Itmr. Chief justice and may please the court, that ninth sister error the ninth district and word. The definition of crime or violence is unconstitutionally vague. There are two reasons. First, the standard for assessing vagueness is not the one applicable live in criminal cases. Immigration removal is not a punishment for past conduct. It operates under which the standards and alien is no longer conducive. Mr. Kneedler, if you are making the decision, this court has had a number of decisions saying that line is not so rigid. For example, taking away parental right. As in a criminal proceeding for an antigen party, the state must use a transcript. A rigiduld follow criminalcivil. Then it is civil, no free transcript. But the court said the line is blurred when there is such a consequence. A grave consequence to be denied parental rights. Unitedemoved from the states. Our submission is not just distinction between criminal but we think the court established there is a difference. The important points are immigration is distinctive. Repeatedly said he even not might be regarded as a harsh result. It is not punishment for past offenses. Congress has determined the presence of the individual and the United States is no longer conducive to the welfare mr. Kneedler, does that permit arbitrary removal . Can they walked down the street, the immigration officials, and just say i dont like the way you look or co so whether it is criminal or civil, is it arbitrary . Standard,nder any this is vague. I know you are saying it is not arbitrary for a bunch of Different Reasons but please explain to me on the two grounds ordinary caseed, or type of risk, how this is not equally arbitrary. Mr. Nagler there are a number of reasons we think that is true. It was the sum of the residual clause that created the problem. Whatever might be the problem with one of those, it was the combination. I thought it was only two. They were critical attributes of the two. That is the point. I am quoting. Two conspired to make it unconstitutionally vague. Then there is a clear hole in your sentence later on the knee opinion where it basically tells you what the two aspects are they were talking about, it says combining determine as the and it indeed terminus in about how much risk it takes for it to qualify for a violent felony. It has arbitrariness in the due authorized. So that is number one. Adinary Case Analysis and fairly fuzzy standard as to the threshold level of risk. I guess the question is, are those two factors any different here . Mr. Kneedler they are very different here. It relied on the features we believed our critically distinguished from the residual clause. Right . Tatutes, know, but they operate in very different ways. It is a way of saying the elements do not have to match up like 16a. 16b addresses those situations in which the elements of the offense involves substantial risk even though it is not actually an element. Under the residual clause, the ordinary Case Analysis was not relevanthe text of the provision as it is here. The three provisions in the ordinary Case Analysis that are here that were not present there, we look to the nature of the offense by its nature. This case as you look at the elements into the nature of the offense. Substantial risk of physical force being used. Not that injury might result on the road but physical force, which this court said is a focused inquiry and specifically distinguished of possibility that harm might result. In footnote seven, it is establishing guidelines that use the language of the residual clause and say, this is not 16 bended like that and says the substantial risk asked to arise in the course of the commission of the offense, which is tied temporarily to the actual conduct of the offense and functionally, does the substantial risk at here to the elements of the offense . So how did those two things change the definition of what an ordinary case is . Understandme that i burglars actually go into in occupied home is very little. It is probably less than 10 in someone. Y confront probably smaller amounts when the actually use force against that person. Lots of burglaries are done with open doors or with jimmy without injuring a lock. How does any of those two things you have mentioned, how do they change what constitutes an ordinary case for burglary and what the substantial risk of these physical force or injury mr. Kneedler starting with the text of 16 b, you look at the nature of the offense. Inherent in those elements, a substantial risk that force will be used. So looking at her glory, what is the nature of the offense with respect to the risk of harm, excuse me the risk of force, natureurt said that the of the offense there is that the burglar will encounter someone if it is risk of force against a person that the offender will encounter someone while committing the offense. Exactly that in johnson, and said the ordinary case and the risk of force or you ares something that leaving to the judges intuition. With respect, Justice Scalia is opinion in johnson were james or whatever case you may be speaking of, it was not about a unanimous decision of this court written by chief Justice Rehnquist identified it as a classic example of what is covered by mr. Kneedler, may ask you couple of questions . First back to the standard of review and distinction between criminal and civil. This court seems to have drawn that line based on the severity of the consequences that follow to the individual but that seems to me to be a tough line to draw because i can easily imagine it may be convicted of a crime for which the sentence is six months in jail or a 100 fine and you would not trade places in the world with someone who is deported from this country or the subject of a civil forfeiture requirement and who loses his home. So how sound is that line that we have drawn the need past, especially when me civil