structure, be succinct? well... | number ten is not configured to structure, be succinct? well... - number ten is not configured to be the nerve centre of a national crisis like covid... the nerve centre of a national crisis like covid. . ._ the nerve centre of a national crisis like covid. .. because of the absence of— crisis like covid. .. because of the absence of personnel _ crisis like covid. .. because of the absence of personnel or- crisis like covid. .. because of the absence of personnel or the - crisis like covid. .. because of the i absence of personnel or the absence of structure that allows people in number ten to liaise with all the other parts? in number ten to liaise with all the other parts?— other parts? in every term, physically _ other parts? in every term, physically in _ other parts? in every term, physically in terms - other parts? in every term, physically in terms of - other parts? in every term, physically in terms of the l other parts? in every term, - physically in terms of the physical layout and the proper rooms that you would have for a crisis centre. in terms of the personnel, in terms of the power, as i have tried to explain. real power on these things is almost entirely in the cabinet office, not number ten. is almost entirely in the cabinet office, not numberten. numberten wasjust completely office, not numberten. numberten was just completely unsuitable for this and that is why i try to change it in january this and that is why i try to change it injanuary and try this and that is why i try to change it in january and try to this and that is why i try to change it injanuary and try to change it in the summer. in it in january and try to change it in the summer.— it in january and try to change it in the summer. ., ., , ,': ::' ,., in the summer. in paragraph 301 you sa , as in the summer. in paragraph 301 you say. as with — in the summer. in paragraph 301 you say. as with the _ in the summer. in paragraph 301 you say, as with the cabinet _ in the summer. in paragraph 301 you say, as with the cabinet office, - in the summer. in paragraph 301 you say, as with the cabinet office, it - say, as with the cabinet office, it is problems and lack of specialist skills combined with its responsibility for human resources and recruitment. there were problems with the... friends or colleagues, tom sheena who may have been a member of the civil service, but was also an adviser. mark and ben warner. why didn't you approach the relevant part of the cabinet office and number ten and say, we need other people taken from other parts of government and brought into number ten? why was it necessary to have your friend, your colleagues, put into number ten? i did have your friend, your colleagues, put into number ten?— put into number ten? i did do exactly what _ put into number ten? i did do exactly what you _ put into number ten? i did do exactly what you just - put into number ten? i did do exactly what you just said. - put into number ten? i did do| exactly what you just said. you put into number ten? i did do - exactly what you just said. you said why didn't i do that? i literally did do that at scale. i spoke to the cabinet secretary about it, the deputy cabinet secretary and other people in the cabinet office. part of the point of bringing in tom sheena in was because i knew he had been involved in the cabinet office with the whole brexit no deal preparations which was as close as anybody had had since world war ii to actually managing an extremely large scale, very, very complex set of operational and logistical questions. and because of this and also because of some other aspects of his career, which i will not go into, he had extensive networks across the system into the military, all sorts of things, so he was much better place than me or anybody else really in number ten to know, we should call general so—and—so and get him to help with this, we should call so—and—so in to help with that. that was the logic behind it. was mark warner _ that was the logic behind it. was mark warner a _ that was the logic behind it. was mark warnera member of that was the logic behind it. was mark warner a member of the civil service? ~., ~ mark warner a member of the civil service? ~ . ., , mark warner a member of the civil service? ~ . . , ., service? mark warner is the ceo of an ai service? mark warner is the ceo of an al company _ service? mark warner is the ceo of an ai company but _ service? mark warner is the ceo of an ai company but he _ service? mark warner is the ceo of an ai company but he was - service? mark warner is the ceo of an ai company but he was working | service? mark warner is the ceo of i an ai company but he was working at that time with simon stephens and patrick vallance on use around the nhs completely fortuitously. it made sense, given he and his company were embedded in the nhs structure, sorry to make it completely clear, mark got involved with the nhs data before covid ever started, so they were already in there working on these issues, so it made sense for us all to integrate, and they helped with the dashboard. mas us all to integrate, and they helped with the dashboard.