Including the second sino japanese war that started in 1937 and the u. S. Embargo of Oil Shipments to japan. This hourlong event took place at National Defense university in washington and was organized by the friends of the National World war ii memorial. I am with the world war ii memorial. With our board. Thank you very much for hosting us today. We are favored with an extraordinarily interesting and wonderful lecturer. Dr. Craig symonds, an old friend of mine, who has devoted his life to College Teaching and writing. To be more specific, a professor in the u. S. Naval academy for 30 years, during which time he , is currentlyooks finishing a book about the history of the United States navy in world war ii. The whole thing. And has also written wonderful books, including a biography of general joe johnston. What brought you to dry land for that, sir. Ateral johnston was present the funeral of his great antagonist general sherman. And my right in saying he caught cold and died himself . A case, that is the kind of fact that attracts historians and antiquarians. We are blessed to have him with us this morning. Perhaps the proudest ribbon on his breast would be from the his service during the turner revolution. 60 and 85ween ages of might know about that. Admiral Stansfield Turner was president of the Naval War College from 1972 to 1975 and he was sent there by his superior basically with a hunting license to make the place stern and rigorous. They are up there in newport, rhode island, playing golf and having a good time. I do not know how many of you met admiral turner, but he took that advice seriously and he hired relatively young military officers and professors and insisted the curriculum be changed so that all entering officers would be required to begin their studies with a reading of the peloponnesian wars, the most important book on political and Literary History ever written. This was a year of great change. One of the stars in the change was the gentleman on my right who survived a great teaching career at the Naval Academy. He has been invited back several times as a visiting professor and has received the academys highest award for excellence in teaching. Join me in welcoming dr. Craig symonds. [applause] thank you, everyone. I am delighted to be here at the National Defense university, in part to honor the legacy of the work by Hayden Williams that led to the establishment of the world war ii memorial. Also in mainly to commemorate december 5 anniversary of the japanese attack on the American Fleet at pearl harbor, 75 years ago tomorrow. The image that we have been looking at on the wall is the uss arizona in its death throes. For many americans, it is a metaphor for what happened that day. December 7 is a date that still echoes in the collective national memory, as roosevelt promised it would. When he prepared the speech he was going to give to congress the next morning, roosevelt dictated it out loud to his secretary, voicing the punctuation as he did so. Yesterday, december 7, 1941, a date which will live in World History. After he finished dictating that, he sent grace off to type it up in a trip ive been spaced manuscript he could work with. And she brought it back and he had a pen and rewrote the first sentence, deciding it lacked the impact he wanted, so he crossed out the words World History and wrote in the word, infamy. Well, i am having no luck whatsoever here. Here we go, in the upper right corner. And so, we have thought of it ever since. Infamy. A surprise attack on a sunday morning on a nation at peace. To most americans, it was a complete shock. Surprise is the most common adjective applied to this event. Like all historical events, it had a long back story and a critical context. In fact World History, the , phrase f. D. R. Originally wrote in his speech, had quite a lot to do with it. The roots of this stretch back a more than a decade. I think we need to back up to at least 1937 when japans military leaders initiated a conflict they labeled rather benignly the china incident which soon became a full scale war of invasion and conquest. It may seem more than a bit absurd that a small Island Country of fewer than 100 million should seek to conquer a continentsized nation of 780 million. Part of it was hubris. In 1937, the japanese were infected by a National Confidence and National Pride that was rooted in the assumption of a racial and cultural superiority. Not only over the chinese, but over everyone else on the planet. They believed that they were exceptional. And not bound by the normal rules that applied to other nations. Inaddition, japans military 1937 was a relatively recent creation, modern, wellequipped, well organized. And chinas military was none of those. At first, the japanese found the war in china easygoing. Their army swept aside the opposition and occupy great swaths of chinese territory. Soon enough, that progress slowed and the japanese found enmeshed in a seemingly bottomless quagmire. In most cases, the chinese armies they fought dissolved from the battlefield and, in retreated to fight another day. In many ways, it was their vietnam. Frustrated by chinese tactics, convinced by their own propaganda