In the past u. S. Experts and officials have always had really private sometimes stern messages for both sides to take auction to move forward and we will see how are panelists come down on that issue today. And we really have a group of stiller panelists and i will introduce them later but first we have for what many of you will be a surprise guest, we only heard formal confirmation late yesterday that mike will begin the opening remarks, mr. Napper, his appearance may not be on the website yet and people may not have been aware of it, but mr. Knapper, member of senior Foreign Department of state and hes serving as the Deputy Assistant secretary for korea and japan and i first met mark when he was the head of the political military unit in the embassy in tokyo, well, probably more years than either one of us would want to admit and since then hes had any number of jobs, any number of business cards i think i have in my collection, its not to say he cant keep a job, expertise on so many areas has been recognized, he has served multiple postings in tokyo, seoul, hanoi and baghdad, director for Indian Affairs and more recently he was deputy chief of mission at embassy in seoul. Hes twice worked in north korea, in 1997 as state Department Representative and in 2000 as the advanced team for secretary of state to pyongyang, recipient of number awards from trust department of state including the secretary of states distinguished service award, the nations highest highest diplomatic honor, hes a graduate of Princeton University and also studied at university of tokyo, go panthers, intensative japanese program, the Army War College and mark, when i was at the national war college, army beat us, and just if that wasnt enough to be envy enough, he speaks, japanese, korean and vietnamese. He would not be taking questions and answers but he would be able to provide opening remarks to us, so, mark, please. [applause] thanks very much, bruce, generous introduction. The old joke wishing my parents were here to hear that. My dad would have smiled and my mom would have believed everything he just said, but thank you, honor to be here and i apologize for the surprise nature, final nature of my being able to join this today, i appreciate you for allowing know speak, great to be here with so many people who are committed to building stronger ties between 3 countries, United States, japan and the republic of korea. Thank you all for your interest in this important subject, thank you all for taking the time to be here especially the panelists, all good friends of mine who are here to discuss and hopefully come up with some great ideas for how we can move the relationship between japan and korea, but also among u. S. And japan and korea forward. Todays topic is disputes and the way forward and a lot to talk about in terms of economic and security challenges as well as implications for u. S. Strategic objectives, i would like to spend briefly on my time to give a review of what we consider to be the key drivers of peace, prosperity for the past 6 decades and, of course, those two drivers are the u. S. Alliances and friendships with japan and the republic of korea. And the bottom line for us is that thanks to these Strong Alliance relationships the u. S. Enjoys all three countries have been able to together promote peace, security and prosperity throughout the indopacific region and this has been untold benefit toll 3 of our countries and many others. Our Alliance Relationships have allowed us as over decades we have taken some of the most pressing challenges since world war ii, whether it was the challenge of the soviet union during cold war or whether it was the threat posed by north Koreas Nuclear missile programs or whether its the challenges posed by other nations in the region who would seek to overturn the existing economic order and impose their will upon other countries. And today our Close Relationships with japan are okay while originally security alliances created under vastly different circumstances, these close friendships now span full range of human endeavor from trade and investment linkages to cooperation on regional and global issues and we believe that in spite of difficulties today these relationships are well positioned for the future as we continue to take on together shared challenges based upon our shared values and interests. And while our security treaty commitments to japan do remain the cornerstone of relationship of two countries and our key, of course, to regional security, they in no way define or limit the current state of our relationships. Our 3 countries share bonds based on values whether its our commitment to human rights and freedom of religion or commitment to rule of law, whether its our commitment to free and open markets, whether its our commitment to High Standards for the free flow of commerce and trade or whether its our commitment to the establishment of an inclusive architecture for regional and global trade and investment. And when it comes to our investment relationship, our economies are intertwined in a way that is uncommon around the world, both japan as we all know are among the United States largest trading and Investment Partners and we seek always to deep further our economic ties with these two countries. With japan we hope this year to expand relationship even further with Free Trade Agreement and with the rok, we will continue efforts to implement recently amended trade agreement. Beyond agreements, investment agreements, we also share with japan and korea similar vision for growth and prosperity in the indopacific region. A vision thats marketoriented, guided by a commitment to good governments. With japan we have incorporated now for more than a year in support of President Trumps indopacific strategy, together we have embarked on several shared efforts to promote our common vision of free and open indo pacific and these efforts with japan include developing Regional Energy markets, building necessary infrastructure and promoting digital connectivity so that free and indopacific as free and open internet. Similarly with south korea, president moon jaein has endorsed indopacific strategy which we believe has significant overlap with that of our own country and this overlap between our two strategies we believe will enable us to pursue initiatives across a range of issues, global health, energy, ouration or resource management. And beyond e investment, we are working both with japan and south korea on a number of regional and global challenges and together with the two allies we Work Together to combat terrorism, to combat piracy, violent extremism, stall weapons of mass destruction, Health Security in africa, Work Together to promote human rights and contribute Economic Development around the world and provide development assist assistance and its not bilateral, our corporation is trilateral, whether its promoting Women Empowerment or Development Assistance around the world. So this brings us to the subject of the current difficulties between japan and the republic of korea. As ally and friend of both countries more than ever it is critical to ensure that there are strong and Close Relationships productive and constructive relationships between and among our 3 countries. And this is particularly necessary at this time in the face of shared challenges posed by north korea, russia and chine only have to look at the recent joint patrol by china and russia aircraft as direct challenge to 3 countries in an attempt to take advantage of the south korea relations, we must not met challengers in the region drive further wedge between and among 3 countries. We believe that japan and korea each suffer consequences when bilateral ties worsen and we believe that each bears responsibility for improving relations. We believe that some soul searching is in order about political decisions that have damaged bilateral trust in recent months and by the same token we believe that prudence is required to prevent tensions from contaminating the economic and security aspects of japan, south korea ties, calm confident words from National Leaders we believe will generate a similar response from their nations. We hope and we believe that japan and korea can find the space for Creative Solutions and we, the United States, will continue engaging on this issue and stand ready to facilitate dialing dialogue between allies, we are all stronger and northeast asia is safer when the United States, japan and the republic of korea Work Together in solidarity and friendship and, of course, much work remains, we are confident that we will get through this difficult period and remain unified in promoting our shared values and achieving our shared objectives including promoting peace and prosperity for the peoples of three countries and entire region, thank you very much. [applause] i would like to get my first panelist. Its often then said that our panelists need no introduction and the 6 we have today really i think show that to be the case. If you dont know who the 6 people are you really havent been working the issue very long and even my abbreviated listing of their accomplishments and their authorships and credentials goes on really for a long time, but scott snyder is senior fellow for korea studies and director of the program on u. S. Korea policy at council and foreign relations, author of numerous books, including south korea at the cross roads, coauthor of the japansouth korea identity clash and then perhaps one of his oldest books but one i still find to be the best on north korean negotiating behavior is his book negotiating on the edge, north korea negotiating behavior. Prior, mr. Snyder was at the Asia Foundation as well as u. S. Institute of peace, our next panelist, senior fellow and codirector of the East Asia Program and director of the Japan Program at the stimson center, before that she worked at center for strategic and International Studies and special assistant for Political Affairs at the embassy of japan in washington. Numerous publications, most recent being balancing between Nuclear Deterrence and disarmament and lost in translation, u. S. Defense innovation and northeast asia. Shes a recipient of the incentive award and letter of appreciation for ministry of National Policy of japan. Riley walters is a policy analysts in the asia for asia economy and technology here at the Heritage Foundation and our asia study center, specializes in northeast asian Macro Economic issues as well as foreign investment, emerging technologies and kinder cybersecurity, lived in japan while attending sofia university, holds masters and bachelors degrees from Mason University and fluent in japanese. Ly turn over to you scott to get us started. Okay, well, thank you, bruce, its always a pleasure and honor when bruce calls on on me to contribute. And i also just want to say that i fully endorse and agree with what mark knapper had to say and the way i would characterize it a call to statesmanship by our japanese and south korean allies. Now, i feel like im a bit of at a bit of disadvantage there because im supposed to describe the south korean view on a panel that focuses on the economy when im really focused more on the political and security dimensions of u. S. Asia relations, but and so i apologize if i cant stay completely in my lane but what i want to do is describe south koreas response to Prime Minister abes export restrictions and potential removal of white list and tie it to broader context and so i think that the structure of my presentation is kind of like watching a video of someone peeling an an onion backwards, south korea and japan are significant trading partners of each other, over 1,000 strategic goods are likely to be affected by japans removal of south korea from the white list. South korea bought 17 of japans exports of chemicals for electronics and japans chemicals industry employs almost 900,000 people. South koreas boycotts of japanese goods mean loss consumer good sales and decline in south korean tourism to japan, last year 7 and a half million South Koreans visited japan. We know that Samsung Electronics are likely to take hit and this is beyond the other contextual issues that are affecting the stock markets and the Economic Indicators of in asia from the u. S. China tariff war and domestic economic stagnation. So what was the south Korean Response to abes export control announcements . Well, i would describe the response in south korea as one of shock, alarm, indignation. I think South Koreans were gasped because they not only considered japans criticism of south koreas unfounded but