[inaudible conversations] good afternoon everybody. Im a Senior Research professor for the budgetary assessment and it is my pleasure to welcome you here for a discussion of this book softcover and the necessity of military force. What we are going to do because the author should always have the last word even if he doesnt, we will give up the last word so what im going to do is first turned to my colleague for his comment and i will turn to my other colleague at the Global Affairs for his comment. Then we will turn to the author and opened th open the floor tor your question and go from there. With no further ado. Its great to be here. I think its important to remember the important part of the book event is to sell books for the office i think all of you need to get a copy of the book particularly the Television Audience you need to get a copy. Its available on amazon. And its a very important book. We are making on groundhogs day and that is very apropos. For those that dont know, he saw his shadow so they are in for another six weeks of winter. The movie groundhog day is this one of my favorite. In some sense i think that is a metaphor for what the professor is writing about because every so often, the United States needs to learn that military power is important and we learned that lesson after world war ii and korea and vietnam. And i think we now have to learn it again. As a now lapsed diplomat having been the practitioner for 30 years, i certainly associate myself with the comments that George Kennan made although hes not my favorite Foreign Service officer but hes so that the diplomat in 1946 in addressing the National War College in the u. S. No idea how much it contributes to the politeness of diplomacy to have a little quiet armed force in the background. The existence of the forces he said is probably the most important single instrumentality in the u. S. Foreign policy, and i agree they use them as sometimes they think the service wants to do but it does mean it has the ability of military power. The diplomacy that the former secretary engaged in over the last year and a half would be exhibit a. He begins his book by the way i want to say about more than the use of military power and hard power. Its a book about the role of the United States and the International System and by hard power and the alliance sustain sustained. The challenges that we faced fae multiplicity of challenges and the form of russia, the continuing challenge and the danger of the failing states to the International Order and how the u. S. Military power can address those challenges and she concludes the book to give you a sense of what you will read if you take my advice and go out and buy it there is also some good propositions about how one ought to think about the use of force because like i said i dont think that i or he would argue that its called upon. The challenges that he describee describes i will end on this note and turn to my colleague. The challenges he describes in asia and europe and the middle east to me are very reminiscent and i think that he agrees the book supports this, the kind of challenges to stat statesmen fan the period. I wanted to conclude my remarks with a quotation from Winston Churchill on a book the gathering storm which speak to what the professor addressed in his book and also the current moment. He says it is his purpose as someone who lived and acted during the period to show how easily the tragedy could have been prevented and it was reinforced and how the democratic states unless they are welded into larger organisms lack the persistence that can give security to humble masses and how even in the matters of self preservation no policy is pursued for ten or 15 years at a time we shall see how the councils of restraint may become the prime age and of danger and how the middle course adopted the safety and a quiet life may be found directly to the bullseye of disaster and we should see how absolute the International Action pursued by many states across the years are irrespective of the ebb and flow of national politics. It is a pleasure to be here and have the chance to offer some comments on a terrific book by someone i consider a colleague and a friend and i suppose i could go on at some length about the virtues of the book but to get a sense of god you just read the glowing reviews that have been written everywhere from the New York Times to the wall street journal to the Weekly Standard to get a sense of how good it is. In the interest of providing some broad discussion discussiot briefly mention five thoughts. One where i violently disagree with him and for that have to do with the state of the military power today where i suspect we violently agree. The first one, and this is in the best interest of the academic hairsplitting i will take issue with the three paragraphs i didnt like as opposed to the 225 pages that i did. Elliott knows what im going with this. He slays the dragon of the grand strategy in the book by pointing out any sort of intellectual design or theory or blueprint plan isnt going to survive very long in the real world and that comes from teaching the class in the title. Let me push back because i think that your critique is well taken but he may be critiquing a strawman version of the strategies of if you believe it is a stepbystep plan that can lend to the Foreign Policy thann you are right it is hopeless and dangerous but i would say most people that argue with the strategy think that its something a little bit different and perhaps more modest but its a basic set of principles and ideas that are how you interact with the chaotic world and adapt in thadeath in the face of the unforeseen events. Its what is most important to me and what are the things that threaten that and then how can i apply the sources i have to get the good stuff. If you take that as a definition, you can find a lot of historical examples done very well from fdr to truman and beyond and furthermore i would point out i think the