Transcripts For CSPAN2 North Korea Policy Part 2 20171204

Of what a nuclear bomb means but this man does have a sense. He was 13 years old living in nagasaki when the atomic bomb was dropped on his city. He lived about 2 miles from ground zero and somehow survived even though his neighborhood was devastated. Two days later heres how he described this scene. The clip is in japanese so i will transcribe as well. He said houses were gone. Only the steel bars stood hollow. Everything else was a burnt field. We saw blackened bodies all over the place, they probably burned underneath houses who burned down. People who died from severe injuries and burns were left on the ground without being collected. Those who were injured in a live left in pain without rescue. Today he is a Nuclear Engineer and an activist against Nuclear Weapons. He says he feels things are going in the wrong direction. He said its disconcerting that the japanese government is actively feeding the military threat. They have come all the way over to do military exercises so it seems to me the United States is provoking war. I want them to stop provoking and make dialogue possible. I think a lot of people might feel differently. Theyve seen missiles flying over there territory. Where else can they go. Let me get the question out and i want you to answer. People in japan have seen missile test flying over there territory. Theyve had air raids, sirens going out. What you make about what he has to say. I have low sympathy. Why did have sirens going off . They want to get rid of the constitution and the only way to do that is frightened japanese people which is why japan is not interested in settlement of the situation because they would lose theop referendum. Japans interest is to make ring every time theres a missile within a thousand miles. If you want to launch a medium range missile, theres no other way to go. They are the ones that wrecked the Six Party Talks. I understand, have a great deal of sympathy but because of them, they refused to agree on anything. This is why they walked away and they refuse consistently to go back to the six partys. Talks because they werent a venue that was going to get anywhere. Frank, is the experience in japan, as part of their culture now, is that experience in the nightmare of it feed in to the potential threat they represent . Well, i think the threat has always been there so theyve had Nuclear Weapons for at least ten years. The Nuclear Shadow has been there and now with the longrange test its growing in the United States, but i would add that its one thing to have the capability and its another thing that theyre not going to use it. If they os were ever to attack the United States we would respond with overwhelming force and that means destruction of the country. Ii think we turn to nitpick and say they didnt achieve this and they want to prove beyond any doubt that they have this capability. The concern is they would demonstrate a missile test with a live warhead with that nation over International Waters and that would be a game changer for us. I think another concern for us is that north korea may now mistakenly believe that they have a Nuclear Weapon capability so they can keep the u. S. Aside and run amok and coerce south korea and do a lot of provocation for their purposes. We started with japan. Lets go to north korea. His from the university in seoul and has equipment all translate this one as well. Oh good, i dont have to. Transition translate this one. The first thing i would like to know is why is thee u. S. So afraid of north korea . North korea has a very tiny army. Even if they w t get icbms which its looking its way toward, america still has a qualitative and quantitative militaryry edge both in conventional and nuclear capabilities, and so, the North Koreans know if they do anything, ifg, this escalates with the National Conflict with america, they will lose so why is the u. S. Making such a big deal out of north korea. We have had a lot of analysts and experts and journalists, maybe even you on the take away, on my show explaining that South Koreans tend to be much less excited about the north korean threat than americans are. Is that true . It is true to a certain degree. South koreans have been living with this threat for decadeses and had to go about their arily lives. Remember, they are living in a country that is extremely competitive. They have everyday concerns are much more concerned about. I remember as a child when i was visiting south korea, we used to have these regular air raid drills at 2 00 p. M. And you pull your car over to the side of the road, take cover, frankly, i think people dont even stop what theyre doing right now theyre so oblivious to some of these threats. That said, these are a little bit different right now, i think the uncertainty and the lack of clarity in terms of what President Trump might do has unnerved some South Koreans, and also, whats interesting is there is a growing call in south korea among some parts of the populationon for south korea to arm itself. I think its kind of reflected in what the student is saying. Some people are calling to have them reintroduced to the crampton slough which is a really Interesting Development that i see happening in south korea. Frank, you have experience in the diplomatic world. We are talking about the potential for military confrontation and how these societies view the threat. Youve been around the negotiating table. How does the actual threat of violence in the actual threat of war, if there is such a threat informed these discussions. You were with the Six Party Talks, and the kind of defunct , but how does that inform how talks are received. This is really debate over whether we can have policy deterrence. I think the question is a good one, i think frank mention this as well that of course north korea is not suicidal, i dont think any of us think that, i think north korea sees its icbms and Nuclear Weaponsat iprograms as a way to prevent the United States from coming to south koreas aid and probablywe protecting japan as well and so the question here, one that i think people have been strugglingea with please can you Deter North Korea, a possible policy cook solution, can it be lets just not given them all this credit and attention for these provocations and lets just say you do whatever youu want but you cant attack