[inaudible conversations] good afternoon everyone. Id like to welcome you to this afternoons session of the washington history seminar, and for those of you who dont know the seminar is a joint project of the Woodrow Wilson Centers History and Public Policy program and the american Historical Associations National history center. My name is Eric Arn Ericsson from George Washington university, and i am the cochair of this seminar. As is our custom, i want to thank two people whose behindthescenes efforts makes this seminar possible on a weekly basis amanda no moniz and pete [inaudible] i would also like to express thanks to the society of historians of Foreign Relations whose generous financial contributions support this seminars activities. Todays speaker is Bartholomew Sparrow who is a professor of government at the university of texasment he is the author of multiple works including from the outside in world war ii and the american state, the insular cases and the emergence of the american empire, and has been a wood roe Wilson Center fellow, and he is the recipient of the leonard d. White award and the franklin l. Burrdettefy sigma alpha award. Today he will be talking on his new book which is called the strategist. Mr. Sparrow . Thank you, and thank you for having me. A frend in washington a friend in washington is someone who stabs you in the chest. [laughter] this is one of sew crofts jokes, and the irony is he is well admired, if not aa doered adored in washington. Its good to be back speaking under the auspices of the National History center. My time here in 2009 as a resident fellow was invaluable for making this project possible, and i benefited greatly from the intellectual environment, from the many speakers and from talking to and learning from the other researchers, administrators and staff. Id like to thank christian rojer and the others who made this possible, amanda and pete in particular. Incidentally, when i first considered what i would title the biography, there were a few books called the strategist. In the meantime three books have been published with the very same title. One is a police procedural, another is a financial thriller and the third is how to be the leader your business needs. So much for planning. [laughter] what is interesting, though is that few in washington and around the country im sorry let me start over. Many in washington dont think of Brent Scowcroft as a strategist but merely as National Security adviser to george h. W. Bush and as a long time, washington insider. So for some the title may ring counterintuitively. And if he is not the strategist in the sense of a von clausewitz, neither is he a a a theorist in the anticommunist manifesto or Henry Kissingers sweeping arguments in world order. In fact, several of my interviewees told me they didnt especially think of Brent Scowcroft as a separatist strategist, with one official saying he thought of scowcroft as operating between the 40 yardlines. Many have spoken admiringly of scowcroftsic sense strategic sense, its just that hes kept his abilities large hi out of view, with a few exceptions. One has been his op eds. Most note my in 2002 when the wall street journal, enjoining the Bush Administration not to rush to war against iraq. And while scowcroft has written about a hundred opeds over the course of decades these provide only a piecemeal and periodic glimpse of him as a separate just. His strategic strategist. Even in his coauthored books scowcroft t has received second billing, perhaps because of the tyranny of the alphabet, repression that many of us have experienced. [laughter] there have also been published interviews with him and of Journal Articles he has written. Despite these writings scowcrofts own Global Vision has not been visible on the order of kissinger or brzezinski. At least not else i might add. This is where the publication of his memoirs might help since i understand hell be focusing on his philosophy and world view. Almost always behind the sans whether in small scenes whether in small groups oneonone or in closed meetings. Of particular significance has been scowcrofts relationship with the former National Security adviser and secretary of state kissinger with whom he worked closely after nixons election and after ford took office between 1973 and 1977, a period in which kissinger calls scowcroft his quote, full partner, unquote. Yet because this pickup took place almost partnership took place almost entirely behind closed doors, it has gone unnoticed on those who have written on the National Security policy of the nixon and ford administration. But as Vice President fords tutor on Foreign Policy in the months before nixons resignation and as someone whose agenda was only that of the president and the United States general scowcroft, in fact became president fords most trusted Foreign Policy adviser. The Reagan Administration then brought in scowcroft to resolve the mx missile controversy and later to serve on the threeperson tower board to investigate the iran contra scandal. He subsequently became george bushs righthand man and helped george w. Bush with intelligence reform. Advice on the latter issue that went mostly unheeded. He later worked quietly with bush 43s Foreign Policy team is and has occasionally given Foreign Policy advice to the obama white house, especially early in the administration. A few specific examples of a sense of strategy. With the british pound collapsing in 1976 and with secretary of state kissinger and the secretary of the treasure, scowcroft quietly worked out an arrangement for concessions by britains Prime Minister callahans Labour Government for a 4 billion imf rescue package backed by the United States and supported by germany and france. A great deal of money at the time. And the trick here was the pound was sinking and they had to keep these negotiations secret away from the press so it didnt provoke a further run on the pound. Another was scowcrofts advice to president bush early in 1989 that the United States and the soviet union both withdraw their Ground Forces from central europe. His logic was that