Transcripts For CSPAN2 Nuclear Threats 20180112

Spee5 we are delighted to have you here as president of csi s it is a great opportunity to welcome back ernie when he was secretary was very active with us and we are very grateful as he would talk about oil and gas and Nuclear Energy and about Nuclear Weapons but now we are lucky to have him still staying active and of course he is the cochair my former bosses the cochair with him and i asked he wanted to make remarks he said hell no. [laughter] thanks for being here charlie. Part to be partners with us to raise the important issues of our day. Just a safety announcement for an emergency follow my instructions with the next it taking us down to the street then we will meet at National Geographic and then i will have hot chocolate. I didnt think we had a more qualified individual to be energy of secretary than ernie. If you could design someone who was perfect for the job he knew government, the private sector and has the honesty and objectivity of academia to reflect on government and private sector and brought enormous energy to the job. Those were the golden years for us and of course working through pretty sophisticated at the time. I hope we have an opportunity to hear about north korea and iraq that you will find this a fascinating afternoon. Ernie mo knees spee17. Thank you although i thought you said the emergency announcement is coming tomorrow that maybe we will touch on that later. I appreciate the chance to be back here at csi s as a respected organization and of course t2 has had close ties with them as an enormous leader in Nuclear Security but to have that privilege to partner with him and or with him with the Global Security threats which he founded in 2001. And sam made extraordinary source of wisdom. Since you mentioned brent scroll coughed he was one of the introducers for my nomination the great sway in the senate but we are great friends and i have the pleasure to roam around with brent scroll croft each week and also Charlie Curtis dragging himself out of retirement to help us with the first. So last month i had the pleasure of speaking at the university of chicago the 75th anniversary of the first controlled trade reaction Chain Reaction it was the precursor to the Manhattan Project which had started technically but his work was critical for the Manhattan Project. At that time he was already recognized at that time the dual nature of this technology that on one hand the potential that were quite different from other instruments of war of the technology with beneficial applications so this duality facing from the beginning it really draws from a Common Technology base challenging governments and international institutions. Focusing on this for four decades and committed to extending the outstanding work with the Broader National Security community now being judged only by those metrics Nuclear Energy provides one sixth the energy it saves countless lives to say we have enjoyed that peaceful usage while affording the use of a Nuclear Weapon since world war ii but with that said we have had too many close calls and Nuclear Weapons states have grown. So now today we are challenged by a different nuclear age. First i will be using this calculation throughout the speech as a broad blockage for accident one and terrorism in my view that is the most likely catalyst even though deterrence remains. Amount it is not enough. Second the sophistication of north korea Nuclear Weapon program cannot be denied. Their advocate both russia and United States threatening to use Nuclear Weapons and scenarios to deescalate making the rounds in moscow and then to expand the role of Nuclear Weapons that is central to prevent nonstrategic attacks in large scale aggression. 911 heralded the age of terrorism unconstrained and that capability is spreading including those areas with rivalries and conflicts it is a separate set of conditions Going Forward which calls for reexamining Strategic Policies to force the postures and we need to examine our response as well as the dangerous state of u. S. Russia relations. With those diplomatic challenges we shall have a version of these remarks i will start the conversation with five broad messages than a few remarks of the day on iran and north korea. First the combination of advances of technology and nations to challenge traditional thinking in the risk of Nuclear Weapons use the priorities of investments. To maintain a safe and secured it is not sufficient risks and miscalculations are at the forefront of our thinking as an important driver. Second to prevent nuclear use is the objective of the Nuclear Policy and specifically when that surfaces we need to assess the recommendations by considering they lessen those dangers to reduce the risk of nuclear use or not. We could beheaded in the wrong direction but expanding the types of threats under the banner of deterrence likely makes the risks of miscalculation greater, not less enhance deterrence have a high burden to explain why those options are insufficient. The president already has options for Nuclear Deterrent but by what logic should we stress more usable weapons against the backdrop of our capability that remains second to none is less likely they will be used . By which logic to we remain on a Nuclear Exchange . What about command and control to have confidence under those scenarios with a short decision time . Are we about to join those in russia who say we need to be prepared to escalate to deescalate what if the superpowers start down this road . These are the hardnosed questions to examine the npr. Third the United States and russia have a divergent interest the backing of the genocidal regime to increase tensions. The outcome of the investigation is also a factor but to remain convinced to resume a strategic relationship with russia next essential, interest Crisis Management and terrorist acquisition and more we did this at the height of the cold war and we must do it again to support this imperative to forge a bipartisan joint Congress Administration approach to secure those issues with russia know that the sanctions legislation puts into place congressional decisionmaking. We have specifically recommended a group of congressional state Department Leadership similar