Modernization. I want to begin by thanking sponsors of that study. Without sponsors we dont get to because do studies. This study was sponsored by a combination of support from general dynamics. Drs technologies and l3 as well. I want to thank them of their support. I will briefly walk through the chief of findings and recommendations of the report. Its about 80 pages. Its a pretty quick read. Theres a lot of pictures. I urge you to go read whole thing. I will hit the highlights. And then we will bring up our distinguished panel to give us the real scoop on Army Modernization, how we should think about and what we should do with it. I want to start by saying with this study weve always every time we talked about it, we had to start by saying this is not a critique of arm acquisition. This is a look at if you start with a premise that the army needs to modernize, how does it develop a strategy for doing that which it can clearly and forcefully communicate within the army, within the department of defense and with the congress in order to get the resources to actually carry that out. Thats what the focus of this study. Its less procedural and more of strategic overview. In terms ever our findings, we wanted to set the scene to say what is the state of Army Modernization today. And we came back with a finding that the armys experiencing modernization triple weigh me. Ill get more into that in a couple of minutes. The Army Modernization is below its historic level both on average and during periods of when the army is seeking to modernize. Because the army like most of the services, go through phase of modernization that represent peak and valleys. As is the case with the overall defensive budget. Theres little of relief on the way. Both in terms of the budget control act discussed heavily by senator cotton and the limits it puts on defense spending and Army Spending by implication. And in terms of the issues that the army is confronting. Such as readiness that the senator referred to. Even if the army had a robust budget for Army Modernization, the army has limited option. Because the Technology Effort has been more focused on the early stages and given the level of funding that was available, that is probably appropriate. There hasnt been a lot of Platform Development or System Development in the army budget in recent years which we could seek to modernize the army. The army was through the drawdown. Drawdown, no the army sought to minimize harm. They did a pretty good job on that. Our study is not a cry technique decision on the tough decisions made on sequestration. Its clear they dont leave the we do believeits clear they dont leave the army in a position with a ready obvious path forward. And so, work needs to be done to develop that. We have taken a crack at that. Lastly, we think theres not a consensus on priorities for Army Modernization. And well talk about why we think thats the case. Let me just talk about this idea of the triple whammy. Which we coined a little bit i think last year and has been picked up in some circles. What do we mean by that . This is not the first time this drawdown that happened because of the budget control act and sequestration and end of the wars in iraq and afghanistan. Its not first time the army drawn down. It happened in the past. We say how does the current draw down compared to previous rawdowns. Theres definitely similarities. But there are some notable differences. First difference, the first leg of the triple whammy is that this draw down is larger than previous draw downs. If you look over on the righthand column under total modernization, the draw down was 74 . This is in contract obligation dollar terms. That exceeds relatively robustly previous draw downs. The second leg of the triple whammy is where most of that drawdown came from. If you look at the procurement column on the chart, youre not seeing what im seeing, excuse me. There it is. Okay. A right hand column has total Army Modernization. 74 during this drawdown in excess of previous drawdowns by 10 to 15 . But the source of most of that excess of drawdown is really in the r d accounts. But the decline on the r d account was 52 . If you look at the first few you average them of , 23 . R d historically has been preserved during draw downs. But in this drawdowns the reduction in r d is almost twice the average of the previous two thats more than twice the average of the previous two draw downs. The last element of the triple whammy on the bottom part is the state that the army entered this draw down in. Previous draw downs, the draw down after the end of the cold war, the army had completed or within a process of completing a very substantial cycle of modernization. The big five of the 1980s to which our report title refers were basically all procured. Or were in the process of completing procurement when the last drawdown happened. However, when this drawdown went into effect, the army was coming off some regrettable program collapses, future combat system, comanche, crusader. Theres a list. I wont go into detail. You did not see the substantial build up of new systems in the army that preceded the cold war drawdown. We call that the triple whammy. You started behind. You had a drawdown larger in the past in particular, your r d accounts were drawn down much more substantially than previously. We then wanted to get a sense where Army Modernization today in context of modernization. We went back and looked at Army Modernization going back to the under world war ii. Sort of in the modern era. And we developed if you see the two dotted lines, the lower line is the historic average level of Army Modernization across that entire post world war ii period. The higher line is the average level of Army Modernization when the army was modernizing. In those up cycles when the army , was seeking to regenerate its technology you had that higher , level