Transcripts For CSPAN Discussion On Combating Disinformation Campaigns 20240713

To discuss, we have brought together experts. Wheatley we will begin with comments on the Current Situation from the director of analytics and research followed by a Panel Discussion of two new publications. First, we will be discordant joined by a professor who will analyze the propaganda threats targeting democracies globally. We will be joined by dr. Ingram, who has done a project addressing gaps addressing propaganda and disinformation threats. Crucial gaps in the posture confronts malicious activity. Overall, the publications offer a straightforward, strategic framework for understanding state influence. Strategic policy guidelines. Please join me in welcoming our guest. [applause] ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am the director for analytics and research at the Global Engagement center at the department of state aired its my pleasure to be here on behalf of the gc special envoy. Before i give a few remarks, i would like to say thank you to George Washington university. We thank you for your continued partnership and our ability to be research and data driven. And, of course, a special note of gratitude to dr. Ingram. It has been a privilege for the gc to participate in these interviews and to share with you our plan as part of this inquiry. We are honored to be participating in this event with dr. Allison reed. Our special envoy and staff are committed to using every available tool to counter disinformation and propaganda and are advising and our adversaries undermining our society. We are encouraged to read that the doctors assessment of our ability to do so is optimistic and we look forward to todays discussion of the paper. We are especially interested in the framing of statesponsored information as antidemocratic threats due to their shared intentions to erode trust in society. For me personally, i can say firsthand that they have positioned themselves as the Mission Center of the u. S. Government and pushing back against false narratives and the views those narratives create. Our work is never final. More and more people have access to the internet and more and more people are able to find these audiences globally. It makes it more difficult for the u. S. And their partners to reach key audiences. For example, i can tell you that one of our adversaries has taken advantage of and continues to take advantage of the coronavirus out like and continues to push disinformation campaigns in at least five linkages. Some of these narratives include the coronavirus as an engineered bioweapon and that the cia cooked up this virus because china is an economic rival. Three, blaming bill gates as the mastermind behind this. Im pretty sure hes busy somewhere, but you get the point where it the point. While you and i can ask ourselves how would anybody believe this, the fact is many do believe these laws. And for some, it reinforces or shapes their views of the west. If these false narratives are repeated, it may become increasingly difficult for public clumsy efforts diplomacy efforts where they are most needed. This is a challenge we are grateful to have partners from the community that are with us. Today, the gc has by far the strongest mandate, staff, and budget. In that regard i would like to share with you our five key lines of efforts. The first is to leave the agency in coordinating and synchronizing efforts. The second is to do the same with our international partners. The second is the civil sector including academia and engagement such as these. The forces to adjust and to be effective in the information space. Last line of effort is to strengthen the gc workforce. We have made tremendous progress, especially in the last year. They are hard work on a range of efforts both big and small. We can be more effective at deterring our adversaries from attacking us and our partners of course, we cannot do it alone. I did not put this in here because it is sounding good, it is very true. We need our allies to help protect the democratic values. I will stop there for now, i just want to say thank you. We look forward to the discussion. I will hand the floor over to you. [applause] thank you very much. Good morning and thank you for coming along. I just want to say a few words about the special issue. This is before i turned over to the role of cdc communications. In the special issue, we wanted to look at the weaponize station of communication with state and nonstate actors which has emerged as one of the most pressing security issues. This communication threat has been transformed by the rise of the Islamic State. It is not that the Islamic State is something new. Its that they have been more successful than previous groups, in part to have a have exploited new technologies to allow them to communicate directly. However, this emerging threat goes beyond isis and we have seen other movements become increasingly challenging online, particularly from far right nationalist groups. But this goes beyond extremist groups we have seen state actors using these technologies to launch disinformation campaigns. In short, the girl democracies face ultimo threats from a spectrum of Different Actors in the nature of these threats has been transformed by new technology. However, the threats do not exist in isolation and our responses must be strategic and comprehensive. While there was a tendency to look at the issues individually our focus was to look collectively to identify the spectrum of threats facing modern democracies and to understand modern Communications Theater in which they are operating. We can also understand the tools to better understand how to counter them. The special issue touches across aspects including nonstate actors, the sociology of can indications, and the challenges we face tackling propaganda online. It also includes much, much more than that. I also want to move on to the article i wrote about prevention. When we look at the role Strategic Communication plays, it has been widely accepted as playing a key role in policy. If you look at any strategy of most countries, you find the reference somewhere. But when you look more closely at it, Strategic Communications is rarely actually strategic. We have these Communications Apply to one particular aspect of gce, particularly within the interventions sphere. This might