Madam secretary, could you please announce our agenda for this morning . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Good morning to you and good morning, commissioners. You will hear six items for your consideration and one presentation. First, you will receive a preliminary report from the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau on its investigation into the false Emergency Alert that occurred in hawaii on january 13, 2018. Second, you will consider a second report and order and second order on recon to enhance the effectiveness of emergency wireless alerts, including improving the geographic accuracy of these alerts. Third, an order addressing the remaining issues raised challenging the commissions order implementing the connect america option 903 in which Service Providers will compete to receive support up to 1. 98 billion to offer voice and Broadband Service in unserved, High Cost Service areas. Fourth, you will consider a Public Notice establishing procedures for the connect america funds phase two auction, which will award up to 1. 98 billion over 10 years to Service Providers that commit to offer voice and Broadband Services to fixed locations in unserved, high cost areas. Fifth, you will consider an order to accomplish an office of economics and analytics. Six, you will consider a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing to eliminate the requirement that broadcast licensees and permitees who routinely submit paper copy of contracts and other documents to the f. C. C. As specified in section seven 7 3. 6 of the commissions rules. And seventh, you will consider an enforcement action. This is your agenda for today. Please note item seven on the agenda, as listed in the january 23, 2018 sunshine notice, 54,tle amendment of hearts 73, 74, and 76 of the commissions rules to delete rules made obsolete by the Digital Transition was adopted by the commission and was deleted from todays agenda. First on your agenda today is a preliminary report presented by the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau, and lisa fowlkes, chief of the bureau will give the introduction. If you are ready, the floor is yours. Good morning, mr. Chairman, commissioners. Earlier this month, on the morning of january 13, people throughout hawaii were alerted on their televisions, radios, and wireless phones of an imminent Ballistic Missile attack. The warning unleashed widespread panic and fear. The alert was issued by the state of hawaii through the Emergency Alert system and the wireless Emergency Alert system. But the warning was a false alert. Compounding this problem, it took 38 minutes for the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency to issue a corrected alert. As chairman pai stated, this false alert was unacceptable. He immediately directed the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau to investigate the incident with the goal of understanding how it happened and how to help prevent such an incident from happening again. Americas Emergency Alert system s provide timely and lifesaving information to the public, and we must ensure that these systems remain effective. This includes maintaining the public confidence, so that when an Emergency Alert is issued, the public heeds its call. Today, the bureau presents a preliminary report on its investigation. Joining me here today are nicky mcguinness, Deputy Bureau chief and Homeland Security bureau, james wiley, an attorney adviser in the Communications Deputy chief of the bureaus Emergency Management division. These talented folks, along with the bureaus alerting team, has excellent work on this investigation, the wireless Emergency Alert that will be considered shortly, and my recent testimony before the Senate Commerce committee. All within a very, very, very short time frame. To nicky, james, and the rest of the alerting team, as well as the bureau who have helped on these projects in recent weeks, thank you. You have my pride and appreciation, and im grateful that you are a part of the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau family. I would also like to recognize ryan hagihara, field agent with the enforcement bureau, who assisted james and justin when they were on the ground in hawaii as part of this investigation. James will present the report. Thank you, chief fowlkes. Good morning, chairman and commissioners. As the chief said, on january 13, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency initiated a false Ballistic Missile alert using the wireless Emergency Alert system, which delivers alerts through television and radio. Investing the false alert, the has interviewed officials in person in honolulu and received a demonstration of how its alert Origination Software initiates alerts and tests. In addition, we have interviewed representatives of wireless providers that offer service to hawaii, the president of the hawaii Broadcasters Association and the hawaii state Emergency Communications committee, vendors, including the vendor other state and local emergency state Emergency Managers. So far, we have been pleased with the level of cooperation we have received, including from the leadership from the hawaii Emergency Management association. Unfortunately the individual who , transmitted the false alert refused to speak with us. Last week, the agency provided us with information from a written statement made by this individual shortly after the incident which helped to improve our understanding of the events that led to the false alert. By way of background and to provide context to what happened on january 13, hawaii has been actively testing its alert warning capabilities over the past year. