Transcripts For CSPAN2 Capital News Today 20110708

be the result of more generation would be less environmentally friendly. but typically it doesn't get to that. it's a long settlement process where -- >> as the gentleman have a specific requirement you have to consider offsets for shutting down a plant? >> not that i'm aware of. >> that's one of the things we need to talk about more is when you don't approve a road improvement you should have to offset the pollution caused by the congestion rather than always we look at the emissions that happen for construction, but the no project option and the environmental and economic and social the impact of that need to be considered but the environmental impact is 1i find a real hypocrisy you want to have offsets for the emissions cost for building the project but nobody who's stopping the project has to account for the environmental pollution caused buy not finishing the project and i yield back. >> the gentleman from deily, mr. sculley says recognize. >> thank you mr. chairman. i appreciate you holding this hearing and all of the commissioners who come here to participate and talk about the cost of regulations especially how it impacts people and when you look at a lot of the intent which usually is said aboutqoqoo regulations that come out theqoo sound really good and usuallyq the name of a building can tell how bad itq is by how good the name sounds is an inverseqqq proportion. andq so, as i talk to people aç our economy is sluggish rightaçç now and of course in many cases when you talk to small business owners anda talk to american j creators as as many of us to th first thing they will tell youa the biggest impediment to joba creation in america are federal regulations.aaaaaaaa all of the other things they ge in their way theya can manage  seems alike the federalaaa regulations have become theaa biggest burden to creating jobs in america today. so when you look at some of these regulations you definitel want to look and sqee what is e impact or the even achievingqq some of the results they wereq intended to and in many casesq you find out they are not and then you look at some of these agencies and we've had a numberw of hearings and i appreciate chairman having the hearingsqwqs we've had going through variousq agencies looking at the president's executive order and we have been pointed out aboutyy the people in implementing it, the shortcomings of theyyyy president's executive orderyy yich doesn't get it the cost o regulation and there is a repor recently done by the small business administration. it's titled the impact of regulatory costs on small firms. this really look at how will impact our small businesses.çñç the people that actually create the bulk of the jobs in our economy. and i guess it's not surprising for those of laws that have been to some of these hearings, but they talk about the cost of federal regulation and small businesses is over $1.7 trillion how does that break down? i broke it down profoundly. over $15,000 per family is the cost to small businesses of these regulations. and so when you look at the regulations and the impact our it's not only affecting jobs, it's a major impact that's costing jobs but also costs every american family over $15,000 you say where's the bang for the buck, and i want to ask commissioner northup, you touched on this in your opening testimony, about some of the things and you have seen businesses go under, actually go bankrupt because the regulations and in many cases had actually no health impact. bills that were sold in regulations that were sold as helping children that bachelet had nothing to do with health it just had to do with some kind of radical policy somebody had that didn't help anybody it just a company go bankrupt. can you expand upon some of the things you've seen how the regulations not only impact the businesses that you talked about, but also how in many cases there's not leave any relationship between health. >> i will give you two of them quickly. one is in the bill that you passed, you had exclusions with the limit for electrical products, and we have a hole cut out for that. you have an exclusion for and accessible parts, and we have addressed that. you also had an exclusion for lead that where it couldn't be observed. i assume you meant force some things to be included in that perhaps screws, nets and bolts that are holding the credit together, maybe the handlebars of a bike because handlebars unlike paint is trapped in that metal. you can't suck out the lead. but our agency, even though i proposed a de minimus standard where if you read the handlebars and the rest of the molecule could be gotten off of that it couldn't possibly change your blood lead content so that absorbable the exclusion that you wrote in the bill on the intended you meant to apply something. the rest of the commissioners decided no so basically they found that even though you wrote in the monsoor ability exclusion applies to nothing, that there's not one material that it applies to. if we had nuts, screws, bolts, things that can't be swallowed, things that have small amounts that are in her lead and excuse me, trapped in a steel but those would have been excluded from the law. it would have made a huge difference. >> i'm running out of time. how many people have read this report that cannot just a few months ago on the impact for small businesses of the regulations? not one person on the panel -- i think it should be required for all the regulators if i can ask unanimous consent to submit this into the record the final question if i can ask -- >> before we put the minority would like to look at it and >> there's a report published in september, 2010 that cites a number of sources that goes into a very good detail on the sector of breakdowns and also differential between large businesses and small having to fall higher on the small businesses on the commissioner. can you give an assessment on the things that the fcc did to take into consideration looking at both met neutrality and data chroming rules, did they look into a proper market analysis in your opinion to look at the impact how that would be on our job creators? specters no finding of market power in fact the order, the order says as much that there was no market analysis conducted with a lot of the regulations that come down the have dramatic impacts on job creators and the cost us jobs and run out of the country it seems like the regulators kind of going to their own michelle and are oblivious to the actual impact on the, uh, so hopefully we can shift that course and i appreciate chairman for having this hearing and more like it to get the economy back on track. >> the gentleman, the minority looked at this by unanimous consent this will be made part of the record some things you for bringing it. the gentle lady from tennessee is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you for your patience and being here. commissioner mcdonough will come on the net neutrality order, a no market analysis done, no look ahead at a cost benefit analysis is going to be. if there had been that analysis done, do you believe the commission would have gone ahead and issued that order? >> i think so. i think the proceeding was out come the stand out come driven. german leibowitz, i want to come to you. i'm concerned about some with the ftc that line, food marketing guidelines. i have two grandchildren aged three and age to come and so things of this nature really like a lot of attention to. you think about the unintended consequences that are going to you may see is an unintended consequence can be having a significant reduction one of the things i found recently is the food currently sold through the wic program that is designed to provide a healthy program could no longer the proposed marketing food marketing restrictions are voluntary, but aren't these government the ngo attacks and then also, talked about i think that you can see there should be concerned about shareholder actions. if you would address that >> thank you, a congresswoman. department, the cdc and the fda. we are obligated to do what it's voluntary. just say, and you recognized the obesity crisis and twice as many obese children as there were a generation ago, but from speaking only from myself i try to take a sort of pragmatic approach here. if my kids eat special k with yogurt in the morning which actually wouldn't quite meet the nutrition guidelines, i'm pretty happy because you know what, i so my understanding is that the food marketing companies are proposed standard restored uniform guidelines. that are good, and i think they will, then we ought to take that into account going forward, members of the working group, and we will. >> but me shift gears with you, i want to go back to the privacy issues that are out there, and engine in this country and the regulatory structure when it comes to proceed. do you believe the ftc should mandate on the internet >> the last thing we want to do. no. >> thank you. i appreciate that. i think just as i said with chairman mcdowell, if he were to look at the net neutral the issue, if there had been a robust preview, cost-benefit analysis, i think that it would have been determined that benet neutrality order especially 84 was going to be detrimental to our economy, and i think that a heavy hand of a privacy issue would likewise. i've got less than a minute. i want to ask each of you a show of hands how many of you have read the executive order that we are discussing and have been through the process of reviewing that. a show of hands. >> okay. so all of you have. all right. how many of you disagree with any part of that order? is there any part of that order that you have disagreed with? yes, sir, go ahead. >> i think a member of the provisions aren't well specified. if you could have benefited from a fuller discussion about how it intended specific trade offs that are implicit in the order, commentary. it's a nice start. >> anyone else? gration our? >> it could be broader, more comprehensive and more aggressive. have had joggling hearings this morning and we appreciate it. >> the gentlelady's time is expired. the gentleman from virginia is >> thank you, mr. chairman. but my eyeglasses on so i can see everybody better. commissioner mcdowell, it's nice for me to be able to say that in a formal setting in my new role. when i look at the fcc merger review process under republican and democrat administrations, i see a process that appears to be broken. xm and series merger took away too long, comcast in b.c. merger to wait too long. there's simply too much discretion for the commission to hold the timeline of the review, for the review of the transfer of control licenses in an expeditious manner. is their something we can do to provide applicants with certainty regarding the timing of the fcc review process? and congressman chris if it's good to say that on my first time saying that publicly so congratulations. >> yes. there's a 188 day clock in the breach and in the rule to get the mergers done. i read yesterday also that of the assistant attorney general for the antitrust christine varney is stepping down and there's a big merger in the at&t t-mobile merger that needs a thorough and expeditious review, and i would hope that her stepping down doesn't believe that. i think we could get that done by the end of the year in a fare, faeroe manor. but i have been in a dialogue with chairman genachowski about making sure that we move as quickly as we can on the merger review process as there are a lot of problems with how the commission under both republicans and democrats have conducted themselves in terms of taking too long or imposing conditions that have absolutely nothing to do with the substance of the merger itself. so congress could look at it and there could be a statutory provision certainly, but the best thing to do would be to honor its own 180 déjà clock. >> just to add something we from time to time work with the fcc on the merger views and from our perspective, you don't deserve a particular outcome, but to do preserve a sort of speedy resolution. sometimes it takes longer with documents but that's where you deserve, i think that's a reasonable point. >> i agree. >> most of us would agree as well. commissioner northup comedy think congressman waxman's proposed the legislation will likely ease any burdens under the consumer product safety and protect? >> no, i don't think it goes nearly far enough. in fact, you know, he has proposed previously a functional purpose exception, which i have to say is like picking winners and losers. if you think a part -- first of all that says it can't be harmful to children, and then it says if it serves a function, for example the bicycle, then we can extend it. well, if it doesn't harm a child, why don't we have to then extend it part by part? it means big companies that have lots of product or big expensive products can afford to get a functional exemption because it's a very complicated petition you would have to follow with us. they can afford to solve the petition and all the supporting work and everything and then we can expect them before small needs for the same exact materials that do not harm a child. and i think that, you know, they probably would be able to afford either the wait for us to act on it or the cost of the petition together, so that in particular to me is not a good way to go about easing this. mckelvie of sort of a bloody a useful exception would make a huge difference. >> and did you want to add on to that? >> wanted to disagree. >> let me -- somebody tells me give you time to do that but one more thing i want to say and if i could take back my time. >> i did hear from several of you as i was listening to the testimony that he will at least eight mentioned that perhaps the legislation create more of the problem than you and to come commissioner. the legislation created more of the problem in the agency created the we should be careful when we craft legislation that may be costing jobs as well as the regulation that ultimately were in some cases it maybe an agency that's pushing the envelope in some cases it's just the agency following with the congress told them to do. >> the gentleman from cholera was recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman for your time and testimony today. chairman wellinghoff come in developing energy policies, such as policies to support the integration of renewables, demand response or the deployment of smart grid technologies, thus ferc felipe the impact that the energy price -- evaluate the impact that increased energy prices resulting from the implementation of the policies will have on jobs? >> the policies we implement hour not direct to the specific technologies but rather directed to the integration of all technologies into competitive marketplace. i believe my colleague would agree we believe the competition is good for consumers and the extent we can maximize the competition we can increase, the types of markets available in the market with a be coal or nuclear or natural gas or solar, geothermal, hydroelectric or any of these resources and also to the extent that we can do things like incorporated in demand response and energy efficiency which are usually the lowest cost resources. the whole mix of those resources in the competitive environment allowed to compete fairly in that competitive environment will in fact produce the lowest cost for consumers. >> so do you do we and analyses these policies will have on jobs? >> stomach we don't do a specific impact. >> you don't do the analysis than? >> would want to specific analysis. >> you do not to be specific analysis on jobs? >> we do not, but in terms of -- >> reclaiming my time. the executive order, so you do not believe that it -- the executive order, which i think you said you believe in the spirit of, you do not believe it requires you to look at jobs and you are exempt, but you said you want to follow the spirit of it. do you think you will have to be concerned about jobs and looking at the job impact? >> i think we're always concerned about jobs to the extent we can drive down prices in the competitive atmosphere and allow for the economy to have access to low-cost power, to the extent that we can provide low-cost competitive power within the economy we are going to create jobs and maintain jobs. ischemic but you don't do an analysis to know that or not? >> my basic economics is what i know of basic economics tells me if we can lower cost through electricity we are going to have the ability to increase jobs. >> would you commit to beginning a jobs analysis when you make decisions? >> i certainly have no problem looking at jobs. i believe, for a simple -- >> shouldn't it be -- >> a call from louisiana for example was talking give up this issue with respect to jobs, and regarding that, in turkey which is one of the utilities in louisianan, has chosen to julian a competitive market and the analysis was done that showed by joining that competitive market something over $700 million could be saved. i think there's a lot of money if you can take that money and save it