Transcripts For CSPAN Nuclear Posture Review Part 1 20180217

Strategic command. Thank you very much. [laughter] i want to see how long you can stand to attention. Thank you. Its my pleasure to introduce my several of the u. S. Navy, a mariner who commands the following position. He assumed his current post as the 16th president of the National Defense university this past september. He will provide welcoming remarks. Hi. Thank you, john. General heighten, mr. Trachtenberg, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning and welcome to the National Defense university. It is my great pleasure to welcome you to this policy seminar on the 2018 Nuclear Posture review. Proud that wend are able to help facilitate discussion and debate on th e npr, and as a former commander of some of the Strategic Forces, it is particularly satisfying for me to be able to contribute to a discussion so fundamental to the nations security. It is a vital part of our mission to support the development of national policy, and we are proud of the great work our Research Staff does in support of key initiatives like the Nuclear Posture review and the defense strategy. Such Research Also helps to ensure we can bring the most topical content and the deepest insights into our classrooms. That is where we are helping to prepare the next generation of National Security leaders, drawn from across the services, the whole of government, and from our partner at allied nations, to build security for an increasingly dynamic world. I would like to thank the dedicated professionals of our centers for the study of weapons of mass destruction under dr. Chuck lutz for coordinating a Great Program for you this morning. Youll be hearing from the Key Stakeholders in the department of defense and from across government, from prominent subject Matter Experts and of course from the commander of u. S. Strategic command. You will leave here with a better understanding of these complex issues and their implications for National Security. Once again, welcome to you all, and best wishes for a successful seminar. [applause] thank you. My name is john caves. Either the Deputy Director of the centers for study of weapons of mass destruction here at the National Defense university. I would like to add my welcome. We are very pleased to host this event. Of last turnout is a test the significance of the Nuclear Posture review. It is about the foundation of the u. S. National security. Nuclear deterrence safeguards are most vital interests. At the admiral mentioned, you will hear from those who played key roles in developing the npr and who will play key roles in as well asntation, analysis and commentary from respected experts within and outside of government. David trachtenberg will provide a policy overview. Willal john heitman provide a command perspective on these documents. He will answer questions following his prepared remarks. Hisvite you to review biography in the handout. A seniorbernstein, fellow at the wmd center, and a person who put this event together, will moderate a discussion with senior officials on the secretary of defense, the National Nuclear security administration, and the state department distinguished fellow at the wmd center, among many other titles, will moderate a discussion of experts from within and outside the government who represent a range of views on nuclear matters. Heed thete and following administrative remarks. First, be sure to silence your phones or any other electronic devices. Please take a moment to do so if you havent had an opportunity yet. Event. A nonclassified most of this event will be on record. The final panel, however, will not be for attribution. What does this mean . From now until the end of the first panel, the one that mr. Bernstein will moderate, you may quote or otherwise attribute any statements made to the speaker who made them. They also may be filmed or recorded. You may notl panel, attribute any statements to the speaker who made them. The members of the press who are present and other members of the audience may not fillmore make audio recordings during that panel. You certainly can report on what was said during the final panel, but not who said it. We will reiterate this prior to the final panel. There will be two breaks during the event, the first following general heightens presentation, and during that break their will be refreshments available in the south atrium of this building, the same place they were available this morning. Willecond and final break follow the first panel. It will be a shorter break, and it will not have refreshments, so i recommend you stay close to the auditorium. Restrooms can be found right outside the auditorium. There are additional restrooms off the south atrium. We are on a tight schedule this morning, we want to get a lot accomplished the time we have, so please return from the brakes on time. You may hear all gong letting you know that the break is about to end. No food or beverages allowed in the auditorium, so if you brought them in, hide them. [laughter] goal is to adjourn at or close to 12 30. Recognizing that some of you may be hungry, the cafe will remain open until 1 30. Introducew like to the honorable david trachtenberg, deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. Mr. Trachtenberg assumes the current position this october. He is more than 35 years of Public Policy experience in the private sector in the executive and legislative branches of government, and is highly regarded in the National Security community. Mr. Trachtenberg . [applause] thank you very much, john. Good morning. Its a pleasure to be here at the National Defense university. I would like to thank president roti is the entire ndu team for the invitation to speak today, along with general heightam about the Nuclear Posture review. And thinking about how to structure my remarks, i was reminded about the old story about the gentleman who considered to be inexpert in a certain subject matter, he was told he would be a luncheon speaker who could speak for 15 minutes. He got very incredulous and upset and angry, thinking he was the worlds preeminent expert on the topic. How do youhis host, expect me to tell his audience everything i know about this topic and 15 minutes . To which his host responded, well, sir, i advise you to speak