Transcripts For CSPAN3 The Civil War 20140810

Troop of trained guerrillas, maybe i can do that. I will try to keep it moving along here. As you have just been told, and as i assume you know, the battle of nashville was the last major battle of 1864. It was a major victory, maybe the greatest victory for george h. Thomas and the greatest defeat for john bell hood. As you may be aware, the army with which George Thomas fox battle of nashville was composed of several contingents. You might even say, cobbled together almost on the field of battle there. Thomas was sent back with the fourth corps of his army of the cumberland back into tennessee to gather forces there and other reinforcements that would be sent to him and put them together into an army that would stop john bell hoods late fall incursion into the state of tennessee. The fourth corps that tomas had commanded throughout the Atlanta Campaign earlier that year, there was the 23rd quarter under 23rd core under schofield, which had also served under sherman alongside, sproul army of the cumberland in the Atlantic Campaign. There was a large cavalry contingent under james h wilson, as brian just mentioned. And there is a division of United States colored troops under Major General james steve mann. There were three divisions of the army of the tennessee under general Andrew Jackson smith. These are the people i will talk about briefly now for the next 3040 minutes. This contingent of troops went by several names officially. As far as what theyre officially designated, sometimes it was the right wing of the 16th corps and sometimes it was just the 16th corps. The for the time they were at theirille, there official designation was sometimes detachment army of tennessee, a very imaginative name. They were often called smiths guerrillas. Shelby foote said that they called themselves aj smiths guerrillas spelled gorillas. I have on more than one occasion had cause to regret that shelby foote did not footnote, no pun intended, his excellent work. I have not been able to come to that source yet, but i have a lot more sources to look at. I may be able to find some of smiths men referring to themselves as smiths gorillas. I did find the number of occasions where they refer to themselves as smiths guerrillas as well. They did refer to themselves that way. I understand the kerry joyner said thatoyner has nathaniel p. Banks, who had command over them among other troops in the red river expedition, referred to them as a group of gorillas. He may not have meant it as a compliment. But they did save his bacon. Smiths guerrillas and what they do it nashville. I want to talk about smith and his guerrillas and what they did at nashville quickly. Then i will try to analyze why things came out the way they did, briefly analyze, and why they enjoyed the success that they did. Aj smith . Was he was born in pennsylvania in 1815. He graduated from west point in 1838, 36th in the graduating class of 45. He was a career army officer, unlike people like grant and sherman who got out of the army before the civil war and spent some time in civilian life, smith stayed in the army and served mostly out on the frontier against indians. He served in the mexican war, too. He was a major at the time civil war started because promotional were slow in the old army. Promotion was fast once the war started. By the time shermans Chickasaw Bayou campaign in december of 1862, smith was a Division Commander within shermans army. He continued as a Division Commander under grant in the entire vicksburg campaign. He did well. After the fall of vicksburg, smith continued in division command, but in the 16th corps which did primarily occupation duty in western kentucky and west tennessee. The rear areas of the army of the tennessee. This was not all just administered duty, this occupation duty included suppressing confederate raiders and guerrillas in that region. It included a certain amount of combat, but not too much. Not in a largescale and no major battles. In the winter of 1864, in january of 1864, sherman was tasked with leading a raid from vicksburg eastward into mississippi to strike at the confederate logistical base and meridian. For that purpose, sherman decided to use contingent from the 16th core, as a field force, he would use the 17th corps as well as a 16th. Aj smith again wound up having a division of force that marched on meridian and successfully and returned to vicksburg. Then, immediately after a meridian operation, the guerrillas, smiths detachment, took on a character. At this point, the Red River Campaign was getting ready to march and sherman was ordered to provide three divisions as support for nathaniel p. Banks in his illfated Red River Campaign. Sherman assigned aj smith to lead that force. He sent two divisions of the 16th core under smith, plus one division of the 17th corps. That became the basis for smiths guerrillas, for this unit that would fight in nashville in december of that year. This is a unit that as a group, as a three Division Corps near the beginning of 1864. It has one of its finest outings in december of 1864 at nashville. Smith led this three division contingent to the army of the tennessee in the Red River Campaign. It was there