up and around 35 billion and the historical average about 30 billion. Thats in constant fy 2017. Today, were 5 billion below the Army Modernization, about 10 billion below the level during periods when the army was actually engaging in aggressive modernization. S that if theest army is seeking to modernize its technology today, it is going to probably require additional funding to actually make that happen. Lets talk about the issue of the priorities and in order to get funding for Army Modernization, you got to be able to go to the congress and also to the leadership of dod and say this is why we need this , funding. That means setting some priorities about what it is that needs it to be modernized. What were showing here is a list, some of the examples of modernization priorities that have been expressed in recent documents or in testimony by the army to congress. The gist of this is that every list is there are some similarities but theyre all , different. They have different points of emphasis. They take different starting points as to what theyre talking about. Aviation, as a priority is an important area for prioritization. But it doesnt convey a lot about how youre going to pursue modernization in the aviation world. We think theres a lack of clear message on priorities. Now, let me talk a little bit about the geostrategic position that was a big , focus of the senators remark. And the title of our event today on the implications of the russia challenge for the inf treaty and Army Modernization. Interestingly enough, when we started this report, it was prior to the election controversies and the attack on the election system. But pretty quickly when you look at questions of Army Modernization, the chief has testified that russia is the pacing threat. Not necessarily because we expect to go to war with russia and europe or elsewhere, but russian systems are the core systems for most of the adversaries we could contemplate attentively getting into Armed Conflict with. And so, the rapid advance, theyve invested back when they were investing heavily when oil was high, have gone into systems that are not just russian systems, but they are proliferated to others as well. Iran certainly in that group. Theyve particularly gone after an a2ad concept. The Cruise Missile technology that the senator was focused on is a big piece of that. But its about keeping the u. S. , its allies, and systems away from the defended areas that the russian systems are defending. In the case of russia, thats russian territory. And its a sophisticated layered redundant approach, long range , artillery, Cruise Missiles, radars, tanks. It is a real suite of capabilities theyve been developing and employing and sharing with others. That the u. S. Army is likely to face if it gets drawn into conflict. Particular focus on nonkinetic tape abilities like Electronic Warfare and cyber. That that they have been focused on probably more so than the United States has as weve been involved in the coin challenge in the middle east. So, im going to move now to our recommendations. And what we talked about, a new big five for the 21st century. How do you express clear priorities about what it is that the army will need to meet the invest andw do you develop a Modernization Program that delivers on those priorities. One of the tricky arguments a we make in the report its much better to talk about this in terms of capabilities than in term of platforms. The previous big five was a list so of platforms. ,it was the abrams tanks bradley, patriot, and couple of , other black hawk and the apache. Five platforms that were going to meet the threats of that day. In todays world, youre better off talking about capabilities. The reason why is platforms take depending on who you ask, 10 to 20 years, maybe more to develop. And so going to the congress in , 2017 and saying, we have an urgent problem, i want you to join me in a new Platform Development that in 20 years will give us an answer. Thats a tough case to make. If on the other hand, what you are asking for we have a , significant deficit in Electronic Warfare and we have plan to increase Electronic Warfare to meet that, you can actually show progress on that priority relatively quickly while also developing long term plan. And these are the five that we recommended i would say. We had two workshops. We talked to a lot of experts. The army will ultimately come up with its own. Theyve been working hard on that. This idea that thinking of in terms of capabilities rather than platforms, we think its very important to enlisting the support that the army is going to need to do its Modernization Program. Just wrapping up my piece here and well do the discussion, our recommendations developed a clear, articulated, focused modernization strategy. Make modernization a priority. It is on the chief list of priorities. But there is this competition with spending on personnel and spending on readiness. Those are important priorities as well. But the army has to really think hard about how to make modernization a higher priority. Focus on capabilities, not platforms. Make Army Acquisition more agile by focusing on evolutionary innovation. Being able to deliver capabilities rapidly even as you move toward longerterm type innovations along the road. Making room within your Modernization Program to address opportunities and challenges appeared then aligning Human Capital with this modernization strategy and some of our panelists, i think have , additional ideas to make this approach work. Without further ado, i will call them up to the stage. We can hear from them. Mr. Hunter thank you for joining us today. I will introduce the panel and well turn and get their thoughts. To my right is heidi hue, the former assistant secretary of the army for acquisition logistics and technology. She is currently serving as chairman of the board. For robo team america. She