Transcripts For CSPAN2 Hearing On Cybersecurity Policy 20151005

Of the nation in broad terms, and strong encryption is important to strong internet defense and will defend it is in our best interests. Within the broad framework of though the challenge we cant figure out is realizing that communication that the use by very law abiding citizens, nationstates and companies engage in lawful activity is also being used by criminals, terrorists, nationstates who attempted generate advanced against the United States advocates are allies and partners. So were trying to figure out how do we balance these two important. Is a privacy and security, and realizing the world around us is changing in a foundational way. So were trying to come to grips broadly with how do we do with the reality of the technical world around us to yet the broader legal and social imperatives we have begun the first acknowledge we do not have a defined way to hit you in the end i think this is about how to get the best minds together to address this. When i look at our capabilities are is a problem we cant overcome when we worked together between the private sector interest, academic world. I think thats the way ahead in broad terms. Thank you very much. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Sandra inhofe is chairing the epw committee. He couldnt be here. Youve given us a good summary of the threats that we face other threats that are actually occurring today, and i appreciate that. Senator mccain fantasy about staff reporting on the policy that congress has asked you to report on, and that not having been done. Mr. Secretary work come into 2014 nba a the senate and house agreed on a provision that required the services to report on the cyber vulnerabilities of weapons and Communication System to connected by networks. Something that came out of our strategic subcommittee on a bipartisan basis and was eventually expanded to include all Weapons Systems, not just satellites and missiles a National Missile defense. We dont have that final report. I believe its overdue. This budget i believe it is 200 million in it to help fund this effort. What can you tell us about that . First let me say may take some time. If it does, i understand but i dont think we got any report from the dod to state what progress youve made and how much longer it will take. Well again on both of the boys come on the policy we expect that its in the final deliberations, its an interagency effort, you know, generally try to establish norms and deterrence is central to the policy. But again its a denial precise and cost a position. I am the first to do with the farthest ahead on the denial and resilient sport. Those are the areas where we are moving faster, the cost imposition part because weve elected to retain the retaliatory mechanism of Cyber Attacks of the National Level just like Nuclear Weapons because of the risk of escalation. What about the other, the vulnerability of our Weapons Systems . It is a big, big problem. Many of the Weapons Systems we have now were not built to withstand a concerted cyberthreat pics are going through every single one of the Weapons Systems which Frankie Kendall has done is has prioritized the Weapons Systems inc. Is working to very carefully and i expect this work to be done very soon. We now have new requirements in our Key Performance parameters speed so you have assigned an individual to be responsible for this speak with this. Frankie kendall is the one whos going to all of the different working with obviously our cio, also the Cyber Command and all of our cyber experts. Which is responsible for taking a look at the Weapons Systems and also requiring kpp. Performance parameters, for new Weapons Systems so when we build them cannot Cyber Defenses built in from the beginning. What about our defense contractors. Admiral rogers, they maintain and build a system and have highly Sensitive Information. Are we satisfied they are sufficiently protecting . We acknowledge theres a vulnerability. We been public about our concerns about for nationstates trying to access some of the operational technologies to penetrations in a clear defense contractor between clear defense contractor between a forest if we pay changes to the concoction relationships between us and those copies went out to meet minimum requirements, and foremost now of penetrations. We are clearly not what we need to be but we continue to make progress. I think its a bipartisan commitment on partners to help you with it. Secretary work, if it takes for my let us do. We will have to evaluate to get i also understand some of the protections can be done without much cost some may require considerable cost. We hope you will complete about. Admiral rogers, you i believe last week reported in the Los Angeles Times about the threat from china. You note one thing that theyre involved in obtaining u. S. Commercial and trade data in a foreign nation, advanced nation, ally of ours. I was told that one of their companies bid on the contract and that the chinese have got all the good data from the web and discount was its hard to win a bid when your competitor knows what you are bidding. Is the kind of thing happening . It has been. We have been very public of that. I think thats reflective in the agreement that you so raised during the president of chinas visit last week where we are explicit about that concern. My time is up but i would just ask, you are not allowed if you saw an American Business being a damaged to improper action, you are not allowed to advise them or share any information with them while our adversaries defenses their businesses . I would provide information and insightful in my intelligence have asked director dennis as will the command of the Cyber Command if under that sort of became of activity i would share the insights with the dhs and fbi to have a Mission Associate with interfacing with the private sector in a much more direct way than i do. Senator manchin . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank all three of you for your service and being here today. Admiral rogers, start with the. Which country is the most determined and successful hacker of the u. S. . Could use u. S. . Could you see the one what im . Which country deeply into those committed, successful hacker of the u. S. . If you look at volume and nation statewide, nation statewide, china, prc has been the one we been the most vocal about. They are not the only one by any stretch of imagination. I thought the last time i recall you think of more concerns russia the more of the ability or expertise to do us damage. I thought your question fully focus more on volume. If the prospectus capability, if you will, then we been very public about saying i would probably put the russians, their capability. But it seems like china is more committed and determined . They do it at a volume level. I understand. Director clapper, if i may, i know you just said no come emphatically no, you dont believe that this agreement that the president of china and our president has made last week will work. With that, is there any penalties in this agreement if one or the other violates or is it is basically what weve agreed and let it go at that . The terms that i have seen, i dont think it treats specifically penalties or certainly implied penalties. I think the threat of economic sanctions which brought minister mong to this country i think is a luster to of owning something to the chinese if they transgress or violate this agreement. I think as admiral rogers was discussing earlier, with respect to sanctions their certain our hope of governments possibilities here. Dont have to do necessarily cyber eye for an eye. It could be some other form of retaliation. I dont think, to answer your question, police were unaware that there are specific penalties if the agreement is violated spirit thats why i think youre pretty quick and send you dont think you were. He said no to that i think when the chairman asked you. The reason i said no of course is the extent to which a chinese prolonging of our data, our intellectual property is pretty pervasive. I think the question to the extent to which the government actually orchestrate all of it, or not. I think were in, to borrow president reagan term, trust but verify mode, at least as far as intelligence is concerned. We are inherently skeptics. Could i add something speak with i have a question for you, secretary, and you can go ahead and add to that. Recent news article that examines similar between chinas j. 315 of our strike fighter, with a been able to do in such a rapid. The time without any r d come to believe that gives them a competitive advantage . I understand there may be some differences as far as in the Software Come in the weaponry and this and that. But they are making leaps which are uncommon at the behest of us. And we notice i understand people we are not taking any actions against them spent id like to work this in and follow up with your first question. At the highest levels weve made it clear that we believe chinese actions in the cyber sphere are totally unacceptable as a nation state. We made that clear in a white right of different ways that i would characterize the agreement that we have as a confidence Building Measure with the chinese were were asking them to prove to us that they are serious about what they say, about what theyll do to control these efforts. They were really for things we agreed to do. First, we would give time responses to information when we say hey, we believe theres a problem here and weve agreed to Exchange Information on cyber crimes, weve agreed to possibly collect electronic evidence that could mitigate malicious cyber active if it is occurring on our soil. We both agreed we would not knowingly conduct cyber enabled theft of intellectual property which as you say has been a problem. We are told and thats a problem, is unacceptable. They have said that they will work to curb that. Then weve agreed to, effort to promote international norms, and the final thing is we will have a high level joint mechanism when we can meet at least twice a year and say look, this is just a working. You are not coming through with what you have said. So this isnt a treaty or anything like that. Its a confidence Building Measure for us to find out if china is going to act responsibly. I agree totally with the director clapper. Theyve got to prove to us, and we know that theyve stolen information from our defense contractors, and it has helped them develop systems, and were pardoned our systems through Defense Industrial base initiative and were trying to make we know that j20 is pretty much mirroring our f. 20. We know that j. 31 is pretty much mirroring our f35. When we know this and the cost to american taxpayers and let them, why wouldnt we take heart actions against them . Why wouldnt we, i dont understand why wouldnt retaliate. There are a wide variety of cost and position options that we have. They are developed through the interagency. And again its not necessarily kind, i mean, titfortat. It is proportional response and were working through all of those right now spend my time is up and if i could followup on the that if we could meet with you later. Absolutely. If i may just add a word here about, this is a point admiral rogers has made in the past about terminology, lexicon, nomenclature definitions are important. And so what this represents, of course, is espionage, economic, Cyber Espionage. And, of course, we, too, practice Cyber Espionage in a public forum to say how successful we are, but we are not bad at it. So we talk about what are we going to do to counter espionage or punish somebody come retaliate for espionage, i think its a good idea to please think about the old saw about people who live in glass houses shouldnt throw rocks. Gotcha. So its okay for them to steal our secrets that are most important i didnt say that. Spent because we live in a glass house, that is a standard senator ayotte . I did not said its a good thing. Im just saying that both nations engage in this. I want to thank all of you for being here. With regard to the chinese, i want to follow up on, we talked about the feeling of the stealing of the highest secrets in terms of our weapon secrets. But what about the 21 Million People as background check and personal information has been of course associated publicly with the chinese . And the fact we know that 5 million sets of fingerprints as well leading to potential vulnerability for our citizens. And if you put that in the context of these other issues that weve raised, it seems to me, i look very carefully, for example, secretary work, some of language youve been using it to give a speech at the Royal United Services institute in london. User deterrence must be demonstrated to be effective. Sector klapper into a prepared statement he said the muted response by most victims to cyberattack has created a permissive environment. So im trying to figure out based on what you said how we are not in a permissive environment in light of what they have stolen on our Weapons Systems but also this huge infringement on 21 Million People in this country. And also could you comment on the vulnerability of the david and where we are in terms of how it will be used against us . First, that is an assessment of what was taken. We actually dont know in terms of specifics but that is i think frames and magnitude of this theft. And it is potentially very serious, has very service applications. First, close to home from the standpoint of Intelligence Community at the potential for identifying people who may be under covert status. Just one small example, and, of course, it impose all kinds of potential and a fortuitous basic it is going to keep on giving for years. So its very series