the United States or south korea or japan . I would save course we can from those korea military strikes, but the problem with that is a policy and that gets to this question, he cant really use that as a policy to Deter North Korea from proliferation. For example, north korea built a Nuclear Reactor in syria that was destroyed by israel in 2007. If our policy is similar to strategic patience and just saying lets not worry about this, we can Deter North Korea, lets focus on something else, then are we prepared to have ao north korean Nuclear Weapons program and icn program that will sell to anyone who is willing to pay for it . That is the crux of the policy debate with north korea. You can have deterrence as an element of the policy but what is the other part of the policy . Thats where we get into the debate of sanctions versus diplomacy. I just want make one last point, a couple of times panelists have noted that it seems like the u. S. And japan are not interested in settling. Its interesting that that question really needs to be on the other side. Is north korea interested in settling . The investor whose the special representative for north korea policy for the u. S. Has been trying to get the North Koreans to respond and his latest response said there is no signal from north korea so if you want to have negotiations, as they say, it takes two to tango. If the North Koreans are not interested in nort negotiations, where does that leave us . We cant just show up to beijing in the state house with a Six Party Talks were before and sit at the plenary table and say okay, were ready for Six Party Talks. The work that way. Soho the North Koreans have shown no interest in denuclearization. Why think they havent responded, that doesnt mean theyre not interested. They may eventually want to get to the negotiating table but theyre doing it on their own timeline. They want to get the program to point where they considered the table as peers, or thats what the thinking. Right, i guess i would say thats the danger there. I think they were very clear in russia that she sees this to north korea sees this as an arms control negotiation, as a discussion amongst nuclear peers with north korea replacing the ussr and those negotiations, and that is plainly unacceptable for the United States but i would argue it should be unacceptable for everyone that we would suggest that we would accept north korea as a Nuclear Power as an end goal. Thats not naive suggesting they dont have Nuclear Weapons now. Of course that Nuclear Weapons now, but i think we have to think, north korea experts, most of us have this flaw of thinking about in silos. If we accept north korea as a Nuclear Weapons power, the Iranian Regime will stand up and save course, lets renegotiate that nuclear deal, and you know what i want . I want to north korea deal. I want the deal where i can get a Nuclear Weapon so we have to bewe careful about the precedents we are willing to set with regard to global nonproliferation. One moment. In just a few minutes, i want to tell our audience at the institute for peace that will open it up for q a. Thats coming up in about ten or 12 minutes. Them telling you now as you can get the juices flowing and start think about your questions. You know all the different areas of expertise that the panels are bringing to bear so start think about your questions. And if youle might minutes the microphone will go out to the audience. I leave you with that. You set a precedent with israel, you set a precedent with india and pakistan and the worlds most proliferated proliferators are the pakistani and. They got centrifuges around the world. Where were the sanctions against pakistan . Where were the threats and negotiations . No, it was fine. That was fine. North korea, oh no. Re their big problem so from a north korean perspective, its the u. S. Thats changing the rules of the game halfway through. Frank, you are the one around this table who has worked in the pentagon. You dont have uniform but you worked over there. The other inevitable part of this discussion is military action from the United States and its allies. I had mike mullen on our show a couple months ago and i asked him if when he looks at the big map and looks at the military options inside the pentagon, as they relate to north korea, if any of those options are good. He said none of them were good. That was a short answer. There was a longer one but i think you probably have some thoughts on viable military options and if any really exist. Unitede anything t v fastates can do to really brush back the North Koreans Nuclear Missile program. Im not going to object to what the admiral says, thats my first point. There are certainly military options, i wouldnt call them viable military options because they all entail significant loss of life so there r is a recent survey that came out and said even in a conventional conflict, within the first few days you would have anywhere from 30,000 to 300,000 deaths, and obviously those numbers go up exponentially when you have Nuclear Weapons involved. So, that being said, theres other things you can do militarily that may not be expository enough that would put us in a conflict. Its hard to think a lot of what those ared because i think if you have action that strikes even one missile facility you know they will respond because based on history when they are pressured they dont wilt, they certainly persevere and they almost always fight back. Right. It sounds strange and it sounded strange to me the first time i read about this but there is a language of military kinetic action, i like that phrase that you use, you have the option of a devastating strike where you can suit and transcend to cruise missiles to one site and those two things say Different Things to the victim. Its just a pinprick strike this is were not gonna wipe you out were just sending a message. Interpret datas message sent. Is that language work with the North Koreans . I have to interpret whats happening and there is ass danger, they misinterpret whats actually happening, thats the first problem. They are acutely aware from studying the iraq war and the rest that they literally have minutes to make a decision. Lets hope they appreciate thee distinction between two missile landing somewhere and a fullfledged assault. Ththats the first problem you face. There are talks about