— us all to integrate, and they helped with the dashboard. was ben warner a member of the — with the dashboard. was ben warner a member of the civil _ with the dashboard. was ben warner a member of the civil service? _ with the dashboard. was ben warner a member of the civil service? i - with the dashboard. was ben warner a member of the civil service? i think . member of the civil service? i think his status at _ member of the civil service? i think his status at this _ member of the civil service? i think his status at this time, _ member of the civil service? i think his status at this time, it _ member of the civil service? i think his status at this time, it might - his status at this time, it might not have been officially confirmed, but he became a member. ipolitely not have been officially confirmed, but he became a member. when you asked him to — but he became a member. when you asked him to join _ but he became a member. when you asked him to join number _ but he became a member. when you asked him to join number ten - but he became a member. when you asked him to join number ten did - but he became a member. when you asked him to join number ten did he| asked him tojoin number ten did he come from the civil service? he asked him to join number ten did he come from the civil service?- come from the civil service? he did not. did dennis _ come from the civil service? he did not. did dennis come _ come from the civil service? he did not. did dennis come from - come from the civil service? he did not. did dennis come from the - come from the civil service? he did not. did dennis come from the civilj not. did dennis come from the civil service? he not. did dennis come from the civil service? ., , ., ' not. did dennis come from the civil service? . , ., , ., , service? he was a different category of erson. service? he was a different category of person- was _ service? he was a different category of person. was he _ service? he was a different category of person. was he a _ service? he was a different category of person. was he a member- service? he was a different category of person. was he a member of- service? he was a different category of person. was he a member of the | of person. was he a member of the civil service? {iii of person. was he a member of the civil service?— civil service? of course not. neither was _ civil service? of course not. neither was tim _ civil service? of course not. neither was tim gowers, i civil service? of course not. | neither was tim gowers, he civil service? of course not. - neither was tim gowers, he was a professor of maths at cambridge. shy, professor of maths at cambridge. a number of witness statements before the enquiry refer to the fact that there was a dysfunctionality, a lack of a proper working relationship between the cabinet office, number ten and other departments. there was a lack of clarity about who was leading. there was an overall absence of a sufficiently organised response. nobody knew in essence who was in charge. who do you go to in order to get decisions out of the government machine? would you agree with those sentiments? that government machine? would you agree with those sentiments?— with those sentiments? that was a reneral with those sentiments? that was a general description _ with those sentiments? that was a general description probably - with those sentiments? that was a general description probably 2019 l general description probably 2019 and 2020. it improved once the task force was created. it had a lot more reality, so thing certainly improved from the summer, partly thanks to tom and helen and others. but certainly until we did that it was extremely chaotic. you certainly until we did that it was extremely chaotic.— certainly until we did that it was extremely chaotic. you are tempted, accordin: extremely chaotic. you are tempted, according to — extremely chaotic. you are tempted, according to your— extremely chaotic. you are tempted, according to your statement, - extremely chaotic. you are tempted, according to your statement, to - according to your statement, to bring about a major reorganisation and the layout and structures of number ten initially in the layout and structures of number ten initially late january?- initially late january? early janua , initially late january? early january. first _ initially late january? early january, first week- initially late january? early january, first week of - initially late january? early . january, first week ofjanuary. initially late january? early - january, first week of january. late january, first week of january. late janua is january, first week of january. late january is taken — january, first week of january. late january is taken from _ january, first week ofjanuary. late january is taken from your statement. you then return to the subject in may, and we know there were changes to the cabinet office structure and to the committee structure and to the committee structure in number ten, or the meeting structure. did you in general terms have success in your attempts to reorganise the structures? i attempts to reorganise the structures?— attempts to reorganise the structures? ., ., , structures? i would say generally failure with _ structures? i would say generally failure with pockets _ structures? i would say generally failure with pockets of _ structures? i would say generally failure with pockets of success. i | failure with pockets of success. i think we managed to create the number ten data science team which was interrupted by the covid first wave nightmare. we created that and that proved really critical. it brought in crucial different skills, crucial different people, people with a different mentality to the civil service. that was i would say a rare success. civil service. that was i would say a rare success-— a rare success. just post their leas, a rare success. just post their pleas. mister— a rare success. just post their pleas, mister cummings. - a rare success. just post their pleas, mister cummings. in i a rare success. just post their- pleas, mister cummings. in relation to the establishment of a proper data science team and a process, a system, for getting in data and disseminating it around number ten, that broadly worked and we know there was a dashboard and detect the esteem setup. in there was a dashboard and detect the esteem setup-— esteem setup. in january there was some scepticism _ esteem setup. in january there was some scepticism about _ esteem setup. in january there was some scepticism about everything i esteem setup. in january there was | some scepticism about everything in the cabinet office, there was resistance, but once everyone had gone through february, march and april and the nightmare then resistance completely flipped and the cabinet secretary and many other senior people actually completely supported doing it.