And part of which was a reality. We also dealt very closely on the issues of detentions. This goes again to this issue of president karzai seeking to establish and to reinforce the sense that afghanistan was a sovereign country and to wrest from the United States and other countries the kinds of respect due to that country and due to its people, and as we negotiated a contentious mou for my turning over of several thousand afghan detainees to afghanistan, that process and that sense of sovereignty came home in a very real way for me. And then, unfortunately, when president karzai abrogated parts of the mou, i had to cease the turnover of detainees until such time i was sure that they werent going to be released ultimately to target us or afghan citizens of the afghans again. We also had a period of time where we worked very closely on night operations and special operations, and that resulted in a memorandum of understanding as well where we sought to move from being unilaterally engaged in night ops, spec ops, to one where we partnered with the afghans to one where i committed to him and to the Afghan Security leadership the development of special operations capabilities where afghanistan could eventually operate unilaterally without specific u. S. Or nato help. And then very clearly it was a time of transition, as scott properly said. We were moving the Afghan Forces from being in trail to being in the lead. We were moving isaf forces from being in the lead to being advisory in nature, but very importantly for me i worked hard, and i know Stan Mcchrystal had before me, and ultimately Dave Petraeus in succession to him, on trying to understand Hamid Karzais sense of his ownership of the Afghan National Security Forces as the commander in chief, but more importantly the ownership of the Afghan Security forces in the context of the conflict that was being waged. It was never fully clear to me what his attitude was. And then, of course, we dealt very carefully and often on the issue of corruption, me trying to get him to work towards dealing with institutional krug kruges and him trying to get me to get our contracting and spending processes under control, and there were a number of other areas like the Afghan Local Police and the elimination of private Security Companies and transitioning prts where we worked together very closely. But we also faced some world class crises which were very important in defining how we worked during times of real stress and crisis, and i think that was an area that defined our friendship, and we leveraged that friendship on a number of occasions to get to the solution, or at least to keep the crisis from spinning us off into space. The first was the downing of myc h47 with an entire s. E. A. L. Strike force on boort within a month of my taking command. That was a moment of great concern for him because he believed that we were beginning to witness that moment on the battlefield which had been witnessed in afghanistan when the first stingers arrived during the soviet war, and it was a moment of real concern for him, and we worked that very closely together. Then shortly after that the u. S. Embassy and my headquarters was attacked by suicide bombers, and that was an area where we worked very closely in the solution of that and understanding how that came about followed almost immediately a week later by the assassination of president rabbani, the head of the High Peace Council, the chair of the High Peace Council and all of the associated 2ki d difficultih that. And then the event on the pakistan border with 24 pakistani troops were killed resulting in pakistan closing my principal ground line of communications over which 80 of my supplies flowed into the country. That was followed by the urination video where u. S. Marines were found to be urinating on dead taliban. That created a sequence of events in conjunction with the inadvertent and sad burning of the holy koran at bagram which began the process of the insider attacks, which really stressed the relationship between the west in general, nato, and the Afghan Government and president karzai, but also stressed the relationship within the coalition itself as increasingly these insider attacks were eroding the consensus of the coalition to remain committed to afghanistan. And then that was followed by the mass killing, youll recall, of the 16 afghans in kandahar, and each of these, whether it was a challenge or a crisis, permitted me to take the measure of the man, and i found president karzai to be a worthy partner in most of these. We didnt agree necessarily on many of them and often the outcome wasnt what either of us desired, but it was these were moments where we had the opportunity to work very closely. So against the backdrop of these many factors, i think its important to take stock of president karzais legacy under these many strains. He has very strong opinions, for example, on the sources of corruption in afghanistan. He blames foreign influences significantly and the United States in particular but was unable or unwilling to take credible and Decisive Action to curb the corruption within the country. He remembers the u. S. Role in the shaping of the 2009 election which caused a lot of animosity and antipathy towards the United States, i believe, while avoiding at the same time the matter of substantial ballot box stuffing. He was enormously critical of the u. S. Policy toward pakistan but did not exert every effort to reach out to pakistan to improve that relationship, and he would accuse the u. S. Of arrogance and malfeasance demonstrating in the process his mastery of Something Else called brinksmanship, but at the same time he was confronting this, we also had to keep in mind as americans, and i heard this first from Dave Petraeus and i tested it myself when i was there, that many of these crises that we had with president karzai could easily have been solved if we had listened closely to him one or two or three years before when hed raised the issue early along in the process and we were either deaf to the issue that he was raising or we under resourced the solution and ultimately didnt really solve the problem. So issues about, for example, the private Security Companies. That was a real issue to him, and it was a real issue to afghans, and we didnt solve it properly. He ultimately brought us to the brink and the creation of the Afghan Public Protection force was the result. Not the perfect solution, but it was a solution. And the elimination ultimately of provincial reconstruction teams in terms of rendering them as Capacity Building mechanisms rather than Service Provider mechanisms which compromised the ability of local governance to develop. And then ultimately civilian contracting, civilian casualties, and corruption. These were all issue where is if we listened to him earlier and wed taken the kinds of actions that he believed we should have he often provided us excellent advice in that regard, this could have reduced, i think, friction in many respects on many issues. Legacies take many shapes and invariably are formed in the eyes of the beholders. Im going to take a crack at some of this and i want to be careful because its difficult even before hes out of office to talk about his historic legacy, and thats why a panel like this is valuable i think in terms of how we look at the future and for policy processes, but i think its fraught with dangers in terms of the potential for criticizing a sitting president. Ill leave to the afghans, and i suspect ill hear a bit in a moment from a very prominent afghan journalist, how they view their president , but from the many, many afghans with whom ive dealt, and i have never asked an afghan his or her opinion of their president because i believed out of respect to the president and respect to the afghans, i didnt want to put them in that place. It doesnt mean they didnt offer their opinions. And i always had a sense of their open but sometimes grudging respect for him. They respected hamid karzai, but there was also a sense of melancholy, i believe, on the absence of his presence and that of his governance in their lives, and im talking about Sub National Governance which we worked so hard to try to develop, but it defied my abilities when i was there as a commander. We can talk about that if you like. But they were very proud of him in many ways. They were proud that he stood up to the foreigners of which i was one, but recently i think as regards the bilateral Security Agreement, which would enshrine a permanent presence for the foreigners, many afghans were simply horrified that he seemed to be sacrificing their future in not signing an agreement and never fully explaining why or clearly understanding why, and i think in some respects in terms of a contemporary legacy, we see that much ground was lost by the president in that regard. Regionally i believe pakistan will not view the karzai era and the relationship between islamabad and kabul with much nostalgia. Karzais views of pakistan were seldom positive, unfortunately they were frequently openly expressed which made the relationship different to manage. Tehran will not miss the president either for many reasons, but i think this goes to kais points about president karzais journey and personal goals of making afghanistan a sovereign entity to be reckoned with, and i think the iranians ultimately were to determine even with a substantial presence in kabul they had much less influence over the president and over the parliament than they had hoped, and the bilateral Security Agreement left a foreign presence in the country which iran had consistently resisted. Nato i think will view him in the short term as an unappreciative partner who over time became increasingly difficult to deal with. While only the president , hamid karzai, can say for sure, it is likely that he always viewed the enormity of the 50 nation nato Led Coalition as too intrusive on the sovereignty of afghanistan and ultimately on his own authority. But i think we may have missed or he may have missed the larger point, that those 50 nations committed their blood and their treasure to afghanistan and thus tied irrevocably the International Community to the future of this poor and beleaguered country in ways we have probably never seen the parallel before in history. Afghanistan, this poor state, this nation emerging from conflict whose interests were the personal interests of 50 nations in the world, i think that was a True Advantage to afghanistan. And then theres the u. S. , and hes being judged harshly, frankly, in the u. S. , perhaps unfairly so and will be likely for some time. His inflammatory and provocative and sometimes disrespectful rhetoric aimed at this administration, but sadly also aimed at the sacrifices of u. S. Troops was compounded by a sense of his ungratefulness for the u. S. Investment. Again, perceptions, and this perception ultimately attracted the ire of much of the congress and the administration, and taken together, this tyme put the u. S. Relationship and commitment to afghanistan in danger. When i was the commander, i did not seriously consider that there was a possible likelihood of a zero option. In essence, the u. S. Pulling out completely of afghanistan and, frankly, taking with it nato and the International Community. But i have to tell you, over the last probably six to eight months and in particular with the rhetoric and the problems over the bilateral Security Agreement, we came perilously close ultimately to a zero option, and we still dont have a signed bilateral Security Agreement although i suspect that the soon to be inaugurated president will do so pretty quickly. And, unfortunately, this has tainted his shortterm legacy overall, and i believe it will taint it for a considerable period in the United States. But the truth is hamid karzai is a man with extraordinary abilities but with human frailties. He was placed in one of the most demanding, thankless positions on the planet and was forced to operate