Transcripts For CSPAN Discussion On U.S.-Iran Tensions 20240713

Welcome and thank you for joining us today for this important and timely discussion focusing on the implications regionally and internationally of the recent development between and escalations between iran and the United States and the killing of qassem soleimani. As you know, on january 3, an american air strike ordered by u. S. President donald trump lled the top ianian military commander, qassem soleimani. Ran responded by attacking two military bases in iraq that housed american forces. The last few weeks have seen violent increase in escalation both before and after this major incident. With varying degrees and impacts. Y we seek to discuss the this on three levels. First in iran, with the Iranian Regime continuing to face a crumbling economy especially after the shoot og down of the ukrainian commercial plane and further sanctions by the united options t are irans both domestically and regionally as well as with europe and the United States. Second, regionally. What are the implications of soleimanis killing for irans regional influence and expansionist party. Whats the impact on iraqi sovereignty and iranian influence there and on u. S. Iraq relations. Allies in theans region have vowed to revenge the killing, will the crisis in lebanon and iraq prevent such steps. Third, will other countries break away from the u. S. And chart their own deals . Whats the strategy of the Trump Administration toward iran especially given that its an Election Year here. Amidst these domestic, regional and international crises, are iran and the United States ready for war, negotiations, or neither or are we coexpect controlled keaslation and the use of Unconventional Warfare methods . To answer these questions and help analyze these developments an options we are pleased and fortunate to have with us a great panel of experts to discuss the implications of the killing nsions and the in the region and beyond. Thank you for joining us and being with us to contribute to this discussion. Ahmad who has agreed to chair the discussion and contribute to the discussion. Before giving the platform to the panelists i would like to remind you to silence your phones and for those of you not familiar with arab center, washington, d. C. s, format we use these cards for questions. During the q a questions, please use the card. Write your question and name and affiliation and raise the card, one of our staff will pick it up from you. To our t, i will turn discussion. Thank you. Thank you, tamara. Good afternoon, everybody. I hope its not too cold outside but i think its manageable. We are here today to discuss really one of the its a serious, serious problem for the United States and iran and serious problem with its repercussions, local, regional and international. We really have a very good panel today, were going to be iscussing issued pertaining to iran, specific to iraq, syria and lebanon, which are basically places that are impacted by the United States and iran and whats happening in the region. Thed orer of the presentation, by the way, each will have about 12 minutes to present their cases and i am lenient, im not going to be cutting people off but it would be nice to stick to the time limit. Daniel from Georgetown University will be talking basically about United Statesiran policy and basically the overall geostrategic policy and dimensions of such policy. From iran shes an iranamerican journalist for bbc, aljazeera, shell be talking about domestic dynamics of iran today and whats going on there and how that will be impacted in the future. And the director of the Iraq Initiative and he will be talking about iraq and how its affected by issues, by the current conflict. And yours truly will be discussing reflections on or implications for lebanon and syria, whats going on today. So without further ado, daniel, go ahead. Daniel thank you very much, tamara and imad. Im delighted to be here. I have a presentation that is essentially three points and i may actually come in under 12 minutes, well see how it goes. And my task is to answer all these many questions in that toe and i think its reduced the following three closely related points. First and foremosting, my perspective on the Trump Administrations approach to iran, to put it in the largest frame possible at this moment is that its just basically tactics and no Clear Strategy other than a strategy of implicit regime change and Economic Warfare which i dont think actually is a strategy that has any coherence or chance of discuss. When you are looking at the kind of conflict we have between the United States and iran, whether its focusing on the Nuclear Issue or other issues, you have really two choices. Ne is to engage, and you can use various forms of coversion buttress that engagement but the purpose is to resolve this through compromise which means implicitly or explicitly that you accept your opponent and do not go into it trying to bring down the regime. Or you can make war one way or the other. Those are your options. They are very different options, have very different outcomes, obviously. There are different ways to make war. We hear now that we have the debate about whether the assassination of soleimani would precipitate a military war but in effect the United States is already at war with iran because not only did the administration pull out of a nuclear deal but imposed sanctions which amount to an economic war which has had drastic effects on irans economy. We have chosen that option. I think that choice persists despite the fact that bolton left the white house. I think there are many in the white house or near it, including pompeo and others who support basically the assumption that somehow, through some use of force, we can somehow bring down this regime and achieve all our options, the Silver Bullet strategy. Im not sure that President Trump actually completely understands the implications of the choices before him in any sort of way other than instinctively. He doesnt really have a strategic concept of what the options are, the kinds of things we are talking about here are not much concern to him and that has allowed for a certain effort to leverage his own involvement in this. I think his instincts are to keep out. I said in my piece a week ago that i thought he would not pursue conflict with iran and his preference is for negotiation, he simply doesnt know how to square his desire for negotiation with what is in fact objectively speaking, to use an old marksist