke its moratorium on launch testing of Ballistic Missiles from the Korean Peninsula and for 1718 after that Nuclear Weapons test, the United States and the security counsel were very clear in their response. I know this because i helped write both of those resolutions. 1695 dealt only with missiles, 1718 dealt with both and ill quote from 1718 just to remind everybody how clear it was. In operative paragraph 2, the unanimous security counsel said and i quote, demands that the dprk not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a Ballistic Missile. And in operative paragraph 5, the council said that it decides that the dprk shall suspend all activities related to its Ballistic Missile program and in this context reestablish its preexisting commitment to a moratorium on missile launching. North korea today as we speak is violating those resolutions. Now, i say this not because of a theological commitment to u. N. Security Council Resolutions. I say it because when the United States, having led the fight to get those resolutions, says we really dont care, other countries can draw the conclusion that they dont really care about the sanctions contained in those and other resolutions. So when you ask for consistent behavior from others, you have to demonstrate it yourself. And when we fail to do that, we open ourselves and our policy to failure. Now, remember, also, what it is that caused the concern in 2006 when north korea broke this moratorium. In 1998 north korea for the first time launched a Ballistic Missile that landed in the Pacific Ocean east of japan, which needless to say got the attention of people in that country. And the moratorium was intended to signify that north korea was behaving in a more responsible fashion, yet the only thing they gave up was launch testing. Static testing continued. A very important part of missile development. And all of the evidence we have in the Public Domain is that north korea has simply shifted its interesting on launch testing to cooperation with iran, which was also developing scud base Missile Technology to create Delivery Systems for Nuclear Weapons. So that the 1998 launch done by north korea and the subsequent enhancement of cooperation with iran was actually a clear demonstration, not of responsible behavior, but of the continued aspiration to have deliverable Nuclear Weapons. So i think right now we are in a classic standoff with north korea. They want a piece of something that we should not be prepared to give them. People will say, but what can be heard hurt . What can be lost, why not partial agreements . Why not look for some indication of something that north korea can do that will allow us to alleviate the sanctions . There are several points important to understand here, if you believe and you may not, if you believe it is unacceptable for north korea to have Nuclear Weapons. First for the wouldbe proliferator, a partial lifting of sanctions is far more important than it is to the opponent of proliferation to have a partial cessation of a north korea Weapons Program. The history, whether its with respect to north korea or iran is very clear that the economic kick to the proliferator, getting economic benefits and relief from sanctions is far more beneficial than a marginal reduction in the Nuclear Weapons effort. So from the perspective of the p p proliferant country, they have the benefit of the bulk of their Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Programs. And theres a world out there thats ready to fall sucker to that kind of argument. Even now we see governments, particularly south korea, watching north korea test missiles and providing food aid because north korea say their harvests have been bad and not so difficult that they cant launch missiles, but too difficult to buy food for their people. There are those who succumb to that argument. This is something that we can apply this lesson both to iran and theres a second element as well. Theres time, time for a Nuclear Weapons sake is not a neutral factor. In fact, the more time that goes by, almost inevitably benefits the proliferant. Because it takes time to overcome the scientific and economic difficulties in a Nuclear Weapons program. We can say were in no rush of negotiations, were in no rush, take your time, were telling iran and north korea, youve got more time to test and produce these capabilities. Time works against those who oppose Nuclear Proliferation and a relaxed attitude to time is a benefit to the likes of north korea and iran. And then finally, and this applies to the circumstances on the north Korean Peninsula. For about a year and a half, the United States and south korea have not had what some called war games. We have not had large scale military training exercises. Now, ill leave it to the pentagon to describe exactly what we have been doing, but i think youre all familiar with what im talking about. It is inevitable that when exercises are not taking place, readiness can come into question. And a failure to be militarily prepared results in a weakening of structures of deterrents. Now, im not going to make any assertions here today about the level of american and south korean readiness on the peninsula, but some day, whether from the department of defense