that they got their nickname, the guerrillas. Before the campaign was over, banks told smith that he and his contingent saved the army. They couldnt save the campaign because banks would not listen to smith, but they could save his army and make good its escape. The Red River Campaign detained smiths three division contingent left of the mississippi so long that it became impossible for smiths contingent to join shermans army for his offensive, his Atlantic Campaign through georgia. He was supposed to be there, that was where smith was supposed to have been. Grant gave banks positive orders that he was to see to it that smith was returned east of the mississippi to join him for the drive on atlanta. Banks did not get it done. He did not get it done among other things and smith was delayed and could not join the Atlanta Campaign. By the way, it is for hard for us to say what would have happened had smiths contingent been there to be part of the Atlanta Campaign and how things would have worked out in the Snake Creek Gap operation and all that. We really dont know. It mightve been a different ballgame. That is not how it worked out. What did happen was that aj smiths three divisions became grants fire brigade during 1864. They became grants strategic grants Strategic Reserve. Three very good experience d divisions. Grants goal at the beginning of 1864 campaigns had been to have all of the union forces pushing together at some point on the confederacy. It is explained here, many of the separate components of the plan went astray because of generals like nathaniel p. Banks. His plan did not really allow for a Strategic Reserve because the idea was to put pressure, as much pressure as possible on every part of the confederacy as much as possible and cause the confederacy to collapse. It might have worked if it had been carried out consistently. The plan did not call for the Strategic Reserve, and aj smiths force became that Strategic Reserve. So, it went where needed during the campaigning season of 1864. The guerrillas, after saving bankss bacon in the river campaign, were sent after forest forrest and i am afraid they got the better of them at to below tupelo. Sorry. Blame it on stephen d. Lee. It was lees fault. The other lee. Price left missouri, so we will give them credit for that. Then they were sent to join thomass force for the battle of nashville. As youre probably aware, because i think im speaking to an audience that is fairly familiar with the civil war, you know that after the fall of atlanta, who it had decided to ood had decided to try a somewhat Desperate Campaign into tennessee, and this is what thomas is sent to stop and aj smith and his contingent are sent to help thomas do that. We often read, when you read about the National Campaign or other places where ages smith contingent shows up, you read that these were the dowdy veterans of vicksburg. Well, just over half of the 29 industry regiments in smiths contingent were veterans of vicksburg. 16 of the 29 regiments were veterans of vicksburg. I should say that the contingent numbered about 9000 men at the time of the battle of nashville. They were in 8 brigades organized into three divisions. It had 29 infantry regiments as i mentioned and 16 of those 29 had actually fought in the vicksburg campaign. 28 of the 29 regiments were from the valleys of the ohio or mississippi river. They were what was considered western troops. One exception was the 178 new york, and i dont know how those guys that in there, but with the exception of them, there were nine regiments from illinois, 4 each from iowa and minnesota, 3 each from indiana, wisconsin and missouri, and two from ohio. Now, some of these regiments, a smattering of them, had been with the army of the tennessee, grants army and shermans army from way back. One regiment in smiths contingent had actually been present for the surrender of fort henry way back in february of 1862. Theml of quattro 4 had fought at fort donaldson nine days later when that great Union Victory had been won, that victory that sent grant on his way towards greatness. Five of these regiments had been at shiloh. Yet regiments had fought at various battles along the way. Numa dread, Island Number 10, iuka. The minnesota regiments had actually seen action against the sioux in putting down the 1862 sioux uprising in minnesota. Of course, many of the regiments in smiths contingent had seen action in the various previous campaigns of that contingent, the meridian expedition, Red River Campaign, tupelo and the pursuit of price to missouri and arkansas. They liked to boast at how much they had marched. One of them said that his diary in his diary that there was various running around across country, putting out fires, figuratively speaking, only figuratively speaking. [laughter] literally speaking they were , more likely to light a fire than to put one out. Just ask the citizens of louisiana. But, figuratively speaking, putting out strategic fires for grant. One of them said he had marched 15,000 miles that year. Safe to say it was probably a pretty good distance. Now, i think what is notable about them, if you look at these regiments, then is that you have , a leavening of very experienced regiments who