that the ungrateful chinese were refusing to accept the nine liberation at the hands of their superiors, the japanese responded with what was then unprecedented fury, unleashing their aircraft and artillery on chinese civilians in chinese cities, conducting wars against civilians and the elusive chinese army. This was a form of warfare all too common today that was unusual then. Included whatt western newspapers labeled the rape of nanking in 1937. The numbers are in some dispute. But perhaps as many as 300,000 chinese died in the japanese assault on nanking. Most of them were civilian and many of them were women and children. Photographs, like this one, became infamous throughout the world. Appeared in american newspapers and moviehouse newsreels and they embittered americans even further toward the japanese. That same month, december 1937, japanese planes attacked and near 1 american gunboat nanking. The fact american boats were operating there says quite a bit about the dysfunction of the japanese government at the time. The japanese suspected the americans were there to gather information. And although they insisted the attack was an accident and apologize, the incident further poisoned japanese and american relations. It was evident to americans that the japanese were the aggressors. Self evident it remains today. And the chinese were victims. Are, wers that we thought someone ought to do something about it. There was no enthusiasm for intervention. But the United States sought to modify japanese behavior by applying economic sanctions. Again, there is nothing new under the sun. In the late 1930s, the United States was in a particularly strong position to apply economic sanctions, especially against japan, because america was then the worlds leading producer and exporter of crude oil. And by a large margin. The discovery and exploitation Texas Oil Fields in east had made the United States the worlds oil king. In 1940, the United States was not only the largest oil producer, it generated six times the amount of the number two oil producer which was venezuela. Middle east production at the time was negligible. So, throughout the 1930s, we pumped oil out of the ground as fast as we could and sold it for overseas for pennies on the barrel. The japanese had no oil and that is still true. What that means is that the United States has its hands on the control valve that supplies d oil to japans industrial economy. If japan did not behave, the United States could close the valve anytime it wanted. Despite that implied threat, japans behavior, at least two american eyes, only got worse. Iner the european war began 1939, the success of the German Forces created opportunities for the japanese in asia. The swift defeat of france and holland and the circumstances of britain meant that the asian colonies of european states had become virtual orphans. Borneo, java, and sumatra were in the Dutch East Indies, as well as the british colonies in red, were all rich in proven oil reserves. French indochina was a source of rubber and tin. And because japan had none of these resources, the temptation to seize them was all but irresistible. To Japanese Army officers in particular, the move into south asia was not only economically appealing. In their it is a curious and kind of contradictory vision. To complete the conquest of china, they needed access to the european colonies. They would have to fight a war with britain and holland and the United States and the Japanese Army leaders saw that as acceptable, if it enabled resolution of the war in china. In for a penny. In for a pound. Roosevelt certainly knew that americas near monopoly on oil was a potential key to influencing japanese behavior, but he was reluctant to play that card. To use the modern euphemism cutting off oil to japan was the Nuclear Option. It would force japan into a corner where her leaders would have no choice but to knuckle american demands or to find oil elsewhere. This obviously being production in the west indies. There is hardly any question about which of the options they would choose. And calculating the response of other nations to whatever leverage, cost is a critical factor. Tougher is not always better. Roosevelt sought to calibrate the pressure he applied on japan rather carefully. He wanted to apply enough pressure to encourage the japanese to change their behavior, but not so much that it attacked their National Pride, forced them into a corner, or triggered a war. Since then, there have been a few conspiracy theorists that have suggested in fact roosevelt wanted a war with japan, and their argument goes with this. Roosevelt was committed to ensuring the survival of england in its survival of germany, and that is true. In the spring of 1940, they focused on lend lease on being the arsenal of democracy. As england staggered under the blitz, he began to fear that supplying the tools of war might not be enough. The only way he could make that happen was to provoke a confrontation. In pursuit of that, he directed the u. S. Navy to become progressively, increasingly aggressive against the german uboats in the north atlantic, even issuing a shoot first directive after there was a