Transcripts For CSPAN Key Capitol Hill Hearings 20140329

Is appropriate, that is my feeling, too. That is a result of my soulsearching over the last couple of weeks. What is your opinion of this guy . You said you dont have a close personal relationship. Listen. I obviously believe that having David Wildstein at the Port Authority was a mistake. Let us just leave it at that. I said phil. I meant bob. Sorry about that, bob. Town hall at the meetings that you are very proud of the fact that you introduced for if the attorney general like furniture . [indiscernible] thats not fair. Think to characterize the attorney general as a piece of furniture is really beneath what you guys should be doing. The attorney general is doing an outstanding job. They are to enforce the law. They are not there to act as an ethics advisor to the government office. Governors office. If you find that in the statue of regulars, pointed out to me. [indiscernible] no, he is not. He may have to provide an investigative function in some later time. Imagine that. Imagine what you would be saying if that happened. Supposed to whos have an investigation of his own is helping us to comply with the mitigation of others. Anwould you be opposed to election at as a whole different story. Im not getting into that now. [indiscernible] my support of kevin odowd has never wavered because i knew how kevin conducted himself throughout this entire episode. I think the report backs that up in terms of the efforts he took, particularly with Bridget Kelly, to try to get to the truth than bottom of this. My support of kevin is unwavering. I was not going to resubmit his nomination in the midst of all this while i report was pending, but kevin on i will sit down and talk now that the report has been issued about the future and whether that is something he wants to pursue. Given occupied with other matters, so we will sit and talk about that. Concerned,m everything i said about kevin odowd on the date i nominated him to be attorney general applies just as much today as it did then. I chronicled on the ninth and just again in response to matts question. Reasonss force my for severing my relationship with bill. There is nothing new to add to that. [indiscernible] my decision was that all you would do is ask me about this. I did not have the facts i needed to be able to answer your question. It was not going to sit up here and lay dodge will play dodgeball on your questions. It is not much more competent than that. You know me. I have had regular press briefings throughout my administration. I am certainly not afraid to answer questions from all of you, any of you. If the fact is i know what youre going to ask and i do not know the answer, why would i submit myself to that . It does not make any self any sense. That is why i did not do. It is merely to me when you write stories about what you think youre entitled to. I think you are entitled to the answers when i get them. If all youre going to do is ask me these questions and yelled them at me at every town hall i walk through, i am not stupid. I get with this would be. I was going to answer these questions as soon as i had answers to give them. Remember, when i gave answers before when i thought i had complete information and he did not, it turned out to be a big mistake. One of the things ive learned is to try to not make that mistake again. Yes, i will hold ring the press of the lipase hold ring a press availability. We will quibble over what regular means. You hear about retaliation after the lanes have been over. I asked him directly says yet no idea what they were talking about. [indiscernible] matt, and this is for all of you. Me that askedsk me to speculate on David Wildstein was thinking or what Bridget Kelly was thinking, im not going to answer because i do not know. Into theoing to get speculation game because it will put me in a spot where im throwing stuff out against the wall and i drowned have a factual basis for. I will not do that. The thing i remember for sure is asking him what about the bridge lane situation he knew. And he have any prior knowledge or prove it, and the answers were no. I do not remember if i asked them about that particular piece on that day were the days after that. I clearly asked him at some point very early on and he said yet no idea what he was talking about. In the back. [indiscernible] saying that they cannot do an internal review. If they want to, they can. That is certainly within their purview. I think they are descended to the Inspector General, so i think Inspector General has will serve that purpose. This is not to be exclusive. What i think the report is recommending is that you need a group of people who have not been involved with the Port Authority. One of the things i find him for what the port authorities up to right now is the ring back they recommend bringing back executive directors who created the situation in the first place. Let me tell you, this not the first time the Port Authority has been involved in incidents to grow out of the inherent that grow out of the inherent conflict between new york and new jersey. I think bringing in the very people who helped to lay the foundation for this problem to examine the problem does not make a lot of sense to me. Oft is why this type Independence Commission may make sense. In the end, let us be clear. If anything is going to be change, it is going to have to be something i work on with governor cuomo. I have not had any conversations with him about this yet. He and i will talk. We have a good relationship. I think that the idea of splitting the Port Authority into two may have some real merit to it. Ive only been thinking about this for the last 24 hours, so i dont want to jump to conclusions. I think it has merit to consider and something that will be part of a lot of conversations that i will have with our friends in new york over the course of the coming weeks. Kelly . [indiscernible] kelly, i give them anything they asked for. My cell phone and my email accounts. Being interviewed . Its a number. I dont member exactly. Anytime they asked. They called and they asked and said they needed x amount of time with you. I said fine, cleared my calendar, and did it. Remember how many times. Kelly, i really do not remember. It started all the way back in january and has continued through to very near the time to issue the report. I dont remember how many times and i dont think it really matters. The bottom line is that whatever they asked, i said yes. However long they wanted, i try to give them. If they needed more time at another time i give them more time. In the end, my desire from this was for them to get all the information they needed to put forward a comprehensive result, which i think they have done. It is incumbent upon me to do that myself. I did. [indiscernible] as a government, we need to have higher than yes. Youre accusing something wrong is potentially something that could come back on your administration. [indiscernible] i have up here trying to very carefully answer questions. I dont know if you can take notes or if you are not listening, but for you to characterize my last answer as i did not want to ask her because i did not want to know is so awful that it is beneath the job you hold. What i said was that i made a decision, that given the likelihood of a chance i had of getting honest answers out of Bridget Kelly because you like to meet weeks earlier, versus the appearance that it would create in a later in cory that i attempted to course, influence, and anyway intimidate this , then ind her story made the decision that the cost benefit analysis of those two, wait on the side of me not having a private meeting with Bridget Kelly in the aftermath of these revelations. That is far from saying i did not want to know. Those kind of questions are just ridiculous. Melissa . [indiscernible] i assume the only reason for that is the did not get testimony or have documentary evidence that gave them a window thosehe emotional side of folks. I dont think there is any other reason why that would have occurred. Brian . Strong point of protecting fifth amendment rights, and yet the report uses the terminology in talking about the same individuals that says they asserted their fifth amendment rights from which add loose adverse influence can be drawn perko drawn. In a civil context, which is what this is, the the examination was a civil examination, in a civil context, and adverse inference can be drawn. In my instance, and adverse inference cannot be drawn from having their Constitutional Rights asserted. It is the distinction tween a civil and criminal inquiry. In a criminal instance, it cannot. The judge will charge a jury to say in a criminal context. [indiscernible] first of all, i dont know where they got the 1 million from. I dont know where they got that number. I sought saw it. I dont know where the number came from. If we want to have a search for the truth and we have an incident that people are concerned about and you have investigations which are asking for the production of enormous amounts of documents and testimony, you need to get lawyers to help you shepherd that process, to do it appropriately. That means they get paid for doing that task. [indiscernible] come frome it would the attorney generals office, who are the people who hired the lawyers in the first place and who reviewed the bills and authorized payment of the bills. That means sure you. Were not going to do anything to try to hide what the costs of this are if that is the thrust of your question. I do not know and have not been whated at the moment on this is costing. Im more focused on the result it met myoduce and if mandate and peers and it did and it appears that it did. How the process worse, when it happens, i am confident that we will make it public under the appropriate circumstances to do that. [indiscernible] tomorrow. For a meeting [indiscernible] no. Not at all. The report had nothing to do with it and i have gone to seven or eight states in the last four or five weeks. Im not going to have any meetings until i get the report . No. There is significantly less interest around the country in this report then there is in this region. I think appropriately so. If iknow if having am having a private meeting with sheldon and miriam or not. Imre thing i know for sure doing a las vegas is im speak to the republican jewish coalition. That is the resigned going to las vegas. I will be doing that as the rga chairman. Often times they set up with private meetings for me with donors are potential dover stood the republican governors association. I dont know you. I usually wait until i get on the plane tomorrow and i look at what im going to be what im theg doing when i that when i get there. How much responsibility [indiscernible] take complete responsibility for Bridget Kelly being in the position she was in. It was my decision. I take ultimate responsibly responsibility for David Wildstein being in that position because i permitted bill baroni dyer bill baroni to hire him. Sensitized,that im even more than i was before to this, when you go to experience like this. I think the people that advise me on the stuff are more sensitized to it as well. [indiscernible] a pot that he had . All right. To the never come and talk to you about what the alleged was . My understanding is that what said that it was a legitimate traffic study and it was his idea. It would not be news to me the time. It had been related to me numerous times since october 1. I dont think David Wildstein said anything different than that. I think that he also said at that time that Bridget Kelly had some knowledge about it. Us to goin, triggered back to Bridget Kelly and asked her, and she said she did not. Mike not bring it directly to me. That is not a relationship. You need to understand this that is not a revolving door. Its not where anyone can walk in on any topic they want and have at me. There is a process around here. Report to certain people. If they want to get information to me, they go through channels. The people who had unfettered access to me were evan odowd and Charlie Mckenna and everyone else in the office reported to either kevin odowd were Charlie Mckenna. I have seen some recounting of this in the press and the section about, why did not this person come to you . Im the governor of new jersey. Myont have everyone walk in door saying, hey, something i would like to tell you. To be able to run an efficient and effective office, you have to have lanes of traffic, especially moving towards me. I thought you would like that. [laughter] come on, everybody. We have to have some sense of humor. In this instance, those access rdedts regarded are gua and covered by kevin odowd and Charlie Mckenna. Is my,will tell you always appropriately, when her to his trek supervisor his direct supervisor or his indirect supervisor to report on all of those things. Not erect we to me. Know what i expect him to. Nor would it be appropriate for him to do. His job is to report to the people he is supposed to. I believe that is what the report shows. When my cat information that he thought was a portrait or relevant to the information to the rotation, he shared it maria or directly with kevin. That is how you are supposed to do a. I didnt do it that way, all i would be doing is taking people into my office and hearing information. Himself plainly a propylene clearly appropriately. There are other instances in the report where he went to maria to provide information about pressing quarries or other things about this issue. In the end, from my perspective, that is the way and effectively. Most goodk at governors offices or any chief executive, whether it is in the private sector or other areas of government, that is the way you have to do. If you dont do it that way, you will be overwhelmed by the people want to come in and have face time. I dont have the time to do that all the time. That is why i set up a twochief system, as opposed to the fourchief system we have had in the past. I wanted authority that ran to me. Is clear lines of authority exist today. The chief of staff and the chief counsel. They divide up the office as they see fit with my approval and then folks beneath them, like my, follow that course of conduct. If they do not, they will have trouble. This is the way we have to run things. I appreciate all of the questions. Joys such an extraordinary and relief to be able to come back and interact with you in a kind and gentle way that we always have. I would love to say that i missed you, but i did not. But, im looking forward to having you all back. The fact of the matter is this the single most important thing for me to do is to learn from this experience, to learn from what i have read and what i have heard, and to do my job. Areother considerations really not even secondary, but tertiary. My job is to do the job of governor of new jersey. I have another 3. 