good practice which other police forces should consider under similar circumstances. i know from my own experience that when searching for people lost in water course ways, both the sea, coastal or tidal, or indeed land—based rivers, is very complex, complicated, and i think the report does justice as to why this was a difficult search and why it took so long for nikolai's body to be found. this is very important, as the commissioner said in his opening comments, nothing could be done that we sort that could have led to the body being found sooner. we made one observation about the recovery. it was predicted that nicola's body would be found during those two days, i think that 20th was the day predicted. the constabulary should have made better preparation for the preservation of the scene to prevent intrusion at the scene to prevent intrusion at the scene to prevent intrusion at the scene of the recovery. studio: we will leave _ the scene of the recovery. studio: we will leave that _ the scene of the recovery. studio: we will leave that news _ the scene of the recovery. studio: we will leave that news conference j we will leave that news conference there as details are revealed into there as details are revealed into the review into police handling of the review into police handling of the disappearance of nicola bulley in january in the disappearance of nicola bulley injanuary in st michael's on wyre injanuary in st michael's on wyre in lancashire. her body was found 23 days later. police in their review saying they believe the investigation was done correctly and well but they found the disclosure of personal information about nicola bulley�*s health struggles was avoidable and unnecessary. we can take you live to the covid inquiry in london. the inquiry is taking witness evidence until christmas before moving to scotland, wales and northern ireland. today, professor sir chris whitty, the chief medical officerfor england, is sir chris whitty, the chief medical officer for england, is expected to give evidence. that is under way and we can listen in. i give evidence. that is under way and we can listen in.— we can listen in. i have been very clear about _ we can listen in. i have been very clear about that _ we can listen in. i have been very clear about that for _ we can listen in. i have been very clear about that for some - we can listen in. i have been very clear about that for some time. l we can listen in. i have been very i clear about that for some time. we can come onto the reasons for that. the idea that there was not some tension between those two and it would somehow go without cost earlier than needed, i think was incorrect. and again, everyone around the sage group table would agree with that position. the degree of waiting, i'm talking here in terms of putting weight is in terms of waiting for time, vary between people. i was further in terms of leading through the disadvantages before we act. and making sure before we act. and making sure before i gave advice that ministers were aware of both sides of the equation. were aware of both sides of the euuation. ., . ., equation. you have referred there to the very well — equation. you have referred there to the very well known _ equation. you have referred there to the very well known harmful - the very well known harmful consequences of intervention, to the damage _ consequences of intervention, to the damage done economically, societally, by non—pharmaceutical interventions. were those issues not, _ interventions. were those issues not, however, something betterfor government to resolve, these being intensely— government to resolve, these being intensely political decisions, as opposed — intensely political decisions, as opposed to the cmo, whose primary concern _ opposed to the cmo, whose primary concern is _ opposed to the cmo, whose primary concern is public health and clinical— concern is public health and clinical matters? were you entitled to weigh _ clinical matters? were you entitled to weigh up the adverse consequences of early— to weigh up the adverse consequences of early intervention when advising on public— of early intervention when advising on public health and clinical matters?— on public health and clinical matters? , ., . ,, on public health and clinical matters? i. . ,, , matters? the point you make is absolutely _ matters? the point you make is absolutely correct. _ matters? the point you make is absolutely correct. i— matters? the point you make is absolutely correct. i was - matters? the point you make is absolutely correct. i was not. matters? the point you make is. absolutely correct. i was not only entitled but should have and did weigh up the negative aspects from a public health point of view. it was no part of myjob, nor did i ever do this, to say, what are the wider economic and social and geopolitical questions. that was not myjob. sorry, i am going to interrupt. lets take some — sorry, i am going to interrupt. lets take some practical _ sorry, i am going to interrupt. lets take some practical examples. the question of someone who goes into shielding before needed and ends up with loneliness, depression and so on, that is a clinical and public health problem. the problem of someone living on the borderline of deprivation, plus stove the edge into deprivation, is a public health problem. questions of the wider economy are not a public health problem and not for me, but the first two firmly within the realms of public health and i don't think any public health expert would disagree they are. they might disagree they are. they might disagree on the exact approach i or others took, but i think the principle that those are firmly within the scope of public health, i think is widely accepted.