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Ballistic Missile defense drill aims to simulate a real event. It begins with a mock call from an officer who simulates a call and ends with the transmission of a text message to fema. Under the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys established drill procedures, the text message should be sent to fema. It should never be transmitted to consumer phones, radios, or televisions. By november 27 of last year, Hawaii Emergency Management Agency had a check list of procedures for initiating and conducting the Ballistic Missile defense drill. It had been refined through practice and feedback on Lessons Learned. And the agency was regularly running the Ballistic Missile defense drill as a nonotice drill, meaning it was commencing the drill without prior warning to the officers who issue the alert in order to better simulate actual conditions. The final version of the check list provided to the agency through its Ballistic Missile defense drill on january 13 was created on january 5. I will walk you through a time line of the events as we understand them that led to the issuing of the false alert. In the Early Morning hours of january 13, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys midnight shift conducted Ballistic Missile defense drill without incident. The supervisor of the midnight shift decided to run a nonotice of the drill during the transition to the day shift. The midnight shift supervisor specifically decided to drill at shift change in order to help train the day shift warning officers for a Ballistic Missile defense scenario at a time when it would be challenging to properly respond. At 8 00 a. M. , hawaii standard time, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency conducted its regularly scheduled shift change. When the supervisor of the day shift entered the agency, the supervisor of the midnight shift orally communicated the intention to conduct the Ballistic Missile preparedness drill. But there was a miscommunication. The incoming day shift supervisor thought that the midnight shift supervisor intended to conduct the jewel for the midnight warning shift officers only, those that were ending their shift, not for the day shift officers, those beginning their shift. As a result, the day shift supervisor was not in the proper location to supervise the day shift warning officers when the Ballistic Missile defense drill was initiated. 8 05 a. M. , the midnight shift supervisor initiative the drill by placing a call to the day shift warning officers, pretending to be u. S. Pacific command. The supervisor played a recorded message over the phone. The recording began by saying, exercise, exercise, exercise. Language that is consistent with the beginning of the script for the drill. After that, however, the recording did not follow the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Standard Operating Procedures for this drill. Instead, the recording included language scripted for use in an Emergency Alert system message for an actual, live Ballistic Missile alert and included the sentence, this is not a drill. The recording then ended by saying, exercise, exercise, exercise. Three onduty warning officers received this message simulating a call from u. S. Pacific command on speakerphone. According to a written statement from the day shift warning officer who initiated the alert, as relate to the bureau by the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, the day shift warning officer heard, this is not a drill, but did not hear, exercise, exercise, exercise. According to the written statement, the day shift warning officer therefore believed that the missile threat was real. At 8 07 a. M. , this officer responded by transmitting a live incoming Ballistic Missile alert to the state of hawaii. The day shift warning officer used software to send the alert. Specifically, they selected the template for a live alert from a dropdown menu containing various live and test alert templates. Software then prompted the officer to confirm if they wanted to send the message. The prompt read are you sure you want to send this alert . Theofficers who heard wasage new the call supposed to indicate an exercise. Specifically, they heard the words exercise, exercise, exercise. The day shift warning officer seated at the alert of termination alert termination terminal however, reported after , the event their belief that this was a real emergency. So they clicked yes to transmit the alert. Because weve not been able to interview the day shift warning officer who transmitted the false alert, were not in the position to fully evaluate the credibility of their assertion that they believed there was an actual missile threat and intentionally sent to live alert as opposed to believing it was a drill and accidentally sending out the drill. But it is worth noting that they actually are called, that the announcement did say, this is not a drill. At a zero 8 a. M. , their mobile device of the officer who transmitted the alert sounded the warning signal, distinct audible tones that announce an a wireless Emergency Alert, providing the first indication to the watch center that an actual alert had been transmitted to the public. At 8 09 a. M. , the director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency notified Hawaii Governor that the david ige agency transmitted a false alert. At 8 10 a. M. , the director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency communicated to United States Pacific Command that there was no missile launch, confirming what Pacific Command already knew. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency also notified the Honolulu Police department there was no missile launch. Hawaii a. M. , the Emergency Management agency used its Emergency Alert system to issue a cancellation. The cancellation is an instruction to downstream Emergency Alert system and wireless Emergency Alert systems equipment to cease retransmission. Notably, a cancellation message does not generate an allclear message. It also does not recall messages that have already been transmitted and displayed on televisions and mobile phones. From 8 13 a. M. To 8 26 a. M. , the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency conducted outreach to hawaiis county Emergency Management agencies and radio and tv stations to inform them that the alarm was false. But the agencys phone lines also became congested with incoming calls from the public asking about the nature of the alert that they just received. Some calls to the agency did not get through. The agency also notified its staff of the false alert, so that they could help respond to community inquiries. At 8 20 a. M. , the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency posted on its facebook and twitter accounts that there was no missile threat to hawaii. At 8 24 a. M. , Hawaii Governor david ige retweeted the agencys notice that there was no missile threat. The governor has stated he was unable to do this earlier because he did not know his twitter password. At 8 27 a. M. , the agency staff met to discuss options for sending a corrective second message using the Emergency Alert system and the wireless Emergency Alert system. The agency determined that a correction of this false alert best met the criteria of a Civil Emergency message, which is one of the event codes used to initiate alerts over the Emergency Alert system. At 8 30 a. M. , the agency called fema, and on its second attempt to reach fema, reached a fema ipods Program Management office employee. Ipause Program Management office employee. After 45 seconds, all on the call agreed