The last election and threatening, planning to spend 400 million in the next election in the midterms, that is a huge footprint and theres a lot more going on behind it. The second piece of that is bringing home the longterm effort of the Republican Party to put business friendly judges in the courts so that the courts are increasingly hostile to regular folks, and increasingly interested in protecting corporations. Watch afterwards sunday night at 9 00 eastern on cspan2s booktv. A panel examines the spread of populism in certain regions of the world including the us, europe and latin america including van smith and the origins of populism and contributing factors in the 2016 president ial election. This is about 90 minutes. We will start. Is everyone prepared . I want to thank everyone for coming, this kicks off our afternoon session. I will explain what we did in the morning and afternoon session which is a public discussion, debate about populism, entitled the rise of populism, a global approach. I will be the moderator. I like to talk about it but i will hold back, we have a distant west panel which i will introduce in a bit as we organize in a certain way. We came from and all morning session with experts in the private sector, the Public Sector talking about populism, the objective was to do some conceptual gardening of what is populism, what are we seeing in the world, is what we are seeing similar or different and what are the implications in outcomes more generally . This afternoon we will debate the same things with a reduced crew. Before we do that, what we are going to do is have been smith who i will introduce in a second, give a quick keynote, then he will sit down as one of the panelists and i will throw a couple softballs at him, we will kind of have a back and forth and open it up to a discussion, a general discussion, the dynamics of the discussion back and forth, hopefully this afternoon as well so my name is cliff young. I have two hats, i where two hats right now. I am an adjunct professor, i teach a course in its fifth year on Public Opinion for decisionmakers. Im a professional pollster, president of public affairs, the thirdlargest Employment Research firm in the world with boots on the ground in 90 countries and polling everywhere. I will be the moderator. For our keynote talk, the editor in chief of buzz feed has a long bio but i like a quick note, he is, quote, one of the most talented and admired school mongers in the game. [applause] thank you and i dont know, you didnt give me a heads up on this last time but thanks for having me and they initially asked if i wanted to talk about population and i thought that was a dangerous task. We know what theyre talking about in that regard and im just a reporter and thus know a little bit about a lot but the things that i do have spent a lot of time thinking about is how you do reporting in this moment and actually, the thing that prompted this, my thoughts on this is we were recently, i was recently accused by the Washington Post of practicing journalistic populism which, it came out after we published a dossier of unverified claims about donald trump and russia which was presented as unverified with some clear errors and what we do about the source. And a column in the posttook us to task for this and described it as journalistic populism, the notion that the cocktail set to keep information away from the american people. Which i think goes some of the antielitism that people are serving and populism globally, the sense that the people versus this shadowy elite. But it is also what we certainly believe and that in this moment when people, when theres this crisis of trust in the media, i think our theory is which i think is not the same as a lot of others is the way you get that trustback is to think about how you get closer to your audience. How you can accurately persuade your audience that theyre on your on their side. And it sort of standing above them as gatekeepers. And the simplest level, that means we do know a lot more about their audience and what theyre interested in and what they want than we ever did. You are probably tired of hearing about but we also think thats rather transparency is crucial to that. To winning back that trust and the promise that were not keeping secrets from you, that we dont pretend to be part of a journalistic heresy. And that we dont really fundamentally see our role as gatekeepers and we think the audience should be straight with us for fighting for them to tell stories and have an effect on their lives and i want to talk for a couple minutes on what we in the populist moment see as journalistic populism and what it is. I will go on for too long. I feel like this panel will get off. So i think obviously the media is facing the same crisis of institutional confidence thatyouve all talked about at length. The numbers in gallup are at an alltime low in trust in the media and the question of what the media is as confusing, resident obama and trump certainly trump published a lot directly themselves. On video, on twitter and audiences have segregated themselves where they read what they want to read, what fees their biases. I think the reaction to this for a lot of the legacy media has been to kind of retreat and look backwards, to say, to look back to an era when they were the gatekeepers, to say we have these trusted brands,trust us, after these brands were going to put our slogan on our brand. And trust us because you trust our brands and i think theres an argument to that to the extent that i think in this chaos for readers and viewers to turn the things that are familiar and they trust which are largely behind pay walls. But i think thats broadly great for journalism, the revival of the washington century, obviously the great story of the last few years in media is something everybody is excited about and israel, energy of the times that cnn is broadly exciting. And i dont take it really fully addresses the vast majority of the country who are watching cable news and subscribing to publications behind pay walls and meanwhile we have obviously dont have the luxury of saying trust our ageold brand, read the Buzzfeed News that your parents and grandparents read and so we feel like the path toward winning Peoples Trust in this chaotic environment is a polluted environment. It comes from transparency and from fighting for our audience on issues they care about and the first thing is transparency has been a disaster for media in many ways. I think in the old days when there was a crime or a break in the story, if you were in the newspaper newsroom it would be a total mess. Youd be sending reporters to the wrong house, have the wrong guys name, all the details of the crime wrong but by the time you went to publication a few hours later would have straightened it out. All now all that happens in public and the public says these people are a bunch of idiots and we were always idiots, its now that is more evident. But that, seeing that message realtime has made it a lot harder to maintain this idea that journalists are just this class with these specialized set of skills that allow them to detect the truth through means that you dont have. And so i think a lot of News Organizations are wrestling with what do you do in that situation . Do you try to help navigate and engage this chaotic, messy information coming out of the new story or do you stay silent and wait until you got nailed down. I think different organizations take different approaches to that but for us, we know our audiences living in this social media face where theres, when as soon as the thing explodes theres things we know that are true, things we know that are false, there are stories that have gotten out of the way and the thing that we find useful is to do our best to help them navigate back. We know this thing is false, we know this thing is true. This is a widely reputed claim, we are not sure but heres what we know. And we will guide you through this place. I think thats true on nonbreaking stories too, anybody who spending time in