to the reagan administration. Fourth International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard the architecture it is doing a very good job to monitor iran compliance with the jc poa with the new verification tools indeed that is the heart of the jc poa and does not sunset over time we could consider involving the verification regime to a universal application and fifth we must make worldwide progress comprehensive commercially based fuel services with fuel supply and without this progress additional problem could present themselves in the future. So i will make a few comments on iran and north korea. Obviously we are on the precipice of a new crisis if the president refuses to approve the sanctions waivers and United States fails to meet its commitment under the deal. It puts a straitjacket on the activities with the jc poa misses the most important feature such as 15 year limitation of the tee11 where iran could have no more than 300 kilograms of uranium enriched. This is a very tight constraint. And then to cover every stage of their activities that is what is missed and deserves repeating the heart of the jc poa the International Verification provisions it is ironic iran has constraints on the Nuclear Program of any nation on the planet and the most demanding verification regime but the president could take action imminently to remove these with no alternative. Opponents are fixated on those provisions as they underplay or ignore the importance of the commitments that dont expire a permanent prohibition or the weaponization program through protocols with a time window to respond to inspection requests. And the requirement to ship all spent fuel for the reactor which was the heart of the plutonium pathway causing consternation. But yet 15 years is epsilon compared to the persian empire. That is a fact but it is manufactured. Fifteen years is a significant. In a political life of the country and iran demonstrates that with the protest that shine a light on the governments failure to serve the peoples needs. The nuclear deal was never meant to be the end of the road. We should be using this time to build on the agreement for the outcome with the Nuclear Constraints are lifted which we have done very little so far as we approach the twoyear mark of the implementation. European partners are stressing this and with that agreement in place we should be taking action of the proxies of the human rights record and other aspects of iranian policy without the complications of the nuclear issue. Keeping the spotlight on the failings of the iranian government and the countrys Economic Situation to turn up the heat with our regional friends and allies reinforces the failings of the recent protest. That needs to respond to more demands with the jc poa cannot be blamed with those economic shortcomings and we should not give leverage to those most extreme elements. And also draw lessons from the jc poa for broader fuel cycle considerations. Looking ahead we will confront more circumstances unless he can build enhancements globally to develop them from waste services. To make weapons capabilities easy to acquire and they should be strengthened. The slow but steady expansion of Nuclear Reactors internationally and the uncertainty surrounding the future of the u. S. Clear power make it more important than ever to identify and incentivize and implement that approach for Nuclear Security principles such an approach is economical with the spread of the enrichment capacity and irradiated fuel and ways from the stockpile of tony m. These must be backstopped with safeguards to take advantage of Technological Progress with the political and Financial Resources to back them up we are expanding substantially our efforts in this area to work with public and private partners so countries can have the benefits of these technologies without increasing proliferation dangers. The iaea bake is the foundational step in that direction as the commission concluded and reaffirmed a diminishing technology supplychain is a National Security concern to maintain nonproliferation and meeting our own National Security requirements. There is a big effort that is critical to reach the ultimate goals in the security arena. Finally on north korea while the threat is growing to alarm the rest of the world blurring the recognition Nuclear Weapons have disrupted the power of the most powerful conventional weapons i might just add to make a comparison, the Oklahoma City bomb was about 2 tons of tnt versus the four orders of magnitude from the world war ii bonds not to mention additional radiation issues. This cannot be talked about anything resembling the same way. But now kim jongil has taken that Diplomatic Initiative with pr gains participation in the upcoming winter olympics. We have been living with a Nuclear North Korea that could strike her since in the asianpacific region that threat has become more acute as korea has systematically advance the technology. We have to stop thinking as a provocation as a systematic and Successful Development of those technologies. There would be a significant benefit with a reduction of tensions to forgo any testing. But there is not a long time to capture the benefits. More likely than not it will require direct talks with the north koreans on the path to negotiation if there is an opening for such talks is not clear some believe the new years day claim of Nuclear Warheads and Ballistic Missiles have already been proven to open the door to a freeze on nuclear and longrange missile test we need to find a way to probe them on that point to exploit that if there is one. It is also imperative to focus on those steps of miscalculation including the risk of nuclear use but devastating forces on both sides of the 38th parallel. Or iran where it made sense to keep those negotiations confined to the Nuclear Program and with peon yang to address those issues for the talks to succeed United States and china must share a vision of those security arrangements to form the foundation of the Korean Peninsula to share a vision with beijing on consultations south korea and japan framework and key parties like russia. So with the Real Security concerns those are tough questions of reunification of the Korean Peninsula the future