was formally chairman of the air force Scientific Advisory board. To her right is colonel dan roper. Hes director of National Security studies at the association of United States army. And the author of global counterinsurgency. To his right is doug bush. A former colleague of mine. From the House Arm Services Committee staff. A former National Security analyst and former army officer. Heidi, start with you, if you start us out. You obviously have thought a lot about this the strategy for Army Modernization. If you can give us your thoughts on the strategic approach that you think is most likely to be effective. Ms. Hue absolutely. I think you guys have did a great job in term of covering the eca 2011. I do want to emphasize i want to second what you have said. When i looked army budget, it decreased by 15 . But the r d and procurement funding, the rda pot decreased by 33 . So Army Modernization cant , happen when your budget is cut that significantly. During the last five years, i want to emphasize one other thing. The annual cr creates even bigger turmoil than people realize. Because if you cant get the budget october 1st, youre sitting there waiting. You cant spend. You cant start new programs. You cant wrap up production. Tremendous turmoil on programs. And during the sequestration, plus the annual cr what the army had to do was stretch out programs, restructure them, reduce the procurement quantity down to the minimum sustainable rate without breaking the multiyear contracts. We didnt start programs that were planned, or we terminated them. So there was significant turmoil within our across every single one of our portfolios. We think the declining budget environment, seconding what you said, i actually drew a pyramid. It is a pyramid chart lets , divest the old equipment. We need to save on costs. We have to reset the equipment so were ready to fight in the next contingency. We will incrementally modernize our existing platforms, we will choose carefully what new capabilities to develop to increase our mobility, lee lethality, and survivability. Well invest in our s t to enable the next generation capability. Thats our strategy in a declining budget environment. Looking ahead, it was a great dialogue this morning, i really appreciate being here. I will give you my personal perspective. Based on what i see that the threats that the army will face and what i deem the modernization effort has to focus on. We will obviously see cyberattacks and disinformation on social media. That will never stop. Well see jamming of our gps, our radar, and our communications system. Weve seen that and it will continue. What are the modernization efforts thats required . We have to ensure operation in a contested environment. That means we need assured position, navigation, and time. So we are no longer jammed and unable to operate. We need to operate beyond just ew. Ew is critical. But we need to be operating in the intersection of an integrated ew and io. Because of the agility of the threats. You dont have to be of you dont have time to be a stove pipe system anymore. And we need assured communication. The other type, you guys talked about this morning, is the tremendous proliferation of weapons system. With increased sophistication. We see the rpgs. We see much longer range missiles and rockets, Cruise Missiles, advanced theater ballistic missiles. We see an exponential growth in uavs. Performing Surveillance Reconnaissance systems, think about next generation which will perform attack. What do we need to do . Sowhat do we need to do . , i will expand upon what you talked about integrated Missile Defense. My perspective, we need a layered integrated active and passive iamd to enable Missile Defense offense. It is later in the sense we have started this program, that is for base protection against rockets, armors, missiles, uavs, Cruise Missiles. We need to continue that program, push that forward. The next layer of protection that we have is really plug and play. , which areg system legacy systems into a common , network. So the integrated battle command , system is critical. Bcs, you guys heard that. That is absolutely critical. Another layer under that umbrella thats critical is get a patriot aeisa. Active, electronically scanned array compared what we currently , have today. That will extend the target range, target resolution, and enable countermeasures. Those are the programs either we have today or we need. But we also need to add the passive capabilities. When i say that, is because, active means youre radiating. Something could jam you. Passive, youre not radiating. We need to integrate both of them together. Give us a layered integrated activepassive capacity. Then i will focus on because of the proliferation of threats, we have to increase survivability. \tantamount to what we need to focus on funding and pushing forward is integrated active , passive survivability program. To enable to us to detect, identify and countering of the threats. It needs to be integrated system because theres no single sensor , of single Counter Measure that will counter all threats. On the ground, this is you see the focus is shifting towards a n active Protection System for combat vehicles. But beyond just these two systems, we have to think about how we need to see the target further and resolve it better. This is why we need the Third Generation forwardlooking ir system. Third generation flare. The other aspect what we need to focus on is visual environment. We have to be able to enable operation in all environment. Whether it is white out, brown out, you name it. Fog, smoke, we got to operate in that environment. Increasing lethality. Longerrange, enabling our apache to be further standoff to be able to shoot. All the way up to Weapon System for longer range precision fires. And this is something our commander has asked for years now. This is a replacement