Transcripts For CSPAN2 Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction On Afghanistan 20240714

Good morning, everyone. My name is melissa and i direct the project here at the center for strategic and International Studies and im divided to welcome you to todays event. The u. S. Approach to security jurisdiction in afghanistan. Before we begin today, i want to share our building safety precautions overall we feel secure that as a convener we have the duty to prepare for an emergency. I will serve as your Safety Officer at this event. Please follow my instructions. Finally take a moment to familiarize yourself with the emergency exit pathways to the room or directly behind you down the stairs if theres an incident behind you we will go out these doors, you follow me and i will take you to a safe location. Today we are delighted to be hosting two distinguished individuals from the special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, the director himself was sworn in as the special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction in july, 2012. He has more than 30 years of experience in oversight and investigations as a prosecutor. He has served as a Congressional Council and senior federal adviser. He was a partner at strauss and fellow and previous experience includes over 20 years on capitol hill. We are also delighted to be joined by James Cunningham who is the project lead for the Assistance Project in afghanistan. He supported u. S. Operations for the past 14 years and in his current role he serves as the lead analyst focused on providing Lessons Learned and best practices for the Security Sector mission in afghanistan and he was project lead for the record we are going to be discussing here today, divided responsibility, lessons from Security Sector assistance in afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Defense forces have served as the proverbial pole in the tent for u. S. Strategy in afghanistan over the last 18 years. So, certainly many lesson in the best practices to be unpacked not only here today but i would encourage you to please dig into the report as it pertains to afghanistan but also the broad u. S. Security sector enterprise. Without further ado, im delighted to introduce john. I want to thank my good friend as well as melissa for todays invitation to discuss the six Lessons Learned report which looks at the divided responsibility for Security Sector assistance in afghanistan. Ive been privileged to enjoy a long and strong relationship going back to its founding when i was working for senator sam nine on the hill in the 1980s. And i continued that relationship since. I think this is my sixth time to come here and discuss the issue of afghanistan and some of the work. I look forward to the continued collaboration for years to come. We begin our Lessons Learned programming the urging actually up my first commander i worked with and that was general john allen as well as the first ambassador i worked with, ambassador ryan crocker. Other senior government officials also suggested we were uniquely qualified to look at the whole of government and the whole of government approach to the construction because of our statute. Prior Lessons Learned reports have examined therefore issues that deal with what we come front and the whole of government confronted in afghanistan. The first one being corruption, the second one being the reconstruction of Afghan Security forces, then we looked at private Sector Development initiatives, stabilization activities and finally counternarcotics and i think one of the brochures if i have the right ones in front of me is a list we put out and at the link to all of the six reports. Todays report actually expands upon a prior Lessons Learned report which was released and looked at efforts to rebuild the Afghan Security forces and this is the title of the report and again its available on the internet. At the suggestion of others when we were briefing them on that first report, they suggested that we examined the patchwork of Security Sector assistance programs undertaken by dozens of entities and International Partners to develop the Afghan Security forces. The report today identifies the areas where this amalgamation of partners and programs worked well and where it fell short. To do so, we interviewed over 100 former and current government officials, conducted fieldwork in afghanistan coming europeanized states and reviewed tens of thousands of records. It was independently peerreviewed. Its available in both traditional and interactive formats. We are the ones tha only ones td the interactive report so it makes us a little more unique and userfriendly to a lot of people. Todays report is organized into five discrete chapters focused on field advising, ministerial advising, equipping the Afghan Security forces, usbased training of Afghan Forces and nato Security Sector efforts. While these chapters can be read as standalone products, taken together, they illustrate the disjointed and complex matrix of activities to United States undertook to develop the Afghan Security forces and related ministries. The relevance of this report is i thin think highlighted and reflexive and threflected in thh nato deputy secretary asked us to come to brussels and to give a private briefing to nato. Since then weve also briefed the bill and the official officd the statofthe state department e joint staff. The findings highlight the difficulty of conducting the Security Sector assistance in ad minutes of the active combat and coordinating the international coalition. It is the developing key components. To test them with the responsibility to develop the afghan armies combat capabilities rather various u. S. Services and executive Branch Agencies were instructed to deploy personnel to assume responsibility of the Security Sector assistance activities for the duration of the individual deployments which normally lasted a year or less. The u. S. Approach often changed with each personnel rotation. They often created strains of unity of command and effort and i believe led to that quote that we didnt find an 18 year war in afghanistan but 18 of the one year wars and we thought 36. While the other nato commander in afghanistan, it is largely responsible for the reconstructive Afghan Security forces the commander lack absolute authority to dictate the exact methods and activities each nato country must use when training and advising and assisting the Afghan Forces. Additionally thats coming in are no direct authority over civilian actors operating within embassies, the European Union and other International Organizations all of whom are part of the effort. Due to the breadth of this report, 200 some pages, and the limitation of time this morning and i will focus my remarks specifically on two areas which i think are extremely important as we go forward, and that is field advising and equipping efforts. I would say these are probably the two most Critical Issues that must be