5 years to do that and i intend to do that as vigorously as i have done it in the years that i did before any of this occurred. I look forward to seeing you all again soon. I dont know when that will be. I will see you all again soon and be prepared to answer questions them. Thank you very much. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] next, the Supreme Court oral arguments severely us versus hobby lobby on the contraceptive provision of the health care law, followed by reaction from some of the parties in the case and u. S. Senators. Later, new jerseys governor Chris Christie News Conference today on the George Washington bridge closure. Comee thing to did not known until the late 1980s when a leading fbi scholar founded a filet when he threw through the freedom of information act. That is something that had taken to 1966. M 1940 the fbi had a formal relationship the american 1800n, in which members members of the american agent acted for informers for the fbi in their communities and regularly filed reports with the fbi. Americans had no idea that that kind of informing was taking place and they were untrained informers. On march 8, 1971, a group broke into an fbi office in pennsylvania and stole every document in the building. The story, sunday night at eight on cspans q and a. This week on prime ministers questions, David Cameron Discusses Energy prices, unemployment figures, and defense spending. The Supreme Court heard oral argument tuesday challenging the Health Care Laws concert captives contraceptives mandate. Justices questions touch on numerous issues, including religious freedom, corporate rights, federal mandates, and possible ignition if the companies when their case. A decision is expected before the end of the term in june. This is 90 minutes. Well hear argument this morning in consolidated cases number 13354, sebelius, secretary of health and Human Services v. Hobby lobby stores, and 13356, Conestoga Wood Specialties corporation v. Sebelius. Mr. Clement . Mr. Chief justice, and may it please the court, when a federal Government Agency compelled employers to provide something as religiously sensitive as contraception, it knew that free exercise in rfra claims would soon follow. In particular, the agency itself provided exemptions and accommodations for the religious exercise of a subset is your claim limited to sensitive materials like contraceptives or does it include items like blood transfusion, vaccines . For some religions, products made of pork . Is any claim under your theory that has a religious basis, could an employer preclude the use of those items as well . Well, Justice Sotomayor, the first step in the analysis would be to ask whether or not theres a substantial burden on religious exercise. I do think this case is, in a sense, easier than most of the examples that youve brought up because heres one where its so religiously sensitive, so fraught with religious controversy, that the agency itself provides a certain number of exemptions and accommodations. So thats one way, i think, that youd address the first step of the question here. Well, i mean, just take one of the things that Justice Sotomayor asked about, which is vaccinations, because there are many people who have religious objections to vaccinations. So suppose an employer does and refuses to fund or wants not to fund vaccinations for her employees, what happens then . Well, if we assume we get past the substantial burden step of the analysis, then the next step of the analysis the compelling interest and least restrictive alternatives analysis. And every case would have to be analyzed on its own. I do think in the context of vaccinations, the government may have a stronger compelling interest than it does in this context because there are notions of herd immunity and the like that give the government a particularly compelling interest in trying to maximize the number blood transfusions . Blood transfusions. Again, each one of these cases, i think would have to be evaluated on its own and apply the compelling interest, least restrictive alternative test and the substantial burdens part of the test. So really, every medical treatment. And Justice Sotomayor is quite right that there are quite a number of medical treatments that different religious groups object to. So one religious group could opt out of this and another religious group could opt out of that and everything would be piecemeal and nothing would be uniform. Well, Justice Kagan, nothing could be clearer than when Congress Passed rfra congress made a judgment that rfra was going to apply to all manner of federal statutes. And i think what the congress mr. Clement, maybe it seemed clear then, but since rfra, just as before rfra, congress has continued to write into federal legislation specific religious exemptions for some, but not everybody, for individuals, sometimes religious institutions. So if it was all that clear that rfra took care of it all, why did congress continue after rfra to pass these laws focusing the exemption on an individual, religious institution . Those, as i take your argument, all of those laws and there are more than half a dozen were unnecessary. Once rfra was on the books, congress didnt have to do that any more. Well, Justice Ginsburg, im not sure that they were all unnecessary. And of course, in a variety of contexts, congress may proceed on a belt and suspenders matters. Well, Justice Ginsburg, im not sure that they were all unnecessary. And of course, in a variety of contexts, congress may proceed on a belt and suspenders matters. So i think theres really two different questions. One is when Congress Passed rfra, was rfra just done with creating other exemptions. And i think the answer to that is no. But i think the question that Justice Kagans question brought up is, was congress evident and did congress specifically consider whether rfra would apply across the board to all the provisions of 18 u. S. C. , or rather all the provisions of the United States code. And congress could not have been clearer that it was passing a statute that it wanted to apply to all preexisting statutes and to all subsequent statutes unless congress specifically provided otherwise. You were beginning by giving us a framework for your argument. Do i think of this as a statutory case . Of course, the First Amendment is on the stage at some point here, but i take it you can prevail just on the question of statutory interpretation, and if that is so, are there any statutory rules that work in your favor, that is to say, avoiding a constitutional question or how do we think about this case, primarily as a statutory case . Obviously, one of my clients has before you right now a free exercise claim and my other client has a free exercise claim thats live in the lower courts. So those issues are preserved. But i, think, as your question points out, this court really, first and foremost, can decide this on the basis of the federal statute, and the ashwander principles of constitutional avoidance seem like they would be sort of fully applicable to the courts consideration of that question. And then, of course, the normal principles of statutory construction would certainly point you to the answer to the first objection the government raises, which is do persons include Forprofit Corporations because mr. Clement, isnt this a special kind of statute . Because this a statute that specifically refers back to a body of constitutional law. It basically says we want to get right back to the place that we were with respect to religious claims before Employment Division v. Smith. And so we have its not you know, its a statute that directs us to a body of constitutional law. That body of constitutional law is, i think, very different from the one you portray in your brief. It suggests that accommodations should be made sometimes, but rarely, and subject to a to a balancing analysis, not to a compelling interest standard in the way we would use it for, say, race discrimination. So, you know, whats the response to that . Well, first, Justice Kagan, let me take a little bit of an issue with your premise and let me try to responsive to your question anyways after i do that. How id like to take issue with your premise is that when Congress First passed the statute rfra, it talked about free exercise as defined in the courts cases. And then at the time that it passed rluipa, which is a later statute, it actually confronted some lower court cases that had limited rfra and tried to impose a centrality requirement. And congress didnt want that. It didnt want to take all the baggage of the presmith free exercise cases. So it actually amended the statute to broaden it so it now protects any exercise of religion. So i would take issue with your premise that rfra simply picks up everything that ever happened presmith. Well, there theres another respect in which this, even as originally enacted, does not track the preEmployment Division v. Smith law. That is to say, the compelling state interest test in the prior cases was never accompanied by a least restrictive alternative requirement. That was an invention of this of this law. I think thats fair, Justice Scalia. One of the things that you run into if you try to sort of get at this statute the way that Justice Kagan is suggesting is that not everybody exactly agreed as to what the presmith case law was. You described the presmith case law in your opinion in a certain way. Justice oconnor described the presmith case law in another way. So its a little bit difficult to try to say, as Justice Kagans question would suggest, that rather than just apply the statute as written, we should really sort of just go back and apply presmith laws if this were well, it is applying the statute as written. The statute as written this not a question of legislative history the statute as written points back to presmith law. It says thats what we mean. Well, youre right, Justice Kagan, in the purpose part of the statute it says what we mean to do here is basically restore the presmith law. But it also accompanies that purpose statute with operative language. And the operative language, which i think this court should apply, as Justice Scalia suggests, applies broadly to any exercise of religion by any person and then suggests that the relevant test is substantial burden with the burden on my client as to the substantial burden part of the test. And then its mr. Clement, this was a law that was passed overwhelmingly, both houses of congress. People from all sides of the political spectrum voted for it. It seems strange that there would have been that tremendous uniformity if it means what you said it means, to take to cover rofit corporations, especially in light of there was an effort to adopt a conscience amendment, a specific conscience amendment in 2012, and the senate rejected that. That that amendment would have enabled secular employers and insurance providers to deny coverage on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions. It was specifically geared to secular employers and insurance providers. And that that was rejected. Well, Justice Ginsburg, i would suggest to the contrary. The reason that there was such unanimity behind rfra in the first place is that efforts to limit to just certain subclasses, subsets of religious freedom claims, were rejected and sort of everybody in congress got together and said, all right, you have some claims you actually want to be vindicated, you have some claims you want to be vindicated, well vindicate all of them. And if were going to look at any legislative history as shedding light on this, then i would suggest you look at professor laycocks brief, which goes into great detail about the legislative debates involved in that led up ultimately to the passage of rluipa. And when congress was trying to pass a broader statute, the rlpa, the religious liberty protection act, the issue of the statutes application and rfras application to Forprofit Corporations was squarely put at issue by the nadler amendment. And that amendment was rejected and the house report that demonstrates the rejection of that amendment could not be clearer that they understood that Forprofit Corporations would be covered. Now, in fairness, what they understood is that we were probably talking about in the real world a relatively small set of corporations like