— think is widely accepted. inherent in this system _ think is widely accepted. inherent in this system and _ think is widely accepted. inherent in this system and this _ think is widely accepted. inherent in this system and this process, l think is widely accepted. inherent i in this system and this process, and in this system and this process, and in the _ in this system and this process, and in the government response is this very difficult balance between the public _ very difficult balance between the public health obligation to reduce mortality directly and indirectly, to stop — mortality directly and indirectly, to stop the number of deaths, stop the number of indirect deaths that might— the number of indirect deaths that might be _ the number of indirect deaths that might be brought about by, for example. — might be brought about by, for example, a collapse in the nhs system, — example, a collapse in the nhs system, against the harmful indirect societal _ system, against the harmful indirect societal consequences of intervention. in those early days in january— intervention. in those early days in january and — intervention. in those early days in january and february, was there not a greater— january and february, was there not a greater need to get on top of the first side _ a greater need to get on top of the first side of— a greater need to get on top of the first side of the balance, to make sure that — first side of the balance, to make sure that in — first side of the balance, to make sure that in public health and epidemiological terms everything had to be done to reduce direct and indirect— to be done to reduce direct and indirect mortality as opposed to focusing — indirect mortality as opposed to focusing on the indirect consequences of intervention? | consequences of intervention? i think consequences of intervention? think that consequences of intervention? i think that one of the problems with that argument is if you get... up to and including the beginning of certainly march, we didn't have any mortality in the uk. we had only just in fact had evidence of internal transmission. there then is a very difficult period, really, from the beginning of march until the 16th and then the 23rd of march, where the exact point along that path where the intervention should happen was a matter for legitimate technical debate from a public health point of view, then after that there is a wider set of discussions, exactly as you say, on the wider impacts on the economy and society which are not for me, sage or others, that's not our role. but those technical questions, what we should give in terms of the public health advice, you had to actually give both sides of that advice. let me give an example in a slightly different way, if i can try and make this clearer. if there is a doctor, you only say to someone, you need an operation, and you don't lay out to them all the things that will potentially go wrong with us operation, even if you think personally it's the right thing to do, you are failing in your medical role. and in fact if it came to a court there would be firm direction on that from the legal profession. so it's important that when giving advice, you give advice on both sides of the equation. that is central in my view. additionally you have to actually think through the public health implications. one of the problems i had in thinking this through was i think some people were thinking this wasjust through was i think some people were thinking this was just a matter of getting a few weeks and then we are out and it's all fine. my view is you had to think about this over the course of the epidemic as a whole, and that was clearly going to go on for a lot longer, hence why we put so much emphasis for example on research. my view is always, you would only get to a situation you would only get to a situation you would not have to consider npi, for the sake of argument, when you have medical countermeasures, vaccines and drugs and countermeasures, and that was going to take some time. you have to do whatever you are doing for a period of time until essentially the cavalry came over the hill in the form of medical science. in the hill in the form of medical science. . , ., , ., science. in that period before it became apparent _ science. in that period before it became apparent there - science. in that period before it became apparent there were i science. in that period before it. became apparent there were cases science. in that period before it - became apparent there were cases and then subsequently deaths in the united _ then subsequently deaths in the united kingdom, there are references to you _ united kingdom, there are references to you in _ united kingdom, there are references to you in the — united kingdom, there are references to you in the e—mail correspondence with government and also meetings, referring _ with government and also meetings, referring to _ with government and also meetings, referring to the risks of overreaction, on the 23rd of march, as late _ overreaction, on the 23rd of march, as late as— overreaction, on the 23rd of march, as late as the 23rd of march, in a meeting — as late as the 23rd of march, in a meeting with the prime minister, you were reported by imran shafi in his notes _ were