addressed to create a viable Afghan Security presence. The goal necessary to achieve both afghan and u. S. National security objectives whether there is a Peace Agreement were not. They are weary of the war in afghanistan. The Afghan Security force cannot survive without external donor support, both financial and technical. Senior u. S. Officials have warned that these forces would be able to sustain themselves. The report examines the various approaches to advising afghan combat capabilities. We know the most recent advising approach in afghanistan, they were defined to partner with Afghan Security forces at the core level or below and to accompany the units on operations and coordinat to cooe access to coalition enablers bear is activeduty army and National Volunteers but while the advisory experience is preferred it has never previously been deployed. The first was filling right up to the day that they departed. It contradicts to the high attrition rates up to 70 for the first limiting the continuity at the institutional memory. They have provided an increasingly rare firsthand window into how well the afghans were performing on the battlefield. They also noted a two to three fold increase in the Afghan National army led offensive operations in areas where the teams were advising. However, the report also notes that the review done by the first units also identified many of the same challenges identified by the advisers that served in afghanistan years before. Suggest that the faith team formations, the assignment of the non advisor tasks and the deployment of assignment changes. They had limited assets and the riskaverse leadership for the units that have improved, training still failed to provide instructions tailored specifically to the mission in afghanistan. For example, many advisers were unaware that the Afghan Security forces prioritized the evacuation of deceased personnel over the critically wounded personnel based on religious customs. Its interesting, we briefed a senior u. S. General said we knew that in 2001. They still are not training that the staff. That makes it difficult for the advisers that dont quite understand where the afghan priorities are coming from. Additionally, the u. S. Army advisors were not exposed to the flight hour restrictions on the u. S. Provided aircraft that were being managed by the u. S. Air force in kabul. This issue is critical since the assetassets on the command of te afghan army officer during operations and therefor therefon the purview of the Advisory Mission that the tactical and operational level. Not only did these critical commanding control relationships iand form aspects of the Afghan Military culture that are important for u. S. Advisers to be successful from day number one of their assignment. Despite the 2015 transition dot prioritized the train and advise and assist mission, the sfabs do not operate under the combined security transition in afghanistan but rather under the u. S. Commander in the field for obligations. As a result, many of the advisers were tasked with non Advisory Mission. One battalion was tasked with running an airfield and another was tasked with helping to coordinate attacks. Sfabs advisors noted theyve received little production from the Advisory Mission in kabul. Its also difficult to judge the true impact of the deployment because the unit lacked the Assessment Tool to assist afghan counterparts and in the middeployment of sign and such as having to switch from advising an afghan army units to advising a police unit limited assessment capabilities. Now, if this is one side of the coin, equipping of the other. The United States taxpayer has expended more than 18 billion to equip the force is providing over 600,000 weapons, 70,000 vehicles and more than 200 aircraft. The United States typically provides articles of assistance to the partner nations who before military sales or to the foreign note Refinancing Program which usually are run by the department of state. But in 2005, Defense Department began using what is known as these pseudo mechanisms to acquire equipment for the partner nations like afghanistan that lack the Financial Resources indians additional capability to define their own requirements. It refers to the Foreign Military sales on it with u. S. Appropriations rather than the partnepartner nations funding ir initiate an without a formal request by the participating countries. While the process we found allowed the United States to rapidly equip the Afghan Security forces frequent personnel rotations and the lack of a comprehensive plan meant that equipping physicians for a debate go often ad hoc and inconsistent from year to year. I would say from month to month. One procurement official has three different directors be directed to take that progra thn a different direction. Lieutenant general david told us he compared looking at the Afghan Security forces to the crosssection of the sedimentary rock under pressure to, quote, turned the corner now, commanders equipped the forces with little regard for the past decisions or future expenses. Now the battlefield implications of course. For example, the u. S. Military didnt begin transitioning the Afghan National police to the standard weapons until 2016. Eight years as it did with the National Army and as a result, giving the type of an attack on the province last year, the afghan army were unable to resupply their Police Colleagues because the ammunition wasnt compatible. They also found conflicting reports concerning the extent of afghan involvement and equipping physicians. The afghan input had been and is considered at multiple levels. Those that worked in the area that we interviewed for this report, many of whom worked for long periods of time questioned the extent to which the input was considered at all. One retired officer that he spent four years in afghanistan told us that afghan involvement and in good simply meant, quote, acquiring a signature. The former commander said, quote, the afghans were informed and directed, not asked or consulted. And afghan leaders meet reasonable requests and were told its not part of the plan basically forget it. They lost critical by and for most of the valuable stakeholders, the afghan army and police. The police. The Defense Department officials also told that the rapid turnover of u. S. Somehow often resulted in efforts to include the afghans such as assigning afghan Liaison Officers to thise Security Assistance office would discontinue whenever the personnel related rotations occurred. If it transitions to be more Security Cooperation mission in afghanistan, the afghans will need to be able to play a larger role in the direction of execution and tracking of their own equipment, procurement, training and assisting it. The Senate Appropriations Committee Found similar problems and likewise wrote it was concerned about reports that procurements made on behalf of the Afghan Security forces may be exceeding the afghan needs and of meeting other requirements