of situation. What we tried to do is educate people what to look for an out to protect themselves, but again of this is a huge threat, fast, and it has potentially damaging implications for lots of people Intelligence Committee and ts of people in department of defense and other i think what youre hearing from some of us up here is just now, what am going to do about it is the issue, as opposed to shared agreement on generic principles with the chinese. This is a set or a significant issue that is going to impact millions of americans. Im not doing what were going to do about it at that maybe a higher level decision going up to the president , bu i seems toe if were going to talk about deterrence if we dont follow up with action, and if you look at that combined with the test when we heard last week about the artificial islands being built by the chinese and the fact that we wont even go within i believe its 12 nautical mile of those islands, if you put that all from the chinese perspective i think you would think we can pretty much do what we want to do because we havent seen a response. Now, im not asking from all of you to add to that because it probably needs to be answered by the president and his National Security team, but he seems to me that they are missing a response right now from us and, therefore, were going to see, continue to see bad behavior from the chinese. Before i go out have an important question on another topic, secretary work, and that is, yesterday we heard public reports about a potential violation of the inf treaty by the russians, and that essentially russia flight tested a new groundlaunched Cruise Missile this month by u. S. Intelligence agencies say for the violates the 1987 inf treaty. And, of course, this is going back also to the reports as early as 2008 of the russia conducting tests of another groundlaunched Cruise Missile in potential violation of the inf treaty that weve raised with it and went secretary carter came before our committee on his confirmation, he listed three potential responses to these ins violations. So now we have the russians violating the inf treaty yet again, and i guess my question is, secretary carter rightly identified that we should respond either through missile defense, counterforce or countervailing measures. What are we doing about it . Center, this is a longstanding issue that weve been discussing with the russians are the system youre talking about is in development has not been fielded yet. We have had different discussions with them on our perception of the violation of the inf and have come back. This is due in discussions and we have not decide on any particular action at this point. So are you saying that you dont think they violated the inf treaty speak with we believe very strongly that they did. Thats what i thought. So what are they going to do about it . Because they have claimed they havent gone back to 2008 violations and now here we have another situation. Because they have not fielded the system were still in the midst of negotiating this position. Were giving hours, but if they do feel a system that violates the inf i would expect us to take one of three options that secretary carter outlined before the committee. My time is up but i see two consistent themes both with the chinese and the russians. A lot of talk, no action unfortunately, and people take their cues from that and that worries me. Thank you all. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Director clapper, you testified before the house Intelligence Committee recently that while the United States makes distinctions between Cyber Attacks conducted for economic purposes, taking foreign intelligence, thats the espionage agreement i think that you are referring to, or to cause damage, our adversaries do not. Would you consider the opm breached to the extent that we believe it is a state actor who did that, but that would be the category of espionage . Yes that was the tenor of the discussion at the hearing admiral rogers and i engaged in. And, of course, it has to do with come as i mentioned earlier, senator manchin, the importance of definition, nomenclature and deterrence. And definition of these terms. So the theft of the opm data, as egregious as it was, we wouldnt necessarily consider it an attack or rather, it would be a form of theft or espionage. Other countries including our own engages in such activities. My understanding of the recent agreement between the United States and china though has to do with the commercial cyber theft. I think thats a very different category that has to do with obtaining information about corporations, et cetera and, therefore, that is in the category of economic attacks. So director clapper, would you consider that kind of an agreement to be helpful . I realized you were skeptical, but to the extent that we are defining a particular kind of cyber attack, and they were contemplating through this agreement and the ability of our two countries to engage in high level dialogue regarding these kinds of attacks, is that a helpful situation . It would be very helpful if of course the chinese actually live up to what they agree to. And what the agreement pertaining to was that of data for economic purposes to give chinese commercial concerns and advantage, or the Defense Industries and advantage. As opposed to, i dont believe that weve agreed with the chinese to stop spying on each other, and so there is, for purely espionage purposes there is a distinction. You can weigh in on this. To the extent weve cratered a potential for dialogue or environment where theres a process to be followed, in the cases where we suspected commercial Cyber Attacks, at least we have a way that we can talk to the chinese. You also mentioned, director clapper, that attribution is not the easiest thing although we are Getting Better at figuring out who were the actors that did the cyberattacks. So one hopes that even with a great deal of skepticism Going Forward that this agreement may create the space for us to have more than a conversation, but one that would lead to some kind of a change in behavior on the part of these state actors. Mr. Secretary, feel free to give us your opinion. I think thats exactly right. As director clapper said, first have to find of the geographical location from where the attack came from, and yet identified actor, then identify whether the government of the geographic gec space with you to control speed recognize thats not the easiest to do, yes. At, yes. At what weve done is weve confronted china and china some cases has said look, this was a hacker that was inside our country but we had no control of them. What this allows us to do said okay, what are you going to do about that . That cybercrime. Are you going to provide his information we need to prosecute this person or are you going to take care of it on your own . I believe this confidence Building Measure and his way to discuss these things will come the proof will be in the pudding, how the chinese react to this. I think you mentioned this particular agreement allows contemplate meeting at least twice a year. Is anything that prevents more frequent dialogue between our two countries in suspected cases of commercial Cyber Attacks . Oddly there was a significant cyber event that we suspected the chinese to doing, what they suspected us that we be able to meet this. This would be a high level joint dialogue. The chinese will have it at the ministerial level. Ouhow you said it Homeland Security and u. S. Attorney general will delete on our part. Will have to first we will have the first meeting of the script by the end of this calendar year, and in at least twice a year. So i believe as director clapper is, i think all of us have some healthy skepticism about this but i believe its a good confidence Building Measure and a good first step and well see if it leads to better behavior on the part of the chinese. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, i cant help but comment. Please identify the pla, the building of which they operate, and please dont to see this committee as if we dont know who was responsible for it. Thats just come that she is very disingenuous. There have been public reports that weve identified the pla building in which the Cyber Attacks come from a. Senator urged. Thank you for joining us today. Admiral rogers, ill start with you, sir. Two other president s nine lines of effort into feeding isil our first exposing ices to nature and second disrupting the foreign fighter flow. Over the weekend the New York Times reported 30,000 recruits join ices over the past year, and thats a double the previous recruit a year. Earlier this month in reference to isis recruiting, the state departments ambassador at large and coordinator for counterterrorism said that isis recruiting trend is upward and this information can of note surprise to her. Ambassador also said the upward trend was primary to do internet and social media. So deeply the administrations efforts have so far succeeded on these two lines of effort in cyberspace and social media . Just please simply yes or no. No. Okay. In light of that, with a record recruiting numbers for isis, how would you can assess the effectiveness of these governments counter isis efforts in cyberspace . So what specifically is your assessment of the state departments think again turned away program in support of efforts to disrupt isis online recruiting effort . Im not a position to comment on state department a specific of the program. I honestly im not just knowledgeable about it or i will say this probably to get i think your broader point. I have always believed that we must contest isolate information to make ever get aggressively as are under battlefield. That information dynamic is an essential component of their vision, their strategy and notably their success. We have got to be willing to attempt to fight to end up to me just like we are on the battlefield. We clearly are not there yet. I agree. I think we are failing in this effort and some of the programs that we have seen obviously are not working. So arthur areas in which you could recommend how the u. S. Government better partner with various ngos or private entities pashtun are there more effectively counter the isis propaganda . Again, the contesting the propaganda piece much broader than Cyber Commands mission i will say from a technical and operational perspective, we probably within the dod, the Cyber Command, Strategic Command are looking at within our authorities, within our capabilities whats in the realm of possible in terms of what we can do to contest them in this domain. Okay. We have a larger problem coming forward in regards to isis and isil in the middle east. We seem to see the emergence of a trifecta between syria, iran and russia. And now it seems that iraq has begun information sharing with russia, with iran, with syria. Director clapper, can you speak to that in a broader implication of russia emerging as a leader in the middle east while we seem to be frittering the way our opportunity with isil . That is serving their objective. I think of several objectives, one of which is that which protect their base, their presence in syria, ergo their buildup in the northwest part of the syria. And i think a belated motivation for them as it is fighting isil. As far as the joint intelligence arrangement is concerned, cant go into detail here in this forum but i will say each of the parties entering into this are a little bit suspicious of just what is entailed here. So well have to see just how robust capability that actually provides. Okay. I appreciate that. Secretary work, do you any thoughts on the margins of russia with the intelligence sharing, how that might impact the operations that we have ongoing in iraq against isis . I think we were caught by surprise that iraq entered into this agreement with syria and iran and russia. August were not going to share intelligence with either syria or russia or iran. So we are in the process cover in the process of working to try to find exactly what iraq has said. Certainly were not going to provide any classified information or information that would help those actors on the battlefield. Really what were trying to do is deconflict, and that is the primary purpose of the discussion between president obama and president putin yesterday he is i is a frequentt on this battlefield we have to deconflict the other thing weve made clear is they would like to do a military first followed by political transition. We believe those two things have to go in parallel and that is that are consistent message. This is early days. We are still in the midst of discussing what exactly this means. I dont have any definitive answer for at this point. I am very concerned we have abdicated our role in the middle east, and in some other areas as has been pointed out earlier, great concern to all of us i think we need to be working much more diligently on this. Thank you, mr. Chair. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. Admiral, im concerned about all of these private telecoms that are going to encrypt. If you have encryption of everything, how, in your opinion, does that affect section 702 and 215 collection programs . It certainly makes it more difficult. Does the administration have a policy position on this . No. I think w we are still company,e are the first to acknowledge this is an incredibly complicated issue. To utilize the internet to achieve their purposes. Speaking of that, we have a fantastic u. S. Military. We are able to protect ourselves. Its a, its the best military in the world, but we have a vulnerability now. And its a cyber attack. You want to see if you can make me feel any better about our ability to protect ourselves Going Forward . So i would tell you that current stated capability in the department, if i just look at where we were 18 months ago, two years ago, is significantly improved. We currently defeat probably 99. Some odd percent of attempts to penetrate dod systems on a daily basis. The capability in terms of both the amount of teams, their capability just continues to improve, our speed, our agility. The challenge for us fundamentally, to me, is we are trying to overcome decades of a thought process in which redundancy, defense about and reliability were never core design characteristics for our networks, where we assumed in the development of our Weapons Systems that external interfaces, if you will, with the outside world were not something to be overly concerned with. They represented opportunity for us to remotely monitor activity, to generate data as to how aircraft, for example, or ships hulls were doing in different sea states around the world. All positive if youre trying to develop the next generation, for example, of Cruiser Destroyer for the navy. But in a world in which those public interfaces, if you were, increasingly rentals potential points of vulnerability, you get this class of strategies, if you will. And thats where we find ourselves now. So one of the things i try to remind people is it took us decades to get here. We are not going to fix this set of problems in a few years. This takes dedicated prioritization, dedicated commitment, resources, and weve got to do this in a smart way. Weve got to prioritize, and weve got to figure out whats the greatest vulnerability and wheres the greatest concern for us. Senator, is it okay if i jump in here for a second . Yes. I just want to add to that, and for us to let our potential enemies understand that we have the capability of doing to them what they do to us. However, that gets more complicated when youre dealing with a rogue group of a dozen people stuck in a room somewhere that are not part of a nationstate. Yes, sir, mr. Secretary. Well, i was just going to echo what admiral rogers said. When secretary carter came in, he said, look, we are absolutely not where we need to be, and he made job number one defense of networks. So were going from 15,000 enclaves to less than 500. Were going to have were going from 1,000 defendable firewalls to less than 200. Somewhere between 50200. So you are absolutely right. We have recognized this is a terrible vulnerability. We are working, first, to defend our networks as we talked about earlier, were looking at our systems, and were also trying to change the culture. Right now if you discharge a weapon, you are held accountable for that. A negligent damager is one of the worst things discharge is one of the worst things you can do. But we need to inculcate a culture where cyber discharge is just as bad and make sure thats inculcated throughout the force. I agree. But now the admiral is assaulted by the telecoms who want to tie his hands behind his back by doing all of the encryption. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. In our state Naval Warfare center crane has taken the lead on much of our efforts to protect against counterfeit electronics. And so secretary work and director clapper, the Global Supply chain for microelectronics presents a growing challenge for cybersecurity. One of the things we saw recently, ibm should its chipmaking facilities with dod trusted foundry status to a foreignowned competitor. So i was wondering your Top Priorities in managing the risk posed by the globalization of our microelectronics Manufacturing Capabilities and our abilities to protect our systems in that area. Its a big question, senator. In fact, its going to be one of the key things we look at in this fall review because of the recent, as you said, the recent are sale of the ibm chips. Now, there are two schools of thought on this. Secretary carter personally has jumped into this, and some say you do not need a trust ared found trusted foundry. Another group says you absolutely have to have it. Having confidence in the chips that we put in our Weapons Systems is important, and i would expect to that come february well be able to report out the final decisions through the fall review on how were going to tackle this problem. Who within dods leadership has primary responsibility for overseeing the supply chain Risk Management . That would be Frank Kendall and also dla. Dla has the supply chain, and Frank Kendall is really focused on the trusted chip, the fabrication of trusted chips. One of the areas that we look at in regards to cyber and in some ways, you know, technology and particular parts of it not advancing has been a good thing in this respect is in the nuclear area. And so are there any specific groups that are focused just on protecting our nuclear efforts against cyber . Theres the national, thezv nnsa, and also we have a Nuclear Weapons council which is cochaired by, again, Frank Kendall, and the vice chairman of the joint chiefs. They are the ones that work with doe to make sure that our weapons system components are reliable and trusted and make sure we have a safe, reliable and Effective Nuclear deterrent. Admiral, when we look at building a force of cyber warriors, a cyber team, how can we use the National Guard and reserves to help do that . Because it strikes me that that can help us in retaining highly qualified individuals who, who want to devote part of their life to helping their country. Perfect fit for us. So we have taken a total force approach to the force that were building out that includes both guard and reserve, every service slightly different not the least of which because Different Services have different reserve and guard structures. So that is a part of it. Id say one of the challenges that were still trying to work our way through is under the title 32 piece, how we coordinate what guard and reserve are doing, how we generate capacity and bring it to bear with maximum efficiency. The one thing the two things in partnering with my guard teammates and my reserve teammates, because were taking a total force approach to this, we need one standard for this. We dont want a place where the guard and reserve are trained in one standard, and the active side is trained to a different. That gives us maximum flexibility in how we apply the capability across the force, and the guard and reserve has done great in that regard. And then secondly, we need one common unit structure. We dont want to build unique capabilities unique, one of a kind structures in the guard orr reserves that dont match the title x side. We want to treat this as one integrated force and, again, i would give the guard and reserve great kudos in that regard. Weve got a common vision about the way we immediate to go, and weve got a we need to go, and weve got a great series where we bring together the guard, the private sector, the active component in government and work our way through the specifics of how are we going to make it work. Director clapper, and i apologize if you already answered this, what is the one cyber challenge you are most concerned about . Well, obviously, the one that i think about is, would be a massive armageddonlike scale attack against our infrastructure. That is not, we dont consider that the most likely probability right now, that the greater threat or the lowtomoderate sort of threats that were seeing. And what i have seen in the five years ive been in this job is a sort of progression where these get more aggressive and more damaging. And as i indicated in my oral statement at the outset, what i will see i think what we could expect next are data manipulation which then calls to question the integrity of the data which in many ways is more insidious than the kinds of attacks that weve suffered thus far. So, you know, the specter is this massive attack, although its not likely. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Annex three of the recentlysigned Iran Nuclear Agreement calls for the participating countries to work with iran to, quote, strengthen irans ability to protect against and respond to Nuclear Security threats including sabotage as well as to enable effective and sustainable Nuclear Security and physical protection systems, close quote. Secretary clapper, do you read this portion of the Iran Nuclear Agreement, the annex, to include Cyber Threats, meaning that the p5 1 countries who are part of this agreement will be expected, will be deemed to have an obligation under the agreement to assist iran in developing systems to prevent other countries from using Cyber Capabilities to acquire information about or to disrupt the operations of Irans Nuclear capabilities, Irans Nuclear programs . Well, in this environment i would say that i trust that this is not going to prevent us from gleaning intelligence from are our traditional sources from our traditional sources in the interest of verifying the agreement which will be principally monitored by International Organization to iaea. So im not aware of any strictures on our ability to collect on their behavior and their compliance. But why would we want to give iran the ability to defend against Cyber Weapons that we or perhaps some of our allies might one day want to use against iran . Well, sir, in this environment, open environment, there are some aspects here that i cant discuss. Im happy to talk with you privately or in a classified environment about that. Okay. Okay. But youre not disputing the fact that the agreement says that, that we would have to from no. Okay. Now, can you tell me in this environment what specific Technical Assistance well be offering iran in this portion of the agreement . I honestly dont know the answer to that question. Ill have to have that researched. I dont know exactly what would, whats in mind there. Now, would any of these capabilities once acquired by iran prevent or inhibit the United States or any of our allies, any other enemy of iran the from using any cyber measure against Iranian Nuclear facilities . Again, i, im reluctant to discuss that in this setting. Were you consulted by u. S. Negotiators during the Nuclear Negotiations in connection with this portion of the agreement . Well, the Intelligence Community was deeply involved throughout the negotiations. You describe the can you describe the nature of any consultation you had with them as to this portion of annex iii . The iranians . Yes. No, i did not engage with the iranians no, no, thats not what im asking. Im asking if you can describe your discussions with u. S. Negotiators as they came to you and consulted with you on the implications of this portion of annex iii. I didnt actually my lead for this was norm rule who was known to many of you on this committee, National Intelligence man for iran, and he was the direct participant, and i dont want to speak for him as to the extent to which he was involved or consulted on that provision. Id have to ask him. Okay. But you would have been aware of this consultation going on. Im sure he came to you and said, look, this is going to impact our ability, the ability of the United States to do what we need to do with respect to iran. Well, again, sir [inaudible] i would rather discuss what the potential response of ours could be in a closed setting. Okay. Secretary work, how is the Department Working to insure that the hardware and software on some of these major programs that were developing to future con stint genesees con stint genesees and technological advances so they can continue to address major Cyber Threats well into the future without major overhauls of the entire system . Senator, as i said, we are now putting into our kpps, Key Performance parameters, specific cyberhardening requirements. Much like during the cold war when we had emp requirements for many of our systems. The problem that we face is that many of the old systems that are still in service were not built to the, to respond to the Cyber Threats that we see today. So were having to go back through all of those older systems, determine which ones are most vulnerable, prioritize them and make fixes. So it also goes back to senator donnellys question on the trusted foundry. Were trying to determine what is the best way to assure that we have reliable and trusted microelectronics. Okay. Thank you. I see my times expired. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Secretary work, if theres a catastrophic attack tonight on the physical infrastructure, the financial infrastructure of the country, i do not want to go on cable news in the morning if there is cable news in the morning and say the administration told us that the policy is still in development. Weve got to get on this. Weve been talking about it for years. And as the chairman pointed out, this was an essential part of our National Defense authorization act a year ago, and the idea that we can continue to simply defend and never have an offensive capability, i just think is ignoring this enormous threat which we all agree. So let me ask a onewordanswer question to each of you. Do we need an offensive capability in the cyber realm in order to act as a deterrent . Secretary work. We need a broad range of Response Options to include do we need a offensive cyber capability to act as a deterrent . I would say, yes, sir. Secretary director clapper . Absolutely. Admiral rogers . Yes. Thank you. The second part of that is that that it cant be secret. Our instinct is to make everything secret, and the whole point of a deterrent capability is that it not be secret. So i think we need to establish what we have. I suspect we do have some significant offensive capability, but part of making it a deterrent is that it has to be made, it has to be made public. c i think another question that needs to be addressed and i dontnr necessarily think in ths hearing this morning, but in terms of the policy we need to define what an act of war is in the cyber area. Whether hitting Sony Pictures is an act of war or the opm and how do you draw those lines. And i would suggest that thats got to be part of this policy definition. And i dont mean to imply, secretary work, that this is easy, but its urgent. Thats and we just simply cant defend ourselves by saying, well, it was complicated, we didnt get to it. Changing the subject slightly, admiral rogers, do you believe that the dispersion of responsibility in the federal government for cyber is a potential problem . It strikes me weve got agencies and departments and bureaus, i suspect you could name 15 of em if you tried, that all have some responsibility here. Do we need to strengthen Cyber Command and make that the central repository of this policy. I would not make Cyber Command in the department of defense the central repository. This is much broader than just the dod perspective. But i will say i have been public in saying weve got to simplify this structure for the outside world, because if youre on the outside looking in and i hear this from the private sector pretty regularly who do you want me to go to . Should i talk to the fbi, dhs . Why cant i deal with you . If im a financial company, should i be talking to the sector construct that weve created . We have got to try to simplify this for the private sector. If i might add to that, senator king, its one of the reasons why i had a very brief commercial for just within the Intelligence Community of integrating the cyber picture, the Common Operating Picture simply from within intelligence, let alone, you know, what we do to react or protect. And that, to me, is one important thing that i have come to believe. We need along the lines of a mininctc or ncpc. I would hope that that would also and that the leadership and Decision Making on that has to start with the white house. It has to start with the administration for an allofgovernment approach the dealing with this dispersion of responsibility problem. I would point out parenthetically that theres been a lot of talk about china and our ability to interact with china and to respond and hold china responsible, and its not the subject of this hearing, but the fact that we owe china trillions of dollars compromises our ability to interact with china in a firm way. Its a complicated relationship, and thats one of the things that makes it difficult. Director clapper, do you have any idea what brought the chinese to the table for this recent agreement with the president . Well, it appears that the threat of a potential economic sanctions, particularly imposing them right before the visit of president xi, i think, got their attention. And thats why they dispatched minister mong to try to come to some sort of agreement which is what ensued subsequently. And i agree that its not a definitive agreement or a treaty, but i do agree, secretary work, that its a step in the right direction. At least these issues are being discussed. But countries, ultimately, only act in their own selfinterest, and we have to convince the chinese that its in their interest to can cut out this activity thats so detrimental to our country. Thank you, gentlemen sir, could i make one quick comment . Yes, sir. Just because we have not published our policy, it is so broad and encompassing, going over things like encryption, what are the types of authorities we need, does not mean that if we did have an attack tonight, we do not have the structure in place right now with the National Security team to get together to try to understand who caused the attack, to understand what the implications of the attack were and what response we should take. Those are in place right now but the whole point of being able to respond is deterrence so that the attack wont occur. Dr. Strangelove taught us that if you have a doomsday machine and no one knows about it, its useless. So having a secret plan as to how well respond isnt the point im trying to get at. The deal is we have they have to know how we will respond and, therefore, not attack in the first place. Thank you. Thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony. On behalf of the chairman, let me recognize senator fischer. Thank you, senator reed. Following up a little bit where senator king was going on this, many of you talked about establishing norms in cyberspace. Do you think its possible to establish or maintain that norm without enforcement behaviors . When we look at publiclyidentifying those who are publicly identifying those who are responsible for an activity or imposing costs on them, can we do that . Ill begin with you, mr. Secretary. Well, i believe that trying to establish these norms are very, very helpful. In the cold war, for example, there was tacit agreement that we would not attack each of our Early Warning Missile Launch i mean, warning satellites. And so establishing these norms are very important but they will be extremely difficult, because the Enforcement Mechanisms in cyber are far more difficult because its much more easy to attribute missile attacks, etc. So i believe that this agreement with china is a good first step, that we should strive to establish norms especially between nationstates and establish norms which we believe are beyond the bounds and to try to establish mechanisms by which we can work these through. But this will be very, very difficult, senator, because its, because of the its much more difficult. Then we have the added problem, of course, of the norms are as secretary work said really applicable to nationstates. And, of course, you have a whole range of nonnationstate actors out there who wouldnt necessarily subscribe to these norms and would be a challenge to deal with even if we, if there were nationstate mutual agreement. Admiral . I would echo the comments of my two teammates. Im struck by were all captives of our own experience. In my early days as a sailor, well before i got into this business, at the height of the cold war out there we knew exactly how far between the soviets and us, we knew exactly how far we could push each other, and we pushed each oh at time each other at times right up to the edge. Very aggressive behavior. We drop developed a series of norms, we actually developed a set of signals over time so that we could communicate with each other. So im comfortable that were going to be able to achieve this over time in the nationstate arena, but as my teammates have said, its the nonstate actor that really complicates this, is going to make this difficult. So when were attacked in cyberspace, how do we impose costs on those who are attacking us . Do we respond in cyberspace, or can we look at other ways to, i think, respond in an appropriate manner, say, with sanctions . What would you look at, admiral . So what we have talked about previously is we want to make sure we dont look at this from one narrow perspective, that we think more broadly, we look across the breadth of capabilities and advantages as a nation and bring all of that to bear as were looking at options as to what we do. And then its a casebycase basis. Theres no one, single, onesizefitsall answer to this. Fully, think fundamentally, think more broadly than cyber, not that cyber isnt a part of this. I dont mean to imply that. Correct. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with the admiral on that . Do you see a variety of options out there, and wouldnt, wouldnt it be more beneficial to us as a country to be able to have a policy that is a Public Policy on what those options could be and the consequences that would be felt when we are attacked . Absolutely. And that is what i say about a broad policy where we will respond in a time, place and manner of our own choosing. In this case theres an asymmetry with our nationstate potential adversaries. They are all authoritarian states. The attack surfaces that they have are far smaller than what we have as a free nation, and we value that. We do not want to close down the internet. But we are more vulnerable to a wide variety of attack surfaces than our adversaries. So we may sometimes have to respond proportionally, but in a different way than a simple cyber response. It might be sanctions, it might be a criminal indictment, it might be other reactions. So we believe very strongly that this is something where its an interagency process. The process is established where they are taken care of, handled on a casebycase basis. And does the administration have a definition on what constitutes a cyber attack . Well, any type of malicious activity which causes either damage or theft of information or ip, all of those are under either cyber, malicious cyber activities, it might be espionage. In each case theres no defined red line for what would constitute what would be the difference between a cyber attack and cyber vandalism . Well, i would have to make, again, a casebycase determination, and, of course, important consideration here in terms of our reaction would be attribution. And that, again, would be a casebycase. And cyber vandalism, maam, do you is that stealing information or ip or the attack by north korea was described by the president as cyber vandalism. I was just wondering on how you distinguished that definition from a cyber attack. Where well, it didnt affect a National Security entity, but it certainly did cause damage to a company. And in that case, and this is an important illustration of when we could attribute very clearly and there was uniform agreement across the Intelligence Community, attribute that attack to north koreans. And we did sanction them. Okay, thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chair. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and for joining us here today. Director clapper, before i start on, begin to focus on cyber policy, i think were all very concerned about the allegations that leadership at Central Command deliberately distorted the assessments of Intelligence Officers related to the fight against isil. And i understand that theres an ongoing investigation, and im going to wait for the results of that investigation. But i want to say that as a member of both this committee and the Intelligence Committee, i want to in the strongest terms possible impress upon you the importance for all of us to receive absolutely objective and unbiased assessments, and i look forward to the results of the ig investigation, and i expect that you will hold accountable anyone who has failed in their duty in the Intelligence Community no matter how high up the chain that may go. Well, senator, you brought up a very important consideration here which is of great concern to me. Im the son of an Army Intelligence officer who served in world war ii, korea and vietnam, and ive served in various intelligence capacities for over 52 years ranging from my first tour in Southeast Asia in the early 60s to my service now as the longesttenured dni. And it is a almost sacred writ in intelligence, in the intelligence profession, never to politicize intelligence. I dont engage in it, i never have, and i dont condone it when its identified. Having said that, i and i completely agree with you. Many spite of all the media hyperbole, i think its best that we all await the outcome of the dod ig investigation to determine whether there was politicization of intelligence at centcom. I will also say that the intelligence assessments from centcom or any other combatant command come to the National Level only through the Defense Intelligence agency. That is the main conduit, and i will say to evaluate or filter for what flows into the National Intelligence arena. Thank you, director. Turning to you, admiral rogers, as the director of u. S. Cyber command, your responsibilities include strengthening our Cyber Defense and our cyber deterrence posture, and i want to return to a line of questioning several of my colleagues have begun this morning. And as you know, the breach of opm computers resulted in an enormous loss of sensitive personal information. Thus far to my knowledge, the u. S. Has not responded, and to put it in the words of deputy secretary works language this morning, we havent imposed a cost. Which raises questions about whether we truly have developed the mechanisms for proportionate response to Cyber Attacks against the u. S. Government. Even after the april 2015 publication of the dods cyber strategy. We know that if a Foreign Agent had been caught trying to steal u. S. Personnel files in a less digital age, we would either kick them out of the country if they were a diplomat, or wed throw them in jail if they werent a diplomat. That would be considered a proto portion nate response. Proportionate response. But in the case of the breach, the u. S. Government seems unconcerned about what a proportionate response would look like. So i want to ask you three questions, and ill let you take them as you may. What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace . Has the United States decided on a proportionate response in the case of the opm Cyber Espionage case . And what types of information gathering by nationstates, by governments are legitimate and what types are are not . Well, first, let me start off by saying, look, im the operational commander here, and all three of the questions youve just asked me are much broader than that. Im glad to give you an opinion, but im mindful of what my role is. In terms of have we defined what an act of war is, the bottom line is clearly were still working our way through that. What are the parameters that we want to use to define what is an act of war. My goingin position is we ought to build on the framework that we have developed over time in the more conventional domains. Thats a good point of departure for it. Its