pinprick strikes, theres talks about if you want shooting down a missile and flight, you might get away with that because they said that was a missile failure. You strike a disappearing submarine or hitting something on the ground, hes not going to survivor along withg his own administration. This is not a man on his own. His military agrees with what he is doing as well. Is not going to survive if he doesnt fight back. About bringing down a Computer Network with some worms and viruses. I think ive seen that before. Hang on. The u. S. Is doing that. Why do you think the muscles are failing . The North Koreans woke up to that and rewired their whole Missile Systems and they started to work. They also read the newspapers about th what the israelis and americans are doing. Fine. Thats going on. I think that would work, but its not a very computer oriented society. Its not quiteit like the states or europe, they can get by without computers probably better than anybody else can. Lets get back to kinetics for second because the United States has thousands of troops in south korea huddled on a couple bases. As i understand it, within range of north korean artillery so we have to think two or three times about the ramifications of even a pinprick strike. The United States has 20000 troops in south korea, and in the region, 80000 troops, and we have 200,000 americans in that part of the world so there are huge risks to any kind of kinetic, i dont even know what kinetic action means, but there are huge risks to any kind of action that could spark or trigger that not just to the Korean People or the japanese but americans as well. I think when i hear the military option words, we do hear the president threatening in very vague terms that he can do something and he can handle it or military options usually mean the americans are going to remind north korea they have some powerful tools in the region or powerful force in the region, nuclear operated weaponry that they could unleash if they wanted to, and also remember they carry out joint military exercises twice a year. They see this as provocative and they consider it a rehearsal for an invasion. I think this is something thats really dangerous right because, just to remind you there is a Winter Olympics coming up in south korea in february so this is something certainly on the mind of the South Koreans. The americans and South Koreans have a joint military exercise that will overlap with part of the olympics and paralympics for this is a huge concern because thats always the start of the cycle of tension on the Korean Peninsula. But thats also another military option are these joint military exercises. Im not sure i answered your question. Yes, the whole idea of kinetics is weird to you and it is to me too. When we go to one more video clip, this one is from shanghai, from an Office Worker in shanghai china who asked not to be edified. Not sure from translating this wonderful translated but i guess well find out. Eat wondering if you would ever consult south korea or salicylateyo help from south korea or china, they dont want to engage or want to be engaged. She wants to know if the u. S. Would engage help with south korea or withed china. Its actually a good question, former ambassador chris hill was on our show just the other day, leader of the Six Party Talks where you were, anthony, he said one of the motivations he saw on the part of the north was to drive a wedge between the United States and south koreaea, that these increasingly sophisticated missile tests are designed to divide the United Statesat away from its allied relationship with the south. What you think about that. Absolutely. One of the Major Concerns in seoul right now is somethinget they called korea passing. Its a little bit of a phrase, but its the concern or fear that they are being bypassed and that the u. S. And north korea are in the middle of some sort of move toward bilateral discussions that wont involve south korea. South korea wants to be part of this discussion. They are really the ones whose lives are at stake. They are desperately trying to make sure they are at that table and at those discussions. Weve got kind of beenl ideological difference between the current president of south korea and the president of the United States. The president of south korea, his parents were born in north korea so they were refugees from north korea and he has a much moree holistic sense of the cramped insula, he is concerned about the future of north Korean People as well, he does not want the obliteration of either south korea or north korea, and its a little bit atk, odds. Right now he is very angry about the provocation, especially with the olympics coming upoe the so he is trying to be tough but he does eventually want engagement. So theres a little and difference in policy and icapproach between the u. S. And south korea, but he also wants to be active in those discussions. He does not want north korea to create a situation where the North Koreans are only talking to the United States or the United States is only talking to north korea and not including soul. To see the United States vulnerable to a play to divide us away from the South Koreans. Guess thats the part that surprises me the most. I would say he was very good at doing that very strategic, his father was very strategic in getting incentives for giving up his program and of course we all know that he didnt give up his programs, thats pretty obvious. I was surprised with the election of south korean president that equifax didnt make an overture word toward them to divide them from the United States. It doesnt seemed like that has happened yet, certainly it could be something he winds up doing. I think unfortunately, i think jeans right that they would prefer to have a different north korea policy then he has currently. His policy, in his view, unfortunately is aligned with a tougher policy than the United States wants now, whether its deploying or making statements about strongest sanctions. I think you would much prefer talks about reopening the Industrial Complex and we can talk about how that violate sanctions, but thats for another day. And we would much prefer a trip in a conversation and talking about the olympics and having ceremonies associated with that, but he cant do any of that. Thats what he iran on and he cannot do that. Thats what surprises