the last year on twitter and facebook has an enormous amount of garbage and full stories and in 2016 it was a lot about Hillary Clinton. Now im sure a lot of you are seeing nonsense donald and russia are in your feeds. Along with reported true stories and i think weve always, we thought way to again engage with the best of our readers is to is to help them navigate the stuff that, not to keep our hands clean and ive raised like this group of macedonian teenagers whoare filling the internet with false stories about Hillary Clinton last year , its a crazy story. And i do think again that when you think about what is journalistic populism, it is about that you havent had a special knowledge. From your audience . And then the other thing, when we think about again what kind of populist journalism , i think it will not ultimately largely be about politics like it is more poisoned criticism space and thats where we feel like we have the deepest connection with our audience, things like a big investigation of a Mental Hospital chain thats touching people and when they next with those stories, when they see some of these pros that touch of their lives feel real, and just this social media screaming match that that again is where we sometimes find trust. I think that there are two other things that the populism isnt although i think that also in this moment when journalism is changing as much is politics, as much as these other businesses and one is telling people what they want to hear regardless of the truth and its obviously a huge opportunity and a kind of sugar high. We are hopeful that by holding back from those and often debunking the things that people want to be true that you win a longterm credibility that people feel you are serving them. And then the other is really, abandoning the idea of professionalism entirely and i think the critic criticism of us in publishing the rest of that russian dossier that we publish any tips, any pieces of information that came to an backend in our view that was influencing decisionmakers at the highest level of power and the subject of a real debate. And just we found one final note, i was on a panel a couple weeks ago and an editor i admired who runs a local News Organization said that he expects his journalist to extend their citizenship, to be journalists and they need to sort of pull back to whatever country they happen to be from in order to follow up an abstract set of journalistic practices and i feel like particularly in this moment, probably always it was sort of the fact and that american journalism has always been very patriotic business and we think, the audience expects that. Expects reporting as a fax or improving in an imperfect country and reporters should not be afraid to say that. Thanks for letting me share those thoughts, i look forward to having them debunked. And by the way, this is being live streamed by skype and we are being taped by cspan. And so we will take some of those strands later on, were going to donate a bit. The role of the media in todays world, the low levels of trust and the global poll this morning, on average in 25 countries, 27 percent local Citizens Trust the media. Thats even lower right now than donald trump, he has a Higher Credibility rating than the media doesnt ultimately, can we think of institutions in this case journalism or media as having a populist strategy to retract readers and users and thats something we can obviously talk about. We talked about that a lot this morning so let me introduce the panel and i will ask the first couple questions and weregoing to risk from that. Ben is introduced , the next sitting next to ben is francisco gonzales, he is the riordan senior associate professor of latin american studies at Johns Hopkins. He is an expert on latin america and will bring that sort of perspective. We have once again people from the private sector, from academia, different regions of the world so we can mix it up to have a good and interesting reflection and perspective on the issue of populism. Sitting next to francisco is sheri berman, sherry is the professor of Political Science at barnardo College Columbia university, her expertise is europe. Shes written a lot on issues of populism and politics there. She will bring us that sort of perspective. All of them had wonderful comments this morning and hopefully we will glean that out this afternoon and finally our last panelist is christopher garman, christopher is a managing director at the Eurasia Group. Hes in the Country Office of emerging markets and lead analyst on brazil. He worked with private sector clients, hes a practitioner as hes been and he will be bringing an interesting sort of emerging market as well as practitioner practices and it comes to the issues of populism so let me do the following. Let me initially throw out, i dont know if the softball but just throw out some general questions and we will go from there. Listen, we were surprised by the professional pollster, we thought there was a probability of trump winning but it surprised us. And in the question is is what we are seeing in the us and europe in braxton perhaps with france, is this new . Is this Something Different . Are we entering a new era of politics and the drivers of politics or is this more of the same . Is more of an empirical question, i pollster, and i want them to comment on that. The length of that obviously, we think its something new. It walks like a duck, a. It is a duck and maybe its Something Different. The concept of populism, the term populism has been thrown allowed a lot by journalists. Especially with whats going on and once again that is a duck, we think its a duck and it walks like a duck, talks like a duck but were not sure what it is so iswhat were seeing if were seeing Something Different , a new emerging driver in terms of politics today. Is that populism and more specifically, what is populism western art because its a dive used term and id like to try at least this afternoon to pull down those two points, conceptual, what is populism on the one hand and more empirical, is what we are seeing new and different. I want to work backwards. And will startwith chris and then , let everyone talked first and then we will go from there. So chris . First of all, i want to thank the opportunity to be on this panel. Is a great debate, such a precious one and highly relevant the discussion given around the world. Listen, as cliff highlighted i worked in the Eurasia Group for Political Risk advisory firm. And if we live in the interface between speaking with policymakers on the one hand and business elites and Fund Managers on the other. And ive been at Eurasia Group now for 12 years. Kind of navigating the field. And ill just say, that i have never in my 12 years at the firm had a sense in which a political establishment are so uneasy on the terrain in which they are stepping on. And this, we see this on multiple levels. I think obviously we had a one moment, we had a favorable Global Economic environment, feeding of the Global Financial crisis in 2018 and then we had an acute crisis of confidence in the markets, tremendous uncertainty over the sanctity of the euro zone project and the record of adjustments, none of our clients were asking us and we were on the hook to candidates whether or not we were headed for the breakup. In the euro zone and argue was that political markets were underappreciated the commitments towards the project and elites were running the game and the end result was a stable outcome but what we are seeing here today is something entirely different, i would say that to answer your softball question cliff, are we seeing something new, Something Different in terms of underlying voter sentiment. I think the answer is unequivocably yes. We have very good Public Opinion data on affairs and its got fantastic data. On the, we didnt coordinate that before the event but you look at the Global Survey indicators and the levels of discontent towards the political establishment, distrust of Political Institutions. Distrust with International Institutions be it the European Union or the iron map or these multilateral frameworks. Distrust of bigbusiness. Has never been running as high as it is today. You look at some of this, the Global Surveys that each of the time and quit already highlighted some of the data points on the media, on the 21st percent of those surveyed its Something Like 45 countries. Thatthey actually trust the media but you range from issues , do you believe that the additional parties and politicians dont care about people like me . 