She was a valuable employee until she told her boss she when harris responded by firing her, he discriminated against her because of her sex for three reasons. First, firing her for failing to conform to explicitly stated stereotypes about how men and women should behave. It discriminates against her the same way as Price Waterhouse discriminated against and hopkins for failing to walk and talk more feminine league. And hopkins that would lose her case on the same facts. Second, harris fired her for identifying as a woman only because she was assigned male sex at birth. In doing so they fired her for contravening a sex specific expectation that applies only to people assigned male sex at birth. They live and identify as a man for their entire lives. Is mistreatment on the basis of sex. Harris fired her for changing her sex, that is discrimination the same way firing someone for changing their religion would be religious dissemination. Harris would fire transgender men for being insufficiently feminine and transgender women for being insufficiently mass killing is as the government conceives none of these arguments ask the court to redefine or update sex. Minimum sex a assigned at birth based on physical anatomy or biological sex. As the aretand that to make, and i believe it is the same in the prior case. Does that argument hold up when you get to specific work requirements . Of ae objection transgender man transitioning to a woman is that he should be allowed to use the womens bathroom. How do you analyze that . I understand how you analyze status against hiring and firing on the basis, treating it on the basis of sex. When you get to specific policies, does that hold true . 4 mr. Cole how whether you rule against us or for us, the next case will arise. A dress code that establishes on the basis of sex obviously is because of sex. The question then is doesnt impose a discriminatory term and condition . To disconnect is not just to differentiate, but in a way that injures. I thinkstice roberts you are missing my point because it was not carefully expressed. Be i understand you are dealing with transgender status and you cannot discriminate on that basis but when you get to the actual policy, do you analyze it as dissemination on the basis of sex carrying forward your reasoning at the outset, or on the basis of transgender status . If the objection of the transgender individual is i want genderconsistent with my identity, do you analyze it as the affecting based on the transgender status or on the basis of biological sex . On cole our argument rests biological sex. Sex assigned at birth. Asks whether when someone fires someone because they are transgender or because they failed to conform to stereotypes, is that because of sex. Obviously a sex specific restroom policy is because of sex. We are not answering that because of sex. Chief Justice Roberts it is because of sex . If you analyze it because of sex, there is no disadvantage whether you are a man or a woman, but if you analyze it on the basis of transit or status, there is because you want to use the womens restroom and you are biologically male. Basis of sex there is no problem, but on the basis of transgender status, it presents a different case. Mr. Cole i do not think so. Anybody can challenge a transgender person can challenge it, what this court said is to decide whether something discriminates that refers to sex , you have to ask not just whether it differentiates, but whether it does in a way that injures. You answer that by asking would a reasonable person experience a significant or trivial harm . That is the question i posed earlier, and we went around the tree a bit, but ultimately came to a submission that a reasonable person in the transgender position would be harmed. If he or she were fired for failing to follow the bathroom code. Or some dress there were facts in this case were men and women had traditional options available to them. Is that your answer as well . Mr. Cole that is my answer, and here is why. Lets say we have a sex specific dress code, and you require me or you to follow the male dress code. In most instances, that will not be a significant harm, a trivial harm, therefore it is not discover nation. Dress you ask you army to if you ask you or me to dress as a woman, and when you ask a transgender person to dress in a way contrary to their gender identity, you have imposed a significant harm, that is based on sex. Lets not avoid the difficult issue. You have a transgender person who rightly is identifying as a woman, and wants to use the womans bedroom womans bathroom. This is what they identify with. Their need is genuine. They want to use the womans bathroom, but there are other women who are made uncomfortable6, but who would feel intruded upon if someone who still had male characteristics walked into their bathroom. That is why we have different bathrooms. So the hard question is how do we deal with that . And what in the law will guide judges in balancing those things . That is really what i think the question is about. Mr. Cole that is not the question in this case. Wetice sotomayor once decide the case in your favor, then that question is inevitable. If there are singlesex bathrooms there might be one answer, meaning what harm would reasonable women feel if a man is using a singlesex bathroom. It might be another if it is two rooms, and who walks in is