nato minus the u. S. Would be to the United States Net Advantage and would take the initiative away from mikhail gorbachev. Although the idea provoked a tourstorm especially from defense firestorm especially from defense secretary cheney bush eventually agreed to a scaledback version of the plan. Rather than belligerently demand that the wall be torn down scowcroft wanted to create the underlying conditions that would make the berlin wall no longer necessary so it would fall of its own accord. More significantly Scowcroft Bush and baker wanted to take the initiative away from gorbachev to think what they wanted to achieve militarily, economically, stoogeically and then to provide a set of carrots and sticks which meant getting the u. K. France and germany to agree. A third example was his decision on the Scowcroft Commission later under bush 41 to push through radical reductions in Nuclear Missiles and and to reduce the number of war ads and to reconvert or to download to single warhead icbms. Scowcrofts argument and one that gradually prevailed was that rockets with up to ten warheads were both more attractive as targets and as weapons that could be used in contrast to singlewarhead icbms. In fact, this is some of the logic that infused s. T. A. R. T. And s. T. A. R. T. Ii. Another bold moves as a strategist were his insistence that iraq had to leave kuwait the first in the at managers to con administration to convince bush in short order. His call for prudence with attacking iraq after 9 11 and his willingness to support the troop surge after 2007. So what has allowed Brent Scowcroft to exert such an enduring influence on National Security policy, so much so that hes one of the most be admired elder statesmen this many washington . One is his ability to keep the eyes on the ball, on the United States longer term interests military political, economic whether in his capacity as an air force lieutenant colonel, as military assistant to the president , as deputy National Security adviser or as National Security adviser proper. Yet this ability to look down the road would be of little use without the ability to see the moving parts, to anticipate upcoming curves, the on to instructions ahead. As a student of World History and International Relations as a graduate of the National War College with a doctorate in International Relations from columbia and as a professor at west point and the air force academy, he has been able to analyze the forces in play to get a feel for their tendencies trajectories and to gauge their possible effects. Like a skilled chess player scowcrofts been very good in figuring out how the opposing player or players might respond. These were characteristics p honed under the tutelage of air force general major richard genkin, also one of the developers of cyop and while in the preponderate gone, helped scowcroft learned how the different bureaucracies interacted with industry and scientific communities and ore actors other actors. Later, working under kissinger, scowcroft became more comfortable working with the press. All the same a strategist has to be relevant. One can be a military Planner Campaign consultant, but if he or she is on the sidelines and his or her ideas are ignored that person cant be considered a strategist. Ken nonis renowned for his long telegram, the sources of soviet conduct, yet after in this white hot burst of innuance, policymakers essentially ignored him while he was of at princeton and on his pennsylvania farm. Neither do we think of him as a strategist over the later period. Another aspect of strategy is operational then where it is hard to this think of any other policymaker in recent times who has been as consistently influential and well respected for his judgment and expertise. I was one slide behind, excuse me. Distrust has distinct roots. One is sew covet scowcrofts ability to speak to different audiences due to his experience in International Relations, in Nuclear Weapons in military affairs, in intelligence and in economics. Furthermore, not only can scowcroft speak authoritatively on these separate issues, hes also able to consider how they intersect and interact. Another is his drive coupled with his ability. One comment made repeatedly was his ability to the keep growing with no discernible upper ceiling. Would have clearly received a fourth star had he not retired from the air force when he became National Security adviser in november 1975. A third is his cordial and respectful personality. Another frequent comment his superior officers made was how easy he was to work with. He impressed his air forces bos bosses not only with his ability to go the extra mile but as a team player. Hes willing to be persuaded by new evidence and strong argument, he listens. As one Bush Administration colleague put it, scowcroft doesnt want anything. Member be very he can be very serious, reserved and compartmental rised, east also affable, had a good sense of humor and was not bo making offcolor jokes. He got along well with others and had a good sense of how to pitch his remarks whether to associates reporters academic, military officers, foreign leaders, students or young people. Some implications of the subtitle, Brent Scowcroft and the call of National Security. I should say that it feels odd to be writing about the high of someone who still participates in politics and till runs his own and still runs his own business. He was just in saudi arabia for king abdul thats funeral. There are abdullahs funeral. The question becomes do their lives merit this attention however provisional at this stage . Here i can unequivocally say, yes. To the first part of my subtitle as a biography i wanted to examining and present scowcroft roots. This research led me to his background as a member of a very well established family. Joe pinkery was one of the captains of the mormon Companies Making the overland trek to what is now part of omaha to the Great Salt Lake basin, another was a missionary in india and the founder of the mormon sunday schools. Both were polygamists. A third great grandfather john scowcroft, arrived later by train