pool with itself is balancing tasks. Not exclusively, there may be more than seven factors as i understand it. I look at the text as a good place to start. The due process speaks of loss of property, does not draw a civil line and yet elsewhere in the fifth amendment i do see line drawn, the right for self incrimination for example. Kneedler i think the analysis derives from thinking about what the purpose of vagueness restrictions are. There are two points. One is that an individual person of Common Intelligence should have notice of what the law requires. We have so many civil laws today, and they are often hidden away in places like the federal register and other places like that . The second point i was going to mention was weather gives rise to the potential for arbitrary enforcement. What is different about immigration for example from terminal law, for example it seems to me being fair notice point pertains to the civil and criminal. It does but in different respects. In some ways, the points i just mentioned are related in some ways. Notice pointto the and the immigration context, this court has held that this apply inause does not immigration proceedings and therefore the person may be removed from the United States on the ground that was not grounds for removal at the time they engaged in that particular conduct. So the idea that the statute for that reason has to have a notice element does not work. Then there is the concern about arbitrary enforcement. This is not the sort of statute loitering ors being annoying on the streets or something which is at the height of where i think the Court Concern has been about judges arbitrary. Being the immigration laws have always been enforced to the executive branch reflecting the fact that emigration and Immigration Enforcement are closely related. Does the government have another string in its bow here. We are arguing about 16 b and its resemblance but you can be removed if you commit a crime of moral turpitude and when it burglary fall under that . It would depend on the role for what is a crime involving moral turpitude or if it is intricate depending upon the nature of the offense. The nature ofd on the offense. In this particular offense, the immigration judge concluded the conduct involved moral turpitude but did not apply to the categorical approach. Concluded the defendant conduct in this case of mounted to a crime. The concept of a crime of moral turpitude is less vague than 16e . I think not. No, at this brings to mind what is immigrationout enforcement. But mr. Kneedler, the crime of moral turpitude is always applied to the facts of the case. So, johnson pointed out that when you have a statute that uses of approximations like substantial or significant or severe, what gives it life is facts. Lication to actual the difference between these two approaches is that this one is asking judges to hypothesize the facts and has nothing to do with the reality with respect, the crime of moral turpitude the categorical approach is there. It is not fact. It is a different kind of categorical approach, isnt it . It is asking what the elements are that everybody has to commit as opposed to the elements that people commit in the ordinary case, whatever that may be. Questionraises the Justice Scalia thought was so important in johnson and elsewhere where he said there is no way for a court to do that. This is the line. Should we look to a Statistical Analysis that the state reporter etc. Ce, that instinct but this is the problem with the residuals under the clause of johnson as we have here. Theres not really a source of law to look to to tell what an ordinary cases to look to. I really do not think that is correct. Again, the court was concerned about a statute that referred to the chance that injury will occur which could be completely openended. Here this is tied to the text of the statute by its nature. Does it give rise to the risk before you get into that question, before you get into does it do this in terms of force, does it do that and terms of injury, before you do any of that you have to have an understanding of what the ordinary case is. With johnson according to Justice Scalia of the court is that there was no way to tell what that ordinary case was. Again, with respect, this Court Unanimously held that burglary is a classic example and to give the reason why which i think is helpful for answering this . Generally. The court said that burglary by its nature in the course of committing the offense, gives rise to the risk of physical offenseing used are the because the person will encounter someone else. So built inherently into the nature of burglary is the risk encounterurglar will someone mr. Kneedler, if i might interrupt again. I am signed up this raises the question for me about the nature of our track here. Reasons to me that one for vagueness is not just to ensure fair notice and procedural process, i think you would agree with that. Mr. Kneedler with a caveat immigration. Of course. A primarily the doctrine serves that function. Mr. Kneedler yes. Justice gorsuch i cannot say with the law is, we dont make it up. We stop. That is why we do not have a federal law of common law for crime, right . Here i would have trouble going about with the ordinary cases. The ordinary burglary in california doesnt include securitiesy selling in a persons home . I would want to have statistics, evidentiary area hearings, and procure experts on that question. It sounds to me like a lot like what a legislative committee might do. If i cant distinguish my job from a legislative committees work in my not verging on the separation of powers . Are eggs at the margins or outer limits are major problems like that but i think it is important for the core. Clause, thissidual has a core. Another partner not discussed, with the court was concerned about could do into my question is to mark