One of the things we to do is we have a postdoctoral program, we have a number of postdoctoral fellows here at sais this year with us doing their work. And one of them has just finished a book before she got here, and we were really delighted to end publicize it and the first public release of the book. So cornelia has this new book. So, peace, security and defense cooperation in postbrexit europe. Pretty timely. Shes been working with her colleagues on those questions. So we thought the context of the book would be good to talk about a very timely issue now, which is whats going on with brexit, what does it mean not only for the u. K. And the e. U. Member states, but also for broader Security Issues which start to affect, of course, u. S. Interests quite intensely . So what well do is i will just briefly introduce the speakers. You have had an invitation and so on, more about their backgrounds, but just to keep it brief, i want to have cornelia tell us briefly about the book, and then were going to go to two colleagues, ellis pina who does work and teaches on these issues. And eric bradford, who was a fellow with me for many years, is now two doors down at the Carnegie Endowment working on europe will offer further perspective. Were very delighted to have ambassador mulhall with us, ambassador of ireland to the United States. He has a great perspective on this because he also was ambassador in the u. K. , and so he can convey some of the reality also from his time there. Welcome back, mr. Ambassador. Were so delighted that you could join us again here at sais. So without further ado, let me turn to cornelia whos going to tell us a bit about the context, and then well go from there. Hello, everybody, and welcome to this book launch on brexit, European Security, and Transatlantic Relations. Thank you very much, professor, for this very nice introduction. So as we mentioned, this is the book we are launching today, and i would like to say a few things. I wanted to check my time. The book is an academic project, is a collective project with different contributors from various universities in europe. And in relation to the general the genesis of this book, so the idea of the book has materialized at the university of hamburg during the ecpr conference, a European Conference for Political Research last summer. And so this is where we have started, and we decided to put together this contribution to help greater understanding of the subject matter. And before coming to telling you some of the major findings, i would like to say a few words put this in a broader context, the role of the research and researchers and in the 21st century in a broader context so that you can better understand how we reached the conclusions of this book. So uncertainty, insecurity and crisis as we know are some of the major hazards in the 21st century informational security order. And in this context, the role of Academic Research is to generate a body of knowledge which can help us to understand, to explain or predict crisis and unsecurity. But of course, it is not easy to predict uncertainty or to know uncertainty because, yeah, the question is how do we know if it is uncertain . And a professor of mine doing a talk this year has made, actually, a very interesting point referring to a picture which probably most of you or many of you have seen this year, that of a black hole. So nasa found a way to know something which was previously unknown and which was difficult to know, and how did they do it . They put together several telescopes. And this is what we tried to do in this book as well. So we tried to put together the pieces of, the pieces of the puzzle in order to estimate more complex variables which can help us better predict and you understand. So the objective of the book was to fill a crucial scientific gap and to contribute to better understanding and management of the challenges associated with the Brexit Process for European Security and transatlantic cooperation. And the book is based on an understanding of peace and security going on resilience, anticipation and integration of aspects of daily life which are important for predicting uncertainty. So now i think i will come to the findings which we can categorize in four major themes or sections. The first finding is related to the e. U. u. K. Collaborative potential. So here we, the findings suggest that there is a mixed track record of e. U. u. K. Military cooperation. And reaching an agreement in the area of security has prove more difficult than expected because, mainly because of diverging interests of the u. K. On one side and the e. U. So interestingly, security was an area where we would have expected an easier agreement. However, the development of the , as i said, has made reaching an agreement increasingly difficult. Another major category of findings relates to the picture of europe. And when we talk about the future of europe, we need to talk about the future of the Common Security and defense policy. And here, our findings suggest that the, or highlight the role of policy entrepreneurs such as france and germany in making advancements for csvp, but still challenges are expected to continue in the future because, because of the difference in the strategic preferences of these two major policy entrepreneurs, but also e. U. 27. Nonetheless, we can expect increased cooperation for lifting obstacles in the future for csvp. Another aspect also in this category, the future of europe is related to peace. And, because when we talk about europe, we need to think about the essential aspect. Peace is a major attribute of european innovation. It is a for the other e. U. Membership benefits such as the economic prerequisite for other e. U. Membership benefits such as the economic or political cooperation. The findings have highlighted how the Brexit Process or brexit can undermine or undermines the Northern Ireland Peace Process and the good friday agreement because the good friday agreement was possible due to the e. U. Membership of both countries, the u. K. And ireland. And the openended nature of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. And im sure ambassador mulhall say more about this later on. Another important thing was related to, which we found was related to bilaterallists. So we could expect that the u. K. Will strengthen or relations with individual Member States will be strengthened on a bilateral basis, and we had a case study in our book on estonia. So the findings suggest that individual Member States in a difficult strategic environment or in exposure such as estonia can have an increased utility for the u. K. Particularly because cooperation on a bilateral basis can constitute avenues of interest for the e. U. Policy or on the e. U. Policy. Then we have, we have a third category of findings which relates to new sources of power and legitimacy. And here we assess whether and how new and emerging Security Technologies can be turned or can turn into a competitive advantage for the e. U. Another thing we looked at was the potential of collaborative defense, security and defense regimes and procurement and the European Defense fund. And also, we looked at the future of the European Nuclear deterrence. And finally, there was a fourth prospectiveated to strategies. So here we find a greater need for, we find the need for the the findings suggest the need for more greater, for more holistic e. U. Agenda. Holistic in the sense that peace and cooperative strategies should aim at fulfilling or yeah. Fulfilling both system stability, system resilience. So in the sense that the ability of the system to maintain its power and system efficiency, that is the system the extent to which the member of the system comply with the rules of the system and those systems capacity to fulfill strategic objectives. And this can be reached to increase interdependence and increased interconnection at all government structures. And, yeah. So i would say in conclusion that the findings of the book suggest a greater need for e. U. [inaudible] and for the u. K. , it emphasizes the importance of bilateral if many orand minilateral multilateral structures particularly in the scenario of a no deal. To conclude, future of u. K. e. U. Relations will probably or we can expect to depend on the u. K. s ability to normalize its relations with european partners, and also on its level of commitment or ability to show commitment towards csvp. But well also depend on the preferences of the e. U. 27. So i think that is from my kind, side, and we are not going to move on with now going to move on with beginning our panel. Our first speaker is alex menuate, who is an assistant professor here at Johns Hopkins University School of advanced international studies. She will a talk about brexit or the u. K. Bilateral relations with european partners, particularly with france. Thank you. Alex can you hear me . Oh, yes, ok. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you so much, cornelia, for the invitation, and congratulations for putting together this event that it is such a short time at sais. So indeed, im going to talk about the u. K. s bilateral defense relation with european partners, and in particular france, but by talking about france, i hope to draw conclusions that apply to other e. U. Member states and so could be of interest to other partners as well. So, indeed, as cornelia pointed, bilateral defense relations have a stake and a particular importance during the Brexit Process. They will be, potentially, more important after brexit is effective, but they have always been extremely important and thats why we have spent the ten past years working on the bilateral defense and security relations in europe and in particular, the u. K. French Defense relation and, hopefully, well have a book coming out on the subject in about a year. So when it comes to the u. K. And france, even though conclusions can be applied to other cases, there is something quite special about the u. K. french bilateral defense relation. They do enjoy some sort of special relationship even though the term is connoted and tends to refer to the u. K. u. S. Bilateral relationship. It can also to some extent apply to the french. It is unique according to the French Embassy in london because it applies to all domains of defense and security, and it is special according to the u. K. Director for general strategy, you know, posted in march 2019 because it applies to Nuclear Deterrence as well as to u. K. And frances traditional capacities that other european states do not necessarily have. This Bilateral Partnership in the past 10 years has been rooted in a bilateral trade deal whereby france and the u. K. Have committed to enhance their bilateral cooperation across the spectrum of defense and security, ranging from joint armament projects and including crossborder industrial integration, and thats an important part of their cooperation that i will go back to, because its probably the one thats been the most affected by brexit. They have endeavored to integrate their missile industry in particular around the company nbda, coowned by french and British Industrial groups. France and the u. K. Are have committed to enhance their cooperation on military operations and the interoperability of their armed forces. They have jointly led operations in libya in 2011, have together participated in the u. S. Led coalition in syria, have worked together under french leadership sahel, under u. K. Leadership in Eastern Europe, and they have built for almost ten years now a joint Expeditionary Force which is nonpermanent military force involving all three services that is going to reach full operational capacity next year in 2020. France and the u. K. Have also been collaborating in the Nuclear Deterrence domain which makes their partnership, indeed, quite special, sharing facilities for the maintenance of their Nuclear Stockpiles as well as test simulation on their nuclear warheads. France and the u. K. , obviously, are also both members of the u. N. Security council, and as such, they engage on a lot of international Security Issues, and they have a common approach on Current Affairs including on iran, russia, or syria. So thats for, if you like, the background of what im going to say now is going to build. So based on this bilateral, strong, allencompassing partnership that has been reenforced for the last decade, what has happened since 2016 . This microphone, i dont know if supposed to stay close or far . This, okay. What i said for the last three minutes wasnt that interesting, so its okay if you didnt hear anything. [laughter] when you have a partnership that has no equal in europe and you have this bilateral treaty, what you come up with after Something Like brexit is, first, disbelief on both sides as well as public declaration ares that support the maintenance of the partnership and try to create the political atmosphere of continued trust and support and mutual support. So in 2016, the president of france declared that france will continue to work with this big friend country and the defense field will be preserved. Theresa may similarly in july 2016 suggested the Security Corporation between our countries is something that will always endure and that it will even strengthen the wider Strategic Defense Partnership between the two countries. So a lot of goodwill was shown at first. Then since 2017, 2018, we have some fatigue. We had macron taking hard line on brexit to preserve the different pillars of the e. U. And maintain unity of the e. U. , and we face the fact that the problem that defense, indeed, is not as important or is only secondary to economic and social issues, right . So you have defense coming, if you like, more to the back of bilateral declaration and french posturing, same on the u. K. Side. Then with the rejection of theresa mays deal, there is an increased fatigue and disbelief on the french side of what the u. K. Is up to. And then you have an increased governmental instability in the u. K. And with the coming into power of boris johnson, the question is, is it even worth working with johnson, how long is he going to stay in power anyway . And the talks and the constant post bring postponing of brexit make any kind of focus on defense and security very, very difficult. So in the meantime, you do have the collaboration that continues at the working level, political, military cooperation, miltomil cooperation continues una unaffected by the political events. Indian ocean of combined Aircraft Carrier groups continue, collaboration in the sahel in Eastern Europe and in syria continue. However, on the industrial side, things have started to take a different turn. The big project of a future combat air system, a u. K. french system, was abandoned not only due to brexit, there were already many disagreements on the industrial side, differing needs between the two countries, but it was acknowledged in all the research and interviews that ive done that brexit presented a sort of window of opportunity to just abandon a project that they no longer had an incentive to maintain because of bad political context and difficult economic context as well. Now there are many doubts about other projects, including this very ambitious industrial integration. Meanwhile, cooperation in the Nuclear Domain continues. That was for the past three years. Now we can wonder whats going to happen after brexit and these are the questions that are raised about resilience and i only have two minutes and im obviously very late. Im going to speed up. My point and thats something i write about in the book that i will hopefully be able to publish soon is that even for partners and neighbors enjoy that enjoy such special relationships and very deep partnerships, those partnerships need maintenance, they need effort. And when we think about whats going to happen next week and think about 4 lines of inquiry. First is how all the two partners going to show common interest decide on things they want to do together. This is going to be difficult first because of brexit representing two opposing political visions. On the one hand, you have france thinking of its future in the european context and almost only in the european context and on the other side you have a uk thinking of a future individually around this idea of globalism so you have different political visions and you also have Political Tension because of the brexit negotiations which creates incentives for negotiating common positions, common interests and finding areas and ways to work together. Then in the longer term, if the u. K. Does not participate in the e. U. , in the European Defense fund, the common Foreign Policy meeting, there is a chance that theyre not going to be able to converge on many issues that concern you diplomacy. Diplomacy, but may be my colleagues will talk more about that. So thats also going to make it more difficult to reach common positions from procurement choices and military procurements as the eu moves forward to become an actor in that field. Then there is the broader question of how willing and able the u. K. Is going to be as a military actor and the root of the partnership between the u. K. And france is they both share this expeditionary interventionist strategic posture. If the u. K. Indeed is still struggling with brexit, as lower defense spending and just general loss of leadership, is still going to be a very attractive partner for france . There is even the risk maybe thats if the uk has to negotiate trade deals great powers including the u. S. , including china, including russia, maybe thats going to create some entitlements for the entanglements for the uks european partners. Second about coordinating government to Government Military activities. The uk being outside of it eu will make it more