64 percent agree with that statement. That the economy is written to the advantage of rich people, 68 percent agree with that statement, that we need a strong leader to take it back from the rich and powerful, 64 percent so the demand and distrust with established institutions demand for antiestablishment candidates, is running inordinately high. And this is creating the father for political trump in reverse to tap in to that discontent. So i think that what we at the Greater Group spent a lot of time is to think what are the repercussions of this . And the repercussions are profound. We can talk, theres a debate in the beltway over whether the Trump Administration will represent such a radical shift with traditional republican parties and what are the constraints that you can have to keep the legislation in congress and there are large constraints but the other one is withdraw from multilateral commitments in international architecture. Were seeing a breakdown of the institutions that emerge after the Second World War on the multilateral security frameworks, atomic frameworks, the European Union slowly ticking away and were having a realignment of Political Parties across the board so an important debate that we all need to tackle is understand the nature of that discontent, whats driving it . Is it economics, is there something about the technological advances in globalization thats writing that discontent and is that discontent going to continue to grow or not . I think its transformative and i would say, i think i got my three minutes up but i think the next two to drop may very well be in the emerging markets. If you look at the level of discontent and Political Institutions, large emerging markets running as high as it is on the european continent. We have an election calendar coming up and a lot of markets including latin america next year and i think that may well be part of the debate this time in about a year from now. Let me see if i can try to briefly address some of your questions and ill recap some of the stuff we did this morning. About the question of what populism is, we spent a lot of time discussing it this morning and the group that i was part of basically emphasized two aspects or two characteristics of populism. That we felt needed to be stress, the first and most obvious one is this inherent in the firm itself is this idea of the people and the idea that there are a certain people who have been disadvantaged or disenfranchised by the system. Along with this goes a sense therefore that those people have enemies whether they are internal or external and that politics someone out for another become a gain, they are losing and somebody elses wedding and this rhetoric and appeal is sort of very much part of what differentiates populist parties or movements from other kinds of movements. The second aspect is that populism is a manifestation of, a symptom of, a part of democratic systems, that is to say they arrive in democratic systems that are having problems because by definition as i said before there is a significant sector of the population feels that system is no longer working so populism is also a manifestation of problems, prophecy, it arises in fact of revitalized democracy to make it more responsible so that people who feel they are being left out. Criticizes very heavily existing institutions, Political Parties for the most part both notably and the elite run that system, sort of out of touch and unresponsive so often convince those traditional institutions. In order to say that they are going to revitalize the population by working against those parts of it that have made it unresponsive to the people again who have been left behind or are just to stand and so thats with regards to your first question. Of the panel, and others large optics and im going to disagree with chris a little bit on the second question which is about how new this is. If i had for instance a nice powerpoint which i dont, as part of the world that i know best, europe, i would show you a chart of populist parties in europe. You would not in fact see any dramatic acceleration in the last years and support. These parties all were born more or less the same time and thats the 1970s . Why . Because its the 1970s that we begin to see the breakdown of what we now come to refer to as more and more often as the post world order. The time when the institutions, the practices, the procedures put in place after 1945 began to run out of steam. Most social sciences recognize the 70s at the time when this border began to run out of steam and we saw there for the rise in pr, nonmajority and that you can only really have to parties. He began to see the rise of parties very much against existing orders and against the traditional dominance of centerright and centerleft parties. What you seem therefore is the parties begun to tip over the point where they now have become viable contenders for political power but theyre still dramatic acceleration and support over the past 10 years, it has been a secular rise since the 1970s and i would argue that probably is what weve seen in the us with the critical juncture being the financial crisis and the Obama Presidency which crystallize a lot and accelerated this this has been building, this is clearly true very much in europe where you can see that reflected in the realignment of Party Systems that began in the 70s and it really now only justagain as i said , to the point where some of these parties are now viable contenders of power that didnt come out of nowhere, not because they have a dramatically higher vote shares but because their growth is continued as this thing traditional Political Parties, institutions and elites have proven ineffective at coming up with a response to the problems that have arisen as the 1970s so both problems are right but it would be wrong to give us entirely of creation of the rescue crisis, immigration and the financial crisis, these are times that have been there that are catalyzed and mobilized in the last year or so but that have been the breakdown of the post order that began. Thank you to chris and sherry. For their perspective on the first one, what is populism, i think on average that its a political strategy. We realize that it has at least two compliments, one component is on the assault down, if it is for an individual and his group to gain and or retain power. Theres also an element which is those who feel underrepresented. Our disenfranchised, those who feel that the right things have to be done to improve their lot. And so that is if you want in some cases, ends up being a happy marriage which allows these episodes to be born. And to grow, its definitely an issue that has to do with as sherry said the idea of democracy as a majority pool and against liberalism where liberalism is individual rights, checks and balances so here the dynamic is the majority rule does not have the patience to go through the motions and the process of liberal democracy to create structure. And social economic processes , to try to reach consensus, to reach negotiation. Here, in fact, usually the successful populist leaders what they will do is try to reshape the rules of the game to strengthen the idea of democracy of majority rule to get directly close to the people, more referendums, popular initiatives at the expense of the constitutional frameworks that talk about individual rights, different branches of government and checks and balances with another. On the second one, i think theres definitely a new element. In todays outbreak of systems so to