or louisianan consumers and others throughout the region it wasn't just louisiana that spread through the region that a marginal money in the pockets of consumers is going to help them create jobs and invest back in the economies in ways more jobs will be created, so i think that's a very valid example of the types of things that ferc is doing to the regulations and the competitive structures that we are putting in place to insure that in fact we can create more jobs. >> and then saw what you're telling the committee and believe what you just said when it comes to developing energy policies like integration of renewables, demand response for smart grade technologies, then you are saying today that you will do a jobs analysis on these decisions? >> i am saying that to the extent that it's possible to do so, we certainly will in fact look at the impact on jobs. estimates that the we ought to be looking at the impact on jobs no matter what we do so we have an idea. >> i absolutely agree. >> do you wish to comment on this? >> i want to associate my remarks with the chairman because we believe that there's to become believers in competitive wholesale marketers and the benefit most about the resources to provide think we should always be cognizant of the impact we have on the rising energy prices as it can be substantial. >> thank you, commissioner moeller. my time is expired and i yield questions and we are completed with first round and the chairlady in light, the ranking member and i talked that we are going to ask a few questions and then wrap up. i don't think it's ever in my experience in such a distinguished group of people that could make an impact on the deregulation in america as you folks today. so we are here with a certain humility asking you what is the best way for us to move forward. as pointed out with a small business administration report, every u.s. household paid an equal share of the federal regulatory burden, each household will pay $15,586. that was in 2008. when you compare that with what we spent on health care costs in 2008, the federal regulatory burden exceeded by 50% the private spending on health care which equaled 10,500, so it's within your power to do regulate and get rid of the burdensome regulations which would spur the economy so we are not talking about something insignificant. so i guess the larger question as we passed the 1980 regulatory flexibility act. obviously that is not applicable today. and it's not working. so the question is for you as a sort of wrap up understanding theory. the president reached out and execute order and did not apply to the agencies and some of your opinions we think the letter did imply but we don't seem to have you jumping to the forefront to try to do regulate. should congress reliever statutes or legislation provide more flexibility to you or should we update the regulatory flexibility act of 1980 so we are reaching out for you to tell us one, should we do some of the things i mentioned, and second, would you be willing to help in terms of providing us documentation on what we should do and i will start with my last, commissioner adler. >> mr. chairman, the devil is always in the details to reply would be delighted to look at anything you drafted and respond to it. >> so you think we should take the regulatory flexibility act of 1980 indicated in congress? >> ackley i'm probably a bigger fan of the regulatory flexibility act than some folks here. i think it's a fairly useful tool, especially in terms of what we do when we are trying to regulate and we are looking in particular the impact on small business. that is actually something that both commissioner northup and i agree on is the we do have to worry about the impact on small businesses. >> commissioner northup? >> yes, but i unfortunately have had [inaudible] we had no matter what the regulatory analysis is, if you decide in every agency that you should go ahead and regulate, it's almost it has no impact in what we do. so unless we are required to justify the cost with the benefits, adding that to it i think that would be an important improvement, but other than that, it's a box we check -- and it doesn't have an effect. >> i checked the consumer product safety act. everybody in congress voted for it under the bush administration except one and that was ron paul. so you probably would have been like most -- >> i'm sure he would have and like i said when i first read it before my confirmation, i was really very excited about it. >> commissioner mcdowell? >> i think statutory action is the best way to cut through this lot of regulations and provisions that have built up over the years and so i would be happy to work on something like that. >> commissioner wellinghoff, chairman? chairman stearns? >> as i indicated to congressmen bart and i don't have any specific recommendation for you will certainly anything the committee decided to draft we would be happy to work with you in any way. >> commissioner bixby 16? >> i think a government with rick healey if and legislative should review the legislation's, so with that in order i would certainly endorse that and then as the transit, i have a specific example about hydropower licensing i'm happy to provide greater with the complicated given the number of the federal laws involved but in the help we can provide and would be happy to do so. >> also happy to work with you all well as my colleague pointed out i think only four rules that we have actually are within right flanks, but we do the reviews and i will repeat to my colleague petraeus connect dave, already these days. enormous value of having committees and the congress has assessed before the fact the likely impact and regulation of the legislative adopted you are developing in this hearing making a regular question for all of us how much your you spending on each budget cycle to beget evaluation and assessment of the affect not just to measure accomplishment by activity itself but looking at the actual impact by asking how much are you setting aside each budget cycle to do this? and last, we do an enormous amount of work has at tickets for better protection technique for the of the agencies, before a state government, and this perhaps provides specific suggestions we would be happy to share with you about how adjustments and the national and state legislation can improve productivity and improve economic performance. >> okay, -- i'm going to let their ranking member -- what i think each of you indicated you will help us. you say something should be done, so i am presuppose all of you will submit to us some specifics that we could incorporate and start working as the energy commerce towards this. the gentle lady from colorado. >> thank you and i agreed. i had asked them for that information earlier and i really look forward to working with all of you because as we are set, no action said the devils in the details of the regulations you can say we are all for regulatory reform. we also probably need to streamline some of the statutes because a lot of the regulations will from the statutes and so i think we need to look at all of those. i've been sitting up here thinking about this led stanford with the cp s.i. a. i was on the conference committee with chairman barton and others in your exactly right, there was only one no vote on that on the house and chairman barton and ranking member waxman and a bunch of us and either the other bodies sat around for a long time trying to figure out what to do with this lead standard. i remember it so clearly, and when we drafted the new standards, what we decided was determining the total lead content was probable to the risk assessment because what happened with risk assessment is it was dependent on a product by product determination which you couldn't do because of the large number of children's products in the marketplace, and so in addition, although with most chemicals and traditional risk based models to work if you had persistent a cumulative toxins like lead science has demonstrated the traditional models are inappropriate and exposures inevitable and we spent a lot of time in that conference committee talking about what we do about bikes and eight tds and things like that, so it's not like the congress never talked about these things. i think what we need to do now that we've passed those and it wasn't one of these provisions within the middle of the night either. we really, really have hour on a bipartisan bicameral basis, so now i think what we need to do given the experience the cpsc has had treen to draft the regulation to sit down and figure out what about that new standard might work and might not work and this is what led to this effort buy then chairman waxman last year to develop this legislation everybody's been talking about. the staff undertook a consultation shareholder process with small businesses and others to try to figure out what we do about the atv, the bicycle, the t-shirts with the blue eink and things like that. he did release a consensus discussion draft of a document to try to figure not how to address the concerns because we need to do it. but unfortunately, your side of the ogle rejected that, and so we can sit down and talk about it. we did do that. we did that when the republicans were in the majority of the congress and when we had president bush and the white house, but we can't be solved the states where we say okay we are the majority we are just going to do it our way and the heck with you and vice versa. we really need to work together on how to make this work for small businesses and most importantly for consumers, so that would just be my -- someone who has had fortunately or unfortunately been in those trenches sometimes these regulations actually came from some scientific basis and it's going to take some really hard work to fix it by think every witness here would agree with that on some of these harder regulations that might be more burdensome and just one last thing mr. chairman ms. christensen was asking a question about chairman genachowski's efforts to eliminate the outdated and unnecessary regulations and he had sent a letter to the subcommittee to you and to me outlining the efforts which noted that they eliminated 50 outdated regulations and identified 25 sets of data collection that are no longer necessary. mr. chairman i would like to ask ennis consent to that letter into the record. >> with the gentlelady let us take a few moments to review that? what is the date of this? i don't see the date on this. it doesn't seem to be -- [inaudible conversations] i would say at this point there is some concern that this really perhaps some of that there is concern on this committee we talked about earlier the fact that chairman genachowski was invited as chairman to come here. he said he could not come and so it's customary if he doesn't come we do not respectfully take his statement in the opening and put it as part of the record since he didn't show and we are a little concerned this might in fact be part and parcel of his opening statements. >> i would point out it's not in opening statements in a letter to us and we generally -- >> i think the staff is in -- at this point we are not able to rule in favor of that and so why we are just going to hold off and not put it as part of the record. but anyway, i will close by saying civilizations rise and fall because the burdensome regulations in your hands to do as much as you can to make the small business person succeed so that we can have the innovation in this country. thank you for your time. the subcommittee is adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] this week the house continues work on defense spending. nasa has planned final launch the space shuttle program for tomorrow morning. recently, the space center council and george marshall institute hosted a discussion on the history of u.s. space policy. representatives of each presidential of fenestration from president carter to president obama talk to the core principles of the space program shared by each of ministration and what drove the decisions on space policy changes through the years. this is three hours. >> good morning, everyone. my name is david. i'm the executive director of the american space enterprise council. welcome to this forum focusing on the national space policy. from the carter administration will react to the obama administration we have every single national space policy this is the first of its kind. this has not been done before and it's good timing because this may be one of the last defense c-span does because we all know that the end of the world as tomorrow. [laughter] just a little bit about the space center price council. we advocate for the advancement of space commerce in the context of why space is important to economic and security. why it's an important right now with the budget environment that we have come space budgets are under attack, and we believe that space is so integral and important to the nation that this has to be the message and we bring that message out not only to be inside the beltway crowd but also outside the beltway crowd as well as a global audience. so it's my pleasure to introduce my co-host for today, jeff, the president of the george marshall and institute, the institute is one of the leading players in the ec focusing on this base security issues and space exploration issues. so i want to hand over the microphone to you. >> thank you, david, and thank you to the space and to press council for graciously posting this event today and i extend my thanks and appreciation to the panelists for giving time this morning to come and share their experience and expertise, their anecdotes and observations about the emergence and development of space policy through the years. as david said, this evin to ase as we think the first of its kind or certainly rare and unique to have this many authors and this reservoir of knowledge about space policy here with us today. as david mentioned, space is incredibly important to the national security and important to our economic prosperity house welcome and that underlies a number of programs the marshall institute and space center price council posted the last few years. the series which intends to illustrate to the common man of the general public the importance of space for our military power was and economic security whether it's the international space was the implementation of the policy whether it's an assessment of the help of the industrial base that provides the tools in the means by which we access space and operate their or whether it is our focus on the commercial exploitation and the exploration of space. all of those contemporary policy issues are influenced by the history that we are going to talk about today. if you look at -- if you examine space policy over the long run and the marshall institute has been one of the players trying to do that. if you examine that history, you find continuity. certain core principles that were established as far back as the eisenhower administration and the dawn of the american space age continued to designate over the years and a present in each one of the space policies that we will talk about today but there's also important issues that did added in certain areas of this continuity that will certainly talk about today. in terms of the structure of the beef and as i said we have representatives of each administration from carter to obama. we will introduce each one of them separately and they will come up and share their observations and assessments of what the space policy from their administration said, with its unique qualities or features were, how it differed from the previous administration, how we influenced current space policy worse these issues through the years. so it's my pleasure to introduce morrissey representing the carter administration and of course the carter administration is in power during a unique period of time in the united states. you had the pyrenean revolution which certainly influences our decision making. the soviet invasion of afghanistan which reunites the cold war period and makes the importance of u.s. national security ever more important for the american public. you've got economic issues at home but certainly dhaka people's perceptions of the administration as well as the ability of the government to finance the things you would like to do. all of those things and many more influence various policies of the carter administration and space policy as well. it's to our pleasure to escort morrissey to the podium. he served in the science and technology during the carter administration where he developed the decision memoranda for the president on many national security issues including space policy and export controls. thank you. it's interesting to be here. thank you for the invitation to represent the carter administration space policy in the evolution of space policy making. i'd like to thank the state enterprise institute and the marshall institute the state enterprise council in the institute for sponsoring these events and as i look over the audience it's interesting to see a multi