Transcripts For CSPAN U.S. - China Relations 20171009

Being tested like never before. That, combined with populist and over thest forces all world, including here in the United States means what we tend to expect of the International Order is now open to question. Given the history of johns ,opkins and its establishment we might once again reshape international affairs. Continuesmpensation an enduring tradition of. Ialogue on the study of china we have long understood and the importance of chinas relationships around the world, and especially its relationships with the United States. Since the center opened its doors in 1986, we have shaped of u. S. Chinaades relations through our alumni, who have gone on to be global leaders. The scholarship of our esteemed leaders on china has influenced government and the private sector and we are privileged to be hearing from some of them today. Joining the Panel Discussion will be our own professor david he isthe director one of the leading scholars of china today and many institutions have benefited from his wise counsel and scholarship on china. We are also joined by cui liru the former president of the China Institute of contemporary international relations. He serves as the advisor from multiple institutions. He specializes in u. S. Foreign policy, u. S. China relations, International Security issues and Chinese Foreign policy, and it is welcome it is wonderful to be welcoming him today. It is also my great pleasure to. Ntroduce amy celico she is the principle of Albright Stonebridge group and leads the firms china team and washington, d c, drawing washington, d. C. , drawing on her experience in government. She has a deep understanding of the Financial Services in china, rights,tual property and im proud to say she is a hopkins of our johns center. Sais china, and our friends, the chinau. S. Exchange foundation for hosting this event. Finally, i would like to thank and introduce our moderator did day moderator today, dr. John lipsky, a distinguished scholar at the henry a. Kissinger center for global affairs. Without further do, please join me in welcoming dr. Lipsky to the podium. Thank you. [applause] dr. Lipsky i can assure you i deserve no applause. I have the second easiest job. You have the easiest job. You get to sit and enjoy a presentation by our three speakers. First we must talk about how we will go about this. We will hear from each of our speakers in turn. Of re all very capable and youre very capable of knowing how this program will unfold. We will start with professor cui, and then professor lampton, and then amy celico, who, just to amplify what he said is not only a graduate of sais, but attended all three sais campuses. So, we are especially proud of her accomplishments. Our threel have speakers at this event, and then i will rejoin you and they will join us on stage, we will have a brief discussion and then open to questions from you, the audience. Without further a do, let me just add my welcome. Things to the u. S. China wehange foundation, and would like thanks to the u. S. China Exchange Foundation and we would like to tell professor cui how honored and pleased we are to have him. The floor is yours. [applause] that should be turned on. All set. Professor cui all set . Thank you very much, professor lipsky. I would also like to thank johnshina exchange, and hopkins university. It is very much an honor for me to have these duties. There are discussions with the specialists on china in the United States. Today is u. S. China relations and how to manage the transition. Vision there are three keywords in my topic today. They are transition, management, and accommodation. I think that there are also or three points of my presentation. Now, let me start from the first keyword transition. Establish a balance, but that has been changing because of the equation of the power and the deep interdependence developing in china and the between the two country. An unprecedented evaluation process of the two major countries. Complicatedup issues and uncertainties of the future development. Balance has of the been driven traditionally by chinas economic growth, but the most demonstrative has been the year of 2010 when chinas judy b gdp surpassed japan and became the number two largest economy. Since then, china has consistently strengthened the number two position by and large in large and be gdp gap with the United States. Up until the year 2006, the gdp of those three countries are for vely 18, 11, and 4, and china will likely surpass the u. S. In becoming the largest economy in the next 10 to 15 years. Of course, chinas population is much larger, so its for capita gdp is far behind that of the United States. Such dramatic economic has quickly driven s process and comprehensive National Power to a new level. Happenedf these have with a parallel process with chinas engagement outside the world. Horizon haseful become the most important element in the polarization process after the cold war was over. Has change the priority and the special balance in the relationship between the two countries. With the political predominance while chinas capacity and the diplomatic positivity has extended, on the other hand, there has been deeply growing interdependence in the chinau. S. Economic relations, but for most americans the first. S of far greater importance , due to such an attitude, there must be corresponding policy implications. It has an effect on all dimensions of the u. S. Have been china relationship. The u. S. China relationship. Consequently, there has been ,rowing tension and new issues the newlyview balance has been part of two further parallel trends strategic politician and pragmatic corporation. Unprecedented in history. I regarded as a new configuration emerging area now, let me turn to the second keyword. Management. Observing chinau. S. Relations, a relationship between the two. Argest economies is most prominent nowadays the growing strategic competition. Strategist in washington regard chinas rising with its growing entrant, international inference and proactive diplomacy as a major chain challenge to u. S. World leadership. They indicate strongly that china should now be tackled. , hedging is required. The major china policy of readjustment has been carried out with the beijing rebalance strategy, including substantial military and economic measures. Course has been met by chinas reaction to strengthen their National Defense capabilities and countermeasures. Given strategic competition in china and the United States leads to more hedging and risk with each other that creates further impact on each others perceptions of strategic intentions from the other side. These make policy coordination more difficult. At the same time, there is the third party factor. Those are becoming more automatic. Addedpolicies have complexity to the situation. A typical case of such a situation now is occurring in careers where cooperation is dprkd to address the regime. Strategic competition also constitutes the important intervention between the china sean, island. Such u. S. Intervention in the name of taking care of its age allies poses between thelenges two governments on these kinds of issues. Therefore, china could not raise u. S. Ions about the role of systems in asia. Ant is if it is going to be asian nato. Is relevant to the above development, that there is up power struggle a power struggle for primacy in the Pacific Region going on between the u. S. And china. The former is to establish the power is to maintain the status quo. Revisehe latter is to the status quo. There is concern that. Ompetition will devolve this is also a realistic possibility. It seems not so important to. Ebate when both sides are making preparations based on such perceptions, the most important thing is to avoid the tragedy and then the possible would be as the other side requires or both sides would make a strategic compromise. So far, we dont see any such and we are optimistic enough about the future development. That means what we can do is to manage the strategic competition to ensure confrontations can be avoided. So, the two governments have reached the agreement of no and are engaged in confidence holding measures and crisis management. The mechanisms have been set up effective relationships, proper handling of disputes, and Resource Management on certain urgent issues. Despite management and security risks, another challenge in my view in the transition period that both countries should Pay Attention is the political area. Smart, to be strong and to confront pressure from the domestic political establishment. For Different Reasons from both china and the United States, nationalism and populism are rising. The foreignpolicy issues have become ever more closely related as economic twordependence between the countries has developed further. Development