— supported doing it. where their substantive _ supported doing it. where their substantive changes _ supported doing it. where their substantive changes to - supported doing it. where their substantive changes to the - supported doing it. where their- substantive changes to the personnel in number ten or the cabinet office? there were huge changes in the cabinet office and core teams that were put in charge of covid were repeatedly creative, repeatedly dissolved, repeatedly told number ten they were completely burnt out and they had stress and they were gone. i would say until september when it was a little bit more stable, the task force structure existed and people had a much better sense of what their job existed and people had a much better sense of what theirjob was. it existed and people had a much better sense of what their job was. it was still dysfunctional, but it was much different than what it had been in may. different than what it had been in ma . ~ ., different than what it had been in ma . . ., ., different than what it had been in ma. ., ., may. what about the department of health and social _ may. what about the department of health and social care _ may. what about the department of health and social care as _ may. what about the department of health and social care as the - may. what about the department of health and social care as the lead i health and social care as the lead government department? your statement states that the dhs he was overwhelmed by the scale of the crisis from february to may, it couldn't build capacity on testing, and drugs and was bad at asking the cabinet office for help. when it became apparent that it was unable to discharge the heavy burden placed on it as a lead government department, why were changes not instituted? remember the cabinet office is responsible for dealing with a problem like that and the cabinet office was itself overwhelmed by the crisis, with its own staff being out with covid, it was overwhelmed by internal ructions about how the hell this had all been allowed to happen. i think the cabinet office was slow in getting to grips with the problem at the department of hell. i think also undoubtedly, i am afraid, that the story that the secretary of state for health kept telling us around the cabinet table contributed that. as the cabinet secretary himself said, matt hancock is not being clear in asking us for the help he needs and that is contributing to the problem. i think everyone was unhappy and this was one of those examples that the cabinet office had serious problems and the department of health problems and the coordinating mechanism to solve that itself had crumbled under pressure. it is mechanism to solve that itself had crumbled under pressure. it is very obvious that _ crumbled under pressure. it is very obvious that there _ crumbled under pressure. it is very obvious that there were _ crumbled under pressure. it is very obvious that there were a - crumbled under pressure. it is very obvious that there were a large - obvious that there were a large number of criticisms made by you of the secretary of state for health and social care, matt hancock. we will look at some of those observations later. where did you or number ten, observations later. where did you or numberten, however, suggest number ten, however, suggest structural changes numberten, however, suggest structural changes to the lead government department, to the dhse, changes in the way in which it operated in order to ensure a better service in this crisis? where is that debate? where were those changes proposed? bear that debate? where were those changes proposed?— that debate? where were those changes proposed? bear in mind in arilwhen changes proposed? bear in mind in april when we _ changes proposed? bear in mind in april when we started _ changes proposed? bear in mind in april when we started to _ changes proposed? bear in mind in april when we started to discuss i april when we started to discuss this, i discussed this with the cabinet secretary, the pm had nearly died and he was in chequers, so discussing it was inevitably very tricky, but i talk to the cabinet secretary in april about these issues. we discussed the possibility of splitting up the department of health in various ways, formally, informally. we discussed creating various task forces to take critical work away and we actually did that. in an ironically odd way the scale of the nightmare in march and april actually made it much easier for us to make such a monumental decision, taking vaccines out of the department of health and creating a separate task force. just department of health and creating a separate task force.