japan deliberately making false accusations to undermine international ability to have south korean regime and felt that japan was trying to create an excuse to retaliate against south korea for other issues. South koreans perceive japans announcement as coercive threat aimed at imposing significant cost at economy and interfering in a south korean judiciary ruling that victims of japan force labor earn compensation. Now i see 3 name policy response s through which south korea has pursued its case since that announcement, the first was a campaign to spotlight japans infringing on wto procedures at the wto including presentations in geneva and south korean government officials have focused on their argument that japans claims are groundless, at the same time weve seen south Korean National Assembly Representatives point out that there are a loft japanese components that have been revealed to have gone to north korea in the un panel of experts reports, they are challenging the idea that south korea has been the source of leakage of sensitive technologies to north korea. And japan is has responded with its own response to south koreas efforts to discredit japans claims. The second line of response by south korea has been an effort to draw the u. S. Into the dispute to turn around japans spread of history dispute to the economic sphere, but i dont know that that effort has been terribly successful. U. S. Is Still Standing aside from getting involving as a quote, unquote, mediator in this dispute. I would say the third line of response in south korea, in some ways this is the most interesting and attention grabbing has really been the unleashing of Korean Nationalist outrage through boycotts of japanese products and i think that this has taken two forms, one more negative in my view and the other more positive. The negative aspect is includes social Media Campaign from the blue house that insist that south korea will never be defeated by japan and doubling down on the idea of a peace economy that meets the two koreas together to counter japans threat to korean economic security. And also in the korean media we have seen a critical review of japans contributions to south koreas early Economic Development in the form of an examination of japans involvement in building the seoul subway and its involvement in helping south koreas steel industry, but the good side, i think, of south koreas efforts to harness National Spirit on this issue arises from the channeling of some of that outrage into a focused on competitiveness and innovation and drive, in some ways this could even be an opportunity for moon to effectively address south korean economic stagnation and note that the south korean government announced that it would invest 6 and a half billion dollars on r d in order to cut dependency on japanese import. But on balance i would say that these responses have been on the economic merits alone. Im skeptical that the reports in south korean media about a campaign to damage the success of the Tokyo Olympics will be successful. And i worry when i see the politicization of the relationship with japan in south korea and domestic politics. And so here is why i have to dig a little deeper and maybe go beyond my lane because we have to take into account, i actually think that president moon started on a good try with relationship with japan underscoring policy, focused on separating future from the past. And the question is how did things go wrong, and i would say that the Moon Administration putting itself in a box on policy towards japan in part because of the dismantling of the foundation which was part of the agreement and in part related to aftermath of the Supreme Courts decision abes growing distrust of moon. And so ironically moon finds himself in the same kind of box that she found herself in when she started her term putting the issue in front of Everything Else in south koreajapan relations. And so you are now in a situation where, you know, actually the dispute with japan has helped moons public Approval Ratings but comes at the cost of fanning nationalist responses by encouraging the elevation of domestic politics over the bilateral relationship on both sides. And here is where im little bit critical of the Moon Administration for not taking the Political Leadership necessary to protect the relationship with japan from domestic political spillover which is arguably in japans longerterm strategic interest. Instead i think the Moon Administration has hid behind the idea that its resetting and curtailing the role of executive but not interfering with the judiciarys role, but the executive has a special responsibility to advance National Interest not only domestic policy but also through Foreign Policy and this includes upholding International Agreements including the japansouth korean normalization treaty while adhering to liberal democratic principles and separation of government powers, the Moon Administration approach has yet to realize optimal balance between domestic and Foreign Affairs. And what id like to see is a reinforcement of the legitimacy of the korean court ruleing and affirmation of the conclusion that theres individual claim to compensation for forced labor by the south korean government starts by honoring the ruling by paying compensation domestically while at the same time trying to pursue a dialogue with japan on that issue. I think this is a better course of action than the unilateral seizure of assets or continue elevation of domestic politics over National Interests and, of course, assumes that theyll be a willing partner with whom to have that discussion. I want to conclude with kind of fundamental reason why i think the bad relations with japan is a problem with the Moon Administration and really related to the fact that south korean Foreign Policy has been most successful especially under progressive administrations focused on north korea when south korea has had positive relations with all of the four major powers and i think that the highlight of that in our recent experience was actually Kim Administration in 1999 who successfully built on positive relationships with the four major powers around korea in order to achieve historic opening with north korea, of course, one of the prerequisites that kim jong un had successful meeting and agreement with japanese Prime Minister and they signed, in 1998 they signed friendship agreement, so aside from the question of whether current leaders are able to live up to the high bar of statesmanship set by predecessor raises the questions whether moons policy towards north korea can succeed in the absence of a Good Relationship with japan. And so what i worry about is the downturn in koreajapan relationships to mobilize the needed leverage for better relations with beijing and tokyo and the south koreas problematic relationship will become a drag in u. S. South Korea Alliance as well. On the current path moon will be constraint, south korea will be frustrated because south korea will have less control than it should on critical Security Issues that are directly consequential to south koreas National Interest, thanks. Great, thank you very much, scott. Thank you, bruce, good afternoon, everybody, thanks again for having me back in this auditorium, its always honor to come back and share panel with my good friends and i also would like to second what scott said about opening remarks of marc knapper, very difficult time for japan and south korea. I would also like to give out a disclaimer that its more a political realm so im going out of my box here, but and then i also think that riley would have better insight into actual trade focus impact on the issue, so i will try to what i will try to do is to not japanese perspective per se but what it looks to me sitting in sitting in washington looking at the issues for a long time and which boils down to this is really an unfortunate turn of events, that is one point that i would like to stress and the turn of events have been happening because of the many piling up of many factual misunderstanding which kind of feeds off of each other and now, i think, two countries have gone into this negative spiral where its really hard for both of them to get out of. So just couple of points about what i can see what i saw as the misunderstanding of how these recent turn of events worked. Initial reporting kept talking about embargo regarding the japanese governments decision of trade decision, its not embargo. We often read about what the white list is and what is not and also what determines as the white list is not based on the actual law, its given given by the policy directive so i will come back to this point at the at the end but white list, in other words, can be revised again if japanese government decides that is a good time to revise and the issues how to get there but thats for a later discussion. And also this japanese government recent decision is based on japaneses government concern about implementation of the expert control regulations in south korea, but this is separate, the direct impact actually hits Japanese Companies who try to do business with south korea and the and then also the list of the item is you probably heard this over and over so i wont repeat, 3 items as opposed to initial reporting, initial reporting some of them said the Economic Impact is like a thousands and thousands of items which is not true. And second point is that limited Economic Impact, here let me talk a little bit of white list. White list is what you what you might call the preferential treatment on the Economic Expert control license provision and for that for a country to get on that list from japanese governments perspective two concerns need to be addressed, one is that they have a one concern is that there is japanese government doesnt have a concern that whatever Technology Material that goes out of Japanese Business to a country, export to the country will not be reexported to a different different country that could use this from a different purpose of the end use when they first apply for the license or should those mistakes happen, japanese government has enough confidence in the other governments that they can rectify that, at minimum japanese government needs to have a reliable body that they feel confident that they can they can address those issues. Taiwan is not a part of it. India, which japan considered a Strategic Partner, is not on that list. Just to highlight that and this is not a this is not a blanket preferential exponential treatments. Thirdly, i would go back to the government needs to have the reliable, i would say, reliable and i emphasize that consultation to discuss any kind of export control related concerns with its partner countries and in fact, those consults are important so that japan and this other country can Work Together to make sure that the global export control regime will remain robust. We often nowadays because of the tension between u. S. And iran we hear about the coalition over the street of hormuz and a friend of mine who is an expert control expert told me expert control is very much a coalition of the willing. That each country has its own response ability to have the appropriate regulations and enforcement of those regulations to uphold global export control regime for whose ultimate purpose is to prevent proliferation of technologies and materials falling into the wrong hands. Really, like mark said, about how japan in u. S. And south korea all shares the values of liberal international order, democracy and some of those fundamental values these two countries need to be working together to stay on the positive force and uphold this global export regime. Again, i would reiterate its unfortunate that the two countries which the United States considered a key ally in northeast asia and beyond are to uphold some of those very critical values are going to bat against each other and thats the most important of all this. You may ask could japan have done anything differently . Possibly. For example, the timing of the july announcement of them starting to have Public Comments about their trade restriction was less than desirable timing. Some people talk about when you are late on the rent payment and if youre a landlord you dont go ahead and shut down the power but you will give warning to your tenants that if you dont do this in three months time this will happen. You dont do it overnight. I have no idea whether those quiet warnings have been provided from tokyo to south korea but if they have not been then that could have been provided. But again, japan, south korea Bilateral