torpedo at the uss greer in september. Risking, and according to some even inviting, a german declaration of war. If that was his goal, it would not work because hitler were not take the bait, he was forced to subject to the soviet union before taking on the United States. The japanese would oblige, according to the conspiracy theory. Provoking a war with japan would provide the United States the socalled backdoor to japan. It was in pursuit of this they claim roosevelt deliberately backed japan into a corner. The most extreme version of this theory holds roosevelt knew the japanese were about to attack and withheld that information from the operational commanders so that the attack would come as a bolt on the blue that would ensure a furious response from the American People and of course congress. There is no substance to this theory. It was precisely because roosevelt was determined to focus on the defeated germany that he wanted to keep japan at arms length. He wanted to slow its expansion southward if he could, but he was determined to avoid an open confrontation until after germany was beaten, just as hitler was determined to avoid confrontation with the United States until stalin was defeated. Roosevelt moreover, roosevelt had no assurance whatsoever that a japanese attack on the United States would convince congress to enter the european war. It is significant that when he went before congress on december 8 to deliver his infamy speech, he did not ask for a declaration of war against germany. Only japan. It was hitler who asked for the declaration of war against the United States. There were hawks in roosevelt cabinet who had sought to rack up the pressure on japan especially by cutting off oil exports, but roosevelt wouldnt do it. Instead he approved an embargo of highoctane Aviation Fuel which could hardly be categorized as military in nature while insisting that the sale of crude oil should continue at the same level as in past years, as the historian Jonathan Utley has put in a nice phrase, roosevelt wanted to bring it to its senses, not to its knees. Others in the cabinet however did, and they got their opportunity in the second week of august 1941 just two months before pearl harbor. Roosevelt sneaked out of town in the kind of cloak and dagger stating that he almost boyishly loved, he stole away from washington on the supposed fishing trip. Off marthas vineyard, he boarded admiral kings flagship the cruiser augusta which carried him to Placentia Bay on the coast of newfoundland where he and Winston Churchill met for a fourday conference. Here they are. Their military advisers and commanders are right behind them. This is during a Church Service aboard the hms prince of wales. The meeting produced what has become known as the atlantic charter, but fb fdr made no Firm Commitment about american involvement. Churchill was greatly disappointed, but the fact that the two men had not met at all was significant. While fdr was away at this meeting, the assistant secretary of state, dean acheson, one of the hawks i mentioned earlier, and who also headed the foreign funds control committee, refused japans application for the credit to buy the oil. In effect, cutting off oil exports. Since 80 of japans oil came from the United States, that provoked immediate crisis within the japanese government. When roosevelt returned from his meeting with churchill, he felt he could not reverse addisons decision without looking in resolute, and so the decision stood, and it was decisive. The japanese had 18 months of oil in reserve, and they had to choose quickly between backing down to the americans or forging ahead with the conquest of south asia. For tojo and the other Army Generals in tokyo who were now fully in control of the japanese government, it was inconceivable that they would kowtow to the americans merely for the privilege of buying their oil. Imagine if saudi arabia or iran or other countries insisted that we remove all of our troops from the middle east as a precondition for buying any oil. The only other option for the japanese was to obtain the oil from those orphaned European Companies of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The commander of the Japanese Imperial navy was this fellow admiral yamamoto. He had opposed the war with the United States from the start. He had spent to two tours in the United States and had seen the spindle top oil fields and the production plant in detroit. He knew his country had virtually no chance against such an industrial behemoth. Once the decision had been made, he insisted the only way japan could survive that was to cripple the American Battle fleet at pearl harbor in the first few days of the war. That, he argued, would by japan a sixmonth breathing space to secure a south asian resource base, and perhaps it could hold out long enough for the americans to weary of the war and agree to a negotiated settlement. Almost no one in japan genuinely expected to win the war with the United States as in defeating its military and dictating peace. They did however expect that by holding out long enough, they would wear down the americans and erode their resolve to continue a war of 5, 10, or 15 