mr. Kneedler yeah. I was getting a. I apologize. If we look at i think the court can comfortably look and see whether the statute has a core of admin or a stowable offenses. Burglary ake udge course gorsuchrsuch justice a burglary and california, how much california burglary would be a different question, friendly. Here this resident was if burglary is a close case, then california burglary california burglary, only because health for does not require an unlawful entry and therefore does not satisfy generic burglary. But generic or glory, as this court again as you know unanimously a classic resample and may i use other examples. Kidnapping is typically accomplished by the use of force but can also be accomplished by trick, but that does not mean covered by 16b, because the entire time that the victim is being confined, whether or not he or she knows that initially that she is being fined against her will, once she finds out that she is, the risk of harm will materialize. Im sorry. Question. On my how my supposed to determine what the ordinary cases . Should i bring in some experts and have been evidentiary hearing . Why is that not a legislative function . Mr. Kneedler there may be places where the statute is not clear. California burglary maybe one of them. Justice gorsuch so you would have been bring in experts . Sayingedler im not experts, no. But where there are statistics available. For example, as there were in several of this course cases under the residual clause that statistics were look to two reinforce common sense. Justice gorsuch probably you do or maybe not, do you remember because several judges one of them was me, some of them Lower Court Judges said, why hasnt Sentencing CommissionJustice Breyer why dont they go out and find out, what is the typical way in which the other provision case after case, nobody ever had the statistics. Think, well they cannot get them. Otherwise they would. So, what is the story . I think it is a similar question to what is being asked. Mr. Kneedler maybe general categories of offenses were that in other words, we never had a case that i remember under that other provision were some became up with statistics despite what i call and other words and there were some flightics dealing with not nottatistics, but probably as good as a legislative committee. I think it is important to recognize what we have here is a legislative in a in which congress chose to identify crimes covered by categories and type of offense and theres only so much one can expect from the legislature in identifying a category and here congress identified a category in 16be that is very closely tied to 168. 16a involve situations in which the element of the offense itself involves the use or threatening of force. 16be expanse at slightly to say, it may not be technically an element but is the offense under 16be so instinct or inherently contained to risk the use of force that it should fall in congresss judgment in that same category. You look at other offenses, a number of the records of held that conspiracy to commit robbery is a crime of violence. Robbery certainly is a crime of violence, conspiracy it self contains the substantial risk of physical force being used because conspiracy is an agreement to commit the very inme that will result physical force how about statutory rape . Offenses are sexual offenses are difficult. As you know from last years case, sexual offenses of a minor. With a sufficient age difference between in the doll and a minor, the use of physical force is an inherent in the nature of the offense when the adult, even if get each is able to out to comply without actually using physical force, the threat to or potential for physical force is always present if the child resists. The adult can use force. Is at the ordinary case . I thought that most of the pornography cases where saying is children not being physically forced into sex, but being tricked into it by caretakers or talked into it, etc. When we have personal views about whether an adult can not improper but the point is, in that encounter the potential for the use of force, the risk for the use of force is always the same risk and whether or not force is 25d in 50 of the cases or present the cases so it doesnt surprise you that the court well, as we point out in our brief, the distinctive in the lower course on this question and others have to do at the particular element of the state offense, particularly when it comes to sex offenses it is difficult to say statutory rape or sexual abuse of a minor because the element of the state offense may vary. Lets take this an ace in a slightly different direction. Illegitimate on that score. Suggested it is a form of procedural due process and also the product of our separation of powers as we discussed to keep the law. T of what is the governments position on that . Mr. Kneedler i dont know if we have adjusted in those times. That is why am asking you now. Mr. Kneedler it feels more like a subsidies due process limitation why . It does not prohibit the congress from legislating in any area, just as you to do it in a way that provides fair notice lawmaking. T involve mr. Kneedler in that sense, i do give outhen you motives, but i think substance and hopefully it also requires include any it wishes, there is no statute of limitation. Mr. Kneedler if category chose to give a category of crimes it thought rose to substantial risk, and put peoplen it will in prison, we should not expect congress to specify which laws . Mr. Kneedler we think this lot reasonably captures what congress thought gave rise to serious risk of physical force being used. Did i get correctly your answer to the question about moral turpitude being an alternative the government could pursued . The immigration judge found this were grounds we thought not correct because the immigration judge to not apply the categorical approach which