of us. China relations tells that historical junctures, the and the policymaking branches in the government are extremely important with strategic insights, political to ensure them tot important relationship develop the longterm interest of the two nations. Current is true in the transition of our relations. Few words on the relationship in asia. The configuration has been changing and the balance is shifting, which probably is irreversible. Based on that understanding, i believe the accommodation of isna in the United States the only prospect we should strike for. And that should also be among a more stable framework. I also believe that kind of framework is an important parts of multipolarization. Before that could be realized then, i think that there will be a pretty long transition period, and how long that will be depends on how the interplay between the two relations countries handle their differences. Of course, fundamentally speaking, i think it depends more on the development of each country. Theideal situation of Development Process could be will bent, technically avoiding the damaging tofrontations stepbystep develop into a positive, constructive management. Then to add more and more consensus for our cooperation which will be beneficial to both countries, and that will pave framework oftable our future accommodations, and that process could be what dr. Coalitionsaid, because coevolution, because the United States and china that the other will change likewise. Each country will maintain their course, but also to accommodate each other. That idea goes the politicians and the diplomats to not only study the past experience in history, but also should have very much a constructive vision of the developand we should our relationship physically, but we should develop our relations and value. That we can find higher toues and reach consensus resolve our differences or disputes. Solve them right away. Before that has been realized, i relationsinau. S. Pressed between the practicalf the relations. In the past history, in several decades demonstrates that and calculations based on rationality will always on important historical junctures and issues. I believe this is something given by the history and the culture of two great nations. I amfore, personally cautiously optimistic about our future. Thank you very much. [applause] prof. Lampton good evening. Can everyone hear me . If my voice gets too far away from the microphone, just wave. I am glad to be here this evening. Was trying to think about how long we have known each other. 25 years or 30, at least. Our gray hair is one indication. Anyway, thank you so much for your remarks and thank you all for being here. Cuis remarks are very much like an article he wrote in 2011. About six years ago in a very rapidly changing world. It is a measure of his deep thoughts that he could write in 2000 11, something that is meaningful, essentially, today as well. 2000 11, he said that china can no longer remain a bystander surveying the world beyond the seas. I think you said that was a quote from mao. An it was much rather act as insider. He called for china to play a greater role in the world in a responsible way. Like today, he talked about how power in the world was rebalancing in the direction of china. I think that is obvious. And that the United States and china needed to jointly manage ,hat you called at that time volatility. Hotspots. Global economic volatility and so forth. I thinkto go youve framed the problem very well. I want to ask the question how do we think about doing that . I think the u. S. Has some things to do and i want to talk more about what we might do to be pragmatic, place importance on interdependence at the same time that we have this strategic competition. I think it is no surprise to anyone that i and most americans would prefer to adjust to a changing balance as little as possible. We would like to see our in some diminished sense or at least balanced to the minimal degree. We have a lot of interest in managing volatility. I would add the Global Economy to that list of things and certainly north korea. , however, that we have to start with a premise which is at the moment, i dont think the environment is inoming more conducive either country to the management you called for six years ago and that i think you are calling for now. Athink we have to start from kind of realism about what some of the problems are. We share the goal that the environment has its problems. Bothnk we have interest in of our capitals, frankly, that are more assertive than the management we have had previously. You can think what you think about it, but i think in the subjective reality. Secondly, it is important to americans and the foreign policy, they look at the direction of evolution. Internal governments, it human rights related issues. And i think not all americans of great about anything, but i think there is some consensus that china is not moving is moving in a more authoritative direction. I think we have to acknowledge that as a problem. I think if we look at china and how it is viewing the United States, every time i go to china, people tell me why is the United States trying to slow us down . A repetitives word. In some sense, i think we both see each others internal policies going in a direction that are not very conducive to the kind of management youre calling for. As you mentioned in passing, this environment also includes third parties. Going in directions that are problematic for our part for our bilateral relationship. Most prominently at the moment, it would be north korea but taiwan is a problem. Towards autonomy are deeply disturbing to china. I would say we have an environment that is not conducive, necessarily, to pragmatism and farsighted management of volatile issues. Framework that though, it let me suggest three things i think the United States really needs to do. Maybe in the discussion along with reacting to amys remarks as well, we can talk about how feasible or troublesome some of these reactions might be. First of all, economically. I have been doing a Research Project on chinas really impressive effort to build railroads in southeast asia. Is theally struck me degree to which the united intes economic presence this region is not nearly as great as it needs to be. And i think that the United States ought to begin to be more supportive of the idea of conductivity, not only to china, but building out infrastructure, participating more actively in trade agreements, multilateral trade agreements that include both china and the u. S. In short, i see us as retreating economically where we need to create more interdependence in asia. China, that it could also include india, japan, republic of korea. I think we are going, in effect, in the wrong way. We should try to create a balance of economic power, to some extent, knowing china will always be the way the the most weighty single actor there. Therefore, i would see us opposing, initially, and now, withdrawingt , absolutely the wrong thing to be doing if you have this vision of interdependence being a shock at store per shock absorber to our inevitable competition. I think the u. S. Has to reaffirm its policies since world war ii involvement, the importance of infrastructure, multilateral agreements and so forth. Disabused,g to be but i do not think we are going right in that direction at this point. And i cannot say when we well. What i think that is what we should be doing. The next point that i would make , and this is probably directed both at americans and chinese, i think one of the many things that china since china has gained power is that the world has opened more to china in economic and trade terms than china has opened to america. That that isgree true or not, i can guarantee you that is what americans think. Or at least a lot of them. And i think what the u. S. And is siteeds need to do down and find particularly troubling areas of nonreciprocity. I will give you a few examples to signal what i mean. I think china has to open up. And i do not mean just in terms of global trade balances. Let us take the media. China has a very big Media Presence here with dozens if not print,s of television, and other media here in washington. It would be absolutely inconceivable for the united an equivalent presence in china. If you look at jesus for research. Of theal in terms duration for which greases are given. We have people here at sais where we have cooperated for 30 years. And we have faculty members that not to that cannot get a visa to go to china. There is a problem maintaining support for the relationship. And then there is the whole issue of Market Access. I will give you an example that was kind of amazing to me. Last month, i was driving in china towards hong kong. Their to the border and was first the prc immigration and then the Hong Kong