slowly. [laughter] with that in mind, i will try to speak slowly. Let me begin by noting that president trumps first president ial memorandum, issued one week into the new administration, directed the department of defense to undertake the fourth review of u. S. Nuclear policy, posture, and programs since the end of the cold war. That armitage offense, with significant input the department of defense, with significant input, conducted this review along with the department of state and energy, in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside the government. The resulting 2018 Nuclear Posture review is consistent with prior reviews in its definition of u. S. Nuclear roles and strategy. In fact, in many respects, the review reaffirms longstanding, bipartisan principles of u. S. Nuclear policy, while at the same time recognizing the reality that a much more challenging Nuclear Threat environment has emerged since the previous 2010 Nuclear Posture review. 2010 nprrs ago, the made several assumptions about the nature of the strategic that served as a foundation for its vision of achieving the global elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Unfortunately, none of those assumptions proved out. That served as a foundationfor example, first thr argued that u. S. Relations with russia and china had changed fundamentally since the days of the cold war, and it assumed that the prospects for military confrontations had declined dramatically. Second, it asserted that engagement could result in greater russian and chinese restraint in their Nuclear Programs and postures, which would reassure and stabilize the region. Third it stated that if the United States reduced the number weapons, that the rest of the world would move in the same direction, reducing the salience of Nuclear Weapons in international affairs. Fourth, it held that while the reassurance mission of u. S. Nuclear weapons remains, the deterrence challenge was fundamentally different. A Nuclear Arsenal built for stable deterrence of other powers had in the 2010 nprs words, little relevance to the challenge of preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism. Powers had in thethe world is s much different today than it was then. What we have seen over the past decade is the return of Great Power Competition, not necessarily a return to the cold war, but the emergence of a new, complex, and threatening security environment. In 2010, russia altered its military doctrine to state that nato was its top threat, a position it reiterated in 2014. That same year, russia invaded ukraine, supported a bloody secessionist civil war, and used military force to attempt to change longestablished borders in europe. Rather than reducing the salience of Nuclear Weapons, russian leadership made explicit Nuclear Threats, brandishing their Nuclear Weapons and away we have not seen a generation. Like russia, and is attempting territorial revisionism against its neighbors through the threat of the use of force. In 2011, china began its creeping militarization of the islands in the south china sea. China has also threatened u. S. Allies and partners in the region, and disputes over territorial boundaries and claims to contested island territory. At the same time, rogue states like north korea have repeatedly made explicit Nuclear Threats to the United States and our allies in the region. North korea is working aggressively to hold our homeland at risk. While Irans Nuclear future remains uncertain, its maligned activities and hegemonic aspirations in the middle east are not. Further, it is clear that our attempts to lead by example in reducing the number in salience of Nuclear Weapons in the world have not been reciprocated. Since the 2010 npr, russia, china, and north korea have increased the numbers, capabilities and salience, of their Nuclear Weapons, a topic which i suspect the general they discuss in greater detail. Restraintational reflected in u. S. Nuclear policies did not result in the rest of the world following the same path. Conclusion a unique of the 2018 Nuclear Posture review, but it is shared by our allies with whom we consulted extensively during this review, and by senior figures in the previous administration. Contrast to the actions of potential adversaries, the United States has dealt no new types of Nuclear Weapons or Delivery Systems other than the f35 for the past two decades. In fact, the members of Nuclear Weapons in the u. S. Arsenal has declined by more than 85 since its cold war height. We have instead sustained our Nuclear Deterrent with life extension programs, keeping systems and platforms literally decades beyond their designed service life. Former secretary of defense Ashton Carter rightly observed that if there is an arms race underway, the United States is clearly not a participant. Review0 Nuclear Posture prioritized preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism over the goal of deterring other Nuclear Powers. However, in this increasingly challenging threat environment, some potential adversaries may now have the mistaken belief that limited Nuclear First use threats or escalation could provide them with a military or political advantage. Responds not by changing longstanding tenants of Nuclear Policy that have bipartisan support, but by emphasizing those capabilities needed to correct adversary miscalculations, and thereby effectively deter the use of Nuclear Weapons. Regard, i would like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 Nuclear Posture review. The reprioritization of nuclear roles, the clarification of our Nuclear Policy, and the recommendations for deterrence capabilities, each of which has been subject considerable mischaracterization in much of the public commentary today. Npr returns018 deterrence of Nuclear Attack against us, our allies, and partners to the top priority of u. S. Nuclear policy. Given the changes in the security environment, this, we believe, is a prudent, realistic, and necessary change. Review8 Nuclear Posture makes clear that our new your posture must contribute our Nuclear Posture must contribute to deterring nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attack, assuring u. S. Allies and partners, achieving our objectives should deterrence fail, and hedging against the risks of an uncertain future. The npr