generational people that i've worked with over the years and of course in the marketplace it's interesting to see and as described in the out set the state's policy generation has been an evolutionary process. the carter administration was the first to encompass the three sectors under its umbrella of space policy comes of all, space and intelligence and the carter of frustration built on the investments of the decision and investments that were made in previous administrations. it would be remiss actually not to cite some of the more notable examples. in the eisenhower of fenestration, several lasting policy directives are taken. one was of course the freedom of space which of course was the first article in the outer space treaty that was subsequently agreed to and submitted legislation on nasa on the reconnaissance of the air force and put it under a civilian organization. the kennedy administration of course is the most remembered by its decision to go to the moon and the enthusiasm to achieve that objective. the ad ministration also consolidated intelligence and organizational the activities and moved, removed them from public scrutiny and placed them in the then classified organization called the national reconnaissance office. it also endorsed the principle freedom of space and free and open to all, and some mentioned the act approved during the kennedy years was the creation which was a public federally funded corporation developed communications satellites and would start working in the organization here today. the nixon administration approved the shuttle program and it's an enduring the program and still operational now 30 years after the initial operational flight. the carter and fenestration highlights some of the things were specific influence in the media policy consideration that time when he arrived in 1977 there was the deployment, unemployment at 17.5%, which is high. federal budgets were constrained , and the cold war was still ongoing and competition in the states was central to the equation to the russians were the only other national recognized space power at that time. national technical means and satellites were pursued under the umbrella of the intelligence programs supporting the treaty verification and tactical intelligence was just the beginning of supporting the systems capable of supporting the war fighter which is the vernacular that is currently used. the defense intelligence capabilities were becoming more and more recognized as valuable contributions in the arena that we played. at the space shuttle was in development and experiencing significant cost growth that continues through the carter administration. the yearly policy decisions that were taken in the carter administration to ship the subsequent national policy review were decisions on the shuttle and the decision to pursue a bilateral discussion with the soviet union at a time who put some arms limitations on space. first, the shuttle program after much debate in the carter administration, the administration decided to fund the four orbiters and it would be the primary access to the states for the intelligence community as well as the department of defense. but it would need a primary access to face. the decision to enter the negotiations in the soviet union to ban the systems was a two-part decision. the first of course was to hopefully arrive at a agreement would place some limitations on the soviet capability and the second was to pursue the active research and development program in the event the negotiations were unsuccessful. the carter era the fenestration resulted in three presidential directives that were released in 1978, and a lot of the material as both of you were probably school than states policy are redacted but the fundamental aspect of the three policies were reflected in the national space policy at 37. 42 was the national policy and the civil operational was captured in tv 54. the national space policy directives established policies that would conduct activities of space, reaffirm the previous administration initiatives and directives and added others and the claim of sob and terrie which of course you've heard before. the space systems have a right of passage without interference and purposeful interference would be considered as an infringement on sovereign rights and the united states would pursue activities in space to support the right of national defence. the u.s. would pursue the -- to these and all the application arena, civil space, science to maintain the leadership in space which was of course of the femur and underpinning that jerk. the united states would conduct the activities to exploitation of space capabilities. spelling out the space shuttle, nasa would be in cooperation and development with nasa and the large priority would be given to the defense and intelligence missions. the shovel as i indicated would be the primary access phase to provide some eeov backups for short access and you will be hearing about that subsequently as the policy evolves. close collaboration between the various sectors which is one of the objectives of the review was encouraged. policy organizations were asked to comment on that. it was the first time that all of the state's policy players in the deferral of the organization's defense department and the intelligence community participated, but in addition, the state actor interior and energy were also included in the participation. it was in the latter two were freed agriculture and energy were the first experienced in space policy, and it was interesting to see their participation and the contributions made. the structure include all the players with many opinions and it's interesting to note it was surprisingly cooperative and that period. one would have thought it would be an argumentative jumble the competition and institutional, but in the reality it turned out to be surprisingly successful. all the departments and agencies were very vocal and of course from the white house both included in the discussion, but in the final analysis, the president, president carter was very involved and actually made the ultimate decision in the direction of the national space policy. in the remaining time i would like to briefly highlight some of the social and operational policy tenants as they have continued and will be fleshed out in the subsequent policy discussions as we go through the morning. there was an emphasis on the applications to bring important benefits to the understanding of the resources come climate of other, pollution and a culture and of the things we are seeing here again and again in the discussion as we go through the morning. and the emphasis of the space science and exploration in the manner to permit the nation to remain vital and its space technology base and increase benefits to increase efficiency across the various sectors and assurance that the u.s. leadership would be continued with the necessary resources for the bases of the leader decisions in the developed programs. the private sector as site earlier was encouraged to participate and become and the words of the of penetration more roles and activities by the private sector even at that juncture, and of course to foster communications between the cross cooperation between agents. at the time it was decided it was not feasible, necessary to commit to a high visible, i space engineering initiative comparable to the apollo. that was a shorthand for the space station. that was common in subsequent years to rid the government role in the sensing highlights the two points. it was the site of the management responsibility for the civil plea and remote sensing the stotland command again, the -- there was the encouragement to press towards the commercialization that discussion and i wouldn't call what a battle, but that discussion and pursuit continues. the defense and commerce would coordinate but continue dual pole in orbiting satellites, and not to combine them at that juncture what steps were laid for the future joint development if warranted. and in science, space science and exploration the goal is to maintain u.s. leadership in space and planetary exploration, to pursue a vigorous program and plan to the exploration, continue the reconnaissance in the planet's and utilize the space telescope to usher in a new era of astronomy. we are asked to comment on the use of accomplishments. actually there were several restricted initiatives and activities that occurred that cannot involve them that they have been importing and significant and sustained the shuttle program it is a significant contribution to the operations and space. the hubble telescope and operational and satellite programs i think the decision to continue them and try to make them operational and of course hubbell was stored in the previous administration but the benefits have been amazing and remarkable to the contribution of states. on the opportunities lost, i view that the inability to negotiate arms control agreement with the russians was an opportunity lost with the invasion of afghanistan, the soviet union lead in the administration. the administration decided to withdraw from those negotiations. since that time that has not been a serious entertainment of any arms limitations in space since that period of time. thank you. [applause] >> we are going to do the q&a session at the very end of this program. so save your questions for the very end of the program and when the q&a session arrives, because we were taping this for c-span, please make sure you state your name and your organization or affiliation. thank you. >> next week of the ronald reagan administration. the reagan administration was marked by the program arms control, the beginning of the space shuttle program. and unfortunately the space shuttle challenger disaster and a few other events occurring as well. the bombing in beirut, the american embassy in beirut, but a very lively area and to discuss the ronald reagan administration we had mr. gill rye. a director of space and intelligence programs on a national security council staff in the white house. he was also the executive secretary to the senior interagency group for states which oversaw the military, civil and commercial sectors of the u.s. space program. it is indeed my honor to introduce mr. gil rye. >> thank you. well, good morning. i am reminded of an introduction a friend of mine gave to me recently. here's gil rye, he used to be somebody. i felt like i was somebody that in the early years of the reagan administration. we came into office under a president who was considered to be a true leader, and it was a very stimulating index of the reading experience for me, and i am sure my fellow panelists would agree there's a period in the white house that was one to remember and maybe a highlight of their career. .. at least when the first operational shuttle landed on july 4, 1982 at edwards or -- air force base. president reagan was there. he was there too announces national space policy which was really is the first statement of he stood on the space program in general and where he wanted the country to go. this was a product of an almost a year-long activity to collate all of the various inputs from all of the agencies, and to bring those together and nay here at way that carried on from previous administrations and set the course for the future. i had arrived at the white house about two months earlier and had been there only a week when bill clarke to national security pfizer brought me in to meet with the president for the first time. i sat there in awe. the national security adviser, bill clark, asked me to explain some of the things that were going on in space, which i did her go but as the meeting went on it became clear to me that the president was a little frustrated. he was frustrated that the space policy had taken so long to develop and he was also frustrated that it didn't appear that space policy was being given enough emphasis within his administration. he wanted that changed. change. he wanted an organization to pull together all the sections of the space program into one coherent whole. that is what resulted in the senior interagency group for space, one of those acronyms that could only be invented by a bureaucrat u.s. government. not as as some later when ones such as the national space council, but nevertheless it got the job done. it established the national security adviser as the chairman of the -- the first time that had ever been done. he had established an executive secretary who is the guy who did most of the dirty work, who tried to bring the agencies together in meeting after meeting after meeting. and we tried to bring together all the aspects of space ever going on in the government. that is the civil, the military and the commercial. this was the first time the commercial space sector had been elevated to a level equal to the military and the civil. so bringing those together turned out to be quite an experience. the web site from george c. marshall institute says that the ronald reagan administration arguably had more focus on space and certainly issued more space policy documents than any other administration, so maybe we won the numbers award at least. we had -- we issued and the president signed 15 national security decision directives, what we call an std's. these were policy statements, decisions on his part dealing with space during his administration. i was there for all but five of those. i think all of those documents reflected the president optimism and commitment to demonstrate u.s. leadership and our exceptionalism on multiple fronts. the u.s. space program fit perfectly in his vision of the future for our country. the tools for executing that vision were provided by an economy that was called the largest peacetime boom in the history of the united states, over 35 million jobs were created from the beginning of his administration to the end. in his state of the union address, early during his administration, the president stated that developing the frontier of space would be one of the four major priorities for his administration in the 1980s. that is pretty heady stuff. this was the first time a president had ever spoken that highly of space and in fact the senior interagency group for space was only one of four senior interagency groups established by the president. the other three were on or in policy, defense and intelligence. to me again that emphasizes the importance he placed on space. early on in the administration our attention was focused on the shuttle program. obviously because previous policy statements had announced that the shuttle would be the primary system for both the military and the civil sectors of space. immediately after i got into the white house i became aware of the military's attitude toward that policy which wasn't very friendly. the military had fought that policy before it had been announced. they felt that they were doing perfectly fine with unmanned expendable launch vehicles for getting their satellites into orbit and forcing them on board the shuttle was not something they looked upon favorably. said they weren't real happy with it and the main thing that they weren't happy with was placing primary reliance for the military's access to space on one vehicle, the shuttle. so one of the first things that we did was to -- that i did was to arbitrate an agreement between nasa and the department of defense that permitted the departments of defense to -- for heavy lift launch vehicles that eventually resulted in the titan four and also agreed that in the context of nasa that the department of defense would continue to use a shuttle for at least a third of its launches. does seem to make both relatively happy. also during might administration expanded the fleet from the four orbiters approved by the carteret administration 25. we permitted the use of the shuttle for foreign and commercial launches, something that hadn't been done before. we encourage technical assistance and launch assistance to friendly foreign governments. and these were just a few of the policy statements related to the shuttle. there were many more. perhaps one of the major achievements of our administration i think was to elevate commercial space program. the president had a great deal of faith and trust in the private sector and he wanted to stimulate entrepreneurship, to get tribe at enterprise going into space and he felt to do that he had to break down a few barriers. so, the first thing he did was issue a statement that promoted drive investment in space, and the u.s.' contribution to facilitate that. we works to establish a mechanism for commercial and foreign launches on the shuttle that needed to -- we needed to balance on the one hand foreign competition. we wanted to make sure that the shuttle was competitive against those foreign launchers. that on the one hand. on the other hand, in order to stimulate the commercial elc for the launch vehicle industry in the united states we could not have a shuttle priced so low that it would not incentivize the investors to invest in those commercial elc's so we had to strike