or from congressional investigation, we are going to hear judgments on what military readiness is. And i think that this is something that should be a priority both for americans and for South Koreans. Now, there are other issues here that i dont think are currently adequately addressed in the public debate. Not only should we be concerned with north koreas own weapons technology, but to the ongoing danger that north korea will sell Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile technology or actual missiles and weapons themselves to other aspiring proliferant states. Thats for north korea, whether north korea is an immediate threat in its region. Now, i also believe that theres only one country in the world that can stop Nuclear Proliferation. And were in it. We can use help, thats for sure, but if the United States fails in this mission, there is no other state or combination of states, and no International Organization that can be a substitute. If we fail, Nuclear Proliferation succeeds. Now, let me just read to you a quotation from winston churchill. Its a very pessimistic statement that he made to parliament in 1935. But i think it applies to american policy over Something Like 30 years when it comes to north korea. Churchill said, describing germany, of course, he said when the situation was manageable, it was neglected. And now that its thoroughly out of hand, we applied too late the remedies which then might have affected a cure. Theres nothing new in this story. It is as old as the civilian books with. It falls into the long dismal catalog of a fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind. Once foresight, unwillingness to act when acting would be simple and effective. Lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until emergency comes, until selfpreservation strikes its jarring gong, these are the features which constitute the endless reputation of history. Now, lets hope that churchills pessimism is not born out in the case of north korea. There are things we should look to and have serious discussions about. One is the possibility, limited though it may be, of regime change in north korea. Second, we should look at and discuss with china and we should have done it long ago, aiming towards the reunification of the peninsula under a freely elected government like that in south korea. And third, if you believe, and you may not, that it is unacceptable for north korea to have Nuclear Weapons, at some Point Military force has to be an option. Now, this is, obviously, the most controversial subject and many people say, its just unimaginable. Unimaginable that you would use military force. So let me quote to you the words of general joe dunford chairman of the joint chiefs of staff on his last day as chairman. Hes done an outstanding job. He said this to the Aspen Institute seminar in the summer of 2018. On this question of whats unimaginable. General dunford said, as ive told my counterparts, both friend and foe, it is not unimaginable to have military options to respond to north Koreas Nuclear capabilities. What is unimaginable to me is allowing the capability to allow Nuclear Weapons to land in denver, colorado. My job will be to develop military options to make sure that doesnt happen. I think general dunford was completely correct. Now, if you dont like those options, there are others, too that ensue when north korea keeps nuclear welcomes. The dprk could become the new aq con, the walmart or the amazon of deliverable Nuclear Weapons. Or you could have more Nuclear Weapons states in asia, like japan, like south korea. So these are questions that need to focus our attention, not can we get another summit with kim jongun or what the state of staff level negotiations are to achieve a commitment from north korea it will never honor. Now, before i close, i want to take one minute on the subject of u. S. Japansouth korea relations. This is also not a happy subject for discussion of the moment. Its well below the radar screen here in the United States, which is a big mistake for our country and not paying more attention to it. I am almost without words to describe how distressed i am that these tensions between south korea and japan have grown to the point where they currently are. I believe that over the past period of time that american passivity on this point has been a mistake. Im not saying that the United States should engage in public mediati mediation between the two countries. I think that Public Participation would be a mistake. And not underestimating how serious the issues between south korea and japan are. Ive heard at length from both side and i think i under soon well both their logic and their emotions. But i think if the United States does not operate here, we face a very serious deterioration of Alliance Capabilities at precisely the wrong time. We see at this point that the hub and spoke system of alliances that weve had in the Asia Pacific Region is in need of modification toward a richer, deeper cluster of relations. Weve seen efforts to trilaterals with the u. S. , japan and australia. U. S. , japan and india. These are all signs of progress so to see south korea and japan moving in effect in the opposite direction from the u. S. Point of view is