Behalf of carnegie today to host a pair of panels that include some of the people i admireof the most in the field of contemporary china studies. Wery at carnegie, and throughout the community have had tremendous admiration for the leadership and the production which is organized by alice muller at the Hoover Institution at stanford university. They have established a tremendous record for hearing the facts as opposed to trends and feelings and moods and things like that. Whenever you want to touch base with reality, i recommend you go and do precisely that. Today will give you ahe whitmans sampler of their writings in the form of presentations looking had to the very short time from now. We have it broken into two panels, the first one will be thewi people w you see here. I will moderate. Michael and alan has been regular contributors as well as to many other contributions in the field. They will speak for the first. Until 1045. James was here a moment ago and has been called away i have family emergency. We wish him well as hes having to manage this morning. Id wanted to mention, as we look around the room, you may see no one here working for the brookings institution. That is not a protest for they been called to a mandatory retreat and they would love to be here with us as well. Id like to get started and the order we have thank you very much. Its great to be part of this effort. Ive been writing for, i dont know, how long. 152 years. Sometimes it seems like that. Yes, its a tough job. Its a very demanding schedule. The deadlines are really harsh. Its been a pleasure writing. My topic has been form policy, and i have usually focused on trying to dig deep into the views in the open media on form policy b issues distinguishing between authoritative and non authoritative because so often in narratives and discussions about chinese policies, observers completely ignore what the government says in authoritative way and all manner of others. Sort of jumping altogether as if they represent chinese views. They do in some sense but they certainly dont in the sense of the authoritative views. What i would like to do is speak a little bit about the form policy themes, continuities and changes and policy initiatives that we might see coming up later this month. Party congresses are usually not occasions for getting into the details of form policy. Most people focus on them and we will see that today with implications to leadership changes in broad nationally policy direction, but they do Say Something about form policy that some very important things. What ivead done is ive taken a look at the 17th and 18th Party Congress since the last, since 2012. Ill make comments in which they usually cover in terms of form policy. The first is general statementsts on the Global Environment that has an impact on form policy. These are statements in the world and it has implications. I think they will continue to stress, a generally stable environment and peace and development of the time. I think youll see that can be highlighted. The statement has always been paired with more negative concerns about the international environment. Those in the past have been called power politics, local conflicts, hotspot issues that keep emerging. Imbalances in the World Economy which may be worsening and then of course traditional and nontraditional securityy threats. You will see references to these factors as well. Theres also been a reference in the past to something called neo interventionism. That has been the tendency for states to intervene in the internal affairs of other state states. This was prompted really for or highlighted in the first Party Congress and it came about because of libya and syria with outside powers. This might not be as prominent in this party because you havent had as many new examples of this unless you talk about the possibility and the fear of usled intervention in north korea. T isi doubt that would be likely tohe be mentioned or cause because its usually occurred after development. It is possible, i suppose. Now, in addition to these concerns that weve seen before, bot both positive and negative, i think they will alsom highlight more recent potential threats to what it sees as peace and growing stability, growth in the international system. That will be this idea of growing imbalances in Economic Development and more importantly, what is seen as the troubling backlash against greater global integration and the forces of globalization but this is a a theme that has been struck by chinese leaders in recent years that has become increasingly prominent. In beijing, they will likely present themselves as a strong opponent of a trend toward protectionism and a proponent of greater economic integration and freetrade which have become, as i say, a theme since the election of donald trump and the rise of similar me first nationalism or nationalist movements in e europe. Just to highlight this, just last month they said we live in a world that is witnessing profound changes in the International Landscape and the balance ofsm h power. Prominent, traditional and non traditional threats and a growing backlash against globalization. There are unprecedented challenges forul mankind pursuit of lasting peace inin Sustainable Development but i wouldnt be surprised if some variation of the statement appears in a Party Congress statement. A second area, getting more to the issue ofw chinese policy, in other words how does china deal with this environment, i think youin will see again in the Party Congress, central focus in all realms on following through the objectives for china which is, as we probably all know in this room, a moderately Prosperous Society by 2021. This was ratified in 2002, reaffirmed to the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and reaffirmed yet againin in 2012. The second is the construction of a strong democratic civilized harmonious and modern socialist