as you know we have 10 or 11 times as many advisers in there as we had a year ago. so we don t see the end of the tunnel, but i must say i don t think it s darker than a year ago, in someways lighter. early on, kennedy made a command decision, we will not allow south vietnam to fall to the communists. in southeast, asia, communist-inspired subversion was unrelenting. south vietnam looked to others for assistance in stemming north vietnamese aggression. going back to the eisenhower administration in the late 50s, the country split into south and north vietnam. you have communists in the north and so the united states is very eager to preserve the south from a communist takeover. the communist north vietnamese believed in nationalism, uniting their country under their own control. the cold war conspiracy was that if the vietnamese communist
times as many advisors in there as we had a year ago. so we don t see the end of the tunnel, but i must say i don t think it s darker than a year ago, in some ways lighter. early on, kennedy made a command decision, we will not allow south vietnam to fall to the communists. in southeast, asia, communists inspired subversion was unrelenting. south vietnam looked to others for stemming vietnamese aggression. going back to the eisenhower administration in the 50s, the country split into south and north vietnam. you have communists in the north so the united states is very eager to preserve the south from a communist takeover. the communist north vietnamese believed in nationalism, uniting their country under their own control. the cold war conspiracy was
mr. president, it was just a year ago you ordered stepped up aid to vietnam. there seems to be a good deal of discouragement about the progress. can you give us your assessment? we are putting in a major effort in vietnam. as you know we have 10 or 11 times as many advisers in there as we had a year ago. so we don t see the end of the tunnel, but i must say i don t think it s darker than a year ago, in someways lighter. early on, kennedy made a command decision, we will not allow south vietnam to fall to the communists. in southeast, asia, communist-inspired subversion was unrelenting. south vietnam looked to others for assistance in stemming north vietnamese aggression. going back to the eisenhower administration in the 50s, the country split into south and north vietnam. you have communists in the north and so the united states is very eager to preserve the south from a communist takeover. the communist north
ago. in some ways, lighter. early on, kennedy made a command decision, we will not allow south vietnam to fall to the communists. in southeast, asia, communist-inspired subversion was unrelenting. south vietnam looked to others for assistance in stemming north vietnamese aggression. going back to the eisenhower administration in the 50s, the country split into south and north vietnam. you have communists in the north and so the united states is very eager to preserve the south from a communist takeover. the communist north vietnamese believed in nationalism, uniting their country under their own control. the cold war conspiracy was that if the vietnamese communist won the war in vietnam, all of southeast asia would fall.
think it s darker than a year ago, in someways lighter. early on, kennedy made a command decision, we will not allow south vietnam to fall to the communists. in southeast, asia, communist-inspired subversion was unrelenting. south vietnam looked to others for assistance in stemming north vietnamese aggression. going back to the eisenhower administration in the 50s, the country split into south and north vietnam. you have communists in the north and so the united states is very eager to preserve the south from a communist takeover. the communist north vietnamese believed in nationalism, uniting their country under their own control. the cold war conspiracy was that if the vietnamese communist won the war in vietnam, all of southeast asia would fall. the dominos would fall, one after another. there is no doubt the fall of