a suitable balance. one of the more important things that we did was to permit the use of government ranges and launch facilities for private launchers. this resulted in the private industry not having to make the large capital investment and expenditures and ranges and launch facilities associated with the development of the new elv's. clearly, the centerpiece of president reagan's space policy as regards to the military sector was the strategic defense initiative, or as the media coined it, star wars. you have got to love the media. the president had announced this policy on march the 23rd, 1983 in a televised speech to the nation that was supposed to be primarily devoted to the defense budget, and he tagged on at the very end this little thing called the strategic defense initiative. which as he has described it, signaled a major shift away from a policy of our government that relied on mutual assured destruction or as it was appropriately coined, mad, as the primary velocity for defending our nation. philosophy that said that the soviet union won't attack the united states because we will have a triad of nuclear offensive systems that could retaliate and vice versa. the president said this is hogwash. the united states should be able to defend itself. we have the technology to do that and there should be nothing to stand in the way. the united states implementing, developing and implementing a system that defends us against a nuclear attack. that signaled the beginning of the sdi program that really signaled a the shift in space policy in regards to the military sector. traditionally the department of defense has relied on space systems as what might be called force enhancers. that is, systems that support the operating forces with communications and navigation and other things. this policy in effect said that the medium of space can be used to defend our country, what some might call a warfighting capability. although, the emphasis was always on nonnuclear capability since the placement of nuclear weapons in space are protected by international treaty. some of the original intention of the sdi program did not materialize because the technology did not materialize. host obviously spi today is a ground-based defensive system. many of the technologies that were intended to be developed such as lasers and kinetic energy devices didn't really materialize or prove to be the most cost-effective way of defending our country but we still rely on space systems of course to support sdi as well as other capabilities. in august of 1984 the president issued a national space strategy which reaffirmed the department of defense reliance on space systems as an integral element of its warfighting capability. and one of the things which i don't know that i have had for heard mentioned, the national space strategy directed the department of defense to look at elevating the organizational options for elevating the importance of space in the military. this resulted in the formation of the u.s. space command in colorado springs. the implementing actions associated with the private sector, commercialization of the private sector were also in the space strategy and it also of course documented his decision earlier on the space station which i will mention in a moment and it announced the formation of the national commission on space and defined the goals that he wanted the commission to pursue. the centerpiece of the president civil space policy was his approval of the international space station program at the request of the administrator jim bags at the time. i arranged a meeting with the president in april of 83. jim eggs brief the president and they talked to the space station being the next logical step beyond the shuttle for the man's space program. he also emphasized the rapid development of the soviet soyuz space station. if he wanted to get president reagan's attention, you talked about the soviet threat, and there was a soviet threat to our leadership in the man's space program in the name of that space program. following that study the president developed or signed a study directive which asks the senior interagency group for space to conduct a study of the permanently manned space station. nasa conducted a dedicated study on the space station headed up by a gentleman named john hodge and i was given the responsibility of taking that study and comparing it with other options and presenting that to the president. which i did. early in, played in 1983, i've read that to the president and almost, almost all those in the cabinet meeting that day agreed that the space station was the logical next step for our country. the presidents approval of the space station was announced in his state of the union address in january of 1984. in 1988, the last year of the reagan presidency, congress passed the law allowing the creation of the national space council, a cabinet level organization which you will hear more about in just a minute. this was a fitting end for the cowboy from california, who used the space program is a symbol of u.s. leadership and a brighter future for america and the world. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you gil. now we move onto the george herbert walker bush administration, where the world changes again. the soviet union disintegrates. managing that process in a peaceful matter is certainly one of the hallmarks of the first bush of administration. you have the first gulf war that a spot where we begin to see in clear terms on national television the integration of space capability to enhance american warfighting capabilities. who can forget on cnn saying the pictures of rescission guided munitions going in a window? that video is seared in the minds of those of us that followed that conflict and it was a perfect illustration of how america had integrated it capabilities into its terrestrial warfighting capabilities. some say that recognizance strike complex of the soviets called it that we had created and invested in throughout the cold war operationalize has fundamentally changed the space policy discourse in particular as it relates to military affairs. the bush administration created the national space council. the first two speakers talked about in various respects how you organize for space activity but it was the george herbert walker bush administration that decided this needs to be a cabinet level set of decision-making and so at the white house you had a national space council chaired by the vice president. you also have the authorship of a space x. version initiative, sdis was called which attempted to define a new course for american space exploration in a post-cold war context where we are not competing with the soviets for leadership and space. central to most of these decisions was mark albrecht who is the principle adviser on space to president bush serving as the executive secretary of the national space council during his administration. dr. albrecht. >> good morning and thanks jeff for that introduction. this is a pleasure and i am enjoying this as much as you are. it is interesting to hear the continuity and i'm going to read ahead to see where the hell we are. i guess in this chapter of the national u.s. national space policy, i would call, this is where it gets interesting. you heard from gil, president reagan did a remarkable job in leading the nation in the space program. at the end of the cold war. and he put in play a lot of things that needed to get elaborated on, definitized and operationalized and that really is what happened in the bush administration. as has been said, in 1988, the congress and the nasa authorization bill began to recognize that rings were beginning to get complicated with regard to space and space wolesi and in fact authorize the president to create a national space council inside his white house. despite the fact that most white house as everybody on this panel will agree jealously guard executive privilege. when congress tells them this is the way you are going to organize and this is who you are going to choose they tend to bristol at the bush of administration, president bush personally, decided he was okay with the idea of a national space council in the back there were communications from the then vice president staff to the hill that he would be accommodating to this. so when he came into office, in april of 89, he signed the executive order that established the national space council. there were a friday things to follow on from gil that shape the space policy issues that bush administration face right from the beginning. the but first and foremost, while the ball was teed up and certainly president reagan and his administration was central in ending the cold war, it didn't actually and until the bush administration and that had enormous consequences for space program. as gil said president reagan and that administration was very much animated by the cold war and in a race of the soviet union. at the end of the cold war that source of animation, that source of motivation was removed. we had a series of concerns right away with the end of the cold war. one was what are we going to do with russian weapons, their inventories and capabilities? where are they going to go? who is in control? who is in charge? how do we incentivize soviet knowledges, not to sell their know how or components to other nations around the world that in the vacuum of a post-cold war world would have ambitions about creating their own regional power centers. and we also had a problem immediately thereafter, which was how to define u.s. national security space requirements and forces post-cold war? again, as gil adequately described, so much of our national security space programmed forces policy structures, strategies were based on the primary conflict associated with the cold war. we now had to say what were the rights that the requirements enforced to meet our objectives and what were our objectives after the cold war? we also had to deal with the immediate response of congress and the american public for a peace dividend. there was an expectation at the end of the cold war that the dollar spent on her national security now could be saved and returned to the taxpayers and applied to other purposes. it is staggering now but in this period of time, then congressman les astin was talking about a 25 to 30% immediate reduction in the dod budget and that is not -- that is not a leveling off. that was a real reduction in the budget so if you had $100 billion last year he was talking about $60 billion. that was going to put an enormous squeeze on the procurement and r&d accounts because you have to pay personnel first. even though you have a rapid drawdown of forces, it will take a while to get men and women out of the services. it will take a while to stop the necessary owing them so while you take a 30% reduction of topline, the procurement and r&d accounts which are dollars, not people and pay etc., are accelerated so that was sometimes that tenet of 50 or 60% reduction. that was a significant challenge. we were worried about the technology pipeline closing. when gil talked about sdi one of the benefits of the sti sti was they had another cold war injection of technology acceleration in the united states. that story is yet to be written but it is remarkable the amount of technology that came out of sdi efforts and optics etc. and the whole field of physics than in 1985. i talk to forensic colleagues. optics was not considered a very important part of physics. everybody was into nuclear particle physics etc. but the sdi program reenergized the whole optical part of physics and the enormous outflow of technologies that have accelerated everything in today's world. we also had a recession. and a recession was looming and we had a president that made a pledge not to increase taxes and you all with spending cuts. that was a huge problem, and so space was going to take a huge hit for a potentially huge hit out of this. we also had a space launch crisis. right between reagan and bush we have the challenger accident and that took us -- an already fragile as gil already described, launch picture for the united states can't really put us into a crisis mode. the shuttle did not return. so here we had a national launch policy and what national strategy based on a single thread to space which was a space shetland would be the challenger accident. 32 months we had no access to space. as gil said seven i was up on the hill working at the time. peter aldrich deserves gold stars for american space history because he almost single-handedly -- i don't know what was going on inside the administration but the at the senate armed services committee overmuch objection was able to get what he called the complementary expendable launch vehicle program funded. if we hadn't have that, the united states would have literally brennan grounded for almost three years. we also had a situation at nasa with the space shuttle crisis and space station freedom that was really beginning, moaning -- moving to building something and we began to understand the program. the shuttle program was in disarray at nasa in 1988. the space station freedom which gil neglected to admit that administrator beggs said it would cost $8 billion. by 1989 the first time we opened him below, it was 400% cost increase and it was rapidly escalating. fundamentally when you began to get beyond the graphs and understood the number of shuttle flights every year required to assemble the space station was two or three times the annual rate that it ever been exhibited at the shuttle. their requirement for extravehicular activity which was the design choice which was to take up the pieces and the civil lemon space was more in any year, and one year of space station injection. there would be more e. l. d. our son had been witnessed for -- by all nations together. it exceeded it in one year. so there was really serious questions about the feasibility of the space station freedom. the national academy of science if you had to question the scientific use of the space station. they were critical that the science they saw coming out of the space station particularly when some of the first trade of decision was made, large centrifuge that was going to allow the creation of all kinds of life science experience -- experiments. they call that marginal. we had the beginning of unhappy international partners, who had gleefully signed up to be part of the space station program but as the program began to evolve and the interactions and the decisions they realized there were less partners and subcontractors and there was real unhappiness being expressed about that. in the planetary program and the great observer dave -- observatory programs have been put on hold with this 30 month hiatus so nasa was an unstable program. but that is not all. there was at this time the beginning of a very serious concern about global climate change and there was a very strong initiative on the part of the hill and from outside academic community that infect the united states should have a heavy emphasis on global change. global climate change in the way was coming to us was that the problem was so critical and the tangible and crucial to the future of the world that we need to act first and study as we were allowed to. and so we were faced with lovell climate change steamroller coming down the hell that expected the space program cannot start studying it but in fact implementing large programs in lower orbit to begin providing data to actually start acting on global climate change. the eos, the earth observing satellite system which was right at the end of the reagan administration was started at nasa. it was designing to gigantic platforms both in excess of a billion dollars it would take 10 or 12 years to develop. again, it was the result of the enthusiasm in the science community and it was also the nasa culture. there was money to be had and there was the big exciting new project. they embraced it heartily. as gil said we also had an emerging commercial space market. is something that has been on the horizon with the carter administration. it was embraced in the reagan administration. by the time we arrived there was $5 billion a year of commercial space business and it was beginning to get complicated. rules of the road, with the proper role of the government is and how to interact with other countries, what we expected and what is the role of government utilization of commercial services? so that was clearly a large contributor. so all those things were the word gets complicated vision of where we get space policy and space needs. as we said before we had a national space council. the president was interested in the area of it and so he was morehan happy to have one. we had rate relations and is each one of these guys will tell you, the chemistry inside the white house makes a big difference on what can be done and how it is done. there is internal wrangling for a variety of reasons, things get hard. if there is comedy, if there is clarity, and there is unity than a lot of good things can happen. we had a clarity, comedy and