grand strategy is i can see it is essential to the good Defense Strategy and decisionmaking as the wow client because you have to have a grand strategy and some conception of how the pieces of the Foreign Policy fit together to note what interests are worth fighting for and which ones are not. Its difficult without a conception of what you are trying to achieve so i would say the grand strategy isnt the enemy. Its actually the ally. The second point in this gets to the area we probably agree had to do with what you described very nicely as the american hand. I loved this chapter of the book because it is a great job of laying out the numerous strengths the United States have and how the rumors have been exaggerated in the past and may be so today. But the counterpoint of that and i think you would agree is although in a global level, the United States has great advantages over any challenger at a regional level it is important because the key challenges and competition today are not global in scope your regional in scope. They could actually defend the baltics. There is a crucial distinction i think all of us have to keep in mind when thinking about the question of how strong is the american hand. Hand. The eldest record when it comes to the capabilities certainly did in the key regions which is where the rubber hits the road i think we are headed for trouble with if we are not there already and that would lead to the third point that addresses very nicely when you look at the regional balance as it isnt just us but make up the equation. U. S. Allies arent big part of it and added immensely to the strengths. Most of them are declined and that is bad. You point out how the capabilities and allies have basically fallen off a cliff in the past 20 years and that decline is adding tremendously to the difficulties we face. Its making for harper sites. Its undercutting the ability to contribute to places like the middle east at a time when the instability is pronounced as weve seen the past 20 years with nearly all of the conflic conflicts. Theyve brought us to the table in each of those and because the strategy has always been a Coalition Strategy that is a significant problem. It is an issue of the strategic solvency. We are approaching the point of the strategic consultancy where we and our allies simply cannot do the things we have traditionally done that weve pledged to do and we think we ought to be able to do. The United States doesnt have an authentic capacity anymore and this is problematic because we face a problem now in all of the theaters that we care about and this one believes it raises some troubling questions where we are headed. I think we are approaching a stark choice and this is something we are working on right now. We are have to pay significantly more to maintain the Defense Strategy that we have enjoyed or we have to become accustomed to doing less and guaranteeing less in the world. We should take the first choice and do that without breaking the bank if you are willing to make some difficult adjustments with respect to entitlement spending and revenues but the gap has become too big to ignore and that is a fundamental question going forward. This brings me to the final point of the book flagged for me and another one you would agree with which is the military power is crucial to the Foreign Policy and International Order that isnt enough and we are reminded of this every day now. You can imagine a scenario in which the United States opens up on the military spending and which we reinvest. In this scenario weve undercut our alliances and pursue trade policies that work against the international and national prosperity. We have stopped reassuring countries around the world. Weve decimated the reputation for the steadfastness and reliability. That is not such a crazy scenario these days. So yes the importance but also to all the other aspects of the state craft and policy that made the nation so great. I want to thank my friends and colleagues here and thank you all for being here. With the colleagues and students ive had in this remarkable institution which brings together this unique mix of history and policy and practice i look at my three colleagues all distinguished scholars with government experience and i hope thats made the book distincti distinctive. I always thought you then do it anyway that is out of the public square. So i wrote this book with the intention that it would be read by people that are not students of military affairs and dont normally think about it and would be pleased with the New York Times review which was by somebody that was an expert on these kind of issues and it may be the nicest compliment ive gotten which is it is organized like a bento box. [laughter] i will take that. And finally i think part of the tradition is simple and spirited so we will do that, to bac. I will say one of the things about the writings in the book one of the most challenging parts was the chapter called 15 years of war and that in part this because i felwas because io tackle the questions in iraq and those that i myself have been engaged in advocating. That was very tough to do and im not entirely sure how i did it because it meant looking hard at the things i thought before but i no longer think. On the other hand i would also say having been in the thick of it it makes it harder to be a dispassionate observer and critic and analyst. One of the great things is it enables you to do that. We have a seat for you right over here. Let me move from that because it gets to the corner of the book. The disagreement may be semantics what you call strategy i call policy. My general editorial principle is one word is always better than to. I just prefer t the word policyo there is some kind of a disagreement about how effective policymaking gets done and its partly because at any time theres an enormous uncertainty in a particular mixture of people and so forth but i think that is going to be an even bigger problem now. I quite