an incorporated kosher market or kosher deli of the kind that this court had before it in the crown kosher case. And so i think its you know, we can talk about the extent and how youd apply these principles to exxon, but i think thats just something thats not going to happen in the real world. It is no accident that the claims that you have before you in these cases are brought by small closely held corporations that have firmly held religious beliefs. But, again, mr. Clement as Justice Ginsburg said, this was a very uncontroversial law. Your understanding of this law, your interpretation of it, would essentially subject the entire u. S. Code to the highest test in constitutional law, to a compelling interest standard. So another employer comes in and that employer says, i have a religious objection to sex discrimination laws; and then another employer comes in, i have a religious objection to minimum wage laws; and then another, family leave; and then another, child labor laws. And all of that is subject to the exact same test which you say is this unbelievably high test, the compelling interest standard with the least restrictive alternative. Well, i dont say that. I think Congress Said that. But to be as responsive as i can to your question, the parade of horribles that the government offers you ought to sound familiar, because if you look at that parade of horribles Social Security, minimum wage, discrimination laws, compelled vaccination every item on that list was included in Justice Scalias opinion for the court in smith. And Justice Oconnor responded to that in her separate opinion and she said, look, youve got to trust the courts; just because free exercise claims are being brought doesnt mean that the courts cant separate the sheep from the goats. Now, whatever well, she had an understanding of how the court worked presmith that was a kind of sherbert v. Verner yoder understanding, which was we did a balancing, we looked at the governments interests, we took those very seriously, especially to the extent that there was harm to identifiable third parties and that it fell on an identifiable third party. That was basically you could not get an accommodation for that kind of harm. Well, what she said and whatever the merits of it as a matter of constitutional debate isnt relevant. What i think is relevant is that congress clearly preferred one side of that debate and thought courts could handle this. So then the question becomes how do courts actually apply this test . And i dont think applying the test to recognize this case, where i think the government has an incredibly weak case on compelling interest and least restrictive alternatives, which they almost dont want to talk about at all, is going to endanger any other statutes. And if i could talk about specific well, could i ask you this, mr. Clement. In all the years since rfra has been on the books, has any of these claims involving minimum wage, for example, been brought and have they succeeded . Justice alito, very few of these claims have been brought. Very few of them have succeeded, and thats notwithstanding the fact that all of these statutes were talking about apply to employers generally. And it and none of those claims have been brought or they havent succeeded notwithstanding the fact that the government concedes that Sole Proprietorships and partnerships and nonProfit Corporations are all protected by rfra. Now, millions of americans are employed by proprietorships, partnerships, and nonprofits. So if these statutes really were on a collision course, i think we would have seen the collision already. Well, with respect, mr. Clement, i think that thats probably because the court has had a different understanding of what rfra does and the kind of analysis that it requires courts to perform than youre arguing for in this case. That if your argument were adopted and there was a strict scrutiny standard of the kind that usually applies and a least restrictive alternative requirement, then you would see religious objectors come out of the woodwork with respect to all of these laws. And because you say that there and i think this absolutely right when you say it that you cannot test the centrality of a belief to a religion, you cannot test the sincerity of religion. I think a court would be, you know their hands would be bound when faced with all these challenges if your standard applies. Well, Justice Kagan, a couple of thoughts. First of all, i mean, its not like this court has never had a rfra case that it applied the standard on the merits. And in the o centro case, this court applied something that very much felt to the government at the time as being strict scrutiny. But if this court well, it was a religious organization. It certainly was a religious organization and its a separate question as this whats different. I mean, all along the earlier cases dealt with individuals and they dealt with religious institutions. Well, if i may, Justice Ginsburg, theres two separate questions. Theres a question about how to apply the test if its applicable in a particular case, and i think o centro is the starting place for guidance on that. Your question also brings up the separate question about the coverage of the statute. And as to that, i think the place to start is the statute itself, which broadly provides coverages to persons. That is not an incidental term. Its a term that picks up additional context through the dictionary act and specifically applies to all corporations, to joint partnerships, to societies. How does a corporation exercise religion . I mean, i know how it speaks and we have, according to our jurisprudence, 200 years of corporations speaking in its own interests. But where are the cases that show that a corporation exercises religion . Well, Justice Sotomayor, those cases i mean, id start with cases like lukumi or o centro, which all involved corporations, and nobody thought it was particularly problematic there that the plaintiffs before the court ere artificial entities. And i suppose you could take well, but they were really arguing about things that affected their membership, not them as a corporate entity. Well, im not sure that you can so easily divide the two, and we can talk about how it is with corporations generally. You understand how the corporation has certain beliefs or a scienter requirement. The courts every day deal with issues of trying to figure out what kind of intent or motivation a corporate entity has. So the dissent in this case, in the tenth circuit case, said how do we determine when a corporation has that belief . Who says it . The majority of shareholders . The Corporate Officers . The is it 51 . What happens to the minority . And how much of the business has to be dedicated to religion . 5 . 10 . 90 . Just assume not a business like yours you picked great plaintiffs, but lets assume lets assume just a business that sells 5 of religious books, doesnt play christmas music, doesnt give off works n sunday, you know, does nothing else religiously. Right. And, Justice Sotomayor, i think the way to approach those cases would be the same basic way you approach other questions of corporate intent or corporate motivation. You look to the governance doctrines, if any of this put at issue. And i think thats really a critical question, which is ultimately, i think this line of questioning goes to a question of sincerity, and if some Large Corporation asserts some claim thats going to save them lots of money, i would think that the government in those kind of cases is really going to resist the sincerity piece of the analysis. In this kind of case thats the most dangerous piece. Thats the one weve resisted in all our exercise jurisprudence, to measure the depth of someones religious beliefs. To be clear, this courts cases have always distinguished between the sincerity inquiry, which the court has allowed, and the centrality inquiry, which it suggested is inappropriate. But sincerity has always been a part of this courts cases. I thought more importantly was whether a burden was substantial or not. That weve never acceded to the person claiming a religious exemption, a belief in how substantial the burden might be. Right. This court has not questioned that. The thomas case, i think, puts as Common Ground the idea that you dont really secondguess the persons the persons belief, but you can contest sincerity. It is there is case law in this. You know, you have people who are arrested in possession of large quantities of marijuana and they assert that they belong to the church of marijuana, and those cases do get litigated and they get rejected. And theres a lot of different ways to is there is there a different way of looking at it, the leeway . In u. S. V. Lee, we said, when followers of a particular sect enter into a commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. So isnt that really the answer, that weve never considered a Forprofit Corporation as exercising eligion . Well, let me let me take on lee first. And i mean, thats obviously the two lines of lee that are the governments favorite two lines in lee. But lee starts with a substantial burden inquiry, which is where most of these sincerity questions go. And lee definitely says that there is a sincere religious belief and a substantial burden on religious exercise. So the two sentences that youre quoting come in the compelling interest analysis of the case. And i think lee does stand for the proposition that in the tax context, its going to be very hard for somebody to bring a claim that satisfies even the demanding compelling interest, least restrictive alternative est. Well, thats an interesting question, because the briefs on both sides here are written as if the penalty for not having a Health Insurance policy that covers contraceptives is at issue. But isnt there another choice nobody talks about, which is paying the tax, which is a lot less than a penalty and a lot less than the cost of health nsurance at all . These employers could choose not to give Health Insurance and pay not that high a penalty, not that high a tax. Well, just to put this in concrete terms, for hobby lobby, for example, the choice is between paying 475 million per year penalty and paying a 26 million per year coverage. Terms, for hobby lobb, for example, the choice is between paying 475 no, i dont think thatmi thats the same thing, mr. Clement. Theres one penalty that is if the employer continues to provide Health Insurance without this part of the coverage, but hobby lobby could choose not to provide Health Insurance at all. And in that case hobby lobby would pay 2,000 per employee, which is less than hobby lobby probably pays to provide insurance to its employees. So there is a choice here. Its not even a penalty by in the language of the statute. Its a payment or a tax. Theres a choice. And so the question is, why is there a substantial burden at all . Well, just to be clear, we were talking about the same thing. So the option, the choice, is between paying a 475 million a year penalty and a 26 million a year penalty. Thats what hobby lobby faces. So 2,000 per person no, between paying 2,000 per employee per year if hobby lobby does not provide thats 26 million. You know, hobby lobby is paying something right now for the for the coverage. Its less than what hobby lobby is paying for the coverage. There are employers all over the United States that are doing this voluntarily because they think that its less. I thought i thought that part of the religious commitment of the owners was to provide health care for its employees. That is true, mr. Chief justice. It is also true that this well, if they want to do that, they can just pay a greater salary and let the employees go in on the exchange. Exactly, which is, by the way, why comparing the 2,000 penalty to the cost of the health care is a false its a false comparison. Its not called a penalty. Its called a tax. And its calibrated and its calibrated shes right about that. And it has been treated for some purposes as a penalty. And i think for this purposes, it certainly feels punitive. And if i could finish the thought about why its a false comparison, the 2,000 penalty to the cost of the Health Insurance, is that its going to very much hurt hobby lobby if all of the sudden it doesnt provide health care to its employees. And in order to compensate for that, it would have to increase the wages. And i think it would be worse off as a result of this. But if i could also well, lets say that thats right. Lets say that they have to increase the wages a little bit. I mean, still we are talking about pretty equivalent numbers. Maybe its a little bit less; maybe its a little bit more. But this not the kind of thing thats going to drive a person out of business. Its not prohibitive. Its like the thing that we talked about in braunfeld where we said, you know, maybe if the store cant stay open 7 days a week, it makes a little bit less money. But so be it, is what we said. No, i actually think what its like, your honor, with all due respect, its like the five dollar penalty enforcing the prohibition in yoder. And what this court says, its one thing if you dont have a direct government prohibition on a religious exercise or a mandate that somebody do something that violates their religion. In those cases, which is like sherbert and is like braunfeld, then you have to look at the substantial pressure, and it becomes a little bit more of a looseygoosey analysis. But when you have a Government Law that specifically says you must do something that violates your religion and its enforced with a penalty, and with all due respect i think 2,000 per employee is