years. The japanese ambassador to the United States, nomura, seen here on the left with the secretary of state, knew none of this. He wanted to seek a settlement, unaware the decision for war had already been made in tokyo. Hull however did know, or at least she suspected. For some time, the United States government had been able to break the japanese diplomatic code, information from which was called magic in washington. In this november, hull obtained a copy of a dispatch to nomura telling him that if he did not Reach Agreement by november 29, it would be too late. According to that, things would automatically happen. The interception of that cable was enough to convince American Military leaders to send out an alert. Emerald harold stark on november 27 minced no words. This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. The target of japans imminent aggressive moves, start wrote, might be the philippines, thailand, malaya, borneo, or maybe all of us. The army chief of staff also sent a warning to Army Commanders in the pacific. A shooting war, marshall wrote, could start at any moment. By the time those messages arrived in oahu, the Japanese Carrier strike force was already at sea. It was commanded by this man. This is admiral kyuchi nogumo. A warrior by instinct, nogumo fretted constantly over the smallest detail. Occasionally he would call Junior Officers into his presence and solicit their reassurance things are going ok, right . You could even sense is insecurity i think in this photograph. In spite of that, it was nogumo who was tasked with the job of taking a 30 ship task force across the Pacific Ocean to strike the American Battle fleet in pearl harbor. American commanders from the white house, pentagon on down doubted the feasibility of any such strike, not only the likelihood that even the possibility of such a strike. It was not even unlikely that tiny japan would choose to go to war with the mighty United States. It was in their view logistically impossible for a major strike force to cross 3000 miles of open ocean, refueling en route, and going. It was simply too risky. No one could do that. Yamamotos view, it was too risky not to do that. To him, it was the only way japan had a sense of surviving. Nogumos fleet got underway on the 26th of november, the day before the war warning reached oahu. And president roosevelt signed a declaration in washington declaring the last thursday in november to be called thanksgiving. The americans were very much aware that war with japan could break out as marshall put it at any moment. As evidence of that, let me share with you the front page of hilo, hawaii tribune on november 30. Let me show you, nearly everyone knew the war was in fact imminent, but it is also clear that no one, certainly no one in hawaii, washington or anywhere else, thought that the target of that strike would be hawaii. If the japanese have decided to attack, and apparently they had, the one area under american control that might be in jeopardy was the philippines. At pearl harbor, the Navy Commander was admiral husband kimmel. Both he and the Army Commander general walter short had received the war warnings a week before, and each had to decide what were appropriate defensive deployments. In kimmels view, what that meant was getting the fleet ready for offense of operations should the japanese strike in the philippines. The fleet must be ready to put to sea immediately to attack the marshall islands. It meant protecting his military assets from the 19,000 residents of oahu of japanese descent. Marshall had told him to provide detection against sabotage. That is what he did. In his view, the best way to do that was to groups planes together in rows where they could be closely guarded. Neither man considered for a moment the possibility that the japanese might open the war with an attack on hawaii. Meanwhile the American Intelligence Community lost track of the whereabouts of japans carriers. You would think that itself would be in the red flag. The americans had broken the japanese diplomatic code, magic, which was how hull knew something was going to happen after november 29. They had not penetrated the operational code. It would not have mattered a great deal because nogumo absolute radio silence. And the japanese effectively pulled the curtain across the activities of their strikeforce. When kimmel asked where the carriers were, layton did not know. Kimmel reacted with mock astonishment. What . He cried. You dont know . That was followed by a sentence that has been much quoted by historians ever since and meant i suppose in an ironic way. Do you mean to say they could be rounding diamondhead any moment, and you wouldnt know it . Kimmels comment was more banter than rebuke, because he knew layton did the best he could with the scraps of data. And the knowledge that they were on the major verge came from british messages in the South China Sea who spotted two large invasion fleets, more than 100 ships, heading south from japanese home waters through the taiwan strait. It was the Largest Naval deployment in World History, and roosevelt was furious at this unmistakable evidence of japanese doubledealing even though nomura