got a broad legal framework, and its where we ought to start a as a point of as a point of departure. The second question was about let me read my note to myself. Proportional response to the opm case. Again, i think that what opm represents is a good question about so what are the parameters we want to use. Is it, as the dni has said, is it the intent is within the acceptable rell system in is it scale . Is it realm . Is it scale . If you trip some magic threshold, hey, is 20 million records, 10 million records, is there some scale component to this . I think were clearly still trying to work our way through that issue, and there is no onesizefitsall answer. I think theres recognition. I think thats clearly what has driven this broad discussion between the United States and china, for example, thats been a positive, i would argue. And the third, could you repeat again the types of information . You know, my time has expired, so ill cut to the chase. I think what youre hearing from all of go ahead, senator. This is an important line of questioning. Is we would like to see more transparency in being able to telegraph our deterrent. Because we all know that looking back into the cold war that our deterrent was very important, but the other side knowing what that deterrent was was absolutely critical for it to be effective. And so we need to be clear about what types of information gathering by governments are considered legitimate and acceptable and where those red lines are going to be. I agree. I think thats an important part of the whole deterrence idea. It has to be something thats communicated, that generates understanding and expectation and then a sense of consequence. I think to contrast the contrast with the cold war is a good one to think about in that i think what youre the concern that people are raising is should there be red lines on spying . Thats really what this gets down to. We didnt have red lines during the cold war. It was free wheeling as far as us collecting intelligence against the soviet union and vice versa. There were no limits on that. It was very difficult for both sides. Well, more so for us. And, of course, underlying the backdrop to all that was the deterrent, the Nuclear Deterrent which, of course, restrained the behavior even though it got rough at times as the example that admiral rogers cited in, just in a maritime context. But there were ground rules that governed that. Were sort of in the wild west here with cyber. Where there are no limits that weve agreed on, no red lines, certainly, on collecting information which is what the opm breach represented. Director and admiral, i would like to thank you for your forthright and candid assessment , and also i think the lesson that all of us are getting is that we really have to have some policy decisions, and youve been very helpful in flushing that out for us. Senator cotton. Secretary work, id like to return to the an exchange you had with senator ayotte about the Intermediaterange Nuclear forces treaty, also known as the inf treaty. Is russia we believe the system they have in development would violet the treaty. And violate the treaty. And you said just now in development. I thought i heard you say with senator ayotte its not deployed or not yet operational capable, is that correct . Thats my understanding. I can have i can get back to you on the question for the record, but it is in development, and we have indicated our concern with the russians if they did deploy it, we believe it would violate the inf. Thank you. Could you, please, do that in writing and, if its appropriate, in classifying writing as well. Id like to move to the Cyber Mission force. The air force Association Conference a couple weeks ago, Major General ed wilson stated that dods Cyber Mission force was halfway through its buildup. How difficult is to establish the capability that we need to defend and deter Cyber Threats . Id like to start, then ill turn it over to admiral rogers. Were building to 133 total teams, 68 are Cyber Protection teams that are focused on our number one mission, defense of our networks. We have 13 National Mission teams that we are building to help defend our nations critical infrastructure, and we have 27 combat Mission Teams that are align ared with the come aligned with the Combatant Commanders and assist them in their planning. To support those, we have 25 support teams which they can call upon for a total of 133. Were building to 6200 military personnel, civilians and some specialized contractors and another 2,000 in the reserves. So about 8400. We expect to reach that in 2018 provided there is not another Government Shutdown. The last time we had a Government Shutdown and sequestration, it put us behind by six months in building this. So as of right now, we are i think were on track. And i turn it over to admiral rogers to explain the, how well were doing in attracting talent. And if i could, first, let me accent, if you will, in one particular point of secdef works comments in terms of an impact of Government Shutdown or sequestration for us. The last time we went through this when we shut it down, we assessed that we probably lost six months worth of progress because we had to shut down the school system. We went to allstop in terms of generation of capability. And like a domino, the layover effect of all of that, we think, costs us about six months of time. If we go to a bca or she questionation level sequestration level, that puts us even further behind in an environment in which we have all come to the conclusion that were not where we need to be and we need to be more aggressive to get there. You cant do that when youre shutting down your efforts, when youre cutting money. To go specifically, senator, to the question you asked, i would tell you the generation of the teams in terms of their manpower and their capability, knock on wood, is exceeding my expect taxes. The bigger expectations. The the bigger challenge to me has been less, not that its not an insignificant challenge, but the bigger challenge has been more some of the enabling capabilities that power the team, the tools, if you will, the platform that we operate from, the training environment that we take for granted and every ore mission set other mission set. The idea that we would take a brigade team and put it out in the National Training center and put it through the spectrum of scenarios we think theyre likely to encounter if tear deployment their deployment, we dont have that capability in cyber. Its those enablers, to me, and the intelligence piece just like every other mission set, everything we do is predicated on knowledge and mission sites. Those are the areas, to me, with the challenges are greater, if you will, than just the manpower. Im not trying to minimize yeah. And how important is it that we take advantage of the existing infrastructure and capabilities that we have as youre building out the entire Mission Force . Thats what were doing right now. But i will say one of our experiences, Cyber Command has now been in place for approximately five years. One of our insights that weve gained with practical experience and as were looking at both defensive response as well as potential offensive options, we need to create infrastructure that is slightly separate from the infrastructure we use at nsa. So a unified platform, youve heard us talk about. Its simpler than the funding. Thats an important part of this. Experience has taught us this in a way that five, six years ago we didnt fully understand. Well, id like my time is up for questioning, but id just like to bring to your attention that arkansas general mark berry has requested a team at Little Rock Air force base. Theres an 11,000 square foot facility there, its already had 3. 5 million invested in it, one of these facilities, i understand, would cost about 4 million. Its harnessing resources weve already invested, and they are ready to support in addition to the professional Educational Center that does a lot of the cyber training for the National Guard which is less than 30 minutes away. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, i have to comment. Im really struck by the irony here of before i left my office to come to this hearing, i was reviewing the directions that were putting out to our people for shutting down and furloughing people. What better time for a cyber attack by an adversary when much of our expertise might be furloughed. I think thats a very important comment, director, and thank you for saying it. There are some of us who feel its urgent that we inform the American People of the threats to our National Security if another Government Shutdown. I believe that it was in arkansas an arkansas philosopher that said there is no education in the second kick of a mule, so i thank you for your comment. Senator mccaskill. Thats probably a missouri mule. Director clapper, earlier this year i introduced a bill that would give Intelligence Community contractors whistleblower protections as long as those complaints were made within the chain or to the Inspector General or the gao. So disclosures made to the press would not be protected. I, as you probably know, defense department, i know that secretary work knows this, that weve already put into the law in recent years whistleblower protections for the contractors at the department of defense, can and to my knowledge and certainly correct me if im wrong, any of you im not aware of any classified or Sensitive Information that has made its way to a damaging place as a result of these protections. The 2014 intel authorization gave these protections to the Government Employees within intelligence. And one of the challenges we have in government is this divide between the contractors and Government Employees. And, frankly, whistleblower protections, i cant think of a good policy reason that we would give whistleblower protections to employees and not give them to contractors. And so im hopeful today that you would anticipate that you believe you would indicate that you believe this is an important principle and that we should move forward with this legislation. Absolutely, senator. And we have published internal to the Intelligence Community an Intelligence Community directive that includes whistleblowing protections for contractors. After all, that was the source of our big problem here with mr. Sullivan who was a contractor. And so our challenge, the additional burden we have, of course, is trying to prevent the exposure of classified information outside channels, so thats why whistleblowers absolutely must be protected so that they are induced or motivated to go within the channels knowing that theyll be protected. This is a program that is managed by the Intelligence Community Inspector General who is, of course, independent as a senateconfirmed official. Thank you. And im pleased to see that you would be supportive of that. And, secretary work and admiral rogers, i assume that you would be supportive of giving whistleblower protections to Intelligence Community contractors . Absolutely. I agree, totally, with what director clapper said. Yes, maam, and i say this as the head of an intelligence agency. Thank you. I want to follow up a little bit, director clapper, with your comment about a shutdown. Could you tell us what impact another Government Shutdown would have on your progress of getting the Cyber Mission force fully operational . Excuse me, admiral rogers. I think that in political isolation shutdown appeals to a certain swath of americans, and i understand why. Because sometimes it just feels good to say, well, just shut it down because, obviously, government is never going to win popularity contests, certainly not in my state. On the other hand, theres a difference between being responsible in terms of Public Policy and being irresponsible in terms of recognizing. I love it when some of my friends wave the constitution in my face and then fail to read the part that we have a divide canned checks and balances in this divided checks and balances in this country, unlike other countries. The American People send a president of one party to the white house and elected a congress of a different party, and that means we have to figure out how to get along. So could you talk a moment about what the impact would be to this Important Mission if once again we went down the rabbit hole of deciding the best thing to do is just to shut down government . So if we use our experience the last time, first thing i had to do was shut down the school system. And training and education is a core component of our ability to create this work force. Just shut it all down because it was only mission essential. The second thing i was struck for all travel that was associated with training, all we had to shut all that down, so i couldnt send people to generate more insights, to gain more knowledge. We had to shut down some of our Technical Development efforts because of the closure, again, put that all on hold. At a time when we had talked about the need to develop more capability, the need to develop more tools, i had to shut that all down during the period of the last shutdown. We were forced to focus our efforts on continued daytoday defense which, dont get me wrong, is prior my number priority number one for us. I have watched this play out just in the last ten days, ive been in command 18 months, and i will tell you the biggest thing i get from my work force prior to the last ten days, sir, this happened to us once this 2013, is this going to happen again if it is, why should i say here working for the government . I could make a whole lot more money in the cyber arena on the outside. So in addition to the threats the dni has highlighted, my other concern is if we do this again is the amount of our work force that says, you know, twice in the course of two years, ive got a family, ive got mortgages, ive got to take care of myself as much as i love the mission, as much as i believe in defending the nation, i cant put myself or my family through this. Aye got to go work in ive got to go work in the commercial sector. That would be terrible for us. People, despite all our technology, never forget it is men and women who power this enterprise. At the risk of sounding like a smart aleck which i do from time to time, i would say maybe we need to open some of those schools so some of my colleagues could do the math, and this is a recipe for dysfunction that does not help anyone in this country and particularly our National Security. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I want to just echo the comments of my colleague, senator mccaskill, i think its irresponsible. Weve had the secretary come before this committee and say that the number and severity of threats have not been greater since 9 11. That should be enough said in terms of what we need to do to keep continuity in funding the government. All the other things that i may have a problem with have to be second to that priority. I thank you all for your work and, director clapper, i thank you for your comment. Admiral rogers, weve had briefings from you since youve taken the command, and one of the briefings im reminded of is the trend that you see in terms of the gap between what tends to be still an american advantage overall narrowing, particularly with nations like china and russia, and i think you maybe even mentioned iran being an emerging threat. Can you tell me really in the context of maybe another six months reset on your training, but more importantly, based on your current funding streams and your current plan, are we going to be able to widen that gap again, or is this just a matter of staying slightly ahead of our adversaries . Right now i think the most likely scenario is were staying slightly ahead of our adversaries because were trying to do so much foundational work, if you will. As i said previously, trying to overcome a very different approach. Its not a criticism of that approach, it was a totally different world. It led to a different prioritization, it led to a different level of effort and a different investment strategy. Clearly, were going to have to change that, and were changing that at a time when budgets are going down and threats not just in cyber, but more broadly are proliferating. I dont envy the choices secretary carter and the leadership has to make. Theres nothing easy here. The most likely scenario for us is how can we focus on the best investments that maximize defensive capability while continuing to help us retain the advantage we do have right now against most. Thank you. And this question may be for secretary work. The announcement about the agreement with china that were not going to, basically, attack each other in the face of the compelling evidence that we have that chinas done it in the past, and theyve denied it. Why is this agreement a positive thing if with the smoking gun information we have right now on prior attacks, theft of intellectual property, commercial data, that we have a pretty strong base of evidence to say that theyre guilty of it. If they deny it, why does this agreement mean anything . Well, in the buildup to this visit we made it very clear through a wide variety of efforts that this was going to be something that was foremost in the discussions when president xi came. We have made it as clear as we possibly can at every single level from the president on down that the chinese cyber activities are unacceptable, and we believe that this is a good first step as a confidenceBuilding Measure where china can either demonstrate that they are serious about establishing some norms and going after cyber crimes, etc. But the proof will be in the pudding. I agree with director perhapser or and clapper and admiral rogers, its going to be up to the chinese to demonstrate theyre serious about this. Would the manipulation of commercial data fall within the definition of theft under this agreement . Well, specifically, one part of it is the theft of ip, intellectual property, for commercial advantage in se, for example in say, for example, a Chinese State enterprise. And we have agreed, at least we have made a tentative agreement that we will not do those type of activities. China has done those activities in the past. It will be up to them to prove that they wont do it in the future. And then for anyone, and then ill yield. I know the committees gone on a while. At what point, i think senator hendrick made some important points about drawing red lines, but at what point are we going to have clear red lines about activities in cyberspace being acts of war and then have appropriate responses whether they be through cyber, sanctions or whatever . When are we going to get that clarity . Because we dont have it today. Senator, i dont believe we will ever have a onesizefitsall definition for these types of things. Every single attack will have to be handled on a casebycase basis, and you will have to judge the damage that was caused, who made the attack. Was it just a nonstate actor or a malicious hacker . Wed have to go after that person in terms of criminal activity. I dont believe were ever going to have a specific definition that says if this happens, we will trigger this response. Each one will be handled on a casebycase basis and be proportional. Thank you. Mr. Chair, the lack of clarity, though, the only concern i have is youre not establishing some level of known deterrent, and thats why i understand the complexities of it. Ive worked in the field. But i think that without that clarity, youre more likely to have more things that youre going to have to look at and figure out how to do a situational response. Thank you, mr. Chair. Thank you, mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today on a really important topic. I believe, and i was looking for the transcript at the joint press conference between president xi and president obama that the president of china, i think, publicly stated that they dont engage in these kind of cyber activities. Was that an accurate statement . If that was, indeed, what he said . In terms of cyber warfare . Its pretty remarkable if youre in a press conference with another head of state and you just Say Something that seems to be pretty blatantly false. We were unaware of the negotiations, but at least from, normally intelligence wouldnt be a voice or shape of a pulse agreement like this between two heads of state. I think our responsibility is to report what they do. We participated in the build up of the visit in terms of policy development, et cetera. But in terms of what went on between the two leaders of the nations, we were not directly consulted. And i was aware of the ongoing process, and like secretary work, same thing, part of a broad effort in preparation. You didnt see the terms of this agreement before, did you, mr. Secretary . Lets assume, you know, kind of past is prologue, talking intellectual property. As you know our country has been trying to get the chinese to stop stealing u. S. Intellectual property for decades really, and it hasnt really worked out very well. Lets assume that, tha at this agreement, that there is some additional cyber theft that we can attribute to china. What would you recommend the actions of the United States should be, particularly in light of this agreement . I wouldnt be able to enter that. I would have to know what the degree of the activity would be. Be. Lets the and of opm kind of activity. I think the department of defense would recommend a very vigorous response. Mr. Secretary, just give me a sense of what that would be. Sanctions, retaliation . Could be any of those, senator, maybe all of the above. Depend upon the severity of the activity. But again i know this, i know this is a big point of contention with the committee. We are serious about cost and position, and our statement is if you participate in this activity, we will seek some type of measure which imposes costs upon you. We just do not think its a proportional cyber attack. It may be something entirely different like a criminal indictment or sanctions or some other thing spin let me ask a related question for all three of you. I know youve been discussing this, im sorry, can i go, kind of going over areas weve already discussed but help us think through the issues of rules of engagement. We have rules of engagement in so many other spheres of the military that are well established. How do we think through these issues which i think somewhere saw the fundamental aspects of what we do in response to Cyber Attacks . Admiral kime do you want to take a stab at that . You look at the defensive side im pretty comfortable weve got a good, broad recognition of what is permissible within the rules of engagement framework. Do we . Between us and other nations . If you define it between us and other nations, i apologize, i thought your question was in a dod kind of responsive framework. If you want to expand it to broader set of nations then its probably fair to say no. I would agree. I think when it comes to offensive, if youre thinking about offensive cyber warfare, we probably do not have defined rules of engagement. I agree with what director clapper said earlier that this really is the wild west right now. Theres a lot of activity going on both from nationstate actors all the way down to criminals. And so sorting through each of the different attacks and trying to attribute it happened and who it came from and who was responsible for it, all demand specific responses on these attacks. But i agree totally with the committee that we need to strengthen our deterrent posture, and the best way to do that is continue to work through these things and make sure that everyone knows that there will be some type of cost. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. The committee would also like to know when its going to be a policy that would fit into these attacks, and then would be much more easily responded to if we had a policy as mandated by the 2014 Defense Authorization bill. I thank the witnesses for a very helpful hearing. I know that theyre very busy and the committee appreciate your appearance here today. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. [inaudible conversations] coming up to date live at 12 15 p. M. Eastern a date livet 12 15 p. M. Eastern a look at health care of able and costs. Posted by the alliance for Health Reform on capitol hill. Active held today at 4 00 eastern when the senate gavels in. They will be considered the nomination of u. S. District judge for the Eastern District of california with a confirmation vote at 5 30 p. M. Later this senate likely to consider report on the authorizing 2016 defense programs. The house returns tuesday at noon eastern with legislative business at 2 00 and later the house agenda includes a number of energy bills including one that would lift the 40 year old ban on crude oil exports. On thursday House Republicans are expected to meet off the foretold pashtun cold leadership elections. Spring as the Supreme Court starts the new turn cspan debuts its new series, landmark cases. We take a look at the real story behind the famous marbury v. Madison case coming into the heated political battles between outgoing president jon adams, the new president Thomas Jefferson and the newly appointed chief justice jon marshall. Jon marshall established the court as the interpreter of the constitution in his famous decision he wrote of marbury v. Madison. Marbury v. Madison is probably the most famous case this court ever decided. Joined the discussion, landmark cases, exploring 12 historic Supreme Court rulings by repeating the life and times of the people who were the plaintiffs and lawyers and justices. Landmark cases premieres live tonight at 9 p. M. Eastern on cspan, cspan3 and cspan radio. For background on each case while you watch order your copy of landmark cases companion book at cspan. Org landmarkcas cspan. Org landmarkcases. Tonight on the communicators, chip pickering, ceo of comp teg, ceo of comp tell discusses3 communicators, chip pickering, ceo of comp tell discusses spectrum auctions, negative and other issues involving you, broadband and television. As the legacy Telephone Companies transitions from copper and something called tdm, and all technology, circuitswitched, to ip, new technology and new networks, how do we make sure that our public safety, the 911, how do we make sure that competition that has taken root in the marketplace especially in the business marketplace continues and thrives . How do we make sure that our critical institutions, schools, libraries, hospitals, first responders, the services that they depend on those networks, how do they go into the next technology, this transition with everything being sustain and improve . I. T. Is what we all want to get more efficient, it lowers the prices. Tonight at eight eastern on the key indicators on cspan2. Cspan resort sat down with the chair of the Judiciary Committee, bob goodlatte, to put your upcoming landmark cases series. Heres our interview. House to share chairman of good luck, i wanted to start in our conversation about the Supreme Court and its history with understanding the role of your committee and the federal court specifically, the Supreme Court. What is your responsibility . The Judiciary Committee was established in 1813 years bash the 1813 to a couple years ago. We celebrate our 200th anniversary and it deals with a wide array of issues but one of the things that i love most about it is a deals with the isis constitution and the amendments. Any new commitments that are