a penalty. But mr. Clement, its not saying you must do something that violates your religion. Its giving you a choice. You can do this thing or if this thing violates your religion you can do another thing. And that other thing is approximately the same price as the thing that you dont want to do. I dont think it would be the same price at the end of the day. Id also like to point out how this well, of course it wouldnt be the same price at the end of the day. If they deny Health Insurance, theyre going to have to raise wages if they are going to get employees. Absolutely. Its absurd to say that, you know, it comes out of nowhere. Absolutely, your honor. And by the way, this 2,000 penalty is very much a doubleedged sword for the government, because youre trying to but why is that a problem . Lets assume that the cost of providing insurance is roughly equivalent to the 2,000 penalty. How is the employer hurt . He can just raise the wages. May i just put a footnote on this. I thought the average price of providing insurance for a Single Person is 4,000, and its 12,000 for a family for a family. So the 2,000 tax thats what its called is to help the government provide subsidies to people on the exchange that dont have employer insurance. So its a tax because its it is to do exactly what your client wants, to get the government to supply the contraceptives, not the Insurance Companies. Heres the problem with this way of looking at it, which is to say whatever it costs per employee to get this, this health care, thats something that right now hobby lobby is paying whatever its paying them, plus its, you know, imputed into that is the idea that theyre getting their wage and theyre Getting Health Care insurance. If they take away the health care insurance, they are going to have to increase the wages to make up for that. And theyre going to have to pay the 2,000 penalty on top of it, plus theyre going to have to violate their own interest which is, we actually we believe its important to provide our employees with qualified health care. Ok, the last is important. But just assume hypothetically that its a wash, that the employer would be in about the same position if he paid the penalty and the employer pardon me, an employee went out and got the insurance and that the employees wages were raised slightly and then its and that its a wash so far as the employer are concerned, other than the employers religious objection, but just on the financial standpoint. Can we assume that as a hypothetical. Then what would your case be . I think my case would be that in that case the government might be able to sort of support itself on the compelling interest. I think there would still be a substantial burden on their exercise. But again, this all turns on issues that the government hasnt put in issue. This case hasnt been litigated on this particular theory, so i think id love to have the opportunity to show how by not providing Health Insurance it would have a huge burden on my client and their ability to attract workers, and that in fact would cost them much more out of pocket. But thats not been the nature of the governments theory. Can i ask there was a point made earlier, and i think you didnt mean to say this, that provision of health care is not part of their religious belief. Covering their employees for health care, that is not a religious tenet, right . No, it actually is. Again, it hasnt been the principal theory on which this case has been litigated. But see, if you go back to the complaints and you go back to our briefs, you know, its part of the religious beliefs that both the hahns and the greens have. They think its actually important but, mr. Clement, youre not saying, are you, that their religious beliefs mandate them to provide health care . I thought that you were never making that claim. I didnt have to make that claim in the course of this litigation. What im pointing out, though, is for purposes of the substantial burden analysis, it is perfectly appropriate to take into account that the 2,000 the 26 million in fines they would pay would not be the only thing that they would lose out if they are on that horn of the dilemma. They would also lose out all the additional wages they would have to pay, and they would be in this position of not Offering Health care, which is something they believe is important for their religion as well. You know, im sure they seem like very good employers. And im sure they want to be good employers. But again, thats a different thing than saying that their religious beliefs mandate them to provide Health Insurance, because here congress has said that the Health Insurance that theyre providing is not adequate, its not the full package. Well, with respect, what congress has said is that this kind of plan is not appropriate for a nongrandfathered plan. But if were going to talk about the governments compelling interests here, which i think has got to be part of the analysis, then i think the grandfathered provisions of this statute really are devastating for the governments argument that it has a compelling interest. When the government pursues compelling interest, it demands immediate compliance. It doesnt say, get around to it whenever its convenient. I cant imagine Congress Passing title vii and saying, stop discriminating on the basis of race, unless of course you have a preexisting policy that discriminates on the basis of race, and then you can keep it as long as youd like. It is fundamentally inconsistent with a compelling interest well, but i think even analysis to have this kind of grandfathering. That example, you know, initially title vii did not apply to any employers with fewer than 25 employees. And then gradually, congress brought the number down because congress realized that there were going to be transition issues and that some time was needed to make sure that the compelling interest, you know, should be applied uniformly across all employers. Heres, respectfully, why i dont think that that works, which is i think the question whenever there are exemptions in the statute is to ask yourself, do the exemptions undermine the compelling interest that the government asserts. Theres nothing inconsistent with an interest in prohibiting employment discrimination to say were going to focus on the people who actually employ the most people and therefore can engage in the most discrimination. Its quite a different matter, and i dont think anybody would think that congress would pass a title vii that said, hey, as long as you have a preexisting discriminatory policy, youre allowed to keep it. That doesnt seem like it would be consistent. Counsel, your attorney one of the attorneys below on behalf of your clients admitted that the grandfathered policies werent going to be around very long because any change to an existing policy and he said these changes happen on a yearly basis. And we already know from the governments statistics that its up to 40 now have grandfathered out. Your own client changed its policy, and thats why its not grandfathered. And he changed it to drop contraceptives it was covering. Well and so my point is, since when does a transitioned randfathered exemption and one that Everybody Knows will have to change, because premiums by definition will change or copays will change, something is going to change its a very short transition period. Since when does that prove that he need is not compelling . With all due respect, its not necessarily a very short transition period. And your references to copays and premiums is precisely on point, because the government, through its regulations, has allowed grandfathered plans to make changes to the copays as long as theyre indexed to medical inflation. Now, if you have a transition period thats just there for a nanosecond, you dont bother indexing it to medical inflation. So this a grandfather provision thats going to be around for multiple years. And by the governments own numbers, tens of millions of employees are not getting this mandated coverage as a result of the grandfather provision. And even if we can project forward ten years to when maybe there would only be a handful of grandfathered plans, even at that point, you would still have the same problem that the government would have, which is it has to make an argument for a compelling interest. Just before your time starts to go too fast, how would you suggest that we think about the position and the rights of the f the employees . And you can have hypotheticals about the employer makes them wants to make them wear burkas and so forth. Thats not in this case. But in a way, the employees are in a position where the government, through its healthcare plans, is, under your view, is allowing the mployer to put the employee in disadvantageous position. The employee may not agree with these religious beliefs of the employer. Does the religious beliefs just trump . Is that the way it works . Well, no, its not just the way it works, Justice Kennedy. And i actually have four things id like to say about that, if its possible. And i actually have four things id like to say about that, if its possible. One is, i think the first thing about thirdparty burdens is you have to ask where are they coming from. Thirdparty burdens are coming from an employer i mean, an employer right now can put some burden on their rights because they have to listen to religious music or whatever. Thats not as serious as a burden thats coming directly from the government. So thats one principle to think about. Another principle, and this more of a detail, but i think its important, is that to the extent you take into account thirdparty burdens, you take those into account in the compelling interest part of the analysis. The government has an argument that somehow thirdparty interests go into the substantial burden part of the analysis, where we bear the burden. And we dont think thats right at all. The thirdparty but, mr. Clement, you made the analogy to rluipa. And the one thing that has not been mentioned up till now is the establishment clause. The court was very clear when it came to rluipa, which you said is similar to rfra, that the accommodation must be measured so it doesnt override other significant interests. And that was true of sherbert and that was true of yoder. The and the cutter case, and this court made it very clear, that the accommodation has to be balanced and you have to take into account other significant interests. Right. But that actually brings me to my third point, which is those other significant interests that carry the most weight have to be independent of the very statute thats at issue in the case and that the party seeks an exemption from. So if you think about the caldor case, there the court was concerned with the thirdparty burdens on, say, an employee who had a seniority right to take the weekends off. So he or she had an independent right to take the weekend off, and the government policy was coming in and displacing this. Im not sure that squares with lee. The statute created the right to Social Security, and there the court said you cant deprive employees of a statutory right because of your religious beliefs. So lee is contrary to the point youre making. There, too, i have to respectfully disagree, because if you remember the facts of lee, lee is brought not just by the employer, but by the employee. So the particular employees there dont have a beef with what hes doing at all. And i think when theyre talking about thirdparty burdens there, what the court is really talking about is the burdens of everybody else who contributes into a system where uniformity, to use the courts words, was indispensable. And so if i could, though, i think, just to illustrate why its sort of double counting to count the mandated issue here as being what gives the burden to the third party or the benefit on the third party. Imagine two hypotheticals. One is Congress Passes a statute and says i have to destroy all of my books, including my bibles. Another statute, Congress Comes in and says i have to give all of my books, including all of my bibles, to you. Now, in the second case, i suppose you could say that a rfra claim somehow gets rid of your statutory entitlement to my bibles, but i dont think, since its the very benefit that were talking about thats at issue there, i dont think i think that really is double counting and i dont think those two hypothetical statutes should be analyzed any differently. The other thing, though, about burdens, and i think it should go this the fourth point that should go into the compelling interest test i mean, mr. Clement, isnt that just a way of saying that you think that this isnt a good statute, because it asks one person to subsidize another person. But congress has made a judgment and congress has given a statutory entitlement and that entitlement is to women and includes contraceptive coverage. Well, Justice Kagan, i think you could say the same thing about my bible hypothetical. But i do have one last thing to say about burdens. And i do think when you think about impacts on third parties, not all of these burdens are created equal. And that, too, i think is borne out in this courts cases. And the most relevant factor is, is there some alternative way for the government to ameliorate the burden. And i think about two types of, kind of accommodations, if you will. You get sort of title vii with a very narrow accommodation. And then you have conscience clauses that allow medical providers, including forprofit medical providers, not to provide abortions. Now, each of those has a burden on third parties, but i would respectfully suggest theyre different. In