Immigration and then there is a no mans land. If you get 50 yards into no mans land, suddenly, all of your electronic equipment begins to work properly again by which i mean you get access to all of the things that you did not have access to. And china has information openness on the part of the United States, that we do not find the reciprocal. What i am saying is that we have to sit down and find areas of inequity where we can level the Playing Field where it is possible. Some areas will not be possible. And we will have to be pragmatic. But particularly in the trade area and access for american what chinan considers pillar industries. We are concerned by what we see in industrial policy. If we are going to improve the relationship and manage volatility, there has to be restored a restored basic sense of fairness in the relationship. And who thinks what is fair is complicated. It could be arrived at by negotiation. Not everyone will get all that they want. But we have to make some progress. Americans are pretty patient when they see progress and they are not when they see things going the wrong way. Somehow, we have to establish a little more of an equal Playing Field. Finally, on north korea. Do not speak for anybody other than myself. This is not any trial balloon. But i will tell you what i have concluded. And i would be interested in china in what chinese reaction would be. Watchingyears, almost, the u. S. , china, and north korea interact on the weapons program, it seems clear to me that all of the various six party talks, policies of patients all of this has not deflected the Korean Program at all. We see steady progress on warheads and delivery vehicles. Missiles and so forth. Everything we have done to this ifnt has not made much of, any, difference. That is the first point. Secondly, after all of these years i have concluded and it started with a conference with a discussion i had in 2002. To,conclusion i have come really recently, is that china would rather live with a nuclear nonnuclearachieve a Korean Peninsula through instability or violence. Chinas line is that it is willing to live with a Nuclear North Korea. I believe anything short of a forceful a destabilizing action will not get them to give it up. In a way, china has decided to live with Nuclear Weapons there. And that may be the right decision. So, then the question is, ok, wouldnt a policy of deterrence work . Just as we had with china and the soviet union in an earlier era, one thing seems clearly is the regime wants to survive. This whole thing has been about its survival. Maybe we have to agree to live with it. Maybe, if we can negotiate some limits and arms control to keep it from spiraling ever more up, that would be good. Maybe we ought to have a peace treaty. Maybe we ought to gradually improve trade. But i guess what i think is that we are on a deadend, where we are going. And the primary problem is that politicians do not want to say that their policies fail. And that is true both in china and the u. S. So maybe, we are going to have to live with something we do not like like we did with india and pakistan. It is not my preferred outcome but i would like to know how we are going to move in a positive direction. Unless someone thinks of the North Koreans actually will get rid of their weapons. And they have put too much into this and come to far to do that. The long and short of it is that i very much agree that we ought to try to build interdependent by creating a feeling of a more equitable relationship we need to somehow get some progress on this north korean issue. And americans need to get their policies, not to mention our domestic policies, under control. Hope what you heard here was a recognition that America Needs to do a lot of things here. But, we need some cooperation from china. Thank you very much. [applause] ms. Celico it is really great to be back at sais and i am honored to be with my fellow panelists and former professor here talking about china. In fact, im going to pick up and talk a little bit more about the economic relationship. With china and dig deeper into what professor lampton was just ining about fairness u. S. China trade relations and specifically Market Access issue. I see the economic relationship has never as one that been more important to both of our countries and our economies have never been so intertwined. More opportunity for expansion though. It took real Political Leadership in beijing and washington, 20 years ago, along with a hugely supportive American Business community to set this economic relationship on the incredible growth theectory through negotiation of chinese accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. However, despite this deep integration and a trading relationship valued at about 600 billion a year, i am afraid that i cannot be very optimistic right now as i would like to be. Andt the bilateral trade Investment Climate between our two countries. Maybe it is because this past weekend, i spent time reading submitted byonies chinese and american stakeholders to the u. S. Government as part of the Trump Administration section 301 investigation into chinas policies and practices related transfer,ogy intellectual property and innovations. Tomorrow, there will be a public hearing on these issues. But even before this weekends long readings and before the its 301nched investigation into chinese policies that may be harming u. S. Policy u. S. Businesses. Things have become more contentious on the trade and investment front casting a pall over the larger relationship. Rather than acting as the ballast that commercial ties had provided for decades in u. S. Chinese relationship. While the scare of our economic ties has expanded, so has the imbalance in the relationship and our two countries have also been increasingly at odds over what rules should govern access to our respective economies. In the aftermath of the Global Financial crisis, protectionist policies from both countries and around the world have increasingly challenged accepted principles and rules over International Trade. More to and china have gain from enhancing our economic relationship and continuing to act in concert to deal with Global Economic growth. But this will require commitments, accommodations, from both of our countries to find Common Ground on contentious trade and investment issues including our National Security considerations and how they should impact our countries. 20 years ago, political leaders made tough calls to take our economic relations to a renewed level two beneficial development. We have the opportunity next month when our president s meet in beijing. The only way to make progress is for both sides to make accommodations on how we govern the bilateral trade relationship Going Forward. China must continue to make concrete policy changes that enhance rather than restrict Market Access or American Business services. Thethe u. S. Must recognize validity of International Trade rules to govern how our bilateral relationship is governed. I am not sure the person the present environment will allow for this accommodation in either of our capitals next month. But, i am sure that cooperation in this trade area would help our countries face of the many challenges that we confront across the spectrum of u. S. China ties. My perspective on these Economic Issues is shaped by my current work at Albright Stonebridge group. Clients,f my corporate american, european, and asian, the development of u. S. China relations is of significant signal is of significance. It involves Strategic Counsel on a company can find commonality between its corporate goals in china and chinas own economic elementals assessed by the Chinese Government. Is meant toignment help our foreign clients demonstrate their interest in and value to the china market for the long term. The rather precarious state of u. S. Chinese economic relations is complicating this work. And an increasing number of my corporate clients are concerned that their business will be directly and adversely affected by a downturn in commercial relations, or heaven for it, the start of a trade war. When i step back from a individual client issues, and look at trade and Investment Opportunities and challenges for the u. S. And china, of course, it is possible to be reassured by statistics given the massive size and threats of our commercial relationship. China purchases one in four of the soybeans grown in the United States. China is responsible for 33 of Global Demand for finished u. S. Semiconductors. Indown Chinese Investment the United States surpassed American Investment in china for the first time in 2015. But then i step back further still. And i look at the Global Environment for trade and investment, where we see the rise in protectionism that has led to an impulse to throw out rules of built and grow Global Economic