Suzanne it is a pleasure to welcome you here today to our conversation on Foreign Policy and the u. S. President ial election. This event is part of the brookings policy 2020 series which seeks to empower voters with factbased, datadriven, nonpartisan information to better understand the policy matters discussed by candidates running for office this year. Thank you all for joining us. We are 29 days away from november 3. Americans will cast their ballots for the next president , but the future of americas global role is also at the ballot. Looking toward the election, todays conversation will focus in particular on its implications for the transatlantic relationship and u. S. Foreign policy toward europe. European leaders and many of their counterparts around the world are watching the election closely. While there are differing views about how the upcoming november election will shape the relationship, few in europe believe it will revert to its previous form. With polling from the European Council on Foreign Relations on european views of the transatlantic relationship, it shows that france and germany see the need to prepare for a longterm disengagement from the u. S. Regardless of the outcome of the election. The polling also finds that irrespective of the results, no e. U. Member states seek to position europe as a third power between the u. S. And china. Todays discussion will assess the stakes of the election and its implications for u. S. Foreign policy. I am delighted to be joined by an outstanding panel of experts who will offer insights and analysis about what we can expect from either a second trump term or a biden presidency. They will also consider how a geopolitical europe would react to either scenario. Before we dive into the conversation, i would like to take a moment to thank the turkish business and Industry Association for their support and collaboration which has helped make this event possible. We are grateful for the renewed support of our center on the u. S. And europe, and we look forward to continuing our Successful Partnership with them. As always, an ironclad commitment to independence is at the center of Brookings Institution policies and values, and the views expressed here are solely those of the speakers. Once again, thank you for joining us this morning. Now over to thomas wright. Thomas thank you so much for that introduction, and thank you to all of you for joining us online this morning. When we first devised this Panel Concept a few weeks ago, we thought it would be an eventful october with lots of things to discuss. I dont think any of us could have envisaged the circumstances in which we find ourselves this morning. So to talk about that and the broader implications of the election and Foreign Policy in general, we are fortunate to be joined by a terrific panel of our colleagues from brookings. I will briefly introduce them although i am sure they are all well known to you. First, bill galston. He has done immense work on the election on u. S. Politics and its connection to Foreign Policy and americas role in the world. Fiona hill is my colleague at the center for the United States and europe and senior fellow in Foreign Policy and formerly the senior director for europe and russia in the white house during the Trump Administration. Celia belin is a visiting fellow in the center for the u. S. And europe and Foreign Policy and also authored a book earlier this year in france on the views of the Democratic Candidates for president. Welcome, all the Experts Joining us. We will talk for about 45, 50 minutes and then turn it over for questions, which you can see on twitter. I guess my first question is really on the news of the day. I will just start by saying, of course, our best wishes go out to the president and to all of those affected by this outbreak and hoping for a speedy recovery. I wanted to start with you. It seems there is really no precedent for an event or Development Like this, certainly so close to an election. It really creates additional uncertainty. It is also a global event of course because we are talking about the commanderinchief of the United States. There is lots of things that can happen on the International Scene over the next four weeks, isticularly if the president impaired or incapacitated in any way. So, we really have everything coming into the mix, National Security, politics, personalities. I was wondering if you could give us your first sort of impressions of the gravity of this moment, maybe some way to think about it and also, how its likely to feed into the election on november 3. Bill well, tom, your question anticipates my answer. It is all of the above and more. I think the general sense in the United States is that we are piling one disruptive event on top of another. If this had happened against a calm backdrop, it would have been one thing, but for it to happen while the rubble was still bouncing from the tumultuous president ial debate last week, while threats of interference with the u. S. Election and the count of the ballots are in play, because the president of the United States has put them there, plus, of course, the actual situation on the ground with the pandemic not under control, with the economy and the economic recovery appearing to slow and perhaps in danger of stalling altogether, with racial conflict and partisan polarization, this is an unprecedented situation. I am plenty old enough, i was an adult in 1968, and i long said that 1968 was the worst year in american politics and Society Since the end of the civil war. I am in the process of revising that judgment. It may well be that the year were enduring is, in fact, the worst since the civil war. With regard to the election itself, this is at the very least, a serious problem for the Trump Campaign to be added to the roster of serious problems, including a decline in Public Opinion polls that it was already facing in the following direct sense. The game plan was that President Trump would barnstorm around the country in the last month of the campaign. He is widely viewed as his campaigns most important asset to be deployed. The trump rallies are famous for their raucous enthusiasm which appears to have ripple effects through the portion of the electorate that is inclined to vote for mr. Trump, and it appears that for a substantial period of time, would i say at least the next 10 days, the Trump Campaign will not be able to play its high card. Which will impede his prospects of coming from behind to catch joe biden at the wire of this race. Thomas thank