had since been determined the right way to look at crime involving moral turbine dude. Thank you, mr. Kneedler. Mr. Rosenkranz . Thank you mr. Chief justice. Man please the court. Let me begin with justice justicedust , congress has originated a statute that makes it impossible for ordinary citizens or for Law Enforcement or for immigration officials to figure out what the law is and congress has delegated that function to them. It has done it with two features that this court described as clause. E residual first, the piece that most concerned the court. The court said was most important. Hypothesizing this ordinary crime. And second, estimating the risk associated with that hypothesized version. Warned that 16 b was equally susceptible to challenge. The government was right and the differences in statutory language that the government has since discovered does not change the outcome. Well, the statute here says during the course of committing the offense. That is quite different from the statute of johnson. Your honor, it is not quite different. The statute in johnson has the same limitation in the front language. Section 16b covers risks in the course of committing the crime. Residual crime covered with crime that otherwise involves conduct. Both are referring back to the crimes. I would like to address more concretely this and can course of committing the crime point because i cannot tell you why the government is run without knowing what the government thinks these words at points, the government says it means that in order to satisfy the elements of the crime, so it reads the sentence to me and you look for substantial risk. The physical force may be use in order to satisfy the elements. But thats not how any court was ever applying this provision. Its not how the government was telling the court to apply this provision. The Government Back then and now points to conspiracy and other offenses. Those are complete. When you say i want you to kill my wife. Heres 100 bucks. Theyre completed with the utterance of those words. Never the less, you look after the utterance, at least the government urged the courts. But what about attempted burglary in james . As johnson itself points out or burglary, johnson himself points out burglary was a problem. Why precisely because under the ordinary approach, courts were required to look past the elements, burglary is committed. The elements are completed. The moment you cross the threshold, thats, if thats the governments reading, then burglary would be out. What the court said in johnson is that its what happens after you cross the threshold that creates the risk. Then the government shifts to, while the crime is underway, thats what in the course of committing the crime means. But thats not a solution. That is exactly the problem that johnson describes. Its concern was that the ordinary Case Analysis was quote detached from the stat torre elements and it leads you to speculate after the elements have all been satsisfied, but while the crime is underway. Thats just as imaginary. Suppose a state intacted a statute that says no person may be licenseded to teach preschool if the person has satisfied the language, not by reference to 16b, but the language included in 16b. Would that be unconstitutionally vague . I dont think it would be. If its some state not incorporateinge congress handy work or adopting this language because its language congress adopted, it wouldnt be. I see were shifting now to the other piece of the case, which is whether, which is the application of criminal standards. Before i decided, before i can determine whether this is unconstitutionally vague, i have to know what the standard is. So thats my question. If we apply the standard that generally applies to civil statutes. Would this be unconstitutionally vague . We might do a wonderful job of pruning the United States code if we said that every civil statute not written with the specificity thats required by a criminal statute is vague, we could boil that down a lot. But thats what im asking. Is that what youre arguing . No, not at all, your honor. No, not at all, your honor. First, youre talking about a civil statute here thats very different from deportation. Im taking it step by step. Its a licensing statute. There are three things to say about how this criminal standard applies in this civil context. The first is to the premise of your honors question, jordan settles the question, the answer to the question how you apply criminal to the detor patience deportation context, but this court never has to decide whether to reaffirm jordan. Lets say we dont think jordan decided the issue. Two things to say before you address jordan then the third is to say is jordan was right. The first two things apropos of Justice Alitos assumption, its a statute that congress elected to import into this statute. This court has held that if congress does that then courts , must apply the same criminal vagueness standards. That seems like a minor point. It did not incorporate exactly the statute. The language is different. We believe that. We believe that. Im sorry. Congress literally said in the ina that the crime, the definition of crimes of violence is the definition of section 16b. Being a criminal statute. It then added all sorts of bells and whistles of other ways to create an aggrevated felony, but this court and ab small said here is what you do when you have a statute that has both criminal and civil applications. I took this away from justice alito. He wants to know the standard for determining vagueness in civil cases. So, the standard was laid out by this court in Hoffman Estates. The answer is, it depends on how serious the crime is. The seriousness of the crime, how serious a penalty is. Thats where i get stuck. Because the consequences in civil matters can be very grave. More so even though a lot of criminal penalties civil