something you cannot control. That is what the question is. Mr. Cole the reason deciding this case will not decide that if you were against us, that case can arise because it is a sex specific rule, and anyone affected by a sex specific role can argue it is given its against them because a reasonable person in their shoes would experience significant harm. I understood you to say that if your client have been fired for using the womens bathroom, that would be a violation of title vii. In our view, if we were litigating that case, which we are not, the restroom was a hypothetical and not a reason why she was fired, but were we litigate in that case, the question would be not whether the policy was because of sex am a which is the question here, because obviously the restroom is because of sex, it is does imposing that policy which is because of sex impose a discriminatory injury on the individual. If you require me to go to the womens restroom Justice Kagen you are saying if we are stuck with that question regardless. Chief Justice Roberts part of the argument is the term sex includes Sexual Orientation. Case, if weis the analyze the bathroom case on the basis of biological sex, maybe you have one answer, but if you analyze it in terms of transgender status, you have a different answer. Any women who identify with biological sex are not disadvantaged whether they use the mens room, they can use their own restroom. The issue is different if you are dealing with transgender individuals who want to use the of their gender identity, contrary to their biological sex. How do you analyze that . You say on the basis of sex. The analyze it on the basis of biological sex or on a different basis . They present different issues. For purposes of this case, we are arguing that title viis references to sex includes what we call that. Can go further than you are saying, yes, because of sex means i logical sex, regardless of whether the transgender person or whether a nontransgender person brings this claim about the restroom. Then it is an easy case because if it is biological sex, there is no problem because there is no disadvantage. If you are looking at transgender status, there is a huge problem because it is not biological discrimination. Different. Ill be a transgender different can bring a claim under title vii, but if the claim is discrimination because i am a transgender individual, that is not your claim. Mr. Cole the claim here is that differentlyting because of her sex assigned at birth. Had male sex assigned at birth, she is fired, that is dissemination because of sex. That does not decide, because the bathroom question, there is doubt because of sex. Sex. Cause of biological mr. Cole the question then is does it pose a burden or a significant burden. The same rule should impose a significant burden as to some people and the schedule change might be trivial for a worker thatimagine you would say excluding a transgender woman from the womens bathroom would be far more than a burden on that person. Let me move beyond the bathroom. Another example, it is not before us, but it will be coming. A transgender woman is not permitted to compete on a Womens College sports team. Is that disk of a nation of sex and a violation of title vii . Permits title vii teams where competitive skill or Contact Sports are involved. Insburg is this a question of someone who has transitioned from male to female, and wants to play on the female team, she is not questioning separate mailfemale and hasut she was born transitioned and wants to play on the female team. Ons it violate title vii genderbased discrimination . Mr. Cole i think the question would not be affected by the way the Court Decides this case because the question would be is it permissible to have sex segregated teams, yes, where they involve competitive skill or Contact Sports. How do you apply that segregation to a transgender individual . It may be because title vii this case just asks when you hee somebody because you say was going to represent himself as a man because she was using man,ame because she is a is that this commission . Have a policyou that permits sex segregation, how that applies to transgender people is just a different question. It is not answered one way or the other by this case. Personair to keep that off the team like it is fair to keep a man off a team . The stereotypes in this case are every bit as strong as they were in Price Waterhouse. In Price Waterhouse, you have statements that nondecisionmakers were making about why hopkins was fired. Here it is a sex stereotype absolutely clear, and the government and petitioner concede that transgender people are not excluded from the statute. It is not like the German Police officer. She has brought a sextus commission claim because she was fired she has brought a sex discrimination claim because she was fired. Case wereuld lose her she transgender. It is not ok to employ sex stereotypes against an employee until that employee becomes transgender. The objection to someone being transgender is the ultimate sex stereotype. It is saying, i object to you because you fail to conform to his stereotype. If you are assigne male sex at birth, you must be that for the rest of your life. It is not true for 1. 