also emphasizes that u. S. Nuclear policy will continue to contribute to u. S. Nuclear nonproliferation goals by maintaining support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and by sustaining the extended deterrent for allies. Extended deterrence, the socalled nuclear umbrella, promotes nonproliferation by reducing the need or incentive for allies to acquire their own Nuclear Arsenals. Second, to strengthen deterrence, the 20 and teen npr the 2018 npr notes that the u. S. Will only consider the use of Nuclear Weapons in response to extreme circumstances that threaten our vital interests. The npr clarifies what nonnuclear scenarios might fall into this category while maintaining a measure, a prudent measure of strategic ambiguity, intended to bolster deterrence. Contrary to some commentary, the Nuclear Posture review does not go beyond the 2010 npr in expanding the traditional role of Nuclear Weapons. What is important is not the means of attack that a potential adversary chooses, it is the extreme circumstances and strategic effect of the attack that will govern our choice of responses. As adversary nonNuclear Capabilities continue to advance, u. S. Policy must make it clear that nonnuclear strategic attacks that would have catastrophic effects on the American People and our allies must also be deterred. This clarification is not only consistent with the 2010 npr, which acknowledged the role for Nuclear Weapons in deterring butct nonNuclear Attacks, is broadly consistent with the policy of every administration from president truman forward. The intent is to enhance determinants by reducing potential for adversary miscalculation. Third, the 2018 Nuclear Posture review recommends to Nuclear Programs to strengthen u. S. Capabilities, to determine attack, and to ensure allies. First is the modification of a small number of existing submarine launched Ballistic Missiles to include a low yield option. Pursuit of a nuclear sea launched cruise missile. That is something the general may discuss in greater detail, but the point i would like to emphasize here is that neither of these capabilities outlined in the 2018 npr is new or lowers the threshold for nuclear use, which remains extremely high. These specific abilities are recommended to strengthen the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies, thereby helping to ensure that Nuclear Weapons are not employed or proliferated. Effective deterrence is about detailing our capabilities to a potential adversarys calculations regarding the use of Nuclear Force to ensure that it can never appear to be a useful option. Capabilitiess our relative to the doctor and, exercise statements, threat, and behavior of potential adversaries. The capabilities recommended arva 2018 npr are tailored to raise the threshold for nuclear use, and to do so with minimal changes to u. S. Nuclear posture. Me be clear, here the goal is to deter a war, not to fight one. If Nuclear Weapons are employed in conflict, it is because deterrence failed, and the goal of the 2018 npr is to make sure that deterrence will not fail. Modernization of the u. S. Nuclear deterrent, adoption of tailored to turned strategies with flexible capabilities, and clarifications of the roles of Nuclear Weapons ill send a strong deterrence message to potential adversaries while also reassuring our allies. Npr helpshe 2018 ensure that our diplomats speak from a position of strength. Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously about Nuclear Reductions without a robust and ongoing u. S. Modernization program. In fact, the 2018 npr calls for the modernization of all three legs of our Strategic Nuclear triad. Russian leaders have essentially said as much, that they have little incentive to negotiate seriously about further Nuclear Reductions. Secretary mattis recently testified, russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. Critics who favor eliminating u. S. Nuclear systems in the face of what is clearly an expensive Russian Nuclear modernization effort, i believe, are undermining americas greatest bargaining leverage in the prospects for future arms agreements. Review8 Nuclear Posture is one of several important, reinforcing u. S. National security documents meant to guide u. S. Policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world. Much as we might prefer otherwise, Nuclear Weapons are a regrettable necessity in the real world, as colin gray has said. After the slaughter of two world wars, they have prevented large power conflict for more than seven decades. This is not a trivial outcome. Era of renewed Great Power Competition, adversaries, the American People should know that the United States has the will and the flexible resilient Nuclear Forces needed to protect the peace. Before turning things back over host, id like to thank those here today at the national thense university for opportunity briefly to present the departments work and engage an informed discussion on these issues which i believe are nationsy vital to our security. Thank you all for your attention. I appreciate it. [applause] mr. Trachtenberg, you provided the essential policy context for our discussion of the n. P. R. Thank you very much for that. I would like to introduce our johnspeaker, general hyten, u. S. Air force, responsible for global command control of u. S. Strategic forces providing a broad range options for the president and secretary of defense. Hytens distinguished a variety ofes positions. Join me inome welcoming general hyten. [applause] general hyten good morning, everybody. Honorable trachtenberg, fritz, its good to be here. Much for giving me opportunity to come and peek to you about the Nuclear Posture review. Remarks will be focused on the Nuclear Posture review today. You heard me talk about a lot of just goingtoday im to talk about the Nuclear Business of our nation. It is one of the most significant things we do. It is the most significant thing my command does and after my remarks ill make sure i set questions sor well have plenty of time for questions at the end but let me it. Right to so, for seven decades, across 10 administrations, president s and leaders from both political agreed that Nuclear Weapons are the foundation for deterring nuclear and nonnuclear state aggression. Agreed that fourthur review of Nuclear Policy since