difficult to work on a regulatory basis including and especially our for Defense Industry because the eu provides for simplification of crossborder arms exports and the extent of Cash Exchange of parts necessary exchange of parts necessary for building arms so that making it difficult for Companies Like airbus that work on crossborder projects. The matter of tariffs, it is not a matter of consequence in the armaments sector, but if you have more paperwork, more administrative paperwork as well as border checks, it just also removes some of the instances of working with the uk and you may have some relocation of industry thirdly, and im reaching the end, for bilateral relationships to continue, you need to be able to make deals and make bets so if you want to cooperate in something, you say, give me this and ill give you that. You do tradeoffs and its constant bargaining even among close allies. If you have uncertainty about the future, how are you going to make a deal . Youre not going to be able to that on whether the uk is going to be able to fulfill their commitments to certain deals youve made so youre going to be in the short term is this incentivized disinc entivized to make certain deals and that applies in particular to armaments projects. Are you going to put money on the table if you dont know your partner is going to be able to do the investigation. Thats an important point as well, how do you arbitrate among different bilateral relationships . Haves at any given time relationships with different states of the uk as obviously strong relationships with friends but also the us and multiple companies countries. Germany as well which is not that small. And so on the one hand the uk is going to be incentivized to arrange for links with a number of other european partners, but also with the u. S. And and this may be detrimental to france if the u. S. Is lobbying, as it has been doing, to buy American Equipment including in the missile sector where the uk has been trying so hard to work with friends and there has been a forceful american lobbying to sell some american missiles at the uk would otherwise be with developing with france on a bilateral level. This u. S. Lobbying can also be felt towards other european states as they tried to find an alternative to the uk as an entry point into the eu so maybe also other colleagues will talk about that aspect. Meanwhile, france is obviously incentivized to try with other to look for other partners, including turning back to germany if its a difficult partner in defense, and it remains another favored ally. Im actually done because i think i skipped a couple of points. Looking forward to questions and comments if there are any afterwards. Thank you so much for your input. Our next speaker is joan denny , a Research Professor of interagency intergovernmental and Multinational Security studies at the u. S. Army work College Strategic studies institute. He will talk about brexit and nato and transatlantic cooperation. I think cornelia used a little bit of my time getting my title out. Thank you for the introduction. My name is john denny, im a Research Professor at the war college in carlisle, pennsylvania. Specifically, i work at the relatively Small Research is already there, the strategic studies institute. Its a small part of the larger war college. Im a government employee, we have Academic Freedom but im happy to acknowledge up front that the views im going to express now and during the q a are mine alone and dont reflect those of the army, department of defense, or the u. S. Government. Cornelia, thank you so much for the invitation and congratulations to you and john doyle for an excellent book. Im honored and delighted to talk to you about the transatlantic aspects of brexit for my take on it and im going to talk about that in terms of three potential rather negative impacts. The first of those goes into the demise of uk capability and capacity militarily. The second follows on from that, the receding of the uks Strategic Horizons. In other words how far beyond the borders of the United Kingdom does london perceive u. K. Interests . Right now, it goes pretty far. Im going to argue i think going to see a receding of that, a significant one. Most dramatically and heres , the most on thin ice dangerous thing a political scientist can do and that is predict. I think those first two things i mentioned that ultimately lead to the demise of the special relationship and the demise of the uk as americas righthand partner and the number two power in nato and i dont just mean that in terms of military issues. We americans as many know love to operate with partners around the world in all of our international dealings and the uk is arguably the closest partner we have in a variety of realms, especially in the military. I think that is at risk. So let me talk about each of those now in a little more detail. First, in terms of the demise of uk capability and capacity i mean that in terms of whats about to happen to the uk defense budget. Most of the reputable independent Economic Analysis that came out in the run up to the brexit vote over three years ago were fairly consistent about the impact of brexit on the uk economy and that was there would be a negative impact on gdp, on purchasing power, on household incomes, across the board. With one or two exceptions, thats what most independent analysis found. That would vary in terms of the depth of bad news but the hard brexit was the worst Case Scenario and there, most analysis averaged about seven 7 drop in gdp. That doesnt sound like a lot but that translates into about a 47 billion pound loss of revenue. That number sounds like a lot to me and it is. Back in 2012 or 2013 when the uk government was dealing with the aftereffects of austerity and the sovereign debt crisis, those two years so i drop in revenue of 33 billion pounds each of those years, so 47 billion pound drop in revenue. Over the course of the next five years, most of these studies looked out five to seven years. Thats a fairly significant index. How did the uk government respond to the drop in revenue earlier this decade . It was clear among the most severely cut budget categories was defense. From 2010 until 2018, uk defense spending dropped by 18 in real terms. There was a 25 cut in manpower over that same time. Theres been some recent good news about what the British Government is expected to fund in the coming year for defense spending, and as many of you know, weve seen a rebound of defense spending across europe at least 2015. I question the durability of that rebound, especially in the case of the uk and especially if a hard brexit comes about. So defense cuts, in my view, are likely. The government will likely do that in order to fend off or protect social welfare spending as it did in the weight of the sovereign debt crisis. I dont think theres risk to things like high profile procurements such as strategic submarines, but i do think theres risk to other procurement programs. They could be delayed or canceled outright, and here, im thinking of the challenge of tag replacements,tank helicopter upgrades and replacements, and possibly some generalpurpose frigates. We should also expect to see cuts in manpower, as we saw a couple of years ago. I would expect the british army and the Royal Marines to take significant cuts to their force structure. Perhaps more significantly, for defense, would be questions about whether the United Kingdom remains united in the event of hard brexit. Many know that scotland is home to the only strategic Submarine Base for the royal navy. Its also home to fairly important raf bases as well as a ,raining facility in cape wr where the uk and ministry of defense felt labeled the only place in europe where you can do sea, air and land exercises operations all at the same time. So if scotland were to hold a referendum and in the worst case, a hard brexit, trying to recreate, replicate, release these facilities in the short lease these facilities in the short run would be extra narrowly expensive and difficult to pull off, i think. Even without brexit, lets say we dont get a hard brexit. Instead theres an agreement between the eu and london to avoid the worstCase Scenario. We know already austerity over the last decade has dealt a serious blow to uk military capacity and capabilities. If you think back to what the uk was possible of doing militarily back in the persian gulf war, 1991 timeframe, or at the outset of natos involvement in afghanistan or the coalition of the willings involvement in iraq, early 2000s. That time period, the uk could Field Division size military units, were talking about tens of thousands, 20,000 or so divisions of mechanized forces. That is simply not possible today. That is because of austerity. Of course, the armys not the only service in the uk affected. Weve seen a decline in platforms, royal Navy Platforms and the raf is been affected, as well. In 2018, the house of commons felt that included that the uk military was at the minimum threshold of operational effectiveness. Their words, not mine. That will ultimately in my view, lead to a shrinking of uk Strategic Horizons. There are a lot of things that go into how a country proceeds perceives of where its interests lie. But the ability and willingness to do something about them, thats tied to this, and i look at two historical examples to indicate to me why this is most likely. The first is the dutch. From the mid2000 until the middle of the current decade, the dutch went through a significant military transformation. Their strategies 15 years ago talked about having really worldwide interest come all in the framework or context of multilateralism. Working with nato or eu contexts. 