forfeiture. Take a mans home. His entire livelihood. Deport him. I can think of lots of other examples. Graver than any other. The line between civil and criminal depends upon a seven part nonexclusive factor balancing test. How my supposed to do that . I will answer the question, but let me preface it by saying ive only mentioned one of the reasons that this court doesnt have to figure out the answer to that question. Lets answer the question first. I would go back that this court has rejected a sharp line between civil and criminal. The correct distinction is the one that this court identified in Hoffman Estates. Cases whether civil or criminal with severe consequences. How do i determine that . Heres how you determine that. This court has never had to answer that question since Hoffman Estates set this out. Its not a question that arises often. The way the court answers the question here is we know First Amendment cases are on one side of the line. What else comes on that side of the line . If there was a consequence that was on par with criminal cases, it is banishment, exile, lifetime banishment. The framers understood banishment to the equivalent that takes away what makes life worth living. Madison talked about banishment and the quintessential penalty. He says its difficult to imagine a doom to which name cannot be applied. By the way, this is not new to this court. Its not just Justice Ginsburgs example. In a case involving a criminal protection, that is a constitutional protection that relates only to crimes, that is pedia and the sixth amendment, deportation already stands alone as the only civil that triggered the institutional protection on a par with the criminal protection. So you dont get to come into court and say my lawyer didnt get i get it you dont want to answer the question. I really, im very interested in the answer. Which is asking where do you draw the line . What is the except civil civil vagueness . Hoffman estates says that it varies. The line between the severist penalties and those penalties that are less severe. If it is on par with a criminal punishment such that someone would trade one for the other, this court answered the question in leave. In lee, this court says most people would happily take a little bit extra time in prison in order to avoid the consequence of deportation. My earlier question was about licensing. I suppose this applies to license as an attorney. License as a physician. Taking that away from a person is pretty severe. Yes, your honor, but not as severe as lifetime banishment from this country, which is proceeded by automatic and mandatory imprisonment. When we start that, arent we going to get into this same kind of legislating and how severe, where is this line drawn . Its where the support drew the court drew in Hoffman Estates. That was decades ago. What do you think about this . Life, liberty, and property. Its great line. Yes, thats a great line. Life, liberty or property. Particularly here, were talking about a liberty interest that says you must leave for some people, the only home that ever, that youve ever had. You must leave your family. So that when someone is making the decision, am i going to plead guilty to a crime that i didnt commit in return for time served, he needs to know by the term for time served during give actor to his wife and kids whether i. C. E. , is going to be standing out there depriving him of that liberty and deporting him from his wife and kids. Do you think you could go back to Justice Kennedys original question . If you dont recall, if i get it right. Is lets look at the when we struck down in johnson and the difficult language was it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Then there were a lot of examples where gee, awfully tough to figure out whether it does or does not fall within those words. Now, lets look at this line. This language. It involves a substantial risk the physical force against the person or property of another, may be used in the course of committing the offense. Now, that would seem to be that if the offense is conspiracy to commit burglary, the conspiracy is finished. Over. Done with. Long before they get to the property. And so that wouldnt be too tough. But burglary, which takes place on the property or conspiracy under the first statute, which will lead to the burglary that takes place, that becomes tougher. Ok. Lets look at our statute now. And give me some examples. Im sure there are many. But i think it would be helpful where under this language, it seems my god, what is the base. This is impossible. Ill give you several. First, sykes, the nuclear flight. The court was mired in controversy about how you figure you figure out whether vehicular flight is going to give rise and how did the court do it . It was looking at the moments or the long time frame after the elements were sats fied. Satisfied. The moment you pull out, you are in vehicular flight. And the distinction between physical force and injury doesnt help and the distinction between the property between personal injury doesnt help, youre still always imagining what is happening, the press happening after you pull out. The next one. Trespass. It all depends on first what do you imagine the ordinary pace to be of residential tresspass then figure out how it plays out. Or car burglary. Same exact problem. Or to take an example directly aca, extortion. It all depends upon the ordinary Case Analysis which goes back to Justice Sotomayors question early on. The heart of this problem is this ordinary case approach and none of the statutory differences help you figure out what the ordinary case is. And mr. Rosenkrans, just to tie in this ordinary case about during the commission of the crime, does the government problem with this phrase in all of this briefing and all of argument ever come up with a single crime in which the ordinary case of that