you. Thanks, bill. Fiona, if i could turn to you next. I mean, you worked with many of the people who are currently serving in the white house. I was going through media reports over the weekend. If not a general sense of chaos, just basically of uncertainty and concern and concern about the continuity of government and there has been some controversy around the chief of staff mark meadows, who i know came off your time there. But i was wondering if you could maybe give us your thoughts about how this is being experienced by the officials who worked on u. S. Policy. What impact is the president s illness likely to have on u. S. National security, and any other reflections you have on these latest developments. Fiona well, i think what were seeing is the risks of having a hyper personalized presidency. This really fits into what, you know, what bill has already said. And i think were in a very unusual time when, you know, President Trump has vocally, publicly and frequently stressed that he is the only person that matters in the system. And it would be very interesting to hear from, you know, bill again as we go around, im sure there will be questions about this, not just about the continuity of government, but about the whole delegation of authority in the case of incapacitation. Obviously, weve had that before in the past. But this is an administration in which the president doesnt like to delegate down authority. As i learned in the time that i think it came out clearly in the end of the testimonies last year, nobody really delegates with potential authority to carry out the business of the state. You know, it can easily be undermined in a tweet, anything you say. Theres a question about whether anything anybody else in the system says really matters. Just in short, it makes it difficult for everybody else to go about their jobs. There is little confidence apart from what i would say are the routine domestic issues, but certainly you asked about National Security that people can press ahead with anything. We just recently saw that National Security advisor bryan has gone off to meet with his counterparts from russia, the equivalent of the National Security council in geneva. Obviously, we did that many times when i was in the National Security council. Even then, at that particular set of junctures, which was much earlier on in the term, the russians and others were always questioning about how authoritative were our interactions. We moved along with arms negotiations that seems to have hit a crucial period, but in the months since the election, how can they really press ahead on some of the Critical Issues, that, you know, like bill is suggesting, that require calmer atmosphere . Its very hard to make breakthroughs on Critical Issues like armscontrol, which are very sensitive and detailed, and complex negotiations that are technical, when you have chaos and uncertainty. As bill was talking about in the domestic front, just a metaphor also for National Security, it is very hard for anyone whos under these circumstances to get on with their job when its not clear how much authority that they actually have. Thomas thank you. Celia, this is really the latest development not just in u. S. Politics for the rest of the world, but also in the handling of the coronavirus. How is it being interpreted in france and in europe and what sort of the main lens through which they see the United States at the moment . Celia, sorry, youre on mute. Celia thank you, tom. Force of habit. Of course europeans are looking with great interest to whats happening to President Trump at the moment. Great interest, great concern, i must say. All the leaders have sent their sentiment of support, of concern for the president and his family. Of course, obviously, from the public or the media, you had some sarcastic comments as its wellknown that President Trump himself had adopted a position of doubt, lets say, regarding this virus. So you had some coverage on this in the media in europe, in france, and in germany and the u. K. Obviously over the weekend. But in many ways, it sort of reinforces this european idea that whats going on in the u. S. Is that you have a country that is adrift just a month out of the president ial election, that the pandemic is not under control, that the tensions, political tensions are extremely high, as bill said, you have crisis on top of each other. There is a strong feeling since the beginning of the pandemic, or lets say two months into it, that the u. S. Is not handling the crisis very well. There was a poll from the Peer Research center mid september that showed that europeans considered when they were asked, who has done a good job in dealing with covid, they were given pretty good marks for the eu, around 50 , 60 . Even more for their own country, around 60 or 70 . And quite high marks for china, around 40 . But the u. S. Notes mark, was abysmal, around 10 to 15 in some of the main European Countries, considering only 10 or 15 of people considered that the u. S. Was doing a good job dealing with covid. So really, what this ultimate crisis would do was just reinforce this image and at the same time, the europeans own sense of isolation. Who else than the u. S. Can be their ally in dealing with this pandemic . And at the moment, the giant, the american giant is missing, and its leadership is missing. Now more than ever, you know, the president ial leadership is missing as well. So, i was just thinking, listening to bill and to fiona, that the only thing really missing from this confluence of crisis is an international crisis, and hopefully, you know, the u. S. Wont face that, but that would be a very weak moment, very hard moment for the u. S. At a time when power is concentrated around the president , and the president is or could be incapacitated. At least its a worrying thought also for europeans. Thomas celia, the prime , haveer Boris Johnson there been instances of high profilers in france who contracted it . Celia and one wase president of a regional council. Another important figure of the socialist party, who died from. Ovid early in the process quite a few members of cabinet have been sick. It has remember never felt as close to a crisis of leadership as it was in the u. K. Or going on in the u. S. Of course there was a sense of relief we have a young president at the moment. It is a little bit of luck, especially at the height of the pandemic in april and may, it was a comforting sentiment for some french. But i am sure it is extremely troubling to have the highest function in the land being