5 million transgender americans. To say we will fire you because generalization about how people who are sex based onicular visible and natalie at birth have to live their lives is sex discrimination. She was clearly treated differently because of her sex assigned at birth. Six amys andu had ask what their sex was at birth, and five say they were assigned female, and one says male, and he fires the one who says i was assigned male. That person is fired because of her sex assigned at birth. In the prior argument, it is not the only justification, is only one justification. The notion that somehow discriminating against someone because they are transgender is not discrimination because of their sex, it falls apart because to say i am discriminate against you because you are transgender is to say i am cheating you differently from other people who have the same gender identity because of your sex assigned at birth. We are not asking you to update sex, weute, or redefine accept the narrowest definition of sex, and arguing that you cannot understand what harris did hear without treating her differently because of her sex at birth. As to what the basis of what the firing was, a violation of dress code particularly, or whether it was broader than that, being. Ransgender what should we make of that dispute . Mr. Cole the fifth circuit expressly said reasons for firing her extend beyond the dress code. Counsel for harris homes conceded that she would have been fired if she showed up as a woman even if she was following the dress code. He fired her after he got a letter saying i am coming out as a woman and will heretofore be called amy. Your argument does not turn on that. , it had beennd it what the Employer Claims the basis on dress code only, the result is the same. I would like you to have a chance to respond to judge lynch and his thoughtful dissent in which he lamented everything you have for us, but suggested something as drastic a change in ins country as bathrooms every place of employment and just codes in every place of employment that are otherwise genderneutral would be changed. That is essentially a legislative decision. Judge lynch is a thoughtful judge and wrote a thoughtful opinion that he probably regretted to write. What do you say to him . Mr. Cole recognizing transgender people have a right to exist in the workplace and not be turned away because of who they are does not and dress codes or restrooms. There are transgender lawyers gorsuch the question is it interpreting statutes that are old. Nobody is questioning, and he certainly did not the legitimacy of the claims. It is a matter of judicial interpretation. Answers, ono interpretation, we are not asking you to apply any meaning of sex other than the one everybody agrees on as of 1964, which is sex assigned at birth or biological sex. Gorsuch i will give you one more shot. When a case is close, really close, on evidence, and i assume we the moment it is close are not talking the extra textual stuff, a judge finds it close. At the end of the day, should he or she take into consideration a massive social upheaval and the possibility that congress did not think about it . It is a question of judicial modesty. Mr. Cole federal courts of appeals have been recognizing discrimination is sex discrimination for 20 years. Lawyersder male following the dress code and going to the mens room, and the courts dress code and sex segregated just code have not fallen. We have never seen a people for 20 years, there is no reason to see that, transgender people follow the rules associated with their gender identity and it is not disrupted. As whether this was a question of interpretation, it is, how can a court interpret title vii to say ann hopkins cannot be fired, but my client can be fired for being insufficiently masculine . There is no textual basis for drawing a distinction is our argument is on text meaning at a minimum, sex assigned at birth for biological sex, and everybody agreed. Justice gorsuch do you want to address judge lynchs comments or not . Mr. Cole i think i have. Aam not asking you to address policy question that would be more appropriate for congress, but asking you to interpret the statute as written, and everybody agrees it applies to sex assigned at birth. Thank you. Chief Justice Roberts thank you, counsel. Thank you mr. Chief justice. Equally women and men does not mean employers have to treat men as women. That is because sex and transgender status are independent concepts. In the context of this case, title vii the sixth circuit imposed any restriction. All holding destroys policies while undermining the protections that title vii provides. If you accept it face value home ns the funeral wins. Womans overnight shelter must hire a man who identifies as a woman to serve as a counselor to women who have been raped, trafficked, and abused, and share restroom facilities. That is because, the man would be allowed to hold that job and use those facilities. Test does not get to the ultimate inquiry whether men are being treated less favorably than women because of sex. That does not reflect the legal meaning of the statute promoting womens equality. Under my friends stereotyping logic it is illegal stereotyping to apply sex specific policies based on biological sex, and that is why he is wrong to say this is not about showers and sports. Every one of those is impacted if you are talking about a sex specific policy. Title vii says sexbased differentiation is not the same as sex this committee. That is why this court