unity. red scowcroft is a terrific guy. he deferred to us on matters and their intelligence space matters that required the nfc to be a joint partner in all of these things. he had no ego, enormous energy and there was a lot of things he was focused on with the end of the cold war. in our case we had ballot from way. he was focused on supercollider. it was the main focus of osd tea and we also had a variety of things on diametric separately focused and allen was more than willing to let the space council take -- dollars matter. darman was our director of omb and he was a bona fide space guy. he loves space. very energetic and extremely brilliant guy. and as long as we stayed within certain boundaries, he was the actual l.a.. he did some really remarkable things when he was at omb. john sununu for crying out loud was a scientist and tea as he reminded us on occasion went to graduate school on a basso scholarship, so he certainly was enthusiastic and it turned out to be the one of two most primary policy of the vice president so we had all the ingredients to make a space council active and engaged on all of the topics. so it works very well. reran it just like the nsc. we had regular meetings and we had meetings with the principles and deputies. we had a variety of committees formed etc. to go deal with the confluence of issues that i described in the very beginning. our primary policy focus, the first direction of the president was keep u.s. out in front and space. as the cold war bore down that leadership was not just a consequence of the cold war, not just a reaction to the soviet space programmed but in fact u.s. space leadership had salience and important for the country going forward in that and that we were to tailor and design the policies of these administration to ensure u.s. space readership given the changing circumstances. probably the most significant thing we focused on was the space exploration initiative and it is very complicated. but the basic tenants were that all the problems that we saw, all the problems from u.s., domestic and economic to technology pipeline etc. were at risk in the president's mind with the end of the cold war. that infect with the rapid reduction of expenditures in defense and the heavy leverage, deleveraging on r&d and procurement would really put the united states at a technological disadvantage. one of the primary motivations space leadership is important for america even outside the context of the cold war. second that the technology driver, the historic technology driver that national security space it played in the previous 30 years really need to be sustained and in fact a bold new initiative and space exploration would be a way to continue that flywheel of technology going in the future. international leadership post-cold war. again, it is now a truism that at the time the sheet was blank about what world leadership men, with the new world order was going to be as president bush wrote in his book with brent scowcroft. it literally was transformed and the space was a vision of how the united states could show leadership and could infect or by positive global leadership in an area that is talked about technology and economic advocates to all nations. most importantly the vision from the very beginning included, including russia and the soviet union and now russia in the mix and an act not just as an adjunct as a lot of participants in the space station program had been that it's a real partner. it turned out that leverage really was used with great success in the clinton administration where those initiatives and that vision were really put to great use for different purposes and i will let richard tell you about that. we wanted to refocus the entire civil space program. the shuttle station as i said was very confiscated and when he began to look at the real structure of the program and it added in with the national academy about the value of the science, we didn't call it that but it has been termed a dead end program, stuck in lower orbit doing science that was not being endorsed by the national academy of science. it had budget treasures and the program.descoped. things like the centrifuge being reduced bersin finally eliminated and that in fact we needed to reorients this entire civil space rogan. we also, many of us were believers. some have been -- took some heat for it but we believe some of the context were applicable to what was then an aging civil space program. we called it faster, cheaper better. i think the clinton administration morphed into a different way and that is great but we believe that there were ways to do things in space that really could give us better technology, faster and in fact been doing it better and faster it would be done more cheaply. we also wanted the aerospace industry to pivot from its focus on supplying critical national security needs to an ambitious civil space rogue ran. we been as another policy initiative, took a new launch capability. the shuttle as i said it gone through a lot of fits and starts. it is a very expensive program. magnificent technology and extraordinary capability but it was fragile and it was expensive. and with the incident of the challenger, even though they flew eight times after a return to flight eight dad in september of 88 it flew eight times than a chair but within 18 months we were stood down again for month after month after month with hydrogen leaks etc.. this is a very complex system. we had the ceo of the program, the titan four as gil describe. very expensive, 18 months on the pad. we needed a new launch system and we needed for national security purposes and they wanted it for civil space purposes. we wanted it flexible, robust. we wanted it very affordable, adaptable to a lot of means and we spent a lot of time and energy in that program and a lot of money. we look at a national aerospace aerospace plan, get something resident reagan admired with the idea of going from los angeles to tokyo in three hours and then ultimately being able to sustain normal flights in a vehicle that would be a single stage to orbit which as you all know is more or less the holy grail of the space launch business. we made in important policy decision. the president made an important policy decision with regard to the study. there is my quest for quest for an order by nasa and after we went through this entire plan of putting together an overall program, decided additional shuttles were not going to be the way we wanted to go. it was very good with it and i think as we will see some of the speakers that will go down the chain, if you keep the baseline program intact and then try to do something new, i will cut to the end of the story. you can do both and it is very hard to stop. believe me, it is very hard to stop and everyone here has had this experience. it is very hard to stop once you start. we stopped the space shuttle program and our view was that the stop time was 2005 and it turns out it looks like he was going to be 2011. that is pretty good. okay, let's see. a new launch. okay. again, as gil said in seven arsenic commercial space is growing. it was $5 million a year when we were there. there were a lot of policy decisions made that were clearly on the side of encouraging commercial space but there were a lot of detailed implementing policies that needed to be rolled out and we spent a lot of time on that. it was a serious policy focus. just defining it, defining what the role of government and the responsibilities of government work, dealing with the issue of subsidized development and operations as opposed to non-subsidized. again, it is in the grind it out phase of government. the real estate work was done by presidents reagan and carter recognizing this would be an important part of the american space teacher but it really was left to the bush administration to provide the real rules of the road. we restructured the climate change program. we were able to use independent commissions etc. to say hey, study first and then take action. so we didn't need to do everything at once the climate change. a big rob long, important problem, urgent problem but in fact it was better to build multiple platforms to collect data on climate change rather than wait for 10 years for a multibillion-dollar program that was going to collect data on everything. you guys remember the disc program, some of the original ideas for the amount of data designed to come down to the earth daily was staggering although it is probably in a handheld today. finally i would like to say that desert storm really helped solidify national space policy and national security space policy. it is space policy national space program that was primarily designed to prosecute a potential war with the soviet union and we all know all those activities and nuclear attacks etc.. desert storm really began to show how all those space systems that have been designed could be used in complex far short of a major conflict with the soviet union. that could involve nuclear weapons and an act that established at the beginning of the policy a policy with regard to national security. we needed that they were absolutely critical to military operations whether they were small or large. that was new. that they were necessary, that they needed to be sustained, modernized and they had to be detected. all of a sudden we crossed over the line. are talked art talk about a missed opportunity, where we could have signed up for an arms control agreement with that. i think by the time desert storm occurred, it became clear that arms controls will be very difficult if the united states national security apparatus was to be as reliant on space assets as was clearly demonstrated in desert storm. it was eye-opener. chuck horner who was the allied commander of air force in desert storm called desert storm the first space war, between navigation real-time recognizance communication became very clear that the u.s. military forces in the future would operate on a backbone for space providing capability. not cold war space providing capability but new space capability involved in doing military operations around the world, 24/7 in regions that could not be predetermined and pre-positioned more. this was really new and important and we spend a lot of time on that. they asked about what were some of the impediments. refocused on a lot of different policy areas. i think a lot of them as you can see, there is a lineage to all this. we did have an impediment and i think it is important to get them out on the table because it is part of the space policy and space program history. and it is best summarized in my opinion by a chapter or a paragraph in the final report we provided the president in january of 1993 that said, and here it is talking about the space launch and what we wanted to do at the space launch but it applies to a lot of things across the board. during the intervening five years, efforts to secure support for a new launch system have been largely unsuccessful. the failure of our institutions, u.s. government agencies, congress and the aerospace companies to converge and agree to support and fund a new launch system not only short-sighted but will prevent us from achieving many if not most of our long-term space objectives. that is something that is worthy of discussion because that is a recurring thing. a missed opportunity. we do have a missed opportunity when we came in. senator william proxmire had put in the appropriations bill and the requirement that the person certify within 30 days of being sworn in his intentions on space station freedom. senator proxmire was not a fan of space station freedom. it turns out the time was so fast and i think all of her colleagues will attest to this, the time was so fast you are playing doubletime, triple time when you are in the white house. it seems to be of blur that moves at the speed of life. 30-day injunction after swearing in -- i was sworn would sworn in on march 1 of 1989, and we were already 10 days in zip ear of time. we didn't even have an office. long story short, we ended up working quickly and getting the certifying space station freedom. it was an opportunity missed. if we had really done a real thorough base review. it is arguable whether at that time and that place the system would have stood still for that is debatable but it is a regret i've had and i've talked about the president and vice president about it and given the way things robot eventually on the space station have we done a thorough base review at that time we got it been looking at things that are different picture so that is a small missed opportunity. it for the significant achievements of the bush ministry semi-opinion? first and foremost we defined a national security space rammer bets is sustained today. i think you could take a direct line from that because before cold war national security space policy and strategy and portman in portman afterwards was a post-cold war world. it must be protected and is critical. we created a policy for commercial space commerce that is the same today. government supports, utilizes facilitates encourages and protects u.s. commercial space enterprise. we initiated cooperation with the russians. it was modest by the end of the bush ministry show and we had agreed for the shuttle mir program which was then in the works for about three years, but desert storm intervened and eventually before the president left signed with force yeltsin an agreement to fly a cosmonaut on the shuttle and put u.s. astronauts on the space station mir and that really opened up the opportunity for a lot of cooperation, very positive on the u.s. side. i want to talk just briefly about something that will be a little controversial here. i think it largely unintended but are half the most significant policy initiative by the bush administration, unintended but potentially most significant, was when we convene the advisory commission on the future of the united states space program the so-called augustine commission. long story if you want that story by the way i have a book coming out. called falling back to earth, a first-hand account of the great space raised in the end of the cold war. you can read in detail about that. but the augustine commission even though it's designed to focus on specific issue of nasa and nasa organizations, the space exploration initiative, freedom, space station freedom and the shuttle and the unintended but significant consequence in my mind of creating the intellectual and programmatic framework for nasa post-cold war that was based primarily on our wallet, not our will. and it was focused on balancing and satisfying competing space stakeholders rather than supporting -- subordinating them to national objectives. finally in conclusion i would say another thing controversial thing and that is my opinion having looked at this and this would be a fun thing to have the panel discussed -- i believe the united states human spaceflight throw graham died at the end of the cold war. and it was like a radiation system not an execution. the lethal dose was a in the cold war for a variety of reasons. it seems to be a i believe we are incapable now if reenergizing the human space program. i think it is a human tragedy and something that needs to be rethought, but i think at this -- as we look down the list here i look at our chair during the bush ministry should nasa period a time when the space program in the united states is financially was terminated. so with that, i look forward to questions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much, mark. next we have the clinton administration. the clinton administration was marked by the emergence of localization. the real emergence of -- the bombing of the uss cole, the missile strikes into afghanistan. we have the somalia situation, the bosnian war. we also have had the rise in china and in our industry we do have the rise of satellite services to the consumer. i know the during the clinton administration and administration i think we have someone from the network system here, but my first satellite dish for directv services and i think several thousand others in the united states. by the end of that decade -- to represent the clinton administration we have two gentlemen. richard del bellow. richard under the clinton administration was the assistant director for aeronautics and space and the office of science and technology policy. we also have steven moran. steve moran. he was a senior policy by surfer space in aviation in the white house policy. one small caveat, i know steve had a deadline in terms of time. he has to take a critical phonecall at a specific time. depending on how it goes we will either have rich solo or rick and steve so let me handed over to rich. >> thank you very much. it is a pleasure to be here and to echo what mark said, to listen to this fascinating story as it on schools across time, i think clearly one of the themes we are hearing which i am sure will continue with the other speakers, is that although the administration's change in focus sometimes significantly, we have some very stable thames that are running