relief well will work when it s down, which i anticipate, from what i m hearing, should be late august, early september. they have to do positions once they get to the depth. i m sure that will work. it s worked hundreds of times before. but until then, nothing certain. shepard: there s no reason to believe this well might are compromised below the gulf floor such that there could be leaks and as you cap it it would squirt out underneath and compromise the floor there. i m not aware of anything that would, that the pipe would be what in question. i m not aware of potential damage. there s a question of the cement job but i don t have the details. having said that the relief well, because it goes to the bottom, would cure that problem.
successful cement job due to formulation breakdown. this is an internal bp confidential document from mid april. have you seen this document before? i saw it as a consequence of the letter but you did not see it at the time? but there were bp folks who saw it, correct? do your knowledge? there were certainly bp people who saw this. okay. the document said there would be potential need verify with a bond log and perform a remedial cement job, but bp chose the riskier approach. secondly, bp chose the riskier centralizer option. experts told us in testimony to this committee, the best practice would have been to use 21 centralizers, but bp only used 6. if you take a look at tab eight, it says on page 18, it says you did this even though your
avoided or lessened these risks. here is what the plan review said. if you use the liner, there would be less issue with landing it shallow. there would be a second barrier to gas in the annulus and higher chance for successful cement job. now you said that bp was supposed to be focused like a laser on safety, yet bp apparently overruled warnings of its own engineers and chose the more dangerous option. how can you explain that decision by bp? why were the safety recommendations of your own engineers ignored? i wasn t involved in any of the decision-making. it is clear that there was some discussion amongst the engineering team and an engineering judgment was taken. it is clear to me that you don t want to answer your questions. because, isn t it true that you have served your life in bp? you only recently become the ceo but haven t you been in this business most of your professional life?
we ll probably be fine and get a good cement job? i think that e-mail is a cause of concern. i would like to understand the context in in which it was sent, and as i ve said a number of times, if there s any evidence that people put cost ahead of safety,ly take action. i understand. let me finish with the cement bond. now, bp failed to perform the most effective test that was known to determine whether the cement was properly sealed and that s the cement bond log test. there was a contractor onboard, hired to perform this test, but they were sent away 11 hours prior to the explosion. this test was described by halliburton s chief safety operator tim probert as, kwet, the only test that can really
well design and the chairman waxman talked about this for a moment. the best practice would have been to use a liner and tieback which provides four barriers to prevent the flow of dangerous hydrocarbons to the well made. instead bp chose a look string approach which has only two barriers. and internal document of the company warned that this approach was not recommended because, quote, cementing simulations indicate it s unlikely to be a successful cement job. and you can look at tab six of the notebook you have in front of you to see that. it says cement simulations indicate it is unlikely to be a successful cement job due to formulation breakdown. this is an internal bp confidential document from mid april. have you seen this document before? i say the as a consequence of