n. P. R. D war and the 2018 reinforces and clearly defined long Standing National objectives regarding Nuclear Weapons. The review reflects significant andinuity in Nuclear Policy highlights the administrations strategic priority to maintain a effective Nuclear Deterrent to effectively deter attack, assure our allies and partners and respond decisively should deterrence fail, hedge against future dangers. It continues our commitment to fully Fund Replacement for the triad while underscoring nonproliferation arms control. Today ill give you my perspective on the n. P. R. And address the change in our strategic environment and how this Nuclear Posture review that change through a threat based approach. Fewll hear me say that a times. This is a threat based approach. Strategic, u. S. Command, is a global war fighting command. Of ultimate guarantor national and allied security. Our forces and capabilities all othernd enable joint force operations. Are disperseds bov and across the globe from abovepth of the ocean, the land and air and far into space and men and women of Strategic Command are responsible for an extraordinary breadth of missionaries operations,clear space operations, joint magnetic operations, and cyberspace at least for a little until the new commander of u. S. Cyber commander is confirmed but nearly 184,000 americans, soldiers, sailors, marine, civilians, support the commission providing security and allies every day and it is our Nuclear Force security. Pins that as a senior military was on and Combatant Commander with the responsibility for defending the United States,its allies and partners, i dont have the luxurion of dealing with the world the way i wish it was. To deal with the world the way it is. Lets look at the way the strategic environment has evolved over the past two decades. After the cold war, our nation, especially the department of defense, we changed the way we thought about the world and was whathe 1990s what i grew up with a threat based approach to dealing with our threatbasedthat approach to planning went away in the department of defense. 2001 quadrenniel defense review, the department of adopted a newly approach to dealing with the threats called capabilities planning. Lopment and the stated reason for this shift was a belief that there was no specific threat. Concept was the military could no longer know would pose future threats to National Interests capabilities the based model focused more on how the adversary might fight than who the advary might be and occur as a might functional requirement for driveional analysis to what we needed to do. There are two problems with this. First, especially with regard to nuclear challenges. There were indeed specific threats that did not go away. Our adversaries were clear about and capabilities and intent and announced them publicly. We threats were there but did not take them seriously. The second problem was the capabilities based planning adversaries very good insight into our own capabilities and allowed them to develop asymmetric approaches to counter them. Nowhere is this clearer than our business. In a 2008 paper coauthored by Energy Samuel of bodman and secretary of defense gates, they stated the world has great deal in the last decade and a half. Overold war standoff is and russia is no longer an ideological adversary. The same thought was reflected in the 2010 n. P. R. You heard about. Chtenberg speak russia has been clear about their intent all along. Russia began999, incorporating simulated limited larger weapons use in scale exercises to deescalate conflicts. Newly elected president Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine where the would allow for the use of Nuclear Weapons in response to large scale aggression with conventional weapons in situations critical defense of the nation. That year russia increased its budget 50 and began the shift to the use of nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons on the battlefield which they continue to emphasize in their doctrine today. On may 10, 2006, in a public address to the Russian Federal putinly, president announced sweeping modernization plans to its military including through 2020, saying he wants the nuclear by 2020. Modernized he said that in 2006, and in 2008 and 2010, we chose to consider them no longer a threat. Then in 2014, Russian Deputy minister dimitri regossen publicly stated the strategicion of the Nuclear Force was going faster than anticipated and they 100 of to modernize forces. Today russia continues to expand capabilities, including a Missile System that treaty. The ivan replacingprocess of theyre Nuclear Power missile submarines, as well. Modernizing cruise missiles ofently used in support combat operations in syria. Chinas also expanding and Strategic Forces at the same time. China was watching the United States during this period. Has the mostly active and diverse Ballistic Missile Development Program in and began the transformation 30 years ago but significantly increased the pace decade. Last the6klopment of Nuclear Capable Strategic Bomber gives china the ability to a Nuclear Triad for the first time. Chinesed improvement to Nuclear Submarines and Ballistic Missiles, and rapidly developing hypersonic glide capable capableabilities. Andadversaries are building operating these capabilities as a direct threat to the united is my of america and it job as a Combatant Commander to operate our current capabilities adversaries to advocate for future needs and provide military advice to our toions leadership in order best protect the United States and its vital interests. We, as a nation, have long desired a world with no or at least fewer Nuclear Weapons. That is my desire, as well. World, however, has not followed that path. Not reduced have the rule and salience of Nuclear Weapons, quite the opposite. The oppositejust so the only way i can see a change in our future is if the if ourchanges, adversaries change and unfortunately i see no immediate indications of that behavior. Nonetheless, i remain hopeful but until that day comes, we ready and must respond to the threat. From a war fighters perspective, theres tremendous consistency between the 2018 its predecessor. The biggest difference as it is with the recent National Defense strategy is a return to Great Power Competition and a