because they were never meant for public consumption in the aftermath, we were never meant to see them. but on a deeper level, whether there was a paper trail about some of these decisions, rishi sunak said basically that he didn't think there was a particular issue with that, it wasn't like he was trying to hide anything, but some of these conversations did take place in private. all this came up from an article that was written in the spectator magazine in the summer of last year, which was an interview that was done with rishi sunak at the time when he was a leadership contender. where he talked generally about how decisions were being made during the time. and i think it was quite an interesting insight into exactly that. let's hear a little bit from it now.— exactly that. let's hear a little bit from it now. the author of the article says _ bit from it now. the author of the article says that _ bit from it now. the author of the article says that you _ bit from it now. the author of the article says that you said - bit from it now. the author of the article says that you said that - bit from it now. the author of the article says that you said that you tried not to challenge the prime minister in public or leave a paper trail. i would say a lot of stuff to him in private. this is of course on page eight, if you want to see it in all its glory. this is all of course in the context of covid, the article is of course about your role in covid. and as i say, it says, he tried not to challenge the prime minister in public or leave a paper trail. i would say a lot of stuff to him in private. there is some written record of everything in general if people leak it and it causes problems. why if you were debating these hugely important topics with the prime minister was it important not to leave a paper trail? ~ ~ , ., . trail? well, i think is the article sa s, trail? well, i think is the article says. that _ trail? well, i think is the article says. that is — trail? well, i think is the article says, that is not _ trail? well, i think is the article says, that is not something - trail? well, i think is the article| says, that is not something that i've said. the quote from me is i would say a lot of stuff to him in private. and in fact, there is some written record of everything. so of course i had conversations with the prime minister. as i said, you share a garden, you are neighbours, you live together. of course there would be conversations i would be having with him. and in terms of written records, a mean, i'm sure we will get onto it. at multiple moments, i would write to him with just so that he could have it in one place, instead of thoughts or analysis from me with regard perhaps to exit road maps or the two metre to one metre, or reopening, travel. there is actually about lots of different bits evidence that you have and that we have provided of when i did write to him formally at particular points, where i thought it made sense to lay out a set of arguments from me to him. and perhaps there is a question about the tone of the prime minister this morning. because in previous testimonies from either officials, there have been blockbuster statements from them. we haven't heard anything that stood out from him so far, what do you think? ida. heard anything that stood out from him so far, what do you think? ha. i him so far, what do you think? no, i think that is — him so far, what do you think? no, i think that is really _ him so far, what do you think? no, i think that is really interesting - him so far, what do you think? iirr, i think that is really interesting to me this idea of tone. a lot has been made about how important today as fort rishi sunak. he was the chancellor at the time, but he wasn't making those crucial important decisions —— for rishi sunak. that was the job of the prime minister. there isjeopardy today because he is still the prime minister, so any mistakes or issues will reflect badly on someone who is now the leader of the country. it has been interesting he has really played it quite low and hasn't criticised his old boss boris johnson particularly either. he was pushed on this idea that boris johnson was indecisive and he never quite knew what decision he was going to make. he defended tarmac and said actually, that debate was really important in terms of making such a crucial decision on such crucial matters —— he defended boris johnson. not sticking his knife into his old boss. he was asked whether he felt boris johnson was his old boss. he was asked whether he felt borisjohnson was able to be approached, to talk about for him the economic impact, ie his fear of concern. because there have been some ministers and civil servants who have previously said boris johnson was hard to get hold of, particularly those who have been critical of the power you say some of his critical aids like dominic comics may have had, they say. rishi sunak said, i saw the prime minister more than i saw my own wife much of the period and he felt borisjohnson was completely approachable and there was no issue like that. so quite interesting he has downplayed a lot of the controversy we've heard, plenty of it over the last few weeks, really downplaying some of that. certainly very much not criticising his old boss boris johnson. so i think in terms of tone, it is very low key. in terms of headlines, sorry for some of the newspaper writers, we haven't quite had them just yet, i don't think. ellie, another key focus for the questions this morning has been the prime minister's views that the time between the tension between public health concerns and also the impact of lockdowns, how did he handle those questions?