term, objectively speaking a policy thats built around regime chang. We need to understand that irans response to this policy is something i and others called a policy of controlled escalation. The purpose of which was really as far as i can understand to get the attention of europeans and use leverage not for the i not because the iranians thought they could solve the problems of the United States but use a process of controlled escalation to compel or encourage the europeans to create a mechanism to allow iran to sell its oil. When iran signed on to the nuclear deal it made a strategic decision, that was that its future is based on engagement with the west, not on nuclear weapons, certainly not Nuclear Power and so they were desperate. To sustain this agreement. And to get europes attention, to get europe to find some way of creating this much talked about but thus far failed mechanism. What has happened i think is that has failed. Iran has become more desperate in a lot and a lot of what iran has been doing under controlled escalation is push it as far as it can. I do not feel nor do i accept the argument that this is a part of the intrensic expansionist identity of an iranian government. I think this was the response to american policy dictated by the few choices iran had given what the Trump Administration decided to do. What weve seen as ive said in my piece is that in the last few month, irans hope for that mechanism that trading mechanism, has been dashed. Iran became more desperate, pushed harder and harder, the United States responded. Until then, all sides, israel, the u. S. , iran seemed to understand the rules and red lines of controlled engagement. But increasingly they were violated. I did say in my piece for the center that i thought that irans objective now would be to recapitulate those rules and not go beyond them. That is what iran would rather do, avoid a headon military conflict with the United States. And i think that is trumps preference as well if he can somehow make this work. The second and closely related point i wish to make is that, this is one of the paradoxes of our approach, is that the reason the United States and i think the Trump Administration believes it can make this nonstrategy work is really an imbalance in power between the United States and iran. A tremendous imbalance of power. If you look at the u. S. Effort to negotiate with korea, for example, north korea, that is, or the u. S. Effort to negotiate with the former soviet union during the period of time that that was alive and family members had an intimate view of that in fact what dick kate tated that negotiation was the parity and power between the two and the mutually assured destruction. The alternative was worse. In the case of i iran theres an imbalance of power so we feel we can take the risk of pushing iran without falling into a resip us to war and if we d we somehow feel we might prevail. The problem is we have enough power to engage in whats called maximum power, this euphemism for the strategy, but we dont have enough power to prevail. We dont know how to square that circle. We simply do not know how to square that circle. I think our president isnt even aware of that circle or of this edeep paradox there. And as a result, we dont know where to go because were tempted to use power but we dont know how to prevail and iran has all kinds of power to push back against us for which we dont have an easy or simple response. In my sense, having spoke within a lot of folks in the u. S. Military is that they are very concerned about an outbreak of full scale war with irap as well. We have this paradox of just enough power to push the iranians, max in power, but not enough power and ways to express that power. I think we have not solved that problem. I dont see that problem ever being solved in the near future. I think trump would rather, and he said it many time, said it even after the attack of soleimani, he said i want to talk. This was the thibbed time he said, and not only did he say he wanted to talk, he said i do not want regime change. This is the second or third time he made that statement. He does not want regime change. Remarkable. I think hes speaking uncharacteristically in an honest way because hes really, thats where hes coming from. But he doesnt know how to square that with u. S. Policy. Finally, my third point, this gets back to some of the issues tamara raised at the outset of the panel, and that is the implications for irans own internal politics and as i said in my paper, i predict that iran, being adept as managing crises like this would leverage every opportunity including iraq if possible because all thats occurred against the backdrop of these extraordinary protests in baghdad, in beirut, tehran, a region thats witnessed these amazing street uprisings. Think its premature to say those uprisings are the end of that. They did pose a huge strategic threat to iran. In iraq, in lebanon, and in iran itself. And this we was the irgcs perspective. I think this attack on soleimani would be celebrated as the end of the irgc. Im not an expert but everything i read from the experts tell me theyre very adaptable, have twice reassert their influence. The new commander will find ways to assert influence. I think all that means they will leverage the situation. Having said all that, this is hardly the end of protests. Not at all. And i think this is something none of us anticipated this dast we are the Ukrainian Airline which demonstrating the yawning gap between the iranian government on one hand and its as people particularly the urban middle class and the enormous alienation of that class toward the government. Having said all that, heres where ill finish up. If you want to find a way of creating a context in which those protests have meaningful impact on irans own internal politics, advocate regular jet stream change is not the way to go. It only empowers the hardliners and only makes it more difficult cutors between them and the regime to have negotiating power. Iran is complicated. There are multiple players. Smort of the miracle regime collapse, the way in which therell be political change will be through some sort of process, long, arduous, difficult, of negotiation. Protesters provide negotiators and the Reformist Movement with leverage. They always have. They tried to leverage it in the early 1990s, early 2000s. But thats the way things change. It doesnt mean revolution revolution. It means a long struggle. Therefore just writing off reformism and the write off reformists