be almost synonymous with counter narratives and counter messaging. What we put forward in this article is that Strategic Communications have far more to offer than just counter narratives. They should be an integral part of the totality of counterterrorism strategy. As our framework analysis views the uks counterterrorism strategy based on four pillars. If we look at the perceived pillar, that is the hard edge of counterterrorism. This is using the police, the military intelligence agencies to identify, go after, arrest, and ultimately prosecute terrorists before they have been able to carry out any attacks. However, there is much scope for the application of stratcoms and how they can be used for counterinsurgency to shape the environment. Particularly with terrorist groups who rely on support from their communities. But much candy gain from awareness campaigns which encourage the public to come forward with suspicions to be able to provide actual intelligence to operations. This is particularly important with the rise of lone actor attacks. There is often no organization to infiltrate. The aftermath of an attack, almost inevitably, it turns out somebody saw or knew something but did not know the importance of what they knew for who to tell. One of the challenges how can we have awareness campaigns to educate to be able to report in a way that allows Law Enforcement to be able to go forward and prevent attacks. In this way, successful awareness campaigns can help us combat the socalled bystander effect. If we look at the protect pillar, which provides our Border Security that protection from Critical Infrastructure and public spaces, there has been a long history of vigilance campaigns, particularly on public transport, such as if you see something, Say Something campaign from the new york police, see it, say it, sorted campaign from the british police, these have been focused on public transport infrastructure but also focused on preventing imminent attacks. Trying to get the public to report unattended luggage that may carry an explosive device, etc. There is much scope for vigilance campaigns that go down further, such as precursor materials which are used in running an explosive device. Campaigns which target the supply chain so that people who work in the supply chains will be able to spot what is a suspicious transaction. What is a suspicious amount of a certain chemical . Some have legitimate uses and are frequently brought and available, but how can people in the industry be able to spot things . There are many other areas where we can work to have targeted vigilance campaigns at specific audiences. Another aspect on which communications can be applied is in deterrence. It is one thing to be up to protect your Critical Infrastructure. It is another thing to be able to communicate the protection offered to your adversary in such a way that you shake up their behavior in such a way they realize their success of attack is very limited, so they dont go ahead. One of the reasons why there has been a decrease in terrorist hijackings is because of the security and infrastructure changes we have had at airports. It is not just structures put in place to prevent it, it is also that terrorists are aware and dont even try it. It would be much harder to be able to do it. If you move onto the prepared pillar, it is designed to reduce harm, stabilize and aid recovery quickly in the event of a terrorist attack what can we do in the aftermath to reduce its impact and aid recovery . This is perhaps the most underdeveloped pillar. Sorry about that. Most undeveloped pillar from a communications perspective. Terrorism is not just violence, it is the communication of violence. Terrorists carry out attacks against individuals and infrastructure that are here to have an effect on individuals over there, to be able to terrorize them or inside them insight another group incite another group into supporting them. They impetus for a terrorist attack depends on how it is communicated. This event ceases the wind of opportunity to decide how attacks are perceived. We go to public sense making, where we understand the crisis. We normally have a Communication Campaign to help shape the narrative around this. Governments need to be able to be prepared to have a communication strategy in place so they do not surrender the communication space to terrorist and surrender the narrative to it, but that would help reduce the social impact. It is not just terrorists that carry out the attack which are operational in this communication space after the attack, we see many other aligned actors taking place, such as other extremist groups exploiting the situation. After jihadist attacks, we often see far right groups the backing piggybacking attacks and exploiting it for their own agenda, using it to drive polarization, leading to reprisal attacks, a surge in hate crimes, after attacks, there is normally a surge in hate crimes afterwards. Also by accident or by design, between minutes or hours of terrorist attack, we often see conspiracy theories developing or misinformation, which in turn shape how things are interpreted. Also one of the most disturbing is we see hostile state actors being operational in this instance, in order to help manipulate the communication field, to amplify its effects, to drive polarization in order to push an agenda. Critically, if states are not prepared to be operational in this phase, they are surrendering to the other actors. We need to have a communication strategy in place to help shape the narrative and reduce the social impact of threats. I will quickly wrap up. 1. I want to get back to, communications in Counter Terrorism is far more than just counter narratives. The thing we often forget about in communications is it is meant to be strategic, and it has a role to play in the totality of counterterrorism strategy, and not just in an individual aspect of it. Thank you so much. That was very interesting. I look to this whole series, such an Impressive Group of academic writers involved in this project. It is very interesting to read. I will now hand over to dr. Ingram. Thanks, and thanks, alastair. And thanks to everyone who is attending. I appreciate those of you who are here and made it. I also need to take this opportunity to thank the Global Engagement center for the opportunity that they gave me to access these internal