that were talking about. And then increasing our , mobility. Hightech engines, improved turbine engine programs. It is important for blackhawks and apaches. We currently have a 2000 power engine building 3000horsepower. It will enable us to fly high and in hot temperatures. The risk is a mobility program. Record, theyams of will all increase mobility and legacy systems. One thing that i didnt see people talk about, i think its very important also, is improving our sense in war. Especially in light of the fact, we will see adversary that will use chemical and biological weapons. Therefore, we should not put our soldiers in harms way. This is exactly where robotics come in. Put sensors on robotics. Let the robotics roam ahead of you. To able to sense and warn. I went through a lot. I dont want to hog all the time. Other thing you talk about in but i think, term of logistics this is where robotics can once again play a huge role in terms of reducing the logistics burden on soldiers today. I will slow down and wrap up with some other comments later. Mr. Hunter thank you. Dan, youre next. With idea of modernization strategy and ways means. Youve had history of both dealing with and opining on all of those. I let you take your pick and give us your thoughts. Absolutely. Small question too, thanks. This report does a good job of because thecontext, risk of developing a strategy is not understanding your operational environment. What youve done is lay out by assessing the geostrategic environment and the way that we do modernization, where some critical gaps are. And now, you are essentially proposing a change in the ways, where the ways as opposed to having a big five, abrams, striker and so forth. , things that exist and very familiar with them now. Youre proposing we characterize as capabilities. Intellectually that makes sense. , were too narrow when we because if start, well missing the changing dynamics that were facing. However, as i thought through the capabilities and reading the report, its a little hard tore to get excited about a capability even though its , essential, you have to dig into it and understand the capability gap and say, i need to address Electronic Warfare or i need to address air and Missile Defense. But underneath that, there are systems that people sell, that people advocate, that people attach the their identity to that are very important. Going back to the senators comments this morning, and report also brings it up i dont think we have a problem with analytics. I dont think we have a problem with the science. We know as much as we can know and we have good plans to address some of those gaps. I think the biggest challenge is the communication on what needs to be done, what resources we need to expend on it and why do how do we help senators and congressman make the necessary trade offs with other important things. I think the armys challenge is more diverse and more complicated than saying, i need another Aircraft Carrier. Not that thats an insignificant thing, we would like to have more, but its extremely simple to see the one on one level of the argument. Its incredibly complex to articulate a story that encapsulates everything you said. That was a Tour De Force of all the things that need to be done. But how does person receiving that openly signing the check or committing getting a program going, act upon that. The more i like at strategy, the so, more i find it its essential. Its about strategic medication and it has nothing to do with io or public affairs. Its communicating priorities to people that have to act on it from the lowest level to the , highest level. Thats the little strategy take on this. This is an enabler. The army does need to update its strategy. I guess the one thing i would say on that is shifting to the means. You recommend increased prioritization on modernization. Well, it sounds good in a forum talking about modernization. But the chief of staff in the army recently testified and he said this many times, readiness number one and its going to stay number one until we reach our interim readiness objectives which expects to take about four , years. Thats based on the assumption that theres some level of coherent consistent funding , which is a that fails every year. When you trade off readiness forestructure versus , modernization, this audience or this community of interest just saying, lets try harder. Is not going to move the ball down the field. Because there are other incredibly important tensions. That doesnt offer an answer. But maybe the Strategic Communication thats enabled by talking capabilities helps us bring in the joint discussion. Because we dont develop Army Capabilities for the army. We do them openly to provide it to the joint commander and the Coalition Commander and then thinking a little more imaginatively alluded to in earlier comments. Enable allied and partner with abilities . How can they close the gap in areas were legally or it . Ncially we cant do industry can do that. But industry gets little ham strung process. Maybe through fms in some capacity we deliberately quote , that gap. Its a little bit of ways and means that come out of reading these reports and hearing the great comments. Mr. Hunter thank you, doug . I dont have a lot to add with heidi and dan said on the particulars of modernization. I would offer two notes of political context. One, i see it putting a restraining hand on the army in terms of big push in modernization. Is the army is in a war now. The war in greater middle east has a lot of soldiers in it. Thats something that Army Leadership cant take their eye off for potential of escalation there. I think that is part of why the chief is focused on readiness. Theyre staring in the face a potential war on short notice in korea. Again, thats kind of thing chief has to balance out. To be fair to the army about their readiness emphasis. Specific