is to do them a great injustice. But also more importantly is to not recognize what it would take. The hardliners want conflict with the United States. I understand that a deescalation of conflict with the United States has some sort of normalization is going to make it in the long run easier for the reformists to push for some meaning offul process of lib rahization however slow and arduous. So to the extent we write off that possibility and pursue a possibility of regime change and Economic Warfare, it really means that whatever space there is for any kind of evolution within the body politic within the authoritarian regime will not be there. The United States purr sthide salt negotiations at the same time vowing to destroy the soviet oil industry and pursuing a policy of open regime change at the same time negotiating,s that profoundly sort of contradictory situation. From my perspective its difficult to imagine a gorbachev and his allies would have not emerged had it not been for a policy of that that was part and par sthofle wider strategy. I think the current american approach, rather than create preconditions for some minimal form of plitization or beyond that will create a situation in those forces which want to find change or leverage power from the street which is critical will not be in position to do so. That has to you have to keep in mind, in february there are parliamentary elections in iran followed by president ial. Lections and these are not thank you arab center for having me and thank you, thanks to all of you for coming to this event. But o will try to be brief feel free to cut me off if i go over time. I want to speak of the regional implications of the soleimani assassination based on irans regional activities, then ill speak a little bit about the domestic dynamics and talk more about this hardliner reformists, moderate, how revisions are playing out, who is soleimani, and also touch upon irans Foreign Policy in general especially toward the west and prospects for talks. So as far as the Regional Policy , its true that soleimani was a unique person. Was a capable commander, he had very special personal relationships with many of the forces of the proxies of the allies of the leaders across the region. It was an indispensable he was an indispensable person, basically, an asset to the establishment in iran. But he wasnt irreplaceable. It was mentioned he is replaced by his deputy who is considered even more hard line than soleimani within the rankings of the quds force and the orlingnyization is going to continue. There will be some setback, yes, it will take a while to rebuild the relationships so they quickly fill the voit void but it wasnt a oneperson organization or operation that is going to end or be completely jeopardized with soleimani gone. The allies are still going to be there. The proxies are going to be even some continuing from independently of iran. It wasnt just soleimani it was force leader iowa killed in this, so theres that side of the equation that im sure will be discussed later. What i could predict is for the force to continue with a more focused mission of trying to drive u. S. Forces basically out of these countries and eventually the region or if not at least raise the cost of u. S. Presence in the region which is something basically the quds force and soleimani had been following for over a decade. Its something they mentioned at the peech, there will be friday prayers tomorrow with khomeini speaking, thats a very determining speech, it is probably going to be a hardline speech asking for unification and support for the irgc in the country and also more hardline stance in the region. I dont think its going to be rash, i dont think iran is going to, or the quds force is going to basically in the region start acting out of control but this is definitely not finished. The onetime retaliation was that flashy operation was a onetime p. R. , basically, operation. But the proxy fight is going to continue. Seoul whatever soleimani was feared for, the quds force will continue without him. I dont think this is going to have much impact on the mission of the organization. If not make it stronger and more focused. And we have to understand that soleimani wasnt the top lead ore they have structure. Theres always a Supreme Leader above him who is still around. So that direction, the leadership, always comes from tai tehran, although soleimani was a very significant figure. So therell be some setbacks but at the same time, like it was said, iran is patient. Iran is going to play the long game in the reprobably and basically the proxy fight is going to continue and not stop. As far as the domestic dynamics, i agree with what dan said. This has basically trumps policy, trumps iran, the Trump Administrations hardline policy in iran, the hawkish policy of maximum pressure over the last moreears have weakened the moderate forces and helped strengthen the hardliners, the more militaristic portions of the establishment who were already strong but it just keeps them keeps giving them the upper hand. As we saw with the funeral of soleimani which i think even surprised the white house and washington, people came out to the street in millions. Not the population of course, soleimani was a controversial figure, he was part of the quds force, but as far as the political factions in the country, it did serve as rallying around the flag factor you saw reformist, moderates, those who are considered internal opposition to the hardline stance, all come out in support of not the force but in support of the person and in condemnation of what they see as an illegal assassination by the United States. So basically the reformists within the parliament, those moderates within the administration and also reformists within the Political Party still operating inside the country, those who have been critical of the irgc, of the corruption, the economics, inside the country, even the quds force, in syria theres some criticism, domestic criticism, part of what used to be soleimanis file but you see a lot of criticism taking the back seat and instead its replaced by unification against the more immeant imminent foreign threat which is the threat of war. The november protests, two months ago, the november protests across the country, antigovernment crisis, a deadly crackdown, hundreds of People Killed by security forces, very brutal, we might see more of that. But we also will see more crackdowns and more oppression. Obviously the hardliners have the will and the capacity to repress