agree with you you have to have some general principles and ideas. Those will only give you limited guidance. The more important thing is how you go about in the midst of the fault struggling with things. I think the three of us would agree one of the difficulties that we have is although the american hand is very strong, we can really screw it up and have some of you know weve already gotten off to a good start in a couple of weeks doing that. Particularly in the way that you described and that is blowing up the alliance relationships. I would have been more optimistic about the relationships because as you said as i point out in the book for example theyve fallen off the cliff but you have india coming up in a different way smaller part is like vietnam. But all of that takes effort. Eric edelman is in diplomacy and i learned from him how its done. Im not joking about that. One of the things i learned from him is what George Shultz said, its like gardening. You constantly have to be tending to your allies. Each of those reachable balances is more difficult and i argue in the book there is strategic challenges that we face that are different with different ways of thinking. So this is a much more precarious situation than in the past. If you have asked me a year ago the reason i would say im writing the book is its got the precarious but i think if we play it the right way, we will be able to make the world we are in. Weve been joined by president ron daniels and we would like to give him the opportunity to make any remarks that he would like. Either any from the audience or the podium. [inaudible] wonderful to have you. I will say something. The motto is the truth will make you free. Read the book and see if you agree or disagree. There is a very particular question. With close to the time that it actually appeared and it went through multiple revisions and it would be reasonably satisfied with what is here in the speeches but theres got to be something. There has to be something. They wish you added you didnt need the word limit so what is it that you could do in the directors cut . It increasingly gets me when i talk about the book that we are having the great debate about the american foreignpolicy that was triggered by the end of the cold war. Of the cold war consensus grew out of world war ii but doesnt solidify until when the United States will be a global power. And it will help create global institutions and set up the rules of the road that will be deployed with military power to back up our diplomacy. And that will bear the burdens as i point out they are considerable in terms of loss of lifes treasurer and so on. It was basically a national consensus. I would say pretty much throughout the cold war when at the end of the soviet union and communism, there should have been a general resentment. That didnt happen. Why didnt it have been . There are two fundamental reasons. One, you had to period where predominance was cheap. We didnt pay for the first gulf war and we were in a surplus that is unheard of. Casualties were very low so you heahad over a decade where predominance was cheap so why even discuss it. Then the crisis of 9 11 and everything that followed from it. So in some ways this is the delayed version of that. The Second Thought has to do with the nature of the policy. Thats not what most people like i do now. We argue with each other about all kinds of things which the vast majority of americans couldnt care less about. Wouldve been like to be clear about my views with donald trump. [laughter] you have an opportunity to clarify. Will open it up for questions, and i and i do make question. More concise, the better. You can just wait if theres a microphone on its way as we speak. Regarding our speaking of the recently elected president , he had a rather contentious or illadvised relationship with the Prime Minister of australia. What impact might he have with our close alliances over the next four years. Have a lot of expertise round here. My take would be Something Like this. In the worstcase it serious, maybe not irreparable but serious damage to alliance right relationships that mean a lot to us. This really thing tries us crazy. I think we go an awful lot. These are our closest allies. We have fought alongside them more than we have fought with the brits. They are culturally just like us. If you have to go to war these are the people you want to go to war with. And to insult the Prime Minister of australia with the first conversation with them is crazy. The question is how the australians will react. The might say the americans are much different than we think. I dont think that will happen. They might say this particular guy and mattis would sue them down or Something Like that but in the back their mind would be American People elected. That is a large part of what i worry about. I think the good news is particularly the real important ones are quite deeply institutionalized. Australian and european leaders they would have to get at theres a degree of resilience there but as the remarks that weve seen seem to be taking dead aim at what i consider two fundamental features, not just american alliances but as with america more broadly. First is the idea that the United States is a steady as she goes reliable, dependable country and it doesnt take much to get if you are an ally who counts on america be in utterly predictable thered put a great amount of importance on the opinions and exercise power in a generally benign way. I think were not necessarily going to switch term overnight. They repeatedly feel cajoled then bullied and paraded then he start to tear that fabric with the alliances as well. I agree with what was being said. I would would make a couple of additional observations. One is that although in certain quarters theres a disposition to believe what we have seen in terms of relations with mexico, the phone call the Prime Minister and the phone call that may have this is just a bumpy beginning. Most transitions