Miscalculations on the ground. we hel to miscalculations on the ground. - help to build a state but we could not form a nation. the fact the afghan army that we and our partners trained simply melted away and in many cases without firing a shot took us all by surprise. it would be dishonest to claim otherwise. we need to consider some uncomfortable truths. that we didn t fully comprehend the depth of corruption and poor leadership and the senior ranks, that we didn t grasp that the immediate effect of frequent and unexplained rotations by the president of his commanders, that we didn t anticipate the snowball effect caused by the teal is the taliban commander spoke with local leaders in the wake of the doha agreement and that the doha agreement and that the doha agreement itself had a demoralising effect on afghan soldiers. and finally, that we failed to grasp that there was only so much with and
Against the collapse of a government in 11 days. reporter: questions about the chaotic evacuation, the decision to withdrawal, troop levels, and how the afghan army and government imploded so quickly. the fact that the afghan army that we and our partners trained simply melted away in many cases without firing a shot took us all by surprise. and it would be dishonest to claim otherwise. i think there was a lot of intelligence that clearly indicated that after we withdrew, um, that it was a likely outcome of a collapse of the military and collapse of the government. reporter: chairman of the joint chiefs, general mark milley, also in the hot seat over a series of revelations from the new book by bob woodward and robert costa called peril. the book reports that milley reached out to his chinese counterpart in the days before the presidential election assuring him that all was okay and that the u.s. would not attack china. i am certain that president trump did not intend to at
We help build a state mr. chairman but cannot forge a nation. the fact that the afghan army we and our partners train simply melted away in many cases without firing a shot took us all by surprise. in the end, we couldn t provide them with the will to win, at least not all of them and as a veteran of that war, i am personally reckoning with all of that. that was secretary of defense lloyd austin. delivering some painful truths about this country s 20-ar endeavor in afanistan. he testified today along with the commander of u.s. central command and the chaian of the joint chief of staff mark milley. republicans spent their time hammering talking points attempting to blame joe biden for ending a forever war that republicans favorite president vowed to end, too.
Growing threats from isis-k. staying longer than we did would have made it more dangerous for our people and would not have significantly changed the number of evacuees we could get out. as we consider these tactical issues today, we must also ask ourselves some equally tough questions about the wider war itself and pause to think about the lessons that we have learned over the past 20 years. did we have the right strategy? did we have too many strategies? did we put too much faith in our ability to build effective afghan institutions, an army, an air force, a police force, and government ministries? we helped build a state, mr. chairman, but we could not forge a nation. the fact that the afghan army that we and our partners trained simply melted away in many cases without firing a shot took us all by surprise, and it would be dishonest to say otherwise. we need to consider some
The first of september. and as you know, we face grave and growing threats from isis-k. staying longer than we did would have made it more dangerous for our people and would not have significantly changed a number of evacuees we could get out. as we consider these tactical issues today we must also ask ourselves some equally tough questions about the wider war itself. pause to think about the lessons that we have learned over the past 20 years. did we have the right strategy? did we have too many strategies? did we put too much faith in our ability to build effective afghan institutions, an army, air force, police force, and government ministries? we helped build a state but we could not forge a nation. the fact that the afghan army that we and our partners trained simply melted away in many cases without firing a shot took us a by surprise and it would be dishonest to claim