Consultations have not been taking place for the last three years so in the absence of those consultations tokyo could have concluded that there is we try to give warning in these consultation for a but cannot and i cant pass judgment on that. Those potential steps was made harder for what happened because of the political atmosphere but can we stay stuck here . Its really, really not desirable for countries to stay this way so is there anywhere forward. I would like to highlight and i very much concur that u. S. , japan our partnerships and its just its more about free and in the market and though china religion. And holding up the values of those countries share. We have to go back to the basic thats the crux of this actual disagreement over export control regulations is really that and that regardless of unfortunate politicization of the issue that has been going on, in both countries frankly, this is about disagreement between the two governments and export control authorities about how each other and forces their regulation. The only way path forward it seems to me is that those consultations need to resume. If the bilateral setting is too hard maybe it needs to happen any trilateral but i think two countries do need to begin to talk on how they can resume what actually was happening before three years ago so that the pan and south korea can actually come up with a real path forward and at the end so that in the manner so to further uphold and actually strengthen the global export control system that are in place today. I will leave it at that. Thanks. Thank you very much. Riley. One thing. A lot of the panelists have written on this topic but since you are in my house i get to shamelessly plug my own products so riley and i had a paper come out about one hour ago on the topic and i think hopefully its in the lobby or whatever. I know the other panelists have done so and they can plug their own products. Bruce, i was going to shamelessly plug is on heritage. Org. Look up bruce arise and it should be on that page as well. I will start at the 30000 level and work back to the ground. Global supply chain, i think, in general is going through a serious changes right now particular in asia and last year we saw japan by lies to mega deals and we saw them finalize conference of an progressive agreement for a tpp or tpp 11, whatever you call it, that was a deal between economies with gdp of around 11 trillion and it also finalized an Economic Partnership agreement with the European Union again a cumulatively 24 trillion so big supply chain shifts when it comes to creative goods and meanwhile of course the world has watched as the world continues has escalated trade tensions with the Major Trading partners like japan, south korea and taiwan last year and continue to watch as the u. S. Escalates the trading tensions with china as well so a lot of changes are going on to the Global Supply chain and all this, of course, needs to be taken with the context that the Global Supply trade in general has been flowing. Its been a flowing just as along with the flow of growth for regional economies and merchandise exports just in general are expected to dip below 3 of gdp this year and so of course these are concerns but mostly particularly around the trading of commercial and Agricultural Products and there are growing concerns, of course, around the future of trade of emerging and foundational technologies. Products that have dual use for commercial and military application and so that is where this recent rise in tension between japan and south korea really becomes relevant, i think. The history of this back in early july japan announced it was revoking the export license and for Japanese Companies to export these three chemicals to south korea and not banning it but revoking a special type of license. These chemicals are important for the development of super certain computer chips, Semi Conductors and valuable for research and development and so therefore the japanese government found a warranted oversight to their export control system and export controls are related through a specific system, not just a general gift but the japanese government, of course, claim these companies the exports of these products was being mismanaged and that these companies were somehow not adequate in the way they bowed for their license and therefore revoked their license shifting to a more general license which of course, takes more time and given the longer time that it takes to acquire the license in a shorter amount of time that takes two actually meet the demand of these chemicals japan, more or less, cut off these chemicals exports to south kor korea. Of the three chemicals, bear with me here, [inaudible] japan controls roughly 94, 92 and 70 of the Global Supply. South korea import these products from japan of roughly 85, 83 and 42 so significant over share south koreas reliance on their chemicals. 46 of south koreas Hydrogen Fluoride also comes from china which means south korea of course may have to shift even more of its reliance on to china which may have applications for developing supply chains in the future and future indications when things south korea, china relationships are difficult. We also have that japan announced it would remove south korea office preferred trading list and this is, of course, this allows japanese exporters a little more freedom to export these two partner countries and the revision will go into effe effect, august 28 and could impact up to 1000 products. According to the federation of Korean Industries moving to the white list could cost south korea up to 27 billion and lost exports. This should be taken within the context that exports are 44 of south koreas gdp so while south korea relies a lot on exports 27 billion is roughly only about 5 but its major exports are semiconductors, integrated circuits in so theres a lot of locations they are. As we have seen samsung, one of south koreas largest chip producers, is already seen significant profit losses and of course, it will be difficult to get south korea placed back on the white list and have to go through this similar regulatory process which the cabinet, japans cabinet, would have to approve so its not alleges that the procedure but more of executive, i guess you could call it. Beyond the immediate and future cost from the slower export control approval process from this there is growing to trade uncertainty, i think, between the two countries and regionally of course and i worry about downstream negative affects particularly if this trade tensions leads into u. S. Economic interests. Already, not necessarily because of these export control revisions but we are seeing negative affects such as boycotts of certain japanese products and japanese auto sales in japan down the negative effect that south korean tourism to japan could have which of course, most come from an overall deterioration in japanese south korea relations. Significant nonetheless but tourism in south korea are the Second Largest Group to visit japan and after those from china and it may 600,000 South Koreans visited japan. Back to export controls, while these are still trade goods therefore it is a warranted movement a discussion at the wto which south korea and japan are both members to and so two weeks ago we saw both of these countries argue their case at a wto Council Meeting with south korea are used japan is violating article 11 of the wto which prevents numbers from putting actions on its claim is similar to how china restricted rareearth material exports to japan almost one decade ago and meanwhile, japan is maintaining that any changes to the export control are allowed under wto article 21 which grants security exemptions from a wto because export controls again to use National Security concern different from general trade of goods. And so, while i dont believe we get to see a formal dispute filed at the wto even then once we begin this process it could take years before the wto even produces a ruling on this which could be too late for lot of the supply chains which relied more on shorter time frames. Now, when it comes to the pacific the u. S. Is going through the process to adjust the way it he regulates export controls to include advanced technologies and those two could have significant economic implications specifically for Multinational Companies from allies like japan and south korea and definitely upsetting Global Supply chains even further. I think that, for example, new rules regulating, for example again, the export of Autonomous Vehicles and technologies could negatively impact the operations of Automobile Companies the conde and toyota, not just in the United States but internationally. Id like to slug bruce and isaac paper. We go deeper into this but we have a number of recommendatio recommendations. This was mentioned, a resumption of bilateral export control dialogue between south korea and japan should resume and this is definitely crucial but even beyond that, if japans concern about how security and how south korea administers its correct controls and if this is a National Security concern it could possibly be concerned shared by the United States and therefore, warned the u. S. To be involved on this level as well through our expert control administration. Even beyond that trilateral would be beneficial for everyone at the working level because of the aforementioned regulatory changes that the United States is thinking of. How it would Impact Companies from japan, korea and beyond that going back to the 30000foot level, i think, its in everyones interest that we resume a more stabilizing relationship given all the uncertainty that we are creating and others are creating as a general slowing trend. Thank you very much. Three very good presentations and three very good but complement three aspects and we will open the floor to q a and one question i will put on the table for the panelists to incorporate as they respond to other questions would be in some of it has been covered but to push more what role should the u. S. Be playing . A public role, private role, make sure that so how involved should we be and we have covered some of that but something to keep in mind . As we open the floor, as usual, state your name or organization if you have an affiliation. Let me emphasize, a short question and because this issue is very sensitive and covers a number of different issues of grave concern i do want to emphasize new speeches. Please, treat our panelists with respect otherwise i will cut you off and just as a reminder every third degree black belt. One final note, the schedule may shift a little bit and we may be delayed because we have the keynote speech and so she may need to leave right at the end but will try to keep it fairly close to on schedule. Looking for opening the floor to questions. Kevin. Im kevin, innovate, formally with the state department. One lesson i learned in 30 years in the policy is sometimes we make the mistake of assuming our partners on the other side want to resolve the situation so my question for the panelist is in this case without getting into details of the historical issues of the economic frictions, do you think the moon and ministration really wants to resolve these issues, historical issues . Or is he using them for domestic, political reasons . Wow. [laughter] i think the Moon Administration wants to resolve the issues but they just have a possible objective in terms of resolution that is outside the conventional wisdom of how we thought about these issues for a long time. You know, theres divisions within south korea on how they should be out with. And so the argument i made essentially was a National Interest based argument as to why its in their interest to maintain the existing structure and affirm the normalization treaty while working to resolve outstanding differences rather than deconstructing the foundation for the relationship. And so, as we have moved further down this road initially, i would say i was skeptical about the views about the aim of president moon was to dismantle or to reopen a negotiation on the normalization treaty itself and the further down this road that we had gone the more it seems that there may be influences in the blue house close to president moon who may merely hold to that a and the question is whether that really is the right course of action. I will say it one other thing. Im sorry to say or take more time on this but the other thing i think we have to take into account for president moon is that hes at the vanguard of Political Movement that domestically has experienced success in