— those questions? obviously, as chancellor. _ those questions? obviously, as chancellor, he _ those questions? obviously, as chancellor, he was _ those questions? obviously, as chancellor, he was in _ those questions? obviously, as chancellor, he was in charge i those questions? obviously, as chancellor, he was in charge of| those questions? obviously, as - chancellor, he was in charge of the treasury. he had his eye on the problems of the economy. he said those conversations about the economy were had and listen to. but decisions had to be made very quickly in the first lockdown. so in that march time. he said the conversations got louder and became more prominent into the summer and the second lockdown and we haven't come to the chronology of it yet. but the inference was of course it was something that was considered, but decisions needed to be made quickly and the government was following the science and the science advice obviously changed as those crucial first few weeks through that spring of 2020 changed as well. again, saying obviously, i was worried about the economy, that was worried about the economy, that was my concern. but very much making clear he felt he was able to put his concerns to the prime minister, he was listened to. but at that time, there was a more fundamental health problem going on which the government had to react to and that's why there are strict lockdown measures were introduced. find that's why there are strict lockdown measures were introduced.- that's why there are strict lockdown measures were introduced. and in the midst of this, — measures were introduced. and in the midst of this, i _ measures were introduced. and in the midst of this, i guess _ measures were introduced. and in the midst of this, i guess the _ measures were introduced. and in the midst of this, i guess the most - midst of this, i guess the most difficult questions for the prime minister may be haven't been asked yet. and this was questions around his eat out to help out scheme and whether that contributed to rising covid cases. whether that contributed to rising covid cases— whether that contributed to rising covid cases. ~ , ., �* covid cases. making sure i don't get run over at — covid cases. making sure i don't get run over at the _ covid cases. making sure i don't get run over at the moment _ covid cases. making sure i don't get run over at the moment by - covid cases. making sure i don't get run over at the moment by a - covid cases. making sure i don't get run over at the moment by a van. i run over at the moment by a van. indeed, eat out to help out... thank you! it has been highly talked through. we have heard about eat out to help out time and again at this inquiry, whether that be from previous cabinet ministers who have been questioned or more importantly the scientific advisers, who have all said basically in varying ways, they didn't know about the eat out to help out scheme before it was launched. that they had concerns about it. there is kind of mixed scientific, no real huge damning proof that the eat out to help out scheme contributed necessarily to a huge prevalence of the virus. at the time of course, all sorts of restrictions were being loosened so very difficult to say whether the actual scheme itself could —— contributed to an increase in the virus. , ., contributed to an increase in the virus. ., ., , ., virus. ok, so apologies. that was ellie price- _ virus. ok, so apologies. that was ellie price- i _ virus. ok, so apologies. that was ellie price. ithink— virus. ok, so apologies. that was ellie price. i think we _ virus. ok, so apologies. that was ellie price. i think we might- virus. ok, so apologies. that was ellie price. i think we might have| ellie price. i think we might have her back. can you hear us? irate ellie price. i think we might have her back. can you hear us? we can see you? — her back. can you hear us? we can see you? i — her back. can you hear us? we can see you? i can _ her back. can you hear us? we can see you? i can hear— her back. can you hear us? we can see you? i can hear you, _ her back. can you hear us? we can see you? i can hear you, yes. - her back. can you hear us? we can see you? i can hear you, yes. you | see you? i can hear you, yes. you can see me coming chalet carry on talking about eat out to help out? as i say, the issue was that the scientists had said that they felt that it wasn't necessarily eat out to help out contributed to an increase in prevalence in the virus increase in prevalence in the virus in the autumn of 2020, but it was difficult to prove that one way or the other. but the main issue was it was at odds with the government advice at the time, the messaging if you like that we needed to go back to normal life, but do it sensibly and do it carefully. and by everyone been told to go out to lunch and getting £10 towards the process in a restaurant was at odds with the government messaging, which was to stay vigilant and be careful of the virus. so we're definitely going to get more on that, i think. but it speaks this broader issue about the chancellor and his views on the economy. chancellor and his views on the economy-— chancellor and his views on the econom . ., ~ ,, , . economy. thank you very much. the prime minister _ economy. thank you very much. the prime minister is _ economy. thank you very much. the prime minister is continuing - economy. thank you very much. the prime minister is continuing with - prime minister is continuing with his testimony now. prime minister, just final questions on the first lockdown decision. you referred