cooperation and instead are tech local economies. We have seen this in the United States, in europe, and in china. In the u. S. , it is decidedly more protectionist sentiment in the Trump Administration reflects a growing perception that americans have been hurt by globalization and that trade deals negotiated in the past are unfair. During last years american president ial campaign and since his election, the president has focused on renegotiating trade agreements and reducing deficit. With china, the Club Administration has been pushing on two fronts. Market access restrictions harming u. S. Exporters and investors in china and to enhance protections against unfair trade coming from china into the u. S. Markets. As we have all heard, the trade imbalance is one of two Priority Issues that our president discussed when they met in florida. It seems that trade again and north korea will be a focus of President Trumps trip to beijing next month. And aing the summit disappointing First Comprehensive economic dialogue meeting here in washington the summer, the Trump Administration officials have reiterated that if the u. S. Cannot achieve balanced trade by convincing china to reciprocate higher levels of Market Access, more defensive needs meat means will be employed. They have already begun investigations into whether imports of aluminum or steel are detrimental to u. S. National security. And in august, the u. S. Launched this investigation under section 301 of the 1974 trade act to examine whether chinas ip protections and Technology Transfer requirements constitute unfair trade practices that burden u. S. Commerce. All of these investigations could result in an imposition of unilateral sanctions against imports to the United States. Rumblings that these actions could start a trade war. Distinct from years past, the American Business community is unlikely to fight for a positive economic relationship unless it sees the prospect for Real Progress on some of the Market Access challenges it faces in china. It is a big shift for the u. S. Business community. Once the uniform cheering section dies. From an American Business process perspective, progress has slowed. Trade flows with china continue to grow, the american the ability of American Companies to compete in china is increasingly limited. Despite working on it for eight years, a bilateral investment treaty between the u. S. And china has been repeatedly stalled by chinese and american roadblocks. And its future is uncertain due to misgivings by the Trump Administration. Enhancing openness to both of madearkets was one point by the u. S. And china at the maralago summit. But, there are sticking points on both sides. As both of our countries seek to enhance protections of domestic markets and promote trade and investment ties between our two countries. The u. S. Government wants American Companies to enjoy the same level of Market Access in china as china enjoys in the United States in the United States. And the Chinese Government wants reassurance that america remains open for investment. There is broad bipartisan support to an act tougher policies against china including the principle of reciprocity to govern trade and investment. Engaging late last month, secretary ross talked about rebalancing the lopsided relationship with china. And the section 301 investigation that has been launched will certainly be part of that process. 301ing through the testimony submissions, all 56 of them, i was struck by a few things. Of course, most of the submissions downplayed the existence of policies harming american investors in china while almost all of the u. S. Submissions stressed challenges that have existed for years. On a more hopeful note, almost all of the submissions also had to common themes. One was the recognition of the progress china has made in improving the environment for ip over the past 20 years and the positive impact deep deepening relations has had on our countries. And almost all of the submissions included a plea that unilateral the unilateral action by the u. S. Government would harm the overall relationship much more than it would help it. To deal with way the thorny issues existing in bilateral trade today. Amongd these common goals academics and industry, particularly as our governments are increasingly willing to divert on shared goals in the international arena. 2016, the chinese president and obama noticed that the Climate Change was a key to the bilateral relationship. Our epa administrator yesterday announced that he would begin repealing the Obama Administrations Climate Change to thendermining a key Paris Agreement. The Trump Administration already announced that it would pull out of the Paris Agreement and china announced it would go it alone. We need positive areas of cooperation and positive breakthroughs to help us with withstand these disagreements. North korean cooperation is simply not enough. The meeting in november is an opportunity to make commitments and accommodations to one another. I hope that the u. S. Government wto commit to adherence to rules, to govern the existing 301 investigation, underscoring that the u. S. Wants to overcome bilateral trade imbalance through enhanced trade and not to increase protections of the domestic market. I hope the u. S. Government will relaunch a High Standard bilateral investment treaty negotiation and pushed for enhanced openness of the chinese economy and reassure the chinese that the u. S. Economy, the most open economy in the world, will remain open to chinese participants. Takeo hope that china will andtical, pragmatic, concrete steps to remove bottlenecks and barriers to its markets are u. S. Goods and services. Chinas state, council announced a measure that would speed up of approval for foreign drugs and medical devices by allowing overseas Clinical Trial data in chinas drug registration application. That is something foreign industry, including some of my clients, has been asking for for years. A delay inminate getting worldclass drugs and medical now, thats what we call a winwin. More measures like this to remove hurdles to the market are needed. Not only for u. S. Exporters but also for the chinese economy. Rising above the fray, both u. S. And china have profound longterm interests in committing to a expanded, mutually beneficial bilateral trade and financial ties. But to achieve such an outcome, both sides need to resixth protectionism in words and in action. Thank you. [applause] resist protectionism in words and in action. Thank you. [applause] john first of all, thanks very much to all three speakers for very appropriate, substantive challenging remarks. Before we go further, i said give each one of you for thanks but also to see if you would like to make any comments having heard the other two before we go on. Hy dont we start, professor cui. If theres something youd like to remark on before we go to the questions. Inaudible] no my its fair to pinion sometimes the [inaudible] the other side [inaudible] that is a challenge for of these ecause [inaudible]ties depends on what you emphasize. [inaudible] objectively about the level of [inaudible] hich is a developing interest. And they have developed in a very short period. So this means when the United States believes china will be ompetitive, then the challenge inaudible] therefore, we compare china ith all the other nations. [inaudible] im not specialized. m pretty sure about that. Both individual enter plieses, i think its very much but rom the government you have to [inaudible] and another point is china kes time to develop this democratic system. All these challenges from the foreign competitiveness and in the short period and with such atic development [inaudible] [inaudible] chinas economy. The government sometimes stems about the complexity of china. Another point is, of course, there are different interests the groups, including the theocracies. They will defend what they will fend. Sometimes outside pressure what they will defend. Sometimes outside pressure will [inaudible] so this is what i use this opportunity. Thank you very much. John thank you. I want to ask amy to elaborate on a point i understood i agreed but to clarify and you said in passing talking about trade, equality and more fairness in the relationship, north koreas not enough was your phraseology. And i assume you were talking about President Trump earlier on saying if we can get more cooperation on north korea wed get we could ease up a little the implication was on trade. David and i think you even said taiwan. So what did you mean by that and you said strategically important as korea is to us it isnt going to compensate the Business Community is what i thought you meant. Amy thats exactly what i meant. Actually. Just thinking about what we really have been prioritizing this year in 2017 in u. S. China relations, the president