achieving political transformation. Both with the transition from authoritarianism in the late 80s and with a candlelight demonstration to some degree. And so, im not necessarily surprised that people are in a supporting group and i think its also some of that from the International Sphere but i feel its because they dont understand the International Sphere. I think we have to take into control what is in order to understand where they are coming from but this is not necessarily the right moment to completely revise the relationship and it is a moment to figure out if there are ways to resolve an issue related to forced labor claims that has now had a burden predicted in the Supreme Court in a way that affirms humanitarian principles while also, in my view, maintaining the foundation for that relationship. Sure. Hello. Scott thompson from samsung. You described how Japanese Companies are the one who are suffering from the export restrictions with regard to their potential customers so how would you characterize how Japanese Companies are there for responding to those consequences to the government and more broadly . Thank you. In short i can only give you a brief response but not specific to this recent issue the Japan Economic has expressed for a while the potential Economic Impact that Japanese Business might suffer with the Political Tension between the two countries and that i can only suspect their concern has intensified since then but again i will go back to the technical side of the export control and under japanese systems the norm is individual licensing. Or individual license applications and a copy of the propagation in which is the three chemicals that are widely talked about had been included is rather comprehensive license application and its an exception. That is the ballpark in a very rough description of it. Under japanese systems also for the export to the United States depending on the materials on items Japanese Companies still have to go individual export licenses but when you talk about individual licenses this is based on the contract so its not like every shipment that goes out from japan to south korea the same comedy goes back to multiple. If the contract is a year long so once you get it as long as that specific shipment no space off that contract the Japanese Companies do not have to return for those reissue of those licenses. Its not for every shipment but every contract. That is number two but also, the items that they need to go back for those more stringent license applications is more limited because it is limited and it has to be categorized under japanese government of categorization either weapon related materials that has the japanese government has a serious concern about the potential to be urbanized if not treated appropriately and without verification of the end user. The federation of Japanese Economic Federation had expect that impact that i would thin think given these chemicals it is true that that is w so it could be defense, nondefense but it still the National Security concern can be applied so it is a little bit premature to say with a longterm Economic Impact will be but given that this regulation change has taken affect it so we are all talking about it in speculation here that by, lets say, and of the Third Quarter we might start seeing some impact but even under that, given the there are so many other countries the japan considers an economic partner like india with two countries that have high tax going on you dont hear about these massive economic damage to the other side so my rough guest would be that failure can be limited shortterm but if it gets prolonged im not quite sure if its in a better position to assist that. I view with her. The Immediate Impact and even to a certain degree about the long impact with regard to judge we understand Global Supply of the three chemicals but these other products ive not had time to digest that. I think most people have it so its hard to the other three chemicals there are concerns about what it means for south korea reliance when you cant get those products from japan anymore where will it go . For example, russia will often supply those chemicals whether they can or not thats a different question but it goes to show that this deterioration in south korea relations codified in this trade tension is being taken advantage of by potential adversaries in the region. One issue people have raised is if korea to compensate shifting from its japanese supplier to a chinese or russian supplier and that creates Strategic Issues that the u. S. Would be concerned about but then it was pointed out that toward the purity of the products are 99. Then 12 nines percentage for they cant get that from 20 suppliers. The strategic concern but then theres also the technical requirements that other suppliers may not be able to compensate for the high quality japanese products. [inaudible] thank you for your remarks. I especially appreciated the resolution moving forward and to whatever extent youre comfortable expressing id be curious whether you think these opportunities for resolution could happen before japan moves forward removing south korea from the white list keep. I think the white list issue might be too little, too late. It has been cited that basically the Going Forward and it happens in 28 and will take a similar process to get them back on and have approval and that may be more to the political dynamic at that point whether they can be accepted back into it. You know, as i was saying earlier if there is a National Security concern and those United States shares those concerns that should probably be a drive for the u. S. To get involved in that regard. Timing is an issue. Its supposed to be august and quiet here and thats not the case and its a question of capacity of how much time does bif, bureau of investigative [inaudible] has to meet with officials given all the other jobs they have to take care of. I would they that there are two challenges that we see that make this different from previous cases and one is the metastasized nation of the issue beyond initially politics and security through the economic sphere and now to the security sphere and the other is the u. S. Role is proceeding from it, at best, a standing start because we have prolonged vacuum in the position that would normally be a senior official addressing these issues. I think those are factors that make it more difficult to come up with the nearterm solution and will take time and some new ideas in order to stop the slide continuing. I think i seconds both bilateral consultation toward resolving this issue is probably difficult for the reason that scott laid out happening in bilateral so it has to be in a trilateral but because the nature of this is export control this is, i think, there is a lead agency all government but this will come down to site interagency process with all three countries so again, the issue of capacity so because theres a National Security concern and one participant claim so dod and interagency board on Technology Transfer and people on the state and dod on the u. S. Side that looks at the industrial dirty firm will have to be involved and the picture is more or less similar on the japanese side and our case aside and what makes it difficult for the u. S. To play a role is that the u. S. Is going through its own export control reform and in the manner that it makes we often read about hightech cold war between the u. S. Camp and chinese camp to where u. S. Government itself is weighing in on its allies and partners to take hold new fundamentally different look at their own countries like Multinational Corporation lighting and also americans Multinational Corporation supply chain. The u. S. System is in flux big time and you probably cant predict how this will shake out at the end so for the u. S. Going through the flux inhouse and then try to have this consultation with two of its allies serious disagreement is probably going to be a difficult process and it does not state that can happen but because it has to start somewhere and i think for it to start from summer trilateral will be best. Their concerns that as we are rushing down the road to going off a cliff even further there are signposts that we make breeze by and get the implementation of the white list in the august 15 speech by president boone to see what signals he sent there in late august when the military intelligence sharing agreement between japan and south korea is automatically renewed unless either side sites to pull out and there have been signs from one or both countries saying they do that so there are a number of deadlines or events coming up which could further exacerbated and that raises the issue of whether the u. S. Needs to get involved not only by missing the weather President Trump needs to publicly for both allies to first do no more harm and then try to work to step back. I think there is a lot of cause for concern that it not only is not going to get better but could get. Thank you. David. Retired. Vladimir putins russia has been implicated in provoking conflict and dissent all over the world in fake news and social media in such an there have been reports about other countries, north korea, china, iran among others doing the same. Wondering is there any evidence of some third outside party to getting or encouraging this dissent, first through Public Opinion or such . Not that i know of would be the short answer. I would say this is really japan and south korea own this one and issues to go back quite a long time. I think north korea, china and russia enjoy two of our critical allies at loggerheads with each other at a time when a lot is going on in asia so i think its not really any of the other actors influencing this but i think they are enjoying the difficulties that are two allies are going through. That the Perfect Question for the next panel. Will save the tough ones for the next panel. [inaudible] my question to the panel is the u. S. Intervention on this issue or trilateral discussion [inaudible] i mean, the safer approach would be to focus on economics first, question of whether that will be sufficient to really create the guidelines necessary to stabilize the relationship. And yet, for the u. S. To get involved in looking at the historical side of things you know, also gets very, get it because there are a lot of political crosscurrents in japan and south korea that are little bit unpredictable and would have to be managed for the u. S. To be able to get deeply involved in that. I agree. Frankly, i think it will be more productive if the u. S. Intervention private or stay focused on this particular issue. But, like scott said whether i would go further and say whether being able to do that is feasible or not is another question. The economic and security aspects now are manifestations of the historical disputes. We have seen recent comments by Trump Administration officials that its up to the two countries to resolve those. That said during the previous iteration of this dispute the Obama Administration was involved behind the scenes, very private but my understanding was a very stern messages to both capitals that the other capital was not necessarily aware because we hear from both sides youre only picking on us and its like no, the other side is getting equally stern messages. I think the Obama Administration involvement was in part responsible for the formidable agreement in 2013. That is an area where we did get into the historic issue but certainly not a judge or arbiter of which side was right or what issues or what actions needed to be taken but it was a way of trying to move both countries toward a resolution or at least addressing the issue so that the history issue can no longer be impeding on present day issues. That would be an example of what administration could do even in the difficult historical issues. [inaudible] it is my pleasure to attend the seminar. I wonder if i could ask two questions. One question is to mr. Scott because you please specify your statement that [inaudible] the second question is that do you think chinas military rise to northeast asia with provided corporations are between two states, korea and japan, or among three states with the United States . Thank you so much. In my presentation what i was trying to suggest is that in the mood Administration Domestic politics has been allowed to drive policy without sufficient regard to Foreign Affairs and National Interest. Essentially what i was saying is there is a way to accommodate both political needs and that way is to affirm the korean Supreme Court ruling