are a bit rocky. As our colleagues and Thomas Wright has argued what donald trump has been writing and saying about International Affairs since he first became a public figure in the 80s, this is very consistent. He has always been complaining about trade, only the names of the guilty parties have changed. It was japan in the 80s in mexico in the 90s and now its china. As far as our allies go they have always been a bunch of freeloading exploiters along the lines that he outlined in his inaugural address. What you see is what you can get. This is his fundamental view. Second, i think its also the case that this view that allies are hearing is not just to be attributed to the views of this president. Its also view they heard from this president s predecessor. Who, and his interviews particularly in the last seven years of his presidency made it clear that he thinks American Allies are freeloading and that were getting a free ride from the United States. In many quarters youll see foreign leaders and foreign governments wrestle with the notion with, is the surpassing phenomena or something were deeply rooted in the United States. It goes back to the point where america actually elect these president s. The third observation goes back to elliotts comments about secretary scholz, he is living proof that no man is a hero is wrong. Academic International Relation tends to when it looks at alliances tends to fall generally at the proposition in my experiences government their tender shoes that need to be taken care of the impact that this will have it could be notwithstanding but how correctly said that all these alliances are institutionalized and have deep roots, it might be surprised at how quickly these relationships could come on glued. Coming your way. I havent read the book obviously, but there is an old saying that to a man with a hammer everything looks like a nail. Similarly, to a man with a powerful military things look different. Looking at just the century, would better decisions been made perhaps if the decisionmakers hadnt thought they had such a big hammer . Thats an interesting question. The problem is you might have different views about any given policy if you didnt have a really big military might not of had peace on the cold war. You guys know the trouble that you have so you may find yourselves at a time in which will begin to see what it looks like when you dont have Predominant Military power. Also on my observation of political leaders, for the most part they are pretty careful when the time comes to commit to substantial American Forces to conflict. There is something in that respect, so bring about the office of the president. Whether that will apply in this case to come i cannot be sure. What advice would you have as we were to manage what china is doing in the South China Sea is the case that is closer to them that we care about, does that change their calculation. In what way should be using our military force to affect the outcomes that we want there . I think we should care about a lot because we have large interest. In a way it goes back to subject to a booked which is rules based International Order that we help create in the aftermath of world war ii. However, it is the order that we created and it is a good order. When china gets to say if they get away with the power that they would like to you are endangering several American Allies. This is a huge piece of territory that if you look at where the chinese draw the line come again to the extent where the world the rest with our Alliance System if we failed to look after their interest we are not going to align the system left. One of the things i would put in the book that i put more in the book is a much more explicit argument of how bad things can get if we dont have that International Order, which i believe absolutely requires American Military strength. I think it could get very bad. We may say these are visual conflicts and we can pull back from one it doesnt have a bearing on another, i dont think thats the case. We live in a globalized world and these things are interconnected. If we were to pull back from that i think the consequences would be felt in the region but more globally. Whether you look at the world through the lens that elliot just described of the rules placed order that we have created after 1945 with the help of of their countries and International Institutions or if youre looking at it from the point of view of America First and more jobs for americans, our prosperity has rested historically on freedom of access to the Global Commons and particularly freedom of the seas which we have advocated since her birth as a nation. What china is doing is essentially cheap chipping away at that principle. So yes, goes to the strength of our allies put it goes to something more fundamental which is the underpinning of the entire system which the free flow of Global Commerce and International Trade and the prosperity of the world depends. For that reason thats why we care about the South China Sea or the east china sea. The challenge we face goes to the point of changing the regional balances that some of the rising regional powers where the declining regional powers exerting themselves to more completely dominate their own regions have found that they if they can take certain actions that fall below the threshold that would normally elicit a military response from us they can through a series of slices begin to chip away at this order. Were were faced with a very challenging question. As china militarize is the sandbars that theyre building, i will point to respond. When he put hq nine antiaircraft missiles to take them out then . A small military response could put us in a conflict with china. So maybe you way. Is that enough. What about if you wake up and you can no longer fly over the area this is the challenge that we face and its not just in the South China Sea. Whether the United States has territory, american citizens were represented in congress in