extraordinarily troubling. This is something that, if the other disputes that have ensued in the past few months hadnt made clear, the south korean decision to suspend the general security of military information agreement has really now brought to an acute point because this has a palpable impact on american ability to coordinate among our various allies. I put this down as something that requires urgent attention by the United States. Now, all of these concerns and everything we can say about chinas growing international threat, militarily, politically and economically point to significant risks and dangers in and around korea. I think there should be better burden sharing on issues like military base costs, as were now discussing analogously in the nato context, but this is not the time for u. S. Disengagement or withdrawal. It is a time for more u. S. Involvement and leadership. On the Korean Peninsula, in asia, and worldwide, more, not yesment thank you very much. [applaus [applause] thank you, ambassador bolten, that was wonderful, wonderful remarks on the creation more broadly in policies in asia. Im vice dean at Georgetown University and i want to welcome everybody to the csis forum. I hope you all stay with us. I know ambassador bolten is the main attraction, but i hope youll stay with us because we have a great day planned including keynote addresses. And my role here is to facilitate a conversation with ambassador bolten based on his remarks, as well as asking some questions from the audience which weve collected in advance. So, you know, my challenge that youve answered almost all of the questions already that i had in mind, but let me begin where you left off which is the japankorea relationship and i guess the question i would have for you initially is, i mean, what specifically should we be doing then . What should the should we be proposing some sort of solution, as you know, for the koreans this whole question, at least immediately about the white list and for japan its being the termination of the agreement. Is there anything specifically you would propose on this . And also, as dysfunctional as this relationship has become, who is benefitting from that . Well, i think actually the answer to the last question is the easiest. I think that china and russia are benefitting from this split and its something they can only take delight in, that this effort to try to weave together a more effective south korean, japanese, american presence in the region and bringing others in, a free and open indopacific, for example, has been a major step forward under american policy under this administration. Its all thrown in severe jeopardy by the split. And part of the problem and the dispute is that its asymmetric. From the south korean side, at least in some parts of the political spectrum, the origin of the split is the perceived unfairness in the 1965 treaty that at least at the time, both sides saw as turning a page in history to say, okay, whatever japan did before in 19951945 period were going to resolve and thats finished. Thats now been called into question, which obviously causes deep uncertainty about the future relations in japan. And i might say, it ought to cause everybody here to understand that that puts deep uncertainty into any possible japanese involvement in Economic Development in north korea, if and when there were ever successful nuclear deal. Because if anybody thinks the japanese are going to open their checkbook to north korea after they thought they had solved at that problem with south korea and saw it unstuck, its not going to happen. That is a very broad and difficult historical issue to talk about in both countries. Japan responded with economic retaliations that i think took south korea by surprise. I think it unnerved south korea. I dont think they understood the risk they had taken when they challenged the 1965 treaty. And it terminated with the suspension. And the best i can say, theyve hit a plateau and things are not deteriorating further. And at this point im not sure that the discussions that are going on have any the bilateral discussions have any prospect of reversing the conflict as it now standsment stands. I think theres an awful lot of work to do to get this back on track and im not sure at this point i would know where to begin and thats something people should be thinking about because the longer the split goes on, that i can say, weakens all three of us further. Thanks. The very last line of your speech you said this is not a time for u. S. Disengagement from asia. Do you spends that were disengaging from asia . Well, i think theres a risk of it. I dont want to make this a partisan comment, ill just say in our two great political parties, one of them has a ve very National Security wing. You dont hear about the Scoop Jackson democrats or the Joe Lieberman democrats. Within the Republican Party theres also been a residual isolationist component. I would have to be it pains me to say this, but i would have to say that the strength of that component has been rising recently and the notion that you could have both major parties with a withdrawn sense of american involvement in the world other than more slavish devotion to what the u. N. General assembly does, i find very