through this story, and there are themes that started in the kennedys administration they continue on now into the obama administration. and i think the organizers and thank you very much to the space enterprise council and the marshall institute for conceptualizing this very interesting event. the one of the things the organizers asked us to do is spend a little time talking about -- and make decisions in those times. and i think at the end mark was trying to be controversial but i think he is putting his finger on an important fact that where we are today in society and our economy and our place in the world, some things that were possible during the kennedy or the reagan administrations are probably not going to happen again. there are significant changes that have changed the context of where we are so what we want from the nation of our space program and who we want to do those things will be fundamentally altered as we go forward in the future. each administration as we have already seemed don't indent the world. the world is as it is when you take over. you may have won the office with an orientation. ronald reagan certainly was an orientation of strong leadership, and a goal to express a unique american voice in the world. the clinton administration, not quite so dramatic. looking around the room i guess about half of you were around and thinking about administrations when this happened and the other half of you are probably not, but if you recall, the big praise in the clinton election was the economy, stupid. it was a goal to refocus america on america and now an interesting -- and interest to remember the context was where we are in the budget today. really hard focus on the budget reality. we have a young, you think with all due respect, slightly disorganized president, tremendously creative, congress first then democratic and the republican congress after a significant i think misstep on part of the administration. and a reenergize focus in this was the period in which we shut the government down so there was a lot of looking inward at this time. the themes that mark talked about are still fundamental. in the clinton administration comes in, you had a winding down of cold war. you at a very serious concern with what was going to happen to all the very very talented soviet scientists and engineers. there was a lot of concern as has already been mentioned about the concept of terrorism and they fear over the issue of loose nukes so a great deal of the energy and i will talk about the organization in a minute that a great deal of the energy in and thinking about space and the white house during the clinton administration was in the office of vice president. p.m. vice president gore had a very strong concern about what we could positively do to affect change within russia. this was certainly limited and the white house. the united states congress was deeply engaged in this issue but certainly one of the things that happened was because of the world situation there was a renewed focus on trying to engage the russians again as mark said, dialogue which had already been begun and the bush administration was then broadly expanded trying to bring the russians more fully into the space station. it was not without its bumps and bruises for sure as these two cultures collided in a very significant way. you have the u.s. which liked like to do things its way and the russians who although at the time were in the middle of a significant financial and political crisis. of course the proud people and proud of their tradition and space exploration. so those two cultures colliding in unlikely places like houston was always an exciting thing to watch. i think another big theme which we have seen and gil described i think very well, the atmosphere and the goal of the reagan administration and began rolling out these really big themes. the star wars initiative, the national aerospace claim and then to the administrations a strategic -- sorry this space expiration issue. i think in all honesty, what you saw in the clinton administration was a realization, again a renewed locus of the economy, the budget, the realization of what what -- certainly there were always ideologues and people who would come to a position with an already prefix mindset about it but i think also there was the realization that the technical level just how massive these programs were. we spent a lot of money on these issues, and we had a very much progress. turns out the national aerospace plane which is a great idea and perhaps someday we'll be implemented, which is simply didn't have the technologies to do it. the same with -- we were now -- we have done a substantial amount of spending on the strategic defense initiative since it was first announced by president reagan and we still see the complexity of that. they are all these people who argue if you spend more you would have made greater progress but these are monumental issues. the issue isn't can you make drug rest? the issue is whether the percentage of countries will put you want to spend on any given thing. again, coming back to this issue of renewed focused on the budget during the clinton administration. if you were caught we drove the budget and it just -- wasn't just the clinton administration. we drove from a significant budget deficit to an actual surplus with the clinton administration left office. there is at the same time and neither -- another key theme was reinventing government. rightly or wrongly and it is interesting now in light of the tea party and the other thing is, to think about these roles. if you think about it ronald reagan was pushing a large government program. the clinton administration was talking about reducing the size of government. so we have all the strange role reversals that happened as we go through time. cheaper, faster, better, one of the themes that was i think planted in the bush administration. it was again played out more fully in the clinton administration. there was a sense that we had tied ourselves up in and less bureaucracy and endless objectives and there ought to be a way to move through technology and a more crisp fashion and again, think the key -- a key environmental aspect of the clinton administration was that to understand it, this was the first of the internet. i remember physically seeing the engineers come in and hook up the first t-1 line to the white house. so prior to that, we were communicating over regular telephone wire so we all got the internet on our desks. and to think at the same time of the tremendous explosion of the dotcom revolution was happening and there was rate sense of the vitality of the american entrepreneur. there was a company being born every minute so you know some of those have now gone away for some but some of the large icons remain. .. which has paid off handsomely particularly now has first of all the russians have made significant contributions over the years, but important now is we wind down the space shuttle program's russians will be the only access we have to this peace mission. >> let me talk about the wins and losses if i could -- did he run? okay. let me just talk a little bit about well, let me talk about organization first and then wins and losses. we started out with a space and then he gail talked about the process and the sig grew in the of space council. when the clinton administration came in there was a clear sense going back to reinventing the government the white house had gone, grown too large and there were too many white house related advisory groups whether it was wise or unwise we can have the discretion there was a goal to cut the white house by 25%. as a part of that, as part of that initiative they decided to take a step back from the space council and say this is just like any other complicated issue we don't have councils for the oceans or the air. we don't really need a space council, and so what happened is the response of the first base went back at that point it was run by dr. gibbons who was a scientist and a physicist, and i think his passion for this was perhaps less real than his passion for science, and so i think fed reflected some of the decision making reflecting the leadership on this. of course we always have the full involvement of vice president gore on these issues but in the organizations sort of day today came back which meant something very critical mass market pointed out at this time in history there was also an extremely important national security space program and what this meant is that you really did bifurcate the world's in a way again, you had -- i was one of the team and so was steve. we were brought over to the white house and we didn't have the same focus deal and market. we didn't have the sense our portfolios all of state and ultimately that's not a good thing, why would they argue you what to do a space council again i think there are pluses and minuses but i think not harming a coherent vision as primary and our primary focus was on the national security space program, and i think if you come to this enterprise with that narrowed scope you can't see the whole picture because there's a tremendous amount that happens on that side. so i think that organization does ultimately matter. we made the decisions and you had a triumphant in the white house, the office and technology at the core responsibility that there were many large decisions which were handled by the national economic council and many large decisions, large dollar decisions the were handled by the national security council. so, you sort of divided the responsibilities again. wins and losses and then i think i will wind up. the biggest win without question was the clinton administration's decision on the program. certainly we can't take credit on the program itself which had been the product of many presidents and investment in a very wise decisions on the department of defense to invest in this critical technology but the clinton administration had a fundamental decision to make which is is this something that we want -- you probably don't recall at the time they were actually did during the signal. so to make it impossible to get an accurate signal out of the gps they are actively involved in making the system that for every one except the military. and there were fundamental decisions made and essentially the question they were asking is are we going to make gps -- are we going to pay for it and need a global utility? is the united states going to give to the world this incredible toole which you and every soccer mom and dad in america uses on saturday and sunday now and we couldn't -- all of us have it now indicted in our mobile device, so we couldn't find a starbucks without it. but we made that decision, and it was not without controversy and i think that was perhaps our best and most important decision. bringing the russians into the space station is a lot to be said about the space station whether it's a good idea or not and history will write and cover some of this, but bringing the russians and i think was an unqualified good move. there was a lot of creative work that was done on air-traffic and steve is coming back. i will not talk about the air traffic modernization program. an important thing the clinton administration did is to privatize the entities that time they were basically intergovernmental organizations. the clinton administration claim and said this doesn't make sense. why do we have governmental organizations providing a commercial service globally when companies can do this easily. it's very controversial at the time, very, very little support from other countries when it was first announced that it's paid off handsomely in both countries, both companies have survived the generations with in service, and in ways that are fundamentally improved life or on the planet. and there's a lot that can be said of the planetary science program. this has been mentioned by several speakers. the question of getting the space station and planetary science program to a place where it was fumble and sustainable for long period of time this a challenge and was one where the white house and congress have to work cooperatively together, and i think by and large it's turned out well. there were some big losses on fortunately, some big lessons learned. perhaps the biggest loss was the program. we encourage the consolidation of the military and civilian weather system. it turned out to be a logistical nightmare with the primary user met with nasa in the dod to agree on a system of grow phenomenally out of the budget just went haywire, and requirements for the system were not controlled in a way that is spending dramatically out of control and eventually the program had to be killed and separated, so there was a big loss. my own personal loss i was involved in this case transformation policy-making at the time and we were passionate about the x33 program single stage oregon and i learned a very important lesson, which is policy never trump's physics. so you can say whatever you want, but if you can't do it, if it will happen, and we wanted to will the single states to orbit in existence and we had a beautiful concept that looked like the future we did this didn't have the technology. and ultimately we didn't have the will either. i think that i wouldn't say that national security space was a loss under the administration. i think a lot of great programs were developed by can't take credit for any of that is what i'm saying. there were good people working and we were not really deeply involved in that. with that i will wrap it up but this is a fascinating exercise and i look forward to hearing the rest, how the story is going to end. [applause] thank you, richard. so now we are the second bush administration, the out ministration of george w. bush where the world begins to change again. you have one of the interesting perspectives i think on the bush administration this time is the importance of expectations. secretary rumsfeld comes in and assumes control of the defense department, but he had just been share of two other commissions in the latter portions of the clinton administration. those commissions one on missile defense and other concerns in space management organizations. the expectations for how the community at large sought the defense policies related to missile defense were going to evolves. the rumsfeld missile defense commission outlined a very aggressive set of programs including some elements of the use of space. the rumsfeld space commission talks in great detail about the billing of the organizational process and the importance also of space to the national security missions and warns of a space pearl harbor. the expectation on the part of the community that was then observing the decision the rumsfeld defense department and the bush defense, bush national security policy at large than expects movement in the policy and movement in the budget along the lines predicted by these to commissions but three of these changes. we have a terrorist attacks of september, 2001, the subsequent war in iraq and afghanistan which divert attention and resources on =to immediate critical national priorities and perhaps shift attention away from the policy movements we thought would happen. you have the vision for space exploration that comes out in 2004 which again attempt to define a new path and a new set of priorities for the american space exploration. and you have a deterioration in economic conditions in the second half of the two bush administrations. all of these things that affect space decisions central into these decisions were alexander has the advisor on space issues of the white house office of technology policy urging the clinton administration into the hour georgia will you bush administration and while he was at the white house but serve as one of the principal authors the division -- formation. thank you very much, jeff. as you mentioned, had the pleasure of being there at the end of the clinton administration through the transition, the election that lasted 35 days and then the transition to the bush ad ministration, and that sort of period of turmoil we thought would taper off into an administration that moved out in lock step along the new lines of the way the rumsfeld commission had talked about national security space and other issues. obviously in the first year with 9/11 it didn't happen that we overcome by events is a good way to describe the reality on the ground in terms of the making of space policy and the use of space so what we have for the next seven years really is a reality of the dramatic increase in the use of space for national security purposes space being at the forefront of those issues and those activities afghanistan, iraq, global war on terror around the rest of the world as well. and at the same time, a space policy that is then trying to reflect that as opposed to trying to leave that so when the national space policy comes out in 2006, it is also not a similar infected chemical to the previous policies is viewed not only by the administration and viewed by the rest of the world is fundamentally different