further as we saw in november. At the same time also you probably heard of the downing of the ukrainian fault by the irgc, that was a big internal disaster. It affected the rallying around the flag factor just from a week before but i think its also something that were going to te were here in the speech tomorrow from the Supreme Leader that we will hear in the speech tomorrow from the Supreme Leader. Force andcism of the more support behind it. We are going to see a more closing of the political space. Have already seen candidates registered for the upcoming parliamentary election. Any of them have been disqualified. The election will be very significant, followed by the president ial election the year after. Rouhanis second term will be ending, so it is a chance for another faction step in. Hardlinee dominated by candidates, maybe new blood, but from the hardline can, also followed by the administration, consistent,ee more onehanded establishment, as opposed to what we see now. The Supreme Leader, and in the military have always been hardline. About,lso want to talk and continuation of the defense of antiamericanism, i think there is a misunderstanding in the administration that antiamericanism has decreased, which is not true. President trumps policies in iran, a trend of decline in american sentiment has actually been reversed. Iranians have always been known as the most, if not the most proamerican population because with thehment is leaving of the jcpoa, the u. S. Violating the jcpoa, you see the proengagement of prowestern forces, their justification is becoming weaker. Solemanithe killing of. Again, that sense of decline, the fact that america is a source for good is not going to ,o anything rash or crazy everything that they have been accusing the u. S. Of is now playing out more and more in the proengagement and pronegotiation forces within the country becoming weaker and losing ground for their argument. I talked to a few reformists talking about jcpoa number two. After the iran deal was agreed, there was talk about this movement where the government has to go and negotiate even more about regional activities numbere up with a jcpoa two. That discussion has taken a backseat. After the solemani assassination, there is a feeling that maybe we do need dismissal program. Maybe there will be attacks on cultural sides or if government officials will be killed. Finally, to talk about the iran, prou. S. Of and proengagement is going to take a backseat until the 2020 election. They are watching the election very closely and have learned over time of the divisions in washington, of how things play hereas far as relations among the different parties. There will be much chance, if any for talks between tehran and washington. Iranians have said they are prepared to return to the jcpoa to full compliance, if washington is willing to lift sanctions. So if they can issue some waivers of some significant purchase of iranian oil, the iranians are prepared to return to the jcpoa, but as far as putting a new deal with this administration and president , before the next election is very unlikely. Just to wrap it up, the chance of war is slim. Iranians do not want a full out war for many reasons. Warmemory of the eightyear from the 1980s is still vivid. They do not want anything of that repeating on their own soil. , conventional war is something that they are trying to avoid. To offer an exit ramp to President Trump to deescalate the situation. It will probably be no talks until 2020, but they will continue to be patient. If President Trump is reelected or he stays, we might see some shift in policy come possibly with the help of mediators, to find a longterm solution for another four years. If a democrat comes to the white house, we have heard from most Democratic Candidates who say they will return to the jcpoa. It has been talked about. Thinke next few months, i we are going to see more of the status quo, maybe a little more in the region, if not less. Much and thankry panel and the invitation. Then to for attending. Itself in the middle of a fight between its two most important allies, the u. S. And iran. Both of them are realities. The u. S. Has an Important Role 2003. Y since it has been a major player in iraq. Geographic reality with thousands of years of history and more recent history that was very checkered in a way. War and peace and alliance. They are in a uncomfortable position here. Received this development in the worst possible time. There is no good time for a crisis, but this crisis came in a worse time. Iraq has been divided more than what it has suffered in the past are the protests where they looking for reform. 500 or more casualties , death and injuries among the protesters. The first time we have seen a resignation of a government since 2003. Political leadership is not even know how to handle the internal politics. They still cannot figure out how to replace the government, so on top of this, division among the population, division between the population and the government and Division Within the ofernment is coming on top that, the crisis came as a severe blow to the entire existence of iraq. The iraqis are very disappointed for many reasons. On one hand, the Iraqi Government does not have anybody who can dictate the terms. There is nobody really in power. The government and prime consensus more than the authorities of the office or prerogatives of the position. Consensus is very hard to come by, given that there are so many factional reasons for division and for disagreement and lack of consensus. The u. S. And iran, things that have received very little consensus among iraqis. Those are those who are prou. S. Do not want the iranian presence to be stronger and vice versa. They have used this idea of trying to reach a common ground. Embraced both. Recently has been a dealbreaker for the iraqi consensus. Ofst, lets mention a couple things that are important. Presentssence three forms of interest. One of them is diplomatic, obviously. That they havehe the largest embassy in iraq. Many of the diplomats have been pulled back, but it is a significant presence. Is also the military presence of the u. S. , not as he used to be between 2003 and 2011. We have about 6000 troops , so theymong trainers trained iraqis on using those. Went to defeat isis have remained to fight terrorism and not to allow isis to come back. Certain Important Companies that have worked in iraq, especially in the oil sector. There is a hope that we will have even more contracts, which is what the