and founded a very Successful Company of food and dry goods wholesale merchants. Helped by the fact that [inaudible] was an entrepreneur for rail traffic throughout the west where freight trains had to change passengers when traveling east to west. You cant go anywhere without coming to ogden, town leaders posted. During prohibition, al capone was reported to have said that ogden was too rough for him. Scowcrofts father managed the Family Business and by all accounts he had a happy and active childhood the youngest of three children and the only son. And with his fors being 4 and 7 years older, he was, in some ways an only child. Acknowledging that he never heard his parents fighting he rightly commented that experience growing up gave him a distorted sense of his fellow humans. What do these pleasant stories and nice family photos have to do with scowcroft as an air force member and senior statesmen . What they convey is just how secure he was growing up, secure materially secure socially and secure psychologically. He had no status anxiety, and he wasnt awe grade to join afraid to join the army air corps. Hes here. This sense of security would then make the travails of the u. S. Military academy and his two years in military hospitals following the nearfatal crash of his north american aviation miss tapping at the age of 24 mustang at the age of 24 that much more sering. He received word that his father died of a heart attack at the age of 57. Lying in hospital beds and thinking about the future, he decided he didnt want to be in the Family Business. He wanted to be in a position to influence National Security policy. The fact that the strategists biography has a further implication. Biography, as one political scientist writes provides no framework for the selection organization and presentation of data. This makes it tough to study someone who didnt write things down oftentimes, does not worst of his own boast of his own achievements. So i consulted what archival and history sources i could read the many histories and inside accounts of u. S. National Security Policy and president ial administrations and research and journalism on particular people, issues, regions and countries. But in order to bring perspective to the documents news reporting, scholarly analyses and scowcrofts own behavior, i also conducted 40 interviews with the generals and more than 100 interviews with his colleagues, associates and relatives. To an extent, a biography is an exercise in imagination. Fully capturing that vision is a fools errand, to be sure. But just as surely it is possible to be as accurate and thorough as possible and to be fair. Being fair means not just selecting the positive, as some biographers do or the negative as other biographers do, but describing and interpreting the subjects thoughts and actions as well as one can and rendering them in light of his or her personal and political circumstances. The final portion of the subtitle the call of National Security, refers to scowcrofts vocation, his call to military service when ever since the age of 12 he read a brand new book west point today, and he decided he wanted to go to west point. He would serve as commandant of toking den high school the Ogden High School rotc. He would then come back to teach, serve as associate Department Chair and Department Chair at the air force academy. The sense of vocation carried scowcroft through the harrowing experience of west point, the horrible plane crash and the painful death of his father, and so he would dedicate himself to the air force the white house and several president s and administrations as well as to other purposes such as studying and writing reports for president ial and orr commissions and working with the [inaudible] strategy group, the Atlantic Council and the council on foreign registrations and relations and other bodies. He also had to dedicate himself to caring for his wife who had type ii die boats. Diabetes. He would dash home, to the hospital or wherever to home or the hospital, and then come pack to work, and then get back to work at six the next morning. It was because he would fall asleep that bush 41 is was not the least annoyed that he would doze off, and then wake up as if nothing had happened. Serving as president s personal emissary to countries such as the soviet union china, saudi arabia germany france and Great Britain for the discussion of particularly sensitive issues, be an honest broker as National Security adviser working as a Business Consultant from 19771988 and then from 1994 through the present and agreeing to serve as chair or cochair of blue ribben commissions, study groups. So what important elements are not implicated in a weeks title in a books title and subtitle . One is perhaps, the momentous history of which scowcroft was a part. Many of the chief events in u. S. National Security Policy over the last 40 years. 32 out of 31 22 out of 31 chapters as an adviser to president S Ronald Reagan and george w. Bush. I had two decision rules. One was to focus on a few principal events such as the u. S. Evacuation of sigh done and the development of u. S. china relations, the tower boards investigation of the iran contra scandal that would lead up to the implementation of the 1991 gulf war and the decision to attack iraq in 2003 where many of his friends and colleagues were working were george w. Bush. But i also wanted to focus on his role in other important, if less well known way such as reforming the intelligence community, the 1976 korean [inaudible] incident, the u. S. Government and imfs rescue of the collapsing pound in the 70s why Condoleezza Rice [inaudible] and how scowcrofts role and scowcrofts role in pioneering the development of high ranking government officials turned to International Business consulting after serving in office, a niche or rather niches that didnt effectively exist in the 70s. The other decision rule for these chapters was to be as definitive as possible given the arkansas kyle records now available even if some have not been released, new scholarship by political scientists and the ability to interview