was talking peace in washington, the war invasion was already steaming southward. Stark suggested that this alone might be grounds for military action. Roosevelts closest advisor Harry Hopkins also suggested that since war was apparently unavoidable and imminent, the u. S. Should strike first. That is the top guy on the right. According to his diary, he mused aloud to the president , it was too bad we could not strike the first blow. Roosevelt nodded thoughtfully and was quiet for a moment. And he said, no. We cant do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people. He was determined that the United States would not fire the first shot. Well of course the japanese were perfectly willing to fire the first shot, and at 6 00 a. M. On the morning of december 7, 20 miles from oahu, the six carriers turned into the wind, increased speed to 25 knots, to launch planes. The zero fighters left earth, circling above the task force while the heavily burdened torpedo planes and bombers roared off six carrier decks simultaneously, in a carefully choreographed sequence, launching 183 aircraft in only 16 minutes. That is a remarkable display of efficiency. And by 6 45, the entire formation was heading south for oahu. At that very moment, a lookout on the destroyer ss board looking at the entrance saw what was clearly the feather of a submarine periscope. The skipper was William Outerbridge who was on his second day in command. But that did not deter him from ordering his ship to immediately opened fire. The second shot punched through the subs fragile hull, then he dropped a depth charge to make sure. As it slipped into the wake, satisfied he had sunk it, he sent in a contact report at 6 53. But the word had sunk a midget submarine, very much like this one. One of five the japanese committed to the pearl harbor attack. They had been carried to get back on top of fleet submarines all the way from japan. The 78 foot long to man submarine had been uncoupled from their host vessels the night before and then sent into pearl harbor late on the night of december 6. In the end, their only contribution was to provide what ought to have been an Early Warning of the coming air attack. Alas, outerbridges report did not trigger the alert it should have. As it worked up the chain of command that sunday morning, it was met with skepticism, uncertainty, and caution at every step until it was too late to make a difference. Another lost opportunity to sound the alarm occurred only minutes later at 7 02 from a Radio Station on the north shore, detected a large number of inbound planes coming from the north. The radar installation was new. Radar itself was entirely new in 1941. And it was being manned by inexperienced trainees, which is why they were on duty on a sunday. Moreover the flight of b17s was expected in from california along pretty much that same trajectory. The duty officer told him, forget it. Other than that destroyer is patrolling off the entrance and the catalinas patrolling the Great American naval base slumbered. Japanese intelligence indicated there were nine American Battleships in the harbor that day. They were mostly correct. One of the nine was the utah, a former battleship now used as a target vessel. The pennsylvania was in dry dock for repairs. The other seven are all moored on the southern rim of fork island. This is going to be the nevada at the tail end, the arizona inboard of the festival, the two by two with the california at the head of the line. The japanese pilots swooping in from the north, it was a thrilling and glorious sight. To announce the attack and in fact achieve complete surprise which rather stunned the japanese themselves, the commander of the flight fujita broke radio silence for the First Time Since leaving japanese waters to broadcast a predetermined code signal, tora, tora, tora. Tiger, tiger, tiger. Lastsecond confusion led them to attack simultaneously. It really didnt matter. The level bombers flew in at 2000 feet while others approached from the south at 500 feet. Almost every american who saw them, and there were hundreds of them who saw those planes by day, and every one of them assumed they were friendly aircraft engaged in maneuvers. A few who were upset that they were hot dogging it on a sunday morning tried to copy the numbers on their tails so they could report them to the squadron commanders. Then the first bombs exploded. You see one in fact exploding right here. In the midst of the excitement, formal protocols pretty much dissolved. The nevada, a voice announced, this is a real japanese air attack and no shit. Within minutes, the maryland and the tennessee were each hit by a pair of bombs. Three more exploded close alongside the arizona, and a fourth was a direct hit. At 8 10 a. M. , they punched through the arizonas five inch armor deck, penetrated to her magazine, and exploded. The resulting fireball ripped the heart out of the ship. This is a slide we started with. The arizona sank almost immediately, taking 1177 men down with her. They are there still. Meanwhile the torpedo plane that had circled around to the south came in low over the anchorage, untroubled by american fighters, to drop their specially