teachers were slaughtered. they took no action to get into those classrooms as they waited for more equipment. we pressed for more of an explanation, and the response was devastating. listen. reporter: sir, you have people who are alive, children who are calling 9-1-1 saying please, send the please. they are alive in that classroom. there are lives that are at risk. that s not protocol, is it? we re well aware of that. reporter: right, but why was this decision made not to go in and rescue these children? again, the on scene commander considered a barricaded subject, that there was time and there were no more children at risk. reporter: and what time was that? based upon the information we have, there were children in the classroom that were at risk, and it was, in fact, still an active shooter situation, and not a
and penetrate brick walls, steel doors. firing those inside of a hallway in a school, the sound is disorienting alone. a lot of mistakes for sure but the on scene commander waited too long. it s wrong to say he should have charged in. that s also wrong. i ve handled these hostage barricades. the secretary over waco, i was in the shootout at waco and naeg negotiated and worked with the rangers and troopers. these things get real wild real fast. the incident commander should have made a stutter step when he reached the breach point, which is the locked classroom with children inside with a killer. he had to take a stutter step because people say that s not a hostage barricade. wrong, that is a hostage barricade but it s a hostage barricade in the middle of an active shooter situation. but now you ve got to get in there and you ve got to kill
the biggest break down on any action we do is always communications breaks down. and not to make this simplistic. you can tell that the communication broke down from the 9-1-1 dispatchers to the on scene commander. too much indecisiveness in order to breach that door whatever means they could in order to try to stop this perpetrator. i picked up at 7:35, seven officers inside the building, and a total of 19 a few minutes later. what did the seven officers do? three officers to neutralize a subject. that s the minimum you need to get in. those are the questions i have. how well did they train? and why did the communications break down? and to that point, commissioner, peter lays out that it takes three, at least that s the minimum to form a stack and go in. the person at the front of the stack knows they re likely to
the on-scene commander was saying. that s another thing to be row revealed here. one thing we learned from the young people who survived the shooting is a couple of things. number one, all the things that went wrong here, the school resource officer not seeing ramos because he was hiding when he drove by, the fact that the door to the school was propped open, the fact that the classroom door was unlocked, that s a violation of the county s own school safety protocol that said classroom doors have to be locked at all times for the very purpose of keeping shooters outside of the classroom. the third thing we learned from some of the survivors is that the door to the classroom did have a window and some of these survivors said that ramos shot the window out. and i think even if you can t breach the door, you can t open the door, the question is why not fire through the window in the classroom in, in hallway, and why not fire through the
negotiations? you ve been a journalist too long. exactly. well, they re interviewing the female terrorist already, they ve already interviewed her at the prison, i m sure the fbi has been there and interviewed her or they re doing it now. she s unlikely to be of any help, but they ll be doing it. and to give you a peek of how this works, at the scene, as an on-scene commander, colleyville commander, lieutenant or commander, and it generally works like this, he works with a team of three other supervisors, a chief negotiator, chief tactical officer and a chief of intelligence. so those three wise men report to the commander. i used to like to sit them at a table right across, the chief negotiator, on-scene commander i m sorry, the tactical supervisor and the chief of intelligence and you re getting information from all three. so the decisions are made not based on, well, we talked to him for a while and nothing happened, so now we have to, you