many of the participants in these events. Seven of my interviewees have already passed. Here i wanted to condense the issues into short chapters and to draw out scowcrofts own role by using archival data, consulting secondary sources and through interviews. Among the topics in which the book offers new perspectives are the evacuation of vietnam in april 1975 and the incident of early may that year scowcrofts performance as chair of the president s commission on strategic forces, that is the Scowcroft Commission. By the way, in the middle of this president reagan announced his support for fdi when that wasnt the brief of his commission. The reasons behind the pause in u. S. soviet relations after bush took office in 89, what happened to registrations after Tiananmen Square the rise and fall of the new world order, the leadup to the 1991 persian gulf war and other topics as well. The title also obscures misjudgments and mistakes such as the mishandling of the panama coup attempt of october 3 1989 where scowcroft admitted we were sort of keystone cops. The relative neglect of afghanistan and pakistan after the soviets pulled out with disastrous longer term consequences. Scowcroft also voiced reyet over how the administration regret over how the administration had handled the demise of yugoslavia and not been more proactive. Final hi the book title does not give a full sense of scowcrofts internationalism. As anen light p ped realist, he accepts the world as it is and believes the United States should work with existing powers whether the soviet union, arafat and the plo or iran in pursuit of common goals for the promotion of international stability. So how does a study of scowcrofts life and his approach of Security Policy inform us at present . A study of his career and the implicit comparison that makes with other National Security advisers in other president ial administrations reveals several things. One is the importance of personnel and interpersonal chemistry in the white house. Both between the president and his National Security adviser and among the Foreign Policy principles. Scowcroft learned from the very difficult nixon ford years and from the iran contra affair. The nsc had to coordinate policy making, the president and his principals had to be able to delegate responsibility, but this meant getting the buyins and the principals to their deputies recommendations and vice versa. Furthermore, what vietnam made glaringly apparent was u. S. President s and their staffs had to work carefully and closely with the press if they were to lead effectively. This meant visits with members of congress and reporters both individually and in groups. And in public appearances it meant orchestrating campaigns to pass legislation sustain vetoes, approve nominees and achieve other objectives. In fact the Bush Administration did quite well considering it didnt have the work with it had to work with democratic majorities in both houses. A second lesson from a study of scowcrofts career is his indirect approach. One of his characters ways of diffusing problems is to think about undermining a cause for the problems themselves dissipate, to make Nuclear Warfare unattractive, to make the berlin war no longer necessary by encouraging social and political reform in Eastern Europe. The same principle would appear to apply to terrorism. Human and technological intelligence drone covert actions and special operations may all be necessary and may all have their place but theres also a place for addressing the conditions that make a particular view of islam a viable option. Obviously, people have multiple loyalties, multiple attachments and one kind of religion, there are other views of islam theres certainly different people are neighbors, people are nationals, people seek employment, people seek theyre members of certain societies, and it seems that the society that hosts terrorists when it becomes less hostile this is probably the best way to remove terrorism. In my lifetime i certainly didnt imagine i would see the end of the ira, the end of apartheid or the end of the soviet union, but shifting politics diplomacy, new Public Policies and political lineup made themmer rell Political Leadership made them irrelevant, so i suspect lessons can be learned. When i asked general scowcroft about Edward Snowdens leaks, he said he was against snowdens revelation quote, with every fiber in his body. This is what i expected consistent with his longterm support for executive privilege president ial discretion and strong intelligence. Whether human, signal or covert. He surprised me in the next breath by remarking that snowdenens leaks and here we can presumably include wikileaks or the Senate Report on cia torture might have an impact by starting a constructive debate among the members of congress the press and the republic about legislative oversight, the operations of the u. S. Government and democratic accountability. Indeed, both snowden and the cia torturers in the recent Senate Report were contractors. Scowcroft believes the United States. He might think this to be oldfashioned, but i suspect his argument would be that recent alaskas erode americans belief in the government. Not only are the recent revelations a recipe for cynicism, but it reduces legitimacy of the American Government if president s cannot make plausible claims of the United States being the leader of the free world or the United States as a city on a hill or the United States as a shining point of light. The subtext b here is that the United States faces a very real crisis in government of record low Approval Ratings in the polls for congress the media, business and other major societal factors, the turnout of eligible voters in the midterm elections, the lowest in 72 years, and that was in 1942 to help you with the math when many voters were dislocated because of the massive internal migration because of the revolutionized job market. And the feeling that the wars in the middle east and afghanistan as frightening as isis and alqaeda may be are limitless. Well over half of americans polled over the last six months