modified torpedoes. They did not know of those would work in the shallow waters of pearl harbor. They did. Three of them struck the west virginia, three more hit the oklahoma, and two hit the california. Initial raid lasted about half an hour. Then after a brief hiatus, 170 more planes arrived. They are focused on finishing off the capital ships still afloat or partially damaged. The americans world the by now and shot down 24 of the planes. By 10 00, four American Battleships had been sunk, three more severely damaged. Altogether the japanese crippled 18 ships and destroyed 188 airplanes, damaging 159 others. Not to be overlooked of course was the death of 2403 u. S. Servicemen, nearly half of them on board the illfated arizona. Roosevelt got the news while sitting at his desk in the oval study one floor down from the now famous oval office. He had just finished a lunch of soup and sandwiches when the phone rang. Harry hopkins was with him. It was fdr who reached across his desk to answer the phone. It was Navy Secretary frank knox who told him the japanese had just attacked pearl harbor. Roosevelt slammed his left hand down on the desktop with a loud bang and shouted no. Roosevelt knew that hull was supposed to meet with nomura to receive the japanese peace initiative. He called hull and told him to receive the japanese without comment and then bow them out. Hull couldnt do it. He received nomura and the other delegates calmly. Kept them standing in front of his desk while he read their reply. The japanese decisionmakers in tokyo have planned for nomura to deliver this response and hour before the attack, but there was upset on timing. Hull already knew of the attacks. Nomura did not. After silently reading through the japanese reply, hull looked up and said, i have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions. Infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge, i never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the japanese celebrated what seemed at the time to be a spectacular victory. It was in fact a more complete triumph and with fewer losses than even the most optimistic planners in tokyo could imagine. Pretty soon they had the loss of two carriers. Instead they lost no ships and only 29 planes. And the five midget submarines. The only real disappointment was the american carriers had not been in port. The war warning on november 27 had prompted kimmel to send them off of a deck load of fire planes to reinforce two outlying american outposts, wake island and midway. They were not in harbor when the japanese arrived december 7. Taking the long view that history allows, it is evident that the japanese attack on pearl harbor was one of the most selfdestructive acts in World History, ranking alongside hitlers invasion of the soviet union six months before. It unified what had been a divided america nation, swept away the protests of the isolationists, and awakened a sofar latent American Industrial capacity that would produce the Largest Naval force on earth, one that was not only far larger than the Imperial Japanese navy, the larger than all the navies of all the nations on both sides throughout the world. Combined. Perhaps no other act could have so thoroughly awakened the Sleeping Giant of the United States. Then too none of the japanese pilots who celebrated their victory aboard their carriers that day could possibly have known that 24 hours before they took off, 7000 miles away on the other side of the world, 500,000 russian soldiers sortie out of moscow against the german army. And before the winter was over, the russians would push the germans back to hundred miles. Japan entered the war the precise moment that the german juggernaut was exposed as vulnerable after all. Thank you so much for your attention. I look forward to your questions. [applause] yes, sir. You dont need to get up. He was a microphone. Now we will have you on tape. Great talk. A masterful presentation. I have always been shocked as an infantry officer by the term surprise attack. What other kinds of attacks are there . [laughter] and a further question is, admiral jim lyons i think, who was the paccom commander, he had a book, but he believes that kimmel and short should be exonerated. What is your view . Craig symonds let me start with the first question first. I spent 30 years as a civil war historian before i turned turncoat and became a world war ii historian. In the 19th century there were a lot of attacks that were not surprise attacks. Imagine the 15,000 men lining up on Seminary Ridge for the charge, lining up around noon and then making that charge about 3 00 . The union forces on Seminary Ridge watch them assemble. There were such a things as nonsurprise attacks. We had the word surprise to this particular attack because it seems to carry with it a suggestion of under handedness, that somehow the japanese want to have said they were coming, then come. That would have been the ticket thing to have done. I think it is microaggression as the kids say these days. But as to the second question, the innocence of the commanders, there is a tradition in the navy, and a lot of my navy friends here in the audience know this as well. If you