troubling. You mentioned in your remarks about exercising in readiness. We are in a period now where the u. S. And south korea have greatly modified or moderated the level of exercising were doing on the peninsula. You mentioned it could eventually hurt readiness, maybe its not happening today, but eventually it will hurt readiness. I guess the question there is more broadly speaking, do you think that its a bad policy to be negotiating equities in our alliance for something that i assume you think is not achievable, which is at least the strategic decision by north korea to pursue denuclearization . Well, i think the u. S. And its allies should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. I think its hard for the United States in particular not to let north korea do as it tries repeatedly to do to drive a wedge between us and north korea. Sometimes its easier for them to do and sometimes harder for them to do. I think it would be better to have an adult conversation on burden sharing subjects simultaneously with an adult conversation on what we really think kim jongun is going to do. And this is a question, obviously, that divides the body politic, and well see what happens in the next several months. On the readiness point, im not making any judgments here myself, but i do think that authoritative voices on this need to be heard and people need to decide, if youre not going to be ready to fight, the slogan for korea is fight tonight. Thats the only slogan that they and the South Koreans can have given the nature of the threat. If theyre not ready to fight tonight, i have to ask for the safety of the americans whether they should be there or not. And thats why theres question of the effect of the dim mugs, the exercise, the effect on military at this it readiness seems to require study. When you were with the last administration, i remember you were quite involved in the creation of the first sort of smart sanctions campaign against north korea. I think back then we called it defensive measures. You were also involved in the creation of psi, proliferation security initiative. Im curious, when you came back into government this time and you saw the portfolio of the u. N. Security Council Resolutions on north korea, its very different from back then when we had basically two, 1695 and 1718. So my first question is, do you feel like the current sanctions regime against north korea is more robust than it was when were you last in government and is that something that the United States should give up and negotiate away or is this something that we should hold onto . Yeah, i think since those two initial resolutions, each time north korea has detonated a Nuclear Device or done some other form of testing or taken some other unacceptable action. More sanctions have been imposed. I dont think, frankly, even the way we did it in 1695 and 1718 was right. I think when you impose sanctions incrementally over a long period of time, the country being sanctioned finds way to mitigate against the sanctions. I think that iran was expert at that as was north korea. I think the sanctions would have been in place massively and then enforced and thats something that we should learn going forward. We now have a body of security Council Resolutions and statutes that make up this web of sanctions. The issues today is are they being enforced effectively . The same question you can ask with respect to iran. The answer is theyre not being enforced effectively. Weve seen the development of something that im sure occurred in the past, but which was never much the subject of conversation. We now call ship to ship transfers. Ships come out of nuclear, they transfer them on others. And they come in and take them into part. The ship to ship transports same thing occurring with iran, around the middle east, take place at sea. They take place sometimes without our knowing about it because our intelligence capabilities are not 100 perfect and its a way to evade sanctions thats very troubling. Now, i think there are steps we can and should take to release these shiptoship transfers. I think in some cases it requires greater cooperation from china and russia, when the shiptoship takes place in tear for territorial waters. If youre going to have sanctions, make them, if not have a different policy. You were talking about youre restricted have talking about things in government. Selfimposed. And some questions that dont touch specifically on it, but more generally. So when you were when the u. S. Leader and the north korea leader met in hanoi, that was about ten months into your job as National Security advisor. Who is counting. Who is counting. [laughter] you have years of experience as you made clear in your remarks. I guess the question i asked you is, you know, was the problem in hanoi that the north koreans were not giving enough or that they wanted the United States to give too much . Well, i can only speak from my personal point of view having volumed this issue for 30 years. I dont think the north koreans will ever voluntarily give up enough because what what they have to give up to me is the entire Nuclear Structure and agree to an Inspection System thats so robust and so thorough, they could well think it threatens the stability