documents and evaluations and provide the assessment that i will talk very fleetingly today, looking forward to the discussion, but the policy paper is on the website for those of you who are interested. My goal in the next 15 minutes is to give you a bit of a background to the policy paper, talk about its key findings, if assessments, and then conclude with recommendations. The paper owes much to the access that i am fortunate to receive from the state department, but it also owes a lot to the work of other researchers, those who have tried to understand this complex system of threats, many of whom are in these audiences, my colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School they work into specific threats, things, and trends. In informed and allowed me to adopt the approach i did, which was to understand the current u. S. Posture in the context of a broader in touche and all history. That institutional history that preceded it. So what is the current state of u. S. Posturing and how to address this propaganda and disinformation threats . It is captured pretty well by the 2017 National Security strategy, which says that these events have been covered and fragmented. U. S. Efforts have been lacking focus and hampered by the lack of properly trained professionals. The question is, well, how did we get to this point . Of course, posture is not just the product of current decisions. Decisions made in the last six months, year, even two years. It is that institutional history. The impact that history has not only on making decisions, on precedents, on the legislation that already exists, this Strategic Policy and guidelines that already exist. But also, there are abstract things that are harder to understand or turn into tangibles, which is the mentality of staff working in these areas. And of course, the collective of all of this. What i want to try to do is understand not just the policy dynamics and the broader dynamics, but some of the more abstract things that are just as important to success in National Security and in championing the foreignpolicy agenda. To look back and a more textually considered way at what has been done in the past and how weve got to the situation we are in right now. I have distilled this assessment down to a few points. Firstly, the answers to a set up recurring questions has driven the evolution of u. S. Government information efforts for about a century. Here are the questions should Persuasive Communications play a role in how the u. S. Pursues its foreignpolicy and National Security agendas . If so, how should this be achieved . Therefore, who should be responsible . Deceptively simple questions, implications, bureaucratic legislation has been profound. Trends in the government sector has reflected the answers to these questions, which themselves have been influenced by shifting perceptions of who are the primary threats. Different beliefs in the u. S. global role in the world and Risk Appetite at the time. His history about a centurys worth of this history can be captured in this regularly repeating dynamic of building up the central mechanisms of the u. S. Government and the National Security policy information sector, dismantling it, to rebuild it again later, just to dismantle it and rebuild it again later. This trend, i would argue it can be traced back to 1919, when the u. S. Committee on Public Information was suspended by executive order only to be rebuilt decades later, in response to the nazi and japanese propaganda threats. The u. S. And many of its allies have with Persuasive Communications can also be traced back to world war i, when the alleys were seen, at least with hindsight, to have manipulated the minds. They capture this sentiment well. The report falsehood in wartime captures this sentiment well. He says that the deflowerment of the human soul is worse than the destruction of the human body. This is something that has remained ingrained in a way that so many of these institutions, the cultures and mentality of them have at the time. We see this trend i talked about constantly playing out, where the u. S. Government information sector, especially such as the office of war information in world war ii, the cold war, the gce during the global war on terror, they are belatedly built in response to a threat. The rebuilding process will be split by the interagencies doing this work already. At first, the mandates of the central mechanisms are narrow. Poorly defined, and the Institutional Knowledge is lost. One of the key recommendations is that it is essential that some of the historical lessons, that we return to those and try to capture them. And so you have this recurring dynamic through the second world war, roosevelt establishes the owi, the office of war information, to streamline functions. This was centralize functions. It creates tensions with the oss and obviously with the Armed Services as well. This was not just about finite resources. Just as much about philosophy and strategy. A shining city on the hill or do we play the way our adversaries do . Covert and unattributed . Of course, what happened to owi, it is dismantled, only for it to be rebuilt again and then you get into the cold war period. You have this growing expansion for decades of Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, however you want to call it. The full spectrum expansion, the office of war information on one hand to the kind of Covert Intelligence driven activities on the other. Essentially, everything in between. There is a shift in resources and capabilities in this time, inevitably reflected again in the answers to those questions. Shifts imposter reflect the threat of how well to deal with it how well the u. S. Was positioned. At the end of the cold war, these massive capabilities are dismantled and whats important is that the decisions reflect how the zeitgeist answered that set of questions. The end of the cold war signaled the end of a paradigm of understanding the world. What replaced it . Some would argue this idea that the end of history did, that there is this inevitable trajectory toward liberal democracy, that it had triumphed. And to put it perhaps to too crudely, if these truths are still evident, why Waste Resources telling the world about it . The primary adversary have been defeated. I dont need to go into too much detail over what happens next. Starts after