country by 2049. The centenary of the formatione. These two things have continued to be basic statements about chinese avobjectives. I think these will be couched within the context of the china dream which is the personal concept of regionalization. That will have a prominent place, i would imagine. It hold high the banner of peace, cooperation, mutual benefit, independent form policy following a winwin strategy for countries opening up sustainable balance, growth et cetera. You also here, i think new type of power relation. Some have thought recently that these slogans have been deemphasized somewhat in chinese leaders statements. I doubt however they will be lacking. I think theres still a major element of chinastr view toward dealing with the United States in developing countries, particularly neighboring countries. I think most notably they will see chinas need to firmly uphold the territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and national unity. This of course refers to its disputes with its neighbors around its periphery, in the maritime area that come more direct in recent years. Again, from a recent speech, in this case by. [inaudible] in july on the issue where he lyated china must unequivocally make clear its position on taiwan, the South China Sea and other issues concerning chinas major court interest. We have drawn a clear line of what is acceptable and acted forcefully to defend our court interest as well as our legitimate right. The emphasis on this issue remains. I think very much it will be reflected in the Party Congress statement. It reflects the larger emphasis by the regime which began, the defense of stability and the advancement of peace and stability alongside the protection of chinas rights and interests. Using chinas greater influence to advance those interests. At the same time, i think there will be efforts to emphasize multilateral diplomacy as have occurred in the recent Party Congress in the idea of reforming Global Governance which has also been a theme in past congress meetings. In the defense and security rounds in particular, i think youll probably hear the phrase which was again made after the 18 Party Congress on a search for a common comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. In this regard you might hear the placement of the party the three principles dealing with hot issues. It imposes solutions on others. Its kind of a dig at the trumpp Administration Even though it predates that administration and adherence to political settlement and opposition to the use of force. I think regarding military policies in particular, the 19th Party Congress will reiterate the 18th a Party Congress unprecedented statement about the function of chinas military and military modernization were set a Strong National defense is commensurate with the National Standing and meets the needs of its security and the Chinese Military needs to take a more active role in the international and political roles. This oversees and is a theme that i think will continue into this Party Congress. It will also be a repetition of the emphasis on both maritime space and cyberspace security which is also occurred in the past Party Congress. The reference to cyberspace was unprecedented in the 18 Party Congress work report and also that of space in the context of security. In of course, i think that will be a repetition of the concept, the objective that it to build itself into a maritime power. Finally no details are provided the one belt one road for sure will appear. The improving relationship with countries which was a major theme since the key meaning of the 18 Party Congress could appear again, increasing involvement in a range of Multi Lateral events, including ones that china will organize and host, promote the views, especially on Global Governance issues could get a reference there. An interesting question is whether or not it will mention final russian relations and the Nuclear Crisis in particular. Im not sure about either of those. Russian relations has barely been mentioned in the past. They might be mentioned. The Nuclear Crisis in particular, i somewhat doubt unless its placed in the context of these hotspot issue statements that i said before. In any case, what i see are probably a lot of continuities with some creative emphasis on globalization, et cetera and free trade open market non protectionism. The real question in foreign and defense policy is not so much what policies will be struck in the 19 Party Congress in the following National Peoples congress in the spring of 2018, but whether a stronger, more dominant president will emerge to determine a more assertive or confrontational china on issues such as maritime disputes, u. S. Military activities in asia, taiwan and possibly even north korea. I dont subscribe to the view that its primary of autocrat most concerned with pushing the u. S. Out of asia as some observers think. Yes he wants china to be more effectively using its growing presence and influence internationally to promote its National Development and security interest, as ive said, but the chinese leadership in my view continue to recognize the imperative for china to maintain relatively positive cooperative relations with u. S. And the wes west. Like it or not, china is integrating into the Global Economy and the global regime and highly adverse to major shifts in the regional or global order that could threaten its continued stability and prosperity such as a confrontation with the u. S. The chinese leadership alson know they have yet to make a stable transition to a new normal of growth rates to more equitable and just Society Living standards and lower living of corruption. I tend to agree with those who argue that in order to obtain these very difficult goals, china must carry through the domestic environment for years to come. Ma it would be foolish in my view for china to transition into a highly aggressive transportation will posture after the 19th Party Congress. This doesnt include the possibility of greater tension for the u. S. , its allies and other asian stateses in particula particular. In fact, over time, i think this is probably likely, as i have argued elsewhere. This will require, in my view, new approaches to Regional Security and more extensive cbms than we have yet seen, hopefully leading to a stable balance of power eventually across the region. W u. S. Policy needs a strategy to deal with the changing situation and we havent seen one yet. I will stop there. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I guess we got in early. [inaudible] when President Trump and his entourage arrived in beijingngof very shortly after the congress but there was a lot of buzz that its going to be a more aggressive or less aggressive phase. This audience will have lots of good questions and challenges. Next we will turn to alan. He has written the bible on contemporary u. S. Taiwan relations. He is keeper of chapter and verse on what happens in taiwan. I recommend. This is a really superb look and brea very granular detail of what has been going on in taiwans relation with the west detail in whats going on in taiwans rel me despite all and of the issues , the congress will be focused on domestic issues as well as economic. Antione has been limited in the congress itself to half a paragraph the heather have been in hong kong and and i would be surprised if there were any greater formal attention also those briefings that go along in those press briefings but i do nazi basically a sharp departure from that practice but my own view is that basically we have what is a classic Irresistible Force and that beijing has chosen and i am not entirely sure why, chosen to focus whether under the 1982 consensus and we know from several years of conversation that is in that particular formulation that is so critical but what they call the core connotation. Anded he has not done that but in my view has conducted policy in a way which is not inconsistent traditionally viewed as of one china approach. If you go back and look it was a different story but basically since she became a candidate for president a lot of the rhetoric surrounded her has fallen away. I dont think that principle concern has changed despite the polls that show there is limited support based on what i consider the most reliable either now or to maintain the status quo nevertheless we feel if we will go up tomorrow morning then be my guest. There would not be a uniform deal but this would not happen and i think they know this and that is why we see the i polls show to maintain the status quo. Theyey looked aside with great suspicion and that really points do not the declaration of independence although some day be concerned with the appointments of certain justices budget is covert or soft that they are concerned about them is the focus of the policies been cutting off contact data authoritative levels. There is still a lot of communication the coming out of this congress with a significant tightening up i dont think so. Unless there is some movement particularly starting in channel negotiations i dont see a likelihoodod this will produce major change in the direction of policy. If you go back one year or more there was a hope that there would be in a position and with ways to address a of a stalemate. And then to find a way around it but my sense is that to have defense information and that the statements coming out of beijing and does not suggest it will be easy after congress. Ng end not to push for unification in a time frame although with the second 100 years in the country that is unified under that heading a number of people if they think they could achieve it by then if that is a real change from the second panel but to put a great deal of emphasis on china and i am trying to have that exceptions of china in whatever way. It has to be something to scratch the itch with those are in direct rays to do that but despite their suspicions in to undermine stability through covert cultural independence. I could say three reses said you could come up with more but why make a the problem harder . There is backlash to thosehe punishments to dismiss that term. The coz tour except that common political foundation. Second, focusing on than i want is a major fashion to distract the leadership from those that are clearly a more urgent in the current scheme of things more important. I think bay view taiwan in a very different context from Foreign Policy issues and domestic issues. They dont have that save necessity of imposing a discipline on their relationship so as long as they dont lose ground and it isnt a reversal then they feel they have time it is becoming more urgent and i will discuss that in a minute but not worth distracting from not the more important issues. And finally its i explore in the book tie one was the obstacle and only through acceptance of those terms that we were able to move ahead and and learning from our friends that tie one is important. That doesnt mean today but if something goes wrong in time one taiwans that could set those relations on a negative track and i would argue and have argued for years it is the only issue at the end of the day has the potential to have the u. S. A. And prc to come into actual conflict bilateral is still a possibility. And then those congress documents surrounding those briefings to talk about family and the premier. To say okay if they are my family that they would buy into this notion. That would be a different story. I dont date they were worried about that. And that remains the case. Been to focus on tie one. The fed is the case and will nott change much. If not to advancing something. But my point of view at this point as policymaker maintains principal and to assist in the focus is on line in 2020 with b the election and20 involves to some extent that