the correction met the criteria for use of the Civil Emergency message event code. At 8 31 a. M. , the deputy chief of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Telecommunications Branch logged into the agencys alert Origination Software and created correction messages for the Emergency Alert and wireless Emergency Alert systems. At 8 45 a. M. , 38 minutes after the false alert, the Agency Issued a correction over the two alerting systems. Based on our investigation to date, the bureau believes that a combination of human error and inadequate safeguards contributed to this false alert. With respect to human error, due to a miscommunication between the midnight shift supervisor and day shift supervisor, the drill was run without sufficient supervision. In speaking with the bureau, other Emergency Management agencies stressed the importance of proper drill supervision and conducting a drill without supervision would not be tolerate. Further, the midnight shift supervisor initiated the drill by playing a recording that deviated from the script of the agencys established drill procedure that included the phrase, this is not a drill. Finally, the warning officer at the alert origination terminal apparently failed to recognize that this was an exercise, even though the other warning officers on duty understood this was not a real emergency. With respect to inadequate safeguards, most importantly, there were no procedures in place to prevent a Single Person from mistakenly sending a missile alert to the state of hawaii. While such an alert addressed the matter of the utmost gravity, there was no requirement in place for a warning officer to double check with a colleague or get sign off from a supervisor before sending such an alert. Additionally, the state of hawaii appears to have been conducting an atypical number of nonotice drills, which heightened the potential for an error to occur. The bureaus investigation so far revealed that while other Emergency Management agencies use nonotice drills under special circumstances, the common practice is to schedule drills in advance for a set date and time. It is also troubling that hawaiis alert Origination Software did not differentiate between the testing and the live production environment. Hawaiis alert Origination Software allowed users to send both live alerts and test alerts using the same interface and the same login credentials after clicking a button that simply confirmed, are you sure you want to send this alert . In other words, the confirmation prompt contained the same language, irrespective of whether the message was a test or an actual alert. The confirmation prompt also did not offer the officer another opportunity to review the text that was about to be sent. Further, hawaiis reliance on prepared templates stored in their alert Origination Software made it easy for a warning officer to click through the origination process without sufficient focus on the actual text of the alert message he or she was about to send. In contrast, the bureaus investigation so far has revealed that common industry practice is to host the live alert production environment on a separate user selectable domain at the login screen or through a separate application. Other alert Origination Software also appears to provide clear visual cues that distinguish the test environment from the live environment, including the use of watermarks, color coding, and unique membrane. Once of the false alert was sent, the error was worsened by the delay in a authoritarian willie authoritatively sending a correction. The agency had not anticipated the possibility of issuing a false alert and failed to develop standard procedures for its response. It first sent out a corrective message using social media rather than the same alerting systems that it used to transmit the false alert. Indeed, the agency was not immediately prepared to issue a correction using these systems. The agency also did not maintain redundant and effective means to communicate with key stake holders in emergencies. The bureau was pleased that the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency has already taken steps to help ensure that an incident like this never happens again. It has created a new policy that supervisors must receive advance notice of all future drills. It will require two credentialed warning officers to sign in and validate the transmission of every alert and test. It has created a false alert correction template for Emergency Alert system and wireless Emergency Alert system messages, so that warning officers are more readily prepared to conduct excuse me, to correct a false alert should one ever occur again. It has requested that its alert Origination Software vendor integrate improvement into the next iteration of its software to more clearly delineate the test environment from the live production environment, helping to safeguard against false alerts. Finally, it has stopped all future Ballistic Missile defense drills pending the conclusion of its own investigation. That said, there is more work to be done. The bureau will continue its investigation and issue a final report, including recommended measures to safeguard against false alerts and to mitigate the harmful effects if they do occur. And once we have developed those recommended measures, we intend to partner with fema to engage in stake holder outreach and encourage implementation of best practices. Among other avenues, we are considering convening a round table in the Emergency Alerting ecosystem to discuss lessons that should be learned from this incident, as well as developing a joint webinar with fema to further educate stake holders. And of course, as always, the bureau stands ready to implement additional actions, as directed by the commission. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Wiley and ms. Fowlkes, for that presentation. We will now turn to comments from the bench, beginning with commissioner clyburn. Thank you. First, i would like to thank the bureau for such a very, very, very quick and comprehensive report. This an extremely serious issue , because the false Ballistic Missile alert in hawaii should be a wakeup call for all stake holders involved in Emergency Communications. We cannot simply dismiss this as being an inadvertent mistake that only Public Officials in hawaii need to address. This incident should and is, i hear, serving as a catalyst for every state and locality to review their Emergency Alert processes. Every community should be doing more to prevent an issuance of a false alert. But if and when a false alert is ever sent again, the Technical Capability to immediately send a correction should be in place, and the protocols on how to go about that should be clearly defined. Thank you. Thank you, commissioner clyburn. Commissioner orielly. Thank you commissioner clyburn. Commissioner riley. I want to say its astounding that no one was hurt in this instance, it could have been a cataclysmic catastrophe. One issue raised in the Washington Post article regarding the governor, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency responded to this Washington Post article saying we hope that commissioner oreilly would have waited until the report came out before commenting regarding the password. But nothing you responded today was says the article was inaccurate. The governor couldnt find his password and thats why he didnt respond . Thats whats reported in the news. Michael i watched your testimony in the senate, it was helpful in delineating whose responsibility is whose. Fema has responsibility for preparation of notifications and our responsibility is to make sure the notifications work from the Communication Company side going out. Is that accurate . Is that consistent with your testimony . Lisa the f. C. C. Is responsible for communications. Fema has public alert and Warning Systems which is it aggregates alerts coming from the alert originators this estate and local governments decide what the note when to issue the alert over what systems, and when those alerts would be issued. Michael but communications companies, when i read your good work on that steps, a lot of these steps seem to be femas responsibility is that not act at . When it says things, you know, you mention stake holders round table is a possibility. Best practices are mentioned here. And safeguards were false alerts. Thats allen femas responsibility. Whether they did it or didnt do it in overseing the state and local, thats not Communications Company. The Communications Company side worked well. The information did get out. Whether it was false information or accurate information, it did get out. The companies themselves did their job, is that accurate . Lisa yes. Michael so on the fema side, looking at the statute that governs this, their responsibility is all of that and its not our responsibility, is that a fair lisa from a statutory perspective yes. Michael thats our top level, statutory perspective lisa but what we said in this presentation as well as what i had said in my testimony is that all the stake holders involved need to do their part to address these types of issues. The f. C. C. Is simply performing its part. For example, the f. C. C. Has in the past served as a convenor of stake holders to identify Lessons Learned and best practices. Weve also taken into account feedback received from state and local governments and fema in terms of the policies that we adopt. Michael on the last point there, there is a stake holder Advisory Committee created in the law, right that fema operates . And youre a member of that . So they have the authority for a another couple of years for convening that as they see fit, its only 18 months old. Lisa they have thats they have a committee they set up under statute. Dealing with their system. Michael one last question. Listening to the presentation, its right to say that one of the supervisor of this entire project was at home at the time. Is that accurate . 8 31, the supervisor logged into the system, he was at home at the time . Is that accurate . May we follow up with you on that point . Michael sure. Thank you, commissioner orielly, commissioner karr . Brendan imagine what youd do if at this moment on your phone you received the following message, Ballistic Missile threat inbound. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill. Who would be the first person to that youd call . You what would you say . And what would you do when the intervening 38 minutes between getting that message and getting another one saying that the first one was false . Many residents of hawaii dont have to imagine that scenario they lived through it. Many of them thought those 38 minutes were their last ones. The panic and fear and heartache of those 38 minutes we now believe was due to human error. But also deficient preparation and training. No one should have to go through moments like this. Especially if basic competency would have prevented them. The people of hawaii are justifiably livid. They demand answers and so do we. I commend the chairman for immediately beginning an investigation into what happened in hawaii on january 13. I think the Public Safety i thank the Public Safety and hemland Security Bureau for the work youve done and testifying on this issue and doing it all so quickly. It shed a lot of light on whats already transpyred. We will get to the bottom of this incident and its incumbent on all the relevant agencies of our government to make certain that this doesnt happen again. So thank you again for all your diligent work on this, for the findings you have put together. I look forward to continuing to work with you all on this matter. Thanks. Thank you, commissioner c a arr. Commissioner . Years ago i had the privilege of working with the people of the state of hawaii when i served as counselor to the late senator daniel inouye. I know the residents are resilient and im sure their aware of new threats in the pacific. When this incident occurred i reached out to folks in hawaii who i had worked with in the past in order to try to understand just what had happened. And they had only harrowing tales to tell. Imagine knowing you had only minutes left to live before everything you hold dear could be destroyed. What would you do . When this threat was over im sure people in hawaii held their children a little closer. I know i did the same that night. As senator brian shave said, this system failed miserably. We need to improve it and get it right. Amen. So lets get to work. And that work starts with the preliminary report we produce today. This is thanks to the chairman calling for an investigation which is the right thing to do its also thanks to the efforts of our talented Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau. What your work reveals is that at many level this is could have been avade and effects could have been mitigated. We need to take these facts and use them to improve our Emergency Alert systems across the board. We can start by considering how this agency can help develop best practices at the local, state, and federal level. Then we need to incentivize their use through the Emergency Alert system state plan which are subject to regular filing around review at the f. C. C. While were at it, we should address everything from state training to improved