september 11. After about a decades worth of stumbling and stuttering around, we come to the direct institutional moment that leads us to the gc. Gec. But just to give you an idea of what that looked like, you had Communications Center replaced by the strategic Engagement Center replaced in 2011 and 2008. Dr. Alberto fernandez inscribed it at the time as a dozen years after al qaeda began to tell its see sece to the world, cscc was born. And of those dynamics, you see them constantly replicated. You also see Risk Appetite from the executive. Many of you here, im sure, would be aware of the vigilant engagement activities in the videos put out. Turn away campaign was in the public province and an english language video welcome to Islamic State land. This would lead to a replacement, but think about it. A single video is part of a much broader campaign, different in linguistic output. This video gets a lot of public criticism and it leads to seismic changes. I asked what the impact of this was, and very frankly, they said moving forward, more bold or audacious activities were avoided. Think about posture, mentality, culture. Think about adversity on that criteria. These are the internal dynamics going on. Cscc, tosition from the the Global Engagement center, you see two key changes. First, a focus on coordination and capacity building, and secondly, stopping engaging in directed branding messaging. Datingg on Capacity Partners for that messaging. The capacity build and we give partners the freedom to message themselves. This gets us to 2017. This year emerges as an important pivot point in u. S. Government posture to address malicious activity. First, it was codified into law. The National Defense authorization act, 2017. What you see is not only a congressional mandate but it is actually quite weak. The congressional mandate is far stronger. You also have significant expansions of budget and workforce expansion. Secondly, you have major National Security documents acknowledging threats and importance of increasing u. S. Government capabilities to deal with propaganda and disinformation threats. There were amendments to the gec legislation and they appear in 2019. But this legislation also introduces other legislation that significantly expands the governments capabilities in these areas. February, 2019, a special envoy was appointed, satisfying the congressional requirements. A new internal strategy document is developed. A lot of what i talk about in the paper itself is based upon this document. But long story short, the document is important because of the way it says, ok, now that we have this requirement, now that we have what appears to be a significant expansion, how do we align . The document is also clear that gec is not going to message. It is not usia of the 21st century. So much of the recommendations i speak about are not just about addressing these gaps and issues, but thinking about this process. What needs to be done as we build these foundations . Three key issues. The first is this. We need to sow the seeds for a more sustained commitment for the u. S. Government National Security and Foreign Policy information sector. We need to break the cycle i have been speaking about. Part of this effort requires us to really focus on coherence. How do we cohere our effort over time . Not something that we think about because we need to later on. How do we plant those seeds right now . Finally, there needs to be an overarching understanding of the spectrum of state and nonstate threats. Its important because it helped calibrate Strategic Policy positions. Its important to inform strategic development, it is also important that the framework fits into broader National Security policy and Public Policy objectives. I will quickly go through these recommendations with you. The first is that the department should commission an information sector and best practices report based on historical reporting and interviews with current and retired practitioners. That is important not just for preserving valuable lessons but because it contributes to encouraging Institutional Culture that appreciates the value of communication and achieving Foreign Policy objectives. I spoke before about the importance of coherent. Holistic coherence requires three types of coordination. The first is practical coordination across u. S. Interagencies, that is essentially what the gec internal strategy does. Game plan for ctically coordinating the coordinating. It was described to me as a transition to conductor. That is a good way to think about. The gec is the conductor, bringing the orchestra essentially into the room. That is only one dimension of this. Second coordination is strategic and require synchronization aligned with overarching principles. It is my assessment that the Reagan Administration directive 75 that a similar document should be developed. That it should be developed to inform ongoing thing efforts. Ongoing Foundation Building efforts. The third form of coordination that contributes to this idea of coherence is a communicative coordination. It is my assessment that it is best achieved by a centralized messaging function that disseminates a steady drumbeat of messaging. I realize that this is a contested point. There are three counter arguments that emerge around this. The first is that the government is not the right messenger for the types of messaging and audiences most important for the century. 