identified by the afghans. They also found that the Defense Department missed opportunities to provide the Afghan Security forces with more appropriate or costeffective equipment. For example, the u. S. Continues to provide humvees to the afghans without upgrades to protect the primary gunner that has been available for the u. S. Forces in afghanistan for over a decade. Without these, the afghans have been forced to improvise with scrap parts from destroyed humvees and have likely suffered unnecessary casualties. The provision of the armored ambulances provides another absurd example of whats going on in afghanistan. They have the arm ambulances for the force of 352,000 authorized personnel. The Afghan Ministry of defense has repeatedly requested that they provide additional armor amulets. While the u. S. Army has a surplus of them and while congress has legislatively supported the transfer to the u. S. Partners, the u. S. Army has sent 287 surplus armored ambulances to be destroyed in 2017 alone rather than provide them to the Afghan Military. Sigar also found the personnel and various organizations lack of Technical Expertise acquisition experience and necessary training. Defense Department Officials told us that 1. 3 consecutive directors of the Security Assistance office in afghanistan had no Prior Experience. The staffing concerns were highlighted in one of the 2017 audits that we used for the report on the dod and coalition officials told us that the personnel do not understand the process or procurement flow regulations or best practices for acquisition. Without this relevant experien experience, the personnel involved in equipping physicians are generally unaware of the alternative options available to them that would save both time and taxpayers on this. Despite the lack of experience advisers failed to leverage even the expertise that is how was in the department of defense with various agencies. A classic example which we have highlighted in the past is the 468 milliondollar purchase of the medium lift aircraft planes for the Afghan Air Force and exemplifies we think the lack of coordination. The Program Ended in march 2013 because critical parts were, quote, too expensive and too difficult to obtain. Ironically, the air force had identified the same problems when they were operating aircraft from 1990 to 1999. Deciding to retire the aircraft because parts were, you guessed it, too expensive and too difficult to obtain. No one reached back and asked them what their Prior Experience was. Let me conclude by saying this. The recommendations you will find in the report are intended to improve the Personnel Selection and redeploy to better align the u. S. And International Efforts and intended to increase afghan ownership of the issue and involvement in key decisions and to increase the advisors awareness of complementary activities its also intended to improve centralized command control and to improve coordination to optimize in the future. But we are not naive. Ive been doing this long enough and my colleagues have also. We know there is no quote on quote a Silver Bullet problems. No Silver Bullet that will fix all these challenges. We also recognize that after 17 years after the Security Sector assistance that transformative changes are highly unlikely. But we hope that the commonsense reforms can make a difference in what we propose will lead to improvements in afghanistan and elsewhere in the world where we use the Security Sector assistance. Let me conclude by saying and i would be grimaced if i didnt thank the Lessons Learned program James Cunningham who is here with me to answer the question that really took the bulk of the work and his team for their excellent work on this report. Although this is a bo sigar rep, theyve spent years working on it and i hope you have an opportunity to read it and i look forward to the question as to my colleagues. Thank you. [applause] thank you so much for the reflections on the state of the u. S. Security sector assistance in afghanistan. Certainly a lot of lessons to take forward and digest for how the United States and its allies might approach this enterprise and other situations. Having read the report of course and hearing in your own words talk about the fact there was no single entity assigned for the responsibilities and oversight of the Security Sector assistance in afghanistan is pretty remarkable 17 years in and thinking about the design of any such effort to be able to attend arose on someone for the multifaceted enterprise for the United States partner and also the array of Coalition Efforts are feeding into that process. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more and invite james as well to contribute in terms of speaking about how the building capacity of the Afghan Security forces has been to the strategy for the last 17 years. The fact there is no single entity driving it to the policy outcome and objectives that we are trying to achieve in afghanistan how does that impact our ability to know whether we are on track to achieving our overall outcome and objectives for afghanistan . s pinnacle ocynical of me justd briefly now. You are correct if we ever want to get out of afghanistan, getting our objective was to create or help create a centralized government that would keep the bad guys out and not let them attack the United States or allies. So, security is important. No one can support a a them hont and fair peace in afghanistan. But you still are going to need a Security Force. Because the tablet and are not monolithic as we know, and youve got isis and unruly warlords and other threats so you need a functioning police and military and therefore you need assistance. If you look at it again, i would highly suggest you read this report and go online. If theres all these problems by agency and others have identified in the last 17 years dont miraculously disappear, we have a piece and all of a sudden you think the corruption problem will disappear, the economic problem in afghanistan will disappear . The security problem disappears . No. Though. Its planning the sale once it is declared so i think this is the key. It is the police force back is functioning. Often times we align our vision and we have to move to the assistance of the pace of operations for the pace of security so that is a big problem because it is tied to the prophecies for combat, not necessarily to the longterm foreign policy. Perfect example was back in 2003, 2004 in the Central Court for afghanistan and then in the election the u. S. Army was planning to many to be an extension at a later date but we told them to stop it because we wouldnt expand them well and what we know today that probably would have been a good plan to have. I think the other problem is that out of the advisers are told to operate on the speed of operations for the train advise and assist so you see them partnering with afghan units into the ssn as needing some help i that by the time they lee they show progress