10 years later, new strategy comes out 2018. It states very clearly the focus is now on europe and the kingdom, not on operations far afield. In 1990, the dutch army had 104,000, Dutch Military had 104,000 personnel down to 41,000 in 2011. Iny went from 181 f16s 1990 to 68 in 2011. From 900 tanks to zero. This reduction in capability is what contributed in part to this reframing of how the netherlands viewed its security. The second example i look to for this historically is, ironically, the uk itself and thats what happened about 50 years ago when the uk went through this wrenching decision to withdraw east of suez. One of the reasons why the uk made the decision was the increasing cost of power projection platforms to maintain a presence and influence each of in east of suez. Ultimately, i think these two first factors were impacted as i mentioned to you could lead to the demise of the special relationship between the us and the uk and have profound impacts for nato, as well. The special relationship is rooted in history, as we know. Many of us think of that as being born in the crucible of world war ii but it extends back a little over a century ago to the late 1800s, early 1900s when there was an increasing common outlook towards the world, between london and washington. And that relationship is based not simply on material factors like whether we can operate militarily together. You know it is based on common language, common history, common values. It is based onnt material factors and in part it is, those things are likely going to diminish over time and i mean the next five to 10 years. I think that is going to be the case because washington will increasingly see less utility in the relationship, and the closeness of it. Of course the u. K. Will remain a close ally. Other mechanisms will go on. America is always interested in having outlays allies along for various pursuits and operations, but the closeness of that, the special relationship already spoken of in mostly british accents, will generally fade. Thanks for listening. Thank you, john. Eric bradford direct the Europe Program at carnegie. Thank you so much. Congratulations on the book and thanks for having me here. I was asked to talk about the u. K. Future relations with the eu, nato, and united dates. United states. I would like to highlight a couple of points, moving the conversation beyond defense talking about broader impact for security and Foreign Policy. To me, a starting point is to recognize that breaks it marks brexit marks the biggest u. K. Foreign policy shift the cold war. It will have major implications for the eu, nato, and United States. British Foreign Policy has really been based on three overlaying pillars. The first one, being a part of europe. Second, maintaining a close special relationship with the united dates and third comic being an active player on the multistate world stage, supporting multilateralism. Because of brexit, trump, rising Great Power Competition in the International System, those three pillars are in flux. Oft does this mean in terms the relationship between the u. K. And the eu post brexit . I got back from a trip to brussels last week where i was part of strategic discussions about security and it was noteworthy how little brexit came up in those discussions. It is quite telling, but i do think talking to europeans, especially french strategic experts, there is this notion brexit represents an opportunity for European Security and defense policy, the traditional british opposition to deepening europe defense integration. With brexit, allows the eu to move forward. I think there is some truth to that but some reasons to be concerned. We have to recognize the u. K. Has actually traditionally played a very strong role in european Foreign Policy when it comes to back in the 1990s addressing issues in the western balkans, pushing for enlargement of central and Eastern Europe, leaning leading on trade policy, russia sanctions. That is an important starting point. The u. K. Hast not blocked, it has played an important role. It is important realize europe itself is undergoing a really important major transformation where brexit is only a part of this process. In a world where the u. S. Is no longer as predict will and as stable a leader as it used to be, or the International System is becoming less rulesbased and more competitive. The eu itself is undergoing this process of realigning itself and that is why you see so much discussion coming out of europe these days on strategic autonomy and the need for more european sovereignty. Much in terms of the future u. K. Eu relationship post brexit depends on the outcome of brexit itself, which we dont yet know at this point. Policy port foreign has not really been part of the brexit conversation in the Withdrawal Agreement which is really about the exiting the eu part, which addressed other issues like immigration, future financial contributions to the eu, and the backstop issue. Foreign policy was addressed in the sort of part of the Withdrawal Agreement that talked about future relationship. Not a lot of attention has been paid to this yet. I think much will depend on whether we will see a soft brexit or hard brexit or no deal outcome. Did mostly depends on where the u. K. Itself wants to go. Forld for see another see a situation where the u. K. Will seek to maintain a close relationship to the European Union after brexit. You could also see a relationship where they pivot to the United States or find extra distance between the two. That remains to be seen. When it comes to how the u. K. Will address and respond to broader developments in strategic developments of europe, it is fair to say you progress in europe on defense cooperation in past couple of years. Some of these trends proceed p recede brexit but also come as a result. The initiatives coming out of brussels on strengthening defense cooperations will treat the u. K. Postbrexit as a third party. That will have implications in of. s role in being part these initiatives that how it may perceive them itself and respond to them. Wk be supportive or well they try to delete some of these european dilute some of these european efforts or hedge against them . The u. K. Is increasingly responding to European Defense integration and a deepening of nexus, otherrman countries are on the continent. The british sense in europe has diminished. The question is how the u. K. Goes about that. The u. K. Can learn from the United States, an outside power in europe has worked in europe to be influential. There will be a need for london to increase its diplomatic presence in key capitals across the continent, investing in the relationship with berlin and paris, but also new types of relationships, the league of the netherlands and nordic countries and central and Eastern Europe. These are the Natural Partners in europe u. K. Will have to increase its engagement with. The ultimate goal should be for the u. K. To be a key partner, special partner to the European Union, but that will require changes. We will have to find new arrangements, both with the Foreign Affairs council and the psc. There will be a need for new structures and institutions to coordinate on defense policy. At the u. K. Eu level, and there will be a need to have new relationships between the uk and individual Member States. Weve already seen this, i think, weve already seen it as a result of the brexit referendum, an increase in e3 cooperation, germany, france, and the United Kingdom with iran or the South China Sea or hong kong or whatever. This is likely to continue and even intensify as a result of brexit and we can also see i think other formats emerging such as the quad format where you would bring in the United States, you can also see the g7 perhaps, which also includes italy becoming more significant as a venue or having security and Foreign Policy discussions that brings in the uk. Of course, president macron has floated the idea of a Security Council, that would be a collaborative body to discuss Foreign Policy issues, sort of like a Security Council thats not