hit to this degree and i realized i itnot think europeans feel as much as americans do. I have seen the coverage in the media here. I think it is quite traumatic. Bill, just a followup for you and it is to do with the mechanics of the election. I mean there are a lot of different scenarios that can happen over the next few weeks. President trump coming back and campaigning, potentially, and the other half he could be quite sick. All of that could have an impact on the election. If he has to withdraw from the race, who knows, but my question is is the u. S. Electoral system sort of set up adequately to deal with the spectrum of possibilities . When people go to vote on november 3 in this respect at , is that likely to go smoothly or could we be facing a constitutional crisis with uncertainty about the election and the postelection period . Bill that is a very large question, tom. Let me try to subdivide it for purposes of clarity. Ability to get back on the campaign trail will be dictated, to some extent, by health considerations. This ise saw yesterday a president determined to project an aura of strength and vulnerability. We have good reason to believe he will go to extraordinary lengths to do that and i expect that to continue. Heunless he is really so ill must be confined to bed, his bed in the hospital for an extended period, i would expect them to get back on the campaign trail even against the advice of his doctors. That is just a speculation, but i think it is consistent with his character and conduct. Question number two. What would happen if you became so ill he were, in effect, forced to withdraw as the president ial candidate . Here there is no ambiguity. Both the Republican Party and, for that matter, the Democratic Party have in place very clear legal mechanisms for replacing a National Candidate if the president invice emergency circumstances. Become aexpect that to subject of contestation. We also have clear legal and constitutional processes for temporarily transferring power from the president to the Vice President or people lower down in the chain of succession if that were to become necessary. So, the question that is most able has to do with the election itself in the aftermath. The president in the past has indicated he distinguishes very sharply between the returns that are announced on the night of election at the returns that come in and are counted after that. That could be a serious point of contestation and disruption because a record share of votes in 2020 will be cast by mail. Many mailin ballots will not be counted in time to be reported on election night. Matter i think the situation is clear. Those ballots, to the extent they are not invalidated because of technical violations by individual voters, will be counted whether the president will accept the count is a different matter. That will be a political question, not a legal question. Number ofber of a organizations that have worked through a number of disaster scenarios. Sort of scenarios like a Nuclear Meltdown to which one attaches a small probability, but if it came to pass, would be catastrophic. Time does not permit me to go through all of those. Suffice it to say both Political Parties have reviewed those and it isin detail within the realm of metaphysical possibility that one or more states would send competing slights of electors to compete. Ectors if that happens, all bets are off. Thomas assuming we get through that [laughter] and we end up with a president in quick order after the election, i would like to turn to the two obvious scenarios. Trump is reelected or biden is elected and ask you to paint through what that will mean for international policy, but particularly for the transatlantic relationship. Let us start with trump. I know he is less likely, according to data, to be reelected, but it is a possibility obviously. Let us assume he is reelected. Fiona, if i could start with you, since you worked in the white house and i know you have been thinking about this a bit. We have talked about it separately, but it seems to me there are two different scenarios with a trump second term. One is that it is more like the last year. , itknow, we see continuity is highly personalized, but similar to where we are right now. It is an is that exponential progression from that. Personalizedper and he may be doubles down on his instincts. Is that the right way to think about it or do you have another way of conceptualizing it . What do you think is the main application for europe or former National Security advisor john bolton whod you worked with closely and worries trump up a lot of nato . How worried should we be and is there a prospect this is what people would expect from a transatlantic perspective . Fiona i said in my last response it is hyper personalized already. This is my everything is so fragile. President trump is literally the wildcard in our political system right now. His health and what happens with that, whether he can campaign, the issues with worstcase scenarios bill has played out for us. Everything will also hinge, for a second term, on how that comes about. Is it through an even smaller margin in the Electoral College . A bigger margin in the Electoral College . Is it because of various things we have not caught . At the same time a huge vote against the president , bigger than before, and the popular vote, that will set the tone for the presidency, irrespective of any outside influence here. Let us play that scenario out. The president scrapes through in the Electoral College against an even larger vote against him. He will be on the defensive, extremely defensive, more defensive than he already is. There are larger questions about who will the key people in the cabinet, how many people will stay on, who will leave, particularly on the National Security front. I mean i can imagine a number of the president s closest associates who will be put into these positions. The question will also be will congress and the senate both be in the hands of republicans . Will there be a flip of the senate as well over to the democrats as a result of elections . We could be playing out this game for quite some time. There are a number of games of who is going to be in. Senatesay you have the and congress and democratic hands. Imagine what a sight it is going replacing those who decide to retire and do Something Else and to get other people in place, particularly if those closest to the president do not have the National Security and Foreign Policy credentials. I do think a lot of the people who are already