earlier to the debate about herd immunity and also the advice that the government received, to the effect that implementation of the measures, floral, should not be undertaken to ellie. a great deal of evidence has been received about the nature of the debate about herd immunity —— plural should not be undertaken to ellie. the danger of suppression which might lead to a non—coiled spring. and the issue of the timing of measures, which led into the wider debate about behaviour for tea, into the wider debate about behaviourfor tea, you into the wider debate about behaviour for tea, you will recall these debates. what should the inquiry make of those debates? to what extent did they occupy valuable time and bandwidth in the weeks of the second and 9th of march? do you recall there being a great deal of time spent on debating the somewhat conceptual issues? you time spent on debating the somewhat conceptual issues?— conceptual issues? you know, i don't recisel . conceptual issues? you know, i don't precisely- i— conceptual issues? you know, i don't precisely. i think _ conceptual issues? you know, i don't precisely. ithink i _ conceptual issues? you know, i don't precisely. i think i was _ conceptual issues? you know, i don't precisely. i think i was probably - conceptual issues? you know, i don't precisely. i think i was probably a - precisely. i think i was probably a receiver, as it were, of information on that topic. the department of health were the ones who were the lead department. resenting the information. the delay contains strategy was one that to the rest of my knowledge had been signed off by our scientific health advisers, that is what i think we were told it cabinet. ., ., , ., is what i think we were told it cabinet. . ., , ., ., cabinet. that was a document that was published _ cabinet. that was a document that was published on _ cabinet. that was a document that was published on the _ cabinet. that was a document that was published on the 3rd - cabinet. that was a document that was published on the 3rd of- cabinet. that was a document that | was published on the 3rd of march. genesis in the commissioning e—mail from the secretary of state on the 10th of february. i'm more concerned with the weeks leading up to those decisions... the decision to implement the measures of the 12th, the 16th on the 20th of march. i don't think the overall strategy changed. i think it always was the strategy which was knocked to completely suppress the curve, but to flatten the peak. to push it out —— not to completely. i do remember this concept, i don't have any strong recollections, but i remember the chief scientific adviser talked about herd immunity in that context. and i think the minutes of one of the meetings which is maybe on the 12th, where i think the minutes say that he said a good outcome being that he said a good outcome being that by september 2020, herd immunity would be reached. that is the reference _ immunity would be reached. that is the reference to _ immunity would be reached. that is the reference to herd _ immunity would be reached. that is the reference to herd immunity. - immunity would be reached. that is. the reference to herd immunity. that is in the minutes _ the reference to herd immunity. “inst is in the minutes of that meeting attributed to him. but i think it was just to get the point across that the aim and the goal could not be and should not be to completely suppress the virus, it was about changing the shape of the curve. and all these interventions, i saw regarding our previous conversation at the last session, they were about doing that so the nhs was not overwhelmed.— doing that so the nhs was not overwhelmed. ., , ., overwhelmed. there were a number of sate overwhelmed. there were a number of sage meetings — overwhelmed. there were a number of sage meetings and _ overwhelmed. there were a number of sage meetings and cobra _ overwhelmed. there were a number of sage meetings and cobra meetings - sage meetings and cobra meetings where the issue of don't go too early, timing is vital dominated the debate, at least the debate about whether or not measures should be fermented. you were of course president —— present at the cobra meetings. to what extent do you assess that i had the government not received advice, don't go to early, there is a limit to which the population will be able to countenance and deal with such measures, to what extent did that debate slow down the ultimate decision—making? mt; debate slow down the ultimate decision-making?— decision-making? my strong recollection _ decision-making? my strong recollection from _ decision-making? my strong recollection from this - decision-making? my strong recollection from this period | decision-making? my strong l recollection from this period is that the government acted i think almost immediately on the recommendations from sage. ilitiith recommendations from sage. with res - ect, recommendations from sage. with respect. sage _ recommendations from sage. with respect, sage didn't make specific suggestions, it could only recommend more stringent interventions would be applied. and then they would produce papers showing what the consequences would be of any particular intervention. but they also advised _ particular intervention. but they also advised on _ particular intervention. but they also advised on timing. - particular intervention. but they also advised on timing. both - particular intervention. but they also advised on timing. both on | also advised on timing. both on substance and timing. so i think on the 9th of march, from memory, i would have to check it was the meeting where they said, here are three things that we think you are going to need to do. but we don't think you need to implement even the first one until later in the month. and here are three things that you definitely don't need to think about now, including banning mass events or closing schools, so that was a meeting i remember vividly. that was on the night, i think. that meeting i remember vividly. that was on the night, i think.