clear on what it means. Once we get an idea of where brexit is heading, we will see where the direction goes. The state of play is still uncertain because we dont know where brexit will end up and if anything, it seems not only the europeans are a little bit reticent to pull their issues on the agenda, in many ways the uk itself because of its negotiating tactics, is maybe trying to use security as leverage right now to get the europeans to get the deal. View, its in my really essential that the uk and eu find this future arrangement, because its pivotal for not only the uk but also pivotal to europe. In a world that is increasingly multipolar, where the Transatlantic Relationship is in flux, where authoritarian countries such as china and russia together. Also for europe developing the world, the uk and europes at least second biggest military power, Major Economic force, major diplomatic actor to maintain a close relationship to the europeans. I have some other points too about nato and the u. S. , but maybe we will shelf them for now. We can come back to discuss a little more of the impacts of nato and the specific impact for the United States. Thank you so much. Now id like to invite the ambassador of the republic of ireland to the United States to something on the effects of brexit on resources and the good friday agreement. I wanted to say briefly that before coming to washington, Daniel Mulhall wass the ambassador of germany and the u. K. , and is the author of a new book in 1900 and editor of the shaping of modern ireland. Thank you so much ambassador mulhall for sharing your expertise with us today. Thank you very much, cordelia. And i just want to say first of all that im very glad to be associated with the launch of this book because its a book that was credited by two academics, cordelia baciu and john doyle at the time of the books reduction academics at , dublin university. And indeed, id like to commend the chapter on Northern Ireland and the brexit issue cause it not only covered the issue very well, but its also a good introduction. A short but concise introduction to the nature of the issues that arise in Northern Ireland, the different traditions that have been in conflict for sometime in Northern Ireland and that conflict has to be, the resurgence of that conflict needs to be avoided at all costs. Just to say that ireland is a country and this book is perhaps focused on defense and security, id be focusing on Northern Ireland and on the political challenges, economic challenges in the context of brexit. From the point of. View of defense, ireland is not a member of nato. We have a traditional policy of neutrality, we have also been heavily involved in United Nations peacekeeping. We have an unbroken record, 60 years involvement in Un Peacekeeping and a very significant percentage of our armed forces are deployed on un missions in different parts of the world and also in recent years, our naval vessels have been involved in the operation sophia in the mediterranean, combined with other European Countries rescuing migrants. Our three latest naval vessels, they take turns in being deployed in the mediterranean and the three vessels, the wbh, the samuel beckett, and the james joyce, where the only country of the world that calls our naval vessels after our great irish writers. Just to say that, why should americans be concerned about brexit . For me there are two strong reasons. The first is that the European Union as part of the fabric of Transatlantic Relations and im talking now about not just the security and defense relationships, but the broader shared value system for shared interests that binds europeans and americans, and have done so for the last 70 years, since the second world war. Successfully, indeed. And as for anything that damages the European Union, its a negative for the United States and there are those that might take pleasure in the brexit as a hit to the European Union are i think also taking pleasure in what would be a hit to the Transatlantic Relationship and ultimately to the United States, because the European Union has been part of the Transatlantic Relationship, which has presided over an unprecedented period of of period of peace and prosperity in Northern Europe over the last 17 years. The second reason is economic in that the relationship, economic relationship between the eu and the United States is by far the most important economic relationship in the world in terms of the volume of trade and investment that flows back and forth across the atlantic. It is second to none. Of course, there are other relationships in the world developing an emerging but none of them for the foreseeable future will match the transatlantic economic relationship. You get different views from different economists on the likely impact of brexit economically, but the impact, the predicted impact ranges from moderately bad to bad to very bad to catastrophic. And i know of almost no serious economist who believes that brexit will produce an economic dividend either for the uk or for the European Union, so in that context, if the eu economy is damaged because of brexit, if the uk economy is damaged because of brexit, the overall damage will be felt in the United States because the economic relationship between europe and the United States will suffer accordingly and these are two good reasons why americans should be concerned and worried about the impact of brexit in political strategic and economic terms. From an irish point of view, we are deeply committed to eu membership and we will remain part of the European Union come what may. Whatever happens to brexit, in fact, support for the European Union in ireland has risen significantly. In otherne so also parts of europe, but its risen significantly in ireland since the brexit issue became such a preoccupation in britain and in ireland because of the impact on ireland and the support for European Union membership is in excess of 90 . The last poll i saw put it at 92 and practically nothing in the world in any democratic a 92 support, so basically, there is a unanimity in ireland and all Political Parties share the view that irelands interests are best served by membership of the European Union. The reason for that is quite straightforward. When we joined the eu in 1973, we were by far the least developed economy in europe. We were well behind the other Member States and over the last 45 years, we caught up and now are on a per capita basis ireland is one of the top two or three countries in the European Union, so it has transformed our country economically but also socially and that we become much more open. Much more attuned, really, to european moors and the best example of that i support his is the demographic transformation of ireland over the last 20 years. The island i grew up in was practically homogenously irish, we had two or three percent of the population at that time were born outside of ireland. They were mainly retired people would come to ireland in retirement. Today, we have about 17 percent of our population were born outside of ireland which means we are among, we have among the largest percentages, highest percentages in europe of people in our country born outside of ireland and if you go to any of the big corporations, the big us corporations in dublin. Google, facebook, amazon and so forth, youll find they are their workforces are multinational. Google told me they had 66 languages spoken by native speakers in their offices in dublin. So the other thing about brexit, it is a tragedy for britishirish relations, because when we joined the European Union in 1973, we joined because we saw it as an opportunity to advance our economic interests and advance the interest of our country as a whole. We probably didnt anticipate it would have a benign effect on britishiran relations, but it has because for 45 years, british and irish diplomats have been sitting around the tables in brussels discussing eu issues and guess what . The irish and british found themselves often on the same side. Something they possibly would have never imagined, but it did happen and i can remember back in the 1980s and 90s attending European Councils when our respective Prime Ministers would get together in the European Union buildings at the European Council and we have private discussions trying to resolve some of the issues that were hindering progress at that time in Northern Ireland. So this benign effect allowed us in 1998 to find ourselves, to develop a shared analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland and that led on to an agreement of 1998 that was agreed with considerable support from the United States, most notably the contribution of president clinton but also many members of congress and on both sides of the aisle and of course the chairmanship of senator george mitchell. So ireland, therefore, was not happy to find brexit coming onto the