On 19 January 2021 the Federal Court delivered a landmark decision in
PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah.(1) The apex court decided that in the event of delay of delivery of vacant possession for Schedule G and H-type contracts under Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations (HDR) 1989, the timeframe for calculating liquidated and ascertained damages (LADs) begins from the date of payment of the booking fee, not the date of the sale and purchase agreement (for further details please see Housing developers beware – Federal Court upholds
This article focuses on
PJD s impact on housing developers with respect to their completed and ongoing housing projects under Schedules G and H of the HDR.
Faber Union(1) is good law.
In total, there were seven appeals before the Federal Court by purchasers and housing developers. The key question that the court considered was where there is a delay in the delivery of vacant possession, does the date for the calculation of liquidated and ascertained damages (LADs) begin on the date of the payment of the booking fee or on the date of the sale and purchase agreement (SPA)?(2)
This article refers to the appeals pertaining to
GJH Avenue Sdn Bhd.(3)
GJH Avenue
The
GJH Avenue appeals comprised three appeals by purchasers of units of bungalows under a Schedule G statutory contract as prescribed under the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations (HDR) 1989. One of the bungalow units is known as Unit Number L274/PT Number 5415.
The recent Federal Court decision in
Catajaya Sdn Bhd v Shoppoint Sdn Bhd(1) has breathed new life into the interpretation of termination clauses in contracts. Indeed, it sounded a cautionary note to the business community at large when the Federal Court held that termination clauses must be interpreted strictly.
Facts
The dispute arose from the termination of a share sale agreement (SSA) between Catajaya Sdn Bhd (appellant) and Shoppoint Sdn Bhd and its shareholders (respondents). Under the SSA, the appellant was to purchase a piece of land held by Shoppoint Sdn Bhd by acquiring its shares.
The SSA stipulated specific timelines for the payment of the purchase price, whereby the appellant would pay the balance purchase price by the agreed completion date.
Introduction
Every construction project has at least one consultant appointed by a developer (also known as an employer of the project). While the types of consultant and their respective roles may differ from project to project, a consultant s role generally includes the certification of work and progress. In most instances, this also requires the consultant to certify the amount payable for work done and the amount payable by the employer to the main contractor. A payment certificate will be issued thereafter.
As cashflow is crucial for main contractors in any ongoing construction project, prompt and expeditious payments by the employer are often expected. However, if the main contractor is dissatisfied with the payment certificate, can the main contractor sue the consultant for negligence? The Court of Appeal addressed this question in a recent case commenced by PCP Construction Sdn Bhd against L3 Architects Sdn Bhd.(1) In its decision, the Court of Appeal unanimously upheld t
Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 provides the courts with broad powers to grant remedies as they deem necessary to bring an end to the complaints raised in an oppression action. In
Lee Kai Wuen v Lee Yee Wuen,(1) the Federal Court refused leave to appeal the Court of Appeal s decision which had found that the courts powers in an oppression action are broad and unfettered. This includes the power to order restitution to a company, a remedy traditionally seen as belonging to companies.
Facts
The subject company had two shareholders. The plaintiff (the majority shareholder) filed an oppression action against the other shareholder and a third party (the oppressors), anchored on, among other things, an allegation of misappropriation of company funds. According to the plaintiff, upon the hospitalisation and eventual death of the previous majority shareholder, the oppressors had conspired to have the creditors pay them monies which were supposed to be paid to the company. The plai