In the current literature on Episodic Memory (EM), mental representations are often assumed to stand out as the main view that promises to explain how we experience past personal events. However, proponents of Radical Enactive Cognition (REC) have argued that this view is empirically and theoretically inadequate due to issues with misremembering - failure to recall events in the past accurately - and the Hard Problem of Content (HPC) (Hutto & Myin 2013, 2017). This thesis aims to utilise REC’s already established framework and narrative formulations of memory to provide the tools needed to characterise episodic memory. The thesis turns to Narrativist Accounts (Gallagher 2008, 2003; Gallagher & Hutto 2008; Hutto 2016, Nelson & Fivush 2004; Rudd 2012; Schechtman 1996) and takes notice of the various capacities and requirements needed under these views and how they can serve as a model that can account for EM. However, under a Narrativist Account (NA), episodic memory is alw
Gallagher-hutto
Hutto-myin
Nelson-fivush
Episodic-memory
Radical-enactive-cognition
Hard-problem
Narrativist-accounts
Narrativist-account
Narratives
Episodic-memory
Autobiographical-memory