administration has been trying in iraq. There is not a military andement between the u. S. Iraq. It was signed and expired in 2011. An agreement called the strategic Framework Agreement has so many components, one of is the military side or defense side. Agreement about the status by thees ended withdrawal of the last u. S. Troops in december 2011. The troops that went to iraq after 2011 went in the context of the fight of isis. Stipulation a clear of their status of when they get to be withdrawn and who gets to decide on whether they stay or leave. I have been speaking to people in the government, parliament and none of them seems to have a straight answer. Even from the u. S. , there is no clarity on it. Executivesome kind of correspondence between the government of iraq and the u. S. Government, but there is not a set of written rules for that. That is why we are having this debate between the president of the u. S. And the administration, and the iraqis on whether they will be withdrawn, or they will be expelled from iraq. Frameworknother legal that is relevant here. , with ai constitution lot of pressures on the u. S. , the advantages put in their constitution that iraq cannot conduct any act that would be considered as a threat by any other country. On the iranianit or next to kuwait, they do not like them to be there, you are violating your own constitution. Why am i mentioning these . They have been relevant to the calls for expelling u. S. Troops, not recently, but for a long time. When the president went in december and entered without meeting his counterpart and went to this base that was recently saying, whats were kind of sovereignty is this one people come and go . Questions are being raised. Want u. S. Troops. That is not a secret. The government always managed to work it out and circumvent these calls and argue for the stay of u. S. Troops. Important for building capacity for iraq as a terrorism deterrence, many things. Securitysence provides and infrastructure for other troops and other countries, and it cannot be there without them. Iraq that is for not military aid is all hinging on that. Because itt popular is the nature of foreign troops in any country in the world. Has made it uncomfortable for the government is clearly, the terms and conditions the iraqi were willing to work with have not been able to answer to. Isis or there to fight help the iraqis. Nothing in the agreement that they can conduct bombing, and i think what really made the irans the u. S. And shows iraqi territory to fight each other. This is clearly a problem for the iraqis, especially if they are not party to the conflict. Ability toent has no defend the act that happened. Second, it is a government that is too weak to defend anything. It has passed constitutionally, so there is a major problem of what he can or cannot do. What took place after the bombing, it made the situation even worse. The Iraqi Government did not need a Parliament Vote for that, but they elected to go to the parliament, to involve them to make sure that is not excuse of. Cting unilaterally while the vote is nonbinding now, the armed groups and those who want to expel the u. S. Have a unanimous vote in the parliament to expel the u. S. Troops, unanimous because they didagainst u. S. Troops and not show up for the session. Allhave a sense that iranian fans went and voted and the others did not show up to vote. That is the problem. . Here is that taking us let me conclude with this. That the u. S. And iraq have to prioritize their options. The way it has been played was a charitable way, to be honest. They decided to take the negotiations to the media instead of really sending to go and deally with this. The Iraqi Government asked u. S. To send a delegation to negotiate a withdrawal. Two tos a way to buy three months of negotiations. U. S. Said, we do not want to withdraw and we are going to do one, 2, 3 to iraq. That is not a way to meet the government. They are at the invitation of the Iraqi Government. With the president on one thing, which is that iraqis should night should ask nicely. They should not expel the americans. Lot by iraq,wed a as the u. S. Is responsible for a lot in iraq. The troops have been instrumental in providing the assistance to defeat isis. They should not be expelled as if they were enemies that are being expelled out or kicked out. A nice structure is in order. U. S. Is no way that the can use this hard bargain does the president said we will put sanctions and all of these threats. That is not a good way to respond, especially if you want to keep relations. Cooperationmilitary is not tenable anymore. We cannot keep these tubes for a long time, but we can negotiate keeping a portion of the troops, but not the status quo. I know that business has been lost for a very long time. I do not see an American Company capable of operating anywhere in the or central iraq. I think that the diplomatic relations are not necessarily place. F we keep that in the diplomats can bring back what is lost. Militarybring relations. If we lose the medic relations, i do not see the diplomats going back to iraq. Every time the u. S. Diplomats were expelled, it took more than a decade for them to come back. Iraq does need the u. S. As a balance. They have strong relations and it is important for iraq in the international theater, but it also balances their relationships regionally. They have begun to diversify their relations and have good relations with the gulf and arab countries. They stayed neutral in some of the regional conflicts, which was a good thing. I think iraq should be helped as much as possible, to get out of this crisis and to do what is more important than anything else for the country, which is to rebuild. They have exited from the nastiest fight. One third of the military was taken over by terrorists. They fought every inch to get it back. Around 90 billion and many years of effort of reconstruction. Iraq does not need another war or another conflict, particularly a conflict that is not really a vacs conflict, but a natural conflict between two countries that are allies of iraqand have presence in but have chosen not to fight directly and have chosen iraq as their theater. This is not a crisis that is , ititable or insolvable just needs cooperation from everyone. It is good that the countries pulled back from an allout war, but there needs to be a followup. I will close with this. Afford anothert war in the middle east. I will close by talking about to other countries that are very much impacted by what