the case of the employee whos been subject to Racial Discrimination, even if they can get another job, that Racial Discrimination is a unique injury to them that you cant remedy unless you tell the employer, dont discriminate on the basis of race. Now, in the context of the conscience clause, if a woman cant get an abortion from her preferred provider, thats surely a significant burden on her. But we dont view that as trumping the conscience clause, because she can get the abortion through another mechanism. Here, as your question rightfully highlights, all were really talking about is whos going to pay for a subsidy that the government prefers. This not about access to the contraception. Its about whos going to pay for the governments preferred subsidy. And i think in that context, there are ample alternative ways to address any burdens on third parties. It would make no difference if it were there are 20 fdaapproved contraceptives, all of them covered by the healthcare act. I think you picked out, in one case what, three, and the other case four . Suppose the employer says contraceptives all together are against my religion, so im not going to give any contraceptive coverage. Well, obviously, Justice Ginsburg, i didnt pick these out. I mean, my clients and their religious beliefs identified these as problematic. There are certainly but your argument, it seems to me, would apply just as well if the employer said no contraceptives. I think thats a fair point, Justice Ginsburg, and the governments own accommodations, where they offer them to religious groups and religious employers like nonprofit hospitals, also applies to whatever the religious beliefs of that provider are. So if they extend to all 20, then the exemptions applied to all 20. If they only extend to four, then the exemption applies to all four. Are there ways of accommodating the interests of the women who may want these particular drugs or devices without imposing a substantial burden on the employer who has the religious objection to it . There are ample less restrictive alternatives, your honor. What are they . And i think they all flow from this fact that this ultimately about whos going to pay for a substitute those are alternatives that youre asking the government to incur or the person to incur. There isnt an alternative that doesnt put a cost on someone else. Well, its funny about this particular mandate because the governments position is this actually a costfree mandate; that whatever you pay out in contraceptions, youre going to make up in not having to pay for other coverages. And so one alternative, one less restrictive alternative is whats done in the accommodation for nonprofit employers like hospitals, where basically they tell the insurance carrier or the plan administer that you pick up the cost for this and then essentially itll be cost neutral from you. But i dont think theres anything sort of sacrosanct, if you will, about having the government pay for its preferred subsidy as a less restrictive alternative. And thats essentially what the government does for those employees who have employers. If those employees if the employer doesnt provide healthcare, those employees go on to the exchanges with a subsidy from the government. Now, they can do the same thing for objecting religious employers. They just have chosen not to. If i may reserve my time. Thank you, mr. Clement. General verrilli . Mr. Chief justice, and may it please the court, the touchstone for resolving this case is the principle Justice Jackson articulated in prince v. Massachusetts. As he said, limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with the liberties of others or of the public. Adherence to that principle is what makes possible the harmonious functioning of a society like ours, in which people of every faith live and work side by side. Thats a statement that is inconsistent with rfra, isnt it . The whole point of rfra is that congress wanted to provide exceptions for the religious views of particular including proprietors, individuals. No, mr. Chief justice, i dont think so at all. In fact, the although i was of course, i was referring to Justice Jacksons words for their wisdom because it wasnt the opinion of the court. Yeah. But the wisdom you cited is the idea that you dont have imposed, on the basis of religious beliefs, exemptions or limitations. And it seems to me that was the whole point of rfra, to tell the courts that that is exactly what you should do unless the exception satisfies the strict scrutiny test. Well, but i think, well, unless it satisfies the presmith standards under the establishment clause. But i do think that the exact same point its more than presmith. I take your point plus i take your point about less restrictive means, your honor. Ok. But the exact same point that Justice Jackson made in prince, i submit, is the point that this court made unanimously in cutter. Its not its that when you are analyzing what is required under rfra, the court must take account of the way in which the requested accommodation will affect the rights and interests of third parties. Well, is it your argument that providing the accommodation thats requested here would violate the establishment clause . Its not our argument that it would violate the establishment clause. But it is our argument that you in any rfra case, including this one, you have to consider the impact on third parties, because otherwise, you will be skating on thin constitutional ice. And so Justice Kennedy, you asked about principles that that surround statutory construction. Avoidance is one of them. And that was why the Court Unanimously in cutter said that in every rfra case when youre considering an accommodation, you have to weigh the effect on third parties. Where is that in rfra . I mean, what factor of rfra do you fold that in under . Is that part of the compelling state interest requirement or substantial burden requirement . Where is it in rfra . Id like i think the answer is that it could inform every operative provision in rfra. We have said that it should inform the courts interpretation of who counts as a person. If they wanted you to balance the interest of the religious objector against the interest of other individuals, they made no reference to that in rfra at all. Well, i they said unless the government has a compelling state interest. And the compelling and certainly compelling interest analysis certainly does require consideration of the interests of third parties. Of course, what the court what the Congress Said in rfra, in explaining how the compelling interest test was to work, was that it was to strike a sensible balance between claims for religious liberty and governmental interests. And, of course, lee is one of the presmith cases that provides the governing law. And i would submit is really the only case from this court in which the request for an exemption under the free exercise clause had the effect of extinguishing a statutorily guaranteed benefit. Because in lee, had the employer gotten the exemption from providing Social Security, the consequence would have been that the employees would have been disqualified from receiving Social Security benefits. But that wasnt the basis for denying the claim. The basis was that the government has to run a uniform system that applies to everybody. I disagree. And you cant argue that here because the government has made a lot of exemptions. I first of all, i disagree with respect to lee, that one of the points that the court made in lee was that granting the exemption from Social Security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employers religious faith on the employees. It was one of the grounds of decision. Now but turning to i would like to address these exemptions. Im happy to talk about them. Im happy to talk about our compelling interest at length. The now, the my well, if you could start with the question of whether the companies in this case have a right to bring rfra claims because theyre Forprofit Corporations. You argue that they cant. Thats correct. Now, why is that . Is it is it your position that theres something about the corporate form per se that is inconsistent with the free exercise claim . No, because, obviously, churches can bring claims. All right. But is it your argument that theres something about engaging in a forprofit activity that is inconsistent with a free exercise claim . Yes. And if i could walk through the let me, if you dont mind, just walk through the analysis on well, were the merchants in the braunfeld case engaged in forprofit activity . Yes. So there isnt anything inherent in but i think in participating in a forprofit activity thats inconsistent with corporate form, is there . Im sorry, with a free exercise claim. Yes. But i think the relevant question is what did congress think it was doing when it enacted rfra in 1993 . What kinds of claims did it think it was well, what is it about justifying . A Forprofit Corporation that is inconsistent with a free exercise claim . Do you agree with the proposition that was endorsed by one of the lower courts in this case, that Forprofit Corporations must do nothing but maximize profits, they cannot have other aims no, not including religious aims . No. But heres how we look at it. At its core im sorry, general. You answered yes to braunfeld. It was jewish merchants, but it was the merchants themselves individuals. The individuals, yes. Not the corporation that was going to be jailed. It was a yes, thats right. Criminal prosecution. I understood Justice Alito to be asking me not about the corporate form, but about the activity. And when you have an individual, you have an individual. Its a person. So whether it was a merchant that was a corporation or not was irrelevant. It was that the individual was thats going to be jailed. Thats correct. It was an individual making a profit, right . But i but let me say, i think the relevant question here is what did congress think it was doing in 1993 . And i think the answer to that has to be in, you know, we understand the dictionary act provides a broad definition of person, but the dictionary act doesnt define exercise religion. And the operative statutory language is exercise persons exercise of religion. And so you cant look to the dictionary act to define that. But Congress Told you where to look. It told you to look to the presmith case law and why did it tell to define that. Why did it say that . It changed the definition at the time when rluipa was adopted, did it not, to eliminate the reference to the First Amendment; isnt that right . Well, it says free exercise. And didnt it also adopt a provision in rluipa saying that that the exercise of religion was to be interpreted in the broadest possible way . Well, i think it said something more precise than that, which was that it was to be interpreted not to be confined only to central religious tenets. No. Didnt it say didnt it say the term religious exercise includes any exercise yes, includes any exercise of religion, but it doesnt define what that is. It just says you dont draw a line between centrality and something that may no. But there is another provision that says that, this chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the constitution. Right. And it but with respect to what exercise religion means, it said dont draw lines between centrality and noncentrality. It didnt go beyond that and tell you what it means. And what rfra tells you to look to is presmith case law. And in the entire history of this country, there is not a single case in which a Forprofit Corporation was granted an exemption on not a single case in which it was denied exemption, either. All youre saying is well, lee that there are no cases. Well, lee was certainly a case in which a forprofit enterprise was denied an exemption. Braunfeld was such a case. Gallagher was such a case. Not on the ground that it was a forprofit enterprise. There is not a single case which says that a forprofit enterprise cannot make a freedom of religion claim, is there . Right. There is not a single case right. Holding that. Except that in lee, it was critical to the courts analysis that mr. Lee and his business had chosen to enter the commercial sphere. Isnt that a merits question, general . I mean, i totally understand that argument as a as an argument about the merits. Im not sure i understand it as a threshold claim that this that the claim is not recognizable at all. Right. Well, let me i do want to move to the compelling interest analysis, but if i could make one point in response to your honors question, that the courts got to decide what person a persons exercise of religion means. And that it seems to me that it would be such a vast expansion of what Congress Must could have thought it was doing in 1993, when it enacted rfra, to say that Forprofit Corporations can make claims for religious exemptions to any laws of general application that they want to challenge. I do you know, mr. Clement says, well, you dont have to worry about anything other than small, tightly knit corporations like the one at issue here. I take the point of the appeal of a situation like this one. But the way in which he suggests that you will be able to distinguish this case from a case in which a Large Corporation comes in or a Public Company comes in, is that you will have more grounds to question the sincerity of the claim. But that raises exactly the kinds of entanglement concerns that this court has always said you should try to avoid. Well, thats his argument for distinguishing it. But there are others, including the fact that it is more you avoid all of the problems with what to do if