21st the second is that the interagency is efficient and sufficient and there are enough layers of bureaucracy and function. Thirdly, it is nongovernment actors who should be doing this messaging. I agree with these points but i do not think it negates the need for a centralized function. In fact, i think those three counter arguments contribute to a strong argument for a centralized function. Is significanty and huge, even at the lowest mechanisms,central hundreds of dollars are put into it. But we needed to assure coherence, particularly now in a fastpaced environment. That is the time it takes for example, for embassies to clear a particular message. And for various parts of that interagency. The idea would be that the metanarratives is put out by the centralized function and interagency largely align with the core message being put out. Finally, i am happy to speak about any of these recommendations, but we need to understand the spectrum of state and nonstate propaganda and disinformation threats targeting the u. S. And its allies as antidemocratic activities. I argue this because that spectrum of threats has a shared logic. What an overarching understanding does is help to prevent the kind of siloing that results in threats not being transferred. It means that where there is crossover, there can be better efficiency in the application of resources, personnel, time and budgets. It also means that having Strategic Policy attention does not shift with what the executive happens to be focused on because of media reporting. I argue that antidemocratic activities are simply this disinformation from actors targeting democracies. I am not diluting the importance of understanding the nuances of different threats. It is essential to understand the efforts to recruit and incite violence. Disinformation to diverted attention. It is essential to understand. But what this model attempts to do is focus our understanding on that overarching strategic logic. It helps us understand the typically catalytic or longterm impacts of democratic activity antidemocratic activities on the attitudes and perceived norms in a population. I argue this occurs due to malign influence activities eroding the trinity of trust. Social trust, trusting authorities and trusting democracy. This contributes to two sets of effects. Social effects. Target populations become more susceptible to polarizing narratives. Outwardly and tie this with Urgent Solutions that apply to a particular community. You see this expressed by nonstate actors and politicians populist as well. They are important. There are also these Strategic Effects you may start to see. Target populations demonstrate increased engagement in antidemocratic activities ranging from one end, support, to the other end engaging in politically motivated violence. These may further exacerbate vulnerabilities to propaganda activities in a potentially compounding cycle. Research has demonstrated that propaganda tend to resonate with individual groups that are already predisposed to those things. What i would suggest is that antidemocratic influence activities, if unchallenged, vulnerabilities and by doing that increase the pool for whom such messaging and activities may resonate. You appreciate, then, that broader contextual conditions are very important as for whether or not those dynamics continue. I want to wrap up by saying that we are in the midst of a democratic recession that has been clearly and unequivocally supported. In fact, larry dimon would suggest that this recession is on the verge of a democratic crisis. This graph has been taken from that015 work that suggests three decades in the increases in democracies and freedoms from 19752006 around the world are likely due to second and third wave democracies emerging. , 2006. S a transition what you see after 2006 is a plateauing out that then turns into a decline. His work only goes until 2015, it has notace this shallowed out, it has continued. The democratic recession is only broadening and deepening. Freedoms within democracies are in decline. Trust in democracy and governments. For the 13th consecutive year, there has been a global decline in Political Rights and civil liberties. The economist has seen a continuation of this trend, this global democratic recession. Im not saying adversaries have become good at this, rather that a confluence of factors has added to susceptibility of populations around the world. There is a lot to think about here, so thank you so much to dr. Ingram. I think it is very fascinating to look at this panel. We have three out of the five eyes representing a very different perspective. Mostly u. S. Focus, professor ingram. I know that your work, alistair, is focused on a wide group of researchers. The question i would like to begin with for both of you you mentioned 2006. What happened in 2006 and why was it the shifting point global for the recession of global democracy . That is a difficult question and many scholars more intelligent than me have been grappling with this, what is it about . I think 2006 is significant for a number of reasons, i think the second and third wave democracies were going through latter stages of election cycles, democracy was being tested. It is hard for me, someone who worked in terrorism operations for a long time through most of that time, not to assess the way democracies address the terrorism threat was a significant contributor to this. When you look at faith in democracy in first world democracies that is the most disturbing trend. The second and third wave democracies on the decline, that happens, that could be explained by a plateau. But the fact that freedoms and trust and satisfaction in democracy has declined, Little Wonder when you tell a population we have to pull back on some freedoms for the sake of security. Little wonder that they are not up to it. I do not say this as a hippie sitting on the sidelines watching this play out. I was at the pointy end of this within the National Security apparatus, and again it should not surprise us that in other countries around the world they saw the example that was set and followed. People have to take responsibility for their own nations, but at the time there were confluences that contributed to that dynamic. It has continued. I think 2006 was important, if you reflect on the 1990s, there was a sense of democracy had won and the world changing toward democracy. When you get to that place, you become complacent. It is no longer people making the argument, this is why we need democracy and it is so important, this is why states function better. If you stop making the arguments about it, people forget what the arguments are. It makes it easier to be eroded or questioned. It parallels between the 1950s and evolution and the emergence of creationism. Evolution has been accepted for so long people forgot what the arguments are behind it. When they were confronted with a different perspective, people did not have at hand what the arguments were for evolution against it. If arguments are not constantly being made, you become complacent. Very fascinating to think about 2006, five years from 9 11 and the policies that had ramifications. You are moving out of the 1990s and you have this seismic event and then the dynamic of legislative change, the arguments that were being made, and the way democracy turned. 