within a largely incapable government emerging after a generation of conflict where he found not only difficulty in managing a National Government from the palace but also in creating the kind of subNational Government necessary to extend the writ of kabul to the people. He had to coexist and operate with the largest Wartime Coalition in modern era inside his country while seeking to reconcile with the taliban and foreign fighters a rebellion and ultimately to bring peace to his people. Few men have, in my mind, ever faced larger challenges for so long with so few real measures and tools to deal with any one of them individually much less all of them simultaneously. So, yes, he was flawed, and, yes, he played fast and loose with relationships over time, and, yes, he was provocative, and, no, he was not demented, and, no, he was not on meds, none that i knew of. But in a few weeks time when the next president of the Islamic Republic of afghanistan will lead a nation plagued by insurgency but one profoundly changed for the better in the 12plus, nearly 13 years that hamid karzai assumed his office in this troubled nation, and that context while today hamid karzai finds himself often strongly criticized, as i said in the beginning a searching and Detailed Analysis of his administration and his presidency and of him as a man will return a balanced appraisal of his legacy and how it was that after all these years of confli conflict, afghanistan could have come so far under his leadership. Thank you. Thank you, general allen. I think it was a huge amount there we will be able to engage with a little bit later on. Now youve put me in the position of doing something that you wisely have never done, which is to ask an afghan what he thinks of president karzai and his legacy. So mujib, the floor is yours. Thank you, scott. Im humbled to be part of such a distinguished panel, and i wanted to read a few passages from the article i recently wrote for the atlantic. Its called after karzai and its in the current issue. I walked around for an hour this morning trying to find a copy. I couldnt. So it tells you how well i know d. C. Its in everybodys briefcases. Theyre all reading it at every break. So ill read a couple passages and then i will have a few remarks about the president s domestic policy, domestic legacy and his local governance and in providing the context for this passage, ill go back to one of the points the general emphasized and how difficult it is to predict a sitting president s legacy and how challenging it is. So here is the passage. The afghanistan that karzai leaves behind is certainly a more inclusive and cohesive country than the fractured mess he inherited. Among my own peers, educated young urbanites connected to the world and provided with free space for expression, theres a growing sense of nostalgia for him. Hes largely seen as a man of great personal dignity who, despite his shortcomings, tried to minimize the bloodshed that my generation was born into. Our afghanistan is shaped by principles karzai saw as essential and nonnegotiable but because of the president s style of leadership, these gains appear tenuous. Under karzai a relatively free press blossomed, but every time threats against it emerged, it has been plunted not by the institutions or law karzai put in place, but by the president s personal intervention. The same can be said of womens participation in society which has grown tremendously but with few institutional safeguards. Even the future role of the countrys warlords is uncertain. Karzai has kept most of these men off balance and he deserves credit for doing so yet these men are not gone from public life. They have continued to profit from contracts and investments largely tied to the presence of foreign militaries, vested economic interests is a major factor that keeps them loyal to a democratic system. In 12 1 2 years, many have sanitized their images. Shorter beards, fancier suits, more politically correct language. For better or worse, their sons and daughters who seem more attuned to democratic practices are now beginning to step into their fathers shoes. Sponta, his National Security adviser, he says he doubts anyone could have fared better than karzai in such a fragmented society, and yet the next president of afghanistan will inherit a broken chain of command, weak institutions, and a variety of local powers that may prove difficult to bring to heel. All the more so because he will lack the personal connections that karzai worked so hard to cultivate. The question whether the forces from the past will succeed again, this is spont a speaking, or whether modernizing forces will take the country forward, this has not been finalized. Almost none of the achievements made under karzai appear irreversible, sponta lamented. Instead, afghanistan remains a place stuck between modernity and its own splintered history. Which way it will move next is anyones gruess. So i saw the president about a week after the first round of elections to find a successor to him in april, and it was the feeling at that time was that he had done a good job staying neutral in the elections. There was a sense of jubilation, about 7 Million People had turned out to vote, and karzai had proved his critics wrong as ambassador eide said. There were a lot of conspiracy theories he would change the constitution, he would stay in power. So in april when i wrote this, all that seemed, you know, false, and the article went to print, and in the onemonth period until the article came out, a lot changed. So to go back to the difficult nature of predicting Hamid Karzais legacy, so in that one month or oneandahalf months until the article came out, we had another round of elections, a runoff because the first round did not have a clear winner, and after that runoff, there were allegations of karzai meddling in the election. One of the frontrunners alleged that there was a triangle of conspiracy, Abdullah Abdullah alleged there was a triangle of conspiracy trying to steal the election from him and the triangle was the rival candidate, president karzai, and the election commission. So a lot changed, and i started questioning some of the things i wrote, but im glad that most of the questions that i had discussed in the article deals with his 12 years of leadership and his particularly his style of local governance, and i would like to make a few remarks about that and what sort of legacy he leaves behind. I think at the end of the day the legacy that matters is the legacy on the ground. Yes, the relationship with nato, yes, the relationship with the United States will matter and it will be questioned in history, but what he leaves behind on the ground, especially to my generation, a generation that sort of is a product of his 13 years, will matter a lot. So if we go back to the sense of euphoria that ambassador eide mentioned about 2002, when hamid karzai came to power, there was an enormous responsibility, an enormous mandate to build institutions. Afghanistan was pretty fractured over three decades of war, and even the palace that karzai came to in kabul, i remember during the taliban days, you know, people could take a shortcut through that palace if they were going from one end of the city to the other. There were no institutions. Shepherds could bring their herds to that palace to graze on the gardens because the center of power during the taliban was in kandahar. Thats just an indication of now we didnt have any institutions, and the biggest mandate for president karzai was to build institutions. Unfortunately, looking back at it 12 years later, thats been one of his weaknesses. He did not build institutions the way he should have for us. He personalized politics so much that the president as a leader got involved in very minute local matters. He had a disregard for the chain of command in terms of local governance, and he always directly involved himself, sort of undermining the mandate he had for building institutions. So one of the biggest weaknesses of president karzai looking back now was that. And when i asked him that question why ask did he not build institutions, he had his reasons, and that reason goes to two handicaps that he had, i think, over the past 12 years, which really shaped his style of local governance. I think the firsthand handicap when he took over the government, it was a government that was handed to him. He did not have a say in choosing any cabinet members, any governors, even any local district chiefs. So he was put at the helm of a government that he did not trust, and what he did was to develop Informal Networks as the general mentioned, Informal Networks to use for his governance. So the first handicap was that. It wasnt his government. He did not trust the government. He relied on informal sources. The second handicap i think that he developed later towards 2009 was that he started mistrusting the internationals, and he started believing that his government was in the pocket of the internationals. So he couldnt trust his governors because they were closer to the internationals, and the internationals were conspiring against him. So these two factors played a major role in why he didnt trust his own institutions and why he didnt put enough effort into building those institutions stronger. I will give you one example of what i mean by relying on by having a disregard for the chain of command. Theres a man who was a former taliban commander, very interesting character, this beefy, big man, and if you look at his history, he basically fought everyone he worked with. He was first with the mujahadin and then he started fighting against his superiors. Then he came to the taliban and started fighting there. And around 2008, 2007, there was sort of a consensus that the british troops had made a mess out of helmand. It was quite violent. Karzai started experimenting in his local governance. He reached out to this local taliban leader and he tried to turn him and appoint him as district governor. It was an interesting experiment to see if he could, you know, neutralize the insurgency locally, but the problem was that karzai directly was in contact with this district chief. Going around his cabinet Level Ministry for local governance, going around his provincial governor in helmand, and directly talking to the district chief, and the district chief was quite a colorful character. Every time he would come to kabul, he wouldnt let the governor know, wouldnt let the cabinet go, he would just directly call up the president s office and be like send me a car, im here to see the president. So in a country where building institutions should have been such a priority, he directly involved himself at such a local level and what happened in the process was undermining that sort of local governance chain of command. Ill read you a couple quotes. My interview with the president got very sort of philosophical with his answers. Yes, karzai is very traditional in his way of talking and in his beliefs, but one of his cabinet ministers told me that when he starts speaking in english, he seems as modern a leader as any out there because his education was, you know, in politics and philosophy in english and when he speaks in english, you dont see the tribal side as much. So my interview with him was in english, and it was a friday, which is a day off in afghanistan. He was in a good mood, so he got very philosophical with his answers. And i asked him about relying on these informal sources, Informal Networks instead of his own government institutions, and he said, my style of leadership was not in the sense of a western president relying on state institutions and government institutions, that is true. I relied the very least on government institutions, he said. I relied the very least on government institutions. I was more in alliance with and relying upon the afghan people. All my decisions, my statements, were based on the information that i received from the people and the country, not his own government