the western pacific, pulling all the way back to u. S. Territory and pulling all the way back to guam. Thats not really we have not been a very realistic geopolitical option in any sense. To brief points. Once a echo what elliot said. I think we need to rediscover imagination of the tragic in terms of thinking about what a real breakdown of International Order can look like. We have been blessed to have this order for the past 70 years. Its hard for people to understand what can happen when things go wrong. I echo everything that is been said about the importance of the South China Sea. For any Administration Whether the c Obama Administration or the Trump Administration today, its important to have a firm idea of what youre trying to accomplish in the South China Sea and whether youre willing to use the level of coercion necessary to bring that about. Im all for taking a harder line with china. If you take the comment that Rex Tillerson made that we are going to deny china access to the islands that a bill, what is the level of coercion necessary to bring that about . Are you willing to do that. If the answer is yes as long as you understand what the consequences. If the answer is no then thats a dumb thing to say because that will make you look foolish. One must question. I tend to agree with the panels consensus about trumps a danger to alliances. But to play devils advocate and apologies to satan for the comparison. Might trumps bluster be a shock, short of military catastrophe that dozens buyer allies to contribute more to manpower and resources to collective defense. There is no argument you can make to that effect. I suppose i thought this was part of a shrewd, subtle strategy as opposed to poor impulse control i could understand it. Although i still think it is risky. That is not what to think is going on. I think there is poor impulse control. I think youre dealing with someone who is taking things very personally. Who doesnt moderate or modulate his language. Youre doing something risky to begin with and doing it with an extremely outofcontrol kind of guy. Secondly, we have have not been able, we tried. Erics old boss, secretary gates would be out there flogging the europeans. It really didnt work. What scares me is that people begin to think the United States is not reliable and think theres a serious chance americans are not reliable to think their reaction would be to say we need to rebuild to make this fair. Or would they lets just cut another deal. I think youre likely to get the second rather than the other. A number of our allies are doing things. Look at the australians in japanese. Even in europe Defense Budgets are going up. This is not the way to get it i dont think. I think theres arguments remain that trump has put his thumb on real problems i dont think thats a reasonable expectation it has been in the context in which we are also doing more swell. We are we are fighting reassurance that if used to connect out visavis the soviet union or another challenge we have your back. When you look at spending in the late 50s the bet trump seems to be making as if the United States does less, allies will have to do more. That one may not pay off. Historically it has never worked actually as a strategy. If you have allies remains one of the test he set for yourself as alliance management. As weve said said earlier on the panel it requires time and attention of senior officials particularly the secretary of state and defense. There is no doubt that we can get more out of our allies. We can get more out for reasons elliot was talking about earlier. I think they have gotten the message the Reagan National defense form for the first time that event invited a couple of foreign dignitaries to join. We had michael fallon, the secretary of defense and the Defense Ministry of norway, both said we got the message in her president obama and President Trump lot unclear. We have to step up our game and we will do that. But please, we can only do that if we have american leadership. Theres no substitute in the alliance for american leadership. I think thats important part of the equation. When we are doing more and seem to be leading we get more out of our allies. I would add a few caveats to this. Not everything we get out of our allies is necessarily their financial or military contribution to the alliance. We get a lot of value from our allies both by giving us access to territory, and geographic position. The United States cannot operate in asia. We get an enormous amount of International Legitimacy for our actions the world when we operate together with our european allies through nato. Those are not necessarily tangible contributions by the allies but their contributions and value added to the United States, nonetheless. Finally, i think you have to recall its almost universally true, i think theres one or two cases where most of our allies are facing a less good hands than the one that elliott describes for the United States in terms of demographics and economics. So all we can ask them to do more we have to have some realistic expectations of what they can do and understand therell be limits to what they can do. Part of what we think is the art of the possible is to have a Better Division of labor with her allies over who contributes what to the common defense. They are the United States and theyll have to get a lot more directive with allies about what we want them to spend their pounds and euros and yen on then we have been up in the past. I dont think it can be directive in a way that says do what i tell you or youre fired. It has to be done in a way that brings our allies in common agreement about what the way forward. I know there more questions. I can say the answer to some of the line these pages. What we will do in a minute is perceived onto the next part. It will be good to stick around to find them. Before we do that theres an important matter of thanking our panel. [applause]
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