is not necessarily going non that this point. Because now reiterated to jump above creator reciprocity while it is perfectly reasonable approach federal think it is good work. Why would they accept responsibility if they tagged taiwan for that responsibility alone . That that is the of factor in who is wellknown and stated his support is now premier and was asked to support thailand independence . He said yes. To go back and forth with of less then why doesnt he have responsibility for that . The president does and stop askinger me. So i am puzzled if he is trying to get away from this issue talking about what taiwan will do regarding independence. By one of the things he said that taiwan is a sovereign independent country that is not the mantra. In that party that says in accordance with the resolution of 99 and dad is not to move one 08 or provoke beijing and then finally i dont think anybody can be elected in taiwan. They did notot elect to move toward independence. And then to maintain the status quo. But i believe generally speaking they have been consistent with that. And then needs to be addressed but in as many of view have suffered to keep raising that issue perhaps to say heis is not on the agenda that is a statement of fact when i raised this with mainland colleagues but she does not duet. So it iss important and we cannot forget that. Will gaullism is clear and consistent we wanted to sides to engage and dialogue with a stable basis that could benefit and then for what she has. But the hope is continue to approaches. E some people say they will throw taiwan under the of us eventually and some people say they should. If a thing theyre becoming closer than continuing with arms sales not necessarily bad capability although there is that to some extent but that represents and consolidates the security relationships that is not the direction we would like to see teams go. So the factor is the u. S. Relationship because of what might have been because of those r relations but i remember maurer horror last directly with the major consensus that is the way theyre trying too structure president s trump and they dont want to upset that. So what that looks like in the work and report but the likelihood is anything that happens and y n your from now with those diplomatic partners how many beige jean weld tried to and take away that would create a firestorm with the power to do that in the in negative economic space so those that are running taiwan policy event indeed i think it matters. We will see. I think there would be some differences. Thing store that comprehensive forecast so to ruthne talk above the we wholeheartedly agree with those personalob changes and tall march of next year that we would know in a few weeks but after so to have more continuity and those that look at that stage document to have that pretty big uptick. What is discussed that Chinese Military and i dont know what he wanted to say probably for too far from where heot is is going through tremendous change. Storiess of this being driven by politics or corruption with leadership to replace those appointed by his predecessors after the massive reduction of the armed forces the way china organized itself. That recognizes the role of the defense and power projection in those structures in the ec increased activity around japan and send the ince imagery india and china and there were reports of northeastern china and up along the north korean border but for me i see the pla going forex tensive change to be preoccupied for quite some time. Those in the American Department of defense goldwater said its took 10 years to internalized those new laws to be reflected but this was a massive challenge of the stovepipes with us similar types of competitions and i would they get day . Summary for more accountability than change bin needs to be more active on those borders than those to instructions from the top and those other top commanders. This is probably not what you get out of most to a newspaper stories that china is on the march with a tremendous risk and to take that preemptive action to redress that change coming at us do you have comments on that . Either of you . So with personnel i agree with you it is critical but we can see who lives and who isnt but that doesnt tell us about where those people are and what their role will be and how much they are trusted hearing rumors that they have hady problems with xi jinping beyond a the corruption issues. Withld of pla and would be interested in with that deep military though i veba pla takes very seriously for National Security in terms of fighting a real war and those that really want to do that they are more aware of the consequences it is easy to talk in those terms but when you see it in and watch the vietnam series you get a sense of why they may take that view. The pla talks tough but i am not sure that indicates if they were not in the midst of reorganization and to be anxiouss to show the of muscle. I dont disagree with any of this but the pla has an institution is undergoing a huge change how this operated for decades with systemitary weapons and those types of strategys it is focused on the issue of taiwan and web facilitates chineseca policy but has expanded the capabilities to go beyond that with Maritime Security could not end the classic power projection but not from the United States and currently the organizational challengesor that was infantry heavy focused on the al look better is within a joint staff with those differences services and that is a huge transition for word has all institutions of china the Anticorruption Campaign with very senior military people and that has affected with the recent story that has come out about a recent book that said the Chinese Military is preparing for thek invasion of taiwan. This was the totally distorted interpretation of what is going on. And that military planning to achieve those capabilities. And