reported by imran shafi in his notes on _ were reported by imran shafi in his notes on that meeting to have said, overreacting will have impact. i want _ overreacting will have impact. i want to — overreacting will have impact. i want to ask you, to what extent did the need _ want to ask you, to what extent did the need for— want to ask you, to what extent did the need for the accumulation of data, _ the need for the accumulation of data. to — the need for the accumulation of data, to be sure about what the position — data, to be sure about what the position was, knowing the lie of the land before systemically the country reacted. _ land before systemically the country reacted, infected your decision? my advice reacted, infected your decision? advice was, reacted, infected your decision? iii advice was, by the reacted, infected your decision? my advice was, by the time sage had advice, it was the advice of the sage group, and their advice at this point was extremely clear, that without action we were going to be in very deep trouble, and they had said that from the 16th onwards, really, in my view extremely clearly. it is important that if, in giving advice, the downsides of the advice are also laid out. that is good medical practice and it is also good medical practice and it is also good civil service practice, that's what you should do. it doesn't mean you do not think the action should occur and in you do not think the action should occurand in my you do not think the action should occur and in my view, by the time we got to the 23rd, the options available to ministers, unless they wished to see very heavy loss of life, were pretty narrow, actually, but they needed to be aware of the downsides nevertheless.— downsides nevertheless. there is obvious the _ downsides nevertheless. there is obvious the difference _ downsides nevertheless. there is obvious the difference between i obvious the difference between advising — obvious the difference between advising on the downsides of the variety— advising on the downsides of the variety of— advising on the downsides of the variety of options and different courses— variety of options and different courses that could be taken. and a general— courses that could be taken. and a general appeal not to overreact, and it's that _ general appeal not to overreact, and it's that latter issue that i want you to — it's that latter issue that i want you to address, please. did you, during _ you to address, please. did you, during that — you to address, please. did you, during that time, january, february, march. _ during that time, january, february, march. call— during that time, january, february, march, callthe during that time, january, february, march, call the risks of overreacting, did you call out that there _ overreacting, did you call out that there was— overreacting, did you call out that there was a — overreacting, did you call out that there was a danger that if the country— there was a danger that if the country went too soon, too rapidly, there _ country went too soon, too rapidly, there would — country went too soon, too rapidly, there would be other hats indirect but other— there would be other hats indirect but other significant consequences? i can but other significant consequences? i can only _ but other significant consequences? i can only in — but other significant consequences? i can only in a sense repeat what i previously said. i was certainly not in any way deviating from the position of sage. that was the position of sage. that was the position of sage. that was the position of sage, we had agreed it, and it was clear the view of sage was if you wish to avoid the loss of life then you are going to have to do act. it was certainly the case that it was clear there would be downsides to that action and indeed if you did not get that advice, when the downsides emerge, when they surely would, the ministers involved would be much more likely in my view to reverse position, so they need to have a firm foundation when they take an advice that this is, if you wish to reduce and minimise loss of life, this is the path down which you will have to choose a number of very unpalatable options, but bear in mind the fact there are downsides and we are telling you now. don't say in two months that we didn't know, this is the situation now. thatin know, this is the situation now. that in my view is an appropriate way to give advice and i doubt any doctor listening to this or any civil servant listening to this would disagree in that being the appropriate way to give advice to a patient or a minister. you appropriate way to give advice to a patient or a minister.— patient or a minister. you have referred a _ patient or a minister. you have referred a couple _ patient or a minister. you have referred a couple of— patient or a minister. you have referred a couple of times - patient or a minister. you have referred a couple of times now| patient or a minister. you have i referred a couple of times now to the fact— referred a couple of times now to the fact you were merely relaying the fact you were merely relaying the position of sage. did sage itself— the position of sage. did sage itself won against the dangers of overreaction in those weeks from late january to early march? | overreaction in those weeks from late january to early march? i don't think i late january to early march? i don't think i would _ late january to early march? i don't think i would have _ late january to early march? i don't think i would have used _ late january to early march? i don't think i would have used the - late january to early march? i don't| think i would have used the phrase, or certainly sage would have used the phrase overreaction. we would have said, here are some downsides. and these are things you need to be aware of. again, to go back to my earlier point, the differences between different people on sage on this were not of, are these downsides there, etc. all of these things were agreed. there was some difference as to the degree of weighting people are going to put on them. but it is important there is a degree of debate before these things are put forward. degree of debate before these things are put forward-— are put forward. there is a debate and individuals _ are put forward. there is a debate and individuals would _ are put forward. there is a debate and individuals would differ - are put forward. there is a debate and individuals would differ as - are put forward. there is a debate and individuals would differ as to l and individuals would differ as to the speed at which the system is required — the speed at which the system is required to react, whether or not steps _ required to react, whether or not steps were — required to react, whether or not steps were taken, whether or not further— steps were taken, whether or not further data should be accumulated, and a _ further data should be accumulated, and a better understanding accrued. but the _ and a better understanding accrued. but the material appears to suggest that you _ but the material appears to suggest that you were prominent in calling out the _ that you were prominent in calling out the risk— that you were prominent in calling out the risk of overreaction, and as sir patrick— out the risk of overreaction, and as sir patrick vallance suggested, you were more — sir patrick vallance suggested, you were more cautious than others in wanting _ were more cautious than others in wanting to — were more cautious than others in wanting to wait to see how things would _ wanting to wait to see how things would eventually... i wanting to wait to see how things would eventually. . ._ wanting to wait to see how things would eventually... i have re'ected and will continue * would eventually... i have re'ected and will continue to h would eventually... i have re'ected and will continue to reject h would eventually... i have rejected and will continue to reject your. and will continue to reject your characterisation of this as overreaction. because that implies that i thought the action should not happen. what i thought should happen is that people should be aware that without action very serious things would occur, but the downsides of those actions should be made transparent. i don't consider that's incorrect, and actually don't think that was stopped that sir patrick was in a sense a saying exactly that, the advice we gave was identical but the debate we had was how do we get the balance of these clearly in front of people, and that's an appropriate thing to do. in principle, and obviously you have explained _ in principle, and obviously you have explained very clearly what your position — explained very clearly what your position was, but in principle if generically the response of government was too cautious, or the advice _ government was too cautious, or the advice was _ government was too cautious, or the advice was given was too cautious, can that. _ advice was given was too cautious, can that. in — advice was given was too cautious, can that, in the field of pandemics, in the _ can that, in the field of pandemics, in the field — can that, in the field of pandemics, in the field of epidemiological study. — in the field of epidemiological study, lead to government responses bein- study, lead to government responses being behind the curve, so putting it another— being behind the curve, so putting it another way, antithetical to the notion— it another way, antithetical to the notion of— it another way, antithetical to the notion of which the inquiry has heard — notion of which the inquiry has heard quite a bit, that when dealing with pandemics, the precautionary principle _ with pandemics, the precautionary principle demands that you go early and you _ principle demands that you go early and you go— principle demands that you go early and you go hard? i principle demands that you go early and you go hard?— principle demands that you go early and you go hard? i think some of the evidence to — and you go hard? i think some of the evidence to the _ and you go hard? i think some of the evidence to the inquiry _ and you go hard? i think some of the evidence to the inquiry on _ and you go hard? i think some of the evidence to the inquiry on the - evidence to the inquiry on the precautionary principle misunderstands it quite profoundly, actually. the precautionary principle is useful when you are dealing with something where there are for practical purposes no downsides. orvery are for practical purposes no downsides. or very minimal downsides relative to the advantage. in which case the contest to be, just go ahead and do it. an obvious example was advice to people to wash their hands. there is no downside to that. it's good thing to do. the more you get into things where there is a significant cost, and i don't mean that in an economic sense but cost to individuals, cost to families in terms of their health, mental health and so on, the less you can say, well it is just a precautionary principle and i will impose this on you just