has happened, what is happening and what will happen in the future. Lebanon and syria. Abouting for sure soleimanis killing, killing him was killing the person, yes. Killing the genius . Maybe, but it is not killing the policy. Iran has not been totally crippled, regarding its influence in different arab countries. The irgc will remain. Institution has already been revitalized i the appointment recently. Remain influence will syria and lebanon, as it will remain in iraq, obviously. There has been a lot of work done so far. It will not simply disappear quickly. Obviouslyn, there is a lot of votto going on. Has made twollah speeches over the last weeks, in which he laments the killing of his friend, soleimani. He has threatened to keep the fight going, but sometimes, you lebanonow any party in is going to be able to say that we are going to respond here, there and help in avenging solemani. Yes, they will try to avenge him , but hezbollah is bound by the lebanese domestic problems, domestic issues. Hezbollah does not operate in a vacuum. Responsibility, practically, hezbollah runs the country and it is the overwhelming force there. Just a couple hours ago, the announced the formation of the new lebanese government, but hezbollah had to interfere, discussing how to form the new government. Wass a government that produced by hezbollah pressure. The very important point about that it isment is almost a paradox. This is a government that hezbollah is responsible for forming, but he cannot necessarily exercise all the forces it has on that government because the government has two very important features. It is a government that is supposed to coalesce different representforces that the political environment. At the same time, that government is lebanons opening to the world. Only bycannot live hezbollah. They need International Assistance and approval. This is the paradox that hezbollah finds itself in. No matter what they want to do regarding the soleimani killing, it is bound by these facts. Be thrown in as one of these countries but is simply an irans orbit and nobody can do anything about it because they need assistance from the entire International Community outside of iran. These constraints really make weak and how it wants to respond to the killing of solemani. Hezbollahsasically last stand. It is the place where the party is, where the partys constituency lives. It would not be an easy war. Devastated bye missiles and military operations, but at the same time, that will also happen to lebanon. I do not think hezbollah is ready to take on the cost of a war like that. Commitment toa avenge solemani. Is restrained, but help. Robably try to iran has its proxies and they might be able to do something. I really do not see hezbollah able to do a lot. Specifically because it is responsible for running a country now. Control, buten in it is any much more difficult situation, especially public demonstrations, public protests in lebanon today are opposed by hezbollah. It is supposed to be the party , theprotects the poor marginalized, the people who are revolting against the political system, and now hezbollah is against these very people. From eight legitimacy view, they have lost a lot of popularity and legitimacy in the country. Of party is under a lot stress regarding policy and lebanon. Respondill be able to to the solemani killing is really to be determined. It was definitely felt bad the in syria, but at the same time, it affects irans situation in syria is no longer it is governed by what russia wants to do with. Irantunately, i do not see being successful in syria, specifically because Vladimir Putin may have different plans for the country. A couple of weeks ago or a week ago, Vladimir Putin visited base. Us to a russian he was not received at the airport by the president and was not given the due of a president of a very important country. Like it become a trap of russia. Ist reflects on how iran received in the country. Tried to useays the iranians against the russians, but also use the russians against the iranians. Solemanis assassination has a wayrussia some sort of of influence, of increasing its influence in syria at the end of iranian influence in syria. Iran was in syria, engaged over the last seven to eight years, really engaged in local politics. Always been better than dealing within syrian domestic politics. They were better than the russians in dealing with secretary and is him dealing with it. At the same time, iran today really lacks the influence that it had when solemani was alive. Yes, soleimani will be inherited. Somebody will be replacing him and iran will have some sort of assistance, but i do not think they are in influence in syria. They are restricted on what to do anyway. It is also restricted by israel. There is no resistance to it, so i do not see how iran will be influencing the situation, if the russians are really going to controllingsically, the Syrian Government and deciding what it wants to decide for syria. This is all i will say about this. We will open it up to questions and answers. A to write your questions on cards. As legibly as possible, if you can. Thank you. We will start with our executive director. Soleimani enjoyed for a long time larger than the component is personality. Since his assassination, he has been deified by the u. S. And iran for their own respective reasons. What do you think about that . Sainthas been made into a by the iranians and into a total satan by the u. S. Was he worth it . The man was a war criminal, among many things. You cannot forget what he did in iraq. He was more than a bad man. He committed atrocities. We have to remember that. Is the devil for us and he has been deified and iran, but as i said in my piece, iran is a force of institutions. When it comes to creating a vast and effective, and supple but sometimes brutal institutions, iranians are very good at that, so it is dangerous to assume that we can just get rid of this guy somehow, we have all of this enormous leverage. I was listening to a program a about thes ago intercept, which produced all , and itanian documents has to be remembered that solemani was the guy. He had an enormous influence. It is not going to be simple to replace that kind of leverage and cloud. Having said that, in terms of u. S. Policy, it is highly simplistic to assume that getting rid of this man will produce or be part of an effective strategy. Does not play into an effective strategy at all. Andeflects an infatuation not any clear strategic sense. I think both sides have