there will stay. Some in the white house in the west wing, but also the Deputy Assistants throughout the departments and agencies. We should be grateful for people staying on under difficult circumstances. The problem is people have been enacting and i do not know much about this but how they can stay in acting capacity. That will reduce the ability to really do things. Getting back to what i said before when you have delegated authority it is hard to do your job. On whose behalf are you speaking . Makes theent always distinction. On specific questions you asked about nato, you know, i think we can see a lot of the decisionmaking is driven by disputes with other countries and what is going on with nato gdp. E question about 2 of the result of covid19 largescale recession we are seeing on a global scale, a lot of gdps will have fallen if defense spending stays consistent. They will already be at 2 . [laughter] that might be the upside. That could take the edge off. [laughter] however, i somehow doubt it. I think there will be a huge debate and, celia, it would be interesting to see what you think. You will already have britain pulling out and wanting to figure out how to pull down nato, tightened resources, a lot of questions about the perception of threat, should nato be doing more on pandemic, what about the rise of china . How do we tackle russia . We have so many things where there is contention. We have the question about europe and will europe build up its own capable defense . France is very interested in that and has a close defense relationship with the u. K. I can see more room for divisiveness on nato rather than less. The president will, being very defensive on the home front, be less interested in having a broad and strategic approach abroad. One area where there is a big crisis is azerbaijan. The United States was pretty critical in helping manage. We have a grouping that includes france, the United States, includes russia, that is trying to manage, or in the past, managing this dispute. The United States is missing in action. We did not have to be. On your or so ago we were in the thick of the action, but now we see turkey and russia facing off over azerbaijan. Example ofeady an what can happen when the United States is not fully engaged. To be honest i would be worried about us getting engaged because we have also shown a propensity in recent conflicts to pick sides rather than neutral arbiter. I willpresident s say it right out Kim Kardashian has been tweeting about armenia. Shes probably one of the most famous armenians in the United States. Sign forot a good playing a neutral role which we had previously and thing it in as close relations to azerbaijan. You can already see the consequences of us be missing in action and i am not sure europe will be able to pick it up. Celia, france also has a similar situation with armenia, correct . Celia absolutely. Here is a huge diaspora thomas we are going to turn to you. We have spoken about this before and i think the feeling in europe was that trump was likely to be reelected. Conference, before everything shut down, the american delegation seemed to think it was either very substrate or that biden would win. The european uniformity seems im not quite sure what but that he would be elected due to the economy. We are in quite a different point now, but trying to go back and put on that hat about what europeans are seeing then, i trump second term, and how it has evolved. How would they be likely to foworence the shock off . With this be the end to the Transatlantic Alliance or would they can macron assume work with trump . The u. S. Has normally been could you walk us through what those policy planners and leaders will be thinking, say, in six or eight months time if it is a second term of President Trump . Celia i think europeans by a large up until the convention or a bit after that the majority thought trump would be reelected. Only recently have i started to see repeated expert saying that joe biden has been ahead in the polls in a substantial margin. There is a possibility of a Biden Administration. Europeans want to prepare themselves for a second Trump Administration. They want to prepare themselves psychologically, but what i could see they are not preparing very much in terms of actually anticipating the type of policy that could be put in place or initiatives that could be put in place with a second Trump Administration. Part of the reason is, i think after four years, europeans have not found a remedy to trump or a way to deal with with donald trump. It,a said it and you said because trumps Foreign Policy is so personal it is anathema to europeans. It is something that both european institutions, european leaders, and even personalized president ial systems and france have trouble dealing with because they have such a strong administrative, bureaucratic state behind it that deals with a love of Foreign Policy decision. Aback forbeen taken the past four years by the fact engaging with, you know, the americanhannels of the administration has sometimes optimal results. It could differ from one day to the other by the white house. They have still not found the formula and the other example of this is that president macron has tried to have a personal relationship, a good personal relationship, with the president and tried to personalize politics. Once again it has not led this proximity has not led to results either. If a second term is to be first,d, i think, europeans will think whether President Trump felt vindicated. In that case, as fiona pointed out, whether he would be able to just go one step further, doubling down on some of his own instincts. On continuing or increasing pressure on the eu, continuing to retreat from global responsibilities, questions other nato, and the element they are thinking about is that they know donald trump is tactical. That may be the way to engage him by engaging him on specific know, and offer, you offer for him to reach big deals or any sort of agreement that would put him in a good political light technically because it does not have to be rooted in a grand strategy. In that case, maybe the europeans have some elements they comply with on the trade front. Finish, il, just to think there is a big question that combines right now the longterm. There was a question in european and covidhether trump illness at the moment would ever change his mind on the way to deal globally and collectively with this issue. Europeans as much as any other countries have been waiting for u. S. Leadership on collective