75, theing about Reagan Administration demonstrated an appreciation for the semantic battle, for words. What does that word mean, and what does it mean to the rest of the world . What does freedom and democracy mean . It sounds superficial but it matters, it shapes understanding, and a big part is how much the policy was sold to undermine what it meant. Those of you in your papers touched on the spectrum of disinformation campaigns. I would like to ask you why you are focusing not only on violent extremists but also on state actors, and the importance of looking at those. As we look at things the last decade, they had become increasingly connected, and we have seen state actors are crossing over to manipulating communications. Two things are coming interconnected, but ultimately they aim at the same thing, weakening the state and undermining it. If we look at them individually, we miss something. We need to look at the totality of threat. There are lots we can learn about understanding the approach of states, and if we artificially silo them, we lose the interpretation of that. That is not to argue against in any way, we can agree on this point, we have devoted too many years of our lives looking at specific threats and trying to understand them. We are not saying that should be dismissed, but what we are saying is there should be a value especially to Strategic Policy, policy decision and architects, to understand there is an overarching logic, and if it is framed in such a way can speak to larger Public Policy, security and Foreign Policy. That is an important lesson out of the rules on terror, the way counterterrorism policy was something that needed to be addressed because it was urgent. It was always over here. Once we do this counterterrorism thing, we will get back to what we do. This is a perpetual threat, and ongoing threat, we need to settle into an appropriate rhythm, and that means building foundations and avoiding the siloing. Specialization because it is vital but having that larger framework. We saw in the early days the applications of nct, reinventing the wheel. There was a role for communications but started developing things on principles rather than what can they learn from communication . There is a lot that could have been brought in. What were trying to do is take a step back. You really touch on that in your paper. Going beyond counter messaging. Strategic communication is bigger than that. This is fascinating. The audience has not had a chance to look at this, but this is a new idea for how to look at the threats and how to counter it. Could you briefly discuss what are the main challenges for implementing such a model . Very nice of you. This thing does not work i think conceptually there is an obvious point to be made. It comes back to what we spent a lot of this conversation talking about, we cannot dismiss the nuance. We need to appreciate there are short to medium term objectives that this spectrum of threats individually have, we have to understand that. From a larger policy perspective, to understand the potential impact of sustained exposure to this within the midst of a democratic recession on the verge of democratic crisis. Denying this is the political and moral equivalent of denying climate change. You put yourself in a position without addressing this issue you are contributing to a broadening and deepening of the pool for whom these influence activities will resonate. One of the challenges is the specificity of making sure we do not gloss over specifics. Secondly, i am sure all of you who work in government have heard it and seen it. People are tired, and when you bring this up, people will point to the past, and say, how can we do it . I look at the present and say how can we do it now, look at the administration . I look at the future, and things will probably work themselves out anyway. There is a passiveness and defensiveness to that which is sad. But which is not a good way to posture against a threat that takes this very seriously, that devotes more attention to this issue. I think that is an important part, there is going to be a cynicism about world democracies. This democracy thing, again. Are we talking about that . Yes, we are talking about it and it is a problem. We need to take the problem seriously. Thirdly, a manifestation of that is this idea that somehow the religious fundamentalists and the populist and the nationalists, the authoritarian regimes of the world, that they have a more passionate argument to make for their cause. The spiritual emptiness of liberalism, liberal democracy, that might be a weakness. He talks about that in his article, the end of history . I disagree with that. There is just as much passion and emotion and rational choice arguments that can be made for democracy. One thing that is clear from this historical analysis is that when the u. S. Government leads and synchronizes with its partners and allies, international allies, more often than not it starts to get things right quickly. Inevitably it takes time, stumbling, and hard reflection. We are going through that at the moment, and part of this Foundation Building is to do it seriously and honestly. A ray of hope. If you look back historically, world war i and world war ii and the cold war, at the start of all three of them, the allies had no Strategic Communication capabilities and in the fuse for years, in the first few years learned and developed it. The end of world war i and world war ii and the cold war were successfully doing at communicating the other side, then dismantled everything and started from scratch the next time. We have a capability in the past to be able to develop communications that we need. For me, what is important is that it helps to understand the disparate types of communications and threats we face from misinformation to extremist threats. When you look at extremist groups, they have multiple types of different messaging, and they do not often make sense looking at them collectively. How do we understand misinformation . A campaign was talking about the coronavirus. All these different messages do collectively one thing, undermine trust, which is at the foundation that democracy is built upon. These seemingly unconnected messages, but they come together. I am going to open the floor to questions. We have two individuals with microphones, please