disapprove of president obamas Foreign Policy. In other words a moral dimension to american politics that was very clear during the cold war and clear, arguably through the end of the soviet union and the first gulf war that is now missing. A decline in u. S. Soft power if not in other aspects of American Culture and society. In this begs the question this begs the question then of american grand strategy when theres still really not been anything to replace the containment of the society soviet union. What is the United States for . Just against extremism isis or some future group . What hope does the United States offer other peoples of the world, our children, our grandchildren . Ill leave you with those questions. Thank you. Are. [applause] we now have a healthy bit of time for questions and discussions. We would ask you to wait for the microphone before you begin to speak, and when you do, if you would identify yourself to the group. So well start right back here. Don. Thank you. Thank you, bart, for that presentation. I look bard to reading the book. You sort of, in my mind, left a gap between one whose plane crashed in world war ii and when he took up as an officer in the pentagon ask so on. Did he have any other active military experience, or was that sort of the end of it as a soldier . No, he had a whole career. He could have gotten a fourth star. He was, he left the he was put up for his first tar when he was leave star when he was leaving the pentagon and invited to become nixons military assistant basically to oversee and handle the military operations at the white house which basically includes the transportation medicine, carpool, all the logistics, all the, you know president s detail. And before that he worked in the pentagon for a number of years. He served in he went to the Army War College or the National War College. He taught, i mentioned hes taught at west point and in the air force academy. He also served in yugoslavia for two years as assistant air at after they which was an intelligence post and also as an air officer. He worked there and overlapped with kennon a little bit and eagleberger would be there shortly thereafter. So he had a bunch of different positions. In fact, i talked about his multivocalty earlier, and this was one of the things i think helped his experience and repertory of skills was like a large company. He kept being cycled around, and the air force was young enough and growing enough because he went to west point right . The air force was just established in 48, so he really benefited from the fact that he was as one person actually here at Wilson Center said he benefited from the fact that he had a 40pound cranium and that the air force was young and willing to tolerate someone who was this, who they saw his talent b and brilliance and let him sort of write his own ticket in a way thats hard to imagine now. The reason i laid that predicate is i just wanted to know whether he gave you an indication of how his exposure to actual combat situations he didnt have no, this is one of the anomalies about him. He never had any command experience outside of academic duties and his military attache duties. So he never was in korea. He never was in vietnam, never in thailand or in west germany. So yeah, never even commanded the missile base or an air force base here. So that also made him quite distinct. In the back right there behind don. On the far thank you. Bob hathaway here at the center. You, obviously, had a lot of access to south scowcroft. Can you tell us a bit about the kind of relationship you developed with him . Um to what extent do you think he was forthcoming, what did he not want to talk about . How much, if at all, did you have access to his personal papers . Can you give us a sense of how over a period of time your relationship with your subject developed . Yeah, thats actually a thats a nice question. Right in the preface it started out with he was a little bit suspicious of me. He hadnt heard of me and before i visited with him, he had a copy of my cd, and i prepared a short talk about why it was necessary that his life be recorded and be written. And argued that i could do this. And he agreed. So the relationship developed where i think there was cordial and respectful throughout. Now, how forthcoming was he, actually, let me just say he was very generous. He not only allowed me to interview him about once a month, but people would he would give me other names, and sometimes i would ask him to make the entree. For example, to talk to bush 41 or talk to Henry Kissinger or to dick cheney, and they would call up his office and say well whos in this sparrow character and he would say, blah, blah blah. So no doubt people were checking with him first before agreeing to talk to me. Having said that, for the most part he was quite forthcoming. There were things that he said he forgot, there were things that he didnt so he didnt remember. There were things on occasions where he would say i cant talk about that. And things that he didnt want to talk about were his kind of Current Business for obvious reasons. As head of National Security as National Security adviser, he was also overseeing the committee that plans and commissions can covert actions. So these things he didnt talk about. Other times i would come back to issues. He didnt want to talk about something, and i would come back to them. Several things i asked him repeatedly. So he was always very guarded, always very protective and thats kind of consistent with him being very discreet, very behind the scenes. And so he was the opposite of voluble or discusserrive. Having said that, i would i kind of tried to get as much out of him as i could, and when i came back with questions with what other people said or if there was a discrepancy in my understanding of something from the record or from my interviews, id say, look, i dont understand this, what is going on here . So it was kind of this, kind of this cumulative process really of trying to yet more out of get more out of him. I think as someone whos used to working on sensitive issues, it was, well, you