into the mechanisms they use to go green at the next unit that comes and says they regret and we see its almost like a shark tooth and its based on the deployment cycle so we cant assess the longterm because we are viewing it in the longterm policy. To the plaintiff tracking metrics it seems we have been viewing that through the u. S. Lens and referring back to the speech about defining what their outcomes and up objectives are for their own Security Force development had there been instances where we have gotten that right may be at the tactical level that your report eliminated, or was it a complete guess acrosstheboard . Stanek i think we got got it ct concert and abilities. There is a capability we were able to assess when we had input and output mechanisms to judge over time. We still were looking at the right metrics for some of those things. The problem in the evaluation tool is we didnt include the afghans in deciding what to look at and the second thing is the advisor himself is creating himself and so theres not an independent Assessment Team that we recommend in the report recot thats doing this longterm deployment evaluation of how well they might doing and so i judge myself. Is going back to the prior operational battle driven metrics and progress were makinwe aremaking versus the lom policy goals, the current u. S. Administration has emphasized the desire to see a better return on investment for the security but with large often times these returns take time to manifest. How best can the United States strike a balance between showing shortterm gains that are necessary for political and fiscal cover on capitol hill while simultaneously maintaining the political will in afghanistan with the coalition and partners more broadly taking investments in longerterm Sustainable Solutions . Some of that becomes realistic. If other things they can help sustain or not u. S. Makes a perfect example of the air force. They will be able to self sustain that about 2017, 2018. Buthe u. S. Decision to take away the program sets the afghans back but i dont think we have been transparent enough to say that isnt a result of the afghans but its a position which we need to be transparent about that ticket that political will and commitment. Its to understand what our decisions do. To show them progress over time we also need to talk about in the u. S. Military you are not going to have a Lieutenant Colonel or colonel in five to ten years so we are starting to see now is this next generation of the nato advised forces coming in to the fold to the positions and they are highlighted as the good news stories so i think we are starting to have some highlights we can show that say this is the outcome of longterm security, but i would argue that the new generation still its too early to judge completely as far as the ability to do something. If i could add to that. If you read the report, the common refrain is to be honest to the taxpayer and more Honest Congress as to the limitations of what we are doing and i think that there is a tendency of how long and maybe it is by the appropriation cycle but to claim success just like he talked about where he took the assessment and they matched perfectly with the rotations so just wondering about that. We also looked at i think it was three or four different Assessment Tools on having the independent inspectors general we dont have to go to the hill to argue for a program so any time we look at the Assessment Tool, the military would abolish the rule and they know dont waste your time, we got a new Assessment Tools with a kept moving until th the goalpost eventually disappeared. Thats important. Lets be honest to the american people. We should have been more honest years ago. This is going to take a long time just like the chain said it takes with some 20 years for us to train a colonel in the army . Do we really think we are going to turn around a general officer in the military sixmonth . I think general miller is talking about the officers weve brought in. Speaking of the training elements i believe in the report that mentioned only 13 out of the large number of Afghan Security officers trained in the United States under the International Military Education Training programs now in prominent government positions acknowledging the support is a generational effort. But what are some of the specific problems related to afghanistan with maybe the efficacy and what steps can the United States take to mitigate these issues . First problem i dont know if it is a tool that is good for afghanistan. Basically it is breaking success on how many pilots were soldiers that we train end up in parliament or as general officers, and i dont know if that is the right tool to use in afghanistan. The second problem, we dont really have good visibility on the system. We really dont know. Even after that number we dont know where they end up because they dont have a good personnel system. System. This would probably have noticed, and i think because of the way weve gone backwards and forward, afghans come over here and it got highest percentage of correct me if im wrong of any country that sent its people over here to have the highest percentage of going awol. Part of it is a problem that the Afghan Government when somebody comes over here for the training, they go on with retired employee status so they lose their pay, so they may not want to go back. Theres also problems with corruption that many of these people be trained we bring them over here and they did pay a bribe to get their jobs back in afghanistan so they decided to stay. Theres also the heard a network of afghan peers trying to get the soldiers who come over here to leave and then end up in canada or elsewhere. That is a problem but this year we decided we were not going to train any afghans in the United States and i think we were talking about this before. We highlighted the air force Training Program and it was the Gold Standard where the u. S. Air force at camp movie down in georgia would bring the afghan pilots over. They worked closely with american pilots and for four years they went back and forth and it was a Great Success story but that program no longer exists. We decided because of the fear took hold training of afghans in the United States, so i think that we maybe despite your self you cut off your nose rather than use a meat cleaver for the procession to see there was a very clever program on how to keep people basically if you came as a group for training, you would get additional money so if anybody left it would be like peer pressure and there were some great things they were doing but they wont be able to do that anymore. You raise an interesting issue taking the lessons from afghanistan for example and extrapolating them to develop Security Sector assistance world in terms of, you mentioned it might not be the best training tool for afghanistan sai so thes the question whether there is an active war happening where the force is engaged as the