speak. The means of diffusion of the messages and then alluded to this during our, our group sessions, time and again people were referring to how much stronger, how much more intensely some of the frustration of disenfranchisement can be helped given a profusion of means of diffusion of information , of images. The alternative facts can be posed through, if people feel that this speaks to them, they might jump into this bandwagon and much more effectively in the shortterm period of time than it used to be the case. In that sense, the barriers to entry have become lower and easier to end up creating collective action in the direction of populism. Someone mentioned pays disability of change which is i think related to that first point. Its easier to gain Public Appeal through a populist message, on the other hand i think there are some constants, constants potentially could be identified even all the way back to the old roman republic. As three centuries before, real or perceived dissatisfaction to connect which then taken over by a voice that will represent these people. Status lee, they are all members of the popularity group, not supposed to be oligarchs. That has been, that continues to be there. That Public Appeal and the interactionbetween these two groups , it need not be two groups but usually, the, those champions of the popular spirit of the disenfranchised and those defending it start to cool. They frame the interaction and in an antagonistic manner in which theres little room for compromise, little room for negotiation. Its either or, its you or the possibility that i can implement my plan. It requires me to eliminate you, to silence you if necessary, to water down the rules that you created and selfserving system where the elite are the establishment. So i would highlight those aspects as constants that can be seen, at least in the west and latin america. I was going to do off another question unless you want to respond because. Were going to start going backwards so i stick to that quicks. Its notorious. The populism around. I want to throw another question, so i understand that we are talking about entrepreneurs. Right, its a political strategy. Its addressing severances. It can be functional if a democracy isnt responding to the basic needs of individuals. Theres all their sort of concerts in there but were getting there, it cant be institutional, it can be antielite. It can be different flavors and places but did you want to Say Something or no . I thought you were waving your hand. I was going to serious conversation. Why dont we go there. Listen, im a really laissezfaire moderate. Just in the spirit of the debate, its great that we try to be able to compress our views here. I would agree very much with your point, i think that when we look at the levels of discontent we are seeing in the european comments, in the United States, these are a discontent that has been slowly growing for a long time. This is something that changed overnight so i think there are deep underlying structural reasons for that. I think whats different is that we have recent reached a Tipping Point, thats what is different, its this translates into a realignment of Party Systems. It translates to unpredictability of elections that helps discontent which was probably accelerated with the repercussions of the postfinancial crisis and all the requisites of adjustment and then you throw in immigration into the mix, thats a realignment of the stars , a political system we can start to talk about that the European Union in trouble. Our established school of Party Systems in big trouble or not, it has the potential for these candidates which we havent been anticipating to come into power so i agree fully with your points, its an important one and that is something driven by shortterm effects. Thats another reason i expressed caution that when we look at the Election Results in europe and here that we dont overtly impute a negative trend. We have builders in holland and it looks like a populist right lost the election so maybe the tide is turning in the other direction or his independence when in france, oh, this is a blowback against the populist sentiment in the us. Number the electoral discontent is that deep. We cant over impute a binary event, Election Results therefore say that the tide is turning. What we have to understand is whats driving the swell of discontent, thats the question that going to dictate politics. My concern is that im not necessarily seeing a reason to believe that thats waiting anytime soon. I want to focus on a couple things, grievances and we will focus on political entrepreneurs in his or her own behavior and strategies and i want to bring it down to practicality starting with them because he has a report on a journalist and reflect on the us elections, will talk about trump afterwards and his strategies and his predecessors, pushing forward his agenda. But what were those grievances in the us . In the us is case that drove him to power . From your Vantage Point, and what you understand, i want to hear that a bit. Im a little hesitant to give a simple analysis of this election, particularly since he lost the popular vote by such a wide margin area and the similar issues lost the popular vote but is not easy to election to interpret. Its not a landslide, there were so many factors and i think the obvious ones that have been widely declined is manufacturing the upper midwest, that is something that is not a new trend. Its apparent with current voters who experienced that. The sort of white racial resentment, its obviously part of it and i do think what felt new from our perspective was politics has always been the media business. To some into an increasing degree that exists to the extent that they are televised and written about. And seeing. And they, in a Political Campaign theres a media that produces images and videos and text. I think you sort of, theres an increasing merger between politics and the media that really kind of was consummated, this cyclotron and the issue is entirely a media character and that in a way pushed all the rest of the Political Institutions to the campaign, the grassroots organizing to the side for media and i think in a way allowed it to be so much about grievances, real or imagined. I want to get that antiinstitutional aspect and indeed the much of the polling that weve done but also others have done captures the sickly you know, in these what we call populism or banana,whatever we call it traditionally in these scenarios , theres a high degree of belief that the system is broken as we were saying but also the need for a leader to break the rules. The data points didnt show, what was the level of that . The simple majority belief in that across the world. I want to come back to this antiinstitutional aspect of things and ill start with sherry but you can talk about in the european case, more theoretically. I think its important Vantage Point about the antiinstitutionalism aspect of what we are seeing. So it struck me in europe, the political trend that has gone wrong mostly the rise of the populist rise is this right of Center Social democratic left. Those are not just corollaries, i think theyre causal. Theyre positive on a superficial level in the sense that a lot of voters of social democratic or centerleft parties moved over to the populist right, this is very clear even more so in europe and in the United States and its a lot of talk in the United States about white workingclass going over to trump, that trend has been more pronounced in europe where workingclass voters historically have voted for the left are now overwhelmingly trump. Voting for the right. But the trend, its not just a voting trend where that is a causal relationship, during the course of the postwar period centerleft or social democracy, now everyone about it was movement that paralyzed the sort of solution to europes postwar problems, it said look, want to offer you pocket some version of democracy, everybodys going to win. Were going to have growth, more equality, better institutions, were