show me what you know and ill tell you how i can help you. So i kind of had to prove know enough, and he really didnt occasionally he would volunteer things. More, of course, about his childhood or early years than later. So we had a friendly relationship, we have a Good Relationship, but i think the fact that i was im a generation younger than he is, not in washington in some ways maybe that helped me, but in some ways it wasnt as though i remember reading an interview he did with at west point for an oral history collection, because there were some things he told this guy that he hadnt told me. But also his energy and how he was feeling would vary. So sometimes he would be tired and not feeling so well or hed there were different ailments over the course of about five years i interviewed him. And sometimes hed be more energetic, more upbeat and more cooperate i have. So it was a relationship cooperative. I have a friend whos just finishing a biography of Robert Mcnamara and they really had this antagonistic relationship. It was kind of, you know he would insult my friend, and he would, you know say all sorts of things. It was all kind of in the open and very rough and tumble, and scowcroft was the opposite. Always very genteel and is kind of reserved. Right up here. My name is steven short. Was scowcroft ever considered for secretary of state or did he ever have any interest in that position . Yes. He no. That is, yes about your question. No he wasnt interested in secretary of state. He thought he wanted to be secretary of defense under bush 41 because even i think very, the first announcement i think that bush made may have been upon his election was james baker as secretary of state because they went back 30 years from houston and bush had been by his side when bakers first wife died, and they were old tennis partners, you know . So they had this long, very Good Relationship. Is so that was his first appointment. So that wasnt really on the table. So he was thinking about secretary of defense. But then they the bush and baker persuaded him that National Security adviser actually, would be more important and he would have equal status with them in terms of nsc or other white house discussions. And even though hed done it before so at fist it didnt hold much appeal to him, but then he thought well, maybe this would be good, and he realized it actually gave him more power and influence than he imagined. He and bush were so close a few months apart in age, both had been pilots in the 40s and both kind of had the same kind of background. Back here. Thomas [inaudible] and i Teach Nuclear history for the air force institute of technology. A question you mentioned general webkin who, i believe was an unrelated officer in the pentagon, something of a legend in his own right although, again, not too well known. Im curious did the name Wesley Posvar come into your discussions at all . Head of Political Science at the air force academy. I was down the hall in history yeah. And we were very jealous i must say, of the influence they had. But the fact is, he came from the military academy, i believe then yeah. Hes what kind of influence was there . Yeah. I didnt find much direct influence. He was actually at west point when scowcroft was there after he got his masters degree at columbia, he was still doing graduate work so hed commute down to morningside heights. And posvar was there and later on it was because posva was going to harvard to do graduate work they asked scowcroft to serve as Department Head at the Political Science department at colorado springs. So it was he was there. They got along well, and i think they are friendly. I think posvar then later left to head which university [inaudible] pittsburgh, yeah. So yeah, hes mentioned. I didnt find a particularly strong relationship but certainly, its there. Id like to ask a question, if i could, about the writing of a biography. And i think the challenges of writing a biography of someone who is living is poses a set of challenge that you dont have when the subject is not in that they can reflect upon the work that youre doing and comment on it all along the way. But you also are able to ask followup questions. One job of a biographer is to faithfully spook to the historical record and to provide an account that is accurate, useful for readers. But often times poiger ifs reflect biographers reflect more broadly on the visions the character, the contributions of their characters that theyre writing about. And here i sense that this is very much an admiring biography. And im wondering if you could offer us an example in the book if there is of where you step back and raise questions about either the judgment the conclusions or the strategies that this strategist put forward. Yeah. I actually it is mine. One of the things about the relationship as it developed is i certainly have some differences with scowcroft and some of those are are in the book. But i certainly do like him and respect him, and so that was nice. To write about someone who i really herald in contempt or held in contempt, that wouldnt be much fun for spending years of your life. But i gave some examples when i talked about the misjudgments about where about yugoslavia. Hed had that wreck in yugoslavia and he that record in yugoslav rah, he and eaglepirger had been there. Lawrence of macedonia was his name, that was what it was called. I think they thought they knew more about yugoslavia than the folks in the state department and the intelligence and they looked at milosevic and these brewing nationalists separatists, whatever you want to call it, and they didnt respond well to that. I also spend a half chapter on afghanistan and really, you have really kind of the blowback from afghanistan that is in many ways kind of the root of the sort of the terrorism and of alqaeda. And so i talk about kind of how they, you know, after the billions of dollars and the years from brzezinski and carter to the Reagan Administration to support the mujahideen and to supply them with weapons and aid and fund pakistan, and pakistan was then funneling to the different rebel