tool sets that would bring to bear to work with our partners in that context are there other tools that need to be sharpened with relevant authorities and funding to be able to provide the type of train, advise and context to support the actual training objective as it connects to the context for the partnering in the United States. I think we have some Relevant Authority that we use in places outside of afghanistan that perhaps that is a broad conversation that needs to be had. Your recommendations are coming at a time when theres an ongoing active conversation in washington following in 2017 the National Defense authorization act there were sweeping reforms to the enterprise as implemented by the department of defense so if you are putting these recommendations out there, what have you heard so far from the Broad Community in terms of what lessons should be informing how we do this in other countries theres been a good perception on how to do things that are going to improve our Security Cooperation efforts over time. I think the problem with afghanistan related to 2017 is often excluded or not in support of it if you look at the mandated budget, theres a lot of instances so i think they view it as a lost cause, something outside the purview of the traditional cooperation so it is often a perfect example of that is the monitoring and evaluation tool program that is supposed to be for all programs i know they are trying to formulate a team now but again, weve been there over 17 years doing this so how do we get the reforms that are targeting kind of the future effort to also look at the current effort and improved timprovement to include Workforce Development or i dont believe many advisors ou advisee are getting that certification training and they are still the ones making all the key decisions for us on a daily basis. To break down the barrier of thinking about afghanistan as apples and oranges versus Everything Else that the United States is undertaking a falls apart over the arc of our experience in afghanistan and as we are shifting to a different type of mission in support of the last few years and looking out regardless of what policy courts this administration or future administrations choose to take, decision likely will be sustained. Some of the comments and findings on the Security Force if assistance. Can you speak a little bit more about the role in the afghanistan context, you spoke a little bit about the differences between the first that had deployed an active at multiple levels down the organization of the Afghan National defense and herSecurity Forces. In the second appointment being a bit more removed. Other other bindings that you think will be important but often guinness iafghanistan con. This operating while under model might be applied or thought about more broadly and more context. James had a great opportunity to go in brief. One of the best successes i saw was the best Lesson Learned. When they redeployed, they treated the Training Program the second aspect and you do not lose out. Down in georgia, initially created at the level. And shortly before we are told by general mattis that we are going taxable and operational. Theres a revamping of them realtime to trying to get them ready. They become a little bit more study on what theyre planning to do and how it comes to moving forward. But these are big thing for everyone to consider, institutionalizing a team formation, but theyre not institutionalizing and peach. But yeartoyear, its a new advisor learning again from the ground, reporting and theyre not really institutionalizing in the memory that is google moving forward prayed one thing we recognize, it has strained the u. S. Military ability to leverage and there is only so many military intelligence captains in the army. And how do you balance that need against the brocade that will fight to purify and the assistant brocade in the units. And it will also look at how we do both. And of the low level people as far as the advisor course and think about the writer context and strategic competition, and actually be deployed in the partners, is also interesting. Itll be interesting to see more broadly the Services Going forward. Lets ask our two panels, one more question, and will turn to the audience. You mention the Institution Building, there was the program earlier in the u. S. Experience in afghanistan and now we have Defense Management and Institution Building or defense institution. The name of it has evolved over time but is a key function that connects the tissue between the top political level down to the field level being such a protocol under political part. John also mentioned some of the issues and questions around the personal system. How do you see Going Forward the question of defense in afghanistan into some of the findings of the report . So what we found in the report, one of the best trained and selected individuals Going Forward. However, at most i think we had 12 15 compared to u. S. Military. They didnt have a Training Program institutionalize yet for them to go through an Institutional Development or training and advisor of how to do advising and still focuses on the tactical level. I know theyre working on it at the Training Center but is not into toys Going Forward. Then i did the training Going Forward but theyre making a large part of the advisory core. One thing, the Human Research management budgeting, what we do under stand. We dont think about these systems is refocusing on, and operational capabilities and then we come around we think about Human Research systems. We need to start a moment in them early in the biggest challenge we will have is it with the Institution Building and it really requires a proper turnover between advisors. That you will not be able to complete all of the tasks to create Human Resource system in 12 months, what are your tasks for the first 12 and what you need to transition to to take over the mission. But we lack that mental mindset, i dont do everything during my tour. If we can start getting her advisors of how to understand the build and to work with the next divisor to make sure its true my Going Forward i think that is the best chance we have. That is really well said. Also engaging on how they frame their institutions in the solution that will work for them. After we departed. This goes back for the longterm planning and looking at the long haul on the sink. Not the sixmonth or oneyear rotation. We will transition to questions and answers from the audience. We have several cfi of staff on hand so when i call you please wait for the staff member to bring the microphone to you and then introduce yourself with your name and affiliation and state your question in the form of a question. I dont know of any tension, ive talked to general miller and all of that, the information that you may be alluding to maybe the Afghan Government not to provide. We have highlighted that. I dont think this is general miller or his team particularly. And then a decision