to modernization, i would just offer one additional thing. Is pulleds the army in many directions because of diversity of its missions that it has under different plans, different requirements. It has been hard for them to focus. The armys defense, one reason its difficult to focus is a lack of Political Leadership. Giving them priorities. In the absence of that, from administrations that havent paid a lot of attention to the army really, the army has to try to do everything. And thats very difficult and makes it very difficult to do what youre talking about. So more Political Leadership , across the board to tell the army what to focus on and where to take risk. I think that would be a big factor in helping the army achieve more coherence in its modernization plans. The last thing i want to mention, i think those capability areas are good ones. I was thinking about where the money would come from. Because the money is spoken for. And its not in those things. If you look at the palm, ground vehicles, eat up at the do of money. Aviation platforms eat up a lot of money. The army is going to need a big lift, doable. Theyre going to have to move money out of those things absent 10 billion shortfall being fulfilled. Which would certainly make it easier for the army here so, it is something that requires the chief, leadership secretary , mattis working with congress to achieve doable. Members across the board support the army broadly. But the army had challenges. I want to put you on the spot a little bit. The ndaa just passed house. It set out an approach to funding the department of defense in particular, but in general, the army in particular. Well above caps, and yet the , vca caps are still. Is there an end game here . I admit my crystal ball doesnt , show me one where we get to a change in the caps or is it realistic . We can probably all sit here and so, i thinkwe can probably all sit here and say, if the army was told you need 10 billion a year more for modernization but , you get no more to the top line, that is undoable task for any reasonable person. Therefore, somewhere probably there needs to be some uptick to get there. Are we on a path towards an increase . I mean, that is what the house bill passage in a lot of ways is encouraging. Its not clear if it gets us to the end. Ill be very careful unlike senator cotton. Im not elected. I think a lot of members support some. You saw it in the house vote. Some Additional Resources for defense. That doesnt answer the question about the other things that senator cotton mentioned. Im hopeful. Ive been hopeful for several years, a new kind of a new version of what weve seen in the past where if we cant get the budget control act, reduce its effects little longer , this time two year deal. I believe if you look at the public statements, lot of members want that. Thats really lays out well intention. I think theres support for it. But it is all to be determined in the end game this fall. We will see. Mr. Hunter i want to ask for the whole panel, also feel free to talk about funding if you like, a question about timing. One of the key things that drove us towards the conclusions that we reached was the fact that due to some of the challenges that we have discussed today, we think the army really needs to do some modernization quickly to regain an advantage that has been eroding. And certainly in specific Technology Area thats true in particular. That was one of the things that informed our approach of capabilities over new platforms because new platforms are very , hard thing to do quickly. I would be interested in the panels thoughts about time frame. Leaving aside momentarily the , question is it realistic if get enough money to do something quickly on modernization. Do you see the need for . How would you pursue doing something quickly if youre king of the world and had that choice . Heidi you want to start . ,ms. Hue this is a discussion i had with the general miller before when i was in the , pentagon. He ask why does acquisition takes so long. Its not that we dont know how to do things faster. But regulations put a shackle on you. You ask to run a marathon and use print it, but you have got shackles on. You cant move fast. Here are several ways that can help us move faster. Our partner nations also has the defense budget. They develop capability that can compliment ours. We ought to be leveraging partner nations capabilities and products. We have a tendency to design, develop, deliver everything ourselves. So, not invented here syndrome. So we can expedite things a lot , quicker by doing that. The other thing is, instead of a golden bar for requirements, waiting for the requirements to be finalized, which takes forever and you cant get consensus on the requirements, one method doing it is this is a capability i would like to have. Were exploring it. Industry tell me what it is that you have in this area. Bring it. Let us see what you have. Let us see what you have. Let us test it out and use it. Provide User Feedback as to is this good enough for what i want to do. Or here are the after you do that. Then inform you what requirements ought to be. But get the users feedback into the requirements up front rather than lobbying over the requirements and start from scratch trying to scratch your head how to meet it. I think that would be very valuable. First thing that could help the tremendously is dont tray dont try to buy the same product before you upgrade. Look at global hawk. Global hawk has multiple lots. Lot was, from lot to , not identical. It improved every single lot. Army should leverage the same methodology. So what if the entire army doesnt have it, then you bring a better product, lot two, why number of brigades have that. Thats a way you can bring the latest technology into the hand of warfare far faster than the current acquisition process. Those are three arguments, ok. A i would