efforts on producing a vaccine, distributing treatment, on working together on this issue. The u. S. Has been, from early on, it has helped more than 120 countries on a bilateral level during this crisis, but has failed to engage collectively both in multilateral organizations but also in more ad hoc initiatives. That would be the big question for europeans. Can donald trump ever change and can he change based on personal experience as he mentioned in his videos . Like, i havehing gone to school with his covid. I have learned things and i will go back on this and discuss this. Maybe that is the case and it will give europeans some hope. Thomas celia, just to jump in, and we will go to bill in a second, that happened to Boris Johnson, right . He was cavalier about it, joked about shaking hands. I do not see that happening with trump. Last night he did make those remarks that were a bit odd, but did say he learned a lot about it. Within hours he went out with the secret service in a very dangerous environment, you know, to his secret Service Agents to wave at the crowds. I think that is, to me, that is a pretty significant episode. Howhows us that irresponsible he has been internationally and nationally on this is no different than how irresponsible he is with his own health at risk. In terms of bloody his approach to it. To me it makes me worried, you know, i think he may use it as a pr talking point. I would be very surprised i think most people, like the prime minister, you could have gotten change, but i am not sure with him. Also looking ahead to a second think the do you trump second term would look like on Foreign Policy . It is a real hinge moment. People have described it as this will be the definitive end to the postwar u. S. Because of his opposition to it. Headed . Where we are tom, i do not think it is overwrought. It was one thing to elect mr. Trump in 2016. There was a widespread sense of discontent with the pace of the economic recovery, many portions of the country felt entirely unseen and unheard by the previous administration, and mr. Trump was a protest candidate, a classic protest candidate, who parlayed a Strong Campaign and a disruptive message into the narrowest of victories. The American People have had for years to experience four years to experience directly this kind of governance. If they were to ratify it by giving mr. Trump a second term, i would conclude that the america i grew up in for nearly three quarters of a century has changed fundamentally and i would be amazed if people around the world did not draw the same conclusion. Now, i grant everything that celia and fiona said about the specifics of different scenes of action, different tactical possibilities, but the overall framework of understanding of the United States and its role in the world, i believe, would have to shift. Governments and people around blind not told be and the intellectual shift two, especially in europe, rethink how it can do the best for itself in the absence of the United States that it can depend on. Let us remember that to depend on the United States, ultimately, is to depend on the American People. It is to depend on the understanding of the people that politics is to be contested at end ofd and not at one the goal or the other. Victory, and ratifying victory for mr. Trump under the circumstances, would lead straight to the conclusion that the American People are more unstable and less reliable in their judgment in ways that affect the security of International Alliances and international affairs. What would a second trump term look like . Samet is on more of the and my reason for saying that is very simple. Insisted as fiona has this is a highly personalized administration were the formal structures of advice and decisionmaking are much weaker than they are customarily. Add that to your premise, tom, the mr. Trump is unlikely to change his personality. So if you have a personality driven administration, and a personality that does not change, why would anyone expect anything else them more of the same . That would be my prediction and i do not say that welcoming it in the slightest. Thomas thank you, bill. Celia, we turned back to you to look at biden and then we will go to fillon after that. Celia, you spent quite a bit of the candidates around the campaign trail including Vice President biden who, i think it is safe to say, at the time did not look like the frontrunner. You wrote a book about what the implications of the election might be in terms of that democratic worldview. Could you give us your impressions of what you think a Biden Administration would be ite, but a particular how might be received in europe . One would expect that it will be widely welcomed. But after that initial welcome what are somelief of the additional elements, including complications that might arise over the next year, concerns the french government or europeans what with the main areas of opportunities be . Celia yes, indeed. I completely misjudged joe biden. You know, i can use my foreigner card. [laughter] tom, telling you weeks before South Carolina i had seen joe biden giving a speech to a room that was emptying out and i was telling you the guy is done. Ins is done, this is over, two weeks later he had a major win in South Carolina and went on to become the nominee. Part of the reason i think i completely misjudged was that i was first impressed by the progressive ways at the capacity of a large part of the electorate and candidates to be ideological. Probably closer to european politicians that they are american politicians that tend to build coalition and tend to find the center of gravity rather than push ideological ideas. I think the strength of the Democratic Party at this juncture is to have both. You have both the progressive, ideological elements on the ground feeding the battle of idea, feeding the youth and those who want to be engaged, but then they rallied around a candidate that can embody all of this because he can embody everybody at the same time. Said, be ato, as you bridge between the more traditional Democratic Party and the younger, progressive wing of the party. That places a big question in my mind regarding Foreign Policy. Will joe biden be a transformational candidate . Idease bring progressive to his foreignpolicy . In at as also coming specific context. The context of this multiple era of crisis, mostly internal, but the pandemic, economic crisis, racial crisis at the same moment which will weigh very heavy on his capacity to do Foreign Policy. The other big question is will