was made at the beginning of last year if im not mistaken about actually not collecting certain data which i think was a decision that was made not by general miller that made back in washington no longer collecting it. I dont think it was the intention, we highlighted the fact without this data it is hard for the average taxpayer, it goes back to modern. We are not collecting the data in the district under control of Afghan Government were the number of districts controlled by the taliban. That is the detention that we have. The amount of information. There is no tension per se with general miller and his team. Where they can, again, i differed because you are talking about some of the things they were implement them. But again, general miller is not in charge. I dont know why these changes have to be made back here in the pentagon or have to be made elsewhere. But maybe you can go on that. Great access and afghan to what theyre doing. It was a great trip of providing that the reforms are taken and best practices are implement to. In the Agency Review process where close discussion about being valid in our report and the things a challenge. I think we do have a Good Relationship with them. Im not quite sure of everything within a report that their taken action on. It will continue to engage in this dialogue for future operations. Gentlemen in the front. Thank you very much. Im a journalist in washington covering the white house and state department. People of afghanistan still living in dark and hoping one day light in the dark. My question the question is, how much to think about the husband doing to help the u. S. And billions of billions of dollars in the name of afghanistan, taliban and all those things. And he admitted to get Osama Bin Laden for pakistan. And they were denied for the last 20 years in pakistan. Second, he said within 40 tariffs groups. At the same time, that a groups are still there including one by u. S. And afghanistan. But theyre not saying theyre there. How much do think there relying. Pakistan does not want indias president inside. How much do think it is invested. Thank you very much. It has nothing to do with any of those issues that you raise. Im an Inspector General, my office looks at reconstruction. The question you are reading is a policy, political issue that im not the person to ask. We cannot address your question. Lets go to the german in the back. Thank you. I just want to get back to the information the husband been withheld. They are still being done but that was about the intelligence commit. Even a vital role in determining whether the u. S. Is winning or losing or being successful. Have you been able to reach out to the Intelligence Community and any willingness to declassify interim information with you . Smack what we have complete access from information from the intelligence committee. But i really dont want to comment on what they do or dont do. What we have specifically were adjusting at the time as an unclassified collection of information that the military was doing from getting data from afghans. We highlighted the fact that is no longer being collected. I just really dont feel i can discuss what the Intel Community does and does not do. But we do have access. All of herself as clearances, we get the class for briefings. We produce a classified annex for those members and staff on the hill who want to read the report. Gentlemen in the front. Thank you. You mentioned one of your recommendations that the Afghan Air Force training should not be cut off. Since it is crucial in these problems are covered by air force operation and Continuous Operation is needed. But current atmosphere in d. C. As election time and that probably would be something to consider, would you like any kind of alternative and training the u. S. Military advisors . Thank you. It is very good question. It is not going to be done here in the United States. I think our concern brought them over here and assign people for four years the same advisor for four years with those pile. He developed a really good report. I dont want to imply that the training will not be done, i believe, which country will be assigned. But its a shame, it was the Gold Standard and it is not being done because of the fear of a wall, is not just that program for all the programs. They are being done but there being done in other countries. I dont know where the 829 programs are down. Is that india theyve not made a final decision. We highlighted different areas and winch beyond the u. S. Is receiving training going back to gibson. The problem what we can do in the u. S. Military, we can train them to combat standards. But they are training them to civilian standards and have to go through course to reprofessionalize. How does that impact our secure sector system programming. How does that impact the uh 60 program. We argue that they need to be some dependency so we can measure where the Training Needs to occur and to make sure they are forced capabilities are sustained. Gentlemen in the back. Thank you. Up to express concerns known one. I follow it in the news and we support the fair and lasting peace and afghanistan prayed the point we make with this report and what i was saying, despite peace, problems dont miraculously disappear. We wish they would but you have to plan for the day after. That is the point that we do. Again im an Inspector General and reconstruction, not on peace a station or foreign policy. We look at process and we are saying, we and oversight body have identified problems that have affected reconstruction and some of these problems could affect lasting peace. So we are telling congress, executive branch, here are the problems, plan now not waiting till the day after. I am not commenting on the negotiations because again, im not privy to that and that is not my job. We support peace and i think everybody in this room supports a lasting and fair peace. Lets go with the gentleman over here. Thank you. Retired navy captain immigrant could of a First Lieutenant in afghanistan. To go a little further which you mentioned about plate appointment training and whether it is being improved, how do you assess a daytoday activity between afghanistan. And you are commander in afghanistan and i came up and i learned something, i know i am leaving in four months, and i know that im coming on something of my relief that needs to know. And these people talking generally back to their relief or do they even know who he is or what unit he is coming from. The problem is you are right. Know who they are and how to put in place. Historically over time we have not had that in place. If today, theres a huge effort to get this Advisor Network database to be able to work at the combat and operational level where you can input things that you observe and issues you are engaging with and they will be in place for the next unit to come on board. It is not there yet. They are still working on some of the issues to make it more available. But even