institutions. And i said, doesnt that undermine your mandate to build institutions . He said, no. The government has to be built up. The government doesnt have to be fakely admired and kept weak. He said it was a realization of a fact, of a true situation on the ground. The fact on the ground was that the Afghan Government was weak, that it had no capacity, that it had no means of movement, that it could not provide the president of the country with the information that related to the facts on the ground. Thats why he relied on these informal sources of information and Informal Networks to run the country. But i think there was a sort of misinformed analysis in his decision to rely on these Informal Networks and Tribal Networks particularly. President karzai wrote an essay in 1980s analyzing how the king used tribes as a sort of a bulwark of stability for his regime. He kept the tribes at a good distance. He had a Good Relationship with the tribes and that gave the regime 40 years of stability and he wrote about that, how that was important to the king. The problem was that president karzai ruled on that mentality about 40 years later, and during those three to four decades of conflict, that tribal those tribal structures, those social networks had been completely disrupted. What the conflict did was create a new generation of local leaders who had guns, who had drug money, who did not have local legitimacy. Karzai comes in in 2002 relies on what he thinks are Tribal Networks, but in fact theyre a new generation of these local leaders that are difficult to distinguish from warlords because they have guns, they have drug money, and they dont have that legitimacy associated with tribalal elders in the past. I want to comment on two other things about karzais meg si over the past 12 years. One was an issue the general referred to of his views as a commander in chief. The perception on the ground among afghans is that hamid karzai never became a commander in chief, and i asked him that question. I asked him that, mr. President , when your soldiers die in the line of duty, you dont stand with them. That is a perception among the people. A few months ago there was an incident where 20something Afghan Army Soldiers were killed. Their bodies were brought to kabul at the military hospital, hamid karzai had a trip planned to sri lanka that day. He canceled the trip using the death of the soldiers as a pretext but he remained in his palace politicking, building election coalitions rather than attending the funeral of those soldiers, and i asked him this. I said, mr. President , the people believe you never became a commander in chief, and he said, yes, i never became a commander in chief for two reasons. One, that i am an absolute pacifist in my heart. So the contradiction here is that you have a president in time of war, 12 years of war, who says he is a selfproclaimed, absolute pacifist. And the second reason he said is that i didnt believe in this war. That was not a war, this was a conspiracy. So it was fascinating to me, and i asked him whether you see it as a conspiracy or as a war, your soldiers die every day, and as a commander in chief youre expected to at least show appreciati appreciation. He said, i do. He pounded, you know, the table. He said, i do. Thats western propaganda which is funny to me because i was a local sitting there asking him that question. It wasnt a western journalist. So his views on the war were fascinating to me. The final issue that i would like to, you know, close with is that the perception of hamid ka xi is that hes a tremendous political tactician in terms of building consensus, in terms of if you go back to 2002, the way he came to power, he did not have a militia. He did not have a massive political network, yet 12 years later hes, you know, the most powerful man in the country. That shows he has political genius in terms of political tactics, but the criticism is that hamid karzai was never a visionary leader, and i asked him that question. I said, mr. President , the perception is that you did not have a vision for this country, that you were a great tactician trying to keep the fragile stability together, but you didnt have a picture of where you wanted to see the country say ten years from now and the luxury that president karzai had is so rare, no other leader would have the amount of resources he had, the amount of International Support he had, yet he lacked a vision for the country. When i spoke to those closest to him who have worked with him over the past 12 years, they say he never defined a clear vision that this is where i want to see afghanistan ten years from now, 20 years from now. He had principles, he had principles that he did not compromise on. One of the principles that ambassador eide mentioned was the freedom of press, freedom of expression. Hes been good on the issue of womens rights within the context that he has to please these tribal, you know, parts of the country, but at the same time he has to work toward slow progress, sort of institutionalizing safeguards for women. So he had principles, but he didnt have a clear vision in terms of a model in mind that i want to see afghanistan like singapore ten years from now, 20 years from now. Like an iran or pakistan or whatever. Just not a clear picture and those closest to him say that its one thing to have a vision and not publicize it. Its another to not even sort of paint a picture of that vision to those closest to you who worked with you every day in trying to help you move the country forward. And i think the question that i try to raise in the piece in the atlantic but the question that is important to me also is to ask whether it is possible to be a visionary in the circumstances that hamid karzai ruled in. I think the general mentioned that we should see this as sort of a learning experience of looking at a leader and his challenges, and i think to me thats one of the more fascinating questions, that if Something Like hamid karzai is not sure of his physical or political survival every day, especially if you go back to 2002, can he afford to be a visionary . And i went to kandahar to sort of trace the story a little bit. In september 2002 on september 5th, 2002, just a few months after he had taken power, he was attending his brothers wedding in kandahar and he got pretty close to being killed right there just a few mounser months into his presidency. He was waving at the crowd and a young man in a Police Uniform started opening fire at him from a very close range. He ducked. The governor of kandahar got a bullet in his ear who was sitting next to him, and there was a young man, a very big fan of karzai, he jumped on the assassin and wrestled him down. So i went to canakandahar to tr the young mans story and to ask his family was that sacrifice worth it. When you look back at it 12 years later, this young man made Hamid Karzais 12 years of governance possible. Was the sacrifice possible . The young mans brother had a very emotional answer and a very candid answer. He said sometimes when i think about it, we have a good house, we have a good family, all we want is our brother back. You know, the natural answer. But then his he said i have a 9yearold daughter, and he had his second child was asking for a second ice cream right there. They have a bakery, so i was interviewing him at his bakery. He said but sometimes when i think about it, my girl is in fourth grade, and sometimes when i think about it, if my brother hadnt made that sacrifice in 2002, maybe this wouldnt have been possible. There would have been more chaos, more bloodshed, and maybe my daughter wouldnt be in fourth grade right now. So its that mixed legacy, but i think we ought to ask that question that in the circumstances that hamid karzai ruled in, a very fragmented society, unsure of his physical and political survival every day, can a leader afford to be a visionary . Thank you. I want to make maybe one comment and ask one question before we open it up. Its fascinating especially listen to kai and mujib who have both been in kabul recently and have skins pred karzai certc president karzai these questions, but i think both of you minimized an issue that i think especially of interest to this audience and important to the future of afghanistan which is the relationship with the u. S. And with the rest of the world because afghanistan is still a country that depends a great deal on the resources of the International Community, on the willingness to support the ansf in continuing to try to provide security, in paying the salaries of the government, and so forth. And general allen raised this question but, you know, the question i would have first to kai and mujib and maybe a reaction from john is, you know, it seems in the last year or several months, president karzai has sort of gone out of his way to be an ttagonistic and almost petty in his relationship with the u. S. Not just the bsa, but things like the relice of prisoners in bagram, kinds of things that seem to be deliberately antagonizing an ally that the next president will need to rely on and i dont know if either of you have insights on what is his thinking behind that. Is there something behind it more than sort of a visceral reaction and then maybe after you two speak, general allen could have something more to say on that. Start with you, kai. I have heard the same. You mentioned the crimea and i discussed that with him. I dont think i will go into that here. But i think there is now a level of bitterness in him that has increased tremendously over the last couple of years, of course. It stems i think from the very early days, and general allen mentioned, mujib did also, he came in not with his own government, not the government of his choosing, but what was he facing . He was facing a situation where there was a reluctance on the part of the u. S. To try to regulate or reduce the power of the warlords at the time although there may have been an opportunity. There was a clear reluctance. There was a strong hesitation with regard to starting building afghan institutions. There was very little investment in 2002 and 2003. We lost tremendous time. In addition to that, there was from the u. N. As well as the u. S. Because the u. S. Attention was already on iraq, they wanted a lightfoot print. The only ones that had a heavy footprint were the warlords who could remain where they were. The man was left in a situation where he had no instruments to project power. That was the start, and i think that problem has been with us all the time. Then when the money started to come in and the forces started to come in, what happened . Almost inevitable that you have civilian casualties. And its even more inevitable in a context that you do not know where the information or intelligence that you get from one person can be a part of a family dispute with another, land disputes, et cetera, et cetera, but its quite clear that when some say hes now playing to his own audience as if its a tactic, its clear that what we saw in terms of civilian casualties, destruction of property, et cetera, harmed him in the eyes of his public very, very strongly. Not only the u. S. Became less popular, but there were protests in kabul against the president. And i remember the governor who said if this doesnt stop then we will start a jihad against the americans and it was followed by the events in kabul. Then when the money came in, what did the president see . He saw that the u. S. Contracting system and subcontracting and subcontracting, et cetera, et cetera, left a little in afghanistan. Very little was left in afghanistan. And he saw how some of the people became super rich and he felt our criticism of him for corruption to be hypocritic. Its not quite right. Im not sharing that view. He saw it as being hypocritic. I remember in the hague he said we will carry out a joint audit, the joint International Community and the afghans of the money being spent. And the International Community said it does