have been right in some of the hottest battles right in the beginning of the war. You have a pretty good number of them who have maybe not that much but a considerable amount of combat experience. All of them have a number of combat experiences, including some major battles and a lot of smaller actions with guerrillas and readers and things like that. And things like that. They have been under arms, that is in the military, for several years. These are not new recruits by they have had a decent amount of time to recover after battles they have not been ground down and used up the way would happen to for example the army of the potomac in 1864 in that Overland Campaign as rich told you earlier today that the army of the potomac was practically used up during that summer of 1864, springsummer campaign. This has not been the case with smiths guerrillas. They had experience, they had some leavening with very experienced troops, but they were not used up. And they had been under arms for a good long time. They arrived at nashville. Two divisions arrived on november 30 and the third on december 1. George thomas was happy to see them arrive. How happy was seattle he was so how happy was he . Happy he even hugged aj smith. George thomas did not hug a lot of people during the civil war, at least not that we are told about. He is pretty reserved, staid fellow. And aj smith was not hugged by a lot of people during the civil war. [laughter] smith was referred to as old whitey by his man because his hair andhite beard and he wore wirerimmed spectacles and he was a crusty old fellow. I dont think a lot of people in in the civil war went around hugging him. That wouldve been a scene that would have been worth seeing if you could have been there for that. If you want to take a time machine to any moment in the civil war, there is a prospect for you. Smiths contingent arrived. Thomas is glad to see them because here are three veteran divisions. Thomas considered them the best among the best in his army. They certainly were very good. Thomas assigned them to a position on the right wing of his army, anchoring on the Cumberland River downstream from nashville. There they remained for the first two weeks of december. Tom iss offensive against hood outside nashville was delayed by various factors, and finally by a spell of very bad weather, including an ice storm. By the evening of the 14th, it was clear that the icy spell was ending, and so thomas sent around orders for his troops to be ready to move first thing next morning. Smith alerted his three divisions to be ready to move at 6 00 a. M. They couldnt get underway quite that early because december 15 very foggy. So foggy that one participant said you could only see a few yards in front of you. It was very difficult to move the troops around. Smith did get his troops and in motion. The earliest of any of the commands for that day. It was as it should be. His attachment was assigned to play a key role in thomass attack on hood. Thomas was to move to his right and then swing through a left wheel, and rotating as it were 90 degrees in a counterclockwise direction so that he would face the flank of goods line hoods line. Smith put his command in motion fairly early. Smith was to have support on his own right flank by the union cavalry. Wilsons command, the cavalry would be fighting mostly dismounted in this battle. It was quite a bit of movement that was required of smith, along with the fog and opposition from confederate skirmishes along the way, it took most of the morning to get smiths command into position. By 1 00 p. M. On december 15, smiths command had completed its left wheel, had rotated to position more or less 90 degrees so that now smith incident facing south as he more or less south, we will say schematically south, but instead of facing due south, smith was now facing due east. Towards the flank and was ready to begin the assault. Early in the morning while cavalry had been getting into position and while schofields 23rd corps on orders from thomas had been shifting behind smith to be ready to come in on smiths right, so even further out on the flank, they are on their way there, theyre not there yet. While that was going on, other elements of thomass army had tried other portions of goods hoods line. Stephens color contingent had made an assault which showed great courage, but was not successful. And general hoods fourth corps made an assault which came out unsuccessfully, but at least distracted them hopefully. , they were repulsed. By 1 00 p. M. , smiths contingent was ready to open the main event. Now, hood was not ignorant of the idea that one could perhaps take his flank. He knew that his flank was in the air, in the military parlance of the time. It was not anchored on a strong geographic feature like a river. There was no river for her to anchor his flank on. His army was not nearly large enough to stretch and curve forward all the way to the Cumberland River. Hood had done was refuse your flank. He bent his arm back, his army backward, a flank of his army backward about 90 degrees. Not a precise 90 degrees, because you have to conform to the lay of the land, but he bent the flank of his army back about 90 degrees so that his army