the first, when they are deploying they suffered from lack of water, lack of electricity, how do you use these systems if you dont have access of basic needs on these missions. They are trying to fix in which the units can communicate to each other and bring the capability back and provide advisors access prior to Going Forward so the able to see these things one. And upon the unit commander and leverage it to go forward. That is not standardized or institutionalized prayed. One thing we have seen over time, there has been an over lot between some of the units. I remember about a year ago we were down at the tack in the Texas National guard we were leaving, and the new group and Senior Officers that are to come in and overlapped for a few months, so they shared information that way. So that is occurring but i dont know how much of that was organized or if it was a one off. But let me say everything, we are not just vertical of the military, and this report looks at. This is a problem throughout the u. S. Government, we have hundreds of advisors from the department of justice who came over and enrolled law and i remember and talking to one of them he said he begged the department of justice enter justice to let them stay over and write up their notes of what they saw and who they dealt wi with. No one has captured any of the information. It is a waste, a total waste. That is what weve seen repeatedly. Its not just the military. Is a problem that is not just unique. Based on the Security Sector, the systems and the Security Cooperation. In the Workforce Development program initiatives and part of that is to try to connect members of the security and in the community as mentoring and creating repository for best practices and Lessons Learned although to enable the transition of personnel as their coming and going to different locations. Is a work in progress. When we started this, john allen a had breakfast with us ad he said we started the lesson and program four years ago or three years ago, he said the marines will do this with an after action report and even the air force doesnt ring that was always everybodys cutting down prayed i probably shouldnt say that. Anyway, but will there be purple which means you know what purple means. Will there be Lessons Learned . And will the state department be doing report, will usaid be doing report . And is anybody trained to capture the government and how they interacted. He was absolutely correct, he went around and went to the state department and said great idea, we will be doing Lessons Learned. They assigned one person, who did a tour and that was it for the Lessons Learned report. Usaid we went over there, thats a great agency and they do Lessons Learned they said they would not share with anybody. That the former usaid not the former. We went over to the nsc and they said great idea, but we are not doing it. So it falls to Inspector General to do Lessons Learned for the longest u. S. War, i think it is great what were doing and a lot of people like the reports that of came out, they find them useful but it is odd in this entire u. S. Government, there is not an agency that regularly collects information like this and does best practices and Lessons Learned. Thats why we tend to repeat the same mistakes. The importance of lessons observed, theyre not learned until you actually apply them. Not only this issue but for other issues. How do we handle, i was on the hill and worked for 25 years, how do we handle issues dealing with opioids. Is anybody looking at it, narcotics, has anybody done a Lesson Learned report of how we handle this going back into the first antidrug act in 1900s . No one has put the altogether and try to analyze what are the best practices. So my plea to you as you read these reports in thing about it, you have an Inspector General office on reconstruction with a history of afghanistan. We are glad to do it. It is part of my charter but it seems like an odd charter to have out there. Maybe there is an enterprising that wants to come up with this. Join us. Exactly. The woman in the front. Hi i work with the majority moderation. We keep hearing that taliban control in the 30 personal and afghanistan and my colleague just recently did a map of afghanistan to see how much troops. And she did it based on population. She looked at eas each districtd she found that only 3 had control of course taliban has no control of this because they tried to take over the military to quebec. And what is the answer to say they are taliban control and still looking at the population of this. I dont know, im not responsible for what people say in the press. We reported the data that we got from the Afghan Government and the u. S. Government and as we last reported that in a coterie report and generally prayed we stand by whatever the information was. I dont think we reported that. These reports you talk about our reports in the media or other sources that i really dont know. I cannot, on that if theyre accurate. [inaudible question] consider your sources. Thank you. Government and the blue shi shirt. I work with International Foundation in d. C. My question, giving the election in september, based on the Lessons Learned in effort how with the capability of Afghan Forces can predict security for International Elections . Are you saying after negotiation . The ongoing. The ongoing election. I cannot answer the question. I do not know. They are going to try and it will be difficult. And i know they will try to get support from coalition where they can but i really dont know. I know they are doing elections a deplaning to see what they can do. But this is where we talk about the operational level. Weve a better idea of what the afghans canning cannot do as far as district level elections but as soon as we move that up to the brigade level we lost the visibility to make inaccurate judgment. Its hard to set. Gentlemen over here. One of the questions will corruption is a major problem in afghanistan and i asked that contribute to the war and he said yes. So progress made so far, this is one part, and the second, based on the Lessons Learned, can you name a few more problems that can continue . I do remember that interview. I corruption does impact on the security situation in afghanistan. Corruption to Human Rights Violations by the Afghan Government are utilized by the taliban and other forces for recruiting. We know that, our generals have commented on that. Everyone is aware of that. Corruption is still a problem. It will continue to be a problem until it becomes more aggressive. Have the Afghan Government made progress in the area . We have done the report assessing the afghans anticorruption strategy. We are currently doing a second report in these reports were asked by congress, and that report should be coming out sometime in the fall where we will give a more detailed assessment, i dont want to reveal what it is because it has not been finalized yet. So we are taking a look at the Afghan Government