not relate to us, it relates to you. Investigator general for afghanistan has proven beyond any doubt. So i must say i think he has reason for bitterness. I think he is grateful to see everything that has been invested, but as one very prominent colleague or member of his government said, we should be grateful, but it was spent in an inefficient way. Then comes to the coronation and we have people that know this much better than i do. When i was head of the u. N. , we found out that between one half and one third of all the money spent in afghanistan, nobody knew where it was going. For what purpose, to what area, et cetera, et cetera. We didnt have a clue. How can you then coordinate . The Capacity Building, building the institutions that you mentioned, onethird of it was done with the knowledge of the Afghan Government. How can you then build institutions . There had to be a partnership between the two. That simply was not there. Finally, i must say, the bitterness that is there today, i think we have to in the beginning the afghans did not have any institution and there was spoon feeding from the International Community. And as one member of government said, you dont bite the hand that feeds you. Much was accepted at the time, and then came a different situation where the afghans felt that now were Strong Enough to say what we think about this, and the bitterness increased, and you saw the reaction you had from karzai. And even one of those who spent the longest time abroad and came back as member of the government said, we really had to tolerate a lot at that time that we should not have tolerate d. Again, as he said, i cannot quote him but he will be quoted in a few weeks, he said the americans found it very difficult to distinguish between afghanistan as a sovereign country and afghanistan as enemy territory, and i think theres something true in that. We did not manage the International Community to adapt from a situation where afghanistan was without institutions relying completely on the International Community to a situation where it had institutions and where we had to demonstrate that they should not really be in control. We talked about it all the time but we were very reluctant to, in fact, implement it im afraid. So i think much of his bitterness today, he also looks back at the last 13 years as we do. Much of his bitterness can be understood. He has as mujib said, he disregarded the chain of comm d command, put at the head of a government he didnt trust. Let me also say with regard to the informer network, many people that came in and among the best members of government, didnt know much about afghanistan. They had been out for 20, 25 years. So no wonder why he would pick up the phone or bring me or mujib and others to a meeting and said, now you will hear what the afghans really think. Those were the ones he trusted, the people he met during the friday meetings or during his much too infrequent visits to the provinces, but being called the mayor of kabul as we used to say in criticizing him is to a large extent a result of the fact that we did not in the beginning Start Building an afghan army immediately. We did not allow isaf to go outside of kabul and we did not build civilian institutions he could use to project power so we made him also the mayor of kabul in many ways. Mujib. I think its not just im convinced now that its not tactical antagonism. Its more of a deeper pain that he feels. It may have been tactical at times, but so when i framed my interview to him, he didnt know me, he didnt trust me, so he asked me for lunch first, and when so we had lunch and i explained to him what i was trying to do, that i wanted to write this story as an afghan as sort of a product of your 13 years, and i explained to him that i am entirely focusing on domestic politics and local governance, which means there would be no questions about your relationship to the u. S. , but every couple minutes somehow he would drag the u. S. Into it and in very sort of deeply sort of heartfelt anger. Anger. So i dont think it is tactical antagoni antagonism. And the ambassador mentioned some of the sources for such feelings. Some of the reason for such feeling. I think he feels that to me theres theres this hypocrisy. He perceives an american pi pock sy to push him on certain issues and say the warlords. Some of the warlords that the americans allied with at the beginning of the war and then a couple years later they would pressure hamid karzai not to side with the same warlords, whether it was the marshal or the general. They were the biggest allies of the americans coming into afghanistan. Yet a couple years later, when karzai trying to build a coalition, if you read the wikileaks, how much pressure from the americans not to side with dosdum. So that hypocrisy becomes clear to him, that there is a sort of twofaceness to the american policy. And he told me theres a i mention an episode in the article. Theres a meeting between general abized and president karzai and karzai complains the general that you shouldnt why are you helping the warlords causing me trouble . And the response of the general is pretty interesting. He says, well, theyre one of us. Just like youre one of us. Were not going to be green on green. And it was a term that karzai heard for the first time, a term after the insider attacks would become very common but at the same time it was a that term karzai heard for the first time and the general confirms the anecdote. He remembered saying Something Like that to karzai. If youre karzai then, you are not putting the anger publicly yet youre expressing it to partners in private. But youre not seeing any actions on it. As they said. The allies are deaf or not doing enough. And if part of it is natural, also, that this perception of hypocrisy of karzai. If somebodys in power for 12 years or so, on the other side of partnership theres a change of administration. And obviously, that comes with change of policy. One partner is the same guy and he perceives that as hypocrisy rather than a natural change. But there were episodes in private that kept triggering this anger deeper. So im im convinced its no longer tactical antagonism. But i think it also goes back to what the general said. He knows the United States far better than the United States or some of the u. S. Officials have known him. And i think it proves a buoyant in the bsa negotiations that the u. S. Threatened with the zero option that if you dont sign this, were going to pull out all troops. Yet several months later we see thats not happened. So he knows how far to push the u. S. Maybe sometimes he pushed the u. S. He pushes the u. S. Too far and it is the u. S. s patience and not and not sort of jeopardizing 12 years because they know that president karzai will be gone pretty soon but i think at the same time tactically we need to give karzai credit he knows how far to push them and done that on the issue of bsa and the funding, military funding and future sort of u. S. Presence. So, general, why were we so deaf . You mentioned the beginning of your talks the importance of holding a mirror to ourselves. How responsible for what share of the responsibility do we also have for where we are right now . Well, im not sure i want to engage in an exercise of self flagulation here but we didnt listen to him initially and i think we didnt listen to him because in so many ways we felt we had the answer. I think in so many ways, we felt that the exigencies of the operational environment drove us to make decisions that we would perhaps under other circumstances might have been willing to listen more closely. A couple of things. He and i had a couple conversations about the issue of sovereignty and i think both mujaib and the ambassador hit it clearly and it is a really important point. As time went on and as we were very clearly facing the end of the Large Scale International involvement in afghanistan, i think the president rightly, president karzai, rightly saw that one of the most important things he could deliver to the afghans was a sense of their sovereignty, a sense of their citizenship, a sense that they were as a people bigger than their perhaps tribal or ethnic origins. And, i told him on a number of occasions i did feel any differently about that than he did. And that it was, in fact, one of my principle goals and objectives to do all i could, all the matly, for the afterman National Forces to be in the lead in its entirety in the context of creating a stable and safe and peaceful afghanistan. But i also told him on a number of occasions, and this is a conversation ive had in a couple of places around the world, that sovereignty isnt something that exists apart from the inherent responsibility of the people seeking sovereignty to act responsibly. So, sovereignty demands responsibility and to be able to take responsibility for your actions and your words and your vision, such as of it may exist and i think he was more visionary than perhaps some folks have given him credit for. But also, requires capacity. And so, the frustration that we had often in our conversations was, you know, mr. President , i absolutely do not disagree with you on any of these issues with respect to your ambitions for sovereignty. But in order for you to be truly sovereign, you have to be able to take responsibility for the actions of the system of the judiciary or the actions of the finance ministry or the actions of elements within the ministry of interior. But you cant do that unless you have capacity and thats what were all trying to partner to do. If you dont like our Capacity Building, tell us. He frequently told us issues he didnt like. We worked hard to try to lower civilian casualties and frankly we were pretty successful at that. We worked very hard at ultimately getting after the business of war prof profiteering and creating a Task Force Afghanistan and brought the countercorruption elements together, the contracting elements, all the spending elements, all the threat finance elements brought it together where it should have been from the beginning. Thats the first reflection that i would give you. If we were to do this again, we would have to be properly organized in the context of understanding, organized criminalality in the environment in which youre going to operate, understanding it clearly, being organized ourselves once we understand it and can see it to be sure we dont contribute to it or dont exacerbate it in the course of the Natural Development and pa ka pastie building and reconstruction that would have to occur and im afraid we did and im afraid we came to the conclusion far too late in the process that we needed to be organized in a task force about corruption and the denial of funds to the enemy in a manner almost as important as a Maneuver Task force would be because in the end the afghans were moving into the lead. What was going to win the war ultimately for the afghans was less about defeating the taliban than eliminating the existential threat to the afghans and not taliban and he was right and should have probably organized in that concentrated manner much earlier in the process. We didnt i think in some respects he could have helped us more in this, didnt see the enemy truly for what the enemy was. And the enemy in afghanistan wasnt just the taliban. The enemy in afghanistan was a collective threat of organized criminality, what we call criminal Patronage Networks for whom the taliban frequently worked, actually. The organized criminality, the taliban elements, what we call the ideological insurgency, fueled then by the narcotics enterprise. We went to war in afghanistan very well organized to get after the insurgency. But not well organized in a Law Enforcement sense to help the afghans hold in the context of a judiciary the criminal, the organized criminality and i had no authorities to go after the drug lords and the drug enterprise. If we had had that consolidated authority from the beginning, we could have been striking at those