are the captain of a ship down asleep and the ship runs aground, who bears the final is possibility for that . It is still you. For that, kimmel and short had to be relieved. That is a different question from guilt. The implication is that they overlooked some obvious preparation that they did not, they were not conscientious and preparing commands. They were not serious about their job. I think that is not true. They had to give up those positions because circumstances suggested that the American Public would have tolerated nothing less. In terms of saying they were guilty of either oversight acts of commission i think is going much too far. It is interesting to me that kimmels family in particular has tried very hard over the years since then, 35 years now, to exonerate their father, grandfather, from the guilt that has been laid upon him by generations that followed. And im sympathetic with that move. He did revert from four stars to two stars. I find that reasonable. Two stars is a statutory rank. He got four stars as virtue of his command of the pacific fleet, but he is no longer the commanders of the reverts to two stars. I think that was probably necessary as well. It is interesting that if you visit the cemetery at the Naval Academy overlooking College Creek where his tombstone is located, there are four stars above him, whatever that may mean. I hope that is responsive to your question. Yes, sir. We have got a microphone coming. Wait just a second. 50 years ago tomorrow, i was a naval officer at denvers point, oahu, and i went over to the 25th celebration of this battle that you have just so eloquently talked about. And i was impressed by two things. I went over about 10 00 in the morning. There seem to be more japanese there that americans. And second, they, their mood although i did not find it offensive, their mood seemed to be one of pride, that this attack was really something in their eyes. I was wondering what your experience with japanese and their attitudes toward pearl harbor . Craig symonds what it implies is the american view of peripheral pearl harbor, this was a dirty, sneaky, underhanded, mean, vicious almost stabbed in the dark and back alley kind of act. In the Japanese Point of view, this is a remarkable just tickle accomplishment. Something you would not have tried yourself, we brought six fullsize carriers across the entire width of the Pacific Ocean and launched planes only 220 miles away from your greatest naval base, and you didnt know a thing about it. That is pretty amazing. So i think you are right, perspective is almost everything. I dont know if that pride continued in subsequent generations. Im not sure it survived the war. The japanese government was embarrassed by the fact they learned later that nomuras document was late, that it had come in after the attack. They really meant to announce a break in diplomatic relations and then to strike. But they mishandled that particular kind of logistics. But there was a great deal of pride in the Japanese Navy at what they had been able to do. I dont think that survived the war. I dont think it survives today. I dont think you will find very many japanese beating their breasts and saying, yes, we really showed you at pearl harbor, anymore thanamericans would go to hiroshima and say ha. There was a woman in front of you that had a question. Thank you. You mentioned a great deal about japans desperate need for oil. And i remember, we were shipping scrap iron and steel to them in the late 1930s. That apparently got shut off. How did they come to the decision to stop that . Craig symonds the idea of embargoing certain critical elements was to make it difficult. When you employ economic sanctions to get a nation to behave the way you want to, which is hubris, you start with him a little bit of pain as if to say, we can make this harder on you. Then you embargo more. We will do scrap iron, now something else, now highoctane Aviation Fuel and then, my guess is terrible now, the Nuclear Option of embargoing oil itself without which the japanese could not survive. It is like do what we tell you where we you will not be able to survive as an economic entity. There was a ratcheting up of pressure on the japanese to force them to behave. I think one of the reasons why there was expectation in certain quarters, there is a point where you can make it so painful they have to do what you want. But if you dont also take into consideration the culture and the pride and the Natural History of the people you are dealing with, that can very much backfire on you as apparently you did in 1941. Yes . Thank you. You mentioned the success against the American Service fleet and the coincidence of the carriers gone. Would you comment on the japanese failure to go after fuel tanks, the shipyards, and Submarine Base and whether that was something they considered, or if their point was to get the American Fleet . Craig symonds that is something that afterward it was easy to point to. Hawaii has no oil either. Hawaii imports all of its oil. It has to come from mainland United States. If they take out a tank farm in oahu, the ships that are there cannot operate even if they are afloat. The japanese