— meeting i remember vividly. that was on the night, ithink.— on the night, i think. that was the week of the _ on the night, i think. that was the week of the 9th _ on the night, i think. that was the week of the 9th of _ on the night, i think. that was the week of the 9th of march, - on the night, i think. that was the week of the 9th of march, yes. . on the night, i think. that was the l week of the 9th of march, yes. they then came back _ week of the 9th of march, yes. they then came back with _ week of the 9th of march, yes. tue: then came back with timing advice which on the 12th, it was more specific and the timing advice on the 12th said that you don't need to implement the first of these until i think the 20th and the other two later. that all changed on the 16th. there was a 13th sage where they said, don't allow concern about the timing of implementation to delay anything you might wish to do. so there was a change on the 13th in terms of material from sage and the evidence is quite clearly there were dramatic changes in the approach over that weekend. i dramatic changes in the approach over that weekend.— dramatic changes in the approach over that weekend. i think the 16th is the meeting _ over that weekend. i think the 16th is the meeting that _ over that weekend. i think the 16th is the meeting that i _ over that weekend. i think the 16th is the meeting that i remember - over that weekend. i think the 16th | is the meeting that i remember and over that weekend. i think the 16th l is the meeting that i remember and i think the imperial modelling had come out at around the same time. sage themselves said at that moment in time and it is recorded in the minutes that they have you had changed just in the past few days. that is what you recall.— that is what you recall. yes, in those days. — that is what you recall. yes, in those days, something - that is what you recall. yes, in i those days, something changed. i that is what you recall. yes, in - those days, something changed. i do remember it was the imperial modelling that came out at around the same time which was no doubt factor, but you would have to say that she would have to ask them. on the 16th, that is when they said, we need to do things sooner than we thought, do them now, and i think the prime minister announced on that day. he the prime minister announced on that da . ., , ., , ., day. he did, there was a suite of measures _ day. he did, there was a suite of measures on _ day. he did, there was a suite of measures on the _ day. he did, there was a suite of measures on the 16th _ day. he did, there was a suite of measures on the 16th and - day. he did, there was a suite of i measures on the 16th and decision taken on the 18th to close schools and on the 20th, you will recall vividly the decision that nonessential retail and so on should close. but the fact that you as chancellor recall the debate about the warning, and i don't mean that in any pejorative sense, the debate about the potential impact of going too early, rather suggests that it was an important issue and that it would be likely to have had an impact on the decision—making process. t impact on the decision-making rocess. ~' impact on the decision-making rocess. ~ ., ., process. i think we were following the advice from _ process. i think we were following the advice from the _ process. i think we were following the advice from the scientists. - process. i think we were following the advice from the scientists. i l process. i think we were following | the advice from the scientists. i do agree that we were influenced and informed by what they were telling the government to do and when to do it. and they definitely early on, as you've mentioned, they talked a lot about timing and not going too early, in their words in the press conferences and with us in meetings. 0n conferences and with us in meetings. on thursday the 19th of march, whatsapp meshes between mr cummings and mr cain showed an emergency or at least a debate that had to take place in front of the prime minister —— messages. concerning the fear that the bond market or the gilts market as we would call it might collapse, or at least a concern as to the extent to which the government might be able to fund itself. just so that we can get the chronological picture correct, did you go and debate or speak to the prime minister on that thursday in relation to your concerns about funding? because there had been, although shortly to be, a placing of debt on the market place that failed. so there was a real problem on that thursday.— failed. so there was a real problem on that thursday. yes. now, i don't recall the precise _ on that thursday. yes. now, i don't recall the precise timing _ on that thursday. yes. now, i don't recall the precise timing and - on that thursday. yes. now, i don't recall the precise timing and date i recall the precise timing and date when i was speaking to the prime minister on these issues, but you will have a record on it. but the key moments were that i received advice on the 19th.