in case. that's not an appropriate understanding of what the precautionary principle is or should be. the precautionary principle is or should be— the precautionary principle is or shouldbe. ., . , . ., should be. you gave a presentation at the royal— should be. you gave a presentation at the royal college _ should be. you gave a presentation at the royal college of _ should be. you gave a presentation at the royal college of physicians i at the royal college of physicians on the _ at the royal college of physicians on the 12th of february. if we can 'ust on the 12th of february. if we can just have — on the 12th of february. if we can just have a — on the 12th of february. if we can just have a note of what you said. 274050 — iam bound i am bound to say you expressed in beautiful— i am bound to say you expressed in beautiful language, professor, the dichotomy that was faced both by you and the _ dichotomy that was faced both by you and the system generally when dealing — and the system generally when dealing with this pandemic. by saying — dealing with this pandemic. by saying these words. and then we will come _ saying these words. and then we will come out _ saying these words. and then we will come out the other side and at the other— come out the other side and at the other side — come out the other side and at the other side one of two things will happen — other side one of two things will happen. either i will be with some colleagues in front of the committee or inguiry— colleagues in front of the committee or inquiry explaining why it is that we failed — or inquiry explaining why it is that we failed to prepare adequately for this armageddon, which actually would _ this armageddon, which actually would not be in armageddon, i think that was— would not be in armageddon, i think that was a _ would not be in armageddon, i think that was a technical explanation of the stop— that was a technical explanation of the stop or— that was a technical explanation of the stop or we will be sitting in front— the stop or we will be sitting in front of— the stop or we will be sitting in front of the committee saying, why did you _ front of the committee saying, why did you spend all this money on an effort _ did you spend all this money on an effort to— did you spend all this money on an effort to make that never happened. those _ effort to make that never happened. those are _ effort to make that never happened. those are the two solutions, and i'm basically— those are the two solutions, and i'm basically ready for either of them. 0bviously— basically ready for either of them. obviously this is an excellent demonstration of gallows humour, but does that— demonstration of gallows humour, but does that reflect, do you think fairly. — does that reflect, do you think fairly. the _ does that reflect, do you think fairly, the dichotomy which was faced _ fairly, the dichotomy which was faced by— fairly, the dichotomy which was faced by you and your colleagues and by the _ faced by you and your colleagues and by the government? | faced by you and your colleagues and by the government?— by the government? i think it's important _ by the government? i think it's important to — by the government? i think it's important to put _ by the government? i think it's important to put some - by the government? i think it's important to put some context| by the government? i think it's i important to put some context on this. i actually stand by what i said but i will explain it and i should say here we are, so this was not an entirely unfair thing to say. i was giving a talk to the medical profession at a point where we were over two weeks, i think from memory, before the first internally transmitted case in the uk, more than three weeks before the first deaths in the uk, and in fact before the first death in europe from covid. my point at this stage to then was, this in a sense was part of a two hour briefing in which i and colleagues were laying out the science and saying, we are going to have to do a lot of things here. many of which are going to be difficult. and if you want to watch my whole talk i think it's pretty clearly a kind of battle talk to people, a brace yourself, and things will get harder. it may be that at the other end we will decide that we shouldn't have done all those things and this was an overreaction, but the fact is we have to do them. by this stage for example i had already committed public money to doing research on covid. that decision was already taken. and a variety of other things were already in train that were causing significant difficulties to colleagues in other bits of the health service. in my view this was in a sense saying, yes, we have to act, but be aware of the fact this could go, even at that point, i was increasingly doubtful, but this could go either way. the reference to _ but this could go either way. the reference to spending all the money on an— reference to spending all the money on an epidemic that never happens is of course _ on an epidemic that never happens is of course another way of describing overreaction. you of course another way of describing overreaction-— overreaction. you are trying to ascribe discussions _ overreaction. you are trying to ascribe discussions in - overreaction. you are trying to i ascribe discussions in mid-march overreaction. you are trying to - ascribe discussions in mid-march to ascribe discussions in mid—march to ascribe discussions in mid—march to a point where i was trying to explain a rather