policy does not violate title vii. Congress has added classification to cover transgender status in other statutes, it has rejected a dozen proposals here. You made the parade of horribles argument. What you have heard as i have the response, that is not this case. Many things you are worried about would be taking care of by qualifications. Would be taking care of by the need to show harm and difference. And that there could be, i am not advocating it yes or no, the possibility of bringing into cases imperative harms. All of the things are open. If you say the lower court, this is not the lower court. We are deciding simply whether under the words sex discrimination, and if it does, we are not saying there has been ism, whether there comparative harm. That is what i have heard. What do you say to that . That is incorrect, because 18 dialogic of male is male is a biological refused there are serious injuries on the outside, this is not the case. We do not have to decide it, and i do not see why or how you can assume the answer and then build your argument on an answer that i have not given. If stevens is right that you cant apply sex specific policy to those who identify for the opposite sex, you cannot apply the policy to anyone because that is self would be sex discrimination. In the off chance i feel we do not have to decide that matter in this case, have you other arguments that would favor your side . I know you do and we will hear them. Mr. Bursch certainly. A man violating the dress code with a woman who follows the dress code is wrong. A man who violates the dress code with a woman we know this is wrong because if you were claiming transgender status discrimination rather than sex determination, you would compare eight transgender and nontransgender employee, which is what they do, which proves they are adding a different classification into the statute which congress has not added. I am just saying this is what right, it you are does not fall within this statute. Say,nstance where people or many instances where they say athered this man because the woman because it is a mans job, it is ok as long as sometimes you fire a man because it is a womans job. What is your answer to that . Mr. Bursch there is no nonracist reason why you would fire an individual in an interracial marriage. To know people, there are people in my life, i being jewish or catholic is fine, just do not get married. Mr. Bursch that is a religious reason. Does that mean it falls outside the statute . Mr. Bursch title vii allows you to recognize there are differences between women and men, and an employer switching back to the first case could terminate a samesex couple or employee married to a samesex partner because they are catholic and believe marriage is between one man and one woman, and sex does not have anything to do with it. If the employer is a christian. Justice sotomayor there are still religious exceptions written into a lot of statutes. , women in a shelter who you say if we accept this argument will have to be guarded by transgender women. Where you cannot have sex specific guarding of prisoners unless they found it was. Should make men only guard men and women only guard women. I am not sure i understand your parade of horribles. Bursch bfoq Justice Sotomayor they cannot wish it away. Mr. Bursch if you have a bfoq saying only a man can apply for this position, he would say a woman transgender is a man, and is eligible for that position, foq can keep them out of that position. They areotomayor saying if there is an independent reason why a man who is transgender cannot have a job that a woman has, then that reason is good enough, you do not have to hire. If there is no reason why your workr should matter in the you are doing, why should you not be hired . That is a different proposition. Mr. Bursch assume for a moment andemployer had a bfoq, only winning counselors can stay overnight with abused women. Is a verynsburg bfoq y narrow category. Mr. Bursch their position is it a stereotyping not to treat a man who identifies as a woman as a woman. They are arguing but for the fact they were born as a man, they could take that womans position. There is no bfoq or religious requirement that would draw the line at the argument they are making. All distinctions are gone forever. Do you wish to. Clauses,may be dual but sex under consideration narrowly construed is enough for the statute. Mr. Bursch it is entirely drawpriate for a judge to that line, and the line that has title vii, based on bfo it will fall on the line Justice Kagan it is not quite right that women should be treated less deadly than men. It you are making title vii into a statute about groups. Title vii is not about groups. Lets put those together. Have a woman who identifies as a man, working at an employer and get pregnant. They would be entitled to the pregnancy benefits as any other women at work because if they did not get it, that would be sexist. If a sex specific dress code, showers, restaurants, that would not be a violation because of their biological differences. Being treated differently. You can have an employee who might have a sexist commission claim sex discrimination claim. Justice kagan maybe you s question. Gorsuch but you did not answer mine. About individuals and whether individuals are being treated differently because of his or her sex. It is not a statute about the