regional posture is a critical piece of the puzzle but sufficiently to encompass those disc is low discussions have taken place. There is no doubt the United States continues at that sponsor ability to set the right course that posture set in the coming days and weeks will determine the decisions on the dpr k for decades since the nonproliferation treaty both parties have reaffirmed the legal obligation to work with other Nuclear Weapon states to divest themselves over time. It is essential with the npr to back that up with concrete steps to achieve that goal. The best way to reduce and eliminate is to define then walk the path to eliminating Nuclear Weapons. When there is a lot of room for diplomacy. Thank you spee17. You have given us a lot of wonderful material to guide us. But you mentioned several times the Nuclear Posture review. I think the question largely is the development of micro Nuclear Weapons does that require us to build comparable weapons for the terrorist . What do you think about that . Let me repeat those four orders of magnitude because they have to be remembered it is still a Nuclear Weapon number one. And i think the test is i dont know what is in the npr but if there is something in that direction then i hope using sufficient analysis as to why this contributes to stability or reduces the possibility of use, i have not seen that argument made convincingly. We have a deterrent there are many ways to reposition my answer is i am open to hearing what i have not yet heard to convince me that is a viable path. Traditionally we said we dont want to build a warhead but what happens if we think our opponent is building a warhead . So we need to see that proposal. It has to be made very clear a deterrent against the use of any Nuclear Weapon from our allies. My failings may be did not appreciate this before but that verification agreement is eternal. That is interesting could you amplify on that . Certainly there is a layered set of verification measures that are completely unique to iran. So in the negotiation at least when the head of their Nuclear Program and i were brought in that early on we had to establish whether or not the International Community has a high distrust of the program. The facts on the ground tell you that. The fact that u. S. And russia post ukraine tell you that. So right up front it was clear there would need to be extraordinary verification measures for any agreement. So 20 years of surveillance of centrifuge parts in 25 years of uranium supply chain verification but i ran commits to the Additional Protocols that is what gives the iaea the opportunity to inspect the Nuclear Sites of which they have to be suspicious that is a voluntary agreement but iran is required to be in the protocol forever but there is more. With that Additional Protocol as exercised now, there is no time limit if they say the facility which could be military gives us cause then we have reasons. Great. There is no time limit for when access is granted. In the iran agreement there is a 14 day period in which i ran in the iaea must work out the terms of access if they cannot reach those days then ten more days for the access to happen or they are in violation. This is a very, very powerful constraint and almost never injured in discussions so imagine that is the type of constraint we would give up to unilaterally walk away from this agreement while i ran complies. So if we do walk away what do the other parties do . It is hard to speculate so there were two different examples one scenario iran says it is done we will resume Nuclear Activities as we wish with no limit et cetera and then the question becomes having the one to precipitate the failure could be marshal the International Community for serious sanctions regime . I doubt we would reach what we had before but that is the issue. So i ran and the free European Countries all agree to proceed with the agreement but to recognize this is voluntary. So we managed to isolate ourselves no seat with the joint commission. So any dual use items have to go through the process the five plus one but then there is a real issue of that voluntary agreement as erosion could be setting and especially because of the verification measures that are unique. One reason why pursue looking at the Nuclear Cycle globally can we get some of those verification measures adopted by other countries . They would greatly strengthen the Global Safeguard regime to put pressure to continue. Several times to talk about the role commercial Nuclear Energy plays of the proliferation regime and russia is such a major supplier that we have to find ways to Work Together so is there a window of possibility to discuss those Nuclear Safeguards . Is that the realm to talk about. It would be very difficult there are many things we can and should discuss something that occurred last may was a catalyst with the department of energy the meeting was in kazakhstan worried about dirty bombs and to identify insecure and eventually replace things like medical sources for dirty bomb material that is a clear neutral interest in the part of the world we should be concerned about. So what we are hoping we could discuss right now with Nuclear Security frankly until we get past our significant problems between the u. S. And russia right now it would be very tough but going back all the way through through the ukraine that was the area the russians wanted to collaborate with the commercial fuel cycle with those capabilities to draw on. This is one of those that is the irrelevant footnote we were in epsilon within nature effect agreement. Done at the end of the administration and it would have these elements of fuel cycle and services. Obviously this is a dangerous situation. And with that sophisticated delivery capabilities. And then if that extended deterrence they dont say that during the first round of drinks that you normally take several rounds but they say we need to have the retaliatory capabilities. What would you say to that confidence they should have in us . Tee4. The capability to deliver those weapons. Not to mention our own military families and the like who are there so i cant say that i find the dialogue having been terribly well thought through a canal. We need to have the broad security discussions