overhyped person. The iranians have used the pr of this hero, this largerthanlife person, and i think the americans have also overhyped the villain as bigger than what both discussed, it is an organization. There is a structure that he put in place. Andas a capable commander fighter, but it was not a oneman show. This overhyping gives the sense that he is gone and everything is gone with him, but that is not true. The population that we saw that came out for his funeral, which was massive. We were surprised. This was beyond the core supporters of the regime. It does not show a support of what is seen as solemanis bad behavior, the atrocities in the area and iraq, but because of his status as somebody who fought isys. There is nothing scarier than the nightmare of isys. People have been killed, so it threat andl visible there is this understanding beyond the regime supporters itt isys is a threat and if was not fought in iraq or syria, it would come over the border and we would have to fight it in iran. He was the person who fought and played a key role in defeating isys. Some people think he is the only person who fought isys. That is the war hero status that fighterot only was he and the iraq war but played a key role in defeating isys. Rarether issue, he was a irgc commander who stayed out of politics. The last time he played a role in domestic politics was 1990s where he signed on to a group letter with commanders demanding an end to a student protest. Despite lines from the white house that he orchestrated internal domestic crackdowns on protests, he was not very involved. Morelped him to gain bipartisan support from different factions because he did not play into internal politics and infighting that many other commanders do. Solemani stayed largely out of that compared to other commanders. Question. Another with iraq caught between the u. S. And iran longterm, will they will they ever regain their sovereignty . What conditions . , whather questions reflection will it have demanding protest . How do you envision the way forward for appointing a new Prime Minister . Iraqs sovereignty is a problem because to have your sovereignty means that you have to be independent and not reliant on others for various needs. Is an important player in because of their friends on the street. That when they needed a majority, they got it. We saw the opposition to that. It is not much of a resistance because you cannot even prevent a vote. That is an issue. There is another aspect to their importance, when it comes to iraq. Iraq is this idea that relies on iran for its fuel, for electricity and it buys its electricity from iran, also the trade exchange. They areout talking about bringing it to 20 billion, which is huge. What i back gets out of iran is more significant because these are things that are daytoday livelihood. On the other hand, the u. S. Is very important for iraq. Iraqhave troops inside of and have a strong diplomatic influence. Permanent member of the un security council. It can do a lot of damage to iraq. They have not emerged completely from the sanctions of saddam husseins era. They could make iraqi life a living hell. That is a problem for the iraqis. They are not dependent independent. They are dependent on the entire political economy of iraq and the macroeconomic theater. Fromng the oil underground, selling it and praying that the prices do not go down. Fact economy is based on oil. It has two problems. You cannot control the price or the prediction. One problem like this, whether in iraq or outside, you cannot use oil that much. A little drone took out 5 million barrels. How can you be sovereign if you cannot feed your people, pay your people, if you cannot be an actor in the National Arena without the foreign influence and tolerating the foreign influence . A lot of it is not the thought of this current government. Received ime after it hit that iceberg. Situation. It was stitched together, given what it has seen. Many countries were disintegrated or completely wiped off the map of other continents for less than what the iraqis had to go through, so sovereignty is really a very hard prospect for iraq. There needs to be a lot of work by the iraqis and the International Community. They are not in a neighborhood where they tolerate sovereign nations next door, so everybody has a stake in iraq, and they use their own forces and forces from within. We do not expect to see a good measure of sovereignty in iraq unless they solve all these issues. He made his name policyutation in iraqi for fighting the u. S. Back into withdrewthree, then he that and froze the army that he used, then he used a smaller number of his group to work to fight isys. Maturedof changed and over the years. He is no longer the firebrand he used to be. First, iraqi nationalism that is his own version of it. He is not into tolerating areign influence, but he has very large and significant social base that is always loyal to him. He is the one leader and iraq who does not have to secondguess or doubt the loyalty of his followers, they will show up whenever he wants them to show up. That is important because it makes him someone who can deliver on his promises. Instated what will he do with it . That remains to be seen. Clearly made it clear to everyone that he will use illegal and political means to achieve what he wants, the pullout of u. S. Troops, otherwise he would use other means. We hope that he will not do that. Otherime, he is joined by armed forces that used to be not on good terms. Had recent meeting that he with armed groups is significant and people have to watch for it. This is not an empty threat. It will be important. What happens depends on the demonstration that he called for in a week or so. Thedemonstrators are casualty of the recent event. And have given 500 dead 20,000 injured. They accomplished something completely unique, getting the government to resign. Then they were sent to the backseat by the boot by the more newsworthy event. It is going to be very hard for them to get the same momentum that they had and that they lost. A new Prime Minister finally. This is the biggest question. It is unprecedented. The iraqi constitution does not specify a clear roadmap. They had three articles about the vacancy and none of them talk about the resignation of the Prime Minister. They do not know there is a lot of trouble in it. There are two possibilities. There is the violation of the constitutional rights. Point appoint a new Prime Minister or to keep the current Prime Minister and government in