was sort of like a big l lading over. Ing the short stroke of the l would be what smith is now facing. Hood has prepared for this. He got a line that faces the direction from which smith is now going to be approaching. That line is about a mile long, give or take. The problem is, who did not have enough troops for that either. He did not have enough troops to man that refused line, that sent bent back line with a conventional continuous line of breast works and infantry supported by artillery. Hood tried something innovative. It was not absolutely new. The idea of individual forts mutually supporting forts was something that had been around since the days of the French Military theoretician. If not before. Hood was going to use this in a different way. In the days leading up to this battle, hood had his men build a chain of five small forts called redoubts. Redoubt onembered through five. That was not very creative, it was pretty straightforward. Redoubt five was the very end. The flank of the flank, way out there with the confederate line where the confederate line did and about a mile south of the mainline of woods army. Those little redoubts were to be small and build to the could be defended by a small force. And use the maximum advantage out of earthworks, the maximum advantage out of the entrenchments that you built so you dont have to depend on manpower. Each one of these redoubts was equipped with anything from 24 pieces of artillery, then in addition to that, it would be supported by maybe 100 or 200 infantry. That was how that flank was going to be held. In theory, hood could bring up maybe a division of infantry and back them up, provide an infantry line behind these redoubts to support them. Smiths job was to be to take those redoubts. By 1 00 p. M. He was ready. He started out with a artillery preparation. Artillery he used all three of his artillery ballot ash batteries. He bombed that first redoubt on the end of the line, number five. He hit it with three batteries of artillery. In the civil war, civil war artillery is not very effective, usually, at doing preparatory bombardments. It is not for a good at bombarding troops in entrenchments, theoretically. In general, most of the time. It is good for stopping attacks, but not for this. Smith has them do this. In fact, smith is more more than three batteries of artillery. The division of the force that would be carrying out the attack is his best division under general john macarthur. Macarthur is a very good mission Division Commander. His is the most experienced in smiths detachment. That division has previously been under another very good officer who has been transferred to other duties now with sherman, general john a. Mower. They are some of smiths best troops. Also, the union skirmishers worked their way very close to the confederate lines. Throughout the civil war, the art of using skirmishers effectively was being developed, especially on the union side. Some officers were really giving a lot of attention to how to use skirmishers effectively. Macarthurs skirmishers get very close to redoubt number five. According to some of them, they were almost to the ditch, one he said they were practically in the ditch, one soldier said. By the skirmishers getting that close, they are able to force the confederates to keep their heads down, to keep out of the embrazures. Macarthur taxes to and reduce confederate fire. And that is the same thing the artillery is supposed to do. After that then, macarthur attacks with two brigades, and they overrun the redoubt very quickly. It is almost anticlimatic. There is little if any handtohand fighting inside of it. Most of the confederates are made prisoners and the thing is overrun, just like that. It is almost shocking how quickly that happened, it is sort of stunning. I think it was surprising to the confederate defenders and maybe even to smiths men, just a little bit, that it fell so easily. They tended to have a very high level of confidence. Then, very quickly, they immediately come under fire, the troops who took redoubt number five were taking fire from number four. The idea was they would support each other. They would not follow alone. They would not fall alone. But number five had fallen. Number four was trying to pick up the slack and they put macarthurs men around the redoubt under fire. They reform their ranks. Notice the influence of experience here. They actually reform their formations and moved out quickly. The leadership acts quickly. The brigade commanders do not send messages back to macarthur or smith. What if we went for the next redoubt now . This is what they will knew the this is what macarthur will want us to do. Everyone seemed to be on the same page. They could anticipate what the other was thinking and would want. Four,ey head for redoubt it falls even more quickly than number five. The same thing happens again with number three, and it falls even more easily after more feeble apparently more feeble resistance. What i notice here is the quickness of the movement and the momentum that smiths men developed. Smiths men were part of the army of the tennessee. The army of the tennessee had received its original training and organization and institutional