me that kim jongun has not taken that opportunity to really drive a wedge between the United States and south korea. He hasnt done it yet but maybe he will. Frank, is kim jongun aware that the United States does not have an ambassador in seoul . You might have an opening here if he wants too so this kind of dissension that he has an opportunity to sell. Or. Ont have a top person we dont have an ambassador to south korea. I do think that point is maybe a little bit exaggerated because we definitely have a strong cohort of career officials at the state department that do their jobs very well, but it reflects concern amongst people in south korea and in the region about the lack of attention given to this policy. And general brooks is an exceptionally good man so i wouldnt worry too much about whether he will arrive in seoul any day soon. Thats not the problem. I think whats interesting, of tcourse is clearly kim jongun is not trying to divide south korea from the United States but hes not making the kind of offers you would expect him to make. Clearly thats not one of his aims. What would you expect him to do if that were one of his aims . What would be his best play now if he were trying to drive d that wedge which a lot of people expect. I dont think hes terribly interested in in the moment. He was probably interested back in july where he thought there could be a difference but then he decided he couldnt be out of the decisionmaking loop and that would be five years for south korea. I fully agree, South Koreans dont trust President Trump so in therm short term they will be as close as possible. In the mediumterm they are scarcely talking not about u. S. Nuclear weapons but developing their own Nuclear Deterrence because they dont trust the United States. Maybe rightly. On that basis theyre going to be looking after their own interest. The one thing we might see out of this is if south korea goes nuclear, japan will follow in 15 minutes. Were gonna get a whole new environment there. I think thats what the situation is. The North Koreans realize that the result of their dilemma, they have to talk to the United States. Nobody else really matters in the end. Thats the solution. Other than some peripheral work with the south and the people paying the bills for north korea and even if he did he would get it so its going to be the koreans doing the heavy lifting with maybe some insistance fromm china, the European Union and possibly, depends how long it takes, japan. Just one or two minutes left before we go to our final break and then on to questions from our distinguished audience. We talked a lotom about sanctions and ratcheting down, lets give a moment of lipservice. Anthony, you are the sanctions man. Talk about carrots for a moment. It may only take you a minute, what positive motivation do we have two offer the north and should we . Sure. I am probably the rare person that talks about sanctions that thanks we should be talking to north korea directly. I distinguish between talks and negotiations. I think its valuable to talk to north korea directly. Im going to avoid, my criticism of our negotiation strategy is that we would negotiate for both sides, in other words come a we determine what we want from north korea, denuclearization and how we get to that point, and then we, determine what were going to tell north korea, what were willing to give them in order to achieve that goal. If north korea tells us what they needd from us in a negotiated settlement. We shouldnt be coming to the ftable with a list of here are the number of sanctions we can release, i would just say, my final point will be, that is the one area that we are not taughtalking a lot about. What would be the negotiation strategy in a renewed Six Party Talks . Remember, 2005x party talks they know nuclear program, no Nuclear Weapons for north korea. Thats certainly not what the iran deal negotiated so we would have to discuss that. Then we have to think about how we flip it on its head and get north korea to commit to denuclearization up front. The flaw in the negotiations in the 201,990s was that we accepted this long run outng negotiation that in the end did not lead us to denuclearization. There actually might be a book in your future on the fine art of making deals. I think theres a market for that. Jean . So i just want to follow up on something you mentioned, i agree if we are going to figure out what it is we want, we also have to understand who they are and what they want teand how to reach them. Unfortunately at this time we are at a point where we have almost no access and theres almost no interaction. Part of that is what we call the new york channel has been silent to a certain degree, thats the view that the north korean. [inaudible] and we have a travel ban in place starting in september that will be good for at least as year that prohibits most americans from traveling to north korea so theres little opportunity to get to know who they are and thats certainly a concern of mine. If we dont know who they are, how do we even know how to punch them or reach out to them. So in terms of the carrot, one of the interesting things when donald trump is campaigning is that he said i would sit down with kim jongun and have a hamburger with him and it was kind of intriguing. There are reasons why dont do that because it legitimizes the person youre sitting down with and that is certainly a concern. But i can tell you, thats exactly what kim jongun wants. It was an intriguing proposal to put out there im very interested to know that whatever happens. A little bit ofdi burger diplomacy which means legitimacy, is that a good carrot . That is a good care and we know exactly what they want because they stated repeatedlyu that i believe at this point the price is probably gone up. We know they want to keep their weapons. They want relief from sanctions. They want an end to u. S. Hostile policy which means an end to military exercises, removal of forces from the peninsula and economic concessions but we know what they want its just a matter of what are we willing to concede that allows them to get to the table or eventually get the goal that we want. And a peace treaty which is part of all of that. Ot its a bushel of carrots but i asked for 1 carat. 