return planning. Based so we start at the n. P. R. With a assessment of the threat, detailed assessment of the threat using all the available approachnce, based our on what our adversaries are doing today and increased challenges of the future. Theave to remember strategic environment is dynamic. It changes constantly. Approach to deterrence must be equally dynamic to address threats. There is no onesizefitsall for deterrence. We have tried that and it does not work. Tailor our approach to every potential adversary that requires us to flexible capabilities including a broad mix of yields modernize platforms to incredibly deter the spectrum of we faceies and threats today and in the future. This is what the n. P. R. Directs its critical to future defense posture. While deterrence in the 21st is based on the integration of all our capable ities across all do mains, our Nuclear Triad will for thathe basis deterrence. All three legs of our triad diversity, necessary flexibility and resilience. The n. P. R. Reaffirmed the need to continue the comprehensive nuclear recapitalization programs initiated by the administration including the columbia class submarine, ground grass longrent, b21 bomber, range Standoff Missile and andear stockpile Infrastructure Modernization program and pursues a series of to strengthen n. C. 3 and address 21st century needs and challenges so as we evaluated our Nuclear Posture, we found it is strong today. We have everything we need to address the threats of today but it is potentially lacking in the future. That if we do not act now within the next decade, unlike me, one of my successors might not have the appropriate flexible capabilities to give the president of the united to adequately deal with the uncertain and evolving security environment. Assure that ensure that no circumstanceer any believes they can achieve an advantage through limited Nuclear Escalation or other the n. P. R. Ttack, recommends pursuing additional capabilities that provides that and bolster the credibility of our deterrent ally directsfic modifying a small number of ballistic war heads to provide a low yield capability. These new capabilities provide and enhanceibility deterrence. It is important to note that weve had low yield nuclear aapons in our inventory for long time. We have them today. Exclusively air delivered. Our bombers with gravity bombs are auise missiles critical piece of our forestructure but cant be everywhere at the same time. So after a year of studying this challenge we determined that for additional low yield capabilities in other elements of our force to enhance of limitedrence nuclear use. Lown adversary employs yield Nuclear Weapons on a battlefield, the only option we have should not be just to go big. If they believe they can achieve objectives through limited use a Nuclear Weapons, we risk deterrence failure. A low yield submarine launch Ballistic Missile is survivallable, prompt and able risk targets. Low yield warheads would replace yield warheads. A nuclear as a launch cruise is an assured response capabilities, adding to the of options capable of being delivered at the the bying and tempo delivered the conflict. Considering that oceans cor70 globe, it provides additional regional presence, strengthening commitment to allies. Pursuing a sea launch cruise givele will take time but room for the diplomatic process to work and as the secretary to sett is our job conditions for diplomats so they can negotiate from a position of strength. Make no mistake, this does not lower the nuclear threshold. Its just the opposite. It increases the flexibility and capability of response, making weapon use less likely. Flexibilityedible, options, i believe well never have to use them but without adversary could begin a conflict neither want but if it toes, we have to be ready respond decisively and our adversary must know this. Prevent conflict is to be prepared for it. To be prepared to impose and deny anycost benefit that any adversary may perceive. That is deterrence. Ultimately, the morpdization triad and n. C. 3 along supplemental capabilities bolster our deterrence and respond to the threat. N. P. R. Defines and expands against what hedging against Nuclear Weapons. The security environment can change quickly. Technology is constantly evolving. Adversaries are seeking to use theirlogies to advance own capabilities. Hedging against an uncertain future means ensuring we are always ready, always confident, no matter what the future holds. Agile,quires an adaptable deployed force and responsive infrastructure and educated menned and women dedicated to the mission and postured for success as the flexibility to adjust the force with new capabilities and acquire systems quickly. Today our force is strong, powerful and ready but the pace of change and strategic demandsent is rapid and adapt how west operate to stay ahead of threats. What really worries me is this. Im afraid our country has lost the ability to go fast and if were to be successful in modernizing capabilities to respond to this threat, it will in the way changes we operate. Our budget, requirements, opposition, testing processes are all too slow. We have to get away from a culture that is risk averse and empower our people. We have to move fast once again. First we need a budget. Critical enabler for everything else. I was encouraged last week when congress agreed to a Defense Budget framework that provides Stable Funding for the next two years. That would be huge. But today were still under a continuing resolution. A budget will be incredibly helpful. Its essential but is just one areas to becal addressed. We need to fix our requirements process. Why does it take years to build of requirements . Right now i can grab three smart Matter Experts, sit down with a piece of paper and write down the requirements the next generation Missile Warning satellite, i know what are. I dont need three years analysis to do that and next is process. Ition if youre working opposition, acquisition, you should spend most of your time in the process. Program managers spend most of the time in the pentagon. I love the pentagon. [laughter] i dont blame our Program Managers. The process is forced on them. Spend their time in the pentagon because they have to get approval for everything. Theyre not authorized to make really