user interfaces that reduce the likelihood of error. In addition, we should explore the viability of offering these alerts to audio and Video Streaming Services and the possibility of aligning traditional daisy chain reporting practices with newer federal alert aggregation capabilities. But above all, we need to act with dispatch. We need real changes in place on an accelerated schedule. We should commit right here, right now, to having them in place before the summer begins. Because what happened in hawaii should never happen again. Thank you, commissioner. As we heard, the only things that struck the island on january 13 were panic and then outrage. Rightly so on each count. That leads to two key questions, what went wrong and what needs to be done to stop a future mistake from happening . Those are the two questions i asked the Public Safety bureau to immediately investigate when i initiated this investigation on january 13. As todays preliminary reports demonstrate, the bureau has made a lot of progress in less than 2 1 2 weeks, very busy weeks. The presentation this morning also makes clear that many things went wrong in hawaii. We talk to as we saw from the power point. I dont say this for the purpose of casting blame or disparaging hawaiian official bus we need to identify the problem in order to fix them. Not just in hawaii but anywhere elsewhere they may exist in this country. In my view, the two most troubling things that our investigation thus far has found is that number one, hawaii the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency didnt have reasonable safeguards in place to prevent human error from resulting in the transmission of a false alert. And number two, hawaiis Emergency Management agency didnt have a plan for what to do if a false alert was transmitted. Every state and local government that originates alerts needs to learn from these mistakes. Each should ensure that it has adequate safeguards in place to prevent the transmission of false alerts. I and each should have a plan in place for how to immediately correct a false alert. This is important because the public needs to be able to trust that when the government issues an Emergency Alert it is indeed a credible alert. Otherwise people wont take alerts seriously and respond appropriately when a real emergency strikes and lives are on the line. Todays preliminary report, as mr. Wiley pointed out is not the end of our work on this issue, but rather the beginning. In ethe weeks to come the bureau will produce a final report on this incident. The f. C. C. Will work with federal, state and local officials to ensure best practices. We want to minimize the chances of future false alerts being issued as well as the impacts of any such false alerts. I too, would like to thank the witness who was cooperated with our investigation. I also want to thank senator brian shoths and congresswoman Coleen Hanabusa of hawaii for speaking with me on that day and days subsequent, and most of all, i would like to thank the bureaus staff for the expertise, tenacity and speed they have brought to bear on this task. James reilly and justin kaine were dogged on the ground investigators in hawaii. They have been ably assisted by many others. Thanks to all of you for your hard work and thanks in advance for the efforts to come. With that, madam secretary, would you please announce the next item on todays agenda. Mr. Chairman and commissioners, the second item on the agenda, wireless Emergency Alert, rules regarding the Emergency Alert system, will be presented by the Public Safety and Homeland Security, once again, lisa fowlkes, chief of the bureau, will give the introduction. Thank you, madam secretary. Ms. Fowlkes, whenever you and your team are ready. Lisa thank you, good morning again. The Public Safety and bureau is pleased to report a second report in order and second report for consideration that would enhance the effectiveness of wireless Emergency Alerts. When the the wireless Emergency Alerts program launched in 2012, participating wireless providers were generally required to send alerts to a Geographic Area no larger than the county or counties affected by an emergency. Oftentimes, however, an emergency affects an area smaller than a county. To address that, as a last as of last november, all participating wireless providers are required to transmit alerts to a Geographic Area that best approximates the area affected by an emergency even if its smaller than a county. Todays order would improve accuracy further by requiring wireless providers by delivering alerts to an area that matches the target specified by originators with an overreach of no more than one mile. This would allow them to send alerts to only those phones located in areas affected by an area without disturbing others. Recent natural disasters in texas, california, and puerto rico, among other places, have demonstrated the need for Public Safety personnel to communicate potentially lifesaving information to targeted areas, including orders to evacuate or shelter in place due to wildfires or hurricanes. The enhanced geotargeting requirement before you today would allow for the kind of precise alerting, prevent overalerting and encourage the use of wireless alerts during times of crisis. If adopted, this and other improvements in todays order would make wireless Emergency Alerts even more effective tool for Emergency Managers to keep their communities safe. Gin joining me at the table are niki mcginnis, megan henry and james wiley, attorney advisors in the communications and reliability division, and dr. Rasul sabian, of the bureaus policy and linetsing division. I want to thank other bureaus and offices in the agency, particularly our colleagues in the office of general counsel who provided their expertise and counsel throughout this process. May began will present the item. Megan thank you, good morning chairman and commissioners. As chief fowlkes explained, todays second report and order takes important step to improving the wireless Emergency Alerts or wea as a lifesaving tool. It would require them to providers to deliver wea messages to an area that matches the target area specified by the alert originator. We define that as delivering an alert message to 100 of the target area with no more than. 1 of a mile overshoot this requirement would apply to all new twices and all existing devices that are capable of being updated to support this match standard. We expect that participating wireless providers would match the target area in all instances except where theyre technically incapable of doing. So in those very limited circumstances, for example, when a consumer turns