1 carat. Peace treaty. Thats a big carrot. That the bugs bunny size carrot. And a peace treaty today, simple of that. Come to the table. This is partle of the problem. Some of the things they want are impossible to deliver. So lets build realistic. You have to see it the other way around. Some w things u. S. Want and we want and the european would really like but we can get because you can deliver some of the things they want. St we got to be realistic about meeting in the middle somewhere. It seems to me the u. S. Interest is really about stopping themhe and having the ability to hit the mainland usa. Forget about the Nuclear Weapons, thats gone. That ship sailed. It sailed in 2010 which was the last time they mention the possibility of getting rid of their Nuclear Weapon. Another back in your future. Ss the impossible carrots but ill ready have a title for you. We will take another short break in a minute or two and ill give all of you a chance to get your questions ready. The microphone will start traveling around the room because you have an opportunity to question these experts yourselves. Stay with us. [applause] we will have a microphone circulating pretty if you have a question raise your hand will have the microphone come down to you and we will call on you. Also make sure when you ask a question to identify yourself and then if you have a panelist you want to address, make sure you who you want to address that question too. [inaudible conversations] also, immediately after we will do a couple things so we will take two minutes of your time so just hold off right will we do a couple quick things so just be aware of that. And, this is going to be a radio show. It will be all cut together on your local npr station, but like we always say come on the show that i work on, the show relies on you in this part of the show definitely relies on you so do not be shy. You are here because you care about these issues of this is your chance to get in. I really want to do it. Definitely want to hear from you. Toso please get in there. Will start just one second. The ricoh welcome back everyone to our program. U. S. North korea relations here at the United States institute of peace in washington d. C. We are pleased to welcome back our panel, frank, jean, anthony and glenn ford on the other end. Thank you all for being here. One last little round of applause, if you would. Now tend to have your say and your questions. Ive asked plenty and im looking forward to a little bit of a break. All i have to do is point to the audience and hands are already up so there will be a microphone coming around the room. Identify yourself and he would like your question go for. Lets start with a woman with her hand up right up there. Hello. My name is bailey, im a freshin freshman studying international affairs. I would like to address. Is making a deal with north Korea Possible or do you think youd be arguing with a child that wants a cookie that you can give them the cookie but they really want the cookie. If military intervention is preventable or necessary . I think the deal is possible but at the moment its looking very unlikely because i feel with the u. S. Wants and what north korea wants is so fundamentally irreconcilable so i think the u. S. Is saying, north koreas thing we absolutely want to keep our Nuclear Weapons in the u. S. Is sang north korea cannot keep their weapons so if you take this all or nothing maximalist approach than it really is in space for the policy. I think there needs to be a little give her they needs to be focused for a shift away from that singular focus on denuclearization and a look at achievablecal intermediate steps that give us the political space to later on tackle some of the harder issues. All start there. I would just reminded people that weve tried the middleground. Weve tried it a couple times. When we traded in the 1990s, north korea felt a covert Uranium Enrichment Program which was another path to Nuclear Weapon and then we tried it again in the Six Party Talks and north korea was building a Nuclear Reactor in syria, and even after that was destroyed by israel United States continued its negotiations, removing north korea from the statesponsored terrorism list, blowing up the cooling tower and beyond, and none of that worked. I think we have to be very clear m eyed suggesting that there is this middleground. That sounds like the pessimist, but im actually the optimist but i do believe there is a negotiated settlement where north korea denuclearize is, and how do you achieve that is the type of sanctions that i was describing earlier. I know that everybody is a pessimist when it comes to sanctions, but there will come a time when chinese banks are punished for what they did for north korea, and then you have chinese banks on the front lines identifying north korean money that is sitting in china that is used for the elites, for the military and for the weapons programs, and what kim jongun will have to decide is which of these are most important. Now he gets to rank them 1a, b and c. What happens when he has to rank them one, two and three . That will be the issue for him, his revenue will dry up, his relationship with china is going to dry up, and that is the leverage that the United States cann use to bring a negotiated settlement. We dont have that leverage now and i think we should get caught up in the provocation that distract us because its a deliberate attempt by north korea to distract the unitedri states from denuclearization. Anthony, how hard are you working to raise the strategy up to the Trump Administration and to convince them that iran style sanctions on the way to go . They already know that. I think we certainly have conversations withme them, i think theres some great work being done by organizations here in the u. S. And d. C. In particular, theyve written two groundbreaking reports on Chinese Networks and the point i would make is that if they confidedt here in d. C. , some of the largest banks in the world in china can fight it. I would also say capitol hill is watching. Some of the sanctions that were passed last year end this year and the executive order that was issued by this administration are carbon copiesn. From the sanctions program in iran. The issue here is the United States administration, are they willing to go and implement those sanctions, in this case it means going after china and other countries, are they willing to move past north korea. Some countries have