introduced into congress to amend the constitution are referred to the Judiciary Committee. Even in the other areas that we work we are constantly trying to refer back to the constitution for guidance on what is appropriate legislation and what is not. When i became chairman of the committee we also had instituted a rule that house of representatives that required and when introduced to build unity site that Constitutional Authority for the legislation. That continues on into existing congress. Whenever a member introduce a bill that required to point to section at the constitution that they think justifies of that. And, of course, every member gets to look at that. Before i became chairman of the committee i suggested to our leadership it would be good to read the constitution, and we did that for the very first time in the beginning of the congress in 2011. We have done it twice more since then, and very strong bipartisan support. Dozens, in fact over 100 members usually come down and read pieces of the constitution. I asked my staff when we started doing it to check to see when the last time the tragic constitution was read on the floor of the house of representatives in its entirety by anybody, not by a large group of people, just by anyone. It turns out that it was 1800 never. It had never been read on the floor before. We are trying to promote interest in the constitution and would welcome cspans effort to do that as well. As regards to the way the constitution lays out the responsibilities of the court, what is your understanding of what the framers had in mind for the judicial system, specifically the Supreme Court . I think the framers had in mind the Supreme Court would resolve specific dispute that the congress designated to them and the constitution designated to them or their original jurisdiction which was set forth in article iii, and anything else that the Congress Might add or take away. One of the earliest decisions was the case of marbury v. Madison which involved the new chief justice, jon marshall, deciding a case, a rather small case to get involved a maryland federalist who was appointed in the closing days of the Adams Administration to a justice of the peace position. There are lots of them done right as adams was leaving office in Thomas Jefferson was coming in. The responsibility of getting these actual appointments deliver to the people, so his official they were a justice of the peace, was right behind time and it didnt get them all done. So the outgoing secretary of state, who interestingly also happened to be john marshall, it was secretary of state in the Adams Administration, he said the new secretary of state will have to finish delivering them. The Jefferson Administration didnt like these people getting these positions and they didnt deliver anymore after they took office. Marbury sued james madison, the new secretary of state, for a compelling of the delivery of that appointment. That is what came to the Supreme Court with a new chief justice just appointed by the Previous Administration to decide. He decide it in a very interesting way that has had ramifications all down through the last 200 plus years. They determined that he was entitled to the appointment, that madison had an obligation to deliver it, but he decided that the sprinkler t could not have jurisdiction over the case because the congress had, the suit was based upon their original jurisdiction and congress had given them no authority to decide this case. So its an interesting decision. It actually, in the small perspective, limited the courts power. We dont have the power to decide this. They essentially said you are entitled to this but we are not the ones to give it to you. He wound up not getting his justice of peace appointed. Many people have taken that as the key case for the unis the key case for the United States Supreme Court being able to decide the ultimate constitutionality of an issue that comes before the court. I would argue thats not the case. I think that decision was narrower come into it was a decision based upon the Supreme Court determining what the powers that congress had under the constitution and what powers the quartet under the constitution in that narrow decision. And nonetheless it caused a furor at the time. Jefferson was hugely critical of this. One of the issues was well, should the chief justice have recused himself . He was a party to the underlying action that was a site indicates. He was the sexiest it was responsive and for delivering these. Today i think the moderate Supreme Court may well about justice recuse himself from the case. But he did not. He decided that case and then tested for Different Things to different people down through the last 200 years. In fact marbury taught in virtually every High School Civics book come as a little decision for the Supreme Court establishing judicial review. Some of the historians weve been talking to suggested that for the next 50 or so the court did very little of this but at a certain point you begin to assert itself more. What do you think of its role today in terms of judicial review, and how much i it has taken upon itself in this area . I think the court has been mistakenly relying on marbury for something that goes beyond what the actual decision made gone too far. In a number of decisions with regard to getting involved in constitutional decisions or other decisions that are either not to be found at the constitution and yet they found something there, or not finding something that i think most people today looking back wouldve found that it shouldve been there. One of the worst decisions the Supreme Court ever ruled upon was the wellknown dred scott decision, where a slave in missouri moved to illinois, established his freedom in illinois and then went back to missouri to sue for declaration that he was a United States citizen. The court found that he was not a United States citizen. I think most people would truly scratch their head. It necessitated after the civil war having the 13th amendment making it clear that having been born into United States he was a United States citizen. But the other issue there was that they took a compromise, legislation passed by the congress and signed into law by the president , the missouri compromise and ruled it unconstitutional. How that change the course of history and led to the civil war is an interesting historic discussion. But the underlying decision about that was in my opinion very, very wrongheaded. And so thats an example of where the court i think stepped in where it should not have and exceed its authority under the law. Can you take a line straight from the to some of the review of legislation that the court has taken upon itself today . I think you can look at several decisions. Certainly the marbury decision and look at some recent decisions that would i think not be found to be the correct position. I personally believe that the decision in roe v. Wade is not found in any constitutional language and that the court again stepped in and interfere with loss of 46 states in that case, and thats caused a tremendous amount of difficulty and anguish over that period of time. And i hope that someday as people saw with regard to the dred scott decision that the rights of unborn children are deserving of constitutional protections that can be found in that document. Ruled the way it is the final of the 12 cases we selected, in the 1973 decision to as you suggest congress when there is tied up in knots over whether the abortion issue and funding for planned parenthood. It seems as though that 1973 decision settled nothing with regard to this. The court it did because it certainly established, it overturned the loss of a number of states and the states have been busy over the ensuing years and figure what the law means and passing new legislation which is come back to the Supreme Court many, many, many times over the last now 30, over 40 years ago. That i think would be better left to those states determining in the first place. But thats the decisions were faced with now, and we legislate in the congress, and then if we pass a law it can be challenged and taken to see whether it meets the Supreme Courts standards or not. I frankly think this is an area where the Supreme Court has found something in the constitution that does not exist in the constitution, and usurped the legislative powers of the states and of the congress. So the Supreme Court and generally has the last word in cases like this, and when society continues to royal opera topics such as abortion, what redress is a very to a Supreme Courts decision . Is it congressional legislation would be the only arbiter to change the law . The Supreme Court rendered a decision, and its very interesting because technology has changed dramatically in 42 years. I think that is play the role in peoples attitude about this issue changing. Mothers and fathers have much more information about that baby and what stage of growth it is in the womb. The ability to keep children alive after theyr they are born prematurely has changed dramatically since that time. The ability to know more about everything about a pregnancy has changed significantly. If you look at some of the technology that people used back in a time of the, we use in other aspects of our lives today, you would understand that that has changed dramatically. I think that increase information has given more understanding of that life, that more and more people i think want to see p life, that more and more people i think want to see protected. We are faced with no Supreme Court decision that inhibits that but states have passed laws, and the congress has, to come and when did they can be challenged in the court comes back and says that meets that standard or that disappeared the other thing that could happen would be simply overturning the law and saying, that is just an old perspective about what life means. So you can compare that to the plessy v. Ferguson case, not one on your list, but one military dramatically changed later on. Versus ferguson was a decision by the Supreme Court in the 1890s that said it was okay with the 14th amendment to the constitution to offer africanamericans and other people, races other than the white race, separate but equal facilities, and that case was i think the commendations on railroads. But it was didnt apply to virtually every aspect of life, schools to drink a found. It was okay. Met of the equal protection of the law as provided in the 14th amendment to the constitution as long as it be separate as long as was equal. They were not equal, number one, but that i think in an and of itself is a simple part not in the spirit of the 14th amendment but it took all the way into brown v. Board of education case in the early 1950s, nine to nothing decision that said no, thats not what the 14th amendment of the constitution means. It overturned the prior decision. That doesnt happen very often. Some people believe that times change, maybe that should happen more often. There is a doctrine, a principle called stare decisis which causes the court to base all its decisions on the prior precedents. If the precedent is built on sand, on a weak foundation, in my opinion that shouldnt stand. And so thats what the Court Struggles with women have to deal with the fact that peoples minds change and Technology Changes when we know becomes more perfected and refined. Now, plessy did not make our livelist painfully because we cd only get 12 but brown v. Board did. Im wondering about is the typical year in American Society with the Michael Brown shooting and the charleston shootings and the black lives matter movement. What do you think about how to establish Race Relations in society and where its brought us to todays . This is a long transition from a horrific start we got. The great people who wrote our constitution, many of them owned slaves at the time. They struggled with addictive look at the debates and discussion they struggled with it but it didnt resolve it. Its taken a number of different important events in our history to move forward on that, including the civil war, which involved this issue of slavery. There were other issues involved in the civil as well but theres no doubt that slavery was a part of that as well. And then after the support these constitutional amendments were adopted to assure certain like looking at a bad taste like plessy v. Ferguson which said we do of the 14th amendment buddy means you can do everything separately over here for these people and keep them segregated from other people over here as long as it is equal. Thats a very bad decision to we were making progress but i do that case as a setback. Then you move forward to brown v. Board of education which is a hugely important step in the right direction in finding that the 14th amendment does not mean separate but equal. But it largely leads to the states and to the federal government to work through making sure that the laws are enacted respect the 14th amendment. So you have the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights act and this is what i think the species need to be addressed by the peoples elected representatives. And more that that is done rather than relying on court cases, the more youre going to i think a growing respect for the rule of law, and the court should step in as a poet did in brown v. Board, but they should step in only when theres a clear intention on the constitution by the federal government or a state legislature taking action that clearly does not comply with the constitution. I know in the post might have worked a particular event is for you and all members of congress is the war against terrorism. Wanted to get a case or to injure that just has some antecedents in the. Were going to be looking at