going to have national solidarity, everybodys going to be in this together and we will take care of each other and when that starts to fall apart in the 70s and the centerleft lacked solutions to these problems, these problems of economic decline and the changing demographics of european society, and the social institutions that began to drive a wedge in european policy after the mobilization of the 1960s centerleft has absolutely fallen down. It does not have good response to those questions and its a political decline really begins then. It is not linear. Theres always cycles in this election but you can, the secular decline in support for the centerleft is absolutely fed both programmatically and electorally in demise of the populist and you see this in the us because we are stuck in a party summer but we have to see these trends together because they the question of solutions to problems. What is traditional institutions, Political Parties, the elites, government institutions are not responding or not providing the solutions to voters, then they are going to look elsewhere and a lot of voters that are looking elsewhere again, 30 years after 1945 are traditionally look to the left. See a version of this in the us where the constituency is voting for the republican and Democratic Party have gradually but now i think potentially realigning, thats probably not a word. Have begun. Begun to really switch. Now theres talk of the Republican Party being the party of a significant sector of the workingclass thats not a new trend but its now become something we can talk about as a possible part of the Republican Coalition so this is, it is an important change but its one thats been building for a long time and its again a response to the traditional institutions not being able to respond to these constituencies. Francis, what about the letter in the case and the grievances and anti institutionalism . I like your perspective there. Several people mentioned that at least the classic episodes of integration which were founded in 1924 the 30s are whats known as nationalism. The appeal of the middle class, the elites, elitists 1b political entrepreneurs if they paid usually the captains of industry and they are foreign allies, grievous americans, and this is french. A great as the enemy and the idea, it has a strong nationalist undertones. The Public Ownership of Natural Resources to build institutions that work for the improvement of loss mexicanos rather than a surname with three or four names. Usually. Highly connected to a group in europe or the United States. In terms of the antiinstitution, i think conceptually speaking, to have a leadership that is and institution, you only want this ideal aside, its a unique personal autocratic system where everything depends on the will and wins of an individual, how they wake up, how they are feeling. And in the institutions are put aside. And most of. Real life cases, 20th century and early 21st century, the populist will change some institutions but will build others. The populist experiments of the late 90s and 2000 throughout latin america, one of the key things, the first thing the populist leaders did when they had a lot of political capital, a strong wave of Popular Support behind them was to say we are going to remake the constitution, we are going to create a constituent assembly to redraw the rules of the game so they have been rigged in favor of the elites and their foreign partners and this rebuilding, this retracting of institutions that usually follows a very similar point, they want to weaken legislatures in court or pack them with yes, men. Individuals. They want to strengthen the executive in particular they want to strengthen the direct connection between the chief executive and the people and they do this by including referendums to put aside popular consultation which can be treated by a different threshold, 250,000, 300,000 signatures. You can table this in congress and the system is going to be more and helping to redress the spaces, the swap that in their view is the previous system which had checks and balances, which had individual rights and was very unequal landscape in social america. They are able to lead a strong impetus for shortterm redress and the institutions are not allowing them to do it so these people back on ripening their relationship with the executive and the people are incorporating into constitutions these limits that in fact pose a new type of democracy. This is not liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is for cosmopolitan elitists. This is participatory democracy where the people, where the majority, where those that feel unrepresented and in fact have a direct channel to the president are listening, and offering some of this rich rest on behalf of health perceived addition franchise disinfected. I want to go in to ask a quick question about antielitism. We talked about that a lot this morning and its coming up a lot. You think of in the us case we have an administration basically saying that the media what the opposition party. Very antimedia, antielites as well. We saw the same sort of dynamic with brexit in continental europe. Talk about bad it, talk about the antielitist characteristic of what were seeing. Maybe i will talk with chris a bit and will start with you and your reaction. I think that this is the anti elitist undertones that we are seeing, were seeing this in europe and in a very strong fashion we are seeing this in the us as well. But Public Opinion Research Really demonstrates that the trust in Political Parties is at an alltime low. Its a Global Survey that they have done that says the local parties, the 14 percent surveyed in 35 countries. So i think part of this is this Tipping Point phenomenon thats driven probably by nature of economic transportations that weve seen over the past 15 years and the growing gap we have seen between the upper middle class and lower middleclass segments. The interesting phenomenon i think is that you have this demand and this antielites sentiment. And evidently its not clear what are the political actors of the channel that have anger. And the, my bet is that over the next two or three years that how this plays itself out in terms of the political actors that channel that anger will also be intertwined with the Economic Cycle. Right now, i think we are all talking about how politics is driving economics. But i think it will also have a feedback loop again and lets talk concretely. What is the ability of the Trump Administration two, to be robust and hold a base of support not only from the republicans point of view amongst Republican Voters but also to hold the republican establishment and in congress defined, and much will depend on the resoluteness of the base of support which is now around 40 something percent and is the us economy going to be in a similar economic recovery or not . If in fact we are not in a typical recovery, then we are in lacking growth and a lot of these things that new parties are proposing, undermines the disciplines of growth, you can also start to cave the basics for that support and then ask for another chain cycle and next election. The same could occur when in france. And we also start to have a crisis of confidence over the euro zone and the European Union that feedback into undermining the trump rationale base of support so i actually think many times we under appreciate the extent to which political movements that are antiestablishment either get lucky or unlucky given the economic positions. I would say part of the populist leaders in latin america over the past years that were elected at around early 2000 whether it be the pd or chavez or the kushners, they got lucky. Because they came into office and they have the conditions to be able to feed their popularity on the base of the support. Will these antiestablishment forces now be as lucky on the Economic Cycle . That may very well be a critical driver or how sustainable are these movements if they come into play . Does anyone else want to respond to that . I want to