reduced commercial or diplomatic relationships. We need to see more. That issonsh only in this last year. Interesting. Thats a place to watch over the next year or two. Lets go, i dont want to give you too far to walk. . An we go down to thewo, front hello. Fascinating discussion. I am Michael Marshall from the global peace foundation. I would like to hear from ms. Lee and mr. Ford who spent extensive time and north korea ,re on their take on changes within north korean society, particularly as it affects the elites. How important are the people in north korea and what will happen if their standard of living is declining and also the nexus between marketization and elite corruption. Thank you. You may go first. The elites is extremely important to the regime. Some people describe north korea as having its own economy. I like to think it a little bit like a monarchy in a sense, you have to keep a certain number of people happy in order to win their loyalty so thats extremely important. Remember that until fairly recently, so many of the elites were working or traveling overseas, the flights that i used to take were packed with North Koreans who were doing business overseas, studying or had other reasons to go overseas. We are seeing some of that stop now because of these sanctions but they were exposed to what life was like outside their country. They were developing a taste for some ofid these creature comforts, iphone, i used to sit next to, the North Koreans would have to come until 2013 they would have to lock their iphones up or their phones up in lockers at the airport. Now they can take them in once they register them but often there would be devices that they became very comfortable with. In some sense what weve seen is a lot of effort to try to makey. Sure to keep that population happy. Ive been traveling there for most ten years, and i can tell you it has changed, this is a country where change comes but in terms of the consumer culture, it has turned quite changed quite a bit and its because he knows he needs to keep those people happy and give them some of those creature comforts. Whether or not sanctions affect their actions to these kinds of creature comforts, i do think sis that we are startig to see some of those, weve had quite a number of high profile defections from that elite class in the last year so perhaps they are starting to see there is a strain on even that population. Its extremely important and certainly very clear since round 2008. You were always privileged but theres been an enormous privileging. Youve now got restaurants, shops, youve got an area, water parks, outdoor iceskating rink since summer, horse riding stables when you can have a ski slope. Its an enormous privileging. Youve got borders around. Anybody can leave, but coming back in, you need permission. So, this is a closed city and its very important for kim jongun to actually deliver to those people. Thats the point im making. He believes yesterday two things. He needs nuclea weapons to stop regime change and he needs to grow the economy. Theres compatibility there and thats the trick hes actually got to pull off. Now, maybe the sanctions will work, i suspect that a certain point china will get set up. The notion is that you can push china around as if it some third world country, i suspect that doesnt work anymore. Resident she will put up with quite a lot but they will reappointe and they say enough is enough and you start interfering with the banks and enough will be enough. Book. I dont know, but im pretty convinced there is a level of corruption in north korea. Its probably y not entirely dysfunctional if you look at levels of corruption around the world, nigeria barely functions because of corruption. There are other places where they are functional. I dont think it interferes with the functioning of the system. Its a little bit like japan. Most of the industries, most of the import exports are connected to a ministry, to a military unit, to a section of the party. There, theres a protected ones. As a sign of that youve got the master list of people going out in the marketplace. Some making a lot of money but most loser homes and the possessions. But thats capitalism. What they want at the moment is they want to countries, one system. Thats what North Koreans want for this one a separate north and separate south, 25 years to grow their economy and then the be in a position to unify. To see some more hands, if we can. Mamaam in the black sweater. My name is maria, im at the center for peace building. Thank you for this discussion. My question is about talks and what is the right way to go about encouraging those talks and who are the right players. It seems the situation is to polarize between the u. S. And north korea for there to be direct talks without some facilitation. My question is, first of all, when you talk about the elites, are there people within that group that can be harnessed to come up with some sort of platform for talks . Further intelligence that can be john or is it only people from the Political Party that can be engaged . If you could just talk about the potential for talks and how that might come about, that would be great. Jean would you like to take that one . Lkje i want to reinforce the point andnd provide some background. In early 2015, northd r korea originated their proposal for a dual freeze which now china has sort of taken up the mantleze on later in the fall, they also proposed peace party talks. S. They have been proposing talks in recent years but i think anthony is right, recently,y,ntt least since september they have been silent. If they dont have that partner on the other end, its hard to see how that mayay happen. Things are change and things are fluid but i think you have to have a partner. I suspect you will have a willing partner. As they say, i think the announcement, the best use was the announcement by kim jongun that he has now finished his program. You look at the history of the United States development. Whos next. Lets go to the gentleman down in the third row. Three questions. If they plan to close the sanctions office within the department of state. I wonder if theres a way the second report on north korea suggested a positive way forward to enjoy exchanges. And i wonder if someone has good examples despite the travel ban situation. Would you mind if you restate your question