three legs of this enemy triangle from the very beginning. Another reflection which i think is really important for us to understand. And then Sub National Governance. It was an issue, again. The writ of kabul needed to be extented to the people on the ground. I wont name the names of the afghan commanders but this goes back to the unwillingness of the president ultimately to embrace the really vital role of being the commander in chief, to being the moral figurehead to whom his leaders in the field who were shedding their blood every single day needed to be or noted as a moral compass. And a number of those core commanders, two stars, again i, wont mention their names, ive spent most of my time with them in the last two months, they could be two stars in anybodys army and id welcome them. They were very, very good fighters. They understood their people and took risks with their people. Heres their observation. Their observation is were fighting and dying in large numbers to clear ground of the criminality of the taliban and when the people can finally lift their heads up, can finally ultimately seek a better life for themselves, theres no presence of the government there. We had this conversation in the palace on a number of conversations. I even suggested your army, not mine, your army has cleared large numbers, large areas of substantial population numbers. Lets take those areas and seek to insert into those areas your elements of governance at the district level or at the provincial level which represent your insertion of the presence of governance from kabul on to the ground to give these people a sense that kabul is in their lives. You know, my question would be, how often is this minister out of kabul and down in kandahar . Or in other areas. And the answer is, not very often. And so, theres a lot of the word blame is not the right word. Theres a lot of responsibility for how we could have done this better. This is not something either country has done on a regular basis but ill tell you now the things that i believe we have learned about spending and contracting and countering corruption, the things we have learned about Capacity Building, the inherent formula which i said before is if you want to be sovereign you have to be willing to take responsibility and you cant take responsibility unless you have the capacity. That needs to be driving our thinking on how we would prepare a country to be a developing society to a developed society because you cant get there unless you have capacity and you can take responsibility and truly be sovereign. Thank you very much. We have microphones i think on both sides of the well start over there with you, bill. And then just say who you are, the usual protocol and keep the answers also succinct to get as many answers as we can in the next half hour. With usip. Very rich presentations and i think quite balanced on the positive and negatives. One question i think is, do you feel that president karzai evolved during the 13 years in line with what i agree with the panelists were some major changes that occurred . And has he evolved during the recent period of transition . And the vca is an example but in my view he totally misread the u. S. And the idea the u. S. Does not have a zero option, i think the may 27th announcement was a zero option in 2016 and its going to be very hard to reverse that. The question is more generally, did he evolve or stuck in the kind of tribal mentality and i think mujib said changed a lot during the war. Second question, just on corruption and these points and i agree theres plenty of responsibility to go around, but the single biggest picture scandal kabul bank, i think it does not involve a penny of aid money. It was afghans own money stolen and misused and so i think, you know, there needs to be a perspective and certainly i think on his side more could have been done and finally but related the issue of sovereignty and came up very well from the general but more why he didnt build sovereignty and, you know, the government administrative machinery, thats an aspect of sovereignty which is obvious and then what is a sovereign government do . Raises money. Very little evidence that he paid any attention to mobilizing more domestic revenues for the Afghanistan Government or the budget process or things like that and the armed forces and its thats already been said so was the use of sovereignty an empty term of respect for him personally . I mean, because, we know what sovereignty means and this already came up. But what does it mean when asked for sovereignty . Is it anything more than just personal respect for him . Thank you. Three easy questions. In six parts. Do you all want to take a anybody want to volunteer for the first . Answer to any of them . I would just brief remark on whether he evolved or not. I think i think he evolved toward extreme of consensus politics. If there was if you ask him now and i think voa in their interview and some of his recent interviews about some of the choices he made, especially about market economy, he said if he could go back, he wouldnt have agreed to it. It just if you if you look at his sort of trajectory of thinking, i think it evolved towards the extreme of consensus and relates to the issue of corruption, as well. Okay. First five, six years, first ten years, you didnt have the capacity to go after corrupt leaders in the elite. Now you have the government. You have the intuitions for it. Yet every time theres a case of corruption raised, its dealt with politically rather than through the rule of law. So, in my view, he evolved towards the extreme of consensus politics than towards supporting his own institutions that he thinks he built institutions. Were leaving the rest of this event to take you live to capitol hill for a confirmation hearing to consider the nomination of Robert Mcdonald to be the next Veterans Affairs secretary. Some of the members of the Veterans Affairs committee are entering the room. We see senator patty murray there and we expect the hearing to get under way after a series of votes on the senate floor which should be wrapping up shortly. Mr. Mcdonald is former president , ceo an chair of proctor and gamble and nominated by president obama to replace Eric Shinseki who resigned in may and after an investigation showed long delays at Va Health Care facilities an ongoing as several congressional committees continuing the look into whistleblower testimony that says there were attempts to cover up those delays. We want to invite you to share your thoughts about the president s nominee both on our Facebook Page and twitter. Using the cspanchat. Senator richard burr has joined senator murray there. Senator burr is the Top Republican on this Veterans Affairs committee. News reports say Robert Mcdonald is headed for an easy confirmation and a confirmation vote could happen in the senate on august 1st. We see the chairman of the committee, senator bernie sanders. Okay. Want to welcome everyone here for a very important hearing. We are going to be considering the nomination of Robert Mcdonald to be secretary of the department of Veterans Affairs. And we are pleased to welcome mr. Mcdonald to be here and his wife diane, as well. Thank you very much and mrs. Portman is here, as well. We thank her for being here. Were going to be learning more about mr. Mcdonalds many qualifications during his introduction and throughout the course of this hearing so i wont spend time repeating what were going to be discussing very shortly. But i do want to say is that i thank mr. Mcdonald for accepting the president s nomination. And when he and i chatted, he said something to me that i thought was extremely important and rev la tori. I asked him why he wanted to come into this job in this very, very difficult moment with so much partisanship here in the congress and problems within the va. And what he said was, the president , our commander in chief, asked me to serve. I want to do well by my country and i accepted that challenge and i thank him very much for that. All of us know that the Veterans Administration runs the largest integrated Health Care System in the United States of america. Just today, today, you can see the scope of it, over 200,000 veterans are walking into the doors of va to get health care. Just health care. And the truth is that the vast majority of those veterans feel good about the health care that theyre getting, feel good about the staff theyre interacting with. But we all understand that there are problems in health care. There are problems in the claims backlog. There are other problems. And mr. Mcdonalds job is to in a very significant way, in a bold way, start addressing those problems. Let me just i dont want to get mr. Mcdonald too nervous by mentioning some of these problems, may pick up and walk out of here, but he does know that some 640,000 veterans have an appointment that is more than 30 days from the date that the appointment was initially requested or the date desired by the patient, clearly one of the challenges mr. Mcdonald you face is to make sure that all of our veterans get high quality care in a timely manner. Not so easy but that is one of your challenges. Further more, in terms of the challenges that you face, it is not only providing quality timely care but many of these veterans are coming in to the va with very, very difficult problems. I am in im going to get this book for my colleagues up here reading a book by a fellow of dave finkle writes for washington post, called thank you for your service. I dont know if any of you read it. What he writes about, with the troopgs in iraq and followed them after they came home and this is about ptsb and tbi and it is a hard read. It is a very painful read to see whatnot only the soldiers are going through but what their wives and their kids are going through. And how do we deal with the reality that some 500,000 people who served in iraq and afghanistan come home with tbi and ptsd . If you had unlimited amounts of money, that will be a very difficult challenge. Its unprecedented. Furth furthermore, it is my strong opinion that if the va is going to do the Quality Health care that it needs to do, we are going to need simply need more doctors, more nurses, more medical personnel, more productivity in the va and at the time when we have a shortage, National Shortage of primary care doctors, psychologists, many other health care professionals, how do we bring those people into our system . So health care to my mind is certainly a major issue but that is not the only challenge that our new secretary will face. We have the Veterans Benefits administration which is now in the midst of one of the largest transformations in modern history and that is going from a paper system to a paperless system. And in my view, they have done a good job at that. But problems remain. We want to make sure that in that transformation bringing down wait times for ben filths for claims we do it in an accurate way and thats not so easy and thats a challenge youre going to have to face. One of the scandals i think in the modern history of this country, certainly since vietnam has been the number of Homeless Veterans that we have seen all over the country and once again in recent years and general shinseki played a good role in this, the percentage of veterans who are homeless has gone down. How do we keep that effort going . No person who put their lives on the line to defend this country should be homeless. Were making progress but thats another challenge that you are going to face. So let me close by suggesting that i think that mr. Mcdonald brings to us two very important qualities. Number one he is, familiar with the military because he sempbed in the military many years. And he brings with that service a passion to take care of our veterans and that is obviously an essential quality that we want from our secretary. But the other quality that he brings is he has been the ceo of one of the major american corporations which has