and to take action now to provide compensation from the south korean government in order to respect the ruling while also addressing this as an issue of concern in the south korea japan relationship. Talking to the government of japan about this issue. One of the problems is the government of japan is not wanted to talk about the Supreme Court ruling under the terms of the south korean government might prefer. That is a real big challenge with both governments are very dependent and their focus on how to talk about this issue. And yet, ultimately the japan separate relationship is a legal underpinnings but a political relationship and the job of leaders is to suffer political problems. We do have an issue that is old and new generated by the korean Supreme Court ruling and i think the only way for it to be resolved is politically pretty i personally was a big fan of a proposal that emerged earlier in the spring from the south korean privatesector to raise voluntarily a fund that could be used to accommodate for forced labor. That particular proposal also left open the possibility that japanese firms might want to join. I feel that that proposal was not allowed to flourish because the government got involved and i think it would have been better if the south korean privatesector had gone ahead and established the fund because the governments themselves were moving in a different direction. Frankly, as we talked earlier one of the one indicator of concern for me as i look at the way the moon and ministration has addressed this issue was the fact that they brought that privatesector fund under control and made it into a government proposal rather than allowing that voluntary effort from Civil Society in the private sector to go forward as a means to which the safety valve and release in terms of addressing this particular political issue. On that issue is raised the idea that is it compensation or punishment if the Korean Society and Green Companies were to provide into a fund so victims of forced labor could be paid either the comedies may say why do we have to pay or the victims or society may say we dont want Korea Companies to pay and we want it to be from japan because they were the cause of it, could be the view. The other thing would be the scope of the issue. We of the current two Court Rulings but then others have pointed out there are pending or potential cases that could be up to 20 billion. Then its not just the nearterm thing but what could be a very urgent number. If i could come back in on this. I personally believe its a mistake and this is just my personal view but i think its a mistake for the south korean government to try to use these particular issues in order to compel a response from the government of japan on the issues of history because anything that is compelled is not by definition not going to be sincere. That means that the korean government has to wait until the government and people in sentiments in japan change around this issue. Anything that is compelled, i think, will be worthless. So to use compulsion is a way to achieve the objective will never address the historical issue. On your second question about the rise of china, can that be incentive for two countries to start working together . Thats a good point. [inaudible] now that current south Korean Administration takes a different approach in outlook piece of the korea and how to respond to them that is gone and so can china be big enough incentive . It should be but so far i would say it hasnt worked that way and im hopeful that it would at some point but at some point i hope it comes sooner rather than later. If you ask a question youre leaving yourself open to them asking your question when youre up here but go ahead. I know she has to leave early so ill ask this question. Its been such a rational intelligence civil discussion over dealing with a hyper emotional issue in south korea and japan and wondering if maybe could you characterize the constituencies of president s moon and Prime Minister abe on these issues and it was not just this issue but the radar lock on a few months ago was the center of attention in the rulings last year, of course, in november and october on compensation but in addition though, heres the right part of this question, japan just had an election and a visit strong right now in japan and as far as i know south korea does not base local elections until next spring. Is this not the critical window when messick politics should not intrude upon leaders taking statements like action and trying to put this behind them . I will be brave and be the first one to do. You are absolutely right. In terms of in the sense that i cant speak for japan and for scott entirely but this will be a good time for president abe to take courageous steps but i do feel that because after all hes been when the 2015 conference agreement was reached the way that the moon and ministration handle that agreement really discouraging him to take any more Statement Like action when it comes to history like action with south korea. Thats my first response. What has been happening is scott was talking about his sense of the moon and ministration trying to work down this issue toward fundamentally revising pandoras box and touching the 1965 normalization agreement and i think that several years passed since you came into office and it alienated some in japan are the deepest sympathizers for south korea and advocates for more civil dialogue and more empathetic response from japanese government. Case twopoint, recently there is a book published by an ambassador to korea and he was an ambassador to korea from japan at the very difficult time and yet, he was one of the people who deeply understood that these issues are complicated and it really needs to be resolved but is a strong advocate that it takes two to tango. Hes been speaking and writing like the ambassador i dont know. So, even for someone who really deeply has had that level of deep understanding of the plot complexity of the relationship for him to come out that way to me, it was alarming. Even those people are very uncomfortable about how government is handling these issues. So, i think, we often heard about korea fatigue within and outside japanese government and we always like to think its limited to a certain number of Prime Minister abes base which are conservative but my sense is spreading and its wider than we would like to think and it really is wider than wed like to think its harder problem to tackle because i think japan often does not come out on really clearly on one side of the debate but if they do its hard for them to move from that. In south korea i look at this on two levels. One is the emotional level which really puts a premium on group action and gives an impression of a model of response. The other is an underlying National Security debate type level. If i think back over the course of ten, 15 years about the evolving nature of south korean debates over japan what is striking to me, at this moment, is that there is a strand of thought that is being expressed publicly about south koreas National Security need for a Good Relationship with japan and that you cannot find 15 years ago because the motion was so overwhelming but what i worry about is the emergence of this debate in south korea is coinciding with what yuki describes, the disappearance of a debate. The possibility of south korea as a Strategic Partner in japan. Will take a few more. Sir, to write here. Thank you for your answers. My question is just straight and simple. Does japan really want u. S. Intervention at this point . What does japan really want at the end of all this . What does japan want at the end of all this on this, by meaning this Current Issue or more broadly on the u. S. South korea relation priming, japan and south korea . My two answers would be different. Overall. Overall i think japanese government want south korea government to uphold what scott described, the basis of that normalization treaty staying intact, honoring all the government to government agreement that the two countries assigned and do not walk it back and especially 2015 agreement and that is why i think the dismantlement of that foundation was did send a strong message to tokyo that we cannot work with this government but does japan not want south korea as a partner . No. They want it to be a partner and then i think the two countries should be a partner and may have more regional and Global Concerns in common that they differ but i think that i will refer back to what i said in response to patricks question that this past couple of Years Development really has put the questions in the minds of japanese, not limiting to japanese government officials about any agreement that tokyo reached at the official level with soul can be uploaded longterm or would that be under the transient agreement that with the new president there will be appended and then i think the last line of defense in this is true when japan and south korea relations went similar diplomatic tensions is that yes, there are disagreements and very hard to work with this government but is fundamental box we created together in 1965 was not touched. This government seems to be trying to touch that box and that all bets are off when it comes to that. I dont know what kind of endgame japan government or japan is country sees at the end of the current tension but i do think that even at the height of this tension japan does like to have a stable relationship with korea and that is an interest not only in japans interest but also in koreas interest and also frankly, the american interest. We will take one more question for all others for the second panel. Right here in the center. Thank you. My name is [inaudible]. Koreans understand how offensive and delicate the issue is but [inaudible] i would like to ask you if you could tell me what you think about this and one more question. Japan raised suspicions that south korea may not abide by sanctions on north korea so according to the reports japan mentioned something of an inappropriate case and something being smuggled into north korea but japan has not showed any specific clue so can you specify on what may japan think this and what would be your response . Thank you. First of all this is why the timing of this decision, japanese government decision and regulatory revision was for is that it often is being interpreted specifically in south korea media as a retaliation but it is not a retaliation but simply the revision of how the japanese government implements and enforces its own export control regulations. And at least this does not happen during this Current Administration but then between the years 20082010 there are several cases again the illegal export of a carbon fiber was made again from Japanese Company but then it was initial expert was made to korea and then went to china. Again, and user based on [inaudible] or other machineries like large tank and laptops are again illegally exported out of japan so those are all investigated and investigated, i think, those are responsible and those are who in with in japan so i go back to what i said in the outset that these regulations first and foremost impact Japanese Companies who try to have the export business with south korea because those companies who use to be able to use the commands of licensing applications can no longer do so so they have to go back to the old ways which is individual based on individual exports contracts they have to go back to get those licenses but can the export . Yes. If the license are granted. This is no way a band and im not quite sure how that is considered a retaliation quite honestly and i will not comment on the more recent cases because i think later on there still needs to be i think shes referring to the comments made by the politicians in some of the talkshows about some of the unconfirmed cases of not smuggling but then illegal reexport or into a third country in this case couldve been north korea. I found conflicting and confusing messages from tokyo whether there were associations of transfer to north korea or what was the evidentiary basis . Reservoir the japanese side or south korea sidekicks that is one of the areas where bilateral discussions where we investigate and lets put everything on the table. This is why the official consultation or expert control that would have been a natural venue in a private and quieter setting so you could say i dont know whose fault is that but. Yes in japan said there is no meetings for five years and then say japan is interested so the first step is to get people into the room with a low visibility level or less political level. We will now think our panelist as we switch out. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] i can usually call upon them to be part of the panel i am very pleased with the second panel we have superb experts to cover the economic aspects security or military aspects and the broader issues of how all of this will impact us strategic objectives in asia. And as i told all the panelist they each have a lane but the curve is pretty short so they can cover those issues as they see fit matt goodman the Senior Vice President for asia economics at csi s before joining along distinguished career at Us Government National Security staff director for International Economics white house coordinator for the east asia summit and at the department of state really the list goes on as well as private sector work at Goldman Sachs heading the Government Affairs office in tokyo and london and currently a senior fellow at carnegie Foundation Asia program and previously served in the pentagon as a Senior Advisor for east asia policy office of secretary of defense and there he was responsible for Strategic Planning and policy development for relations both of japan and republic of korea spearheaded trilateral initiatives and cooperation issues including north korea missiledefense Disaster Relief and Maritime Security and he lived in japan and other parts of asia for a number of years and is fluent in japanese. Pat now holds the Southeast Asia pacific security chair and before that with think tank and government was at the institute for National Security studies and director of studies at the londonbased International Study for studies and before that Senior Vice President at csis and in 2001 confirmed as a third ranking position at the us agency for international development. So three perfect experts to discuss round number two. Thanks to the Heritage Foundation for having us here today it is a sensitive issue and it is challenging i will not go back through all the economics so i will come back to the story that in 2013 the newly installed Prime Minister abe of japan came to a certain think tank in washington and a name that i will not mention but the initials are csis. [laughter] to give a speech he said japan is back and he said while im here my trade team was negotiating the terms of japan with the Transatlantic Partnership i was in beijing three weeks after that and had a meeting with a colleague and a chinese scholar who said the last couple years that tpp initially was a whale with a bunch of minnows in that it did not matter then he said the opposite that it was a threat to china to contain or isolate china but after Prime Minister abe speech he said china should consider joining tpp and i literally rolled back in my chair and raise my eyebrows. What . That is a shocking story and i will come back to it. Both japan and south korea think they have a case on export controls which is what im focused on. Japan thinks there is a concern about technology leakage whether untrustworthy countries and korea feels genuinely that this tool is used by japan for retaliation for other issues. I wont pick sides but those positions are genuinely held and i dont think questioning the viewpoint of the other is productive. First of all if this dispute continues to play out with Economic Impact the numbers you have seen so far because first of all nothing has happened yet and certainly there is a high dependency for some of these materials for Semi Conductor production and korea intern is responsible for those basic chips you get in your phones and other technological devices. So theoretically there is a big impact and then the spinoff spilled over like the korean boycott against japanese tourists like cars and i could have an impact. But probably the Macro Economic impact with two very big economies and thats not really the issue it with those sectors that macro level these are the third and 12 largest economies of the world it puts another straw on the camel bass back to put the Global Economy at great risk there is already a lot of uncertainty of other countries and geopolitical risk and others with a Global Growth that the imf says it is fragile and this could be another strain on Global Growth. And the uncertainty this will cause more than anything. But it will have an Economic Impact. That is one concern but the bigger concern is what i call the strategic Economic Impact. There is lot korea and japan and the United States have shared interest and concern the International Economic space i consider to be strategic where we have a strategic interest to Work Together to advance a High Standard rules infrastructure is another space with a shared interest of high quality Infrastructure Investment with no corruption of those environmental safeguards over sustainable debt conditions and a shared interest of the future of the Digital Economy its everything and everywhere and how that economy will function that is Mission Critical with those aspects of to allow data to flow freely and that data purely used in production and believe that should flow freely. And on top of a sensible Foundation Privacy and security korea and japan have a better sense of what that means we are still debating these issues. Fundamentally we agree or disagree on how to do that with the open internet with no data requirements or taxation with trade or Digital Products and those are strategic things with a little bit of commerce here or there these are important issues for our future and for us to take our eye off the ball with bilateral disputes that are damaging and distracting is missing the bigger interest so i urge them to look at a broader interest so what do we do about this . So both sides should to be calm and confident i agree i interpret that to be statesmanlike that is very important in both sides need to look at those interest to take a step back and say how do we manage the situation . We dont solve those underlying conditions but some are solvable some of them are not. If not you need to try to find a way to manage so to me talking about other panelists is to get a conversation among technical level about those concerns japan has raised if it cant be done bilaterally then at the moment they dont have an appetite for that they dont want to me in a garage for five hours and talk past each other may be trilateral where the us can play a role in the Commerce Department together with their counterparts in japan and korea to have a discussion. As part of that you could see something emerging that was a practical set of solutions may be korea undertakes to do more with the regime is not just japan and the strength of the korean regime on export controls korea undertakes to do something that gives japan the ability to say we are moving in the right direction thats just an example of more Practical Solutions but Something Like that is within the grasp of possibility. I would urge to find a practical solution like that. But the reason i told the story about Prime Minister abe that was the first moment i saw the possibility of a japan looking blot beyond those interest with the broader strategic interest of economics having cutting my teeth when we were in the narrowly focused set of trade japan was looking better than Prime Minister abe to suggest to take a bigger role in what i call strategic economics and you see that in particular working to get tpp done so who would have predicted that . I didnt think even though i was interested in japans greater role i didnt think they could pull this off so that was dramatic japan just hosted the g 20 got the president to endorse quality infrastructure principles like social and environmental safeguards them cost and procurement. And that got the countries together and by the way putin signed that and President Trump. On the Digital Economy japan put forward this notion of free throw but it is a good start of a global conversation that i think Prime Minister abe gets credit to put on the table. So i think against all of that japan in particular as a senior partner should be the one that steps forward to find a way to move toward a practical way to control managing the situation so thats what i am looking for and i will leave it there. Soon i thank you very much it is a pleasure to be here with my fellow panelist. I will pick up from there and talk about the strategic ramifications and Security Issues. Unfortunately i come at this with a pessimistic view having been in tokyo a couple weeks ago im not optimistic to the expert control issue or this dispute between japan and korea because i dont think its about export controls per se as was mentioned there is vagueness about the reasons for the announcement and the subsequent decision or was it the korean government that was not satisfying certain conditions that is not sufficiently dealing with and the lack to engage of a bilateral or a trilateral dialogue so lets fix the export control issue and i dont think that is really whats at the heart of this. And this is asymptomatic issue of a broader dynamic in my mind is counterintuitive and should not be happening. If you have a situation where there is a question of the longterm us commitment to its leadership in east asia or International Institutions with the Us Administration complaining about trade deficits to put pressure to agree to certain trade agreements under the sanctions and applying sanctions and demanding more and more money to support us troops and with the shared interest that matt talked about, that should be driving japan and korea closer together this should be a moment where part of their strategy dealing with the Current Situation with chinas rise and russian activity, we dont see that that each country pursuing a hedging strategy or a balancing strategy to manage their alliance but other opportunities for dealing with these challenges but dont include the other country significantly. I think thats because of what was mentioned in the first panel with the decline of mutual trust and in particular for the japanese side, yes with that falling apart and the radar loft late last year was a significant flow because traditionally that was an area where japan and korea had solid cooperation and trust and that was a situation where japan and korea have practiced search and rescue operations before. This was part of the new feature of our Alliance Relationships to exercise or handle situations like the one that happened in the sea of japan. And that did not come together. Certainly of course the labor cases and the inability to address that and a variety of other issues and the g 20 was one last chance to address these issues that are outstanding and that has not happened. I dont want to give japan a pass to put the blame on south korea because obviously these are more deeper and more nuanced but im giving you a sense of the japanese motivation so to some extent there are control issues involved and to some extent japan would emphasize many have the same status it just means a set of notifying as you are exporting you actually have to get approval to do it and it could be handled relatively smoothly and not be a big deal. Its more of an indication japan looking at all a list of the trusted countries on the white list to say we dont think south korea should be there anymore based on the way that relationship has evolved over the last couple of years and building another elements of the past. With our decision who gets to be on that list. Not saying this is what japanese government officials told me there is no specific effort to fix this problem and to deal with this it is a deeper fundamental problem where the japan side clearly has decide decided, just my impressio impression, they are willing to accept a significantly diminished economic relationship with south korea. And in effect south korea has made a similar decision over a much longer period of time and a crystal moment there is no one decision that they made that escott alluded to with those foundations of the bilateral relationship that both countries have decided they are willing to accept , they dont want it this way that accepting a strategic diminished economic relationship with each other the United States remains as the node between them because he was japan and us Korea Alliance are quite strong and i believe they will sustain themselves beyond the Trump Administration to prove to be quite valuable. How do we deal with a situation that is a turning point in east asia with developing north Korea Missiles and the trilateral venues driving us together . We accomplished quite a lot with the