groups, that once the soviets leave, they kind of, you know, afghanistans in ruins, the economys a shell, there are all these refugees, all these wrecked towns from the soviet actions as well as from the fighting. So kind of this biwater now. And so thats an example. Another is i think they mishandled alexander [inaudible] visit. They later kind of thought, oh this is too political. One of the things that i think where scowcroft gets criticized for his caution and that hes too guarded always sees a downside, doesnt see the upside enough. Theres something to this. Hes always aware of the pitfalls and what might happen, but hes also very nuanced and very analytic and very smart. Hes not one but most people want something a little more, you know, quicker and more uplifting, something shorter. You know, they want a song to sung as it were. And he p wasnt, he and baker and bush werent very good at this. It was something like, you know tear down this wall and, or axis or evil or these nice messages nice messages these messages. But some sort of easy way to get a handle on this world that was happening. And i spend a good bit of time talking about this. When the cold war ended, a little lost. That was his whole life. Hed been, you know, he was there as a young teenager when pearl harbor happened, and then soon after that, of course, you have well, not soon but a few years later you have the gelling of the cold war and how this really defined his career. And they kind of, if they were reelected, im not sure what would have happened. Maybe it was too short of a time 2007 the cold war between the cold war and the reunification of germany for them to have any kind of systematic transition. Just a quick followup, do you know how scowcroft responds to the book itself or to the particular criticisms that you raised . So with regard to yugoslavia or to afghanistan in your discussions and debates was there pushback . Does he come to share your view that these were not perhaps the best moments, or does he stick to his earlier views . No, hes i mean, vietnam too. There he sticks to partly to his view that Congress Caused the war which is kind of, i think, is kind of taking the symptom for the cause. The cause the end of the war. But, no, for the part he i would present him with information or with a question about something, and he conceded on yugoslavia, on the panama coup, on the end of the cold war, on yiewg valve ya that these were kind of, that they mishandled stuff. So he was very candid. He was very, i think, up front about it. Thank you. Dane. Make this faster. Dane kennedy from the National History center. For someone who was such an inside player and presumably so discreet the oped that scowcroft wrote about iraq that you mentioned at the beginning of your talk was sort of startling, i believe, for a lot of people. I was wondering if you could say more about that sort of how that his view of the issue fit into his larger Strategic Vision and also what kind of impact that oped had on his subsequent with relationship with people who he was very close with before that, i assume. Yeah. I think its a pivotal event. I mean, in some ways as i begin the book its really contrary to his personality about being behind the scenes. We know that hes very close to 41 and so and i mentioned about all his colleagues and friends working you should 43. Under 43. So why would he do this . Actually, hed been on television twice expressing these psalm perspectives same perspectives, hed written other opeds for the Washington Post after 9 11, in october and in early october 2001 and then early 2002. So his position was well known by the white house. And the reason why he wrote it and why he writes these opeds, i mentioned hes written about a hundred over the course of his career, is he thinks theres a voice missing. So if he thinks theres a debate that is incomplete or that for whatever reason theres options to be explored or some perspective is needed, then hell lay in. Usually he has enough contacts and people in the administration or whatever administration there is or that theyre covering those issues already. So hell only weigh in he feels its called for. So theres kind of this Quality Control as it were that hes doing. Now, what effect its had is it really instantly made him hated by the republicans and persona non grata in the administration. And it was a very difficult period for him. He didnt really say this exactly but kind of alluded to that and other people i talked to did too, and it was very awkward. How it came about and i spent some time on this because it was pretty interesting. People say, oh, this is george w. Bush george h. W. Bush put scowcroft up to that. Thats not the case. They knew each others minds but it was scowcroft who gave an appearance on meet the press i think it was with bob schieffer, and his colleague and partner in the Scowcroft Group arnie cantor, saw this and said, hey, thats pretty good, you ought to write it up. So he wrote it up and sent it to the wall street journal, they said, well run it. Knowing that he faxed a copy to the senior bush to condi race and then it ran, and she got on the phone with him and yelled at him, and he says he got taken to the woodshed. And denied knowing about his position which was, which was not the case. And so, yeah it made things very difficult. But what was interesting though is that he later on was in support of the surge. Even though he opposed the war, he said, well, where are we now and what do we need to do, and in this situation we cant withdraw, so we need these more troops. In the second term, he worked very closely with rice, with hadley who hes close to and then when gates came in after was it, after the 2006 elections he worked very closely with gates. So you have this guy whos been sort of rejected and spurned, but despite that he stays pretty unflappable anden then works with the administration and then works with the administration in subsequent years. Which, to me, just suggests kind of just how secure he was. He didnt i mean he doesnt read his own press. In answer to your question about the book, a