for the new lines. it is viewed as more telcos, more unilateral things that the rest of the world view as hallmarks and the rest of the bush at fenestration. so backing up before that there was a reality, as i sit in the use of space for the national security purposes on the civil side the reality on the ground was the columbia accident. february 1st 2003 change everything from the civil service perspective. it changed, with it can recognition of the civil human space flight program as being fundamentally different than what we have fought, where is the community thought that was more of an operational system that had had people in this case on space station in the presence it was working toward scientific goals and i think in the light of columbia, people said what are we doing we are not going anywhere, why aren't we moving forward fleeing something we've been flying for 25 years, we need to change this paradigm, and i think an accident like that instantly changes the paradigm for folks watching it. one of the very first actions the bush administration took command this was pre-9/11 with regard to the civil space program come was on everybody's favorite program, space station program, so throughout the clinton administration, when the program was finally solidified from a political perspective by bringing the russians in the commit the same time every two years there was a budget overrun or cost approve of multiple billions of dollars and always had to be worked out, and my impression of those battles was in the end of the schedule slip but nasa got the same content for the station with minor changes here and there. at the beginning of the bush at a demonstration there was a 4 billion-dollar i believe it was overrun on the space station that was presented to the omb within the first couple of months and the result of that was omb and the white house pushed back and said you don't get any more money. you don't get to keep the content. you have to cut content to meet your goals. that results in what was called the u.s. court complete, which dramatically reduced the capability of the station, kept a lot of the scientific things folks wanted of the habitation modules and things like that that were no longer part of it and then over the next year the u.s. court sort of morphed into the international court complete because it sounded like we were not going to allow the international partners to ring of the modules, but of course that was always part of the plan was to let them continue in that part of the program, too. so it was a fundamental budget reality that the administration tried to instill in the programs. along with that, outgoing and minister who had been there for ten years started under bush 41 as they dropped the budget administration was still there beginning in bush 43 was replaced by sean o'keefe who had been a deputy during a tour of the office and management budget for the first nine months, nine to 12 months in the bush administration. so it was a recognition to put in a program manager someone who can manage budgets, not a space person, not an astronaut, not someone who is sort of was in and of the program itself, and i think that really said where the bush administration was going. you mentioned the columbia accident, and that really fundamentally changed everything from the bush administration's view of the civil space program. there had been an ongoing review of this base will the ccf remote sensing policy that had come out or was about to come out space transportation policy was 99% done. i remember a meeting on the very last issue between a o.s. tv and the mass of an administrator o'keefe that happened on wednesday when columbia was in order, and at the end of that meeting we all thought we had come to agreement with the policy was done and in the net saturday morning everything changed, and we ended up putting up the transportation policy and redoing it two years later so i had the pleasure of writing a policy twice and leading the agency twice with 50 people around the room twice for a year each time. and i bring that up because the average ministration -- the obama administration kicked off the space transportation policy review, and i just so glad it's them and not me. [laughter] but i did enjoy the process. two things about the columbia accident and what can out of it that led toward the vision that i think are important, one is that the columbia accident investigation board came out in august. we yet known if leading up to that, but it came out and said some very important things. there was a leaked to add to the columbia investigation board where folks were to focus on policy instead of just the technical reasons why the accident happened. that made a lot of us in the white house nervous because now you're going to broaden it from here is what actually happened to here's why it happened and start pointing fingers and plame, and what they ended up saying and it was john larsen in particular who was on the committee who wrote a chapter nine, and what it said, you know, that was if importance that it was a failure of national policy, it was a failure of national leadership that that contributed significantly that within the organization there wasn't a sense of why we were doing it, where we were going, the importance of it that that had been lost. the second thing they said was it wasn't a failure of this particular administration of this a failure of the leadership over 40 years and a failure both in pennsylvania avenue and in both political parties, and that was very interesting because i think at the highest levels of the bush administration, what that said was this is not your fault. but if you don't change something now, there will be another accident and that one will be your fault. you may be out of office. it may have been ten years from now but the finger will be pointed back at you and you will say you were warned and didn't do anything about it. from the beginning after columbia, about three weeks after the accident, most of the pieces were being picked up literally and down in texas. we started a very small group of folks that said dhaka what does this mean for the program and human space flight in general? and there were folks that said you know, we shouldn't be doing this. we don't have the rationale to do it anymore. we don't -- it's too much money. we don't have the money. and president bush on that day wanted to come back from camp david and he said something very important in his speech that he made. he said we are going to keep doing this because it's important. he didn't say we are going to keep flying the shuttle or in the specifics like that. we are going to keep doing this because it's an portion part of the american character and that was useful so i carried the speech around the next two months when people said we shouldn't be doing it i would say you don't get a vote the president of r. dee said we are going to so let's figure out what we are going to do not if we are going to do it and that was very powerful at least it stiffened up my spine of a lot in those conversations. consequently i almost got fired a few times but you have to stick up for what you believe in when you get these opportunities and i think anybody who has been up here today has come and you know, understands when you get the opportunity to work at the white house whoever you are working for it's an opportunity number one you can't pass up but it is something special. so, as we were looking at what is meant for the space program, human space flight program in particular, we kept having interactions with senior administration folks, chief of staff in the card, deputy national security advisor stephen hadley, national security advisor condoleezza rice and others, and every time we brought them sort of the latest rock what we were thinking, they didn't say i'd like that or i don't like that or change this, change that, they just said keep working. figure out what you think the right answer is, you know, and bring that back. and i think there was very different than a lot of frustrations with has acted. in the end when the decision making happened with the president and the senior advisers and the president and all of the folks people know in the bush and administration with karl rove and others, the decision was made not on the basis of wanting political credit because frankly at that time in the administration, you know, they just have gone into iraq. it wasn't going that well. nobody was thinking this is going to be kennedy speech moment and everybody's going to love it. the president's father had done that and it hadn't gone so well but it was a matter of what is the right thing to do, how do we fix this, and therefore all options were on the table. ethical cynically what i believe most about the vision was that it confirmed was certainly those of us in the space community always said which is that it's about exploring and going beyond not operating and doing things, but it once again put on the table but which had been taken off the table which is that nasa should be going out and exporting. it also laid the groundwork for turning over giglio activities to the private-sector. it said i think it was a choir commercial and international services in the international station later that summer in 2000 for the elbridge commission that was put in place to look at implementation of the vision came out and said turn me over to the private sector right away, and they said much more elegantly than we did in the policy and with the clarity of hindsight i think we would have written things quite a bit different in order to make that happen. with that, the vision became a sort of signature policy direction of the bush administration. the u.s. document that was issued with the vision which was the vision there were documents on the space transportation, remote sensing. remote sensing had a fundamental shift to allow foreign access to the capabilities, commercial capabilities and bush 41 or early clinton years which in the end set up the structure how foreign companies could get access in the industry to develop the key devotees and after ten years or so it hadn't developed of the way we thought it would and therefore we redid that policy to have a partnership between the government and industry, and i think that has worked much better since then because we now have commercial remote sensing companies that work commercially in the hand in hand with the government. but then we had this overarching national space policy. i left one week after the second term began in january of 2005, but at that time we were about 95% done with the national space policy review. that's one of the reasons i felt okay, i've been here five years. it's time to move on and we are in a good place. all that's left is a couple dotting of eyes and crossing t's and a signature, and that document will be out. it was another two years before the document came out after i had left, and the reason for that is there were one or two issues that were hotly debated actually between the department of defense and the intelligence community, and so you know, when you get those titans locking arms or butting heads a few well it takes time and so when the finally the couple seated come out in the summer of 2006 it was, you know, it was surprising to me how it was viewed by the public, by the community, by the international community while the tone had shifted a little bit in terms of national security priorities versus scientific priority, the national space policy that rich had done with the clinton administration had said through space policy co leads it. the inappropriate we all know what that means. the national security council was going to hold on to the national securities these issues no matter what. but there's objects with that. the bush at ministration policy sort of left of those aside and said here's how it is. the substance of the policy particularly on the use of outer space, the willingness to enter into or not enter into arms control treaties throughout space, all those things were no different substantively from the clinton administration policy from a couple of minor changes. i remember going through the policy meetings on the document at the national security council then but fortunately couldn't be here today. but going through those documents and singing okay if you change a single word it will be noticed and you must have a good reason why. and in the end very few words were changed. and so when people cannot including vice president gore, former vice president gore said it was a fundamental shift in policy and very unilateral in its outcome. i was just surprised because to me it was a very -- and marked a lot of continuity in the past. there were not a lot of substantive changes. but looking ahead through the rest of the at ministration, the exploration activity for example , the new administration that just came in and i'm sure the general will talk about this, found that to be in their view to be broken program. so when we talk about the wins and losses and a missed opportunity, obviously the space exploration vision was near and dear to my heart i think going back to the moon is going to happen before we go on to mars. i don't dislike the idea of going to an asteroid first but you need fundamental the almost the same amount of infrastructure and cost if you're going to go to an asteroid versus the moon but we are going to do all of these if we can get out of low earth orbit. the fundamental shift which didn't happen in the second term of the bush administration that i think is happening now is the shift to have commercial take over the low earth orbit so they can get on with the business of exploration, so that to me is a missed opportunity in the past administration. with that, i look forward to your questions and i really, really have enjoyed what i've heard from the panelists today. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. i think that maybe the current obama policy team calling in. [laughter] that will be taken care of and a second. the obama administration brings us full circle. during the obama administration, we have a continuing war on terror. campaigns in afghanistan, wrapping up activities in iraq, and a new openness that the obama administration has pushed forward and open as it has been portrayed in the policy that you will hear about now. more of a focus on international cooperation and a look at a different blend of bass players in the industrial base, not only the company's that focus on the program this but also the emergence of entrepreneurial and commercial space companies. to talk about the obama policies we have to gentleman today. first we have jim kohlenberger, a lengthy resume, but i will focus on his time, focusing on policy and that was the chief of staff for the obama white house the chief of staff for the office of science and technology policy to riffling jim we have peter who served under both the bush and obama administration and he was the director of the policy of the white house. first we're going to start with jim. >> thank you, david, and it's great to be here and see so many folks. the great thing about making space policy as you move forward is your ability to defend on the shoulders of giants and here we have some of the giants of space policy previous and it's just wonderful to hear this and i think you're going to hear this continuity of progress all for about and i was happy to spend eight years in the clinton white house with the vice president office where he had come out of the senate commerce committee where he shared the space committee and it was great because he was engaged in space policy and have a passion and the only thing better than having a vice president who is passionate about a space policy is having a president who is passionate about having a vigorous space policy, and that's what we had in the obama white house. but to give you a little contant -- context and of course this is recent history we came into office at a time when minutes of space had completely permeated almost every aspect of our lives. from the iphone on my belt to the navigation system that brought us here to the google earth that's on my laptop, every day and our life is now touched by space and it's become even more vital to our economy, national security, to our environment, yet we face for immediate challenges in space when we first came into office. first we faced a sputnik moment and it's fitting that the president used a space metaphor to describe where america was in fact at that moment, and we came in the midst of a recession. we were focused like a laser on creating the jobs and the new industries of the future. we knew coming out of world war ii half of economic growth came from innovation but at the same time i think we were concerned we had fallen behind in a few key indicators. so for example american 15 urals ranked 25th in math and 21st in science when compared to other nations around the world so we knew we needed to crank up the innovation engine. number two, we are faced with the imminent retirement of the space shuttle which