of their regime. I dont want fake inspections. Weve got plenty of those around the world as it is now. We need real verification of any agreement given the untrustworthiness of the north korean regime since its inception. This is a government thats essentially violated every agreement, every international vehement its ever made. There is no basis to trust any commitment that that regime makes. Absent some fundamental change inside the north korean system itself. And do you think so you mentioned the libyan modelling. Do you think that the libya model is possible with a country bike north korea thats advanced so far if terms of its program now . I mean, libyas case, they had not searched an Operational Capability or come close to it. So the question i guess when you raised the libya model. It may have been feasible for north is it still feasible today . Its feasible if they can conclude theyre better off and safer without this program. If you believe that north korea has undertaken the development of Nuclear Weapons not simply for defensive purposes, but because they still believe the north korean theology that theyll be reunited under their rule. Theres a good reason for them to have the capabilities. If thats the conclusion, then you have to look to other methods to do it and it may be that the policy is not, but almost worse in a way. Pre sending to get to the resolution of the issues when you still allow it and given through economic provision or resources or through the release of sanctions that gives the regime a lifeline it currently doesnt have. In theory, youre not against incentives under the right circumstances . Yeah, we gave libya plenty of these after they allowed personnel to come in and dismantle the Nuclear Weapons program which was limited as you rightly say. Dismantle it and put it on ships and planes and take it to tennessee where the Nuclear Program resides and by the way, plenty of room for the north Korea Nuclear program. Theres space there. Sure is. Is socalled bromance diplomacy the best way to get to that point . Im not going to comment on that. Nice try. [laughter] okay. Before i go to the questions that we collected from the audience, so youve met kim jongun. Whats he like . Id put it this way, i believe he is thoroughly in charge of the country. I have no doubt, i know when his father died and there were a lot of questions is he sort of a puppet of his relations, is he controlled by the military, is he controlled by other factions within north korea. I think its clear hes in charge. I think its clear he makes the decisions. And i think he feels very comfortable in that role. Okay. So in the remaining time we do have some questions weve collected from the audience just in advance in terms of efficiency of time we asked all of you by email for some questions and we have some. The first comes from our cohost and the question is about i guess i better answer those. You mentioned burden sharing in your remarks and the United States asked korea reportedly to pay 5 Million Dollars in the agreement, and you were asked, i guess, to deliver that news. What do you think is going to happen if the South Koreans cant meet that number. Let me answer in a more general fashion and this is a usual that i think has real rest shans in the United States. I think there is a feeling that weve carried more of the burden than we should have for too long and rebalancing particularly what the Financial Measures should be is overdue. We have done this before and i recall vividly in 1990, 1991 during the First Bush Administration when Saddam Hussein invaded kuwait and the United States first, through Desert Shield and then through desert storm pushed the iraqis out of kuwait, liberated the country and we moved on from there. President bush 41 decided at a very early stage that the kuwaitis were going to pay a very substantial part of the liberation of their country. They werent going to live in fine hotels in london and not their sum share of that cost and others as well. Not just countries in the region, but countries in japan, europe, and others. And senior american officials, the vicepresident , secretary of state jim bakker, secretary of defense, dick cheney were sent around the world to raise money to pay for the liberation of kuwait. Now, if i remember, they felt a little embarrassed by it. Its sort of hard to say, 0 being, japan, your share is however many billion it was. They called it the tin cup exercise because as i say they were a little embarrassed by it, but i think the record, the historical record revealed that we made a profit on the first gulf war, a small profit. We had our costs reimbursed. Some people would say, well, thats just mercenary. Well, i suppose, i suppose it is, but kuwait is a free country today. And saudi arabia was not invaded. I mient point is that it not it does not. Its not inprep to ask for people to pay a fair share of the costs and in particular now, were having a debate in the nato context over appropriate allegation of defense expenditures. And here is really its very interesting. In 2014 in the prior in the Obama Administration the nato countries voluntarily agreed that their target tore defense expenditures would be 2 of gdp and often commit to people by 2024, ten