interoperability and policy planning meetings through afghanistan or Development Goals and aid efforts around the world are we in a situation where we have to recalibrate how we handle this Going Forward and in the short term the message is to go with the analogy for quite couldnt come up with one its more effective but the detached garage and this is a building that serves a valuable purpose but it is damaged and lacking care and not looking as good as it used to be maybe there is a structural or foundational problem with it but it still a valuable part of the state. In my view and in this analogy the concern is if you at least dont maintain a certain level of quality of this asset, it will dk further sooner or later a new owner of the house will come along with new leadership in korea, japan, United States over the next two or three decades with all these different problems and challenges that we face. Future owners may look at the garage and say thats not worth saving i will not put Political Capital into what it takes to rebuild this asset in our relationship. We have to offset to preserve the asset then its more easily repaired and utilized for the future. What is the garage right now . I think the trilateral piece is a significant part of that japan korea is one of the bricks of foundation, search and rescue, defense trilateral, j five strategy, policy planning meetings, the caucuses we bring together to have usjapan trilateral meetings for the east asia summit and would coordinate our positions with a variety of other issues with technology controls armscontrol in east asia is incredibly important as the imf treaty falls away with the future of armscontrol in asia. So building a protective wall around and to sustain this asset although it may take a little bit of Political Capital in the short term is worthwhile for the longerterm future because we will need it again whether because of north korea, china or the regional or shared comments issues so to minimize the potential impact of the current trade dispute is my priority and i would like to encourage ways to address this particular dispute im just left my less optimistic in the short term to do that and more focused on maintaining this asset we have and protecting. Thank you very much. We commend you for the panel you put together today the paper you put out was an excellent analysis from here at heritage and i mean that sincerely. I was asked to talk about the impact of this dispute not really the trade dispute but the overall downturn of relations for us strategy policy in the indo pacific and it really does in the Indo Pacific Region so thats a basic argument starting with the foundation of policy begins with ironclad bilateral alliances. This is the Trump Administration Defense Department Indo Pacific Strategy report statement that uses the language to call the Usjapan Alliance a cornerstone the linchpin for prosperity in the region and its true but its also a statement to put the cart before the horse so it is a means to an end but now we have to say why cracks because if they matter than we should be doing more to deal with this issue between the two key allies. At the cornerstone and linchpin of the strategy is weakened then objectives are harder to obtain that follows logically. We may not be able to solve these problems but i dont want you to solve the problem but listen and try to act like you care about these issues. We all know about this from the policy world so for those challenges for us strategy and policy flowing from the week japan south korean relationship even though admittedly and the three legs this is by far the weakest leg and to work on that consistently over the decades jim has done some terrific work with the last administration but first of all dealing with north korea is no picnic north korea is a persistent challenge for the region what drove japan into the security realm of the 19 nineties once a develop missiles that could hit japan then we realized it was original a regional problem and we have to come together and we did over the initial trilateral one. Five to think through how we deal with different contingencies but the reality is it is always consensual and before they became president started the First Sunshine policy to reach out to north korea. We sat down at a very serious private discussion about south korea to the security concern it was solid and sincere and helped him win over washington early on as a wellknown figure but still a realist in the sense of continuing and this is what we hope to see out of the new administration all of our friends in the region. So to lobby short range missiles into the open wound of the japan us relationship with the japan and us problems the point is that there are several reasons why kim jungun is good with missile firing to show that he can and increase leverage, try to win more concessions before he gives us anything. At the same time, its an insult he knows we are hurting and there is a weakness the allies are not getting along well together and he is spitting in her face. It is a reality we have to deal from a position of unity and strength and thats one reason its very important for the United States to try to get the two closest allies back on the same sheet of music and on the same record. Talk about major power competition so the point made in the last panel with the idea we could be pushing south korea to greater dependency and High Technology is exactly what we dont want to do because that strategic competition with china right now and that technology in command of the emerging technology of the 21st century so at the center of the strategy thats a made in china 2025 is all about with that market democracy then we will lose it. Then far more than causing this dispute these are very serious mistakes is not bore but a huge competition for technology and the rule set of the 21st technology and this is why they have to do more to be involved and not with this run amok so the attention between northeast asia allies with the down troll general sentiments some of which are perpetuated out of the United States we have to put down barriers before how far we let this go and then to unleash these forces . My criticism is the Trump Administration this is how every asian country now thats not the whole story but there is some truth in the fact that every country puts its interest first but we have to understand we have shared interest is not a zerosum game again it is a false choice to have one and not the other. This is where japan and south korea and the United States name to come together and why a fractious set of relations is a whole theory of Network Security not report one of the three pillars is promoting Network Security and if those allies are not getting along we cannot control that what does that say about the value of Network Security cracks but those three bilateral relations is still a growing gathering that is no trivial issue with cooperation. We have to show we can do this. Mentioning the southern policy of southern korea the Trump Administration and the pacific was a term borrowed from the Prime Minister abe administration. We do have overlapping interest to figure out the principles of equality, sovereignty, the things we try to work with south asian friends against unilateral changes to the status quo for essentially the rule set changing by revisionist powers it is important for Network Security and an opportunity cos cost. Is not what it is taking away but to deny the opportunity to think about in places of vietnam or indonesia we can converge our interest to demonstrate the enduring value that is transparent moving in the direction that we want with rules based system so the United States cannot afford the extravagance among our closest allies so the assertive rising china and manage the perception of the declining superpower that is what is at risk right now that is archaic and anachronistic but thats not true we need to be creative working together i will end my comments there but the impact is significant enough to be far more active than we are right now with those objectives are north korea or russia or Network Security. Thank you very much. Those are superb presentations that i would hope delve into the implications. Triggering some thoughts its not just the Current Administration its not just moon or Prime Minister abe or the motors of the detached garage but all of us going through a number of iterations with the t pj government in japan 2002 and five and all the other years it is cyclical. If we do try to look dispassionately and that is har hard, there is the economic issue, security and history issue. Economically, first to say these export control issues are not related to the Supreme Court ruling which some statements indicate that if they are not related to that , then lets address them for export control issues. Did someone refuse meetings for three years . With that hippocratic oath to do no more harm like the white list removal the export control chemicals and say lets have the working group bilateral or trilateral to focus on the issues as we talk about to identify the concerns from the both sides implement not an issue to remove the concerns they might have such a focus on the technical aspect with the underlying causes. And to emphasize the Common Threat like a fly by is a perfect example the threat is there and the chinese dragon is the one a little bit further away but much bigger. We need to emphasize to people its really a boring Technical Agreement it doesnt force either side to give military or intelligence secrets to the other but really just a classified information control document the cia and Defense Intelligence agency had written between them. You are required to treat it in this way. Is not forcing dipole gents but once it is given we need to emphasize that and then expand beyond the current focus to say korea should integrate the Ballistic Missile Defense System with the analogy often used is like having three outfielders talking to each other if a fly ball comes out we have different angles on the ball or the missile to intercept it. Allots of the focus is on Missile Defense to expand on those areas maritime and domain awareness with chinese and russian actions. And how do you address those two lanes as well as the others that could come from that. Then the you try to recreate that with another round of negotiations . Dont we open the 65 treaty that maintained that. Its more easily said than done. Well open it for questions. Thank you for coming i am a japan native us citizen by the way i read your article a couple of days ago and i liked what i read just to let you know. What jim said is right its beyond a trade dispute but i want to share my experience when i was in Orange County california. Keep it to a question. 