its a, you know, theres a 51 ownership of the shareholders, if you simply say that its in this type of Chapter S Corporation that is closely held. Whether it applies in the other situations is a question that well have to await another case when a large publicly traded corporation comes in and says, we have religious principles, the sort of situation, i dont think, is going to happen. But even with respect to these companies, your honor, what are you going to do if theres a dispute between lets say there are three shareholders a dispute between two in the majority and one in the minority . Youre going to have to get yourself involved the courts will have to get themselves involved in all kinds of whoever controls the corporation. Whoever controls the corporation determines what the party and then and the minority shareholder will say, well, this under state law, this an act of oppression and this well, thats a question of state corporate law. Its not a question of who can bring an action under rfra. Could i just raise eight courts of appeals, every court of appeal to have looked at the situation have held that corporations can bring Racial Discrimination claims as corporations. Now, does the government have a position on whether corporations have a race . Yes. We think those are correct and that this situation is different. So that so that a corporation does have a race for purposes of discrimination laws. No, not that the corporation has a race, but that corporations can bring those claims. But youre not interpreting in that situation, all youre interpreting is the word person in a statute, not exercise of religion, which is what makes it different here. So those cases involve construction of the term person . Yes, but only person. So the person the corporation can bring as a person a claim of Racial Discrimination. Thats correct, but not exercise of religion. Thats the difference. But let me, if i could, we think that part of the problem here and the reason we make the argument we do at the threshold about why you ought not recognize claims under rfra Forprofit Corporations is that they are going to predictively give rise to the kinds of issues you have in this case in which the exemption is going to impose a burden on third parties or extinguish rights of third parties, employees or others, and that that really cant be what congress was thinking about. But even if you if you say they cant even get their they cant even get their day in court, youre saying something pretty, pretty strong. And i understand, but if your honor disagrees with me if the court doesnt agree with this position at the threshold, the same considerations with respect to the harms of third parties definitely play into the compellinginterest analysis. In fact, under rfra, the standard, the precise standard of the statute says the government must meet is that it must show that the application of the law to the particular parties here, conestoga and hobby lobby, is in furtherance of the governments compelling interest. Thats the test. So the question here is whether having hobby lobby and conestoga provide this coverage is in furtherance of the governments interests in ensuring that this kind of Preventive Service coverage is available and, in particular, the contraceptive coverage thats included within it. Is it your position that part of the compelling interest here is that you have to protect the integrity the operational integrity of the whole act . It is part of our argument, absolutely. And but it but there is in addition to that, much more does that mean the constitutionality of the whole act has to be examined before we accept your view . Well, i think it has been examined, your honor, is my recollection. But with respect to but with respect to there is a particularized interest here in that what we are talking about is a question of whether 14,000 employees and their families get access to this contraceptive coverage. You have exempted a whole class of corporations and youve done so under your view not because of rfra. So let me let me go to that now, what kind of constitutional structure do we have if the congress can give an agency the power to grant or not grant a religious exemption based on what the agency determined . I recognize delegation of powers rules are somewhat more abundant insofar as their enforcement in this court. But when we have a First Amendment issue of this consequence, shouldnt we indicate that its for the congress, not the agency to determine that this corporation gets the exemption on that one, and not even for rfra purposes, for other purposes. And, your honor, i do think that it was appropriate for the agency, in exercising its delegated authority here, to take into account the special solicitude that under our Constitutional Order churches receive. And its important to understand, and i want to walk through the this question of exemptions very carefully because i think theres a lot of confusion here that needs to be cleared up, that all that the all that the government has done is say that churches, because of that special solicitude, which the court recognized in hosanna tabor, churches get an exemption. The nonprofit religious organizations dont get an exemption. Theres an accommodation there provided, but that accommodation results in the employees receiving access to this to the contraceptive coverage, so that doesnt diminish the governments compelling interest. The tenth circuit and my friends on the other side have relied on this idea that employers with fewer than 50 employees are somehow exempt. But you gave this exemption, according to your brief, without reference to the policies of rfra. What were the policies that you were implementing . Well, with respect to as i said, with respect to the churches, it was the special solicitude that churches receive under our constitution under the First Amendment. But with respect now, with respect to the employers 50 and under, its just not right to say that theres any kind of an exemption. If they offer Health Insurance, theyre subject to exactly the same per employee, perday penalty as larger corporations, exactly the same risk of Labor Department enforcement, exactly the same risk of an erisa suit by the plan beneficiaries. There is no possible way to look at the statutory scheme and conclude there is an exemption there. Grandfathered plans . Yes. The grandfathered plans. What about the let me talk about well, just before you so one thing id like you to address, the dispute arose with mr. Clement about how long they were going to be in effect. But i think what youre talking about is a period in which that number is going to go to a very, very low level over a several year period. Well, if you cant tell us, and i dont fault you for not being able to tell us, when the grandfathering is going to end, shouldnt we assume in our analysis that it is current and, as far as we can tell, not going to end . No. I dont thats right, your honor. And i think lets look at this, if we could, in toto. That with respect to grandfathering, its to be expected that employers and Insurance Companies are going to make decisions that trigger the loss of that socalled grandfathered status under the under the governing regulation. Isnt it true with respect to the grandfathered plans that the regulations required immediate compliance with certain requirements, but not with Preventive Care requirements; isnt that right . Let me read you what hhs said in the regulation with certain particularly significant protections, particularly significant protections, congress required grandfathered health plans to comply with a subset of the Affordable Care acts Health Reform provisions. On the other hand, grandfathered health plans are not required to comply with certain other requirements of the Affordable Care act; for example, the requirement that Preventive Health services be covered without any cost sharing. So isnt hhs saying there, quite specifically, these, in our view, are not within this subset of particularly significant requirements as to which there must be immediate compliance . Well, the question would be whether theres a compelling interest in compliance with these requirements. And id like to make two points in response to your honors question. First, with respect to the issue of delay, which i think, mr. Chief justice, your question raised, and my friend on the other side has put a lot of weight on, id refer the court to the ada. I dont think anybody would doubt that the americans with doubt that the americans with disabilities act advances interest of the highest order. But when congress enacted that, it put a twoyear delay on the applicability of the discrimination provision. Well, isnt that because youre talking about building ramps and things like that . No. No, your honor. Theres an even longer delay with respect to those kinds of provisions, but its just a basic prohibition of discrimination twoyear delay, and no one would doubt theres a compelling interest here. And with title vii. My friends on the other side have said, well, this different because theres so many more people who are going to not have this coverage under the grandfathered plan. But with respect to title vii, of course, its still the case that that employers with 15 or fewer people are not subject to that law, and thats 80 of the employers in the country. And if you run the math, thats its at least 80 thats its going to be somewhere between 10 million and 22 Million People who are not within the coverage. No one would say that because the coverage is incomplete in that respect, that title vii enforcing title vii doesnt advance those were decisions those were decisions that congress made, right . Yes. Well, the grandfathering is not a decision that congress made, is it . Well, the way in which its implemented is a decision that the agency has made, thats true. But even with respect to the Preventive Services, i dont think anyone would say that theres not a compelling interest in advancing Colorectal Cancer screening and immunizations and the things that the Preventive Services provisions provide in addition to contraceptive coverage. I just think this a compelling interest under any understanding of the term. I just want before you get to this point, and my question reflects no point of view at all on my behalf. I just but i took mr. Clement, one of his points, which i thought was an important one. He says there are some people here who strongly object to helping with abortions which include abortifacient contraceptives. Everybody says, yes, they do object to that and thats sincere. So hes not saying this, but i might. But there is a compelling interest in Womens Health and in the health of the family, and theyre not having a religious objection to taking it. And so the government has said provide it. Then he says, but there is a less restrictive way, and the less restrictive way is the government pays for it. Says it wouldnt cost much. Youd have to have another piece of paper that would go to the Insurance Company that would say, insofar as your employer has a sincere objection against paying this, the government will pay for it. Now, what i want to hear, and this not coming from any point of view, i want to hear your precise answer to that kind of argument. Yes. They did argue i will point out, for the first time at the podium this morning that a less restrictive means would be to extend the accommodation that currently exists im not interested in whether they made the argument sooner or later. What i want to hear from you is i want to hear and its not youve thought about this. I want to hear your answer to that kind of argument. Well i want to be sure you have a chance to give it. The answer i think there are two answers to it. Assuming its before the court and im going to answer your honest question directly, but i do want to make a prefatory point here, which is that under the law, under ashcroft v. Aclu, for example, the burden on the government is to show that proposed less restrictive alternatives are not equally effective. If they dont propose it, we dont have a burden to refute it. Having said that, we can refute it. Now, there are two and there are two ways. The first is, they claim that they dont think that the accommodation is a less restrictive means, i take it, because or they havent raised it before today, because they believe that rfra would require exemptions to that too, such that if you were if you were to provide the accommodation in which the insurance Company Comes in and provides the contraception if the employer signs the form, they would say that that signing the form also makes them complicit in the central activity, and that therefore rfra provides an exemption there, too. And of course the test is whether the proposed alternative advances the governments interests as effectively. And if it is going to be subject to exactly the same rfra objections by exactly the same class of people asking for it, its not going to serve the governments interest as effectively because the rfra exemption will result in no coverage there. The second point being that so dont make them sign a piece of paper. Well, whether they sign the piece of paper or not, if they make the rfra claim there, which they have with respect to that accommodation, it will result in it being less effective in terms of accomplishing the compelling interest. In addition well, we can ask mr. Clement what his position is on this. But you say they have already asserted that it would be inconsistent with rfra as they understand it to provide for a Forprofit Corporation, like the ones involved here, the sort of accommodation that hhs has