did not get that. In hindsight, we know that would have been a prime target for them. The orders that nogumo had, and he was a very literal minded individual, was to cripple the fleet. His orders were, take out half the fleet, that is success. If we have four carriers and eight battleships, you have done your job. We sank four of the battleships, the carriers were not there. I have done my job. I targeted the people, i am done. When the pilots came back after the second raid, the squad commanders went up to the break and said, we wiped out all the airplanes. We can fly over oahu with impunity now. No, i have stretched as far as i can go, the details of my orders, i am leaving. Off he went. The short answer is they did not think of hitting the fuel tanks. I have laid out on nogumo, that was a decision he made because he from the beginning was never really very sure that this was going to work. This was kind of a long shot, and he thought he had been condemned to have it commended. To be identified half way across, i will be sunk, and i get there, they might not even be in port. Then what do i do . He thought, wow, i have been so lucky so far, i am gone. He left. Yes, sir. Wait just a minute. [indiscernible] we are actually advising him that their very well could be danger ahead, whereas everyone is horrified that it could not happen. Craig symonds i think he had a lot of advisers who are telling him the japanese were going to attack. Here is the japanese conundrum i did not have a chance to address. The japanese need to get the Dutch East Indies and probably French Indochina and British Malaya. That is where the resources were. They had to get from sumatra and java in borneo to japan, and they have to go right through the philippine islands. In a way, as long as the philippines were in american hands, we still had our hand on the spigot that controlled japanese access to oil. If we are going to take this oil, we have take the sea lines of communication, we have got to take the philippines. They might not fight for British Malaya. I dont thinke Teddy Roosevelt could have gotten that through congress. But lets take out the fleet first. He had a lot of advisers telling him what was japan is coming. They will strike, we know they are going to strike. They will get the british and the dutch have probably the philippines. That is why Kerry Hopkins and edward stark said, why dont we hit them on their way there . Roosevelt said we cannot fire the first shot. Expected that shot to be in the philippines. No one, literally no one, thought that they could attack hawaii, not just that they wouldnt, but that they couldnt. It was too far, too hard, logistically overwhelming. That is why it happened. Where do i go now . We will go with this gentleman because you are closest to the microphone. Is there any truth to the story that pearl harbor was really only going to be phase one of a two phase attack on the United States, phase two being attacking washington, d. C. And new york, some kind of scheme of sending some very small aircraft to the east coast, having them assemble and hit one bomb on them . I heard this story at the air and space museum. I dont know if it is true or not. I never really explored it. Have you heard anything about that . Craig symonds no. That was an easy one. None at all. Down here. Here it comes, just a second. I want to get you on tape. The attack on hawaii comes, and i believe the attack in the philippines comes next. Im always been puzzled as to why the attack in the philippines was such a surprise and why macarthur was caught apparently so flatfooted. Craig symonds you are going to make me Say Something here that about General Macarthur . [laughter] Craig Symonds it is true the long story here is the idea that macarthur was going to launch an air raid and that was recalled by the time the japanese struck in the philippines, those planes were back on the ground. The brandnew b17s just arrived to bolster the defense of the philippines. Instead of following the plan that had been laid down as early as 1911 to defend bataan he wanted to go on the beaches. He lost most of his supplies. Macarthur did some wonderful things. Particularly as the overseer of the japanese reconstruction after 1945, and obviously incheon. But his management of war in the first six, seven days after december 7 left much to be desired. The question is why if kimmel and short had to be sacrificed why was macarthur given the double honor . America absolutely had something to cheer on december 8 three at looked terrible december 8. But when macarthur was recalled out of erigidor, in response to orders, he said i was ordered to come back. I came through, and i will return, it created something for the American Public to hang on to. And the consummate politician roosevelt was, he recognized the value of that and awarded macarthur with a medal of honor and command of the southwest pacific. In terms of applying judgment to who was most unprepared for an attack on the seventh, eighth, crossing the date of december 1941, macarthur does not, off very well. Is that ok for you . [applause] Craig Symonds good, ok. Thank you. 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