aggregate. Does this disadvantage, the statute uses the word individual twice and says there is a particular person being treated differently because of her sex. Here ms. Stevens was being treated to because of her sex. This was the judges point in that opinion. Saying it is as simple as looking at the linkage of the statute, applying it to a particular individual which title vii insists you do and coming up with the obvious answer. Had not been assigned at birth the sex that she was assigned at birth, she would have been treated differently. We agree with the individual treatment. ,ased on a male only workforce he was being treated differently than a woman in his position would have been. If there are no women on the site, you do not have that comparison. Enforcingployer does a dress code applied mutually to everyone recognizes there are differences between men and women. You pinning your answer on a dress code, would it be the same if there were no dress code . All your arguments in your brief , you keep talking in your brief as you do hear about the dress code, but the arguments that you make our arguments that would allow the employer to fire ms. Stevens for being transgender irrespective of whether there was a dress code. The arguments apply in both situations. If this court allows a sex specific dress code because it acknowledges differences between men and women, it is no the same policy is imposed on an informal basis. Women are not being treated worse than men. It does not treat her it does not treat men worse than women. Sex specific policies ignore there are differences. A sec specific dress code in place are not, some have taken the latitude that title vii gives away from employers. You cannot treat someone differently based on their personal appearance. When it comes to dress codes, opposite sex facilities, everyone would understand title vii at the time of its enactment as those things being equal treatment. Problem is under the theory, the federal agency that brought changed the law and added a transgender classification, applied it to a business retroactively. Everything he said this morning,. Ex itself is a stereotype you can never treat a man who identifies as a one differently. To do that is sex discrimination. Scenario,troom general identity is a broad concept. You could have a man who looks like a man showing up in the locker room, and the employer could not do anything about it. But for the fact he was a man, he could be there. Chief Justice Roberts thank you, counsel. Mr. Chief justice, may it please the court. I would like to make three points aimed at easily addressing Justice Gorsuchs comment. I would like to respectfully argue that i think it is not that closed. Chief Justice Roberts neither side ever thinks that. The one i wass talking about earlier, sex and gender identity are different traits. They are defined with different definitions as my friend said, he agrees they are different traits, and there is a Reason Congress wants to prohibit dissemination based on the traits of Sexual Orientation and gender identity it lists them separately. Congress has recognized there are different traits you treat men and women with the different traits exactly the same regardless of their sex, you are not discriminating against them because of their sex. The related textual issue is that the standard for determining why youre discriminating against someone because she is a woman is that you are treating a person differently from a similar person of the opposite sex and taking adverse employment action against them as a result. The threshold question is are situatedally similarly. My friends on the other side assert a transgender man is similarly situated just like they assert a gay woman is similar to a straight man. That is manifestly not true, because with respect to the transgender issue, the difference between a transgender man is that one identifies with his biological sex and the other identifies with the opposite biological sex. That is a meaningful difference not grounded in stereotypes but on the difference between a transgender man. Likewise with Sexual Orientation, the difference between a gay man and a straight woman is Sexual Orientation, that has nothing to do with area types or whether one is better or worse. The arguments here could be cast as stereotypes, right . That case does not conform to male or female stereotypes. You accept that argument. Those are good claims. What is thehe case, difference between the sides . It seems smaller the than at my first appear. Place thatco the stereotypes come up whether two people are similarly situated, and an aggressive man is similarly situated as an aggressive woman. They have the same trait, aggressiveness, and only difference is the stereo typical view that women should not be aggressive. But a transgender man does not same the same trait in the first place because one identifies with his biological sex, and other identifies with the sex. Ite of biological that is not grounded in any stereotype, and a gay man is not similarly situated as a straight woman. One could argue there is another trait in Price Waterhouse, and that is conformity to traditional gender roles. Your argument suggests we should at the aggressive woman and aggressive man, we should instead say there is another thing that is conforming to generals, we should look at whether employers treat the same be