was explicit in linking those issues. And so for the administration certainly the president has made that one statement but i dont think, one, the Business Community agrees with that and, two, i dont think we can really rely on that on a healthy way to think about u. S. China relations. I have to admit, i hearken back to the Obama Administration where the u. S. And china were focused on so many ways where our two countries are cooperating on global issues of import and that was a foundation for the relationship and incredibly Important Pillar as trade ties were becoming more contentious and what i fear Going Forward is without those commonalities of Global Economic interests and instead we see diverging views over whether and how the United States and china should cooperate on global issues, were just not going to be able to rely on that much. North korea is certainly not nough. Ill just say, professor quay, i thought it was helpful cui, i thought it was helpful how you put together the framework of u. S. China relations. In washington it always does strike me when i hear yourself and other china scholars talk about a new era in the world and that era being the end of american predominance. And what does that mean for an american ability to deal with china . I very much agree that its difficult for the United States to think about that but what it does require is Key Management and the phrase that you used, accommodation. I think professor lampton said at the beginning of his remarks, the environment in beijing and in washington doesnt seem terrifically conducive to accommodation right now. And i think thats probably going to be one of the areas where we struggle in the near uture. Thanks very much. Now i will take advantage of my role as moderator to add just a comment on two. John not, of course, these are three great experts on the specifics of this topic. Much greater than myself. On the other hand, i think id like to think about this in terms of what is the structure for this engagement and cooperation in thinking about it in terms as was described global, regional and bilateral . And it seems to me if we start at the bilateral, there is a structure, the strenalic engagement, certainly on economics, that already exists. In other words, we dont have to create a format or a venue for engagement. The substance is another matter. The progress and cooperation is another matter, but the venue exists. Then, let me jump to the global level. Do we have structures in place that are adequate to deal with global issues and Global Engagement . And here, of course, we start with the postwar trinity of the United Nations as the venue for dealing with political and Security Issues with the International Monetary fund to deal with Financial Issues, and originally the w. T. O. To deal with trade issues. The three great challenges that whose failure to engage led to the Great Depression and world war ii. Where do we stand in terms of these Global Engagements . And i would say things are not looking as great as they might. We could start with the u. N. And where we can see the u. N. , for whatever reason, was it was agreed it would be the venue for dealing among other things with Climate Change issues. The United States has Just Announced its intention to pull out of the Climate Change or pull back from the cop22 agreement in paris, undermining the clarity of the commitment to this global venue. The w. T. O. Here we can see in the wake of the Global Financial crisis, the principal Institutional Response was the creation of the g20 at the leaders level, which exists but i doubt that all of you would think its been a huge success in producing substantive engagement and progress. And certainly there is a sense in the four areas that the g20 set its goals, number one, to restore global growth, which has not happened to the degree were not back to precrisis pace of growth to repair and reform the Global Financial system. I dont think anyone thinks that that is a job that has been where the mission has been accomplished. To the initial agreement was to complete the Doha Development round in the w. T. O. , prevent new protectionism and promote new lines of trade liberalization. I dont think anyone thinks that has that has happened. D finally, to reform the International Financial institutions and what instead has happened is a new one has been formed that is a partial, not a global institution, that seems to be uncertain in terms of its relationship to the preexisting multilateral banks, and what i mean is the largest Infrastructure Project at a global level today is one but this was created and is being fnled completely financed completely outside the preexisting network of Multilateral Development banks. Calling into question the relevance of the preexisting order. And the i. M. F. Even though although its not widely recognized, inherent in the i. M. F. s articles of agreement which is its constitution, a mandate for periodic reevaluations of voting chairs based on economic weight that are intended were intended inherently to rebalance voting power as a matter of course. There, i think, is a general sense that it hasnt been as complete as it should be. So a problem at the global level. The institutions exist but uncertain what the commitment is. And then final point. It strikes me, however, at the regional level we dont have institutions. That you could say the Fastest Growing region for the last 25 years, 30 years, the Fastest Growing region economically has been asia. When we look forward i think most people think thats going to be true for the next 30 years. Theres been a huge change in both economic, financial and political power and yet there are no panasian regional institutions that seem adequate to deal with political Security Issues, Financial Issues or trade issues. And there it seems to me theres much to do. So thats my point. Thank you. Thank you for indulging me and now its time for all of you. We have some time set aside. Plenty of time for questions. So please feel free. Ill recognize you. Please wait for the microphone and as a matter of courtesy to our guests, our speakers, please identify yourself and your affiliation before you ask your questions. So lets start with this entleman right here. I am roger. Ok. Roger cliff of the center for naval analyses. So i actually was reassured by these presentations although i do not think that was the intentions. Because everyone started out by talking about the fundamental problem of the u. S. And china getting along in the world but then fairly quickly we devolved into very specific and technicratic issues. Whereas i mainly worry about a war. So my question is, could any or all the speakers speculate a little bit about what potential triggers for military conflict might be and in particular whether or not theres a pathway that leads from the seemingly innocuous tech any attic issues to technicratic issues . John challenging question. Good. Who wants to start . Professor cui thank you for the questions. My personal view i dont think that there will be a war between our two nations. The possible point is in the Korean Peninsula. Of course, we have a long time issue of taiwan. That is a potential problem for us. But i think in the last decade, we have reached very agreement. That is to maintain the status quo. Even the bush administration, the United States took a very strong position and let taiwan leaders understand, that is very much important. And i think the situation i think that will continue. The danger in the Korean Peninsula is because now i ree with the point if we cannot think outside something more effective and actually we are facing a dead end of these issues, but i think the danger circle and vicious escalation of the rhetoric and capable s n. P. R. Are of developing the nuclear weapon. I dont think there is an outside force can enforce them to stop unless you take military actions. And the military action is not feasible at all. And i think the leaders, the people in south korea will not agree. If the United States wants to take that action, the only way based on that kind of threat, the threat is erupting at the United States, then the United States can surpass the right from the South Koreans green light, then you launch a military i dont think that situation will come. So but the misjudgment and this kind of escalation sometimes puts something unexpected. So this is the only danger. Economic i think circles, both in the United States and china agreed, we should have some prediscussions, informal discussions about that kind of situation and what we can do for the preparations. Thank you. David i guess the way i would approach it is there is a low probability of war. I get into some probability but if it were it would be low impact. You would have a low probability of that because it would be so bad if it happened. It would