any decisions. You cant execute a program that give our have to Program Managers the authority and responsibility to move fast them accountable. We need a test process that moves fast and fast does not mean reckless but we have to understand how to take risks and tests. Sometimes that means failures, thats ok. Failure sometimes is ok. Its how we learn and advance. A perfect example last week was and spacex, the commercial side of the business. Nerve this room probably saw the the falcon heavy and watched a cherry red tesla go off into nevernever land, the powerful operational rocket in the world. Moon rocketurn told deliver more payload orbit. Two minutes after liftoff, it touched down almost simultaneously but the center missed to the failure of two engines. The test, spacex released a statement and i quote. Even if we do not complete all the experimental milestones attempted during this test, we will still be gathering critical the mission. Ut ultimately, a successful Demonstration Mission will be of that by the quality information we gather. That is exactly right. Is why we test. Im not saying every time we we should fail. Just the opposite. But every test teaches us something, even when it doesnt go as planned. Finally, our operators need to takestand how to Operational Risk and be given the opportunity to do so when it comes. Iss interesting, risk inherent part of our business. Is the go to war, it ultimate risk calculation every day. We need to empower commanders to take logical risk about how to toloy weapons systems, how accept weapons systems. Our modernization efforts will not be successful if we only of these issues. We wont solve the problem. We need to fix all of these requirements,ets, risks to tests, make a difference. But there are signs of improvement. Congress is moving on the budget. The vice chairman, general are pushingrock, to accelerate the requirements process. Under secretary are pushing on the acquisition business. Good, itsst imperative. We have to move fast to respond to the threat. Isies and gentlemen, this all about the threat. So these are my thoughts. Rest of this day you have two really amazing panels. Some of the best and brightest thinkers on Nuclear Weapons and deterrence are here to talk to you and talk to you about Nuclear Capabilities, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Posture review but whether you are new topic, just starting out seasonedield, or a professional doing forever like , i hope you take the discussions you hear today forward. Voice to this issue. We need you to carry the water and broaden and advance the discussions of the threats we face today and deterrence in the 21st century. For listening. I look forward to your questions. [applause] thank you, general hyten. Provided a strong case for the policy addressed by n. P. R. And i expect there will be more than a few questions for the audience. I invite those who have for general hyten to line up behind one of the three microphones in the aisles. Please provide your name and organization and state your succinctly. Thank you, bob vince, s. P. A. Much forthanks so being here and thank you for your years of service and 184,000 personnel who work for you. Just a twopart question, about forward to get the funding in order to do two things. And for u. S. Response battles to hypersonic threat you mentioned from china and russia launch, airea launch, ground launch systems and whats the path to funding and development . And second, for a coordinated and funded program, really, for the need for a cyber secure Nuclear Command and system, National Command and control system . Complicated questions. Ill start from our secretary of ofenses discussion fourwordity and the answer from the secretary of defense is america can afford survival. The basic. When you look at our budget, the nuclear budgets going to grow from 3. 5 of our budget to 6. 5 the year tot over pay for these kind of pieces. As we look at the emerging have to not only look at at this time from a weapons ser spective and deterrence perspective but part of that is knowing what the threats are and right now we have challenges on sensor side with hypersonics in particular and a number of threats that are our adversaryies are going so were working with Defense Agency to look at the missile that inherently has a capability to not only a threatize environment against space but if you look back at earth you can dim targets like hypersonics and other weapons. We need to pursue sensor technologies, characterization technologies and the nuclear piece, asd control well. One of the big challenges we have moving forward in the only goodone of the things about our Nuclear Command and control posture right now, cyber secure because when you built it in the 1950s, significantt a cyber threat to worry about. Gbsd we go and look at coming online and colombia class upgrade we have to those so were spending a lot of detailed time looking with our Industry Partners at what it would take to provide a cyber secure Nuclear Command and control National Leadership and control capability Going Forward in the future. We have time to work those issues right now. We have put programs together in the budget to recommend going after those. The highest has attention that is secretary point number one focus in my business as a Nuclear Command and control piece and a biggoing after that in way. Thank you for the question. Thank you very much. Tom colina. The weapon goes to you proposed, the low yield trident warhead. As im sure you know about a decade ago, a Similar Program proposed by the defense establishment to congress for a conventional version, headononal war trident. That program was declined, rejected by congress because of concerns of discrimination, how someonee russians or else know that whats coming at is a conventional warhead. That problem seems to be with concept 10fold more. This weapon would be going at therussians as opposed to previous construct which presumably would not have been. This one will be nuclear as opposed to conventional. It will be low yield. Yes, but how would the russians so my question is how do the russians discriminate this low yield from a high yield therefore how do you prevent this from lowering threshold for increasing the prospect that the russians see this as a fullon Nuclear Attack respond