just a little louder and use a radio track. Get close to the micti. Other plans to close the sanctions office within the state department and i wonder if that will reduce the capacity of the u. S. To implement an iranian style regime. I would say the decision to close the sanctions office and the state department, i think a lot of those responsibilities are going to be moved to other will be in the policy Planning Branch we saw the iran sanctions where the Treasury Department played a larger diplomatic role and they were meeting with banks and Companies Directly describing thet sanctions so i wouldnt focus as much on bureaucracies, i would focus more on are the right sanctions in place, is the Trump Administration actually implementing those sanctions . Are they pushing countries to be consistent . Thats music to his ears saying there is no hollowing outgoing on at the state department. It traditionally secretaries of state have different priorities and it was only a couple years ago that those did not exist and we were fine with sanctions. Did you want that question for glenn ford . Did you catches . So the second question was about the 2013 report that called for positive moves forwards. One of the only ways North Koreans can get overseas right now. They have an opportunity with the upcoming olympics, we dont know if the North Koreans will send a delegation. No other areas. The more you engage the North Koreans, the better if you want to change the regime. , have engagement. If they cut off diplomatic relations. [inaudible] the United Kingdom has an interest. Completelyare crazy to close the embassy. We want to get a dialogue. How the hellan do you talk to them if youve thrown them out. Engage more. I just want to point out the differences in evaluations. After ten months they want to declare sanctions dont work but after engagement decades that have not produced the regime that we want, the answer is more engagement. I think we have to be consistent in how we evaluate our approach to north korea. It had 64 years of sanctions. Every time we have new tougher sanctions, nobody says this wont work. We can have that conversation later. Want to get through this part of the debate so we can make sure if the audience has more questions. This german on the end. I work at the institute for defense analyses. My question is for frank. Given that you are recently removed and that your under the bureaucratic thumb, you can speak your mind and be a little candidate. Can you tell us how much consideration was given to pass policy under clinton and bush . An individual you may know who discussions. All the things that north korea wanted, the peace treaty, the lifting of sanctions, and it didnt work. Thats why im curious to know how much characterm considerationas was done in the past. Thats a great question. I could probably talk for a while. First, the u. S. Institute of peace is funded by congress. Were technically an independent organization but we are also mindful. I wouldnt say i feel completely free. That being said, in the late 90s they were studying korean to eventually go and serve. I will say the Obama Administration gave careful consideration. I would argue that they tried diplomacy early on and we saw that leading to two deals, one was the leap day deal in 2012 which was a moratorium in exchange for food aid. There was also a deal that people dont know much about which is remains recovery. There was a deal for u. S. Soldiers to go into north korea and help recover the remains of 5000 sets of servicemen and that fell by the way when they conducted a satellite launch. I think it was basically the same quality trumpet using right now. Its an extension of what obama did which was maximize pressure and build a coalition for community to put pressure. I think we would agree they really emphasize and maximize. I think the strategy is basically the same. I think the trumpet ministration has done a great job in pressuring north korea and chin china. The man in the back with his hand held high. My name is kevin gray from the Wilson Center and i have a question again. I think theres a function of what you say and what many people say about sanctions. The more strong they are. I dont know that thats necessarily the case when sanctions have been applied. The strongest sanctions were against iraq in the 1990s. H it was led to some account by his death of a halfmillion. [inaudible] theres a huge human cost. I think the reason for that is sanctions work for a very specific, its not just about how strong they are but the political and socioeconomic mechanisms through whichch they actually induce change. North korea is not only authoritarian, but its almost totalitarian. It doesnt haveoe splits like iran dead. It doesnt have a Civil Society like south africa did. All these things make me very skeptical about the capability of sanctions to induce policy change in north korea. Thats actually a really fine place to stop and get an answer from anthony. Sure. Ive heard a lot of these arguments. I think we have to look at what is north korea spending the money on. I think the comparison i made with iran is more than iran was targeted financial sanctions. I think was more during the time when we had a broadbased country base sanctions program which, i think if you look at the end of the iran program, we were probably closest to that, but thet rampup was what was considered targeted financial sanctions but i think we are somewhere in the middle, toward the end of that process with north korea, in the sense of whats already been implemented. I agree, i think the issue here is this is not a regime that cares a lot about its people. And that they dont have to make that determination now. The elect military and weapons programs. One thing that the north koreas have helped out is keeping the money or all of the money in china. Thats a significant vulnerability for them. So the issue here for north korea is going to be, if china starts to restrict that voluntarily or involuntarily, how will they react . And then the questions you raise of, how will that react amongst the elite and then within the Civil Society. Those are certainly open questions. I think the way it worked with iran is that evenly we eventually we got to a point where there were severe pressures on their economy, and in the case of iran, one commodity in the sale of oil that was