place and do what they need to do through them. They need to practice prepare for a new election. Both are unpopular because the theesters do not want current government to continue. There is not anybody can be presented and able to be accepted by the protesters, so anybody enforced or imposed upon the process will probably lead to more protests in the streets and more casualties in the confrontations. Been takingrs have advantage of their veto power, but they never said who they really want because they are fragmented and nobody speaks on their behalf. There is no leadership. If there is one thing that i can predict i am a historian and i hate to predict the future, but i would not see a proamerican Prime Minister anytime soon because he will not be able to get the vote. It is very hard to agree. Thatused to be a few names were potential names, but they were burned immediately estimates they were presented as possible candidates. This is what i told to a couple of people who called and asked for advice. This question is for dan. Is, germany and u. K. This to create some time for them to resume compliance or to reduce tension . Class first of all, one of the ways in which iran has been bonded to u. S. Policy is to begin to infringe upon the agreement. They did a calculated way. The most recent infringement is about adding centrifuges. You still have some wiggle room to go back. They have not reached the point of no return, but it is interesting to see what europeans will do that will satisfy them. I see the European Response as work with the Trump Administration on one hand and i ran on the other. I heard a number of interviews with people to negotiate a jcpoa and some feel like it was a mistake, what they europeans did. There is no structural solution to this, other than reinstating the agreement. That is not in the cards. Risk, andalculated provides no obvious solution to the current impasse. Thank you. Controlstion goes way beyond any normal influence relationship. Forever . Last what are the longtime implications for iraqi stability . This is correct. Lets remember that we have some of the armed groups in iraq that have been formed in ivan. Their leaders have been on iran during the time of saddam husseins regime. Others were formed later. All of them have strong relations with iran. There are a lot of armed groups who are formed to fight isys. These are kind of out of the equation. Some of them report to the othersent and other to social actors. The ones that are really in the news and the newsmakers are close to iran. One thing that is important to mention is that it does not mean oft they are having 100 their agenda. They had their own vision for what is best for iraq. We may not agree with them, but the situation is not that they are iranian forces. Is a formula between what their agenda is and what they do for iran. Majority of their convictions, they vinnie have one version of their own on what is best for iraq and for then. What is best for iraq is to have u. S. With less influence. We talk about other countries like saudi and turkey. Iran has to doth with calculations of support. Are an iraqi and you look around you, where is the safest bet if you are in trouble . The performance in the past has not helped. Was inys took over i iraq at the time. I arrived a few days after the most crisis. The u. S. Said, we will help only when they act on a list of reforms that we have. It needed 10 years to do. They sent arms and shipments the next day and the following day, they had their close fighting groups in iraq, recruiting fighters to go out and intercept isys isis. That matters for the iraqis. Hows important to see iraqis see it from inside iraq. It does not help us understand when we apply 100 washington centric view. We are talking to the iraqis and asking them one thing or another. We have to understand how they view their interest before we prescribed. That is why the person whose name role i and a big believer that iraq cannot divide without robust relations with the u. S. , but it not enough. There needs to be a real trust built between the iraqis and the u. S. , in order to have that operational. For natural and unnatural reasons, iran has been gaining more trust in iraq and the less one thing that is important to reflect on is this. The u. S. Can afford to lose iraq but iran cannot. That is why i van works much iranr than the u. S. Works much harder than the u. S. We can like it or dislike it, but it is a reality. Will they be there forever . Not forever, but for a long time. The best way to avoid a longer necessaryabsolutely is to strengthen the Iraqi Government and to take away the reasons for these groups to exist. After that, the problem will solve itself. Very quickly, i agree that these are much higher stakes. They will continue to try to exert their influence and we have to remember that it is not. Ust geopolitical the history, trade, culture, religion. The largest pilgrimage is to iraq, much bigger then to mecca. There are all of these ties and a fear of a return of another saddam. Terrorism issue of and isis. Something that is basically considered in that calculation, so it will continue that theto remember. Illing was not just solemani it is the u. S. Helping to unite this antiamerican sentiment, at least among the iranian forces. Thiswant to finish with small question but a big answer. This is to anybody. What is the impact on israel . Full rightis hands now. He was very careful not to cause certain kinds of lines in his conflict with iran. Andade a rational approach he does not want this to go beyond it. Having said that, from the perspective of the government, i think everybody would agree that they have never had a better ally than this one. Necessary tos maintain a without necessarily getting sucked into a fullblown war with iran, so that will be the balancing act that the prime that they will contend with. Thank you very much for joining us this afternoon and we hope to see you at our next event. [applause] the house will be in order. Cspan has been providing america unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, and Public Policy events from washington, d. C. , and around the country. Make up your own mind. Cspan is brought to you by your local cable or satellite provider. Cspan, your unfiltered view of government. Tonight on cspan, Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee President jessica post talking about the states the committee will be targeting. Former National Security advisor susan rice joins a paddle with officials just