The Sources of Chinese Conduct: A Debate
Recently, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff published an analysis of 21st-century Chinese conduct meant to provide the underpinnings for a new American approach to contending with Beijing’s growing might. Did they get it right? What is the nature of our competition with China? And what should we be aiming for? A recent panel examined these questions.
More than a half-century ago, George Kennan published an analysis of the sources of Soviet conduct that helped to shape US policy toward Moscow throughout the Cold War. More recently, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff – an organization that Kennan founded and led – published an analysis of 21st-century Chinese conduct meant to provide the underpinnings for a new American approach to contending with Beijing’s growing might.
In recent years, China, under President Xi Jinping, has seen substantial growth and sought a greater leadership role in world affairs. New equations have emerged domestically as well. As Xi fortifies his hold over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the country, repressive policies in Tibet and Xinjiang and excessive curbs on academic freedom can pose potential political threats. At the same time, issues like ecological degradation and widening wealth disparities may add to Xi’s challenges. How Xi and the CCP aim to navigate these flashpoints will have a significant bearing on the future of the country, the party, and the president himself.
Beijing’s hegemonial claim must be rejected
By Chang Ling-ling 張玲玲
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is an independent authority specializing in research into armed conflict, arms control and disarmament.
The institute recently published a report on the global arms market reminding the international community to take heed: Last year, China sold the second-largest share of military equipment, behind the US. It is China’s fifth consecutive year in second position, far ahead of Russia.
Due to the unavailability of sales data for Chinese guided-missile production and its shipbuilding industry, these numbers are not included in the data, making it impossible to pin down the extent of Chinese arms sales.