2012 through 2014 the local elections some candidates were asian candidates to them were korea ladies. I went to the asian people to win so i said donations to their campaign and one set i thought you were japanese. Im. So what . And one says i used to live in tokyo for a couple of years they both ended up winning the elections that third with vietnamese but my point is that they know whats going on in south korea the media people can manipulate the mind now japan is a evil country. Thats the stuff i want to talk about they try to make President Trump an evil person this is what is going on. You say trilateral but i disagree with that let them come to a resolution on their own they are not teenagers anymore. [laughter] they also said in that piece i do basically think its up to korea and japan to figure it out but the us can play a role to facilitate was some to store that technical conversation would be something reasonable and could help the dynamic here at the end of the day korea and japan have to manage and for what is at stake just to say these have come and gone. And going with recent history to find a way to work on the things they need to work on that has come and gone but i am helpful even if you can resolve the deeper issues to work on interests i talked about some of them but was japanese and or korean airspace it seems to me that korea and japan should be more focused on than what is hard to resolve. Just to underscore my emphasis to commitment and for show and for substance and then to benefit from that cooperation and coordination and then to include those elements and then Disaster Relief oriented and then to have that potential value with unlawful fisheries. We share information that this has benefit to my life or to my country so there is both that need to happen in addition i think its worthwhile to address in a trilateral format behind the scenes i just dont want to put that as the Critical Path what we have to solve first i want to emphasize the other aspects as well. Just two points to say they are independent countries japan and republic of korea at the same time much diplomacy and effort can be bilateral working with the government but at the same time over some issues the three of us have to come together so beyond those specific issues we have a common interest so we have to be selective that we can figure out what to do and this is what i worry about one of the limitations or constraints of the Trump Administration is trying not just to pursue the alliance goals to deal with north korea but also trying to find adjustment within the alliance to shift burdens and burden sharon and powersharing that is a good idea in general how you do that is very tricky to do that at the same time with the crisis that is a slippery slope we have to be very cautious to do too much at the same time. I hope the administration understands while it adjusts those arrangements from the key allies there are emerging problems in the region and they have to step up but it would be worthless to ask for more at a time when they are no longer effective because trying to deal with the north korean threat are big problems so i hope we get over our reticence to understand this is a clear and present danger to us National Security interest. When we had the flyby incident breached into the security area where that really wasnt affected since then we havent had similar flareups and just so mia is more of a political issue. Some that you talked about is to emphasize trilateral lives in. To try to show the benefits of the countries working together sometimes it has been done on noncontroversial issues anti drug running against quadrilateral or multilateral far from the Korean Peninsula at the strait of hormuz during a conflict we would need a lot of assets to keep those lines of communication open so either expanding into more et cetera . Expanding into more et . Along with australia and others so i think there are opportunities there, the street of hormuz is tricky from the japan perspective because of the legal restrictions on collective defense so anything they do and you heard it in the Defense Ministry this kind of parsing of with the defense secretary by his side, yesterday. With would keep it in terms of limited to japan or japan connected or japan related shipping so its hard but i think there is information, they could share information. It might not be able to actively coordinate together or work or operate together for legal reasons but theres ways to build confidence, we run a very low level of trust in mutual confidence right now. And i think whether its through expedited processing of these exports licenses. Thats a way to, japan could just move these things relatively smoothly out the door and its not that big of an Economic Impact and thats one way to build and if theres reciprocal moves on both sides, and then collaboration and other multilateral venues, there are ways to rebuild some of the damage its been done. Is mark fitzpatrick. In addition to the risks to the broader us objectives and interests patrick was mentioning, is there any danger specifically to bilateral alliances by the United States, not being seen today a stronger mediation rule . When National Security adviser john bolton went out to the region, he was going to go and try to fix this but the reports that i saw may not be was putting the, making them pay more for his nation support instead of making them shake hands, he was taking them down its just to the george w. Bush administration, Richard Armitage would have gone out there and put his arm around, shoulders literally and try to ring them together and i think he may have had some success. They seem to want the United States to play this role and are they, is there any danger here not doing so will disappoint them too much or is it that we just try to let them work it outthemselves. Mark, its a good question but of course this is not just about how were treating japan and korea. Sort of the attitude that allies should be doing more, again, theres an attempt here based on essentially the constituency, the elected president that there needs to be some adjustment to allies. We dont want to be the worlds policeman as the saying goes or at least we want to play a role as more commensurate with where we are with current distribution of power. Our allies have developed a prosperous economy dealing with the Third Largest economy in japan, 13 in korea and they can afford to do more, especially about a changing environment that has recognized in the region. But yes, of course i agree with you. Yes, this is the heart of my argument is theUnited States cannot afford to the idol. Because we have many risks including how this plays with other alliances both my lateral and multilateral. At the same time, lets be realistic and start with the administration. Administration wants to make sure others are showing their burdens, their fair share and these reciprocal alliances. Can be a pair part of negotiations but to be sort of like what were saying about japan and south korea. It ought to be more of a technical discussion frankly. Not disagreeing over the big rules that three market democracies, we are on the same side of the big picture. The details i want to send marcus from the state department, when you work there to go and deal quietly not cameras and figure out whats the best path that we can move forward and people like rich are massage, many hours at the gym perhaps where he could puthis arms around these allies and try to reign them in. 480 bench press. Hes quite the bench press are but i think for john bolton, i think he has maintained as far as i know very good relations. I know talking to hr mcmaster who was the japan chair at the hudson institute, theres no doubt john bolton has good relations with his counterparts in both the blue house and in south korea and in japan. Thats important to so he is playing that role but he also has to go out and do what the president wants which is to figure out how do we increase those nations support, how do we increase sort of the burden sharing here. So its difficult, thats why we have to make tradeoffsand right now for me , the dispute wins. The dispute should be relegating that priority issue and the other issue that we should have for burden sharing, that the longer term, thats ongoing. We should see the clear strategic need that in the trumpet ministration strategy documents for the National Security strategy for the defense strategy, for this latest windows strategic report, its there in black and whiteand you can find it on the white house and Defense Department websites. Thats why we need to invest more time in exactly the kind of diplomacy youre talking about. A program over here. There is a hand, theres another hand here. May be because of the thunder . If you stand up, theres a subject. Sorry. [inaudible] facilitating further threat with north korea to satisfy the western market but north korea has been consecutively launching missiles and we think we need japans cooperation in this situation. Was the beginning of the question about the impact . The beginning of the question was how the trademark will impact the rop p. Ill let you guys handle north korea. It seems a little fanciful that somehow even in the best Case Scenario that the Korean Peninsula economy is going to replace the us relationship with japan. Its multiple layers to it and i dont necessarily think its an either or situation like either we have a relationship with japan or we pursue a piece economy and reunification, etc. It would be good if north south relations improved, if theres Economic Activity between them. I think ive long been a proponent of exemptions for current sanctions, specifically allowing north south Economic Activity. In return for certain verifiable benchmarks on the nuclear is asia and or steps towards that end because i think just in the longterm benefitof korea and of the region , its not necessarily a substitute for the economic relationship with japan and you know, i think there will be some rebalancing of supply chains and sourcing by south korean firms as a result of all this. Theres no doubt theres going to be a shuffling of supply chains in some cases. As i think its in japans interest in the short term to facilitate these, get into kind of a normal flow of approval of many of these contracts so that Korean Companies think i dont need to spend a lot of money to ship my supply. I can keep it going. So as matt mentioned in the beginning, you still have to wait and see what the real Economic Impact is, it depends on what happens from here and there have been milestones from out here whether its august 15 and beyond and then how these licenses are managed will tell us a lot about how intense that Economic Impact is. Trade performance on north korea would be to learn how difficult it is to change north korea so even in the midst of the second year of assertive negotiation, diplomacy, theres no agreement that north korea has actually stepped back but in fact keeps moving forward with a lot of its programs and thats when diplomacy is going relatively well, historically speaking. The second point is as we learnedin the perry process in the late 1990s , korea and japan are not on the same sheet of music we risk our National Security interest in terms of trying to deal with north korea. We need trilateral cooperation if were going to have maximum leverage. Also because china and russia will have boots on the other side. Korea to some extent relegated to much to the margins in this process. It would be my personal argument. And now were paying partly a price for that in the like. Just as maybe japan can be choose to neglect south korea and bypassing it, there was too little attention to each other in japan and korea. Now were getting too much attention on the back time, when we need them to turn it into something positive. We need to understand that if we take a meaningful next step with north korea and thats a big if, thats what were looking for right now. Were looking for beyond the failed hanoi summit, were looking for security guarantees or some kind of economic concerns to give north korea in exchange for meaningful steps, if those steps are going to lead to any kind of Development North korea, japan is going to have to be part of that nexus. We need each other to Work Together if were going to have any chance and if it fails we need to fall back on our alliances and our security as well and is more likely to fail than succeed based on history so we need each other. Im going to people who havent asked in the back. Journalist and foreignpolicy enthusiast. My question is dealing with north korea that we just touched upon, did you think theyre going to be emboldened by this risks as far as continuing their program or even maybe trying some more submarine escapades , i guess you could call it . Or maybe even across the border adventures . They may look at this and really take a big risk or just enjoy the moment . When you say big risk, do you mean a military risk . It is unlikely, but i dont know what you think bruce but i tend to see the japan korea piece of this as a factor in the north korean dynamic, but a relatively minor one in terms of when you put it up against kim jong uns domestic considerations and political dynamics, his relationship with trump and whats going on there. There certainly the takashima dispute. [audio lost] tonight we bring you books about gun violence. We start with journalist dave pollan who examines the 1999 Columbine High School shooting in his book columbine. Then in grace will lead us home, Jennifer Barry hodge writes about the charleston manual ame Church Shooting and itsaftermath. We will also hear from the public and congressmen Steve Scalise who talks about his recovery after being shot after a congressional baseball practice in 2017. That starts at 8 pm eastern here on cspan2. Maryland congressman Elijah Cummings called for an end table rhetoric during his remarks today at the national pressclub. We will have at 9 pm eastern on cspan. A reminder, you can watch all of our programs online cspan. Org and listen with the free cspan radio app. On friday, we live at 10 am eastern with former hud secretary who in castro the second saturday we live at 10 am eastern with daughter jay tinsley, senator, harris, senator 80 club which are, senator kiersten joanne, former colorado governor
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