take a queuing day. To the question about elitism . Antielitism is an inherent part of populism and so far populism is again based on this idea that the people are getting screwed by existing elites and institutions. I would see perhaps this has become a political time for antielitism and distrust of Political Parties and distrust of the media as part of a larger phenomenon of a breakdown of arrest and in the traditional institutions that have governed craddock society in the west and in elections and developing worlds for several generations now. What we seen in europe and the United States is a sort of parallel process in the social and economic fields and political fields of what you might think of generally as a polarization, polarization politically, rising more and more and polarization economically, theres growing inequality that the economies have not done so poorly and there is incredible social segregation. Used to think that only in ethnic terms that we now come to see it in political terms as well. Where people are living, we discussed this more and i live in brooklyn had but nobody voted for trump there. So while its incredibly diverse in some ways, its on diverse and others and we begun to see that more and more in the amount of trends thats grown over time in the United States reedit people kind of living in communities where their social values, their sources of information have become increasingly kind of narrow. And so this is all i think part of this larger sort of coalescing of trends that have created a variety of problems in western civilization. Bring it to the next question, weve always at least in my goal in the us, weve always had tribalism, some degree of tribalism and on ideological grounds if you look at the republicans, democrats, theres huge differences relative to latin america like where ideology is in place, but going back to that, we have a red media, we had a red media, weve had a boom in that and my question to you is how do you feel that this environment is different than in the recent past . Think about your career as compared to where you are at right now. As an actor in the middle of this and i want to hear how is it different, how is the cooperation, thats how we define it conceptually, is from different than his predecessors in relationship to the media and to institutions . Is this anything new or is it more of the same . Red versus blue. I think the us has always had that range media, i think you go to, there are a lot of places you have a much more like red media and blue media, theres been a centerleft media that has really dominated for decades. And i think what is surprising in the media isnt so much the rise of. It becomes less centralized and more knife use. That i think is probably the new element to it but the fact that truth is bent, thats part and parcel of populist politics and in many other countries quite frequently. Francisco . First is the qualification on distrust of the media and the antielitism. At least and probably unlike western europe, the United States, we do not have databases going that far back but there are at least three examples in vanderbilt, the government run in chile, they have data since at least the late 1970s, 1990s consistent with in the latin america, the antielitism is broken down to subcategories. Soconsistently , the last 20 years on average the institutions that retain the highest trust amongst people who are asked about the series of constitutions, the church, the military, the media. The mexico on average, highest trust, church, military, media. The institutions with the lowest level of trust systematically, Political Parties, legislatures, Law Enforcement and what are these top three, they are the core of liberal democracy. So thats a problem. In india it seems to be connecting. In the latin american kids. And i think to the alternative facts posting in the world, we have not baptized this style of reporting in latin america but weve known it since the mass communications, radio and newspapers started articulating in the 20s and 30s. A medium educated person, someone with secondary education will tend to be quite cynical, to know where the links is coming from. A lot of newsis packaged in a kind of tabloid political news , people laugh at themselves and maybe its this kind of desperation. Look it up, we are in the thick of it. We are about to be obliterated, these are streaming from us and we have accounting, houston and california, these are so funny. People know about it. And some of these things might be true, others arent. Others are within the realm of alternative facts. They havent baptized but the mass consumer of information means latin america has been bombarded by this type of reporting on both sides for decades. Sherry . I essentially agree. In the european case, look. I think what ben said was correct. There have beenmore overtly political , what you might turn Mainstream Media for a long time, thats true in the british case, through in the german case where newspapers have very clear political lines or bases of support but these were in many cases although not all, im thinking of the british case in particular still Mainstream Media with a sort of some sense that they were part of a journalistic cabal that had certain kinds of standards or expectations. The democratization to speak of the media has been a really, a very significant trend and i think its set into this polarization that enable people to pick and choose their sources of information more. It enabled people with likeminded views to find each other much more easily and so while i dont think the level of false acts out there are any different i remember the person in College Reading things about how the vast majority of americans thought floods were punishment from god for sins. I think people have been misinformed or interested in alternative facts for a long time. I think whats changed is their ability to get reinforcement for them and find other likeminded people and thats been a politically salient trend i think you over the past whatever, 10 years or perhaps20 years. Then, you come generally . The other thing that happened in the rise of this much more, is this ask of the media is there transparency of the media and is it so much harder now to maintain this kind of unquestioned authority when its much easier to examine the errors and biases the media has always had that are now easy to document, easy to catch in traditional institutions are uncomfortable when they make mistakes. But i think there was, it sort of cultivated errors and volatility if you are at the New York Times 20 years ago but now the that sets you up for parity. Already we have questions. I was going to ask a lot of questions but it wasnt so important so why dont we do the following . Why dont we open a question and because we are taking this, and where Live Streaming we want to use a microphone so when we come down here and this gentleman in front, ill go back. We will go to questions. Thanks to you all, this is a wonderful conversation and i considered thing in my desk and working through lunch and im glad i didnt. My name is russ cancer, im a local attorney and will be a student at the dvd Program Starting later this year. The conversation has been largely go the rest of the discussion of racism and zeal phobia. We seen a couple of stray mention and i guess it seems to me that is a distinctive aspect of tropism. It is a centerpiece of his announcement and has been a fairly consistent theme in the campaign sense. My understanding of the National Front and issues in europe stemming from the refugee crisis and before that, issues of integration in turkey and the brexit vote, racial zeal phobia, they played a large role there and i guess my question is how closely intertwined are those forces with the rise of populism . Are they causes or affects or both and what are we to make of that . I opened it up, whoever wants to go first. Thats a great question, i think most people see the rise of populism in the west in particular, less so in latin america as drawing on these