many, employees, maybe not quite as many as the va but many, many employees and it is no question, no question but that we need a good, quality management. We need transparency. We need accountability and i hope that mr. Mcdonalds corporate experience will give him the tools he needs to create a wellrun and accountable va. So with that, i would like to turn the mic over to my colleague, the Ranking Member, richard burr, for his opening remarks and then well proceed with the introduction of the nominee. Senator burr. Well, thank you, mr. Chairman. And i might say that we chuckled a little bit over here looking at table and thought maybe we could afford a little bigger table for these three individuals. I think, bob, it says a lot to have two members of the United States senate on both sides of the aisle here to introduce you and, mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. And, bob, welcome. I share bernies comments. Its tough for anybody to envision why somebody would take this job. Im glad to know we have people that think enough about the future of this country and the next generation and the next generation, and more importantly, the promises we made to so Many American that is we would be there to take care of them when they made the sacrifices that they did. As you acknowledged in your testimony, the vas an agency in crisis. Over the past few months, the nation has been rocked by revelations that the Veterans Health administration was manipulating wait time data leaving tens of thousands of veterans waiting for the care they needed and deserved. In the wake of this scandal, it becomes clear that officials failed for years to act on warnings of National Scheduling crisis. The president s own team found that this was fueled by a culture of which officials tended to minimize problems or refused to acknowledge problems altogether. Although vas started taking steps to improve access to care, much more work is needed to understand and resolve the full scope of the issues facing the Va Health Care. The Ongoing International ongoing internal evaluation by the va and investigations by other offices will be critical in understanding that effort. As the head of va, mr. Mcdonald, it will be essential that you embrace the findings of these investigations and urgently work to bring about the needed reform. Perhaps more importantly, you must usher in a new culture throughout va. Employees at all levels must be willing to proactively identify and address problems in every corner of this vast department. We need a culture where warning signs will not be ignored and twisting performance metrics to make it appear that veterans are being well served will not be tolerated. This pair dime shift is needed not only on the health care side of va, but on the benefits side, as well. In recent weeks Inspector General and General Accounting Office shed light on a number of troubling issues at the Veterans Benefit Administration which suggest that vba is not up holding its responsibility to veterans or to taxpayers. Work that is not counted in the disability claims backlog is piling up. Hundreds of millions in taxpayer dollars have been improperly paid out and there are serious questions about the integrity of vas data on the backlogs and the quality of its decisions. But in response, va continues to tout its suspect data as proof that vba is working well. My hope and my expectation, mr. Mcdonald srks that you will not allow va to ignore the signs of deep dysfunction at vba but will work to resolve any systemic problems immediately. More broadly, your charge moving forward will be to ensure that this entire department from top to bottom is refocused on provooiding our nations veterans with the High Quality Service theyve earned and deserve. I look forward to working with and a nation grateful for their service. I thank the chair. I yield the floor. Thank you, senator burr. Senator Sherrod Brown is senior senator of ohio, the state where mr. Mcdonald hails from, and he and senator portman are going to introduce mr. Mcdonald. Senator brown. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Its an honor to be here with my friend bob portman to introduce bob mcdonald to be the new secretary of the Veterans Administration. Im honored to do that. I also think its appropriate to have a longtime ohioan to be a secretary of the va, the first Veterans Hospital in dayton, ohio. We have a long tradition as the states you represent of caring for veterans. We understand, there are 6. 5 million veterans in this last year and i assume roughly the same number this year, in the veterans Health Care System, that have gotten care, some 85 million patient visits. And the responsibility that soon i hope soon to be secretary mcdonald will assume is great. We know hes qualified as the chairman said. When the president of the United States asked mr. Mcdonald to be the secretary of the va, we know his qualifications as a graduate of west point, a u. S. Army captain and ceo of one of the most successful, large corporations in this country with thousands and thousands of employees and millions of customers all over the world. So, we know hes qualified to do this. We also know the problems weve seen in the va. Ten years ago, decade or so ago, we went to war, the government didnt really envision the number or the severity of injuries that would come out of the afghan and iraq war. I think we probably also undercounted the number of agent orange men and women, men and women exposed to agent orange that would be under presumptive eligibility to be coming into the va system with illnesses that were serious and took a high level of care. Thats the importance of the va. We know that those who are in the va system get good care. Its access to the system that both senator burr and chairman sanders underscored that is so very, very important. The three issues that i know when mr. Mcdonald came to my office, weve had two face to face lengthy conversations and one over the phone since he was selected for this job. He understands reexamining the va employee evaluations, how important that is, restoring accountability among the va senior managers and then ensuring that the focus of the entire department always be on the va. Thats why the importance of caring for those who have waited for more than 30 days for a va appointment, why both the chairman and senator burr have led the discussion and the con ferns committee making sure that happens, making sure that those who were responsible for many of the problems that senator burr pointed out that they be held accountable a that we scale up va capacity. Doctors, nurses, physical therapists, beds and capacity both at sea box and at Veterans Hospitals in the states so we theres no doubt in my mind that bob mcdonald understands the gravity of this mission. Theres no doubt in any mind hes qualified to do it and theres no doubt in my mind he has the heart and the work ethics and the empathy. He has an uncommon empathy among people that come to this city, i think, and thats why i support him 100 . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator portman is the junior senator of ohio. Senator portman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I appreciate you for letting us come together to introduce our fellow ohioan and a pleasure to be here with my colleague from ohio Sherrod Brown and i think sherrod said it well. You know, this is a distinguished patriot whos willing to step forward for his country and i hope you should consider his nomination that we get him as soon as possible to provide direction to an agency that needs it badly. Bobs a friend of diane and bob friends of janes and mine. Were delighted to be here today at their side. Its a tough job. As ive told bob when he asked me about it. And we just had town Hall Meetings across the state of ohio last several weeks. No one in the senate knows more about this than the members of this committee but there are a lot of concerns right now. Some as the chairman has said has to do the health care side. Others have to do with disability and the long wait lists on both sides. Weve got an opportunity in this leader to be able to help turn this around. He does understand the problem. Been in the military. As an army ranger and west point graduate. He understands how critical the need is. At this point, having talked to him, he also believes that his experience having been involved in managing and helping to reform a huge complex organization will come in handy. He also understands the health care industry. Proctor is very big in health care and i think thats important at this point. One thing i will say is that i think one thing that bob mcdonald did at proctor which was impressive is push accountability down to every level. And he can talk more about that specifically. But he started off as a brand assistant and then chief executive. But he also launched an effort to be sure that everyone at every level feels that accountability that the ceo must feel to be able to provide in that case a good product for consumers and i think thats really critical right now with the accountability issues we see at the va. Also been a lot of corporate boards and got that in his background. Hes also been involved in some government issues. When i was at u. S. Trade reps office he would talk to me about trade. Been on president obamas Advisory Committee for adds vise ri and policy and president bushs and has had interaction with government at some high levels. When it comes to running a big organization, again, he is a world class business person but i think his experience in the military is equally important and bottom line i think is as you said, chairman sanders, for bob mcdonald and for diane, this is not about a job. This is about a mission. And he has answered the call before to serve his country. Hes prepared to make the sacrifices to do that again. And to focus like a laser on these problems in a nonpartisan way to create the kind of service that our veterans so richly deserve. I hope that you will see fit to send him to the floor with a strong vote and get the leadership at a va that needs it badly. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator portman. We will proceed with opening remarks based on how early people came. Well start with senator murray. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for holding this hearing. Just last week we heard about the current state of Va Health Care and the departments efforts to address the many challenges before it. And i so i just want to take a moment to thank acting secretary gibson who stepped up during this crisis and took immediate action to help increase transparency around the wait times and planned an external audit of scheduling practices and began procurement of modern scheduling system. As acting secretary, he identified as we heard about 17. 6 billion in critical funding needs to increase veterans access to care including 10,000 more medical supporters and providers and clinic space for patients to receive care. The actions that he laid out before this committee are very important but theyre first steps and even with some of the policy changes and additional funding its going to take some time to see improvement in veterans still waiting for health care too long. And as we know the departments ability to carry out its mission is going to remain hampered as long as theres a number of key leadership vacancies unfilled. Even while we work to bring down these wait times and improve accountability, there are many other serious challenges before the va that have to be addressed. We have 22 veterans still taking their own lives each day, thousands of veterans are alone coping with Sexual Assault and while the department has made some commendable progresses is an uphill battle working to eliminate veterans homelessness and the claims backlog. The next secretarys going to have to grapple with all of these and a lot more, so mr. Mcdonald, thank you for accepting the call. To serve your fellow veterans. I think you know that you are faced with a Monumental Task. If confirmed, you will be responsible for the departments 163 billion budget. 