extended to socalled religious nonprofits, perhaps with the modification that was included in our stay order in the Little Sisters case. Have they taken a position on that . Youll have to ask them. I dont think they have. But they have studiously avoided arguing this as a less restrictive alternative, and i take its because their theory, at least, would lead one to the conclusion you would have to provide a rfra objection. But now the yes, thank you, mr. Chief justice. The second point is that youre talking about a very openended increase in the cost to the government. Now, we dont know how much that cost would be. The reason is because, since this wasnt litigated in the lower courts, theres not a record on it. So i cant tell you what that what that increased cost is going to be, but it could be quite considerable. Youre talking about, what, three or four Birth Controls, not all of them, just those that are abortifacient. Thats not terribly expensive stuff, is it . Well, to the contrary. And two points to make about that. First, of course the one of the methods of contraception they object to here is the iud. And that is by far and away the method of contraception that is most effective, but has the highest upfront cost and creates precisely the kind of cost barrier that the Preventive Services provision is trying to break down. I thought that i was taken by your answer. I thought it was the governments position that providing coverage for the full range of contraceptives and other devices and drugs that are covered here is actually financially neutral for an Insurance Company, that that reduces other costs that they would incur. It is for the Insurance Company, but for the woman who is going to not get the benefit of the statute if the exemption is granted no. No. If she if she has the coverage through the Insurance Company but the employer has nothing to do with arranging for that. Well, so, in other words, if they havent raised a rfra objection to the alternative, but that but as i said, you know, the logic of their position is that you would get a rfra objection. It cant be still, i want to get press this a little further, and i dont want you simply to just agree with what im about to say. Dont worry. No, i mean i mean, after all, somebody, a taxpayer, might say, i dont want to pay for this small war. And it would be a religious ground, and it would be very, very little money, in fact, that you take from him. Or the church might say, i want a sunday morning reduction in the cost of municipal parking. And by the way, that will not only not cost the government anything, theyll make money because nobody parks there on sunday, particularly with this high a fee. Now, im thinking of im trying to figure out where this case fits in that spectrum because i think the answer to the first two questions is no. And i know, so youre just going to agree, and thats what i dont want. I want to understand your thinking on that. On that point, i think that question plugs into our view of what the substantial burden test requires, that their view of substantial burden is if you have a sincere religious belief and there is any law with a meaningful penalty that imposes on you pressure to do something inconsistent with your belief, then you may pass the substantial burden test. I think the problem with that test as they formulate it, is that under the two hypotheticals that you just gave, justice breyer, youve got a substantial burden in those situations, because if you dont pay the tax you can go to jail, for example. And so we think the substantial burden analysis has got to be more strenuous than that. Its got to incorporate principles of attenuation and proximate cause, and that when you think about this case where the requirement is to purchase insurance which enables actions by others, that youre really closer to the tax situation than to imposing a direct obligation to act. So thats how we would think about that issue. But now, with respect to mr. General verrilli, isnt that really a question of theology or moral philosophy, which has been debated for by many scholars and adherents to many religions. A does something that b thinks is immoral. How close a connection does there have to be between what b does that may have some that may provide some assistance to a in order for b to be required to refrain from doing that that action. Its true that its a difficult question. But it isnt it is a religious question and its a moral question. And you want us to provide a definitive secular answer to it . No, but i do think the problem, Justice Alito, is that this court has recognized, and certainly the courts of appeals have recognized, that there is a difference. You accept the sincerity of the belief, but the court still has to make a judgment of its own about what constitutes a substantial burden, or otherwise, for example, the tax thing would be a substantial burden. Or we cited a d. C. Circuit case in which prisoners objected to giving dna samples and the court said we accept the sincerity of that belief, but its up to us to decide whether thats a actually a substantial burden. In the bowen case in this court, the court accepted the sincerity of the belief that the use of the childs Social Security number would offend religious belief and commitments, but said they still had to make a judgment about whether that was a substantial burden. So it does have to be, with all due respect, part of the analysis. I still dont understand how hhs exercised its judgment to grant the exemption to nonreligious corporations if you say it was not compelled by rfra. I dont think then it must have been because the Health Care Coverage was not that important. It didnt grant an exemption to any nonreligious organizations, Justice Kennedy. It granted an exemption to churches, and that was it. With respect to religious nonprofits, it constructed an accommodation, but the accommodation delivers the contraceptive coverage to the employees of the nonprofits. It just does it through an indirect means. But there is no diminution of theres no basis for questioning the governments interest with respect to that accommodation because the employees get the coverage, just as they would well, but that of course is an issue thats being hotly litigated right now, right . Whether the employees can get the coverage when youre talking about the religious organizations. Well, thats exactly why i think you cant look to that as a less restrictive that accommodation, extending that accommodation to Forprofit Corporations, as a less restrictive alternative. Precisely because its being hotly litigated whether rfra will require exemptions to that, as well. But youre relying youre relying on it to make your point with respect to the accommodation, and then youre criticizing your friend for relying on the same thing in making his points. Well, i think i think what Justice Kennedy i took Justice Kennedy to be asking me, mr. Chief justice, was whether the governments choice to provide that accommodation reflected a judgment on the part of the government that this was something less than a compelling interest, and i dont think that inference is possible, because the government was trying to use that accommodation to ensure that the contraceptives were delivered. So, with all due respect, i dont think there is an inconsistency there. And i and i do think, if i could, with respect to the issue of whether there are exemptions that defeat a compelling interest, that i submit would be a very dangerous principle for this court to adopt in the form that my friends on the other side have offered it, because not only would you then be in a position where it would be very hard to see how title vii enforcement could be justified by compelling interest in response to a rfra objection, ada enforcement, fmla enforcement, all kinds of things. And i do think title vii was passed before 1993, so it wouldnt apply rfra wouldnt apply to title vii. Well, i think with all due respect, Justice Ginsburg, i think you could claim a rfra exemption from title vii. And the problem here would be that and i think one of the things thats significant about the position that my friends on the other side are taking here, is that with respect to exemptions, for example, from the title vii requirement against discrimination on the basis of religion and hiring, congress made a quite clear judgment to provide a very narrow exemption churches and religious educational institutions and religious associations, and thats it. Nobody else can claim an exemption under title vii. Except that they passed rfra after that. That made a lot of sense. But the question is they passed rfra after that. But i think the further question, your honor, is whether you would interpret rfra in a manner where you would essentially obliterate that carefully crafted or what congress meant to do was to obliterate that carefully crafted exemption and instead say that every Forprofit Corporation could make a request like that. Well, if congress feels as strongly about this as you suggest, they can always pass an exemption, an exception to rfra, which they have done on other occasions. And they havent done it here. Well, with all due respect, your honor, i think you could make the same argument either way in this case, that the question here is what congress thought it was doing in 1993, and we dont think, given the long history and the fact that not only do you have no case in which a Forprofit Corporation ever had a successful well, weve already discussed that there is no case holding that they cant, right . In addition, if you look at the history of exemptions and accommodations in our legislation, state and federal legislation may extend to churches and religious nonprofits, and thats and individuals. And thats where the line has been drawn in our legislation historically. There just is nothing in our current under your view, a Profit Corporation could be forced in principle, there are some statutes on the books now which would prevent it, but could be forced in principle to pay for abortions. No. I think, as you said, the law now the law now is to the contrary. But your reasoning would permit that. Well, i think that you know, i dont think that thats i think it would depend on the law and it would depend on the entity. It certainly wouldnt be true, i think, for religious nonprofits. It certainly wouldnt be true for a church. Im talking about a Profit Corporation. You say Profit Corporations just dont have any standing to vindicate the religious rights of their shareholders and owners. Well, i think that if it were for a Forprofit Corporation and if such a law like that were enacted, then youre right, under our theory that the Forprofit Corporation wouldnt have an ability to sue. But there is no law like that on the books. In fact, the law is the opposite. Im sorry, i lost track of that. There is no law on the books that does what . That makes a requirement of the kind that Justice Kennedy hypothesized. The law is the opposite. Well, flesh it out a little more. What there is no law on the books that does what . That requires Forprofit Corporations to provide abortions. What if a law like that isnt that what we are talking about in terms of their religious beliefs . One of the religious beliefs is that they have to pay for these four methods of contraception that they believe provide abortions. I thought thats what we had before us. It is their sincere belief and we dont question that. But i will say, and i do think this important and i say it with all respect, that that is how they that is the judgment that they make. It is not the judgment that federal law or state law reflects. Federal law and state law which does which do preclude funding for abortions dont consider these particular forms of contraception to be abortion. With all due respect, i would say that i think that, you know, weve got about 2 million women who rely on the iud as a method of Birth Control in this country. I dont think they think they are engaged in abortion in doing that. It is their belief. Its sincere. We respect it. But it isnt a belief that we think is reflected in federal or state law or our traditions of where that line is drawn. And so and i do think that that is what makes this a difficult case. I agree. And if you disagree with our position at the threshold that corporations that even though you have a situation, and we acknowledge you can have situations, in which a tightly knit group of a small group of tightly knit individuals own and operate a corporation where there is appeal to that, to the argument that they ought to recognize a claim of exercising religion in those circumstances. The problem, i would submit, is with the implications of doing it, the implications for entanglement and making the judgments when you move past that group, the administrability problems, and the problems of inviting the kinds of claims that are predictably going to impose harms on third parties. What about the implications of saying that no Forprofit Corporation can raise any sort of free exercise claim at all and Nobody Associated with the Forprofit Corporation can raise any sort of free exercise claim at all . Let me give you this example. According to the media, denmark recently prohibited kosher and halal slaughter methods because they believe that they are inhumane. Now, suppose congress enacted Something Like that here. What would the what would a corporation that is a kosher or halal slaughterhouse do . They would simply they would have no recourse whatsoever. They couldnt even get a day in court. They couldnt raise a rfra claim. They couldnt raise a First Amendment claim. Well, im not