agenda in britain and i was there at the time and initially, it looked as if he might never be a referendum and the referendum was cause. Called. Our hope was that the referendum would result in a remain majority. I pointed out, i was very active at the time in not campaigning in any way for remain, but pointing out the challenges that ireland would face and that would be facing Northern Ireland if britain were to decide to leave the European Union. Sadly, the british electorate that issue of Northern Ireland really never captured significant attention. It was an issue that really didnt feature on the first page of peoples concerns during the debate about brexit. So we hoped that britain would like to remain in the European Union but we accepted the result that the people of britain decided by 32 to 48 to leave the European Union and from then on, our aim was to minimize the downside of brexit for ireland and maximize any upsides. And the upsides would include increased u. S. Investment in europe. We reckoned about 70 or so companies and moved to ireland because of brexit and we expect that trend to continue so there will be a benefit, but the risk is of course that the economic downside of brexit would be greater than any upside that might arise in terms of increase d u. S. Investment, increased Foreign Investment in ireland because we will now be the only englishspeaking country in the European Union after the United Kingdom leaves. So the challenge for ireland xit is twofold. There is an economic challenge and a political challenge. The economic challenge is while britain is no longer our number one trading partner, our number one trading partner is the United States. Britain only accounts for about 12 of irish exports. The u. S. Accounts for 25 , because of the huge amounts of u. S. Multinational Companies Operating in ireland. But the problem is that in some sectors of our economy, notably the Food Industry and agriculture, the bigger percentage of exports britain is probably 40 or sometimes more than that. This is one of the things which last week, because of the airbus dispute, tariffs were imposed by the United States on a range of products including butter from ireland and this would be a double hit for farmers and our Dairy Farmers because brexit could disrupt exports of Dairy Products to britain, as welcome and the tariffs imposed by the United States, therefore we are unwelcome byy ireland and i pointed that out. So that the economic problem and our government yesterday announced our budget for 2020. They provided for 1. 2 million euros, 1. 5 billion to go with cope with the potential effects of brexit which will be particularly severe if it happens to be a hard brexit were no deal brexit. But the main concern i support is that most International Entries is a concern and i mentioned how big a role the United States played in bringing about peace in Northern Ireland, the good friday agreement. That was 20 years ago now. Probably that agreement has saved thousands of lives because in 20 years before 1998 probably 2500 people lost their lives and many more were injured in incidents, violent incidents in Northern Ireland. Weve had a few sad events like the killing of a journalist in april of this year, at a demonstration in derry where shots were fired at the police and this Young Journalist was sadly killed, but by and large, has been the peace maintained. But of course politically, its there has been great fragility. Because the governance of Northern Ireland which has been part of the agreement has to have nationalist involved in it hasnt functioned since 2017, so for two and a half years, there hasnt been a government in Northern Ireland and that means these institutions of the good friday agreement cannot operate in the way theyre meant to operate under the terms of that agreement. A vacuum has been created and when you have a vacuum of course it does encourage other actors to insert themselves into that vacuum and we have seen greater evidence in recent years and months of renewed activity by small but nonetheless quite dangerous paramilitary organizations. So we are very concerned that on top of that fragility and instability in Northern Ireland, the brexit issue enters into the mix and turns things up and churns things up further. Thats why we have been determined from the beginning that whatever happens with brexit, we need to ensure that we protect the good friday agreement and open borders up of on Northern Ireland. Let me talk to you about the border for a moment. For the last 20 odd years, there hasnt been a border. Once there was a customs border. That was in past times when the amount of trade and classic between north and south was a benefit. There was a security border during the conflict between 1970 and the early 1990s. Since that time, the border has been open. The border in ireland is not a straight line. Its goes for 300 miles there are 200 separate border crossings. On the island. So it goes through homes, it goes through farm yards, it goes through villages. It goes through open field. It has no geographical basis. The problem is that if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union with no arrangement for future relations, which would be the impact of a no deal brexit. It would mean that there would be two customs and two regulatory zones on the island of ireland. That would mean that somehow, the Irish Government would have find some ways of protecting the integrity of the european single we would beich deeply committed because we benefit from the Single Market. So the aim over the last two years of negotiations has been to find a way in which britain can leave in an orderly manner but with guarantees that there can never be a border on the island of ireland. That was called the backstop, which was included in the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated last year between the eu and uk. But rejected by the westminster parliament. The backstop is essentially an insurance policy that whatever happens, if all else fails, there will be no border, hard border on the island of ireland because britain as a whole, the u. K. As a whole would remain within customs union. This is controversial and in british politics and its proven to be difficult to get agreement. Now, the present situation and for us, the best solution would be for the u. K. To leave the eu with a deal, with an agreement that would include the backstop, that was included in the Withdrawal Agreement agreed last year or some agreed alternative that would achieve the same outcome as the backstop. In other words, guarantee and an open border, and respect the integrity of the European Union border. The British Government has recently made some proposals, new proposals have been found wanting by the European Union the negotiations continue and our government has said, european governments have said we want britain to leave in an orderly fashion. Nobody wants to see a crash out brexit. This has never happened before. No country in my view, my experience, my knowledge, has ever left a Free Trade Agreement of the kind that exists within the European Union without any provisions to govern trade between that country and the other members of that free trade area, but that is what a hard brexit, no deal brexit would entail. For example, the United States has soft to replace the nafta agreement with usmca, but under the new one coming into effect, there would be an agreement to govern trade between the last govern trade because it would difficult for u. S. Exports if suddenly you went from having back to having nothing but the risk is written go fromin is you will having eu members in the Single Market to nothing. The british Prime Minister will be meeting tomorrow and we are committed to finding a solution but sadly, there is a lot of toxic politics that surrounds the brexit issue at the moment and while a no deal brexit ought to be a 0 possibility, sadly the percentage risk of a no deal brexit is far greater than that which is why we are so committed to this issue and why we hope some agreement will be found to allow the u. K. To leave the European Union in an orderly fashion which minimizes damage to the irish economy, Northern Ireland, the Peace Process, and the European Union. Thank you very much. [laughter] thank you, mr. Ambassador. Okay, now we can hear. Thank you, mr. Ambassador. Let me were going to come into some of the discussion but let me circle back to our topic which we said was about European Security and Transatlantic Relations, and as another american voice, briefly complement what john said which we focused early on the uk, the bilateral relationship. To provoke everyone and put out a couple of last points, my brief point would be the shortterm impact is going to be to strengthen nato. Because the uk will want to show it is not leaving nato, it is leaving the eu and is still part of the group. Most everyone