— key moments were that i received | advice on the 19th._ yes. advice on the 19th. thursday. yes. and the reason _ advice on the 19th. thursday. yes. and the reason for— advice on the 19th. thursday. yes. and the reason for that _ advice on the 19th. thursday. yes. and the reason for that was - advice on the 19th. thursday. yes. and the reason for that was the i advice on the 19th. thursday. yes. | and the reason for that was the day before, there was a very significant move in gilt rates. so the cost of our borrowing to put it in ordinary language. and they had been a move across most developed markets, bond markets, that the move in the uk was outsized relative to our peers and that was of concerning. so global investment community starting to take a different view on the uk government's ability to borrow all the price that we should pay for that. and the cost of our borrowing at that point had tripled in a matter of probably out a week. so it was a very major— matter of probably out a week. so it was a very major problem. and i matter of probably out a week. so it| was a very major problem. and there was a very ma'or problem. and there are other was a very major problem. and there are other things _ was a very major problem. and there are other things that _ was a very major problem. and there are other things that are _ was a very major problem. and there are other things that are technical. are other things that are technical and that led the treasury and the advice i was getting to tell me gilt markets were showing some signs of impaired functioning. so that was what was happening on the 18th and 19th. and then something else happened on the 21st. i 19th. and then something else happened on the 21st.- 19th. and then something else happened on the 21st. i don't want to to into happened on the 21st. i don't want to go into the _ happened on the 21st. i don't want to go into the detail— happened on the 21st. i don't want to go into the detail of— happened on the 21st. i don't want to go into the detail of it, - happened on the 21st. i don't want to go into the detail of it, but i to go into the detail of it, but would you just confirmed that the government put arrangements in place to ensure additional liquidity in the event they were not used, but the event they were not used, but the government was on top of the problem? and you raised this problem with the prime minister on the thursday. in the context of the decision—making which was then going on as to whether or not london should be locked down first, and you are concerned that in any final decision, the prime minister understood that the bond market, the gilt market was a consideration. yes, i think it is worth, if you don't mind me spending a minute on it because i think it's important for the context of the time because it was incredibly worrying to me as chancellor, what happened on the 21st is that we had a failed gilt auction. what that means is a government, in order to fund itself and pay for the things we need, borrowing on the market, and that day when we try to borrow from people, the auction didn't go as planned and we couldn't raise the money we needed. that is an extremely serious and rare events, it had happened once before in the financial crisis. and it unsurprisingly caused enormous anxiety inside the treasury and with me because it was a very worrying development. subsequent to that, the government had to enter into i think what you were referring to matt which was something called the ways and means facility. in ordinary parlance, that is an overdraft facility at the bank of england. the common saying that we are not sure if we can borrow the money we need and fund ourselves, so we will open up and fund ourselves, so we will open up an overdraft at the bank of england and if need be, they will fund us, which is almost unprecedented, it happened once before in the crisis, and it is strong evidence of the extreme stress we were under from a financing perspective. sorry to explain, but i think it's important to understand the context i was operating in and that is what over the course of those few days, i would no doubt have explained to the prime minister. find would no doubt have explained to the prime minister.— prime minister. and what did you understand _ prime minister. and what did you understand to _ prime minister. and what did you understand to have _ prime minister. and what did you understand to have been - prime minister. and what did you understand to have been the i prime minister. and what did you i understand to have been the impact of you telling the prime minister about your concerns? so in the context of the debate which was running on of course during those days as to the extent to which further measures would need to be imposed and of course ultimately, whether there should be a lockdown decision, what impact did your concerns about the gilt and the bond market and the government's ability to fund itself have on that decision—making process? and so you are clear, there is some suggestion there was on that thursday mooted there was on that thursday mooted the possibility of locking down london in advance of the rest of the country. and we want to know to what extent that decision was influenced by the concerns about government borrowing? by the concerns about government borrowin: ? ., , , ., by the concerns about government borrowinu? , ., , ., ., borrowing? probably a question for the previous _ borrowing? probably a question for the previous prime _ borrowing? probably a question for the previous prime minister, i borrowing? probably a question for| the previous prime minister, really, because he would have been hearing lots of different things from lots of different people. you lots of different things from lots of different people.