Bidens Administration be inward looking or will it be able to do what he says he wants to do which is restore u. S. Leadership . There is always a caveat to restore u. S. Leadership. His advisors will say it starts at home. You have to start by rebuilding americas strength at home to rebuild credibility in the world stage. But i think this articulation of inward looking and trying to restore u. S. Leadership is going to create attention that is at probably the first year in office. I would identify three main points i think are of high partners and allies around the globe. The first point is that there is the question on competition with china. I think it is more than likely that the overall u. S. China competition will remain as a policy theor foreign foreseeable future. Know, has implications because the u. S. Will want to restore its strength in china. A lot of investment, joe biden talked about investing in research development, investing in infrastructure including a Green Energy Transition and investment, but it also has implications for relationships. If there is a tendency to confront models, the authoritarian model embodied by china versus the democratic model i embodied by the u. S. , a priority for biden will also be to strengthen democracy been, to say has the least heard, by the last few years by the division in this country as well as decisions from the leadership. Strengthening democracy will be a core issue. The last two points that are priorities, one is a dialogue with allies and partners. Joe biden has taught repeatedly about restoring alliances. He hopes to restore these know, to also, you counter authoritarians around the world and he has accepted he will have a summit of democracies in next year. At least some form of acknowledgment of the importance of allies and likeminded. The last point is that because you have this confluence of priority looking inward and competition with china, i think there was going to be a huge priority given to geoeconomic issues. Innovation,using on trade, cyber issues, focusing on climate action. These this meaning that are the areas where the u. S. Can compete in the world, invest, but also permissible at home. This will reduce the interest for the traditional military intervention as we can imagine. There is a continuation on this front since the Obama Administration, disinterest for military intervention which is probably just as good. But strong instances on geopolitical issues that can find a partner, i think, in the eu. That is the priority of the european commission, the priority of many European Countries that do not feel and im not specifically talking about france but feel more at ease with the economical issues rather than geopolitical issues. Interests on working on climate action, cyber issues, trade, etc. Overall, i think people are expecting a gentler america. Times talks about strategy empathy for joe biden, but he will face a world that has, you know, has grown angrier and more resentful and that might not be ready to see such a partner return to the white house. There is going to be a lot of work ahead. Thomas thank you, celia. We are going to go after bill and fiona to audience questions. Briefcould you give us a analysis of what you think of the Biden Administration would be like . Particularly in terms of what one might not expect. What might some of the developments that might be surprising to people. Expectctually, tom, i the expected. [laughter] i say that because joe biden is the ultimate traditionalist. Personalityolitical has been formed over a period of five decades in public life around the sorts of arrangements characterized in the postwar world and my view is that he will try to shore up the architecture of what he is most familiar with while pushing forward on some of the new transnational issues. Obviously, there will be a renewed focus, perhaps greater than ever before, on climate issues, viewed in international context. Be ank there is likely to renewed emphasis on international and transnational cooperation on health issues. Know, iin all, you think there will be a certain amount of new wine, but in the same old bottles. Most of the people around biden who are likely to adopt senior positions in his administration are, by and large, traditionalists. They believe in the postwar perfect, because it is but because it was preferable to the alternatives. I would expect a Biden Administration to be tougher on china than bidens own history would suggest simply because circumstances have changed. But unlike the Current Administration i would expect him to work very hard to construct a coalition to confront china and the European Union, i think, would be Partner Number One in the construction of the coalition. Partner number two would be the democracies in east asia and the pacific. Policy innovation is more to be expected on the chinese front than any other. Thomas thank you, bill. That is fascinating. Isgree with that, but what interesting to me is within the biden world there is actually an interesting debate going on. They all believe in alliances and the international order, but there is relatively significant differences about how to deal with that and i find it interesting to ask not just how biden will differ from trump, but if you will be different to obama. I do not know. Maybe there will be a synthesis between the two. I suspect we may see, once the election is over, some of those debates coming to the fore because right now, just by being in favor of alliances biden is different from trump, but that does not tell us a lot about what he will be like. There are a lot of different ways to be proalliance. We will see. Did you want to come back in a that and we will go to fiona . Emphasizebut just to that the obamaBiden Administration was the end presided over the end of the old confidence that chinese economic integration would give china incentives to play by the Global Economic rules and would lead to a progressive liberalization. Nobody believes that anymore. Not in the Democratic Party and not in the Republican Party, so in that respect it will not be the third obama term. Not possible. Thomas thank you. Fiona, your take on a Biden Administration and a twist if you are willing. Is there anything in the trump know, inration, you their approach whether it is national defense, national r thinky, or any othe they are working on with their because annuity or would there be a sharp contrast with the Trump Administration . Emails fromtting people saying, what do you keep looking out your window . This is a segue to what