two trends. One is a sense of economic dissatisfaction and the other is a sense of what you might consider social or identity questions. And i think actually most of the Research Shows that the latter category actually had two components. One derives from the 60s, the decline of or the attack as is seen by some on traditional values that begins in the 1960s, making a lot of what you might consider traditional voters uncomfortable. Then the changing demographic side, this is more pronounced in europe than in the United States but true in the United States as well, that is to say he increasingly diverse societies without a history of dealing with the need to assimilate people from backgrounds, different religions, different languages, etc. So these also longterm trends obviously immigration in europe is a post war phenomenon but exaggerated or accelerated by somewhat more recent things in europe, the refugee crisis, in the United States that aquinas concern about pc stuff which draws again both on the backlash and on the sense that previously disenfranchised groups are now all of a sudden having this incredibly powerful political voice so yes, this is very much part of whats going on and it varies from country to country in its manifestation and berries from country to country and precisely what kind of identity issues are being activated but both of these things again, you might see economic versus the social and cultural are very much part of whats eating both discontent and the rise of new movements and parties today. Excellent question, good points and they are different ones that are divergent. On the one hand, we are keeping up on what sherry was saying, certainly what we see in europe in particular, the less extent in the us is that racism, zero phobia are strong and enablers for the populist voice to rise and to start garnering Public Appeal. Several iterations before hand, economic populism, National Security populism, capacity to become popular by being animalistic, security, a society that feels exposed and a few high visibility impact episodes confirmed in the mind of many that we are insecure and a core driver has to do with these people. The second issue, the classic populism was predicated on the idea of redressing the vast injustice, exploitation, that was done on the original inhabitants of the American Indians by europeans so classic 1920s, 30s, 40s latin america populism contains a significant dimension of racism against whites, europeans and the idea was to engage in building of mixed polity. Those who have some european inheritance. And so sense of belonging among ourselves. And 500 years, xena phobia, populism in latin america, has always had as a softball, easy target, a way to win points with many. I will take the prerogative to answer as well. I am begrudgingly a moderator because i would rather be a panelist but i will talk to the pollster that is pulling in the United States and europe. We do a disservice to ourselves to call xena phobia racism. What we do is delegitimize the grievances real people have. We measured it in the United States and europe, it is the key driver, broad, chris mentioned this, a broad sense that the system is broken and bernie sanders, the same coin, when it comes to trump voters specifically it is nativism, a feeling of identity and the United States is not the same america as my grandparents. I no longer identify with the place i live. Nativism has a pejorative term. We are all a little bit nativist. All of us could agree at some level, we have policies, and control of the borders. And it is a continuum. And what it has to do with is a sense of identity and a sense of loss, a sense of grievance allows us to better understand it, doing what we did during the election, brushing it off, we have a bunch of the uniforms, by doing that we dont understand the larger pictures. It is an incredibly important point politically and intellectually, certainly a core of racist voters but the data, maybe concerned about what they see as loss of traditional values and identities, and examples of this, the most powerful populist party in europe is the National Front in france, the pen has done a remarkable job changing that party from the party of her father, prominently figures both african and muslim figures in her party to make clear that what she resents or dislikes is people who come to friends and dont want to be french. It is not the color of their skin, not even where they worship, it is that they dont want to be french. If you are willing to come to france and be french, you are fine. There is a dog whistle going on. There is a very clear shift in her party from the party of her father that has made her not only much more popular but made the people who call her supporters racists very much part of the problem because they dont feel themselves racists, they feel themselves protective of a french identity rather than negative toward foreigners per se and by calling them racist you are reinforcing that divide. There is a lot of gray area here but it is important to differentiate these categories. Too much polarization causing the problem. Long answer to a great question. Next question . I am with american university. Actually the phrase in your remarks, said you were surprised by trumps winning, with a catalyst to ask this question to mister smith, as a journalist do you agree mister trump was not the only one who lived in his own reality, Mainstream Media and polls did that too and there was a lack of indepth coverage, the left a space for mister trump and access on the ground, a lot of people like them, the people, speaking their minds, you are great, america is great, our problem is globalization, feminism, muslims, and if you have that condition in Mainstream Media, what has changed in your coverage . There are a lot of Different Things in there and the media got things wrong, some was overstated, what the polls got wrong, trump did lose the popular vote. People were right to be surprised. That doesnt lower probability things happen and i guess i think there is now a story line that the media didnt cover, unhappy white people in the upper midwest in general, those who showed up at trump rallies in particular, just isnt true. If you want to go back, angry white people in the upper midwest, it will take two days to get through them. There is a kind of in the media and probably, a sense that like trump couldnt win the United States because nothing like that had happened before. Complacency to it. I dont necessarily see a Straight Line from that to social media like the ones you mentioned. I do think it is related to something we are talking about. You can get into arguments about definition of racism and things but trump, in a very traditional way, i am used to covering direct trump said to people who shared his ethnicity he would be the candidate for them in the way new york mayoral candidates do in the world he comes out of and the change, the sense there wasnt a white majority gave him and gave some other people kind of cover or excuse to make a direct racial appeal to white people. Anyone want to respond to that . Other questions . Over here, in the back. I know edmonds. I am a student here. We talked a lot about the factors that give rise to populism. I was wondering if we could discuss states that bucks the trend or states that will be either democratic or not. Awesome question. You got your a. To the panel. Good question. I would look at some of these underlying political resentments we are seeing against Political Institutions as a spectrum of discontent that ranges from more to less. I think this, the analytic challenge, trends on the spectrum basis, on election day, i often think sometimes we confuse the 2. The analogy i like to make is even in sporting events, there with me on this analogy, you have a very tight basketball game, two teams are down to the wire. Lets say the end of the game it is tied, kevin durand for the warriors shoots, and goes in, wins the game. Inevitably the pundits after the game will start to describe the factors that led the