off the Location Services on their device, wireless providers would be required to best approximate the target area. In recognition of the urgent need to ensure that members of the public receive only the alert messages that are relevant to them and to give Emergency Managers the tools to communication lifesaving information to those specifically affected by an emergency, we would require participating requireless providers to comply with this rule by november 30, 2019. The order would also adopt new consumer Disclosure Requirements to ensure that members of the public are aware of the availability and benefits of enhanced geotargeting at the point of sale. Second, the order would require wireless providers to preserve wea messages on mobile devices for at least 24 hours or until they are deleted by the user. Preserving alert messages on the device will allow members of the public to go back and review lifesaving information such as location of shelters and supply distribution units and emergency hotline numbers. This capability is especially important given the commissions recent adoption rules that allow for longer wea messages that include clickable links and phone numbers. Third, the order would define what constitutes in whole and in part participation in wea. Wireless providers would participate in whole if they provide wea service on all the mobile devices they offer at point of sale and the entirety of their Geographic Service area. They would participate in part if they provide wea service in some but not all of their owe Graphic Service area or on some but not all the mobile devices at point of sale this will help provide clarity to industry, Emergency Managers and the public about the availability of wea service. Finally, the second order on reconsideration would allow the deadline for implementing Spanish Language for reporting along with longer, 360character length messages. And we recognize alerts in spanish can require more characters than equivalent alerts in english and this will allow wireless providers to conduct Software Testing for these two features at the same time. The bureau recommends adoption of the items and asks for editorial privileges only to conforming edits. Thank you. Whether its text to 911, wireless location accuracy or promoting thery liability of Public Safety Communications Approach when it comes to Public Safety issues has been shaped by three guiding principles. People with accessibility and access challenges must benefit, we should do all we can to educate consumers about these safety benefits, and collaboration among all stake holders works better than litigation. Frederick douglass, one of the most influential africanamericans of the 19th century is known to have said, if there is no struggle, there is no progress. With africanamerican History Month just days away, i find this to be a particularly fitting quote to aptly describe most of the Public Safety proceedings i have participated in over the past eight years. Typically, proceedings start with a Commission Setting an ambitious goal to improve these services. Then in many cases, the Communications Industry pushes back on certain details. This is followed by the five of us not agreeing on all the policy details. But in the end, these struggled and collaboration amongst stake holders have resulted in progress and improvements to Emergency Communications. The same can be said for wireless Emergency Alerts or wea. Wire lescariers voluntarily participate and the wea system enables authorized alert originators at the federal, tribal, state, and local levels to warn the public about all levels of emergencies. First deployed in april of 2012, and thanks to the collaborative effort by industry and the Public Safety community, the wea system has issued more than 33,000 Emergency Alerts. We have worked over the past few years to more precisely target those alerts to cell phone users located in the exact area where the emergency exists. The risk here is that those who repeatedly get alerts which are not relevant to them may one day ignore an alert that directly impact theirs safety and that would be extremely unfortunate. This is why back in september of 2016 we sought comment on requiring the industry to go beyond the current geotargeting stan dand and more closely match the target area that an alert originator transmits. That further noted notice demonstrated again despite differences on specific policy details, my colleagues and i considered the industrys challenges and worked toward supporting this goal. Todays order marks an important milestone because it follows through on the previous a administrations enhanced geotargeting proposal and requires the industry to meet the enhanced standards by november 30 of 2019. I must admit that i had concerns about certain aspects of the draft originally circulated earlier this month but i am pleased to report that i can now in him support the item because will we were able to compromise on a few key areas. The order originally stated that a participating wireless companys net work infrastructure could resort to a less accurate standard if it were incapable of matching a target area. A i was concerned the term could become a loophole. My leagues agreed to a request to clarify that technically incapable does not include circumstances when a carriers own failure to adequately maintain or upgrade its network or devices makes it unable to meet this standard. I want to commend the new york city Emergency Management office and others for the strong advocacy on this issue. In addition, the original draft order did not amend the subscriber notification rule to keep pace with the technical changes we are adopting today. Currently, consumers must be notified at point of sale if Wireless Companies do not offer him weas at all or if they offer him weas only in part. If we really believe that more precise gee y targeting alerts are important to keep people safe, then we should give all wireless customers the ability to choose more precise geotargeting devices and services. Consumers cannot make that choice if they do not have adequate notification. So i thank my colleagues for agreeing to amend the rule to make clear that consumers must also be notified about the extent to which Wireless Companies offer enhanced geotargeting alerts. Finally, i was concerned that the initial draft had no mention of multimedia information in wireless Emergency Alerts. A the september, 2016 further a notice specifically sought comment on this issue and the new york City Emergency Commission made a compelling case it would have been very helpful if the alert about the Chelsea Bombing in 2016 had included a photo of