personality, if i can use that term, from grant. Grant was a general who understood almost better than most others, certainly better than any on the union side, the importance of momentum in war. Forrest was another one who understood the idea of keeping up the scare. Grant did, too. This had been Standard Operating Procedure in the army of the tennessee. So they just implemented that. We are on the offensive, we are doing well, lets keep pushing our advantage. They did and took number three. Before they could move on number two, two things happened. One, the next division in line of smiths troops got into the act, too. The advanced against redoubts 1 and 2 and were joined at the hinge of the line where smiths line joined at an angle with the neighboring unit. I want to give credit where it is due. Redoubts one and two fell very quickly. The other thing that happened hood, trying to implement his plan, which was, if my flank is threatened i will reinforce the chain of redoubts by sending additional troops to back them up. He had done that. By the time the infantry arrives by that time, redoubts five and four had already fallen. Three was as good as gone. Again, macarthurs troops wield wheeled very quickly into line. I notice again, the influence of experience. There is no dithering or uncertainty. There is no surprise or shock or panic about confederate reinforcements showing up on what is now our flank as we sweep north along this line of redoubts. Theyre showing up to the east of us. Well take care of them too. They did. They reacted very quickly. It is amazing how everything seems to go smiths way in this action. His troops wheel into line against the front of the reinforcing confederate division. Additional troops get on the flank of the division and begin sweeping down its flank. His artillery had some very them very hard, and the confederate division collapses. They wound up pursuing these confederates about a mile to the eastward, actually moving behind hoods main defensive line. They are actually around his flank and driving in this is where nightfall stops them on the evening of december 15. Remember, this is december 15. We are less than a week from the winter solstice. The days are very short and we started this fight at about 1 00 in the afternoon. In the space of about four hoods entire flake has been stove in. Night allowed him to pull his troops out of that situation that aj smiths attack to put them into. Next day, we find hood having retreated to the brentwood hills. His final position there for the battle of nashville. On this morning, smith is not really scheduled to be the main event. Smith is still in the position, the junior army moves up against hoods army. Smiths detachment is no longer out in the flank. The cavalry had moved up on his flank originally. Schofields 23rd corps is now on smiths right flank. Still on smiths left flank is hoods fourth corps. They sat there throughout the morning. Smiths men sat through it throughout the morning no major , september 16. Action, although some things are happening. Carrying on in hoodsry duel with gunners. The move of 600 yards, hoods artillery starts firing on them. Despite the detachment, their attitude is you dont fire and our infantry. They pretty much shut down hoods artillery in the Early Morning and afternoon. Almost as a matter of course, aj smiths skirmishers worked up close to the confederate lines. These are the confederate lines on shies hill, which anchored left of hoods line. Extending to the east of shies hill. We see the same sort of pattern working out, as though it were a matter of course. Nobody is saying we decided to use this scheme, but just here are confederates and we will put their heads down and skirmished with them just outside the works. And they did. There are no orders to do anything else, so for the time being, they didnt. Again, wood with his fourth corps the u. S. Colored troops was broken with great losses. Finally, as the afternoon is getting on pretty far, general macarthur, a very aggressive general, again, commander of smiths best division, believes he can get something done. He becomes for eager to do it. At the other end of the confederate line, the attack of those u. S. Colored troops had come against the other hill that was anchoring the other end of hoods line that was overton hill. The confederates had been able to slaughter the attack of the u. S. Colored troops. Anchoring this end of the confederate line is shys hill. Theoretically it should maybe be as strong a position, but macarthur does not think so. Mcarthur believes that the confederates have drawn their line on shys hill in the wrong place. Some of the line is too far up the hill. It is actually so far up the hill that is above what is called the military crest. Military crest is the highest point on slope from which you can see every point of the slope below you. You can try this with any help. Go to the chickamauga battlefield and try standing on a hill and back up a little bit. You will see part of that slope in front of you goes out of sight behind the curve of the hill. Then you walk forward until you get to the point where you can see every inch of ground in front of you on that slope. Now you are standing on the