for certain benchmarks they place those to achieve a certain type of capability by a certain period and it does not indicate a plan to invade taiwan at that point as portrayed. It is very hard to see to be vague and sustain that action against taiwan the next several years. But that actual invasion n and seizure theyre not prepared to do this. Ultimately they think they may need to but not in terms of their desire. Talk about the new aircraft or missiles or capability but look at this scenario that china has fewer missiles today banned three years ago. Can to carry armored cross the straits of taiwan. Talk about continuity. In the coronation of the Party Congress with that in your defense to get credit for that island building in the South China Sea without forward leaning posture but first what about continuity . So thatd been greater irritation with that envelope pushing. In the sections in that it is indicative of a china for quite some time as a distinct disadvantage to with that for free of the sovereignty claim. To decisively results and to lay the groundwork to do that. To improve chinas leverage and tear change the of past and the status quo particularly around the islands themselves of the South China Sea and particularly involving the issues of the east china sea. And thein chinese to be a more stable position. Also in that region ase well to be manipulated or taken advantage of. To think this is a launch pad but in the South China Sea . Slow to figure there would have permanent facing and military deployment further down the road. So that those sorts of things would not be merged. And within that context and in the majoror way that will lead jeopardize the larger interest to undermine the argument to continue that emphasis and that is in a radical cents. I think thats if china were to become aggressive in the South China Sea but china has sought to undercut with the administrativee control but there are limits greg but it does involve the United States. But with the once and then leads. But then the relationship with the United States. But the Trump Administration since coming into office with the status of taiwan to do acknowledge the position to reacting anemic lead to sanctions on caria with the Security Dialogue with a large sale of arms to taiwan. Basically yes that had been played around with the one china policy President Trump gave back he would not do that anymore with the north korea sanctions one might have thought when china did not deliver everything he wanted the basically i believe has kept on the track to maintain a positive relationship not to say therere couldnt the major problems but i dont see at this point either side in having an interest in those secondary sanctions against thosee things and how far that goes. Then those questions asking to raise your hand speaking into the microphone so everybody can hear you and identify yourself. Remember. This is taiwans and Foreign Affairs and the second panel will give you the opportunity with Party History and a dynamic that the future of teeeighteen. Look at the Foreign Policy side for this round of questions isr appreciated for pro. Since congress dealing with the military leadership to have any thoughts of what it would like if you are a set of reforms that are far reaching to be centralized command and control and it has created 15 subordinate units in my the these institutional h changes. I will be sure to convey that question. Get last few weeks of a number of reports not on paper were official documents something happening in that space. And i have seen them overall. We are pretty sure. And then with the vicechairman. In that suggests that person and of the successor is that this time for something to reserve for congress. Does anybody know the Central Military commission and what it is . The leading party body with those policies regarding the military. In it is by share by the most senior in party status and has represented with those functional areas of the of pla. With the departure and investigation with the chief of the general staff and as recently as that and i have been hearing others have been given morning with that move was made to exercise strong for control 83 percent of the military representatives. And more than anything not having all the details revealed that those of 10 years ago. And with the new guys people to come in. And those to back up a of a selection. There is significant turmoil with the pla opposition and. With the nonmilitary side of the house. In the party will control the military in with those previous military figures in the end accused of transgression even though guilty of personal corruption and. And then they would not publicize it. And that is the hardest to get into. I have day question on ethans argument that the pla would attack taiwan in 2020. But if this argument with the real sense of urgency in the of the states with policy toward taiwan. I dont believe the vitter people here affiliated with the wests governments follow it is looked upon the my sense that first of all, my understanding is they had taken exception the chinese will invade taiwan 2020. He himself said that is not what i said. This is based upon a report based upon that to rely on anything that has to do with chinaa. In quite plausibly incorrect and to draw attention into the fact there are plans that are contingency plans to achieve pay certain capability they have been known by the u. S. Government for some time. They are not brand new. They apply to a lot of different areas. But to write the book at this time was to call attention to this planning any more public way and thereby increase the desire by people to have a of a greater degree of response and beyond that at all know what his objective would be i dont see that as causing greatt education because of the reasons i have already suggested. D. It needs to be put into that context. And day published a comment explaining