the suspect. So i asked that the item include a further notice on multimedia information in these alerts. Although my colleagues would not agree to further notice, i am pleased that they are willing to support directing the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau staff to issue a Public Notice to further develop the record on the subject. So far, the reasons i have so for all the reasons i have stated this order has my support. I thank lisa fowlkses and the dedicated staff for their work on this order and my colleagues for working with me on such a critical plo seeding. Thank you. Thank you, commissioner clyburn. Commissioner orielly. Michael everyone should be able to agree that providing agencies with the ability to pinpoint wireless Emergency Alerts to specific areas where there isnt a threat is an incredibly useful function. Public industries are supportive of this and so am i, therefore im generally in favor of todays order. A my concerns center on the need to mandate technologies before they are ready. The notice that led to todays item along with the commissions Communications Security reliability and Interoperability Council csric, recommended it should occur 42 months after adoption of the commission order. The Wireless Industry said they could probably then do it faster and suggested 36 months. Todays item adoptance inexplicable 22 month timeline based on new record evidence it is achieveable. Jl though providers stated theyll try to meet this aggressive guideline they also stated it will be incredibly challenging. The stars must align just right to make this happen in this time. While i understand the Public Safety entities want geotargeting now, you cannot wish technology into existence. As the record reflects, further consideration is needed regarding how to effectuate geotargeting including such basics as the need for software or hardware changes and updated an new standards this doesnt happen overnight. In fact the standards bodies are still finalizing the last set of wea changes including Spanish Language messages and 360 character alerting requirements. Before these are completed and geotargeting relies on the ability to send these longer alerts were adopting new rules that will add additional requirements for standard setting bodies to work out. A based on the draft made public, the alliance for Telecommunications Solutions recently identified 25 standards that must be modified or invented to meet these standards. Hopefully this will be the end for a while but one of our and for a while but one of our targets should be setting standards for 5g. I also want to be clear the industry should be given the him industry should be given the opportunity to figure out the best means to figure out geotargeting. It is paramount that industry ensures that whatever means or technology they pick is tested and works. They should not be forced to cut corners or pick a lesser shution to meet an aspirational deadline. In we went down this road for him phase 2 location accuracy and it didnt work out well. Therefore if standards are delayed and Industry Needs more time to successfully deploy geotargeting ill be supportive of extending the deadline. For this reason, im please the chairman agreed to my request to add language to the item that the commission will entertain a waiver of the 22month deadline if the standards process is prolonged. Ultimately we must remember this a voluntary program and we dont want providers opting out because they cannot meet standards and integrate this functionality in 22 months this brings me to the costbenefit analysis. I remain skeptical of the flawed value of a statistical life metric, i appreciate the efforts by the Chairmans Office and staff to improve this part of the item. Going forward, we should work toward improving costbenefit analysis to ensure that they are based in fact and there that there is actual proof or a high probability that the stated benefits will accrue from the burdens we impose. I hope under the new office of economic and analytics which we established in a separate item today, we can work on a framework in which any proposed rule must be shown to have a statistically significant likelihood of correlation or causation to suggested benefit. Further, i want to thank the chairman for incorporating some of my additional edits such as adding language to ensure devicebased insurance was in the 360 characters. I want to thank the staff for all of their hard work theyve dedicated to to this issue, especially given their intense focus on the other issues in hawaii over the last many weeks. I thank you so very much. I will vote to approve the item. Thank you. Commissioner carr. Brendan wireless Emergency Alerts save lives from a National Weather Service Warning about an approaching hurricane to amber alerts that bring a child home, safely. Emergency managers have sent more than 33,000 alerts aimed at keeping the public safe. But an ineffective wea system is no system at all. If Emergency Managers cannot count on a system to deliver their messages on time and to the intended area, or if the public loses trust in weas reliability, officials and the public will opt out. And a system that delivers few alerts to a dwindling audience becomes an afterthought rather than a lifesaving tool. Recent events in california, and hawaii, remind us of the urgency of improving wea. The massive wildfires that swept through Northern California an in october caused the evacuation of tens of thousands of residents. The wea system was designed for precisely this sort of situation. When lives and property are at stake. When a large number of americans need to receive instructions and when time is of the essence. If there are reports that officials in california chose not to use wea because it lacks precise targeting. They feared the unintended consequences of alerting too many residents and telling them as we just heard, the report of false alert in hawaii resulted in 38 minutes of panic and confusion, so we must continue to exercise our oversight authority. Our experience with wea over the last five years and the significant submissions from the Public Safety community in the record support the commissions actions today. Weas match the target area, reduce the overwarning an warning fatigue, we require that messages be preserved for 24 hours is the public can review and share alerts after theyve been sent and we provide guidance on how Legacy Networks and devices can continue to comply with the rules. In selecting new deadline the commission has attempted to balance the urgency we all feel to improve the wea system with the speed at which technology an standards are developing. Im confident the commission will continue to work with all stake holders on implementing these upgrades and do so based on the recognition that working quickly and effectively together will save lives. Thank you to the staff of Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau for your work on this item, im pleased to support it. Our Emergency Alert systems were designed for war and then used for peace. In the wake of these september 11 attacks, we reimagined them again. A powerful tool to send messages to people in imminent danger. 