wait until a microphone gets to you. We will begin in the corner over here. Hi. I am interested in exploring the notion of the way social movements in contemporary times have pushed back on the conceptualization of a democratic recession where we have seen, for example, the march for our lives social movement, the black lives matter social movement, definitely the march post president trumps inauguration and the pink pussycat cap march. These demonstrations are examples of how democratic principles the right to free speech, the right to assembly are being executed in such a fashion that other countries can follow suit, model, emulate, and we have seen that historically in other countries. Pushing back on the conceptualization of democracy in decline. There is no question democracy is in decline, and the number of democracies has dropped 13 consecutive years, and the freedoms within democracies, not third and second wave but first wave i agree completely these protest movements around the world are an indication of his push this push against authoritarianism. They are a great opportunity, how those opportunities are taken advantage of, i do not know. I do not feel the best approach to this is some crusading effort from first world democracies at all. I think consolidation is a far more important step at this stage. I agree absolutely these protest movements are a very positive sign, particularly in volatile regions. There is still a push against authoritarianism. The potential of the arab spring and the failings there was a lost opportunity. Someone who spent time with the syrian opposition, it was a devastating loss. That hope still remains, and it is from Civil Society where i do most of my work. I see a lot of hope in those protest movements. [indiscernible] we are one of five universities to receive grants. Thank you very much for a terrific presentation. I like everything you have said. I would like to talk about your model, i think it is spot on. I would rephrase the top part and say it is a crisis of Democratic Institutions that leads to research questions, why . Is the response to 9 11 part of it . Growing wealth inequality. There are a number of factors. Internet penetration. That is terrific. I heard in your presentation a creeping introduction of an older broadcast model. You referenced world war i. Is that effective . If you focus on al qaeda and think of it as offering messaging to the americans or europeans, and you have to counter message, that is fine, but what if the nature of the problem is you have this crisis of Democratic Institutions, but you have domestic supporters of a White Nationalist Christian Identity Movement that is led in part by putin in russia, you have a different situation because you have white sources of disinformation application that is difficult for people like the state department to address. By law. How do you address something where it is a network of likeminded individuals who distribute around the globe around common themes . That seems to be a more challenging undertaking. It is an excellent question. I certainly that older broadcast model approach, certainly there is some to be said for intent if we are talking about the centralized mechanism, this steady drumbeat of messaging coming out within which a far more dynamic focus not from interagency, but partners on the ground, the Civil Society, the private sector not an issue putting out messaging. It should be independent. With Civil Society and private sector partners, i am not talking about telling the entire network what to do, not at all. I think mechanisms need to be put in place to avoid the messaging communication schizophrenia when you are dealing with an enormous interagency. That was the principle behind it. What you have addressed, what you have highlighted in the second part of your question is one of the greatest challenges facing a lot of democracies around the world, including this one here, the intersection of foreign influence with domestic actors. Given the legal constraints within the United States, there are great challenges there. My colleague is doing a lot of research into this, and i refer to him on these points, but i think the communications aspect is only one aspect of what needs to be a significant approach beyond communications. Legislation has to get in line with this. Part of what is being discussed at the program, what we have been talking about through the caucus has been this idea to not with reference to the far right to not only bring in statutes for domestic terrorism laws within the United States, but prescribing farright terrorist organizations. When russia supports farright entities, it goes from flippant support to essentially supporting prescribed terrorist organizations. You cannot constitutionally prescribe domestic groups, but when you have criminal statutes attached to domestic terrorism laws, whether farright, farleft, any other motivation, you are empowering operators to act. Then you start to see the way the legislation comes in with Law Enforcement, treasury, and then you have the messaging over the top of that. That is the way thinking about not Just Communications but how they fit into the broader apparatus. We talked about the issues we face in the u. S. , but the u. K. Has interesting examples. Like canada, the u. K. Is taking the lead on domestic terrorism. One of the biggest problems, ways, ct space, in some we are lucky with the Islamic State that everybody agreed they are a bad thing, and everybody agreed some thing needs to be done with them. As soon as you move away from the Islamic State, that consensus gradually breaks down, even moving into the farright spectrum, it becomes far more complicated. We saw these challenges dealing with social media content online. You have social Media Companies taking a different approach, some are taking the approach of banning content by far right parties which are legitimate political parties, in the sense that they run elections and win seats and get voted in. People like golden dawn facebook took the decision to ban them from the platform. It raises the question, who should be making these decisions . Who should have the right to speak in the political space . It has been something governments have intended to push off toward social media to deal with themselves because it is the third rail in terms of making decisions that