— separate task force. just to pose ou separate task force. just to pose you there. _ separate task force. just to pose you there. i _ separate task force. just to pose you there. lam _ separate task force. just to pose you there, i am going _ separate task force. just to pose you there, i am going to - separate task force. just to pose you there, i am going to ask- separate task force. just to pose you there, i am going to ask you please to try to keep your answers a little more concise. i appreciate it is difficult. so the way in which taskforces were set up was a reflection, if you like, of the understanding that the dhse was not performing? you had a test and trace task force, you had a faxing task force, a ppe task force and so on, is that correct?— is that correct? correct, but to be fair they were _ is that correct? correct, but to be fair they were performing - is that correct? correct, but to be fair they were performing poorly i is that correct? correct, but to be i fair they were performing poorly and it was a well century event. even if you imagine things have been working ten times better there would still have been a very powerful arguments for having specific taskforces aimed at specific things. bill for having specific taskforces aimed at specific things.— at specific things. all right. the en . ui at specific things. all right. the enquiry has _ at specific things. all right. the enquiry has heard _ at specific things. all right. the enquiry has heard a _ at specific things. all right. the enquiry has heard a great i at specific things. all right. the enquiry has heard a great deall at specific things. all right. the i enquiry has heard a great deal of evidence about the workings of sage and the majority of the evidence has been received from members of sage and its constituent parts. from the viewpoint of number ten, did the sage government liaison, the process by which the government received advice from sage, work well? i by which the government received advice from sage, work well? i think sale did a advice from sage, work well? i think sage did a brilliant _ advice from sage, work well? i think sage did a brilliant job _ advice from sage, work well? i think sage did a brilliant job at _ sage did a brilliantjob at coordinating scientific expertise. i think patrick vallance did a brilliantjob at sharing it and organising it, buti brilliantjob at sharing it and organising it, but i think that the... the mechanism whereby sage's thought processes were conveyed to number ten could be radically improved, because they were fundamentally oral briefing from patrick vallance and chris whitty on the one hand, and the consensus minutes on the other hand. and then often very confused interpretations often very confused interpretations of what they had heard by officials in the cabinet office who did not necessarily have the skills and background and technical understanding to be able to explain those things well to number ten. pausing there, just to split those answers up, please, mister cummings, in relation to the reporting systems through the chief medical officer and the government was back chief scientific advisor, where those briefings by them to government recorded or were they oral? do you mean minuted? were they minuted, did they produce papers in support of everything they said? or was this final of communication largely an oral one? it final of communication largely an oral one? ., , final of communication largely an oral one? .,, ., , final of communication largely an oral one? ., , ., final of communication largely an oralone? ., ., ., ., oral one? it was largely an oral one althou:h oral one? it was largely an oral one although the _ oral one? it was largely an oral one although the private _ oral one? it was largely an oral one although the private secretary i oral one? it was largely an oral one | although the private secretary would record notes from the meeting and issue action points and other things in the normal way. the issue action points and other things in the normal way.— issue action points and other things in the normal way. the sage minutes were, as in the normal way. the sage minutes were. as you — in the normal way. the sage minutes were, as you have _ in the normal way. the sage minutes were, as you have described - in the normal way. the sage minutes were, as you have described them, i were, as you have described them, consensus document, and others have described them similarly. did number ten get a proper understanding of the width of debate that had taken place before sage and of the nuance of these extremely difficult and complex issues? in of these extremely difficult and complex issues?— complex issues? in my opinion obviously _ complex issues? in my opinion obviously not. _ complex issues? in my opinion obviously not. there _ complex issues? in my opinion obviously not. there is - complex issues? in my opinion obviously not. there is no i obviously not. there is no substitute for actually listening to these conversations oneself and interrogating people. iam not saying that the sage minutes themselves where bad product, they were a good product and a useful product, but if you are asking about the nature of a crisis like this involving the prime minister having to make extraordinary decisions, he obviously needed much richer information than the sage minutes could provide. you information than the sage minutes could provide-— could provide. you are critical in our could provide. you are critical in your statement _ could provide. you are critical in your statement of _ could provide. you are critical in your statement of the _ could provide. you are critical in your statement of the way