else will want to reinforce that view. But over the mediumterm, for reasons john said, its likely to weaken nato. Its also likely to increase the importance for the United States of noneu europe. Think about the three points of policy uncertainty right now for the United States and europe. The uk, turkey, and ukraine. None of them are in the eu and all of them are right now and broiling ourng em own politics. Thats going to continue. The second is that this could put further pressure on the debate about defense expenditures because once the u. K. Leaves the eu, 80 of nato defense expenditures, the defense of europe is going to be provided by noneu countries. Noncontinental European Countries. Thats only going to further inflame the current debates that were having right now. If you think about what weve done in nato recently, its to provide a forward presence in the baltics and in poland. Three of the four battalions that lead those three of the four countries leading those battalions are nonContinental European or noncontinental states. Canada, the u. S. , and the u. K. Theres going to be greater debate about where is Continental Europe in its own defense as we go forward as the u. K. Steps back from this. Im speaking from an american perspective. It is also going to further challenge the ability to forge cohesive european foreign defense policies on common challenges, which will mean for the americans, for the United States, will further challenge europes ability to be the kind of partner americans look to to face a whole range of common challenges beyond europe, not just in europe. And it means that europeans are going to be further focused inward on more process, more internal governmental arrangements of how to deal with all this. Which means less time in space in the policy realm issues that for issues that are important to the United States. It is a message also that, one thought what was once thought was one of the most stable democracies in the world suddenly reveals itself to be terribly polarized and fractured, and fragile. And im not sure whether thats a message that will be contained to the uk. So my conclusion is we are facing a more fluid and less settled europe. Were facing one that is less cohesive, more open ended in terms of where its going. Less capable, more open to what the George Bush Administration called disaggregation. Playing europeans off against each other because its so easy to do. And europe that is less marital merkel, but more german, and this disruption will not end with whatever the solution is to the u. K. Eu issue. It will continue beyond that because theres so many other follow on issues that will flow whether theres no deal or some deal brexit. We havent even begun to formulate the questions to that, much less have answers to them so i hope ive provoke somebody now on this and were going to open up the discussion. I think we have made another microphone that works. Either to the ambassador since he is here or other panelists, or comments you like to make. If you can identify yourself briefly so people have a sense of where youre coming from, that would be helpful. Jeff . When i was at the state department, i did eu nato issues and work with eric a few years ago now, but id like to ask the panelists a couple of things that didnt quite fully come up, but i wanted to particularly thank the ambassador for emphasizing the tragedy of this. Which for an american who used to work for former Prime Minister edward heath and helped him write his memoirs, did the three chapters on negotiating the u. K. s entrance into europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The question, number one, is why when intelligence officials seem to believe that the russian role in the brexit vote was more decisive than it was here, have the brits had such a hard time, even harder than we have, dealing with this issue . Were they to do so, how would it be impacting the brexit today and second, why are we assuming that brexit is necessarily a gun done deal when theres enormous difficulty happening in london as we speak, multiple things coming to a head. Boris johnson hasnt won a single vote, across party threety dealt theresa may failing historic votes on the brexit bill and finally does do you say a little more perhaps about is their potential for the uk and nato to develop a particular command or leadership of command and would almost be almost forced to maintain to the best of its ability some specific kind of capability that others dont have that it could be a leader on . Since we have limited time, what i would like to do is collect some questions so we can get everyone more involved. Write down here in front. Im brittany gibson, im a journalist and also a british citizen. Im sorry, please speak as close as you can to the mic. But think the whole panel it would be best for the ambassador to answer. Think in terms of the irish backstop and the border could create or the border it would not create on the island of ireland. There are arguments against the backstop suggests there would be a border created within the United Kingdom. As a bit of a twopart question, what are the concerns if any of that other border that could be created not on the island of course but within the uk and also the difference between these two borders, it seems, is the pressure of violence that could come from them. Specifically from the ira is what im thinking of, which is only associated with the border in ireland, if im correct, on the island of ireland, so what is the Irish Government doing to prepare to combat the kind of domestic terrorism . Over here. Thank you. Andrew hyde, formerly of the state department. I wanted to ask you youve given us all the presentations and have given us a lot of institutional things to think about but i wonder if you might talk a little bit about a couple of specific foreignpolicy challenges for the eu and how that will be affected by brexit. Im thinking about afghanistan, libya, confronting the russians, other elements in the middle east. Take your pick, i think in all those areas brexit will have a real impact and id be interested if you could share thoughts on one or two of those issues. Right here, please. Speak right into the microphone please. Im a student and im going to ask, do you think the constitutional crisis in the uk that emerged from brexit could spread to other European Countries, therefore raise further domestic conflict throughout the european continent. Will the crisis spread . Any others, otherwise mister ambassador, i like to go to you first. I dont think anyone can feel compelled to answer any question every single question, we will end up answering by the time were done. I suppose mainly the question about the irish backstop but and its implications, but also the question about is brexit a done deal. Thats a matter really for the uk. We want to see the best possible outcome to brexit and if the uk for us, if the uk were to decide remain in the eu that they matter for them. We would be very happy, im sure. All European Countries would rejoice if that were to happen, but thats not really in our hands. As to the issue of possible russian involvement, i dont believe thats ever really been properly explored and im not sure if at this stage, that would make as much scope in that because we are now getting to the endgame and i think we dont know where the endgame will end up, but i dont think going back and rerunning the 2016 referendum is likely to lend commend itself to too many people at this point. It is a serious question about the backstop. All, is no first of whatever happens with brexit, Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom. Thats absolutely clear. To pose a question about Northern Irelands status within the u. K. That is covered by the you good friday agreement which provides for the possibility or option of having a referendum that sometime in the future when certain conditions are met on irish unity. Until then, we fully expect firm goodin the friday agreement that Northern Ireland remains a part of it u. K. Until the people of ireland decide otherwise in a referendum. We are not pressing for a referendum at this stage. We think it would complicate an already complicated situation. Issuee to see when that will become a prospect or a reality. That is a matter for decision beyond the horizon of brexit. Nobody will be justified in resorting to violence regardless of what happens with brexit, so the Irish Government is completely clear on that and the organizations that might threaten some kind of violence are very small splinter groups from the irish Republic Movement republican movement, and they have little or no support anywhere in ireland, but that doesnt stop them from being dangerous. The risk is if you have any kind of border infrastructure on the island of ireland that elements like that will take the opportunity of attacking or targeting those facilities