— lots of different things from lots of different people. you must have exressed of different people. you must have exoressed a _ of different people. you must have expressed a view _ of different people. you must have expressed a view to _ of different people. you must have expressed a view to the _ of different people. you must have expressed a view to the prime i expressed a view to the prime minister when you spoke to him and that thursday. i minister when you spoke to him and that thursday-_ that thursday. i don't recall other than exolain _ that thursday. i don't recall other than exolain it — that thursday. i don't recall other than explain it in _ that thursday. i don't recall other than explain it in the _ that thursday. i don't recall other than explain it in the stress i that thursday. i don't recall other than explain it in the stress we i than explain it in the stress we were under and it was a relevant consideration for him and that's why he had an impossiblejob in many ways to balance these difficult things. with regard to london specifically, i recollect that meeting and i recollect that the priority intervention that had been recommended, suggested by sage, was to close schools and we did that. the prime minister announced that i think on the same day as the meeting on the 18th, notjust in london, but nationally. so in terms of the substantive, here are the set of options for london, the one in the papers that it said would be most effective was closing schools, that was announced at the same day by the prime minister and acted on. what prime minister and acted on. what debate did you _ prime minister and acted on. what debate did you have _ prime minister and acted on. what debate did you have with the prime minister about whether or not looking london was an advisable step to take in light of your concerns about the gilt market? == to take in light of your concerns about the gilt market? -- locking down london. _ about the gilt market? -- locking down london. i— about the gilt market? -- locking down london. i don't— about the gilt market? -- locking down london. i don't recall- about the gilt market? -- locking down london. i don't recall a i down london. i don't recall a specific meeting or conversation about those two things. i think more generally as i've said, myjob was to provide him with best economic evidence, advice, analysis and it was a relevant consideration for him that there was this situation in the gilt market and it was right he was aware of that. and of course, with regard to london, we took the advice of sage and close schools notjust in london, but across the entire country on the same day that advice came to the committee. yes. country on the same day that advice came to the committee.— came to the committee. yes, the decision was _ came to the committee. yes, the decision was then _ came to the committee. yes, the decision was then announced i came to the committee. yes, the decision was then announced on | came to the committee. yes, the i decision was then announced on the 18th to take effect from the 20th. in your statement, so that we can understand and it is a matter of huge public interest, we can understand the nature of the impact of the lockdown decision, have you set out and we will have your statement at page 53 at paragraphs 182 to 187, the scale of the economic and social impact of the pandemic restrictions? mr sunak, i will respectfully ask you to try to keep your answers as concise as you can. perhaps you mightjust agree with the following proposition. you set out in those paragraphs the damage that was done in terms of the impact on gdp, the damage on the economy, the government's cover the costs of course, the fiscal impact and the scarring. that is to say the long—term damage to the economy through alterations in labour supply and the like. so you have attempted to set out in very broad terms what the lockdown decision did. yes. witness statement _ the lockdown decision did. 123 witness statement contains a summary of the various impacts, as you highlighted. the biggest fall in gdp was predicted in hundreds of years, borrowing reaching world war ii levels. the impact that would have on the labour market, unemployment and tax levels, which obviously we were grappling with and grappling with today. economic scarring is the long—term impact on the economy from things that happen in the short term. i won't go over it in great detail, but i think it is clear as a result of what was happening, the art —— the economy and jobs were being impacted, which is crucialfor livelihoods and businesses would be impaired. because of the borrowing that was necessary, that would have an impact on future tax levels. in summary, those, iam happy to elaborate if you need, but that was in my witness statement. just elaborate if you need, but that was in my witness statement.— in my witness statement. just to reassure you _ in my witness statement. just to reassure you and _ in my witness statement. just to reassure you and others, - in my witness statement. just to reassure you and others, i i in my witness statement. just to reassure you and others, i don't| reassure you and others, i don't 'ust reassure you and others, i don't just take — reassure you and others, i don't just take into account your oral evidence, _ just take into account your oral evidence, but before reaching any conclusions, i take evidence, but before reaching any conclusions, itake into evidence, but before reaching any conclusions, i take into account everything _ conclusions, i take into account everything you said in writing. so don't _ everything you said in writing. so don'tworry1_ everything you said in writing. so don't worry, it will all be considered.