its justified trying to prevent a low probability event. Now, the ones i worry about ust in the category of i could pathway kind of question, certainly i can see the one trend of what we call more autonomyminded taiwan and that covers a lot of real estate. And an increasingly vigorous muscular china. And some development internally that triggers chinas need to act in its own political millia and i think whatever that risk is probably over time is getting bigger from a low left. I agree, if you look at the current government in taiwan, it seems to me its trying to reduce friction points, broadly speaking, but it seems to me chinas turning up the pressure on them economically and otherwise. So i do worry about it. I think its a low probability event, but it certainly would be an absolute fiasco for regional stability and u. S. China relations were it to happen. So i think we need to carefully manage that, and so when a president sort of cavalierly maybe says maybe we can trade off the one china policy, i mean, i dont know universe hes operating in, right . [laughter] david so i think we need to be responsible in our rhetoric and our behavior not to exacerbate it and so thats the taiwan thing. Korea i could see because you have a number of things that could lead to a scramble in north korea that would be rather perhaps uncontrolable, particularly if we dont each china and the United States, talk to each other about how we would manage a collapse or some other really unstable event there because we have to get control one way or another. Somebody of all those whatever the number is Nuclear Devices and so forth, order would need to be reestablished and indeed the r. O. K. Would be very motivated to stop refugee flow in china its way so you will have a lot of actors in relatively confined space with a lot of weaponry. And i could see a lot maybe not a war but some clashes that would be very unfortunate before we got control over the whoever the we is. So i am worried about what a collapse in north korea would produce in terms of bringing american troops to proximity potentially with chinese troops in a very toll till situation. But there volatile situation. But there are lots of reasons why we should still even if it doesnt lead to war, be concerned about all these things. First of all, they can lead to incidents like the ep3 incident, and the inadvertent sort of collision of forces and so on. And that can have unfortunate consequences. So i think we need to really try to manage this at the lowest possible level of friction. Low probability but not a no probability. And between two nuclear powers, i would say low probability is probably unacceptable. John let me follow up with mine. You mentioned inevitably we have to get used to the idea that north korea will be Nuclear Armed and we have to think about arms control and all of that. What do you do you consider likely one of the responses to an acceptance of a Nuclear North Korea in the long term will be a Nuclear Armed japan . David well john and potentially other Asian Countries . David of course, there are people that know more about japan than ill ever know. But i have to say you probably have to be with the proposal i advanced, there will be proliferations among somebodies will a because japanese be very worried. It depends in part how credible u. S. Nuclear umbrella is. We have something to do with that and we should try to be more credible rather than less. The japanese will be very worried about it. The republic of korea, we already stopped an effort in this direction at least once. Taiwan we stopped once or twice. So there is kind of underneath it thought in these societies and certainly if the japanese got it you can be pretty sure the South Koreans will be thinking about it again. So i dont know exactly how it would unfold. With the proposal i advanced, i think youd have to say undesirable to have this kind of proliferation but so is the war on the Korean Peninsula. John i should say this is the thought underneath all that is again the lack of a regional organizations to deal with this. The uncertainty how they will evolve and what the u. S. Role will be in the long run with regard to those organizations. David i wanted to say because i thought your point was really good on the Regional Business and that is, yes, there is a daerth of institutions, particularly on the security side, but you can say there are some institutions and they are the five u. S. Alliances that originally were aimed at china and now dont include china so theres a structure that explicitly excludes china. Thats the first thing. And the trade structures weve both been acting to create trade arrangements to keep the other out. Were working with the chinau. S. Education change fund to build Community Structures that in the economic have both china and the United States. Its hard to have regional governances which the two major powers in the region either by force of history or current policy trying to exclude each other. Its madness. Amy i think unfortunately the u. S. Had been working under t. P. P. To think one day it would include china, and it seems like 2 1 2 years ago that Chinese Government was coming around to the concept that one day china would be a member of t. P. P. And so, yeah, in your remarks, mike, i think talking about the disintegration of the american presence in the region in ways that actually help the region itself is really unfortunate with t. P. P. And now, you know, sitting in washington, d. C. , were waiting to see if the Current Administration is going to pull back even further from the way that it has integrated economically and adhering to w. T. O. And then in the regional Free Trade Agreements to things like binding dispute settlements. And so that doesnt look good for the u. S. In filling this very muchneeded role in bringing us together, including with china where president xi at davos last january said, hey, were here. China is ready to pick up this mantle of globalization which, again, is well is very welcomed but we want to see what the actions in that regard really mean. John exactly right or you can say t. P. P. Was a good idea only in the context it was a weigh station to something else. But in itself was hardly a it was not an end in itself. It was yes. Thank you. News agency of hong kong. President trump will visit beijing in november. Think amy has touched upon the issue. Your expectation in the economic area. But im wondering, what can we on t in the security area the north korea issue or taiwan issue or military issue, what can we expect from that visit . Thank you. Manage ui my disputes on some important issues. There wont be fundamental breakthroughs of these disagreements. We do have some areas where we can cooperate with ish other. With each other. I think high Level Mechanism i think will play some role on that. My observation is that the Trump Administration didnt have him when they came to the office. They had some Campaign Rhetoric. And that policy is kind of a mixture of the Campaign Rhetoric , the established policies there. Statesicy in the united is a roughly rebalanced strategy , with you Obama Administration. I think that is what we will continue, as the established inference is very strong there. But this is somewhat different because of the new president , so the interplay between the two countries, we will find a balance between these two w differences. Two differences. It is still stable. I am trying to envision this meeting between the two. Correctly, itd was no breakthroughs. Did i hear you properly . Yes, no breakthroughs. I would say that. All, being successful in negotiations with anybody, it has to be clear what you want, and if you just look at the division on trade policy and security policy, and the president not long ago countermanded a Draft Agreement from the commerce secretary, what he came up with, so if i was the chinese, i would say what can we give you that we can give you that will satisfy you . Thisld like to see what would be. Now, i think the chinese would find a few things, like electric cars or more Market Access in some containable areas. I think there would be Something Like that on the security side. I am sure we will try to look like we are cooperating on north korea, but the point is, i do not think whatever we do on going to have them conceding to the eventual andose of denuclearization going in that direction, so i think the operative phrase is as much as a little cosmetic economic concessions going in the right direction, which i am all in favor of. Right. But i think americans very rapidly get jaded, because when we wrapped up the maralago summit, then we met in july, and all we got was a promise, a delivery on a promise that had been made one or more previous times. Five. I lost track. So we feel a little bit jaded from bilaterals dialogue that do not get implemented, but