sure they couldnt raise a First Amendment claim, Justice Alito. I think if you had a targeted law like that, that targeted a specific religious practice, that i dont think it is our position that they couldnt make a free exercise claim in that circumstance and so why is that well, but youre getting away from the hypothetical. Say Justice Alitos hypothetical was that the impetus for this was humane treatment of animals. There was no animus to religion at all, which in the church of lukumi, there was an animus to the religion. So were taking that out of the hypothetical. Exactly. Right. Well, i think if it were targeted only at the practices of the kosher and halal practices, then i think you would have an issue of whether its a targeted law or not. But even if it is well, they say no animal may be slaughtered unless its stunned first, unless the animal is rendered unconscious before it is slaughtered. Well, i think in that circumstance, you would have, i think, an ability for customers to bring suit. I think you might recognize Third Party Standing on behalf of the corporation on the corporations, on behalf of customers. So a suit like that could be brought. But even if you disagree with me at the threshold, even if you disagree with us with respect to the kinds of risks that we think you will be inviting if you hold that Forprofit Corporations can bring these claims, when you get to the compelling interest analysis, the rights of the third party employees are at center stage here. And thats i think thats the point of critical importance in thinking about this case. And i think, frankly, the point that has been just left on the sidelines by my friends on the other side. The consequence of holding here that the rfra exemption applies is not a situation like ones in which this court under the free exercise clause or under rfra have recognized exemptions in the past. Those have always been situations where its a relationship between the individual and the government and granting the exemption might result in the government not being able to enforce the law with respect to the individual, but i mean, the point that Justice Alito was making is that take five jewish or muslim butchers and what youre saying to them is if they choose to work under the corporate form, which is viewed universally, you have to give up on that form the freedom of exercise clause that youd otherwise have. Now, looked at that way, i dont think it matters whether they call themselves a corporation or whether they call themselves individuals. I mean, i think thats the question youre being asked, and i need to know what your response is to it. Well, i think our response is what the court said in part 3 of the lee opinion, which is that once you make a choice to go into the commercial sphere, which you certainly do when you incorporate as a Forprofit Corporation, you are making a choice to live by the rules that govern you and your competitors in the commercial sphere. But even if you disagree with me about that, what id like to leave the court with, is what i think is the most important point here, is that if this exemption were granted, it will be the first time under the free exercise clause or under rfra in which this court or any court has held that an employer may take may be granted an exemption that extinguishes statutorily guaranteed benefits of fundamental importance. Lee came to exactly the opposite conclusion with respect to Social Security benefits, that you that it was imperative that the employees interest be protected. And that is the fundamental problem with the position that my friends on the other side raise here, that they leave the thirdparty employees entirely out of the equation. Thats ok for notForprofit Corporations to do that with respect to all of their employees, and some of them are pretty big operations no. Thats ok there . No, we dont think that. We dont were not drawing a line between nonprofits and profits. They can make you allow them to make this religious objection, dont you . No. No. Religious nonprofits get an accommodation in which their employees get the contraception. But we are not drawing a line between forprofit and profit. But they dont have to pay for it, right . The and you could set that up this way, that these people dont have to pay for it. Well, as ive said a couple of times, they havent asked for that until this morning. But the fundamental point here is that you would be extinguishing statutorily guaranteed Health Benefits of fundamental importance to these employees, and that is something that this court has never done. And i submit that congress cant have thought it was authorizing it when it enacted rfra in 1993. Thank you. Thank you, general. Mr. Clement, four minutes. Thank you, mr. Chief justice. Just a few points in rebuttal. Let me start with the abortion conscious clause. Its because it tells you something about where congress has drawn the line and it tells you the consequences of the governments position. Historically, those conscious provisions have applied to all medical providers, including forprofit medical providers. But we learned today that as far as the governments concerned, thats Just Congress judgment. If Congress Changes its judgment and says that a forprofit medical provider has to provide an abortion, rfra doesnt apply. That, with all due respect, cannot be what congress had in mind when it passed rfra. They also suggested if a kosher market takes the trouble to incorporate itself, then it has no free exercise claims at all. Now, you can go back and read the crown kosher case. I took it as Common Ground, that all nine justices thought that if the Massachusetts Law there had forced crown kosher to be open on saturday, that that would be a free exercise claim notwithstanding the incorporation. The second point i want to talk about is the least restrictive alternatives. In a colloquy with Justice Scalia, the solicitor general points out that yeah, well, its a little bit different from the presmith law because now you have the less restrictive alternatives analysis. Thats not a small difference. Thats a major difference. And its really the easiest way to rule against the government in this case. Because you have a unique situation here where their policy is about a government a subsidy for a governmentpreferred health care item, and the question is who pays . The government paying or a thirdparty insurer paying is a perfectly good least restrictive alternative. So we go back to the start of my question, that would be essentially the same for vaccines, blood transfusions, nonpork products, the government has to pay for all of the medical needs that an employer thinks or claims it has a religious exemption to . Not necessarily, Justice Sotomayor. It will depend on how you because those things are more important . No, not because theyre more its really the amount of money important. But the easiest way to distinguish them is if the governments already provided this accommodation for religious employers. Well, but they and with all due respect they make exemptions for vaccines, presumably, to some people on some basis, but we have a tax code that applies to everybody, but we have a million exemptions. Does the creation of the exemption relieve me from paying taxes when i have a sincere religious belief that taxes are immoral . I think lee says that taxes are different and not all exemptions are created equal, because some exemptions undermine the compelling interest. Now, the reason isnt there a federal program that pays for vaccines for any children who are not covered by insurance for those vaccines . There is, Justice Alito. Of course, theres also title x, which provides for contraception coverage, which is another least restrictive alternative. But i do want to get on the table that it is not true, that we have not suggested that the accommodation provided to religious employers, like nonprofit hospitals, thats not something i invented at the podium. If you look at page 58 of our brief, the red brief, we specifically say that one of the least restrictive alternatives would be the most obvious least restrictive alternative is for the government to pay for their favorite contraception methods themselves. Later in that paragraph, the only full paragraph on the page, we say, and indeed, the government has attempted Something Like that with respect to certain objective employers objective employees employers, and we cite the federal register provision where there is the accommodation provision. Will your clients claim that filling out the form, if youre saying they would claim an exemption like the churches have already . We havent been offered that accommodation, so we havent had to decide what kind of objection, if any, we would make to that. But its important to recognize that as i understand that litigation, the objection is not to the fact that the insurance or the provider pays for the contraception coverage. The whole debate is about how much complicity there has to be from the employer in order to trigger that coverage. And whatever the answer is for Little Sisters of the poor, presumably you can extend the same thing to my clients and there wouldnt be a problem with that. If i could have just one second more to say that the agency point that Justice Kennedy has pointed to is tremendously important, because congress spoke, it spoke in rfra. Here the agency has decided that its going to accommodate a subset of the persons protected by rfra. In a choice between what congress has provided and what the agency has done, the answer is clear. Thank you, your honor. Following the oral argument, they spoke refer to the news media. Our family started hobby lobby else on our faith. We want to live out our faith in the way that we do business. The choice the government has forced on us is unfair and not in keeping with the history of our great nation, based on religious freedom. We believe that americans do not lose their religious freedom when they open a family business. We were encouraged by todays arguments. We are thankful that the Supreme Court heard our case. We await the justices decision. Thank you. Since my family first opened our business, 50 years ago, we saw to glorify god, not only in the quality and crossownership of our product, but by principles that inspired our lives everyday. We believe that good citizenship and the dignity of our customers and employees who were created. N gods image we never thought we would see a day when the government would tell our family that we could no longer run our uses of a way that affirms the sanctity of human life. Sadly, that day has come. Rather than sacrifice our obedience to god, my family and many others have chosen to take a stand to defend life and freedom against government coercion. We did not choose this fight. Our families wouldve been happy to keep providing good jobs and good benefits. But the government forced our hand. We hope the Supreme Court will uphold religious freedoms of all americans who seek to glorify god, even as they go about making a living. Thank you. Is marcia, and im copresident of the National Womens law center. We filed a friend of the court brief on the have of 70 organizations, speaking to the women whose health and whose futures are at stake with respect to their contraceptive coverage. Said in thecourt past, and i want to read this decide when able to or whether to have children improves womens ability to participate equally in economic and social life, access to Birth Control has improved womens status and overall financial security. As theirl, as well health, and the health of their children. Use is nearly universal. The benefits are extra during. Extraordinary. What is it issue in this case is Preventive Health care essential for women that must be provided bethem and whether that can overridden by any for Profit Corporation that the sites to do decides to do so would be objectionable to the corporation. My organization heard from someone who was not heard from in the Supreme Court. That was actually a woman who was an employee of hobby lobby itself. She spoke. Words,ead from her specifically. It is about the importance of contraception to her and to her family. She said it would allow a woman to lead. And she said, a responsible life. It is the ability of women to be responsible, and to protect their own health that is at stake in this case today. Thank you very much. I am the president of prochoice america. I want to say one simple thing. , whathe court heard today the court heard today is that if it was defined for the plaintiffs in this case, it would be the first time the court of this country had proactively extinguished the rights of any american. This is about all women, all Womens Health, all womens freedom. We are the 99 . We will not have our rights extinguished. Our bodies are not our bossess business. Thank you. If the president of planned parenthood and the planned parenthood action fund. I am proud to be here on behalf of the 3 million patients that we see every year for health care. What i think we saw today was the importance of having women on the Supreme Court. I was proud to be there as a woman. Have the justices talk about what is at stake in this case. Whether millions of women and their right to Preventive Care is trumped by the handful of ceos who have their own personal opinions about personal Birth Control. It was a wonderful day for women. I believe that this court understood that women have the right to make their own decisions about the health care and Birth Control. Its not their bosses decision. Several senators discussed the case on the senate floor. We will hear from republicans,