restrict ode overseas and they got to a point where that lemming they hood to had to release the pressure or the Civil Society and elite pressures could have been overwhelming on the regime. I think theres one other ill add on to that. One other way to look at sanctions and thats as a possible tool for diplomacy in a sense that if north korea is continuing to build up its program, you want to have if youre on the other side of the negotiating table you want to have something you can negotiate away. So another way to look at it. Leverage. If we walk into negotiations toy, we dont have a lot of leverage, and thats when i talk about deterrence not preventing proliferation, sinkses is a way to prevent proliferation. Sanctions are working, hurting all of north korea, men, women and children and not the elite. Im going to exercise my leverage here and tell you we have four our five minutes before we wrap up. The place i want to wrap up if with think is the bottom line of this discussion. Well go to each of you. Frank, youre last since youre the host, you get the last word on this. How urgent is this problem . We spent the last 90 minutes talking about. Are we actually closer to war than we were a year ago . Glen, go ahead. Absolutely. I dont know how close, the bulletin of atomic scientist had the clock advances towards midnight, which is when the next nuclear war is going to happen. That used to be three minutes to midnight. I say were one minute to midnight. Theres a real prospect. You talk to people in washington about the possibilities, they talk ten 20, 30 percent, those are incredibly high numbers bus ten years ago we were down around zero. So, were in a worrying position. Seems to me the only way to get out of atlanta there are three roads to war, taking military action, one us covert action, we have not talked about, the u. S. Policy of regime change. The third one is sanctions. If they stash hurting will kim jongun come to the negotiating table or engage in militarism, and the only peace. Solution is through negotiations, and the sooner we get there the better. Saber rattling, tweeting, and tests, are we actually closer to confrontation. Theres so much potential to bedrop into a conflict. We have 80,000 u. S. Troops in the region. How many more do we have from north korea, south korea, poised and ready, braced i mean, with this last missile test, not a that long after that the south korean army conducted its own missile test. Clearly they were prepared. I want to Say Something else. Im not so concerned about the prospect of nuclear war but i am, as somebody who lives on the Korean Peninsula, concern about every test and the dangers posed not only in terms of safety i mean, theres an entire mountain in north korea that collapsed after the last nuclear underground nuclear test. Think about the radiation that was transmitted into the air. If we have another nuclear test, its possible might be above ground as frank mentioned. Hugely dangerous, and i want to mention the cost to the north Korean People, this is an expensive program, and theyre diverting resources away from basie infrastructure. So normally in the past the time of year i was in north korea, freezing, they dont have heat, dont have electricity, limited electricity. Clean water. Running water. Toilet. They are its a difficult place to live, and by allowing this program to continue, were taking food out of the mouths of average North Koreans. So i worry about that. I want to remind you that the people of the Korean Peninsula are also paying the price. Anthony, your final thoughts if were actually closer to war than we were. I dont think were closer to a military conflict or war. I am concerned that north korea will engage in a military action like they did seven years ago, to sink a south korean naval vessel and kill south korean sailors. Concerned the North Koreans will interpret our inaction in 2010 as an ability to do Something Like that. I think that is really the danger i see that something happens and then it escalates quickly. I would also say that we have to be careful about creating these mindsets that we can just have some talks with north korea and that we will magically be able to wave a magic wand and solve the issue. We need to be very careful about the drive by beijing in particular, to drive up the danger and say well have a military conflict and the only solution is a flawed nuclear deal, a freeze for freeze. That makes us more dangerous. I think the 70day over 70day pause clarifies that north korea continues these programs even when we think they are already stopped. So, the only solution, the on peaceful solution, right now, continue with sanctions, to create the leverage for denuclearization talks. Frank. Last word. So i think at the current trajectory, the situation is very urgent. Either trump President Trump is serious about what he is saying, when he says, fire and furry, when he says the calm before the storm, when he says the window is closing, ease either meaning it in which case the situation is urgent, or hes bluffing in which case we kind of go through a status quo and continue to contain north korea, but at the same time were opening ourselves up to a situation that anthony mentioned, we stumble interest a conflict because of a provocation. I think i dont want to leave it on a mess mystic note. I think the pessimistic note. The situation is lewd and can change. I believe sanctions. Believe in the saying that sanctioned dont work until they work. I think theyre necessary and also not sufficient. I think the same applies for diplomacy, diplomacy doesnt work until it works and theres a good track record in the 90s of diplomacy working, the framework for eight years, prevented the processing for eight years, until the agreement was scrapped. Theres always potential but the situation has to change from both the north korean side and the United States tied. Wang to thank you for joining us for this program. Its been a pleasure if want to thank frank, our host. Glen, to to you. Gene and anthony, pleasure, and thank you for having me as part of this. Its been a lot of fun. Have a great weekend, everybody. [applause] thank you for the great questions. Well just have time for magic stuff. Just say, frank, gene [inaudible discussion] glynn, frank, gene, anthony. It worked. When youre on the radio, ill remember that part. [inaudible discussion]