different set of things to the medical profession in early to mid—february. it's a very different set of circumstances. br; different set of circumstances. by that date, the 12th of february, you were of— that date, the 12th of february, you were of course aware of what is known — were of course aware of what is known as — were of course aware of what is known as the report four from imperial— known as the report four from imperial college london on the 10th of february which describe the overall— of february which describe the overall case fatality rate of all infections, both symptomatic and asymptomatic for this emerging coronavirus is approximately 1%, so the death— coronavirus is approximately 1%, so the death rate overall was 1%. and sp the death rate overall was 1%. and sp imo. _ the death rate overall was 1%. and sp imo, the inquiry has heard evidence _ sp imo, the inquiry has heard evidence about this, had reported on the 10th _ evidence about this, had reported on the 10th of— evidence about this, had reported on the 10th of february, again two days before. _ the 10th of february, again two days before, that it is a realistic probability that there is already sustained transmission in the united kingdom. _ sustained transmission in the united kingdom, orthat sustained transmission in the united kingdom, or that it will become established in the coming weeks. in li-ht established in the coming weeks. in light of— established in the coming weeks. in light of the — established in the coming weeks. in light of the information made available to you, my question therefore _ available to you, my question therefore is, in the application of that balance, to which you refer, was it— that balance, to which you refer, was it not — that balance, to which you refer, was it not already by the 10th of february— was it not already by the 10th of february clear which way that balance — february clear which way that balance had to be operated? by this stare i was balance had to be operated? by this stage i was doing — balance had to be operated? by this stage i was doing the _ balance had to be operated? by this stage i was doing the great - balance had to be operated? by this stage i was doing the great majorityj stage i was doing the great majority of my work and my team's work on this, we were putting a large amount of time into communicating it, putting resources into it, trying to get the medical profession ready for it. at a point where in my view we were moving increasingly far away from a probability this could go back to nothing, but we weren't yet at a point where we could say that definitively. we were still a long way away from the who declaring a pandemic and we did not at this stage and did not for some time in fact have internal transmission. 50 their statement by sp imo that we might at some point have it, i am paraphrasing, i thought was a reasonable one. we didn't have it at that point in time. it also important to recognise that it would have been wrong to swing the whole of the medical profession into this, even at the height of the pandemic more people died of causes not covid then died of covid. every one of those deaths is tragic on both sides. {lari those deaths is tragic on both sides. u, , those deaths is tragic on both sides. _, , . ., those deaths is tragic on both sides. , . ., . sides. of course. can we now look at an entirely — sides. of course. can we now look at an entirely separate _ sides. of course. can we now look at an entirely separate subject - sides. of course. can we now look at an entirely separate subject by - sides. of course. can we now look at an entirely separate subject by way i an entirely separate subject by way of trying _ an entirely separate subject by way of trying again to put into place some _ of trying again to put into place some of— of trying again to put into place some of the important building blocks — some of the important building blocks. you met regularly, did you not, blocks. you met regularly, did you not. with— blocks. you met regularly, did you not, with the cmos of the other kingdoms — not, with the cmos of the other kingdoms of the uk? that was obviously— kingdoms of the uk? that was obviously envisaged by the system, the system requires there be regular and significant collaboration with the cmo — and significant collaboration with the cmo is from other nations. did you start _ the cmo is from other nations. did you start to— the cmo is from other nations. did you start to work with them significantly from a very early point — significantly from a very early point in — significantly from a very early point in the chronology? yes. the four uk cmo _ point in the chronology? yes. the four uk cmo is — point in the chronology? yes. the four uk cmo is work— point in the chronology? yes. the four uk cmo is work closely - point in the chronology? yes. the i four uk cmo is work closely together in any case. we all saw this as a shared threat to the four nations of the united kingdom. we came from slightly different disciplinary backgrounds, that an advantage. to re—stress, having different opinions, different opinions and approaches is a strength and not a weakness. it allowed us to make sure that the advice we were giving ministers from a technical point of view remained as aligned as possible. ministers could then take different political positions but i think that remains the case all the way through. i like to pay great tribute to the other cmos in the other nations, i think we worked effectively as a team throughout. you met around 274 times according to your— you met around 274 times according to your statement. that you met around 274 times according to your statement.