are very difficult. Ultimately we need to be able to address this issue. Where do we draw the line . What communication is acceptable and is not acceptable . There are ethics behind us we need to address. That often is not helped in the u. K. , we tend to talk about this whenever there is an election coming, and we do not have the most sensible debates about it but things are gradually moving. In the direction of the more open debate. The gentleman in back. Strategy for humanity, human rights consultancy. I had a question, your paper is focused as i understand it apologies, i have not gotten through it yet but mostly on the strategic statutory basis for it. Gec. It seems to me you are alluding to an earlier point by dr. Reed about thinking about Strategic Communications beyond countering. There is all manner of apparatus within the United States government, even within state you have Public Diplomacy arms within each regional bureau. You have a bureau focused on promoting issues, topics and policies in the United States. I wonder if you can situate i know your focus was on gec but expand a little bit visavis the other state entities as well as the bureaucratic competitors. It may be overt and covert as well. We have about three minutes, i will try to grab a couple questions, and hopefully our panelists can answer and we can wrap up. Digital Forensic Research lab of the atlantic council, following up on that question, i am wondering about institutional equities. If you look at the testimony of mike lumpkin, he talks often that even though he had connections at the defense department, he was interagency coordinator and came last in line for having a seat at the table for these discussions. Is it appropriate that something as important as the gec he is that it is situated under the under secretary for Public Diplomacy, or should there be some cabinet level equipment for this posting . One final question down here, then we will let our panelists answer. Hi. [indiscernible] i was curious about the comments about irrational behaviors and patterns which can be used to counterweight other ideologies. A lot of Research Indicates irrational or sacred values or identity values pull more weight for individuals. What are those . Do you want to go first . You can go first. [laughter] thanks, man. With pleasure. That is an essential point, the gec is actually a small part of this, its purpose is to coordinate. With the congressional mandate its role is significant expansion at least on paper, meant to occur over the next two years. 200 staff, 100 million budget, and that is tiny compared to the interagency and what is devoted to this kind of effort across the embassies, consulates. Not to mention the department of defense, and enormous capability of broadcasting. It is essential, and i say it in the paper that we do not assess the health of the entire effort just by the central mechanisms. If we did, it would be a far more sickly state than the assessment made. The interagency and the continued efforts, which have been important to continuing outreach, but that does not diminish or dilute the importance of the central mechanisms. It highlights how important they are to have those mechanisms in place, they need to be continually supported. With the effort going on now, it is vital mechanisms are put in place to ensure you have those central functions to coordinate across the interagency. It is very powerful, but if it is not synchronized, it can be a hindrance to the effort. I know the struggles special envoys had was precisely that. The issue you are talking about, where they fit in the interagency and sit at the table was a big issue. The congressional mandate is meant to go a long way toward changing that, and the leadership of gabriel over the next few years, we will see the way that plays out. The changes you are talking about may be necessary, but at this time we expect that the special envoy will be exercising that. And finally, i certainly agree with the point you make, it is essential that a lot of the discussions at the state department have been about the importance of having a coordinated strategic approach, but having a method of Strategic Communications within your mechanisms. And a part of having that is a recognition of the psychosocial levers you need to use as a framework to inform the messaging. The rollout planning. I agree the rational choice appeals are very important, the promises, free and fair elections, what that means and implications of that, it sounds like a cliche. The deficit you referred to. It is also that emotional side, the identity choice, that mix of rational and identity choice appeal is just as important. I am not saying the aim is some universal democrat, not at all. Rather democracy is the system of government that creates the space within which human beings can find that meeting. I do not want to get too philosophical. Sorry, you both know that. But it is at the core of that. We need to be humble in the way we project but assertive as well. I will end with a shameless promotion. There is an article about the special issue exactly sacred values but also at the end of the article, what are the most promising new communication approaches about shaping social norms . I will not go into now, i will allow you to read the article. And final comments about the last few questions. I always bring it back to strategy. You can think about how things organize, a lot we go in the rabbit hole and we have to get back to what is the threat . What do we do to counter . What is our objective . Keep coming back to that. It needs to be a coherent strategy. Thank you all for being here. Join me in thanking our panelists. Please do check out all of the publications which will be launching shortly. Thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2020] join us today at 6 p. M. Eastern for the results of the nevada caucuses, precinct results, candidate speeches from joe biden, senators bernie sanders, Elizabeth Warren and amy klobuchar, Pete Buttigieg and tom steyer and your calls about campaign 2020. Live coverage on cspan, on demand at www. Cspan. Org or listen live on the free journal cspan. Org radio app. Washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. Coming up sunday morning, we discussed the president s reelection effort. 2020 with agn democratic strategist. Sam gill on a new study about attitudes and