i could provide. you are critical in your statement of the way in i could provide. you are critical in i your statement of the way in which the cabinet office commissioned work from sage. you say on occasion the wrong questions were asked of sage. you, and we know i think, dennis has a base, yourfriend, attended sage. why did no one say to sage bluntly and plainly, we want you to indicate much more clearly what your recommendations are, we need a much clearer understanding of what you suggest and this is our, the government's strategy, so you know to what you should direct your advice? ~ , , . ., , �* to what you should direct your advice? ~ ,, . .,, �* , advice? with respect, it wasn't my 'ob advice? with respect, it wasn't my “0b to advice? with respect, it wasn't my job to commandeer _ advice? with respect, it wasn't my job to commandeer sage - advice? with respect, it wasn't my job to commandeer sage and i advice? with respect, it wasn't my job to commandeer sage and startj job to commandeer sage and start giving them orders about how they should operate. i spoke privately to patrick vallance about things. i suggested getting some external people like gowers to attend and listen and review the papers. but it wasn't for a political adviser to start giving sage orders about how it should operate. if start giving sage orders about how it should operate.— it should operate. if you would allow me to — it should operate. if you would allow me to suggest, - it should operate. if you would allow me to suggest, mister . allow me to suggest, mister cummings, you were notjust a political adviser, you were in a position to exercise a significant degree of control and power at the heart of number ten. if you saw there was a problem in terms of the root of the advice and the communications you were receiving, why was this not publicly raised? figs why was this not publicly raised? is you know from the various evidence, i sent ben warner to attend meetings and discuss them. i listened to some of them myself. also from the of january i had at least weekly meetings, sometimes two or three times a week with patrick, where i would talk to him myself about all sorts of things, about science, and as time went on increasingly about covid. so i did put on these things and i did probe and talk to patrick about them all. my criticism is not of patrick. i think the fundamental problem was the interface between sage, dhse and the cabinet office. my sage, dhse and the cabinet office. my point that you refer to in my evidence is this is not my expertise i am reflecting. the data people who were extremely smart and able who came in to help us, they said to me the cabinet office is asking the wrong questions and misinterpreting answers. that was a problem both before the first wave and as we emerged out of the first wave. you asked your — emerged out of the first wave. you asked your friend ben were ordered to attend sage. yama i did. you spoke privately to the government's chief scientific adviser patrick vallance. you have not held back in making recommendations in relation to structural changes that, in your view, were required to be made to the cabinet office to number ten, to the cabinet office to number ten, to the dhse. why did you not publicly say there is a real problem with the structural route by which sage advises the government and we are not getting a proper understanding of the picture? i not getting a proper understanding of the picture?— of the picture? i don't think it would have — of the picture? i don't think it would have been _ of the picture? i don't think it would have been a _ of the picture? i don't think it would have been a good i of the picture? i don't think it would have been a good idea | of the picture? i don't think it i would have been a good idea for me to say something publicly... did would have been a good idea for me to say something publicly. . .- to say something publicly... did you sa to to say something publicly... did you say to colleagues _ to say something publicly... did you say to colleagues in _ to say something publicly... did you say to colleagues in government? . to say something publicly... did you say to colleagues in government? i | say to colleagues in government? i did, and i also spoke to patrick about making sage, i had a very strong view that the sage minutes and other documentation should be made public in february for scrutiny and patrick was very good about that and patrick was very good about that and patrick was very good about that and patrick completely agreed. unfortunately, again, the culture of secrecy in the cabinet office block to that, notjust in february and march, but kept blocking it for a very long time. in march, but kept blocking it for a very long time-— march, but kept blocking it for a very long time. march, but kept blocking it for a ve lona time. y., , ., very long time. in your statement in relation to the _ very long time. in your statement in relation to the issue _ very long time. in your statement in relation to the issue of _ very long time. in your statement in relation to the issue of the - relation to the issue of the substance of the advice you receive from sage or the advice the government received from sage, you say that it was represented to the government that sage was broadly in agreement with the strategy of mitigation. we will come back in a moment to look at that in more detail. or plan a as you called it. yes. �* , , , , , ., detail. or plan a as you called it. yes. ,,, ., yes. but subsequently you were told that sa . e, yes. but subsequently you were told that