the korematsu case, ma japanese internment is doing woodwork to. But korematsu was eventually awarded the medal of honor by the present and accounted for only apologize. These days an activist in this issue all the way to the end of his life at age 86. And, in fact, he filed friend of the court briefs in some of the Guantanamo Bay cases, and jose padilla case but im wondering what you think about the courts review of policy with regard to the war on terror and some of the antecedents to that . Well, this is an issue that is very important to respect the rights again under the bill of rights and the 14th amendment to the constitution. And we need to make sure that our laws are respectful of that, but this is also a place where theres been an evolution in thinking. The idea of interning people of one race because they might be somehow a threat to the security of the United States would also add germanamericans and italian americans and we didnt enter them, nor should we have, was really an example more of racism that was of coherent military policy. But either way that policy was a very flawed one. When you look at some of the issues today with regard to foreign nationals who have committed terrorist acts are members of terrorist organizations, i think that gets the different treatment. I do, for example, the prisoners at guantanamo as being enemy combatants. We dont have a declaration of war like we did in world war ii, and you dont have a country to declare war against when you talk to alqaeda as we were in that case and you could do with regard to some other tours organizations today like i says. But these people are engaged in war against the United States. So detaining them bother is this ongoing coordinated effort to threaten the United States is, i think, a legitimate thing that the administration did to detain them in guantanain them in guantanamo. There are questions to be resolved in basically the way they are being resolved with regard to those prisoners is one prisoner at the time. The population has been reduced by other countries agreeing to take some of them. Some people being released for our variety of different reasons, the old question is when you have an undeclared war on terrorism, what is, when does the justification for holding somebody and . Well, one way would be if people were of the opinion that there was no longer a threat from the organization that they were essentially military actors for. Another way would be a if the process had simply exhausted itself over a period of time. I believe that there are certain types of actions taken by people who are a threat to the United States that simply cannot be handled as a normal criminal prosecution. A threat to the United States as a military terrorist operation and not because they had committed a specific crime. So you detain him like to be prisoners of. The prisoners of war havent violated any american law and have simply been engaged as enemy combatants for the country. These people were enemy combatants for a terrorist organization. I think thats the parallel for being able to detain people. Thats like a case of taking lawabiding american citizens who are not involved in anything and saying that you collectively could potentially be a threat to our security during this war with japan and, therefore, will take you away from your homes and put you in a separate facility asomes and put you in a separate facility as a result of that. There is not come in my opinion, any comparison between guantanamo detainees, the japanese internment of world war ii. One of the other cases were looking at in our history seri ii. One of the other cases were looking at in our history series is, was out of an earlier war, world war i, and thats the First Amendment case. Pistorius look at that as a turning point for the evaluation of the First Amendment and abroad our rights are in society. Again kind of thinking about the war on terror and incitement for people to join care organizations, do you see the First Amendment right as a properly guarded in Society Today . Are they being threatened by peoples concern about the kinds of messages that might be spread . I think it is so important that we defend First Amendment rights. Our constitution and our freedoms do not guarantee people that they will not be insulted by somebody else. And i think that there are lots of things that people talk about in a free society for somebody else may be offended by. So theomebody else may be offended by. So the our limited areas of free speech where you find limitations, like you cant shout fire in a crowded theater. You cant threaten somebody verbally, a verbal assault, if you will. There are other types of cases like that where freedom of speech is limited. Child pornography would be another example of that. But i think overall our society is served by allowing freedom. Just recently i wrote to 152 public universities around the country who have basically speech codes that simply say heres what you can say, heres what you cant say. Theres a National Organization called fire that basically looks at every public university, probably private ones, too, and rates based on whether theyre promoting free speech on the campuses or not. And i think theres been too much of an effort to try to control peoples attitudes and feelings and so on i tell them what they can say and what they cant see. I think that is very concerning with regard to promoting free speech under the First Amendment of the constitution. Weve gotten some positive responses back from schools with said in a School Systems around the country, who have said we are concerned about making sure that free speech is to be protected and were looking at our policies today to see if we can make changes to them. We have only about five m can make changes to them. We have only about five minutes left and so it issues to talk about. I wanted to get one of the cases, youngstown on the record because this congress has had some potholes with president obama about executive power. That case and the korean war was about Harry Trumans seizure of the sseizure of the steel mills and the Supreme Court said hes going to for. It was a big test of executive power. Have there been, what is the status do you think of the of the separation of powers and the limits on executive power and what is the courts role . The youngstown case was a very, very important case, a very good case because assembly narrowly ruled the president says hes going to seize steel mills in the United States and have recovered operate them. The steel mills challenge that and say well, winner in all the laws of our country does the president have this authority . It certainly not to be found in our constitution and also not to be found in any law passed by the Congress Giving the president that authority. The president had taken the authority under which he played with executive powers and was simply turned back by the court, a very decisive and important decision. Id like to see the court step up more and make decisions like that when the congress or the private sector challenges the part of the executive branch. We have a president today came to the congress as president to do with his came to the congress as president to do with his long list of things can every president does not, that they would like the congress to enact, changed the policies. But he did Something Different that id never seen before. At the end of that he said, and if you dont do it, i will. I was so does when we members of his own party and the congress stood up and gave him a standing ovation for the president saying if you dont exercise your Constitutional Authority, i will exercise it for you. He doesnt have the authority to do that. So when we recently got a dish Court Decision giving the Congress Standing where we challenge the president , taking money to spend on an aspect of the Affordable Care act, that the congress had not appropriate for the purpose, and the judge found that the congress, the house of representatives had voted a majority vote to take this up, she found that we did have standing to make that challenge. Thats a very important decision. They will be going through the appeals process here in coming months and perhaps years. But making that clear that the congress has the article i power to write the laws also has the authority to challenge the executive branch in court when the president usurps that power is an absolutely important to thats what youngstown stood for. With the private sector challenging because those two countries could show they were harmed but i think the people of the country and our constitution is harmed when the Congress Passes a law, president of Something Different than the congress as well, the president has usurped our powers under the constitution. We want to challenge that incorporate the court should take those cases and decide them. In our closing minutes you point to dred scott as one of the worst if not the worst decision ever made by the court. If you do look across the court system point to a shining example of a core function welcome would be a case you were i will give you too. They came up very close to ech other so most of them, something going on in the court and early 1950s, but the youngstown case that we just talked about was a very iyoungstown case that we just talked about was a very important case in terms of determining that the president can not exceed his powers under the constitution and the laws, nor can he usurp nor can it legislate as that power is reserved for the congress. And then just short time thereafter the brown v. Board of education case which is said that separate but equal was repugnant to the constitution and was not okay with the 14th amendment. Welcome happily for both made onto our shortlist of 12 landmark cases. Thank you very much free time and talk about the Supreme Court and its history and its role in society. Thank you, susan. Tonight at 9 00 eastern the first in our new series landmark cases. We will look at marbury v. Madison which established the basis for judicial review of giving the Supreme Court the power to invalidate acts of other branches of government. Heres an overview of our new series. Student can its annual documentary competition for students in grades six through 12 is an opportunity for students to think critically of issues of National Importance by credit of five to seven minute document in which they can express those views. And support to get involved because it gives them the opportunity and a platform have their voices heard on issues that are important to them. So they can express those views by creating a documentary. We do get a wide range of entries. The most important aspect for every document that we cant is going to be content with that winners in the past created just by using a cell phone and with others that are created using more hightech equipment but once again i its really the content that matters and shines through. The response has been great. Thereve been many different issues that have created for use on that important to them. With topics ranging from education, economy and environment issuing a widespread issues that are important for students spent having more water in the river would have many positive impacts to better serve the community and the business businesses. We have come to the consensus that humans cannot run without food. Prior to the individuals with the dispose and education act, or the idea, children with disabilities were not given the opportunity of an education. This just think it is road to the white house, whats most important issue you want for tenders to discuss in the 2016 president ial campaign. It is full on into the camp3 president ial campaign. It is full on into the campaign season. There are different candidates discussing several issues. One of the key requirements is to include some cspan footage. This footage should really conflict and further point of view and not just dominate the video. The first bill i was cited is the Water Resources reform and Development Act also know as wrrda spent weve all heard the jokes up school meals and going up, bert fish sticks industry made tacos. Theres a vital the federal government plays. Its especially vital for students with disabilities. Students and teachers can go to our website. It is studentcam. Org and they will find more information about the rules and requirements but they will also find teacher tips, rubrics two of them incorporate it into the classroom, more information about prices and corporate cspan video and ways to contact us if you have further questions. The deadline is january 20, 2016 which is exactly one year away from the next president ial inauguration. Live now to capital for discussions about Health Care Availability and cost projection with officials were in charge of state level insurance exchanges. This is been hosted by the alliance for Health Reform. [inaudible conversations] okay, going to go ahead and get started. Welcome to todays briefing on the third open Enrollment Period which im sure everybody in the room knows begins november 1. We are going to be talking today about what to expect, premiums, deductibles, other costs, trends in the kinds of Insurance Products that will be offered, challenges and signing up the remaining uninsured population and a whole lot more. On health of our honorary cochairman Senators Ben Cardin and roy blunt i like to welcome you educate the Commonwealth Fund for being our partners in this event. Moderated with me today is sara collins to my right and shes Vice President of the Health Care Coverage and Access Program at commonwealth. Im going to introduce the rest of our speakers. To my far left is jon gabel, senior fellow at the university of chicago. Cori uccello isnt actually at the american academy