the bush administration has a date certain that the end of 2010. the gao had highlighted for whoever won the election last time that this would be one of the key 13 issues that any administration would need to take a look at to get under the hood and figure out because there wasn't an adequate strategy going forward. ferre, the other issue that we face is critical environmental science and technological innovation efforts had been crowded out within the budget by an ever-growing human spaceflight effort and other challenges and it was costing us in terms of the great opportunities that we saw in space and on the national security site after 50 years of increasing use of space, space was getting more congested, congested, competitive and 60 nations now have a presence there by 2015 there will be 9,000 satellites with transponders in the skies overhead. they're so cluttered that if you have major questions you can actually render orbits unusable. at the same time, we knew that as others have described we have big space programs that were -- the had a tendency to have huge cost growth in years and we knew we needed a new acquisition strategy, we knew that we needed to partner with the private sector in new ways internationally and we are focused on bringing in new openness and transparency to what we did globally and everything we did the president really challenged us for a bigger vision, bolder action, brighter future and he picked up the phrase we needed to win the future and that apply it to what we were doing in space as well and so what the response to sputnik, we often think that in 47 in those early space years we had a space rate. there were several components. investment in space but we also needed to invest in our human capacity and kasich region and basic research and technological development. we needed to out innovate and outbuilding and help educate the world and so the president set a goal of boosting our efforts in r&d to 3% of gdp for folks who don't remember that was the amount of research we were doing at the height of the space race and we haven't come back to that level yet so we set this broad goal and made historic investment in that area to back it up and hit the velte plans to move in the middle of the pact the top of the world in terms of education and i think people forget that apollo 11 mission control the average age was 26-years-old and yet today the average age is around 50, and so we needed to take a look at this new generation of leaders and scientists to get involved, and unfortunately the average middle school kid but rather to get the trash, go to the dentist before doing the math homework or instead of doing the math homework and we knew we needed to do better as we launched a couple initiatives early on. we brought together this base communities and changed the equation 100 ceos to transform the way teachers teach and students learn to create more dreamers. the president posted in a strong meionite on the south lawn of the white house to get kids focused on their but our biggest challenge was on the civilian side of space in addition to kind of building the building block, so the congressional budget office, the general accounting office and both highlighted a number of challenges with nasa's constellation program, but i don't think we knew yet the breadth of the challenges were the scope of wood or challenges would be facing a head. i think brad leaf limited to some of the challenges and so we took a page out of the clinton administration and bush i and the clinton administration early on when we had the challenges in the space station freedom and the cost growths mark referred to the clinton administration set up outside experts to get under the hood and take a look at it, and we borrowed norm augustine who mark also referred to and we brought together astronauts and engineers and space experts to take a look at the program and they held meetings of the country and sought input all over the place and came back to us and in space terms of the said houston, we have a problem. we were actually really surprised at the kind of scope of what they found. we were billions over budget coming years behind schedule, unable to get us back to the moon on any reasonable time frame and the program had become fundamentally an executable, so we knew we had to -- we knew it was our job and we could do better so the result of the augustine committee we embarked on a new effort to explore new worlds, create new jobs and develop technology fostering the industry, strengthening international partnerships and increase our understanding of the universe and the recommendations drew lessons from the decisions of many of these administrations that passed before so first and foremost was the shuttle. as brad mentioned the bush administration made a decision to retire the shuttle at the end of 2010. there was a tough decision on their part. i think as marks points out, it's very difficult to fund and operational program, yet you can't find a replacement program on top of it. it's a challenge. sometimes they have to be done sequentially into the was part of a challenge that led to the challenges we face when we came into office but the bush administration made the decision to retire and we said okay instead of putting a time stamp on their one of the things we saw on safety is if you drive the shuttle launches just by an arbitrary time table you can run into safety problems so we decided to add more money and fly down. we added a couple of flights but we are nearing the end of that incredible program soon and on a $100 billion space station we drew upon i think some of the lessons from the previous administrations. i think ronald reagan had initially kicked off this effort when it started. the clinton administration pulled it out of the fire, saved by one vote. the challenges we saw is the program was going to have to be dumped into the ocean to be able to pay for a follow-on program and we were concerned after all of this investment and putting it together before we had actually turned into a scientific lab which was part of the original design that we would have to be orbited and so we decided to give it a new lease on life and ten years will also enhance its utilization. beyond the earth orbit, this is one of the holy grails in space, and we set out to go places that man had never gone before on a more flexible path which is what the augustine committee has talked about why also matching - importantly means with mission. but augustine found one of the things we had done is vastly underestimated over the decades in the new technology that we needed to go beyond the earth's moon cradle and we went back and looked to one of the reports the first administration did and all of the new technology they out land that we would need to go to mars, and we actually found these are the exact same technology we need today. we haven't invested in these new technologies to take us further, faster and farther into space, and some wonder in the process developed this chart that showed if we wanted to go to mars for example it was going to take the lifting weight of 12 international space stations and, the combined weight is what it amounted to and again when international space station required all of the space shuttle flights to get there and 12 times that was massive but with new technologies, you could dramatically reduce the weight that you would need to lift from 12 down to two international space stations but that some things like the orbit feeling and other new technologies that we hadn't yet really focused on or pushed for. so we sought to push the frontiers of innovation within the space program and develop these technologies before making a decision in terms of what type of heavy lift architecture we would pursue and the president went down to the space center to leave out some new goals for accomplishing the new first in human space flight including visiting an asteroid and eventually going to mars. but with this looming gap in the time between the shuttle retired and between the new successor system which the augustine committee found wasn't going to be ready to launch until 2017, two years after the space station would have had to have been dumped into the ocean and had nowhere to go. we knew there we needed to the extent the space station and find a way to accelerate that time we could get access to the low earth orbit so the augustine committee recommended it for safely transporting astronauts on american made spacecraft and ending the outsourcing of this to foreign governments and recommended to the new commercial crew effort to harness american entrepreneurship and competitively fund the fastest possible development of a safe and affordable american made vehicle creating thousands of jobs and enabling full use of the space station. this amounted to a new acquisition strategy making payments based on milestones rather than cost contracts which is how things went before. the commercial concert got a lot attention in the press. where did you come up with this idea of how did it come forward, and frankly this genesis of the program was long in the making. it began in the carter administration when the first increased the commercial and international space station and the reagan administration where i think they created the office of commercial space and in the first bush administration when they signed the purchase act and 1998 when president clinton signed the commercial space act and contract shuttle operations to private companies commandos brett mentioned in 2004 the second bush administration in the aldrich commission and elsewhere recommended using commercial the enterprises for access for both cargo to the low earth orbit and by 2008 actually congress weighed in and actually pushed nasa to develop a program for crew access to the international space station so we build on that history of harnessing our entrepreneur so that nasa could focus on the hard things, so overall, our plan we put together included more money for nasa, more jobs for the country, competition in space, more investment in innovation. by extending the space station and was 3500 additional astronaut days in space over the next decade. we saw as more rockets launching sooner come more destinations from a really ambitious space program while allowing nasa to focus on the hard things it is best at. new technological developments and getting beyond lower orbit and the technologies we need here and this was seen as big change there is a lot of continuity the continuity with folks putting together before and there has been critics as there have been at every major turning point in space policy but within six months, we saw the bipartisan legislation in the works to move much of the administration's plan into law. congress past, the administration signed it and was a milestone and critical step in our space strategy for achieving the president's goal and it really happened sooner than we ever thought possible and it's thanks to the leadership of senator nelson and hutcheson and others in the senate for making that happen. much work lies ahead, but in the history still being written there's really some exciting stuff happening today because of the work that these gentlemen has done and what nasa is doing today and i think it's exciting progress in space and in the coming months they're pleased to announce details on the heavy lift rocket that's going to take man further and faster into space and places we haven't gone before including asteroids and beyond the earth and moon cradle. just yesterday there is a $2 billion now from magnetic spectrometer that we talked with the space to station to unlock the biggest questions in the search for dark matter and antimatter finally fulfilling the space station goal science component turning it into a research note that is orbiting 250 miles above us. that is something that was 15 years in the making and taking us further into the solar system. last month the messenger spacecraft went into orbit and mercury and another spacecraft is going to begin orbiting the second most massive object in the asteroid world. in august juneau is going to take us all the way to jupiter, the largest mars rover the size of a small car will be lowered on to a sky crane down onto the surface of mars and nasa is working on the hubble replacement. it seems and cost growth and challenges it's going to be several years off the double lowest seat in times further than the telescope to the katella scope and ever before. but the new commercial space rate has been going gangbusters and we have seen more results faster than i think we had expected and it's just amazing progress. last month nasa announced new contracts with competitors ranging from boeing, sierra nevada, -- preparation, and really these are the faces of the new frontier. where the commercial sector as stepping in this case there's four different capsule vehicles all competing to the rocket system. there's this based falcon and the launch alliance would assert -- there have less what served three of the four potential capsules and their atlas just need the 26th consecutive nicked the vehicle likely to the workhorse in the area. on cargo, something the bush administration launched for access to a space station and move along like gangbusters too. it's likely to have the first launch this summer. i think they're planning potentially giving a cargo to the space station or the craft of the way to the space station. later this year we see if that works. -- and xy is about a launch the mission of the way to the space station and in sub orbital space, another dynamic space where things are happening, just last week version galactic had a mother break through to stand as early as next year we are going to see him in space flight in the sub orbital change. these are all i think a big and dramatic things that are happening quickly and swiftly it's a dynamic time, an exciting time i think to be in space coming and i am reminded of that this is really only the beginning. i want to come back to this panel 20 years from now and see where we are. but this marks the 50th anniversary of when jfk went to the center and the concession of congress and said we want to go to the moon and it launched our modern human spaceflight era coming devotee it's exciting we're still reaching for new heights 50 years later, that we are still at the beginning of unlocking less space can bring in down was opportunities that lie ahead, and i frankly still think that the best is yet ahead. with that, i want to go to peter, who was just instrumental within the obama white house on helping us draft our national space strategy. peter? [applause] >> [inaudible conversations] >> first, thanks, david and the jeff for putting this panel together. for the it's been great 2-cd to sit here in the audience and listen to what's happened in how we got to where we are. it's been fascinating for me so i appreciate the opportunity. one thing i want to talk about has to do with the content of policy or how we got there but it's like, why we have a policy that the white house is to be joked about we don't have a policy about this or policy but that but there's no land policy, there's no clear policy, why the heck do you use the special hospice policy? and the answer in my opinion is fairly clear. spaces and a place. it is a place but it's more than that. it's everything. it's everywhere we go, everything we do. if you go to the trademark, that space. check your e-mail, space, check the weather, space, driven and thailand and italy, definitely space help to get around. even the most arcane who uses of space island skiing with my father-in-law and a brother and an add on my phone was able to track where i was, godown mcgeorge i wasn't on the ski trails, my speed, velocity, elevation gained and lost i was able to dump the dump google earth and see the different trails and ensure the air force had no idea that is held gps was going to be abused but it was fun to watch. and the space with the way we do treat, warfare, completely modern warfare and intelligence programs and science efforts. this piece is in everything we do is with some pieces why don't we have a space policy, ask them to pull out their phone or if the check with the weather was. so, i'm going to, i think jim him did a great job of capturing the nasa activities so i went to focus on how we developed a the obama space policy and the content and some of the scientific and the nasa activities. part of it was

Related Keywords

Louisiana ,United States ,Texas ,Afghanistan ,Turkey ,China ,California ,Virginia ,Georgia ,Oregon ,Russia ,Beirut ,Beyrouth ,Lebanon ,Iraq ,Tennessee ,Thailand ,Dhaka ,Bangladesh ,Colorado ,Houston ,Somalia ,Los Angeles ,Italy ,Bosnia Herzegovina ,America ,Soviet ,Soviets ,Russian ,Russians ,American ,Bosnian ,George Marshall ,Steve Moran ,August Juneau ,Rick Healey ,John Hodge ,Ron Paul ,Peter Aldrich ,Ronald Reagan ,Chuck Horner ,Stephen Hadley ,Brent Scowcroft ,George Herbert Walker Bush ,John Larsen ,John Sununu ,George W Bush ,Steven Moran ,Christine Varney ,William Proxmire ,Sam Brownback Tom Harkin ,