aggressive woman and docile effeminate man. And if the employer treats the aggressive woman in the same way that the employer treats the effeminate man, they are both fired and the employer is off the hook. You say that is not right, that is double disc termination, and the employer is on the hook twice. It seems to me the same analysis applies, because there is an independent trait that is a little different from the independent trait here. Here the independent trait socalled that you say is the itnsgender identity, there was to conform to gender roles. Mr. Francisco the reason i disagree with that analysis is because i do nothing Price Waterhouse created some what it prohibits is stereotypes that show you are treating similarly situated men and women differ lead. Justice ginsburg i feel like you answer the question that Price Waterhouse would not have prevailed if it had treated sufficientlye not macho as women who are feminine. Mr. Francisco i believe we set the opposite of that in our brief. Would beinsburg that ok. Both cases rely on a stereotype. That the woman did not fit, that the man did not fit. Both cases say the object of title vii is to get to the entire spectrum of stereotypes. Read priceco as we waterhouse which i have no quarrel with, if you treat an aggressive woman worse than and aggressive man, you are violating title vii because you are treating different people differently. Applying that here, if you treat a transgender man the same as a transgender woman regardless of their sex, you are likewise not discover dating against them because of their sex. Discriminating against them because of their sex. I do characterize one set of your arguments as trying to work with the language of the statute. On one hand, these are individuals, on the other the arguments that were made here. I am putting that to the side. Then there are the horribles, and we discussed that at length. I am putting that to the side. Then there seems to be a third set in these briefs. ,egardless of the first two would not have dreamt of this when it passed the statute. I heard you say we are not relying on that. Is that so . Government is not relying on that . Mr. Francisco we are relying on that, if fortified our argument. Mr. Bursch of course it does think it is strongly dispelled by the history of these statutes, and i want to address that. Here by updating it in the way my friends on the other side would have you updated, they are undermining the way in which congress has considered updating it. If you look at the employment nondiscrimination act, for nearly a decade, congress has considered expanding the scope of the liability provisions, it hasnt knowledged there are religious liberty issues at stake, and it wants to take those into account. They have come to similar compromises where they found peace among groups with different views. If you resolve this judicially, you are delivering and i hate to use these terms a complete victory to one side of the fight. You are upsetting that legislative balance. On the other side of what you are saying is the following, which is abstract. , we were 10 years away from people who were discriminate against obtaining a degree of freedom. These statutes were all part of the Civil Rights Movement that was designed to give, include people who had been fully discredited against for the worst of reasons. At that time, this civil rights statute when it was passed would have put in the category gay people, transgender people, people who were suffering terrible discrimination. Over time this court has moved away from that view. Inding it unconstitutional dozens doesnt argue that is a change, that is a change that both explains why they did not put it initially and explains why we should, other things being equal. Interpreted to include gay people and transgender people now. Mr. Francisco for a couple of reasons i would argue against that. I find it i think it deprives the people with the ability to struggle with those issues democratically. I think it is important when we have these kind of big changes that we actually convince one another that i think this is the right thing to do. No one ever thought Sexual Harassment was encompassed by this commission on the basis of sex back in 1964. It was not till book was written until the middle 1970 spring that out. And now we say, of course, harassing someone, subjecting to terms of conditions of implement she would not encounter if she were a male, that is sexist disco nation. But it was not recognized as such in the beginning. And your honor, i think that is a straight forward application of title viis text. Respect to what i was talking about with Justice Breyer, where we were putting the text aside, i think it is important to allow that democratic processes to resolve these issues so we have a stable resolution of the issue. And one that takes into account what everybody would agree are legitimate interests on all sides. Gafeld this court made clear that there were people had different views in respect to gay marriage print the legislator process is the process that allows those use to be respected, as well as very powerful views of my friend on the other side. What pointt ask, at does a court continue to permit invidious discrimination against groups that where we have a difference of opinion, we believe the language of the statute is clear. I think Justice Breyer was right , the