310,000 employees. And most importantly, the care of over 9 million veterans. The next secretary has to build a va that can meet the veterans needs today and still plan for the needs of millions of veterans in the decades to come. And in doing so, the secretary has to overcome and transform a corrosive cull dhur unworthy of the dedicated and talented medical providers who only want to help our veterans. Next secretary has to reform the communications structures that currently exist at all levels of vha and when we met in my office several weeks ago you told me you were one of the veterans that was lost in the system during your transition from civilian to military life. So i understand i trust that you understand what a critical moment this is for the va and why we have to fix many of these systemic and cultural challenges so i look forward to hearing your plans for addressing these and all the problem that is are before us today and how you are going to finally strengthen the va for generations to come. We all know that our men and women in uniform have earned a va that provides high quality ben filths and services when and where they need them. Thank you very much for answering the call. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing and moving this nomination forward. Thank you, senator murray. Senator isaakson. Thank you very much for being willing to accept this challenge. I think youre the right man for the job and will do a good job. Your primary job as head ceo of Proctor Gamble is bringing a return to the shareholders and bought the stock with their own money. Your job at the varks you have shareholders, veterans of the United States of america who risk their life for the safety and security of this country. Theres no greater calling for us in congress or for you as the next secretary but to bring the value back to the veterans. Veterans administration has many great people in it but urvel we uncovered a culture not con deucive to the best interest of the veterans and some cases and i underline the word some caused veterans to have problems they should not have had because of a system and people more motivated to make the numbers of appointments look good on paper than the results for the veterans look good in their lives so i appreciate the fact youre willing to accept this challenge. I cant wait to ask questions because i have three or four we have discussed before i want to ask. Thank you for being to accept this responsibly and bring the value to the shareholders of the va, the veterans, like you brought to Proctor Gamble. Thank you, senator. Senator tester. Thank you, mr. Sanders, raking member and thank you, bob, for being to put yourself through this process and being willing to serve as va secretary. Montanas a list of high numbers. Wefr second per capita number of veterans in this country. Only surpassed by my friend here to the left in alaska. This is a personal issue for me. Veterans mean a lot. When i came in 2007 to this body, had the chance to work with secretary peak and then secretary schinahinseki and goo things done for veterans under both administrations and i look forward to doing good things urn your Administration Whether its telmedicine, mental health, the doc and nurses we need to support the problems of the veteran that is are coming back. Its critically important and during our meeting in our office i appreciate your focus on the vas capacity to better serve veterans. I think you are in a unique situation. There are some that want to privatize the va. They want to take it down a road of privatization. I am not one of those. There are others who want to build the va and make it better. Make it better for the veterans and more accountable. I am in that camp, so i appreciate your willingness to serve. Youve got a full plate. Once you get confirmed. I think youve got the tools we need to fix whats wrong with the va and improve upon whats right. With that, i want to just thank you once again. Our veterans deserve our best and i think youre able to deliver that. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator tester. Senator johanns. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member burr, thank you for convening the hearing today. Mr. Mcdonald, i thank you for being here and your wife. Its good do see both of you. I appreciate the opportunity that we had this morning to sit down and talk about some of the issues you will be facing. In the midst of this crisis, its imperative that we swiftly move to fill this vacancy. The top position in the organization. When secretary shinseki resigned, i noted that his resignation could not be an end to the crisis. So often, thats the washington way. We make a change somewhere in the organization, if not at the top, sweep the mess under the rug. Move on. Deal with other issues and eventually its all forgotten but its the problems arent solved. With the va really needs is a transformative leader that can bring about true and lasting change. As we have seen in report after report, a culture of complacency, if not corruption, has spread throughout the va. Its going to be a Monumental Task that you have ahead of you. Its not an easy task for you made especially difficult when va has been racked by scandal after scandal and there could be more. So today, we consider your nomination with that as the backdrop. Unlike previous va secretaries, you bring with you management leadership experience from the private sector. Perhaps thats just exactly what the va needs. Someone who has experience in reorganizing, reallocating resources to make an organization has efficient and as effective as possible. In past years, this congress and this committee has made va a priority. Weve provided budget, personnel increases, in an effort to ensure quality of care. We were promised that that was occurring. But as we have seen, the va has failed our veterans even with the increases in funding. Just last week at our Committee Hearing acting secretary gibson said the va could solve its problems with another 17. 6 billion. But i cant believe that just throwing more money at the va is the answer. In fact, we know its not the only answer because since 2000, the vas budget has about tripled, tripled. However, we continue to uncover new problems. In my judgment, the va needs what youve experienced in your lifetime. Your competitors took your business away from you. I personally believe that the va needs competition. Only then will the va see that it needs to get its act together. And only then will we start to see the va get back to its core mission of serving veterans. Without serious changes at the va, the reports of mismanagement, fraud, whistleblower retaliation and more will continue. Your job will be to root this out and do everything you can to turn the va in a different direction. I look forward to hearing from you. I think your confirmation assured. I do believe youre the right person for the job. And i wish you the very best. Our veterans depend upon you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator johanns. Senator hirono . Thank you, mr. Chairman. And Ranking Member burr, for this hearing and aloha, mr. Mcdonald. It was a pleasure to meet with you yesterday. And you come to this position which i expect that you will be confirmed with heightened scrutiny because the issues confronting the Veterans Administration, of course, do not go away with the change in leadership at the top. We all knew that. And i want to publicly thank secretary shinseki for doing that which he believed would be in the best interest of the Veterans Administration. And i commend him and thank him for his decades of service. And here you come with your sense of commitment, with your background in the private sector and a desire, what i heard you yesterday, was a desire to really listen to the veterans, to hear what their concerns are and to respond to them. So, i call this pretty much a not a top down but a bottom up kind of a leadership style that i think will stand you in good stead. While the number one issue based on all of the information thats come out over the last several months is, of course, making sure that the veterans get the Health Care Needs met, but same time we know through other hearings of this committee already other ongoing concerns with the va. Some of them were articulated by my colleagues, including homelessness, over prescription over prescribing of drugs that may make them dependent, certain drugs. Issues of educational opportunities. Jobs, training. All of that. And so, you will have a full plate and i expect that this committee will work with you in a very open and transparent way, in a frank way so that we can Work Together to move the ball and get the veterans the kind of attention that they very much earn. And yes, i understand that there are capacity issues at the Veterans Administration so i am not going to sit here and say that you do not need more money to hire more caregivers and other necessary personnel to take care of our veterans and at is same time you assured me in our meeting that you would review the actions of your employees and take appropriate action as necessary to discipline and hold them accountable. Thank you very much, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator hirono. Senator heller. Chairman sanders, thank you. Ranking member burr for quickly scheduling this hearing for this nominee. And welcome, mr. Mcdonald, and to your wife, also. Welcome. And i look forward to thank you by the way for the discussion we had in my office. In a short number of months congress, veterans and the American Public have had a glimpse into the failure of va to provide quality care to veterans across this nation. Its disturbing to say the least that many of our veterans went without health care because employees decided to cheat the system. Every type im home i hear from nevadans of stoirls and difficulties faced with the va and many of them are doubtful that it will ever improve. For example, at the las vegas va hospital, more than 6,100 veterans were forced to wait more than 30 days for an appointment. Just last year, a blind female veteran waited more than six hours in the emergency room before seeing a nurse or a doctor. In a small town outside of las vegas, 6,000 veterans waited more than two years for a clinic to be built. The va officials have not provided a time line for final approval of this facility. And these problems with access to care extend beyond the Va Health Care. Veterans are also facing difficulty as many colleagues mentioned receiving disability due to claims backlog at the Veterans Administration. I bring this issue up and will continue to do so because of the impact veterans in my state face which is worse than any other. Nevada veteran vs the longest wait in the nation at 338 days on average to complete claims. Reno Va Regional Office remains a worst performing vero in the country and a few months ago a veterans wrote me saying, and i quote, after seven months of no retroactive payment, i returned again. I spoke with the same adviser and told me because i was retired from the navy, and in receipt of retirement ben filths, i was considered a low priority. I dont think mr. Mcdonald, i believe you would agree with me no veteran is told by the va theyre a low priority. Thats why ive been working hard with senator casey to continually urge chairman sanders to have a hearing on the Bipartisan Legislation 21st century backlog or Veterans Benefits delivery act in the conversation that we had in our office you told me you had an opportunity to take a look at this and for that i thank you for taking that time. These issues, the claims backlog, long appointment wait times, lack of access to Quality Health care, rural clinics are a few of concerns in nevada and i expect the new va secretary you, mr. Mcdonald, to tackle these issues head on and work with this commit to address theme. We need more than a few niche tifrs, we need reform of the va and hopes to restore veterans confidence and trust in the system. This crisis arguably one of the worst in va history is a result of a corrosive culture due to management and some employees who believed that theyre above reproach. To change the va in the long term its new leadership must be capable of transforming the agency to meet what would be the core mission. Serving the nations veterans honorably and honestly. I expect the new va secretary to restore accountability and integrity to the organization to ensure leadership and management teams will undoubtedly up hold the promises made to the veterans and with jurisdiction, i want assurance, absolute assurance that the new secretary will be committed to transparency and accountability as the committee conducts oversooigts moving forward. So i commend you, mr. Mcdonald, for your willingness to take this particular position and also a challenging task. I also need to be fully confident that youre prepared to transform the va for nevada veterans. I look forward to hearing your testimony and discuss theesz issues further. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator rockefeller . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Mcdonald, im with you and i was within about five minutes of your coming into my office for some very specific reasons. You have been a veteran. You understood that. You put yourself in harms way. You talked to me about should you be confirmed which i feel certain that you will that you plan to get into some of those waiting lines. No staff. Just you. So that maybe the veterans will notice you and maybe they wont but you will have done it. The word will get around. Theres all kinds of leadership. And a lot of it works on small symbols where you do things that others have not done. And, therefore, youre judged to be different. You hold yourself to a different standard and willing to do the different. The other is that you have more than anybody i can think of this extraordinary combination of having served in very dangerous ways at a very high level. I dont know your rank. Im sorry, sir. But you if youre a navy, youre at high risk. The but youve run a Great Company and when you run a Great Company and you have hundreds of thousands of people working for you, you dont you cant afford to make mistakes. Here we give you oversight. It is sad. There in Corporate America you get your oversight every day from the dow jones, the s p, from your shareholders. You get it every single day. So, you dont have time or room for mistakes. And yet, you have to keep the larger interests of the corporation at heart. Which you do. Which is one of the reasons why i think considered one of the best run corporations in the world or Something Like that when you were the head of it. So for me, it isnt just a question of what youre going to do. I think the real question is what were going to do. How can people possibly talk about all the needs as people here have at the panel about the need for nurses, for mental health, the 22 suicides per day, which is a figure so shocking its almost incomprehensible, the homelessness, secretary shinseki cut in one year the waiting time down by one half in a single year so that can be done. You need good software. You dont have good software. You know that. You know that intuitivetily. Counts. Youre very much into Corporate Culture and evaluation and taking that as a serious process. Not in the sense of intimidating but in the sense of truth telling. And thats a hard thing to do. You and i talked when we met about the problem in some of our great agencies. And i mentioned some intelligen agencies and other agencies which are huge. The department of defense is huge, and youre right up there with the department of defense in terms of numbers of people. So the question is what are we going to do . We can talk to you, at you, about we want you to get ahold of the nurses, psychotherapyists, all kinds of experimental research, cut down the waiting lines, give people the fantastic care and then not give all dime to do anything about it. Thats what i fear. I have no fear about what you will do when youre in that position. I have a fear of what we will do as a congress to support you, so that were not just blathering bromides of good feeling and goodwill, sympathizing with the veterans, and then putting up no money for you to do something. You cannot hire people without paying them. You cannot build stuff without paying for it. So and when you do when you do in a culture of in our senate, where you cant you cant put up any money for anything, because you cant possibly win the next election, its against the constitution, the Founding Fathers would have never allowed it. One can feel good about that, but it sure isnt going to help veterans. So what i pray is that through our superb chairman and through people like patty murray, head of the budget committee, and others, that we will provide you with the resources that you need to be able to pay for what it is that you want to do. Youre here to do the job, youre not sentimental about it, youre realistic, but you need money, and weve got to give it to you. Thank you and good luck. Senator moran. Mr. Mcdonald, thank you very much for the conversation weve had. Id like to use my Opening Statement as an opportunity to talk about a slightly different topic, though related to v. A. , and ill use my time when i get to question you to highlight some things that i want to hear your response to. Mr. Chairman, id like to encourage you and senator bure as well as congressman michau and chairman miller to make certain before we depart, that we have a report, Conference Committee report on the veterans choice act. While i certainly believe a new secretary was necessary, i indicated at the time that i asked for the previous secretarys resignation that that in and of itself would be insufficient. It seems to me that the senate and house have acted in a responsible way, in coming up with a plan that addresses the challenges that our veterans are facing today in lack of access and in waiting times, and it would be terrible on the part of the United States senate, the u. S. House of representatives if we fail to reach an agreement to conclude this work. I spoke on the senate floor prior to the passage of that legislation which passed 930, indicated how it is so disturbing to me to come to the United States senate. Im in my first term and we do nothing to solve the problems of the American People because the senate does not function. We dont have bills on the senate floor, we dont offer amendments, committees dont do their work, theres not oversight. If we cant come together on an issue related to veterans, this of all issues that we face at this point in time ought to be one that we can resolved, and the failure to do so would be terrible for the United States senate, but more importantly terrible for the veterans of our country, and one more time remember themileanhour people how dysfunctional the senate is today. So what troubles me at the moment is the announcement yesterday by the majority leader that he believes its unlikely were going to resolve our differences and have a vote on a Conference Committee. We ought not let that be the case, and we ought not adjourn for an august recess in the absence of us reaching a conclusion. Dont walk away from this issue. The leadership of the senate, the leadership of this committee, individual members of this committee, individual members of the senate, its our responsibility to see that we accomplish the task that we set out for and in benefit of the veterans of the United States of america. While its been easy to criticize the department of Veterans Affairs for their failure to our veterans, if we dont reach a conclusion on this legislation, the United States senate is deserving of that same condemnation. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator blumenthal. Thank you, mr. Mcdonald, for your willingness to undertake this very serious and challenging responsibility. Im sure your family wonders whether you were in your right mind in accepting the president s offer, but i know having talked to you, and again i want to join my colleagues and thank you for coming by to see me that Public Service is in your blood, its part of who you are, and i thank you for that ethic and tradition. I want to draw a comparison to a world more familiar to you than perhaps this one. You are about to take over a bankrupt corporation. The threat is financial, but the real insolvency is in morality and management. I think your background, your qualifications, your skills are extraordinarily well suited to these challenges. You know about the importance of truth telling in massive corporation. With 60,000 employees reporting to you and the soundness of your decisions on products and service, depending on accurate data and information, you know that an organization like the v. A. , which has a bankrupt truthtelling operation cannot long survive in serving its customers well. That includes provides bad news. Which you know may sometimes by more useful than good news. Im very interested and grateful that in your testimony you cite the west point ethos of choose the harder right rather than the easier wrong. That is exactly what the v. A. Needs. Second, in addition to demanding accurate information, i think youll need to change leadership at the v. A. Your background in developing leadership at Procter Gamble makes you well suited to that task, and of course changing culture. Corporations depend on their culture of striving to build new leadership and at the same time rewarding people for conveying bad news that has to be known and acting on the data in ways that are important. Our nations heroes are a public trust. So the corporation youre being to take over wont by measured by the profitable, but how well it serves our nations heroes in health care, jobs, job training, skill preparation, in all kinds of areas that may not have been directly involved in the crisis that brought you to this position, in addition to the continued attention to wait times and strategies that are implemented as a result of the Data Analysis and improved access to care we need concern about the predatory practices of some so forprofit colleges that received funding for g. I. Benefits, concern about our female veterans who all too on which lack access to the best care especially when they have been victims of ptsd or military Sexual Assault. And strong whistleblower protection from retaliation i want to confirm my own commitment to helping you in any way that i can. I believe that were all rooting for you, not just in some abstract or conceptual way. We are in your corner, rooting for you. I believe that you have a unique and historic opportunity to get done a job that all of our nations heroes will be grateful to you for doing. Thank you very much. Thank you, mr. Chairman, and thank you mr. Mcdonald for being here. Certainly a warm welcome to you and your wife. I appreciated visiting with you last week, and im glad to become familiar with arkansas and your past business endeavors. You have an impressive resume, your commitments to family and country are obvious in our discussion. Today v. A. Is failing our nations veterans. From all accounts, the issues plaguing v. A. Are systemic and require big change. Certainly in the current culture. This agency is broken. We need a leader at the top, determined to and equipped with the skills to change the pattern and get us back to our main mission and responsibilities. The stories coming out of the vmcs across the country are simply heartbreaking and unacceptable. I firmly believe that a lack of accountability is the root cause of the problem thats facing v. A. Today. Although the mission of the v. A. Is different from other federal agencies, its still part of the bureaucracy in washington, and as we all kn
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