sage, members _ yes. but subsequently you were told that sage, members of _ yes. but subsequently you were told that sage, members of the - yes. but subsequently you were told that sage, members of the sage i that sage, members of the sage committee, denied that they had been generally in support of a mitigation strategy. when were you told that that representation of sage's opinion was inaccurate? i am that representation of sage's opinion was inaccurate? i am not sure to start. _ opinion was inaccurate? i am not sure to start, but _ opinion was inaccurate? i am not sure to start, but you _ opinion was inaccurate? i am not sure to start, but you could i opinion was inaccurate? i am not sure to start, but you could see i sure to start, but you could see what they themselves set after the first stage happen. from that time on a lot of people around sage started to talk as if they have been recommending this for a long time. whereas as you can see from the evidence they were not even recommending it in the wake of the 9th of march. that recommending it in the wake of the 9th of march-— recommending it in the wake of the 9th of march. that was obviously an extremely serious _ 9th of march. that was obviously an extremely serious problem. - 9th of march. that was obviously an extremely serious problem. the i extremely serious problem. the government saw the scientific advisory group for emergency and it was not accurately giving you a proper reflection of the debate in the committee.— proper reflection of the debate in the committee. well, i wouldn't put it like that- — the committee. well, i wouldn't put it like that- l— the committee. well, i wouldn't put it like that. i would _ the committee. well, i wouldn't put it like that. i would say _ the committee. well, i wouldn't put it like that. i would say the - it like that. i would say the problem in a lot of ways was worse than that. it was represented to us evenin than that. it was represented to us even in the week of the 9th of march that sage collectively agreed with the plan of single immunity by september. as you can see from the public record, many people from sage gave interviews that week articulating that plan a strategy. at least after the first wave, mister cummings, it was obvious to you that the information you had received from sage on behalf of the government was to some extent inaccurate, it hadn't been a fair reflection of the views of its members. sage, you say in your statement had not made plain that there was a viable alternative to mitigation. they had not made plain, at least until quite late in the day, that the numbers of deaths and hospital cases would be massive. sorry, the last sentence is not accurate. sorry, the last sentence is not accurate-— sorry, the last sentence is not accurate. ., accurate. until quite late in the da , accurate. until quite late in the day. when _ accurate. until quite late in the day. when did _ accurate. until quite late in the day, when did sage _ accurate. until quite late in the day, when did sage tell- accurate. until quite late in the day, when did sage tell you i accurate. until quite late in the | day, when did sage tell you that they had concerns that the infection mortality rate and the infection hospitality rate would mean an inevitable wave of death in hospital cases? i inevitable wave of death in hospital cases? ., �* , .,. cases? i don't remember the exact date but if you _ cases? i don't remember the exact date but if you look _ cases? i don't remember the exact date but if you look at _ cases? i don't remember the exact date but if you look at multiple i date but if you look at multiple graphs from cobra that went through sage, you can see that people were envisaging a scale of death that would overwhelm the nhs, certainly in february. would overwhelm the nhs, certainly in februa . ., would overwhelm the nhs, certainly in february-— in february. late february, wasn't it? i in february. late february, wasn't it? i would — in february. late february, wasn't it? i would say _ in february. late february, wasn't it? i would say early _ in february. late february, wasn't it? i would say early february. i in february. late february, wasn't it? i would say early february. we will have a — it? i would say early february. we will have a look _ it? i would say early february. we will have a look and _ it? i would say early february. we will have a look and you _ it? i would say early february. we will have a look and you can i it? i would say early february. we will have a look and you can tell . it? i would say early february. we | will have a look and you can tell us where those documents are. did sage tell you that effectively there was no means of controlling the virus was it had reached the united kingdom? t was it had reached the united kinrdom? ., ., was it had reached the united kingdom?