with korea, japan and south korea, japan and china in particular to scope out what is the acceptable security structure for them and presumably north korea because we will have a stepbystep launch through projects before we get to the negotiations that will have to be multilateral, and i dont think that we have the Security Posture mapped out for the entire region. Do you think we can count on determines to handle north korea . Whether we want to say it or not, we are in a deterrence, and i certainly do not think we should give up on the vision of a nuclear free peninsula, but its going to be a long haul and so wed better get used to thinking about how we are going to manage the solution looks like and the secretary said that. It looks to be a horrible option, so i think its a question of first of all, really enforcing sanctions that are already on the books, which again cant happen without the bigger condominium architecture independent is how one moves forward i think. Theres many analytics that reinforce the case that the buildup of the north korean Nuclear Weapons and missile capabilities has been a quartercentury pretty much towards peac these capabilitiesh maybe some acceleration onto the Current National leader. The corollary to that is you dont unwind that very quickly. We need to think of the long game with no nuclear use or major conventional use either in the 38th parallel as with the International Community organization. I am going to ask a question. No longer questions, i will cut you off and make fun of you if you do. My question is about the iaea. I wonder if you can assess the capability to fulfill that role and as an organization how vulnerable is it . First of all i will repeat they are doing a good job in iran. Its a heavy load for these organization. They have to have a lot more boots on the ground than they ever have supplemented by all of the additional technologies than it has allowed them to an employee. In terms of the capabilities, i feel today quite confident in their abilities. There is part of the confidence that stems from the fact that National Laboratories are significant with the training inspectors and in terms of both technologies, so i think it is a question of sustaining support for the agency. In fact, whether it is the agency or the employment of National Means of trying to understand whats going on. But ive sometimes said as an example i have great news for you we just got you 25 years of surveillance of uranium supply chain. The bad news is good t hes goto stick to it for 25 years. So, if theres also frankly leadership issue is making sure that peace issues of verification, transparency over a long time here coat that the commitment is sustained, and that is beyond financially. It has to remain a priority, otherwise those verification tools will not have the intended effect over time. Theyve been one of the most underappreciated assets that we have. They failed to appreciate how important it is. The microphone is right behind you. [inaudible] it seems to me that it is rough but my consensus is that it is so multilayered and its very advanced. My question is how do you think the Scientists Group role in the negotiation . [inaudible] well, actually, my friend at the Harvard Kennedy school is trying to develop a theme of the socalled scientists as diplomats, and so first let me say i think the role of science in negotiations is always important and in fact i became a negotiator in parallel with the secretary of state in february of 2015, but the department of energy was involved in those negotiations all the time because there had to be a constant analysis of options etc. , so to be honest its a rather unique situation that developed for marvel spotlight and it was different to actually be a negotiator as opposed to a supporter for the negotiation, so in this particular case it proved to be first golfer to win this debate could for two of this debate could both had the requisite and technical background not to mention both having these mit connections which is extremely helpful as well but what i dont know, and graham will be following this, are there other major negotiations where having appropriately trained in a high enough political level people, scientists during the negotiation itself. Its not obvious. I frankly dont know whether this is a oneoff or something that can be much more important in other climate negotiations were things of the like. I thought that gigahertz was a french car rental company. [laughter] [laughter] there seems to be a lot of focus on Missile Technology but whats to say they havent already smuggled them in . That is important and my colleagues may want to respond to that since it is a favorite theme of his that there are more crude Liberty Systems and the crude Delivery Systems can also develop and deliver these crude weapons because you dont have the same kind of constraints as he will have for the longrange missile, so that is absolutely correct, and furthermore, i dont want to get carried away with this, but certainly a crude Delivery System may allow one to at least provide more ambiguity as to the return address. Would you like to comment on this because i know that this is something youve spent a lot of time on a. First, i dont have any rebutt rebuttal. Ive been concerned about the Delivery Systems and i think that we have moved into a new era where Catastrophic Nuclear trigger this one is much more possible and that all the nuclear powers, no matter how much we disagree on a lot of things have a similar box that here in because i think that deterrence even if its a safe, secure and reliable and thats what its got to be, as it is said its not nearly enough. Youve got attribution problems and cyber problems and the possibility of stimulated attacks that are false. Youve got the whole question of protecting Nuclear Materials because the scientific knowledge is out there, not a piece of cake to make a crude weapon and just imagine the dilemma. What is the reaction. Those are things we consider [inaudible] on the Current Nuclear development speeten to pakistan and india is a situation that is one of the clear cases of concerned of miscalculation as a route to that outcome. We know about the deployment of badly misnamed and i hate to say it but