crime, the injury would be occurring after the commission of the crime . If the commission of the crime is taken to mean not just elements, but a more general view of what the crime is. Im just suggesting that the government has never come up with a single case under aca in which remember, aca requires you to look at the ordinary case. In the ordinary case, what crime has injury that occurs after the commission of the crime . The government has not told us of any. Thats correct. After the crime is over, i mean conspiracy or solicitation to murder. The crime is done, it occurs after i think the governments current position , contrary to what it persuaded was that thats out. , so thats the example. But in order to get there, the government has to take the quintessential crime of violence and say that it is not thats inconsistent with what the government has said in multiple cases. The court of appeals has said that those crimes are within what about conspiracy . You can have conspiracy to commit burglary. Its over once you conspire. Thats an example but i think the government said that thats in. Thats in . Right. If thats in then this whole notion of in the course of committing the crime doesnt do any work. Similarly the government a different point. Could the government ask a statute saying that aliens who commit criminal offenses are deportable if in the discretion of the attorney general the presence of the alien is inconsistent with the best interest of the people of the United States . That is the basis of deportation . No. Why . Im sorry, let me back up another what standards must a statute meet before an Administrative Officer can make the determination that remaining in the United States is not in the best interest of the United States . Would that suffice . Would that be unconstitutional . That would be unconstitutional. Under what rule . A reasonable person, whether it is the deportee or an official on the ground or an Administrative Law judge would have no idea what the content of that prescription is as a basis for being within the universe of people who are identified as being deportable. Now, if its a basis for the attorney generals exercise of discretion that despite the fact that you are deportable as congress has defined it, i am not going to deport you, thats another story. Bult way by the way, that was the muller case. What do you say to the krit critique that it should be narrowly construed . Your honor, its not substantive due process. Its procedural due process. Its a separation of powers concern. The procedural right on the part of the individual whos being accused or being deported to know what the law is in advance and as Justice Thomas has explained very eloquently, it derives out of the rule of lenity and its all, as your honor was pointing out, a very important separation of powers and principles because the Law Enforcement officer on the ground who gets to tell a nonlpr , you are an aggravated felon and you are out with no opportunity for bia review and very limited judicial review, that is a classic abdication of Congressional Authority to line level officers. How is it a procedural right . I dont understand how you can say its a procedural right. Forsaid the statute is void vagueness. The statute is void for vagueness because when it is being applied to an individual that individual is given no notice that lifetime banishment is going to be the consequence of what he thought to be a safe harbor what if he was given notice in some other way . I think it depends in what way. But this court said johnson actually had notice. Johnson knew that the illegal that the sawed off shotgun was illegal but this court struck the statute. So that makes my point. He had notice. He knew. So wheres the procedural violation . For the vast majority of the people and the people who are affected by it it is procedural. , but your honor, i just realized in this colloquy, i never did answer the other part of your honors question, justice alito, about the reasons why the vagueness stand applies here, the criminal vagueness stand applies here. The first i said is 16b is itself a criminal statute. The second reason is to the point that Justice Gorsuch was making about the relationship between criminal law and immigration law, there is not an area of law where the two are as integrated and 16b in particular, excuse me, the provision here in particular has very significant criminal consequences. The aggravated felon label, once you are an aggravated felon in the ina, certain immigration crimes are triggered and so aggravated felon becomes an element of a crime. Ill give you an example. If this vagueness analysis works the way the government says it works, mr. Dimaya can be deported because he had sufficient notice or the statute was sufficiently clear, but an aggravated felon who reenters this country is prosecuted as an aggravated felon. So if he reentered the country he can then be he can then not be prosecuted as an aggravated felon because the statute would be too vague. That makes no sense, which is exactly why this court adopted the rule that it adopted and that four members of this court repeated in northwestern bell, which is if Congress Makes that choice to give civil and criminal ramifications to the same statute, the very same statute that the statute is void for vague, in one context void for vague in other by the way that other context in ab small was a silly little contract case, not even the licensing of a nursery. Can i ask you a simple question . If, as this court has held, crime of moral trooper to turpitude isnt unconstitutionally vague, why should 16b be vague . The answer is crime involving moral turpitude does not sit in a vacuum by itself. It is a phrase that congress has adopted that has at this point probably two centuries worth of law describing what is in and what is out. By the way, what did the court do in