— was it had reached the united kinrdom? ., ., ., kingdom? i would not say that sage told us that, — kingdom? i would not say that sage told us that. i— kingdom? i would not say that sage told us that, i would _ kingdom? i would not say that sage told us that, i would say _ kingdom? i would not say that sage told us that, i would say number- kingdom? i would not say that sage| told us that, i would say number ten was told that that was the consensus view of theseus and the cabinet office and the department of health and sage, that fundamentally, number and was told injanuary and february that the most significant danger that the most significant danger that we faced was a second wave happening later in 2020 and that was what everyone was trying to avoid and that is why the single major peak by september approach was taken. hate peak by september approach was taken. ~ . ., peak by september approach was taken. ~ .., . ,, peak by september approach was taken. ~ .., ,., . ,, ., peak by september approach was taken. ~ . ,, ., ., taken. we will come back to that debate strategy, _ taken. we will come back to that debate strategy, but _ taken. we will come back to that debate strategy, but i _ taken. we will come back to that debate strategy, but i am - taken. we will come back to that debate strategy, but i am asking j debate strategy, but i am asking you, mister cummings, why, if it had become apparent to you, that you had not been able to understand accurately what sage belief, or you had not received a fair reflection on what sage was debating and what it thought, why after the first wave did you not bring about changes to the sage structure, advisory structure, in the way that you had advocated for the cabinet office, dhse, numberten, so on. 17 i dhse, number ten, so on. ? i literally did. _ dhse, number ten, so on. ? i literally did. i— dhse, numberten, so on. ti literally did. i created the data science team and part of the point of that data science team was that you had actual, very deep technical experts who could explore what sage was saying and give the prime minister advice on what was coming from sage, how to interpret it, potential problems with the advice that was coming from sage, et cetera, and that team did thejob. excuse me, that was data within downing street. you setup a data system or a ten downing st data system. what changes did you advocate or propose in relation to the constitution of sage and the means by which it informed government of its advice? the main thin thati government of its advice? the main thing that i personally _ government of its advice? the main thing that i personally did _ government of its advice? the main thing that i personally did was i government of its advice? the main thing that i personally did was to i thing that i personally did was to institute the ten ds data science team because that was the appropriate kind of thing that number ten needed to interpret the scientific and technical questions with skill, with tools, that didn't exist at all in january, february, exist at all injanuary, february, march in number ten. i did not regard it as myjob to tell the sage people and patrick vallance how to manage sage. my view was that number ten and the prime minister's office critically needed deep, technical, scientific and data science skills and tools right at the heart of power that could interpret information coming in notjust from sage, but from everybody all around the whole system. including test and trace, including the security centre and dozens of other entities. right. we are going _ and dozens of other entities. right. we are going to _ and dozens of other entities. right. we are going to move _ and dozens of other entities. right. we are going to move on _ and dozens of other entities. right. we are going to move on to - and dozens of other entities. right. we are going to move on to a i and dozens of other entities. right. we are going to move on to a new i we are going to move on to a new issue which is the consideration of vulnerable and at—risk groups. in the course of the decision—making between february and the lockdown decision of the 23rd of march. can you tell the enquiry, please, to what degree the position of vulnerable and at—risk groups was by decision—makers in downing street on the run up to the decision to impose a national lockdown?— a national lockdown? could you say what ou a national lockdown? could you say what you mean _ a national lockdown? could you say what you mean by _ a national lockdown? could you say what you mean by vulnerable i a national lockdown? could you say what you mean by vulnerable and l what you mean by vulnerable and whatever it was?— what you mean by vulnerable and whatever it was? persons who would be potentially _ whatever it was? persons who would be potentially vulnerable _ whatever it was? persons who would be potentially vulnerable to - whatever it was? persons who would be potentially vulnerable to the i be potentially vulnerable to the impact of a lockdown, members of minority and ethnic groups, people who are vulnerable in terms of socio—economic deprivation, victims of domestic abuse, people for whom there was plainly a case to be made that they would require specific consideration in terms of what the impact of the lockdown decision would be. i impact of the lockdown decision would be. a, impact of the lockdown decision would be. ., ., would be. i would say that the entire question _ would be. i would say that the entire question was _ would be. i would say that the entire question was almost. would be. i would say that the - entire question was almost entirely appallingly neglected by the entire planning system. there was effectively no plans or any planning for a lot of that. as you could see, from the evidence, one of the most appalling things of the whole enterprise in lots of ways was on the 19th of march when we realised there was essentially no shielding plan at all and the cabinet office was trying to block as creating a shielding plan. ithink was trying to block as creating a shielding plan. i think there was a brilliant young women in the number ten private office called alexandra burns who tried to raise warnings about things like wives who are being abused and children in care and a lot of similar things, and i don't think the system ever properly listened to her. [30 don't think the system ever properly listened to her.