i want to say. Infamous Electric Company down my treeut unexpectedly. [laughter] i had no idea they were going to do this this morning. Nervously for the branch to come through the window because they are meticulously cutting things around. If i get taken out by a branch, i apologize to everybody. What i want to stress is that bidens bill exercised the and Obama Administration was presiding over the end of the confidence or assumption that largerould adapt to the international environment, we cannot basically say we can go back to what was before. What worries me, and im sure worries a lot of people, celia has said eloquently europe has moved on. Europe was already moving on during the Obama Administration. In some respects, the posturing we see at home in the United States is a reaction to the idea that obama was leading from behind which is a notorious phrase from somebody within the administration. Celia, tom, and many others have written there was a feeling in europe that the United States has moved on. It was not just because they moved on and pivoted to asia, but they were rethinking the whole u. S. Position. Level reluctance to be in the middle east and in all kinds of places. In the 1990s in particular and the 2000s. Most americans have not thought of karabakh when the last ceasefire was brokered. Behind the scenes the United States is managing conflict and, you know, the whole ecosystem in interNational Security has changed. China has risen. It is the dominant player in the asia and into pacific region. We have seen the clashes with on fragilendia borders. We know that china means business. The fact they have killed several indian soldiers should be a wakeup call that china will not necessarily continue to manage things in its own neighborhood as it has before. We have got to be confronted with a whole series of issues and Climate Change is inescapable. Fires burning from california to siberia, everything we know is changing here. Again, the global perspective is changing. There is no back to go back to. What worries me about the biden , it istration conventional to expect the unexpected. We are in unexpected territory. The pandemic should certainly have concentrated everyones mind that those risks are ahead. I think that gives us some opportunity, however, to work more closely with allies. There are some structures that i hope in the coming Biden Administration will try to keep in place. Some of them have disappeared, but there are very good Deputy Assistant secretaries in the government. I hope they will not be a purge of personnel because an incredible number of people have stayed on behind the scenes and have really tried to keep this ship steady and running. Commended for their action, not condemned. The last thing we need is a bloodletting within the bureaucracy. We have to remember the u. S. Majority, the vast like the rest of United States, reflects the composition of the population across all the government, state, and local government. It is the Senior Executive service which tends to be white, male. We are in the business of trying to revitalize the u. S. Federal government at this point. We need to put trust back in, but we need to see our Public Servants not as tragically unelected, which is quite a in thel, but represented best of United States. We need to get back to affirming their hard work on behalf of the country. The National Security council when i was there also set up structures for engaging with counterparts. By thet visit to geneva National Security advisor is one of a long sequence of meetings with nikolai and his team that i think should be continued. Ahead on things like staff. There have been some taskforces that were set up, new that were being forged that need to continue. I think we will need reassessment of some relationships that have become the only anchor is the relationship between the president and the other person on top. There would be a lot to do, but no bloodletting or purge of all personnel. Take a hard look at the people who have been there. There are some structures that could be useful for moving ahead with the National Security issues. Thomas thank you, fiona. We are going to turn to audience questions. We have about 10 minutes, so i propose to direct a couple of questions for members of the audience to each of you. If you could all be relatively brief in the answers, just so we can get through them. Celia, we will start with you. I have two questions here. Asksrom randy ellis who how can the u. S. Turned back global trust after the Trump Presidency ech . Europeansr of could develop an independent alliance if trump withdraws from nato . I think those invoke strong opinions of powers in terms of European Defense and the Biden Administration. If you could give us your thoughts, please. Well, these are very open questions. The first question if i remember correctly is, what to do to regain trust, right . What can the u. S. Do . It depends on who you are asking. I am going to try to answer as a european, and i will probably answer as a frenchwoman. The minimum would be to just collectivelywork after years of not working together and being in competition with each other. President ember the trumps sentence that the eu is worse in china. Ways, it has profoundly euroamerican relations along the lines of are we not working together . There has always been strong competition between the two sides of the atlantic, but the idea was always that this was healthy competition to make our societies, our economies, our markets better and not competition to diminish the other and win over the other. The idea of returning to a winwin corroboration at the minimum and engaging in conversation, engaging in dialogue, would be important. There is a specific case i want to underline which is the idea and itith this pandemic, has been going on for years obviously, there is a very europe ofscious in the Climate Crisis. The idea that the u. S. Has been missing in action completely since at least the paris agreements and since donald trump came to power is the very unsettling thing for europeans who are looking at this crisis as a sort of, the covid crisis times one million. Its effects will be lingering for decades because the devastation will be infinitely more important and just because the collective there was only one way out of this crisis. At least to manage as much as we can as a collective. U. S. To way for the reengage with the world would be picking such a important crisis and work with partners. Defense ifeuropean the u. S. And leaves nato . I think this is too