and that could then create an escalation that could be problematic in a place like Northern Ireland where passions still run quite high on these issues. But there is no sense in which we want to see a border on the irish sea. I think what is required is some way of ensuring that the open border on the island of ireland doesnt undermine the Single Market. We are committed to respecting the integrity and preserving the integrity of the Single Market. We are closing our time so what i would suggest to our panelists issue, one minute. , one i will respond to the above question about whether nato and the uk might develop some sort of special arrangement and i gather your question was to maintain its role and importance within the alliance. I dont think thats going to happen. I dont think the alliance would pursue Something Like that. Uk of course will hang onto as desperately as they can all of the structure, infrastructure, etc. That it has within its borders for nato. I wouldnt expect that to change but as we discussed and they say as dan mentioned, the outlook for the u. K. s role in nato as this sort of second fiddle, is do about that. Thank you. I may disagree actually with you dan on nato, on the american view on how nato is reinforced by the u. K. Leaving the eu. To what john says about the u. K. Abilities, and what is happening in syria today is catastrophic, and we have an american president that is also causing problems for the light for the alliance, so i do not think the u. K. Is going to make it stronger in any way. The one point that i maybe wanted to tackle from you, sir, is the eus foreignpolicy priorities and how that may change with brexit. I dont see much of a chance there to be honest. One reason being that the eus main tools are tools for which the u. K. Did not contribute much or rejected, to include some ,hird parties, Development Aid if not done together, can be coordinated. In a way, hopefully the parties can agree similarly with economic sanctions. Theres going to be continued coordination, i guess, on russia sanctions. There is a risk of a lot of drift in the next five years. I dont see the eu policy changing radically as a result it or diminished, and i will stop here. Theres also increased nato corporation for which everyone should rejoice instead of constantly saying that it is one against the other. I agree with alice on the impact of foreignpolicy elites in least in the short term. I think its more of a dilemma for the uk itself that it is for the eu and i think the uk is a very difficult position visavis the United States as previously discussed, especially on an issue like china, for example, where you have brexit trade agreements with countries around the world such as china and now the Trump Administration very much leaning and pushing britain and nonEuropean Countries to take a tougher approach towards china. That is really posing a dilemma, i think, for london. It is posing a dilemma for europe, as well, but europe is better able to handle it. The sort of illustrates irony with brexit as it makes the uk less sovereign in a world of big dogs. I think very quickly on the question about will there be contagion and more brexit, i think very clearly for any foreseeable future the answer is no. If anything brexit negotiations and the prospect being the uk has simply led to the notion of exiting the eu, becoming unthinkable, and that is why usda countries the opinion polls in countries becoming more favorable towards the eu, and even some of the far right france andle pen and others, no longer advocating and thathe euro zone, is something i think is far more easier to handle. I think there was a question influence. Russian so, for my perspective with my background in Political Science and as a Political Science researcher, i think it is very interesting because it emphasizes the importance, the increasing importance, or the increasing unpredictability, of development, and as we know, brexit and the other event in the u. S. , the election of donald trump, have been two examples of failed to be predicted by opinion polls, and i think this raises a credible question and makes it interesting for research in the future to find new ways of, yes, to try to estimate citizens attitudes and peoples opinions which are important for a political outcomes, and the second point i would like to make is in relation to future so, according to the Alliance Theory, the Alliance Theory predicts when there are two similar matrix of security threats and are exposed to a similar constellation of threats, a weak commitment of an ally, the Alliance Theory predicts this Strategic Alignment between these two act years. Now if we were to apply this to our case, in this case we have the u. K. And europe exposed to a similar relation of threats. We have seen the u. S. Basically recently withdrawing from several agreements, so we could expect both the u. K. And europe aiming for a Strategic Alignment, even after brexit, but we need to emphasize at the time of our talking, our discussions are counter effective because we do not yet know whether there will be a u. K. Withdrawal from the eu is going to be a postponement of brexit or if there will be no deal. Thank you. So one point, from the u. S. Point of view, if you think of the eu Member States, the only two countries, really, who have this broader strategic horizon historically and in the recent past, and that is the u. K. And france, and i think, to answer her question, and i think without that u. K. Voice within the eu, france is going to find it very lonely. The Strategic Horizons that the eu will narrow, france will have to fight that, and i think it will find it hard, and i think from a u. S. Point of view, that is not going to be good, so on that happy note, thank you so much for bringing us all together. We wish you Great Success with your book. Everyone, go buy it please. We hope it is good reading for you. Mr. Ambassador, thank you, and the panelists, please join me in thanking them. [applause] a reception here next door if anyone would like to continue the conversation with our panelists or with each other. Come and join us, so thank you again for coming. Appreciate it. Thank you. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2019] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [indistinct conversations] [indistinct conversations] thank you very much. Yes. Thank you very much. Very good. Thank you. Cspans washington journal, every day with policies that impact you. Coming up thursday morning, we will discuss impeachment with the Brookings Institution. Then, the Hudson Institute with an advisor to President Trump on china policy, discussing the latest on trade talks and the growing risk between the nba and china. And with it sows, some results of the most recent cspan ipsos poll. Journal,hington thursday morning. Join the discussion. Live thursday on the cspan general, h. R. Rmer mcmaster, speaks. Ons is at noon eastern cspan. Ranked choice on voting, also known as instant runoff voting, and then minneapolis for the President Trump campaign rally. On cspan2 at 9 30 am, a discussion on immigrant health care. At 12 30 p. M. , centcom strategy for security in the middle east, and on cspan3 at nine 00 a. M. , the Brookings Institution looks at a new report on universal National Service at 9 00 a. M. , the Brookings Institute looks at a new report on universal National Service. Eastern,at 11 00 a. M. The book no surrender, and a good provider is one who leads, on the plane of snakes, and the memoir how we fight for our coverage from the southern festival of books continuing sunday at 1 00 p. M. Eastern. At 2 00, learning from the germans. A former ambassador to the United Nations talks about her book, the education of an idealist, and the book religion of fear. Be sure to watch our coverage of the southern festival of books starting at 11 00 on sunday at 1 00 on cspan2. Speaker plosive the house will be in order. Announcer the white house, the supreme court, and Public Policy events from washington, d. C. , and around the country, so you can make up your own mind, created by cable in 1979, cspan brought to you by your local cable provider. View. , your unfiltered next, a discussion of russiaukraine relations, hosted by the jon Hopkins School of events and international studies, and a former secretary of state for the Bush Ministry should talks about the conflict between the countries, the impeachment inquiry of President Trump, sanctions, and u. S. Military aid to ukraine. This is one hour and 15 minutes. I would like to welcome everybody to russia and eurasia seminar. We do it every two weeks. As you know, and today we, given the speaker we have and the topic hes going to deal with, we had the pleasure of welcoming cspan here, which is broadcasting this event, as far as far as i can tell, on cspan2. Im charles gati
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