— to your statement. that is true, and we were messaging _ to your statement. that is true, and we were messaging in _ to your statement. that is true, and we were messaging in between i to your statement. that is true, and we were messaging in between that| to your statement. that is true, and i we were messaging in between that it was a very close interaction. iikla was a very close interaction. no doubt you _ was a very close interaction. no doubt you gave advice collectively? we gave _ doubt you gave advice collectively? we gave advice collectively where there were important issues. we gave advice collectively under a number of circumstances. the most important one was where we thought there was an issue with great public importance where we wanted to signal to the public that this was a collective view. to give an example of that, when schools were going back, we wanted to give a collective view about the risk benefit in a very clear way to the general public and to teachers and staff members. we wanted to give a clear view about vaccination of children. we gave those views as a collective, because our view was as a collective, in a sense we were demonstrating this was not just the sense we were demonstrating this was notjust the opinion of one person, this was a general opinion of the profession as represented by the chief medical officers and in some cases we did it with the deputy chief medical officers. you cases we did it with the deputy chief medical officers.- cases we did it with the deputy chief medical officers. you did it not 'ust chief medical officers. you did it rrot just to _ chief medical officers. you did it notjust to aid _ chief medical officers. you did it not just to aid collective - chief medical officers. you did it| notjust to aid collective decision not just to aid collective decision making _ not just to aid collective decision making for trends uk matters but to make _ making for trends uk matters but to make a _ making for trends uk matters but to make a strong collective public statement. make a strong collective public statement-— make a strong collective public statement. ., . . , statement. correct. and sometimes we would aet statement. correct. and sometimes we would get other— statement. correct. and sometimes we would get other senior _ statement. correct. and sometimes we would get other senior clinicians - would get other senior clinicians from other areas to do this as well. i think one bit of that which the inquiry will find useful, we collectively wrote a report to our successors along with damejenny harries in her new role and steve powis from the nhs, to say this is our professional opinion on technical matters, fully saying, to be clear, that the narrative of the inquiry... the narrative of the pandemic will come from this inquiry. we wanted to have a collective view to have a was next having to face a pandemic in the uk. here is what we learn from this. can ou recall here is what we learn from this. can you recall any _ here is what we learn from this. can you recall any significant scientific disagreements between you, albeit i'm sure there were times— you, albeit i'm sure there were times when you were testing each others— times when you were testing each other's thinking and testing the conclusions the other might have reached. — conclusions the other might have reached, but any significant disagreements? not reached, but any significant disagreements?— reached, but any significant disagreements? not that i can recall. ithink— disagreements? not that i can recall. i think there _ disagreements? not that i can recall. i think there were i disagreements? not that i can i recall. i think there were several points when we had to choose something over quite hard to reach a collective view. but these were usually things that were in practice 49% to 51% calls where it is not clear what to do when there is a legitimate spread of opinion and we wanted to, when we gave a collective view, be pretty confident we could give one we could all sign up to and be confident with. we thought through the pros and cons of that. i don't think from a technical point of view, the most difficult one tended to beyond borders. you gave advice on borders, _ tended to beyond borders. you gave advice on borders, balancing - tended to beyond borders. you gave advice on borders, balancing risks. advice on borders, balancing risks and benefits in education. of course. — and benefits in education. of course, vaccination, dosing schedules, clinicaltrials course, vaccination, dosing schedules, clinical trials and winter— schedules, clinical trials and winter challenges, challenges faced by all— winter challenges, challenges faced by all the _ winter challenges, challenges faced by all the nations. there has been some _ by all the nations. there has been some suggestion from some quarters that there _ some suggestion from some quarters that there was an absence of proper collaboration from the clinical medical— collaboration from the clinical medical front with devolved administrations. do you consider there _ administrations. do you consider there was— administrations. do you consider there was in fact the closest of collaboration with all four nations? just commenting on the areas where i was involved, there are many others, i think the cmo is demonstrably does a lot