role in the collapse of the government and the security forces. i also believe that weak leadership added to that, the fact that president ghani, without any apparent reason, changed out commanders, which degraded the confidence of the troops and their leadership. i think i believe also that the doha agreement had a significant negative effect on the moral of the military. i think there is a combination of a number of things that came together to create effects. i certainly agree that corruption was central to this issue. general? absolutely. i d take it one level higher, it is about legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the military and think corruption is one contributing factor to
have questions about power with the strikes. with that, i will yield back. thank you, mr. jackson is recognized for five minutes. thank you, madam chair. thank you for being here today. very important hearing we re having, i appreciate the committee s urgency making this happen. there were differences in opinion on how it should have been conducted, something we should agree on, withdrawal should have been conditioned based and not any political motivation involved, which i don t think was the actual case. general milley, how often were nucontact with your chinese counter part discussing evacuation in afghanistan? zero. okay. i agree with you, conditions based. jeem on august 18, recorded saying timeframe of rapid collapse was estimated weeks to months and even years, there was nothing i or anyone else saw
stephanopoulos says, no one told you, military advisors did not tell you, no, we should keep 2500 troops, we can do that, biden says no, no one said that to me. you read quickly through it has been a stable situation part, that is the important part. look, it is open to individual interpretation, we both made our point, american people can use common sense, it is alarming, whatever, i yield back. mr. lauriet. general milley, i associate myself with remarks mrs. chaney made at the beginning of her questions and focus on the time frame following the 2020 election. november 9, 2020, secretary of defense mark esper was replaced by acting secretary of defense christopher miller and other key leadership positions at dod filled with new people. general milley, did this rapid replacement of top senior officials at department of
we attempted to with taliban to allow americans to be able to get to the gate up until the very end. i do not have facts on why that did not happen. our presence on the ground was very small and we were beginning to turn inward as we prepared to extract. general milley, in 2017, the gao released a report on recommendation to enhance readiness of the global response force to support contingency operation. in june of 2021, gao assessed department had not implemented any of the three recommendations to improve readiness due to ongoing development of the dynamic force employment concept. i m curious, what percentage of the total immediate response force and existing preposition forces deployed in support of operation spartan shield were deployed to hkia to assist in the neo? how many additional battalions
first. kabul makes all, provides everything that you need to be able to do that, capacity, proximity, it was the right choice. isn t it accurate hkia has one runway and bagram has multiple, making it easier for evacuation of individuals from that is a great point. i would have to secure it. reason we could stay there with 2500 people earlier is because we had the afghan security forces securing outer perimeter of bagram. you no longer have that, you have to commit 5 or 6000 troops to do that, secure it, defend it and run air ops, that is substantial additional commitment of resources. general milley or general mckenzie, anything you would like to add? i like to briefly talk about bagram. it has two runways issue not what you want to examine when