argue that there is high sense of urgency maybe some of the things that appear like they could go better. Like your chart with a different terminologies and different top level document or statements that seem to not be across purpose with each other but not totally consistent and understandable. Thats because i think the army fully recognizes that its got ground to make up. It is not due to negligence in many different regions and it gets pummeled in high profile systems that didnt make it. Im sure there is plenty responsibility to go around. But it is actively trying to do it. It is articulated in your document and others, thing like Rapid Capabilities office is a way to get things on a smaller scale not a massive scale. , its filling those gaps that fit into the capability umbrella than the single magic platform. So, its having enough of that fenced so theres some freedom of intellectual maneuver and prototypes,oing the getting the people that are using it to provide input, now and not seven years from now when it is too late to change it. I think that commitment is there. The army communicating internally to the community so it doesnt take all the regulations that are there and then some cases making them harder, making compliance harder which is really not the intent , of the legislation in the first place. We got to do some internal learning to kind of grease the gears internal for the army as well as ask for relief outside where it makes sense. I think congress has shown some willingness to support rapid experimentation prototype. When as a body it is convinced of the urgency of the threat. There is a lot of leeway given when that urgency is communicated well. The army has done that recently with regards to russia active Protection System in particular, striker 30 millimeter. It can happen. One note of caution, the army can get itself in difficult situation if it resorts to effort to speed up not doing competitions, at least some kind at the right point, not doing enough testing. Hopefully acquisition reform does not dissolve into those two things. Ause the army could despite the best of intentions have a big failure. That will undermine the broader effort. I think theres a willingness, especially with regards to the russian threats these days for congress to support efforts to go faster. As long as its done with some thoughts. They can make a sale. Mr. Hunter i want to open up questions to the audience. Raise your hand. Well have someone bring a microphone. We have sydney up front. Hi, referencing the chart of the armys top 25 to 30 priorities and the need you mention this, doug the need for army reserve to figure out its own course, clear leadership course. One of the things is, what are we for fundamentally . What is our primary mission . I mean, we had a Clear Mission. We had a Clear Mission with counterinsurgency for a while. Now, we are looking at juggling russia, syria, and a stand to. What degree armys problem not merely articulating and prioritizing and communicating but actually itself not being , sure what its for . Not being clear on its mission. Which is therefore means it can be clear on what it needs prioritized. What i would offer on that is that many of you probably seen it, rosa brooks has a book out recently, how everything became war and military became everything. And one of the underlying premises is the stakes in , between whats war and whats more than its ever been. The military is getting called in to fulfill things that arent what you would call traditional core, old School Military missions at like invade normandy. Its not that simple to articulate it. And with People Living on the inevitably, if someone has got to do something for the u. S. Government a soldier has , become the default mechanism. It partners and allies and so forth. If theres a gap that the u. S. Needs to fill, generally winds up being some level boots on the ground. Military or civilian. We get pulled. Into things. That leads away at the core things that the chief trying to prepare for such as threat from the competitor. I think the leaderships attention they know what they have to do. Their time and attention and energy gets pulled to fill that gap a we dont have the civilian capacity and sometimes the political willingness to use other tools a we have at our disposal in the United States and United States government. To add to that by saying, with the big five. Original big five, there was a concept of operation that went along with that. It was air land battle. That two fit together. That was a big reinforcing function for what made a compelling case to congress. Then the question arises for our new big five or what would the operational concept be. One discussed referenced earlier, i think by tom, multi to main battle. Personally i like it. Im not sure i fully understand it yet. What i have heard about it, joint with services discussion, it does seem to me very compelling. What does it mean to you . Does it seem like its a compelling case that the army can build and construct a Modernization Program. Doug, i will turn to you. Intellectually its a good effort by the army. It needs contacts with the congress, its not location specific. Well have multidomain battle somewhere against somebody. Some of the battle talk more about the other service than it does the army. While its a very important thing for the army to think through deeply how to better integrate itself across itself and service, i think at this point, its not formed in a way that can make turn the dial dramatically. You put it in place, eastern europe, gets lot of attention. I think one thing the army can build on is deputy secretary lot of that is restoring deterrence. In a place that members care about. I think if the army can find a way to connect what it wants to do to a political context of members care. , which is preserving peace in europe. Deterring russia better