together. the different public agencies did a lot together. for example, the issues around ppe were agreed on a four nations basis, usually at a technical level. the presidents of the royal colleges, with whom i met regularly, on a uk wide basis, principally some of them are more scottish —based or english —based, for example, but they are a uk resource. the general medical council, involved as a uk body. we were walking purely from a professional and technical point of view, clinicaland professional and technical point of view, clinical and public health in my view, very closely all the way through and at multiple levels and this carried on all the way through the system. that doesn't mean that there were not different and legitimately different responses to the pandemic at an operational, political and other areas. it was not identical across the uk but i think at a technical level we did what we could to ensure the advice was shared and also tested across the uk. i think that was a real strength. is the uk. i think that was a real strenuth. . . . the uk. i think that was a real strength-— the uk. i think that was a real strenuth. , . . ., , strength. is a matter of interest, it's obvious _ strength. is a matter of interest, it's obvious there _ strength. is a matter of interest, it's obvious there were _ strength. is a matter of interest, it's obvious there were a - strength. is a matter of interest, it's obvious there were a very i strength. is a matter of interest, i it's obvious there were a very large number— it's obvious there were a very large number of— it's obvious there were a very large number of meetings from the 24th of january— number of meetings from the 24th of january 2020 onwards. in terms of the formality of that process, do you recall — the formality of that process, do you recall whether or not your various — you recall whether or not your various meetings with the other uk cmos— various meetings with the other uk cmos were limited?— cmos were limited? essentially we met in three _ cmos were limited? essentially we met in three different _ cmos were limited? essentially we met in three different ways. i cmos were limited? essentially we met in three different ways. there | met in three different ways. there were informal discussions will stop there were formal things where we were trying to come to a decision and essentially that either ended up with a minute or a joint letter which is essentially the minute of the positions we have taken. then there were discussion groups, of which are probably the most prominent was the senior clinicians group, which i chaired, which didn't just have cmos but people from the nhs, at some point it had chief nurses and others. this is very much notjust decision—making, but for people to share information principally. where a decision was taken, then there would be a formal record of it and i think that was the key point on this.— record of it and i think that was the key point on this. moving on to another part _ the key point on this. moving on to another part of— the key point on this. moving on to another part of the _ the key point on this. moving on to another part of the system, - the key point on this. moving on to another part of the system, public| another part of the system, public health _ another part of the system, public health england, you said in your statement that, because you are asked _ statement that, because you are asked to — statement that, because you are asked to comment on the effectiveness of public health england, that it did play to its considerable scientific strengths in january— considerable scientific strengths in january and february. we remind ourselves— january and february. we remind ourselves that it was in january that it — ourselves that it was in january that it created at great pace a pcr diagnostic— that it created at great pace a pcr diagnostic test for covid—19, but operationally struggled thereafter to scale _ operationally struggled thereafter to scale up the system of testing based _ to scale up the system of testing based on — to scale up the system of testing based on the diagnostic test that it had invented. is that a fair summary?— had invented. is that a fair summa ? . . , there was a wholescale absence of a sophisticated scaled up tester trace system in the beginning of 2020. you must have reflected long and hard on this issue. to what do you ascribe that absence? 1 this issue. to what do you ascribe that absence?— that absence? i think that, in a sense, that absence? i think that, in a sense. there — that absence? i think that, in a sense, there is _ that absence? i think that, in a sense, there is two _ that absence? i think that, in a sense, there is two levels i that absence? i think that, in a sense, there is two levels of i that absence? i think that, in a | sense, there is two levels of it. the countries which were best able to scale _ the countries which were best able to scale up. — the countries which were best able to scale up, particularly using their— to scale up, particularly using their public system, and i'm going to use _ their public system, and i'm going to use south korea for a proxy for that but _ to use south korea for a proxy for that but there were others, had very significant _ that but there were others, had very significant investment in public health— significant investment in public health infrastructure. the case of south _ health infrastructure. the case of south korea, and i this with colleagues from south korea, it was