— listened to her. do you recall when the prime minister _ listened to her. do you recall when the prime minister was _ listened to her. do you recall when the prime minister was advised - listened to her. do you recall when | the prime minister was advised that the prime minister was advised that the risk of long—term sick rely from the risk of long—term sick rely from the risk of private infection? what the risk of private infection? what does that mean? _ the risk of private infection? what does that mean? long-term - does that mean? long-term consequences. _ does that mean? long-term consequences. the - does that mean? long-term consequences. the phrase i does that mean? long-term - consequences. the phrase long-term consequences. the phrase long—term covid. when was it understood that the could be long—term health problems until conditions? it the could be long-term health problems until conditions? it was obviously discussed _ problems until conditions? it was obviously discussed in _ problems until conditions? it was obviously discussed in january - problems until conditions? it was obviously discussed in january in | obviously discussed injanuary in general terms in the sense of patrick and chris and others saying to us, of course we don't know what the long—term consequences of this will be. they essentially said how many people does it kill immediately? and then there is the second problem of what the long—term consequences will be. we had no long—term data on that and we knew there was a problem injanuary, but it really kind of bubbled up i would say, but i am guessing, i am not sure if that is helpful, and roughly may. i sure if that is helpful, and roughly ma . ~' may. i think in may the prime minister shared _ may. i think in may the prime minister shared on _ may. i think in may the prime minister shared on a - may. i think in may the prime l minister shared on a whatsapp may. i think in may the prime - minister shared on a whatsapp group with you, the chief scientific adviser and the chief medical officer, you and matt hancock, a whatsapp group, an ft article entitled mystery of prolonged covid—i9 symptoms. do you recall that? covid-19 symptoms. do you recall that? . , covid-19 symptoms. do you recall that?- what _ covid-19 symptoms. do you recall that?- what about - covid-19 symptoms. do you recall that?- what about the i covid-19 symptoms. do you recall i that?- what about the issue that? vaguely. what about the issue ofthe that? vaguely. what about the issue of the disproportionate _ that? vaguely. what about the issue of the disproportionate number - that? vaguely. what about the issue of the disproportionate number of i of the disproportionate number of deaths in the black and minority ethnic communities? it deaths in the black and minority ethnic communities?— deaths in the black and minority ethnic communities? it was discussed after the first — ethnic communities? it was discussed after the first wave. _ ethnic communities? it was discussed after the first wave. when _ ethnic communities? it was discussed after the first wave. when did - ethnic communities? it was discussed after the first wave. when did you - after the first wave. when did you first become _ after the first wave. when did you first become apparent _ after the first wave. when did you first become apparent that - after the first wave. when did you first become apparent that there l after the first wave. when did you i first become apparent that there was a disproportionate fatality rate in those communities? i a disproportionate fatality rate in those communities?— a disproportionate fatality rate in those communities? i can't remember, i am guessing- — those communities? i can't remember, i am guessing- i _ those communities? i can't remember, i am guessing. ithink— those communities? i can't remember, i am guessing. i think the _ those communities? i can't remember, i am guessing. i think the data - those communities? i can't remember, i am guessing. i think the data that - i am guessing. i think the data that came out of the first wave showed it was an issue. came out of the first wave showed it was an issue-— came out of the first wave showed it was an issue. preparedness. much of our was an issue. preparedness. much of your statement _ was an issue. preparedness. much of your statement focuses _ was an issue. preparedness. much of your statement focuses on _ was an issue. preparedness. much of your statement focuses on your - your statement focuses on your opinion that there had been a critical failure opinion that there had been a criticalfailure to plan opinion that there had been a critical failure to plan for the type of pandemic which in the event institute, and an absence of critical capabilities, as you describe them. in essence, that in january and february 2020 there was no system, no plan, no structure in place, that could have allowed either the borders to be sealed or for any kind of scaled and trace process. dealing with those dozen aspects in turn, enrich it to the borders, —— in relation to the borders, —— in relation to the border is the material shows in downing street there was a regular consideration of what could be done in terms of keeping the virus out of our border. what was the advice that was received from sage as to whether or not that would be an efficient or effective process? first we didn't have the capability to do it because britain has not been able to control its borders for many years, it doesn't have infrastructure to do it, never mind for a pandemic.