military crest. For some reason, the confederates had drawn the line on shys hill behind the military crest. That would mean that part of the slope would be sheltered from confederate fire. He begged smith to let him attack. Smith asked thomas, thomas said ok, but let me make sure that we coordinate the attack with other units and they attack, also. Macarthur was not waiting. The afternoon was waiting. The afternoon was waning on. The sun was getting down the sky, there would not be much time. When macarthur had sent his staff officer to ask smith for permission to attack, macarthur said, if i dont hear back from you within a certain period of time, i am going. Im going in. The staff officer did not get back. I dont know if macarthur had given orders and said dont you dare come back. [laughter] i would like to find some evidence of that. Anyway, macarthur launched his attack and it was very successful. The confederate lines were indeed misplaced on shys hill. They were able to inflict some casualties in the union force, especially in one sector of the hill, whether lines were back far enough from the brow of the hill that they were able to hit the 10th minnesota regiment of macarthurs division after it came out on to the top of the hill and they were able to punish it pretty badly. In most places in line they were hit very quickly. The confederate line collapsed and hoods entire line began to come apart and unravel. Having covered all this ground and showed that smith was really very successful here, kind of being a hammer that strikes hood on both days, the battle of nashville being the force that breaks hoods line on both days and becomes the catalyst of success at nashville, i want to give you some reasons why i think they were so unusually successful. These are things that under normal expectations and the in the civil war should not have just happened. Ive told are some things already. Smiths troops were experienced in battle, but they were worn out with battle. They were leavened with some very veteran troops heard they had a large number of troops who have not been worn out and had not lost their leading experience as casualties in battle. They had experience, but they werent worn down. They had learned things that works like effective skirmishers tactics. R artillery wasei unusually good. And number of eyewitnesses said that smiths artillery was very good. Almost to the level of the kind of thing you would expect in the latter stages of world war i. Not exactly a creeping barrage which was used in world war i trench warfare, but a good barrage that kept the enemy heads down until smiths attacking columns were very close. Smiths attacking troops mentioned that they had to go to ground a few yards outside up as they were up the smoke. Outside the parapet because their artillery shells were still passing close over their heads. Then the barrage lifted, which would be exactly what the british would try to accomplish at the somme, and not. To get the artillery barrage to lift. Infantry jumps up and sprints in to the defenses and they are on the parapet before the guys inside can react. Some of smiths soldiers said that a number of the confederate defenders, not all, but some, were still crouching down inside breast works when they arrived in the parapet and were pointing their weapons down at these men who were still crouching and had not had time to rise up and be part of the defensive volley against the attackers. They said that the ground was plowed up by the impact of artillery shells and there was evidence of large numbers of confederate casualties inside the breast works as a result of the Union Artillery fire. Effective use of skirmishers and artillery, experienced to have a and highly confident troops. You may say what the confederates demoralized by the loss of franklin . Not only that, it hurt, but it didnt stop them from repulsing the fourth corps on both of the two previous days and doing a very good job of that indeed. Was the redoubt arrangement a bad arrangement . Perhaps. Finalt, you know, the stages of fighting it petersburg some individual confederate , forts had delayed grants grants massed forces for several hours. Have delayed for several hours, they probably could have reinforced the line on that flank and perhaps obtained a little bit of resolve, at least delayed resolve on the battle of nashville. So, i want to give you some ideas about what had made that group of guerrillas, however you decide to spell the word, that degree of success at the last major battle in the year of 1864. Thank you. [applause] 40 years ago, on august 8, 1974, president ford was sworn in as president. Join us tomorrow. We will see his First White House press conference. Watch Richard Nixons presidency and an gerald fords begin. Cspan3. Oon eastern on this week while congress is in recess, watch American History tv in prime time. We will feature her grandson the early american republic, jewish history, world war ii, and sports history. Comman email us at ents cspan. Org. Join the conversation on facebook. Like us on facebook. 40 years ago, on august 8, 1974, the country waited as news spread of president nixons intention to resign in the aftermath of the watergate scandal. Up next onme