they were taking too much out of context. But thank you. The interns of Foreign Policy was his of posture imposition regarding afghanistan . Dimension undoes china on u. S. China relations bill is an inviting that trumpmp administration . We three. We gave it away. [laughter] allen Road Initiative is very ambitious if one dashes an ambitious land with as a manifestation primarily withta pakistan and the corridor is support that and chinas position in been given in afghanistan to mind understanding has been increasingly involved in rand increasingly cooperative of that issue with the United States as a way to deal with the threat to. Something that is not working as effectively and the chinese see it that way. The isth part to build up of west pleded is asymmetrical. With that immediate eurasian periphery it is political and economic with this one bill to one Road Initiative. Been dealing with afghanistan. But those that were tolerated by the taliban. Than with those disruptions. Batted the advice of a small scale the Afghan Police are more effective to make sure they dont come back but there was an uptick as they seem to be departing of official activity to be engaged economically to talk to those parties that we have given the chinese relief from that so china can lean back to have that side benefit to further keep the u. S. Focused on southwest syllabub go to answer everyone has starting at the top of the list and has a lot to do with his attitude rather than about chinas specifically so we saw for example, lois senior team and said no dont do i dont know and overtime it probably changes. So with regard to those allies do you mean if they tried to set up the trust or to provoke the president but do you see any way out . Or how the Chinese People feel . I am not suggesting theyre trying to set a trap but if they continue to slow the ratchet up pressure one way to do that there are other countries of diplomatic relations that despite the explanation that if they just decided to move that panama long wanted to change there is a lot of potential so castigated in that type of context does beijing care what people love taiwan think . Yes. Unless they really want to have a longterm resistance than willing to pay a certain price. And for what they fear is going. They tried to swallow taiwan as the of hostile element. And then to address the issue differently and then tried to fire the way around that will sides are determined. And to havee political issues to deal with . We just have to see how that goes. N does xi jinping one day legacy . But i dont think they answered that question to. [laughter] if we assume they in one way shape orau form longer than five years wouldnt they have to assume he will wyden to take on this issue . That can move the situation backing it is hard to see where this goes. I just like to hear a little more of your thoughts. A starting trilby former ball at the charge that is the most immediate issue i dunno how thisid plays and with china in some form what he is really trying to get this point. Said unification is obviously the goal dont mistake that although i have to say i dont know what that means and that is a criticalis issue. Than those that be defined what china and unification means unless and until they can do that i dont see a way out. But i update my goal is exactly right budget i did they he wants to go beyond taiwans as they were trying for a long time. To get consensus then tie one. And that was more problematic. Andob yes once the legacy. Data meetingnn recently there was a concern and it was very m much in mind of this hardened verses a soft independent. To the industry than meaningful ways with the status of taiwan with the american in government as well. And to make the time was right. The it if the of a woman really failed and those who have cabinets that are pro independent point of view. And then a deterioration that in my mind is the most critical factor is that seriously is problematic been given that american position of taiwan then it is resistance to all types of factions. Terrible position coming out of the november 14 local elections and the 2016 president ial elections. But i think we might make a mistake if we assume that they cannot stage a comeback to the point of if the administration is seen as failing and although, the appointment has sort of boosted the numbers somewhat. They still at least the latest polls and ice are still around 30 percent. So not what you would call great. You have to look at the trend. I think there may be a focus of activity that may remain trying to convince the voters in taiwan they made a mistake last time. And i have said this many times, i basically think that the kmt lost the last election rather than somehow, the dpp overwhelmingly winning it. So is there to be done. But we will have to see. Not only are people talking about invoking the antisecession law. They also talked about the next npc, perhaps looking at a unification law. But i have to say that, while im sure theres a lot of chatter about this, i am concerned a bit that we rely too much on our academic friends in the mainland and their views on this, some of them are very toughminded. We will not let taiwan get away with this, so when i think that xi jinping fully understands this and i think it is among the factors that leaves him to want to continue to have a workable constructive relationship with the United States. So we dont get into a position with taiwan is the kind of divisive problem between us. I think theyre convinced and got convinced that the United States is not interested in promoting taiwanese independence. But i do think that they believe many, many, many of them believe that us is not interested in seeing unification either. And so, the suspicion about the us and its relationship to taiwan is to work with taiwan in a variety ways including military and other ways which is real and is a factor. I will just add