team to win, they had a good defensive game plan, had a good strategy and structural factors for the reason the team lost lost, clearly the coach had the wrong approach. In fact it was just a coin flip. In terms of right now, we can probably look at the spectrum of discontent on the european combat and Global Surveys and you will see certain homogenous countries that dont face acute issues of immigration or larger social safety nets or the level of discontent much lower japan and sweden and canada, interesting reasons, german elections, the same type of fervor in france, what is driving that discontent, not on whether a couple of these countries are not going to elect populist type candidates. And into the political process a little bit more. An interesting question to make. The headlines we get in europe, in our estimation, many very well, the tide has turned, the wrong conclusion to make. Other people responding . The canadian case, the real outlier, incredibly Diverse Society without much back lash. The german case is less interesting because theres certainly, the Historical Context is so unique, historical bias against globalization on those issues still strong but not clear to me, and in sweden you had a relatively strong party, these are still unusual, the degree and rapidity of change, the degree of back lash surprisingly small. You are getting relatively good polling for Something Like Sweden Democrats but if you look at the numbers that have gone on in the last generation, a higher population of foreignborn citizens with at least one foreignborn parent than any place in europe in a society that a generation ago was so homogenous that were seen as unusual. I argue that is the case where the back lash is despite being problematic, probably still something going on that we can learn from but the only real outlier is canada. If you are looking for a place you have both degrees of diversity and low degrees of dissatisfaction with existing institutions. The classic political economy does not mean it is the right one, provides a framework to address the question, the initial conditions of socioeconomic, and lower levels of inequality, to lower levels of this need for shortterm redress, even how dramatically different, japan is there, sweden is there, germany, canada. In the middle from the socioeconomic, you have the institutional settings and responsive institutions, governments where citizens have 35, 40 of trust where this place works relatively well. Do you feel a stakeholder japan, sweden, canada, germany, would also fit the bill. Strong parties, latin america is crucial, this is what manages to distant which countries which for relatively similar in terms of per capita, years of industrialization, living in urban areas and you contrast cantina with y and chile, the three have similar history, the earliest industrialized others, life expectancy, educational attainment, stuff growing earlier and faster than other places and two of these cases you have strongly grounded, strongly rooted Party Systems, systems where in fact the party advocates are socializing people from school on words, primary school, not elementary but high school and university are crucial socializing agents, they would channel people in a variety, and you sadly start after the 1912 Electoral Reform that enfranchised males with style of that undermines parties that provide benefits directly from the leader to constituents, and and take their grievance to whoever is in power. And things seem to be and they take their to them, bypassing the element of representation so Party Systems where you see alternation and end up in negotiated solutions, on the other side of the fence, horsetrading, those places are in no way immune that are less likely to experience bouts of populism. Latin america, four or five countries where the incidents are significantly higher and these Party Systems and the issue of responsiveness or lack thereof is crucial to understand the difference. We are getting near the witching hour. We will turn into pumpkins but one more question in the back. As we get the microphone to the gentleman, what props are you giving chris to the outcome . 60 . Stanley, can we feel european spring . Okay. Who wants to start with that . By european spring, what do you mean . Meaning a revitalization of democracy in europe . With a counterpoint. Not sure of the question. Social uprising. What do we think the chances are . By social uprising you mean lots of protests in the streets . We have already seen that. I dont expect europe to be violent, at least its western portion. The french love to protest all the time, they will do that for any reason whatsoever, they will burn tires in the streets, if the french are coming out protecting i dont see that is something new, nor do i see it is surprising in Eastern Europe where democracy is relatively young. If i start seeing violent protests in places like germany and sweden i begin to get nervous. I would put the probability of that being relatively low. Peaceful protests, that is not unhealthy but i dont see democracy being destabilized in any significant way anytime soon. I will reframe the question in a way that might be interesting. What we saw in the arab spring, Political Institutions that have long been held, and up swell of social discontent that led to the demise of institutional order. I dont think we will have the same level of social discontent in the european continent because you have competitive democracy is a challenge but i would say the more interesting question is can the European Union face a version of an arab spring over the next five or six years . Is that something we are underestimating . We think we are probably not headed there but there is a pathway of serious events if this leads to the politics in germany starts to change, able to keep it together, they antieuro sentiment starts to grow, maybe we can have an arab spring in coming years for the European Union. That is an important debate that will only grow. Break the, latin american departments, one more, one more individual, last question, last question. Sorry about that. Thank you for the great discussion, i am from germany, a scholar at Johns Hopkins and i have been in the us several times, maybe this is linked to trump. Europeans are more optimistic than you are. The chance that marie with is 10 . The electorate does not exceed more than 30 at best so she will surely lose in the Runoff Election and lets not forget populist parties in europe, none have reached majorities, in germany they will get less than 10 in the election in september. In hungary or poland they didnt have majorities because of the electoral system so they are far away from having majorities and the European Union is far more stable than in the United States. I would bet money on that. It wasnt really a question, you are a pessimist. Those last words, thank you so much. [applause] the change arent americans Eternal Optimist . We use to be. Thank you, everyone, so much. Thanks for your comments. Really appreciate it. [inaudible conversations] President Trump tweeted today that former white house advisor Michael Flynn should ask for immunity before testifying before congress on russia ties calling the investigation a witchhunt. The Supreme Court is considering a case when police can be sued for excessive force. To Homeless People sued after they were shot by police in a shack behind the house. They were searching for a parolee and the man was holding a be begun used to shoot rats. The couple 14 million. Listen to it tonight at 8 00 eastern. This weekend, cspan city tour with the help of our Comcast Cable partners will explore the literary scene and history of chico california. Saturday at noon eastern on book tv. Author tells us about the founder of chico in his book john bidwell and california. The life and writings of a pioneer. 81841, 1900. Most important were longlasting relationships with the federal government, starting with his days in congress were his days with the department of agriculture. He was constantly corresponding withff