jordan . What the court did in jordan was to say you, jordan, you committed a fraud. One thing that has been clear since as long as those words have been used is that a fraud is a classic crime involving moral turpitude. Thats why he lost that case. If he had been criminally prosecuted under a statute that made an element of the crime that itd be a crime involving moral turpitude, the same result would obtain. Maybe you have in your head a list of you could categorize any offense that i might mention and say thats a crime of moral turpitude, thats not a crime of moral turpitude. I couldnt do that and i doubt somebody whos facing possible removal consequences would be able to answer that question. Its like shoot shooting a bald eagle, is that a crime of moral turpitude . It is not. By the way, nor is flag burning. Let me answer the question this way. You dont have to know but you have to be able to go to someplace like a lawyer who can tell you what the answer is. And where does a lawyer go . There are 14 pages where every single possible crime is categorized as in or out based upon decades of judicial and other interpretations. Thats how one knows. In a crime of moral turpitude we dont have to consider what the ordinary case is, do we . Not the ordinary case, thats for sure. All we do is look to the elements that everybody has to make . Correct, correct. Let me close with this. I appreciate the instinct to try and see if this court can do better with section 16b than it did with accas residual clause. But in deciding whether to take that route, this court has to decide whether anything is to be gained by this whole enterprise of sending the lower courts back to apply now a different standard and figure out how it applies to all of these crimes. That process is going to be no less arbitrary and speculative, and lifetime banishment should not hang on the unpredictable answer to the question, is this crime in or is it out. Congress can of course decide the circumstances under which lifetime residents can be kicked out of this country but it serves the separation of powers as Justice Gorsuch referred to to allow congress to pass the buck to immigration officials and courts with a provision this vague. If there are no further questions, we respectfully request that the court affirm the court of appeals. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Kneadler . With respect to conspiracy and some of the other crimes that have been mentioned, this is a critical point to understand. You can be prosecuted for conspiracy from the moment of the agreement but it continues up until the commission of the crime. The commission of the crime is the culmination of the conspiracy. Same with burglary. Burglary is not over when you enter the house. Its over when you leave the house. Kidnapping is not over until the victim is freed. Escape from a prison is a continuing offense. And 16b and its counterpart, 924c, serve a Critical Role in circumstances like that where a crime extends over a period of time. You can complete the crime without violence being an element, but it is instinct with the risk of crime and that is why excuse me, force, and that is why congress address it and that is what this Court Unanimously focused upon. 16b has been on the books for 30 years and has not generated anything like the sort of confusion that accas residual clause did. This court, we submit, should pause greatly before extracting from the u. S. Code a statute that has so many applications. In the immigration context this statute is applied all the time through the administration of an administrative body. Its not like a regular civil law in that respect. In how many cases is it the sole basis of deportation . I dont know the percentage but its also a basis for denial of discretionary relief. Also in deciding what falls in this category, statistics are not the major thing. There are plenty of things to look at. The body of judicial decisions construeing the very provision, the background of the legal tradition which is what this court drew on in saying that burglary is a classic example, its a classic example for the reasons that i just gave. You can look at the legislative judgments embodied in the crime. The circumstance when forced is not used, is it like the situations where the elements are present. You asked for an example, i think, of a crime that would be in under acca and out here. Possession of a weapon is one because possession inherent in the possession is not the use. There has to be a subsequent act in the use of a weapon. So thats out here because its not in the course of committing the crime of possession. We said it was in acca because it is injury like flow. It was actually a pretty good illustration of the difference between the two circumstances. Finally with respect to immigration, i think its important for the court to understand that immigration provisions and grounds for deportation are often written in very broad and general terms and given content by the executive branch in which congress has vested authority, crime involving youre not asking the executive to define these crimes, youre asking us to do, right . In the immigration context. This is an example where congress has delegated an executive to do this. Youre suggesting its delegated to this branch to do it . No, its not delegated to this branch. This branch has to construe the statute that congress has enacted. In other circumstances the agency gets deference in what constitutes a particular removable offense. Thank you, counsel, the case is submitted. Landmark. A series of cases about the inreme Court Returns february. Lets enjoy drama. Landmark cases, beginning in february. Energy secretary rick perry took questions on capitol hill about the administrations energy strategy. Some of the topics included federal subsidies for the coal and Nuclear Industry and efforts to restore power to