one nuance that which is that xi jinping spends considerable time working with taiwan investors and business people. And other responsibilities that he had on his way up to the center. In that period, and told repeatedly that he came to the conclusion much as the emperor of the ching dynasty did much earlier that the cultural power and economic rule of mainland will be the longterm guarantor that somehow taiwan will come back. And he did not hesitate action to get to that. It will be tested and events will make important differences but that is the thought. We have time for one more question before we take a break and this question may segue into the second panel but i think it would be fair to observe, and im sure certainly prepared to take a position on this question. Xi jinping is to control things. Whether you want to talk about economic small groups or information or history for South China Sea islands or whatever. The guy likes to be in control. So, we are talking about possibly as a result of the 19 Party Congress, his being even more in control. And i think there probably are some Foreign Policy implications that might spring from that. And i would like any of you are all of you to speculate briefly on that. Tim included the notion that he wants to control the diaspora as well. But that is a subject for another [laughter] the part of that was interesting. I do not think it stops with xi jinping however. We have seen with the russian involvement in european and american politics that we are still learning the dimensions of that. But i think i spent some time in europe the summer teaching and i was given insights into the amount of effort that china has been making to influence elections in the european countries. Actually there investing and the politicians and their campaigns. We have a kerfuffle in new zealand right now over a 1c for china and not being honest about it and then being defended by his Prime Minister who had his hand in there. So somewhere the truth is there in between. But it is a hot topic. Where the Fairfax Media group has launched a major Investigative Program to look at where china might be trying to spend itself. Here we have had a running debate about institutes and whether they are tools of chinese propaganda or they are really just interested in efforts to propagate Chinese Culture and language without getting a political overtone purity in different campuses where they host different localities and have different outcomes on that. I do not have a definitive answer but certainly there is activity in a space that we are not used to seeing activity in. I will just mention one thing. I think michael probably has the major thing to say on this. If he is in fact in greater control after this and there is debate about that. I think probably the majority opinion is that it is what is likely to happen. It may give him greater freedom to be assertive. It also may give him greater freedom to ignore some of the pressures that he might otherwise feel he needs to cater to in order to maintain his control within the leadership. I do not know how to assess that in terms of the net outcome for a particular issue. But i dont think it is just a uniform direction in terms of okay, well, he has greater control so he can give them to his obvious inclination to help china play a greater role. You said what i was going to say. [laughter] and its i have not seen a lot of evidence. Others may contradict this, that there are hugely divisive i issues in Foreign Policy that exist within the chinese leadership. I think they in general look at xi jinping as somebody who is more of a kind of take charge decisive guy who and they like that. I dont think they necessarily think, oh, he is out to get me. Im talking about the most senior people who would be coming in, and if the 19th 19th Party Congress consolidates his backers in this regard, that will be even more so the case. So, i dont really see it as leading to a kind of a major transition in how the chinese look at Foreign Policy issues. People who had many meetings with xi jinping say he is very alert to facts. He is attentive to what other people say help is not dog mat tick in the way he talks about issues. He seems to be relatively openminded about things. , but at the same time he is dedicated to strengthening the position of the party. I think his primary focus remains domestic, and i think that will tend to tailor how he looks at Foreign Policy issues in a variety of ways. If alan says, if he is stronger its funny, you have this weird argument that people make, if xi jinping is really strong, hell good out and be really assertive because he has freedom to do that now. If pinning jinping is weak hell be defensive and need to bolster support for himself and use Foreign Policy. Assertive is he is strong, or assertive if he is weak. Covers it all. Covers everything. You have to say both of the argument with a grain of salt based on National Interests and what i know flint divisiveness or lack thereof of Foreign Policy in the chinese leadership. Says something bet gathering today that we hardly any time discussing china and north korea, whereas the media are my life has been hell the last three months as people request Media Coverage on north korea and im sure thats tree for a lot of poo em. Well take our break in a moment, and if you read the china leadership monitor or its predecessor, you come across a word you dont see in ordinary conversation. This is a the Party Congresses are quinquennial. They happen every five years. Five years ago, before the last Party Congress, i invited joe smith and alice miller to talk about why thought was going to happen at the party, so well have another reprieve of that every time in few minutes. Well have 15minute break. Take advantage thereof restrooms and refreshments during that time and come back for the next panel. Please join me in thinking our presenters today. [applause]