by bag able to fight them more effectually, thats a big part of getting support for whatever they want to do. Its a thing that the army lacks. Its pulled in so many different directions, different places in world where it has to be ready to fight. Right now i think the best advocate, armys best advocate for multidomain battle is commanderinchief who is thats the way he has to fight in his theater. With the support of the entire team. I agree, europe hasnt fit into that dialogue, that conversation that much. If its the army talking about multidomain battle, it makes more sense to us than were addressing the things before. Its just internally focused argument. It provides better technical proficiency. You got to get into it, it makes sense. Theres no such thing as a 30 second commercial that conveys it to the Senior Leader busy with 15 other important things. Ive got to jump behind it. That sounds like a great project. Other questions . Sydney you get to go again. Pull threat from the first half of the event, missiles. The canes and chinese and russians sitting assign the treaty. Im generally confused by what a lot of those treaties do. Sitting aside the inf treaty, russia has lots of land base conventional missiles of increasing precision that are major part of their fire power. Does the army need to invest in a missile core or a rocket Artillery Force of that kind . Would it be he to have no inf treaty in order to do that . I think the army is starting to shift focus there. We have a rocket artillery core. We had rock artillery units for a long time. I think somewhat the chief talked about, investing more there both in terms of structure and capability. In european context, 499 is less limiting. On the army getting guidance on where to focus its efforts. Challenge i mentioned earlier, that will continue with all those other modernization parties. Absent of traumatic change in the armys top line. The and is putting a lot of emphasis there. Theres a lot of potential under 499. Thats what the army is focused on now. Leaving the big political question to others. When this discussion occurred, i was doing the pentagon, it comes down to every discussion comes down how much money do i have to go with the capability that we need. Literally came down to is it just a reclaim top give you greater range, do you literally need more capability than just greater range . You want to counter target that made the maneuver in state. It is a totally different type of missile than a missile that have flight ballistically. Lot of the discussion was being debated. Aoa was in process when i left. I dont know the end result of the aoa analysis. It was purely driven by the budget decision unfortunately. Goes back to what doug said, need more money if you want greater capability. I do want to add one more thing. The patriot battalion is stressed how. We need more manpower, another battalion to help alleviate the stress on the manpower. I think theres a chance. The army gets more strength. It might not. Air and Missile Defense and rock artillery for example. Well see. On your earlier point, what is if the answer to your question, do we need more range. Do we need fundamentally different capability. What if the answer is yes . Yes on both. Im thinking of the when the army doing its air wave for drone coming off the carriers, is a strike asset, was it going to be an asset that provided fuel. And i think we have been in that exercise for at least five years now. The answer to all of them is probably yes. You talked earlier how, heidi, about a process doing requirements that would allow you to make progress without necessarily having the 20year answer in hand when you start. Do you see that is there an application of that same idea to this question about integrated fires . Is there hope that we can do that . Boy. Is there hope. I think whats tough for the army is because its portfolio is broader than the navy and air force. We have two to three times more products. As a result, you have so many a demands on the dollar on the modernization. Everybody portfolio is important. As a result, without increasing the top line enough, everything is driven by do i have enough budget to do that. What happens is, you just marginally upgrade the system. Its driven by budget. The reality is like i talked about, to counter these threat and see where the threats are evolving, these are the capability we will need. Will army get enough money to do this . I dont know. Because if the focus is on readiness and manpower, youre not going to have enough modernization budget. Your top line can accommodate it. I can always hope. Its been talked about a lot, the consistency and predictability and confidence over years. These things dont come overnight. To an certain extent Army Modernization program is under nourished program. Not because were evil when this hard decisions were made. Its been exacerbated by budget control act and ongoing continued resolutions. If there was some mystical giant pot. Money became available, which isnt, the thought experiment, if we had all the money we needed there is only a certain capacity and it will take time to regain a viable Modernization Program that is adaptable to the changing threats. It is going to take as long to get out of this as it took to get into it. Its like the plane is coming down to the ground and we are starting to turn it around but to get back upa it will probably took as much effort is it did to get down here. Daniel get the last word. I want to thank our audience for joining us. In readingall buy the report. And thank our panel for a great discussion. Applause if you missed our live coverage earlier we will show you President Trump speaking at the commissioning ceremony for the uss Gerald R Ford Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier tonight at eight clock eastern on cspan
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