years later. When the Trump Administration came in, that commitment achieved a much higher sale in the Obama Administration. I think all would agree on that. The nato secretarygeneral reported as a result of the pressure thats been applied, a aggregate from january 2017 forward have increased over 100 billion dollar. Thats ex the United States. Thats significant, some countries arent at 2 and have no bath to get to it in 2014. Implicitly if we are allowing nato members not to live up to that commitment, while were spending over 4 of our gdp on global defense, we are subsidizing european welfare systems. Thats a very hard case to make to the American People. All were saying to others is, if you believe in your own selfdefense, live up to the commitment you voluntarily made. I remember one european leader at the nato summit in 2018 said, well, we were trying to move up to get closer to 2 of gdp, but our economy is growing so far that its harder to get there because 2 is a higher nominal currency figure. And so youve got to get some slack. A statement that were doing so well economically we cant afford to defend our severals. Its not acceptable. Its not acceptable. And a negotiation, an opening bid is an opening bid, see what happens, but dont think its business as usual. The next question from Lindsey Lloyd at the george w. Bush institute. He asks, to your knowledge at any time during his three meetings with kim has President Trump raised the issue of human rights. Speak more broadly to the question, whether human rights should be a subject with north korea. Yeah, ill speak more broadly. Look, i think its inherent in americas concept of itself that we believe in free people. I think its a mistake and its one reason, just a little footnote on myself here, one of the reasons im not a neo conservative. I dont think its our job to promote democracy around the world and impose it on other people, but if asked, what is the american response to the question, what kind of government should we have going to be. Its not going to be, we actually favor monarchy. Thats not how we see things. Of course we talk in terms of our values. Its inevitable. Its one reason why religious freedom is such an important value for us. The way i country treats its own people tells you something about the leadership of that country. And it was no accident over the past several decades that there was a high correlation between countries that looked for full reparation liberation of weapons of mass destruction, engaged in support for International Terrorism and repressed their own people looked for proliferation. The last question given were out of time, is from nick at the pbs newshour. His question is, is the president patient when it comes to getting a deal with north korea or is he over anxious . We know you may not answer that question directly so let me paraphrase it and ask, you did mention in your remarks time issues are on the proliferating side. So when im out of time when it comes to north korea . I hope we still have time left and thats what i read that churchill quote. When the danger is perceptible and the cost of acting are low, the failure to act guarantees that the threat will grow and the ultimate cost will be higher. Everyday that goes by makes north korea more dangerous country. You dont like their behavior today, what do you think it will be when they have Nuclear Weapons i can be delivered to American Cities . Do you want to wait until then to act or you want to act now . So when does it become too late . Today is better than tomorrow. Tomorrow is better than the next day. Ambassador bolton, thank you for taking the time and opening our conference. Please give him a round of applause. [applause] thank you. Thank you all. We will be taking a break momentarily but you can keep your seat as our speaker leads, that would be much appreciated. Thank you. [inaudible conversations] you can watch this event with former National Security adviser john bolton from the center for strategic and International Studies again tonight at eight eastern on our companion network cspan. Comment up on cspan2 state Department Officials talk about the Trump Administrations approach to Public Diplomacy and a discussion that will be live from the Heritage Foundation starting at 11 a. M. Eastern. You can follow our programs online at cspan. Org or listen with the free cspan radio app. Tonight on the committee caters tennessee senator marsha blackburn, chair of the judiciary committees Technology Task force on Chinas Huawei company in the u. S. , antitrust issues, and regulating big tech. Some of the social media platforms that are beginning to distribute news and have a new speed, individuals want to see them actually having news director. Tonight at eight eastern on cspan2. We just heard from President Trumps National Security adviser john bolton a a moment ago. Comment up, remark some former National Security adviser susan rice who talks about her experience in the obama white house. Her new book is tough love, she also weighs in on President Trump and ukraine at this event at the Texas Tribune festival. [applause] thanks, everybody. Thank you for being here with us. Hopefully get a chance to cool down. We were out like ten minutes ago so perfect for