with fullon retaliation. Through that, there are two pieces to that question. The first piece is about a for conventional prompt global strike. We still have a requirement for way. Capability, by the strike com supports the development of that as an option president of the United States. I support going down that path, as well. As you said, 10 years ago, when looked at the trident for that mission, that was not a good ambiguity that we thought. Trident of ant on low yield Nuclear Weapon does that problem. If the russians employ a low weapon on the battlefield and see something trident,t of the theres no doubt its nuclear. They just went nuclear and now response nuclear coming back. The question is how big is that response. In aboutwill find out 30 minutes. They will. Be a significant issue for them to understand because of theot a mass raid out middle of this country or out of submarines. A focused weapon and they characterize it. It does not have ambiguity. President an option to respond in a way that would better understanding of what is going on on behalf of the russians. See it as escalatory. I see it as a logical extension of our capabilities we should an option. Sent as Henry Kissinger had a great point recently. Hed looked at that scenario and he said if you dont have whatield capabilities, youre doing is putting the president of the United States in a position where his only are surrender or suicide. Thats not a good place to be. Those arent good choices. I dont like either one of those so we need these capabilities to appropriate, tarltd response to thank you for your question. The Nuclear Posture review suggests that something more might be required. That there might not only need to be a correction of the treaty violation, but the russians would have to reduce their detector there tactical Nuclear Weapons as well. Is this system a bargaining chip, potentially for inf . Flesh onut a little what the plans are for developing the system . If you dont go ahead with it, it is probably not going to be a very useful bargaining chip. I never want to speak for secretary mattis, because that can get me fired. [laughter] i did see his response yesterday to a similar question. I know that he does not like the term bargaining chip, and i dont like it either. These capabilities that we are talking about our responses to the threat that is out there. If that gives our diplomats the ability to than negotiate to then negotiate with our allies and we can negotiate a position, that is great. We are building them as a response to the threat. Now, i hope that our diplomats can use them to effectively locked down that path. In regards to buy enough, where also inf where also proposing increases to give abilities. Research and development is not prohibited by the inf treaty. What is prohibited is the employment and deployment of those weapons. Russia has deployed those weapons. Where are proposing that we will go down that research and development place. If they dont come back to the fold in inf, then we will be paired to respond accordingly we will be prepared to respond accordingly. Hopefully we can give our diplomats some room to move. Thank you. Thank you. General, thank you. He spoke a lot about russia. I want to talk about two questions. How do you make the determination that . Especially in the unclassified said that we are introducing more Nuclear Deterrent measures, much like what the u. S. Is doing at the moment. Cansecond question is, how the russians defend their Nuclear Arsenal . Thank you. I will say that there is an interesting dichotomy in our nation. Thing, but you do another. We listened very closely to what your president says. We listen very closely to what your leadership say, and then we watched very closely what your nation does. When we put those two things together, we see 2 things. We see a very mixed message on , but we also see a commitment to full modernization and capability, and a commitment to point a new doctrine to employing a new doctrine of Nuclear Weapons that is there that is a threat to the rest of the world. I am a military officer, im not a politician. As a military officer i have to look at what is real. I have to look at what is there, so we watch. Watch thehe tests, we capabilities, and we understand the employment of those forces. That is how we characterize the threat. That is why we recommend to our Political Leadership how to respond to that threat. Thank you. A couple of things. Have you asked space x for some recallable icbms . It might be an interesting one. Should china be part of any future arms negotiations . Gen. Hyten i guess there was three questions there. Does note, spacex like it when i talked to them of on top of their rockets weapons on top of the rockets. The china peace, im not a diplomat. I have to do with the threats. That is what i do with deal with. I would like china to be part of any discussion on the future. Look at the missiles that china is building. I would like them to understand their role. I would like them to understand what those kind of pieces are. I would like to have an aggressive dialogue between the state department and the Chinese Foreign ministry. I would like to have all of those things happen. That is not my job. My job is to deal with the world as it is, to deal with the world as it could be, and to be paired for those kinds of things that allow the state department to walk down that path. I really want them to go down that path. Reapers, how you use that is really not my lane. I dont know if you have looked strat struck him com force structure, but i dont do with that deal with that. Good morning. Npr. Could quote from the it says that dod is going to prioritize r d funding for rapid delivery of nuclear systems. Gen. Hyten can you slow down a little bit . There is an echo here. Yes. Dod is going to prioritize r d funding for Missile Systems. He tells what options you are looking at can you tell us what options youre looking at . Im just looking for a little more insight on the r d program. Gen. Hyten it is important to say that the npr does not summering crews launch missile. Everything from surface into summary, different into submarines, different types of submarines. The president s budget has requested us to go look at those platforms, and we are going to walk down that at. When you look