in any case, it is better that we talk than not talk. I think i mentioned hope for both sides, and all of it being achievable progress and deliverables. I completely agree with no breakthroughs. Beenshington, i have watching the Commerce Department try to pull together the ceo ande commission to china very much focused on deliverables of specifics, very specific and individual things rather than Market Access. In the back, all of the way back, and then we will i am stanley. Every march, pricewaterhousecoopers publishes the 100 Largest Companies in the world by market capitalization. Largestr, 55 of the 100 were American Companies. In 2009. P from 42 china has remained static at 11. Overtaking the United States, how do you explain these numbers . First, the very buoyant u. S. Stock market. When they talk about the gdp, these are different concepts. This is in many areas. So i think that china is, how do realizing that kind of ist, but chinas competency that we will keep moving and be confident that we will finally reach our goal there, and the is not to beat the United States. The goal is not to be the number one. Of course, there is strong rhetoric in china, too, but i think the government policy is to realize modernization, and that could be beneficial for both sides. David stanley, i just wanted to answer a question, and, john, maybe you know, but if we start looking at banks and world capitalization of banks around the world, the top 10 chinese . There are different dimensions, at least, here of corporate also, i think with still a with disproportionate share of countries, we are at least structured for innovation and entrepreneurship, and china has, i would say, a very heavily industrial policy sort of orientation, so i think we have got a lot of things that help account for that. China has got a lot of capital. We are training a lot of human whont, and i think people have seen an erosion are looking at one of those other things kick in, but i think you are right. The United States, given that we are 4 of the worlds people, we are contributing a whole lot more than 4 of the innovation, big companies, technological advance, and so forth, so i think we have to keep two ideas in mind. Momentum and time. And in a way, you can summarize chinas economic challenge in a net show. China has all most the gdp of any other country, and yet, their growth and productivity is only average for emerging markets, so the challenge is they are investing not very efficiently right now. Improve, buts to that is not something the chinese authorities have not noticed. This is why reform is necessary. But there is another question . Kelso, andy name is i am a student of economics at texas a m university. Couple of years, they wanted three Aircraft Carriers, and since then, we have seen them purchase one aircraft 2017, and theye, are focusing on building their own aircraft from the ground up, and it will be the First Chinese Aircraft Carrier to use a catapult rather than a ski jump system. Given their strategic concerns in the South China Sea as well as their continued economic growth, do you see them continuing to invest money in sea power, and do you see them at some point over matching that in theg region . I think there is an irony there, a paradox. Realizes a larger sense from experience that is different, and china has been learning the concepts of international politics, and my understanding is most chinese ofdents and the professors international politics, they consciously or unconsciously and thisd this world is some of the understanding of and policymaking, so what the statements of the also,ment are, and then it is an idea, but when we see what you would call the rhetoric, and actually, china has been doing this. Ands based on realism, describing the postwar order based on american predominance, time, as it the same pointed out, we can find kind of an accommodation which can get rid of the power struggles, and that is practical policy. It is not impossible, so based on that understanding, chinas defense capability will further and if they want to develop these things, one is not enough. Will not be enough. Now, we are developing these kinds of things. That is my understanding. Amy 20 years ago, i was studying chinas modernization, and it is amazing, thinking 20 years ago about that goal. Werenk at that time we talking about a Blue Water Navy and how china would develop one. I completely agree with you, professor. Three sounds right and probably will not be enough as we think about china in 2017. David i have got a couple of questions. Along the coast and as gdp is more concentrated, china quite naturally wants to push conflict as far away from its territory as possible, so having it in distant seas and distant airspace, so it is predictable. Lets just put it that way. The trouble is, of course, the u. S. Has dominated the air and the sea, and when you push back, that is going to create tension with the previous big, dominant power. The fact that we are worried about it is also perfectly predictable. You start ratcheting up the number of Aircraft Carriers, you arethink a will, talking about at least 14 or 15 support ships, and probably the biggest investment is protecting the carrier as opposed to the carrier when you get it all done, so youre talking about a massive financial commitment, and, of course, as you indicated think, true,s, i china has got lots of internal development needs, so china is and someface some guns internal security versus external security. And also, i would just consider one other thing. You know, the United States has a luxury of having, in effect, canada on one side and mexico on the other side and a fairly specific regional environment. China has got many neighbors all of which are meant much smaller than china, and as they increase their capability, you are going to set of reactions and all of those smaller, insecure states, some concerned about their own means of defense. Others will seek protection from a big power, japan or the United States, so, you know, i think you have to sort of ask, where does this began, and what are chinas Real Security interests . Go ahead. Hi, i am from Johns Hopkins. I have a question. I came from south korea, so it is a matter of life. A power game between china and the United States. The south korean government, with systems from the United States, and it has created tension between south korea and china. Obviously, china is not happy about it, and there is economic pressure in south korea, so my question for the United States, is the United States going to intervene in these issues . David well, i could not hear clearly, that you are asking about the terminal, High Altitude antiballistic missiles that the United States has been providing south korea against the North Koreans, the missile course, the u. S. Sees that as a perfectly defensive and defensible transfer of technology to an ally to protect you from a against which this might be at least somewhat effective, so there is not much debate, i think, in the u. S. About whether this is appropriate. There has been some debate in south korea about that, but the point of the present discussion , and i will say es,their in air quot providing a place for these to be based on the peninsula, so the south Korean Department stores i do not know the , lotte. Potentially into china itself and affects their deterrent, so china has an argument, but the point is south korea has a demonstrable need in the current environment, and china has decided to inflict punishment for an understandable think this is an example of china not managing its neighbors very well. Know, i am sure an arrangement could be worked out if the threat goes away. Then maybe we do not need the defensive means, right . But china is not being very reassuring to its neighbors when it punishes them for protecting themselves against what seemed to everybody else to be a demonstrable threat. Even if you concede the radar business, which i guess is not fully conceded. Amy as an american, sitting here in washington, d c, i think i have to say that south korean residents are probably questioning the u. S. Commitment on that may be because the u. S. Is also calling into question the Free Trade Agreement and talking about reopening that, so while i agree with the professor that the United States has made a decision to provide this defense , and it is unfortunate that china is punishing south korea for it, i think south korean citizens are probably worried about the extent of the u. S. Commitment to south korea right now and our freetrade agreement. This is not a question for me, but i think china is involved because of these. The complexity of that has parts, and technically speaking, it is not directly korea,to defend south but the positive part is that the United States and south korea had to do something when it is provoked. That