— don't worry, it will all be considered. ., , , ., ., considered. to be plain, i have asked you _ considered. to be plain, i have asked you because _ considered. to be plain, i have asked you because it _ considered. to be plain, i have asked you because it is - considered. to be plain, i have asked you because it is potent| considered. to be plain, i have i asked you because it is potent the public understand you have attempted to set out in a witness statement some of the overarching consequences of the first lockdown decisions. if i might so people can see it, i think it's important and this is always tricky in public policy, many of these impacts are not felt immediately. they are felt over time. and that is always a tough thing to deal with when you are communicating. but as it turned out, we were able to borrow what we needed to fund the pandemic response. the impact of having to pay it back only comes well after the fact when everyone forgets why it was necessary and now everyone is grappling with the consequences, i am grappling with the consequences of that as we have a historically high tax burden that is higher than i would like. that is a direct consequence of the support was provided during the pandemic and then later on. but those things are often hard to get across, but they are all contained in a statement. let's please not get onto the issue of tax burdens. there are two issues to which he paid particular attention in your statement following the lockdown in march and april 2020, following the lockdown in march and april2020, mr sunak. following the lockdown in march and april 2020, mr sunak. the first is the hmt expressed concern that there had been over compliance with the government's stay at home messaging during the first lockdown. essentially, you are concerned and your department was concerned that the public hadn't understood sufficiently clearly from the government's communications that they should go to work only if they could not work from home and that the messaging perhaps, the nuance of that position had been lost in the overall messaging, stay at home to help us stay low —— save lives. what did the exchequer to do about that, was there any means open to you to try to change the messaging or to try to change the messaging or to try to change the messaging or to try to ensure that people did go to work where they permissible the and legally could do so?— legally could do so? you're right in summarising _ legally could do so? you're right in summarising situation. _ legally could do so? you're right in summarising situation. perhaps i legally could do so? you're right in| summarising situation. perhaps the best example of it is in the construction industry which because it was by its nature outdoors and we had seen what had happened in other european countries, more activity was able to be continued in europe than was the case in the uk. so that was a good example of the messaging being slightly lost. i don't think there was anything we could do about it particularly. it was a relevant point when we came to the exit road map in the plan and trying to get that messaging great. because the scientific advice and the modelling was predicated on an amount of people who were working from home and an amount of people who were at work and what ended up happening was those assumptions were essentially undershot and fewer people were out at work than had been anticipated. indeed. could i ask you please also to slow down a little bit when you give your answers, prime minister? a record of course is being kept by us. if we could look at 236583. it is an e—mailfrom again your principal private secretary in the treasury to various recipients. and as you rightly say, this is in fact dated april, but it is on the cusp of the debate about the recovery plan. so as you say, the debate about coming out of the lockdown. the e—mail says the chancellor is considering the paper for the cabinet office process. a quick read out of the discussion at the meeting this afternoon. and obviously, references to your position in relation to the various issues which are being debated within the treasury. how difficult it is to argue that the mpi should be lifted while the number of cases and deaths are still rising, but you are broadly supportive of the strategy that encourages return behaviour back to the economy. then there is a reference to economic groups starting to model and you wish that you have very clearly in mind the exact timetable of what advice on modelling is being given and then a reference to the timing of any decision. if you could go forward, please, to page four. we will see this specifically following up on npis, there is going to be a wider cabinet discussion. and then this at three b, prime minister. i propose the following is the next step, a paper that we can share it with the premise that head of the bilateral, an opportunity for the chancellor to set out his views and the economic analysis for the prime minister without it being watered down by the cabinet office process. do you know what that is a reference to, the watered down by the cabinet office process? because plainly, you as the chancellor are absolutely entitled, you suggested yourself, perhaps constitutionally obligated, to bring the economic angle to the prime minister without it being watered down by any other part of government so what is that a reference to, do you think? 0bviously reference to, do you think? obviously i didn't write the e—mail so it's hard for