at the other capabilities that were talking about for defensive systems, where looking at multiple options for defense. Eric, ground, c, where looking at a number of different options where, ground, sea, looking at a number of different options. Will have a groundbased element we will have a groundbased element, a seabased element. We have not made any commitment to any of those at this point. We are just recommending to the president s budget that we begin to explore this technologies these technologies. The npr in general, and your remarks this morning focused on capabilities that are going to be available through your successor, or your successors successor. Given the threatbased approach to planning, do you see a need, and is there money in the budget , to increase alert levels or be prepared on short notice to increase alert levels to have higher levels of Training Operations maintenance, and so forth . Gen. Hyten it is a fair question. And the Nuclear Posture review we look at those options. The icbm force is on alert. The bombers are not on alert and have not been on alert since 1992. The bombers are the most flexible leg. They give us a lot of capability from a deterrence and meshes perspective. Ging bombers fromthe todays adversary you cannot hide todays bombers from todays adversary. We like where we are right now. We believe it provides the proper deterrent approach. We still leave that decision with the president , the advice of the secretary of defense about when and where we would want to raise a look force of our bomber capability raise the alert force of our bomber capability. During his house hearing this week, admiral harris had mentioned that with the low m, meaning to look at the commandandcontrol for those weapons. Can you say whether dod is looking at an option like that . Gen. Hyten we have been directed in the Nuclear Posture , but we have also, if you read the language in the president s budget, that is one of the options that we have to look at. In many cases it depends on which platform it is on and how you want to set up that control structure. I have had the conversation with admiral harris and that will be part of the trade space as we go through. Let me walk to through what his thinking is. If we go down the path of a surface capability versus a subsurface capability, the theent command is through to go through those platforms. If we go through a subsurface capability, that capable that current command is part of strat com. That is the discussion that we have to have. That will be the trade space as a go through. That is why the budget is written the weight it is, in order to explore those concepts. If i could ask you the final question. It is about policy and capabilities. The question is fitting to this venue. Could you comment on the deterrence education to the successful implementation of the npr . Gen. Hyten i would love to talk about that. Especially looking at the people in the front row who have thought about that for their whole lives, but many people in our country have not. As i read the great deterrence , it goes theories back to the early 1960s. That is where the whole concept of deterrence for the United States really came from. Make sure you communicate that capability and be credible, all of those pieces are written in their. Those are all still valid concepts. The world of that time is not the world of today. The world of today is totally different. It is a multipolar world. It is not just one nuclear adversary, it is a multidomain world. We could have catastrophic events in space and cyber that could decimate our nation. We have to be able to prevent those. We have to integrate all of those capabilities together as part of our overall deterrence structure. It certainly starts with their Nuclear Capabilities with our Nuclear Capabilities. You are some good books out. There are some good books out. There is a lot of good things out there, but there is nobody that is really looking at this world multipolar, new that were living in as a deterrent peace. That is why education is so important. You have a great opportunity, because youre going to have 2 panels of the nations exports experts, both inside and outside the government. When you get to the outside of government people, those folks are going to tell you exactly what they think. There will be arguments, and that is awesome. That is what education is about. Education is about differences of opinion. Education is about learning and expanding her thoughts. Secretary mattis has learned a ton in his time about Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy. He reads incessantly. Everyhardest things time i am with him, it gives me nothing but literature. Im just trying to get to one a month. Education is critical to understanding where we live today. The doctrine that we came up with 50 years ago is still valid , but it is not current. ,e have to move into currency and we have to think about how the world is different, and what should we do that is different . What were talking about this conflict and war. This is the home of the national war college. It is the place where we think about war. Andington, caesar, churchill has said that the best way to prevent a war is to be prepared for war. Had we prevented how do we prevent it . How do we prevent that were from happening that war from happening . We have to be prepared for it every day. You are men and women sitting alert there are men and women sitting alert on top of our Nuclear Forces, ready to go under the order of the president of United States. There are some deployed in that atlantic and the pacific. There are live wrestles missiles ready to go. We have bombers that could be ordered on to alert literally with one phone call. They are ready every day. That is because that is part of the deterrence force. What is deterrence right now . I dont think it is deterrence in 1960, so that is why i think education is important. Thank you very much. [applause] welcome to the first working session of our morning. It is my pleasure to be moderating this discussion with a group of folks who are prime movers in the development of the Nuclear Posture review. I would not call this a panel. Were not in the traditional we are not in the Traditional Panel configuration. Person in a group will take 510 minutes to give the remarks