is one of the reasons, but another reason is, i think, the United States wants to build up these defensive systems. I think that is important for for their states longterm interests and and something has been understood in the strategic balance between china and the United States in that asian area and it is deployed to the u. S. Army, but they have made a lot of money in the chinese market, so that is one of the reasons to punish them. Ok. Right here. Hi. My name is i am a first year undergraduate at a school of international affairs, and my question is about xi jinpings consolidation of power. Twove typically taken fiveyear terms, and during their second term, they choose a successor, and we have not seen any successor who is going to take his place once he goes, so with the 19th National Congress of the communist party, a few questions. The first, why do you believe it is the case that he has not chosen a successor, and what about his Reform Efforts and the future of china . And the second is how does his consolidation of power of that u. S. Policy, particularly with respect to cooperation and investment . It does not sound like a question. Amy i was going to say. Professor cui i do not think anyone can answer about the successor, but i dont know, to you, but there is not a legal limitation for how leaders stay in but it is a tradition of , and my understanding is this is something very much interested by the outside world and xi jinping and him staying in power for two terms. I think if he decides to stay longer, it is very much understandable, and it probably will be supported by the majority of the chinese population. He has a successor after two terms and steps down, i think that will be fine. It is not very much a controversial issue in china. That is my comment. David i do not know how controversial it is from my observation. I certainly hear people talking about it in china, so i think the interest level suggests people are paying attention to that issue, but i guess the question was also asked, how will this also affect u. S. China relations, this uncertainty, and on one level, you can say it is none of our business, right . But we can be concerned about things that are not, quote, our business. Thinkingcompanies about longterm relationships, military that have two or more decades of a planning horizon, we feel very much more comfortable with governments in which there is what you might call an institutional succession process. In a way, you might say the most fundamental thing a government can do is have in place a widely recognized process to move power along with either human mortality or political change in society, and i think what this from john to whom, we saw that we thought was the development of norms. It is not a written constitution. It runs entirely on norms and is one of the most stable, modernized countries in the world, so to us, we deal partly with law, but we also can feel comfortable with institutional norms, so what we see is now an individual coming along that seems to have the capacity where we do not know the will, but the capacity, to change the norms, and that almost intrinsically is a less predictable country in thisinds, so i think assumes a great importance, just the mere debate about it. Mao, and one went through three. We got china was beginning to move in a normbased direction, and this brings the question whether that is accurate or not. Y just one thing i would add specifically, i think many of us are waiting to see after this party congress, will that then set the stage for a refocus on the chinese economy and putting in place many of the Economic Reforms that were announced four orrs ago and for one reason another have not taken place, although i think the goal, the rebalance of the chinese economy to promote more consumption rather than investmentdriven growth, still remains, the Chinese Governments overwhelming goal for development, so in some ways, after this month, whether or not people onxi has young the Standing Committee who can potentially be his successor, i think many Foreign Investors are saying, well, this now this process is completed, setting the stage for five years or longer of some Standing Committee members and then allow the Chinese Government to refocus on what has been promised, and so many of us are very hopeful we will be able to see that after this months conference concludes. And this will be the last question. I am with a newspaper. You mentioned during the Obama Administrations eight years, there were many commonalities that the Obama Administration had with the chinese, and what sort of commonalities were there other than the paris Climate Change agreement. Were those trade related . And how come, the feeling i got from todays event was a common feeling that when you are in the Trump Administration, you can subvert everything made in the last eight years. Amy either one of those fundamentals was a tenant of cooperation which was through the g20 and other partners to focus on Global Governance and supporting Global Economic growth through the existing that existed, the wto. Romoting trade and investment although, i was still working for the u. S. Government a decade ago when i think we had already said the doha round is dead. We did not think that members, large economies in the international community, would walk away from the wto itself. Tenant at was one president may not want to support the wto in the future and some of the restrictions that that put on the u. S. System, and i think that is one divergence, where the Chinese Government, of course, continues to say we support the International System , rulesbased order, and the wto is one of the founding principle rincipals of that order, and, yes, it is amazing how quickly it can change, and i think President Trump was very proud of his first day in office to back out of the tpp, and that was only his first thing when it came to our american commitment multilateral and bilateral trade agreements that had been negotiated in the past, so we will likely see more of that. Negotiators right now are talking about nafta. I think after that, it will be a chorus, whether there needs to be adjustments to that trade agreement, and what that means for, i think, china and the United States, areas of commonality, i think we absolutely still care about Global Health pandemics, but i do think that President Trump himself is more interested in bilateral relationships, and a strong relationship with china is something he has repeatedly said he believes in, but that is very different from how the Obama Administration talked about the u. S. And china in the world. Professor cui i think, generally speaking, before we judge President Trumps policy based on his Campaign Rhetoric, it is a very much different conversation, but if we judge ,rom things he came to office not things that people worried about, he changed it. , and now it is very much different policy from what he said, but on the chinau. S. Relations, i think from the between the top levels and the working levels, i think generally speaking, it is not fundamental changes. I think that will continue. David well, i guess i would like to end on a positive note. Focus a lot on the problems, and i think there has been a net deterioration, and i would just say, yes, it is encouraging that President Trump backed off a lot of his initial Campaign Rhetoric, that it has been ratcheting up the more disappointed he is due to cooperation in other areas. I think the best thing we can say is this is a very fluid administration, and what you see today may or may not be entirely compatible in the near term future, but there are positive things going here, and i want to end on the note of interdependence. We really are financially really interdependent. China is doing things that are contributing to implement into the United States, as well as some things that are not interesting to employment. We have collaborated on Health Issues around the world, ebola and so forth. I think the United States on Climate Change, we have got the state of california. It is not changing its policies because of troppo because of trump. Gets changedg because of the president , so, yes, i think we need to be concerned in the ways we have talked about, but lets keep in mind there is some there are e equilibria eating equilibrium causing equations. John and there is a Record Number of Chinese Students here and American Students in china, is a growthse, this of understanding, one of the key institution, and on that cheery note, i would like to please join in thanking our terrific panelists. [applause] and i hear rumors that there is a reception following. Am i mistaken . No . No reception . Ok. [laughter] john so we call that fake news. [laughter] what the right hand gives to the left. John thank you. 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