far down the line. We are not there yet. When president macron talked about the brain dead nato people considered he was talking about the end of nato. What he was really talking about was that nato was moving around without its head. Meaning without leadership and leadership should come from more than the u. S. , but at least the u. S. Is fully required. That means within nato you have tension between Member States including turkey, turkey and many Member States, france. It would bely extremely valuable. The first thing europe needs at this point is reengagement on what do we do with nato . Nato also work in utilize to deal with more global challenges including pandemics, including the future of Climate Crisis . Thewhat do we do with security environment and, in general, the competition with china . There are many topics to discuss already at the nato framework. If this was to not be thinktive, i thing europe, pushed by france, would continue the conversation on , strategicutonomy organization for europe to build some capability. Hopefully, incorporation with nato, but worstcase scenario europestarted to prepare as a prominent american ally. Thomas thank you, celia. Fiona, i know you want to do coming as well, but ive questions for you. The first is on turkey. Where are u. S. Turkey operations headed under a biden or Trump Administration . Trump has consulted quite frequently with erdogan. Where do you see the turkey relationship going . The second question is from Harry Frazier who asks, without u. S. Europe coordination can continue to be an International Actor . [indiscernible] worldviewplausible and could it run into new opportunities . Fiona thank you. Hopefully people cannot hear the which brought semi window. I will press ahead. Leadership and influence are tied together, correct . You only have the ability to lead if you have influence, and you do not get influence through coercion. Influence is done it is part of teamwork, of working together with others. If we look at countries that do not have any alliances like russia for example, which has putin and trump with similar views on alliances as income ments. Ber alliances are were countries are sticking together trying to solve problems. Without close alliances with not just europe but australia, canada, new zealand, japan, india, the relationships the United States has been developing globally, the United States will be forced to coerce countries. Just as she said, when President Trump said europe was worse than china he was talking about trade. Seeing the European Union as a competitor that ought to be rolling over and givings United States giving the United States preferences because the United States was in charge of protection. This gets to the issue of nato because the way nato has been talked about is almost a protection scheme. It was set up by the protection scheme, but mutual protection. All of us working together after world war ii and during the cold war. President trump was talking about this at different times that i heard in all of us have heard like the end of the roman empire where the romans would show and second city. Sack a city. That gives to the point about what do you do with nato . If we get back to the thought that is collective, a kind of mutual place for cooperation on the bigger problems of the day, then that will put us in a better position moving ahead. The difficulty will be of trying to come up with a new vision for nato and i think we should not do that. Given everything we have talked about today the environment is not placed for this. Threats are different than what they were after world war ii. They are not only in the form of countries. They are global pandemics, they are going to be the issues of Climate Change, mass migration. Inhabitable. Become in the long experience of working together. The secretary general of nato has been very good at leadership. That gets us into turkey. The turkey relationship has personalized. There are mutual relationships, but while i turkey is ambivalent in the european arena and bogged down in syria and jumping into armenia and azerbaijan and taking sides in a way that has not been previously 1994 turkey was instrumental in helping russians broker a ceasefire in karabakh between azerbaijan and armenia. It is now playing a much more divisive interventionist role. Flexing its muscle and creating up people in the eastern mediterranean. Energy exploration, falling out with israel after decades of having a Close Partnership with israel. Our u. S. On turkish relationship has been on the rocks. Its not just having the two guys work it out or soninlaw diplomacy. East peacedle process and plan and everything that is discussed. We need to have a structure and the owner only way to have the turkish u. S. And european relationship is to have it in a nato context. European partners including france and germany and other countries that turkey has Close Relationships with like britain. Could have a serious discussion with turkey about the future. Buton the big picture oning to deal with these problemsolving rather than coming up with big doctrine. You. Ank we are pretty much out of time. And,e one question for you this will be our final question. Trumpuld you look at second term scenario in the event that democrats top the senate . If you could answer that may be and give closing remarks, then we will wrap up. This is a panel on Foreign Policy, i will make the obvious point. That is that the president power is at its zenith in the conduct of Foreign Policy unless there is the need to submit a formal treaty to the senate for ratification or unless a particular Foreign Policy venture implicates force requires appropriations to sustain it. President trump has demonstrated that he believes the executive has authority to shift funds around within budgets and between budgets. He has been able to get away with so far and in the second term, he would continue that. I think a Democratic Senate would not fetter him in his conduct of Foreign Policy. Two concluding points. First, european strategic autonomy is a meaningless phase unless germany is willing to rearm. That is a pivot around which we now go to live coverage of a congressional hearing. You can watch this and anything on cspan. Org. Combatingring on misinformation on a 2020 election. Youre watching left coverage on cspan. Members will need to unmute themselves for speaking recognition. Witnesses will need to unmute themselves when answering the question. Members and witnesses, please keep your cam is on at all times. Even if you need to step