capabilities to address the corruption issue. Corruption is a problem in afghanistan. I think many afghans relies on. It is one of the problems that does not disappear overnight. It takes a long time and a lot of effort. We have been critical of the Afghan Government, where they deserve criticism and we have praised them where they deserve praise. Its a mixed bag. But it is a National Security risk for the Afghan Government and Afghan People. The other question, are there other problems, the highrisk talks about them in one of the ones that i think is important to keep in mind is the narcotics. That is going to have an impact on successful peace and successful security in afghanistan. You cannot have a narco existence, which has close ties with terrorist groups and expect that you will have a lasting peace. Narcotics traffickers dont like strong sense of government by definition. It is not just in afghanistan. You can see it in other countries around the world where theres been narcotics trafficking. Many of the traffickers in other countries, we have evidence in afghanistan work with terrorist groups. The provide protection and to pay taxes. Again, we would be so naive if we think we sign a Peace Agreement and miraculously narcotics trafficking would disappear. Recklessly those terrorist who are collecting money and developed a relationship with the narcotics traffickers who all of a sudden say i dont have to do that anymore. We have to make certain that we do without problem and more portly the afghans have to deal with the narcotics problem. So that could be a real stumbling block for lasting peace in afghanistan unless the Afghan Government can handle that. There were a bunch of others we have any. I think human rights is a big issue in afghanistan. Not just human rights, look at what taliban used for recruiting purposes. Otherwise you will recruit more people who were upset with the government they find no solace for pursuing and peaceful means and they turned to weapons and destruction. That is something we have to address and Afghan People have to address that. I think we have time for one more question. Thank you so much. You have mentioned and identified can you introduce yourself. You have identified two particular issues, the frequent personal rotation and the other one the lack of an agency of the support efforts in afghanistan. I think you mentioned that shrek why do you think it took so long for all agencies involved to not identify this particular issue, why did it take six years to come to this conclusion with the six Lessons Learned and what is a solution for the frequent personal rotation in which agency should be assigned . Thank you. Very good question. These problems that people have identified, many people who served in afghanistan came back in 2001, two, three, four, five, whatever and with about problems, your great reporting by voa, washington post, New York Times and many other journalists who came back and commented about these problems. Cigar was created ten years ago. I came seven years ago and i think our reports, looking at individual programs identified the problem of training past frequent rotations of problems. What we have done here as part of the Lesson Learned and try to collect as much data to try to understand the problem. This is not a problem that we discovered now. I dont want anybody to think that, everybody has talked about these problems. We serve a different role, i made a comment to somebody, what is your source of Afghan Government, what is your source, its a contractor or reporter, we are different. When we write a report has to go through the process, it is basically documented and if you take a look at the report, is 200 some pages outstanding. 400 footnotes, and the generally accepted auditing standards or the silver book which is standards that they follow. When you read this report, or you read the quarterly report, you can trust also that with independent, we dont have a dog in the fight, that is very important. God bless you for working for your country for the Afghan Government, but they have their own political and other value system and what they want to compost, how are u. S. Government does, we are independent, Inspector General, 70 of us are by law have to be independent. So you can trust the report coming from the dod or state id on issues like this, we try to get to the truth. That is the difference between these reports and something you may read somewhere else. Too that extent, its not a new issue but i think we finally documented in the six reports and we had many others that we are still working on. Do we tip one particular agency that should be running the show . Because that is a decision, we dont really do policy. We will identify the problem and make certain recommendations but it is really up to the congress and the executive branch and thats were remaking difference. We do the process they do the policy. Whether they want to be in afghanistan, whether they want to continue or whether they want to buy a certain weapon system, you do it and this is your objective, we do need it or dont need it and why. It is not our job to make. Other than me i think say, if you are doing advise and assist, it makes sense that all the advisors report to the same agency. In this case he is sick of. It sounds like a logical play course, but we back off from saying that is what should be done. So i hope that answers your question. We understand the difference. Dont feel bad if you dont know what an ideas. I dont know how any people in the u. S. Government going to be no wooden independent ideas. Oh shocked the first time i went overseas and somebody in the state department says, you did not ask us to rate the report and added it. And i said violates the independent clause. And also some people who criticize our reports who we know have connections to contractors. And we know have connections to procurements out there. Thats the right to be contract and to be involved in procurement but dont hold yourself out as an independent judge from the facts. We are assigned every time we do an audit that is the difference between independent of the United States and even in the auditing function in some agencies. Again, i should come back here and see the briefing on id, i dont take enough people realize how significant the 1978 id act was. Im a big proponent, a brilliant piece of legislation, we may not have lived up to it, some of us have been indicted for corruption over the years. So not all of us have lived up to it. And many have fallen. And those People Congress has got rid of. But that is an important function and i see very few governments around the world how the concept of independent specter general. And q so much for your important insight on the future of Security Sectors in afghanistan and for reminding us of the important that the ig in the marking constitutional system. Please join me in thinking everybody for being here. 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