90 characters to the right person at the right time in the right place can mean the difference between life and death. These messages have already saved countless lives and helped divert many more tragedies. This past year, however, exposed too many shortcomings in our Emergency Alert systems. We saw this quite clearly earlier this month with the harrowing false alert announcing a Ballistic Missile attack in hawaii. On top of this, last year was one of the most devastating on record for natural disasters in the United States. California experienced its most destructive and largest wildfire season, burning 1. 2 million acres of land. And killing 46 people. Hurricane harvey shattered rainfall records for a single tropical storm, flooding parts of texas with more than four feet of rain. Puerto rico is still recovering from when Hurricane Maria made landfall on the island four months ago. More than 1,000 people died in the storm and its aftermath. 30 of the island remains without power. And puerto rico is still waiting for a report and plan for Communications Recovery from this agency. In too many cases last year, wireless Emergency Alerts failed to perform. In california and texas, Emergency Services were unable to trabs mitt these messages these messages because they were unable to target them accurately enough to ensure that they would help those in danger and not cause panic beyond the broader area of concern. Thats troubling. Moreover, its a problem when repeated impression imprecision of these alert cause those who receive them to disregard warnings and wever seen this happen in areas where tornado sirens have been sounded too many times over too large of an area, overstating the scope of danger. Thats why in november of last year, i urged the f. C. C. To act swiftly to require more granular targeting before the next disaster compels us to do so. For this reason, i fully support the actions the agency is taking today. The rules we adopt here can significantly increase the precision of wireless Emergency Alerts. As a result, they reduce the danger of overalerting, making their use more effective, more efficient, and more likely to save lives. Its important that we do not stop here. We need to watch tech nickal technical issues impacting the targeted availability of wireless Emergency Alerts and be on guard for ways these issues can be resolved so that everyone gets the emergency warning they need. We also need to consider multimedia use in alerts, many to one feedback and multiling wadge messaging. The effort on these is already robust. Lets do something bold. Lets take them on now before the next disaster or crisis compels us to do so. Thank you. Thank you, commissioner. When disaster strikes it is essential that americans in harms way gets reliable information so they can stay safe and protect their love ones. The wireless Emergency Alert system, wea, is one important tool for Emergency Managers to quickly convey such information , such as tornado warnings to the public on their mobile devices. Since we became operational in 2012, its been used over 33,000 times. Recently, wea was used four times in response to wildfires in Northern California 16 times more in wildfires around los angeles. Wea was also used extensively in all areas affected by recent hurricanes, including 21 alerts sent in puerto rico alone. But weve heard that many jurisdictions are hesitant to use wea because it lacks granularity. That is, people may receive the alert even though theyre located well outside of an affected target area. Overbroad alerting can cause public confusion and cause some to opt out of receiving alerts altogether, and it can hamper rescue efforts by overloading call centers or causing traffic. People shouldnt miss out on potentially lifesaving information because the Alert Systems current brush stroke is too broad. This morning, we address this problem by bringing a finer brush to bear on the canvas. Todays report in order requires participating wireless providers to deliver alerts to match 100 of the target area that overlaps with the wireless Providers Network coverage area. With an overshoot of no more than than one tenth of a mile. This will help channel alerts to americans who need them. And equally important this will give originators the assurance they need to reline wea as a valuable tool to help save lives. Indeed, among the many Public Safety officials who was endorsed this approach, Harris County deputy Emergency Management coorduator Francisco Sanchez said this rule, and i quote, will be the single most important improvement to the nations air lerts and warnings infrastructure in years. I understand that theres some division over the rules over the rules november, 2019, implementation deadline. Some say the schedule is too aggressive. Some say its not aggressive enough. I think its just right. On this Public Safety matter, i favor an approach that i believe is aggressive and achievable. In my view the record indicates the november tissue that november, 2019, meets this test this rule, coupled with other improvements we adopt today, enabling consumers to retrieve alerts for 24 hours after they are received, clarifying the difference between providers participating in wea in part rather than whole, an and harmonizing the deadline for implementing Spanish Language alerting with a deadline for implementing longer 360character length messages, all of these things will strengthen the wea system and keep america safer. I would like to thank the staff of the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau for all the hard work and the commitment to serving the public they have shown. Rochelle kelvin, greg cook, megan henry, niki mcginnis, emily, an of course james wiley. From the office of general counsel, thanks to david horowitz. With that, we move to a vote on the item. Commissioner aye. Aye. The chair votes aye as well. Thanks for the great work. Thanks, tina, very much. I will have a few comments and be happy to take your questions. Today the sec took a major step forward in improving our wireless Emergency Alert system
comparemela.com © 2020. All Rights Reserved.