tactical Nuclear Weapons which is really a misnomer, but the idea that battlefield use could come in is exactly the kind of escalation that we were talking about and worried about. I might just add thats not thet the only case, pakistan and india but in many of the cases that are of concern, frankly, we are talking about situations of asymmetrical conventional military capabilities and that ends up providing often a lot of impetus i might add that one might say its via the cold war and the shoe in the one sentence was on the other foot as we had our concerns with the iron curtain and mechanized units rolling over, so i think that reinforces the point made in the context that i think a lot of these discussions focus too much only on the Nuclear Threat and not the overall security context which often is driving the possible instability. We have time right and back youre going to get the benediction. Maybe just shifting over to the middle east, what are your thoughts on the potential u. S. Saudi Bilateral Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation without the socalled Gold Standard with the prohibition on the enrichment and processing particularly in light of the difficulty that the u. S. Has competing as an International Market against the russian and chinese. Thank you for the question. [laughter] obviously, weve seen the reports that there are discussions going on for a one 23 agreement with saudi arabia that will not have all of the features of the Gold Standard that the emirates have signed up for, so number one, i think we have to first of all give great credit to the emirates and their posture in the nonproliferation world. I might add we are getting a little bit of home advertising that the bank i mentioned earlier in the same none was very instrumental in that they were one of the countries that provided the funds. So again i think they deserve a tremendous amount of credit for what they are doing and hopefully will do in this context. Now, we have known for a long time certainly in the middle east, and its not just saudi arabia. I can say following these discussions years ago with jordan and issues with egypt they said we have no intention of developing these fuel cycle facilities but we are not prepared to write this off in perpetuity. So my argument would be why dont we focus on what we are trying to get at and think creatively about how to do that. A paper that i was an offer on some years ago with the author of the scope of growth at the time, so for example we said look, one way to look at this is you could provide special fuel Cycle Services to a country for a contracted period of time during which period they wouldnt do in richmond for reprocessing. That is just one example. So, you basically its like a timelimited Gold Standard in a sense that it gets around some of the issues have permanently rejecting your future opportunities and with that i think there comes other incentives that one could put in, for example in our paper, we had the idea that we could support their participation, the third countries participation in a real Nuclear Threats they advanced Nuclear Reactor development program, not enrichment, not reprocessing, but that would be fine. So, you know, i think theres a whole bunch of ways of packaging this that can accomplish the goal even if its not a Gold Standard agreement. It seems that commission of 2012 i think it was, 22, 2013 did that and we published a paper last year that i do believe it is very important for the United States to try to rebuild and certainly preserve and rebuild our Nuclear Supply chain. That was the foundation of our being able to shape the nonproliferation regime so effectively and lets face it, we are not in great shape already. Its going to get a lot worse if we are frozen ou out of the enormous regions in the world like the middle east where russia has at least tentative or some form of contracts with iran and egypt and saudi arabia and jordan and turkey, so i think you have to look at this in a multidimensional way to achieve the overall security objectives. Its going to be a lot harder if this sector goes down to. There is a good idea for National Security needs that are hard to sustain like the small multiple reactors that are deployed on the water and under the water but also, but they do nowe donot have the capability t the needs for fuel for those reactors were producing those that we need in the stockpile. We are living off of stockpiles into that cannot go on forever. Its been American Technology and the clock is ticking. There was some reference to cross domain determines. So the question is is it possible to get to her by threatening a cyber attack on somebody and conversely, is it plausible to threaten Nuclear Retaliation if somebody does a cyber attack on us ask if any of the possible . It was certainly in the National Security strategy. First of all, the entire broadening of the landscape for the Nuclear Deterrence is a very fundamental step in the wrong direction and it had conventional things. Cyber has its own special challenges, and i must say having read only be unclassified report on slavery and Nuclear Command and control to not leave one feeling comfortable about what might be in the classified part of it although i havent read it, so i dont know. But i think the idea of Nuclear Deterrence of Cyber Attacks broadly certainly doesnt make any sense. But that is where we need to have discussions and granted they would be very tough. Its got to be broader than that. This is really dangerous and of course the real concern is that lets say it i between the u. S. D russia it could be a thirdparty doing this cyber deception. So again, we are gearing up a Program Going on at some level for about a year and a half, gearing it up now. Its a critical problem. The speech is going to be available tomorrow at the website. Tomorrow it will be up. I hope youll give us permission to put it up here but you of course have the first rights, so i couldnt take notes fast enough but go take a look at it. Its very powerful. We do have a reception outside thso please followup. If oscar [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] welcome and thank you all for joining us this evening for the conversation the judicial nomination process wha