title vii and the Civil Rights Act all of our acts were born from the desire to ensure we treated people equally and not on the basis of invidious reasons. Cannot tonight that homosexuals are being fired merely for being who they are and not because of religious reasons, not because they are performing their jobs poorly. Not because they cannot do whatever is required of a position. But merely because they are a suspect class to some people. They may have power in some regions. But there still being beaten, they are still being ostracized from a certain things. Sayhat point does the court , congress spoke about this. The original congress who wrote this statute told us what they meant. They use clear words. And regardless of what others may have thought over time, it is very clear that what is happening fits those words. At what point we say, we have to step in. I guess my answer, your honor, would be at the point where Congress Addresses the issue. And the main argument we are making and have been making from beginning to end, is that congress has not resolved this issue because sex, gender identity, sex, Sexual Orientation are separate traits. These arent thoughtful responses youve given to the set of questions but in responding to Justice Breyer you said if we thought there was a clear application of the statute. I would ask you, if you thought this was a clear application of the statute, and the same way that Sexual Harassment was a clear application of the statute, even though nobody recognized it at the time, if you thought that this was a clear application of the statute, would we have to come out against you . Yes, your honor. If the statute is on a vegas leah against me, you have to rule against me. I think that the statute is anime grizzly in my favor. Unambiguously in my favor. For the reason that Justice Breyer alluded to, Justice Scalias light that we do not hide elephants and mouse halls. Everyone here agrees that Congress Never thought that by prohibiting this termination based on sex they would also be for having disco nation based on two different trait, Sexual Orientation and gender identity. My friends would have this court reach the same result indirectly. I think all of the textual arguments cut in our favor straightaway, but to the extent there is any doubt, theres no way to find that elephant in this mouse hole. Thank you, your honor. Thank you, counsel. Five minutes sir. Thank you. Notrpreting a statute is depriving the democratic process. It is doing what the court is supposed to do within the democratic process. Of course, if the democratic process disagrees with the courts interpretation of the statute, it can change. So theres note deprivation of the democratic process here. Secondly, the purpose of title it, as this court to find was to make sex irrelevant to peoples ability to succeed at work. To make sex irrelevant to peoples ability to to succeed at work. When harris hopes fired Aimee Stephens because it learned about her sex assigned at birth being different from her gender identity, it did not make sex irrelevant to her ability to succeed at work. It made it determinative. Think about it this way, if Harris Holmes hired a man, because he was a man, that will be sex determination. If it fired and a plate because he was insufficiently and fired an employee because he was insufficient he masculine, that would clearly be sex determination. In this case Harris Holmes fired Aimee Stephens because he thought she is a man who was insufficient masculine. That, too, must be sex determination. She is not seeking any special protection. And alling an transgender people are seeking the same protection that everybody else gets under the law. Said inrt 30 years ago Price Waterhouse, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees, by insisting that they match the stereotypes associated with their group. We are certainly beyond that date today as well. And what Harris Holmes did, was to insist that she match the stereotypes associated with her group. That is impermissible under this courts precedents. It is impermissible under the of the statute. Thank you council, the case is cemented. Announcer cspans washington journal live every day, with news and policy issues that impact you. Coming up saturday morning, will speak with reporters from around the country on how the House Democrats impeachment inquiry is impacting legislative issues in virginia, utah, nebraska, texas, new york and california congressional districts. Be sure to watch cspans washington journal, live at 7 a. M. Eastern, saturday morning. Join the discussion. Announcer campaign 2020. Watch our live coverage of the president ial candidates on the campaign trail make up your own mind. Cspans campaign 2020. Your unfiltered view of politics. Announcer joining us on newsmakers is the chair of the Democratic National committee, tom perez and joining us with the questioning from Washington Post and politico. I want to begin with the dnc rose for the debate peered we sat down with john delaney one of the candidates and he is one of a number of candidates who said we understand why dnc put in place these debate roles but still feel it is unfair that the dnc and not voters are deciding who is in or out of this race. We have given unprecedented access to candidates. It is hard. Our first set of rules were put into place for a half months before the first debate