friend of his read it and said he liked it, but he hasnt read it yet, and i dont think he doesnt read his own press. Maybe thats his military discipline or something. [inaudible] yeah. How about does this expose a deeper rupture within republican Foreign Policy circles . I mean you say this division, i end mean, opposition early on and then sort of he comes back in. Is that a reflection of the fact that the neocan conservatives had less influence later on . Could you flesh out sort of where the different groups within the republican Foreign Policy lie in this issue . Yeah. Well, he says he calls himself a rino now republican in name only. And, in fact even though he was closer to kerry than or obama on Foreign Policy, he supported the republicans, at least nominally because he felt he had to. But he wouldnt, he wouldnt enforce mccain in the 2008 election because of so many of his advisers were neocons. And so he thought again he has this combination of sort of dove and hawk. He believes in a Strong Defense and having clear sanctions and the use of military force and intelligence, covert actions things like this. But at the same time he believes hes a dove in the sense that he believes in dialogue whether its with the plo or with iran or with, you know formally red china. He believes, and he believes in negotiation. So he believes in sort of that an International System is better by people and forces talking, having conversations and talking to each other rather than because they have to live together, and thats kind of what they found out with the soviet union in china. Were on this planet together, we all have these weapons and weve got to find ways to coexist. You cant coexist without talking to people and staying in touch. Back here against the wall. Wait one moment. Until the microphone gets to you. Thanks. The joan lewis gad disbiography of kennon went deeply into his character and personality and interconnected it with his political and other activities. Whats the deepest insight into scowcroft that you can connect with his, you know his contribution to to american Foreign Policy . And american politics . At one point he said to me theres this gets to his sort of dedication to maybe its the duty honor country at west point but his dedication to the United States, his kind of patriotism and combined with kind of his discipline, so he told me once, he says theres no reason never to be selfish. I thought, wow. And i said well, what about when you get sick . He said well okay. But to think that, i mean, he really is a wonk in terms of Foreign Policy and National Security. This is what consumes him and interests him, this is what he thinks about and enjoys talking about in his off hours with his deputy, bob gates or, you know, after they left office. So i think this really is how he is quite exceptional in that regard and really kind of an extreme case if you will, in terms of social science terms, that hes not representative of most people. I mean, so you have this kind of his background where hes you know, he doesnt really seek material goods, although hes done very well. He doesnt need to be a social player like kissinger is. Hes kind of just happy to or you know completely dedicated on the United States and a believer in a way that maybe is a little bit oldfashioned but i think is kind of consistent with growing up in ogden and utah and having this community that came from all over western europe and all over United States and to this area to have a community of believers and reach, you know, a degree of material success. Control of his ego. Hi, im jawms wilson from the state department. I work on the Foreign Relations series, so i really enjoyed reading this wonderful book. I had a question about the relationships between bush and baker and bush and scowcroft and then sort of the three of them together. There was a line that caught my interest on page 493, you say that during the 92 campaign that scowcroft is the one who asks baker to come back to run the campaign, and you say bush couldnt ask his friend directly. Hed then be conceding he needed jims help. I find that weird. I mean i know [laughter] obviously, i mean it just seems like a weird thing to me. And it also gets back at we get into 89, suddenly scowcroft is bushs best friend, picker is bushs baker is bushs best friend. There are other very competitive people in this administration, and it does seem to work 8992 whereas in previous iterations theres this, you know, tension between these different principals that can cause huge problems. I just wonder, i mean how do you think what is the relationship between scowcroft, baker and bush in 89, 92 . Are we remembering as maybe a more rosy situation over time . I wonder if that, you know came out in talking with scowcroft and others. Well, i think its a complex relationship. It was, i mean, from the first point about why bush would can scowcroft to ask baker about him coming from the state department to help the campaign i think they were benzly competitive. Intensely competitive. Baker always thought hed be a better president and could do better, and bush would joke back at him well if youre so smart, how come youre not president . And they had rivalries, you know over tennis, and they were both kind of these, you know, exuberant texans. So but baker was, hes always very, you know hes very ambitious, immensely immensely capable, very charismatic. In a way probably more so in some ways than anyone else in the administration, and several people have said as much. And scowcroft was completely different. Scowcroft didnt really care if he looked rumpled or didnt care how he came across. He would never deign to leak anything or think he knew the president s mind. And so i think theyre both best friends with the president , but they had a very different basis for their relationship. Let me go back to the book title. He wrote sorry about this. Here we go. He wrote the book with scowcroft, not with baker, not with nick brady, not with dan quayle. At 11 was the only one ofscowcroft was the only one of his friend who would baia condo and move to the kennebunk board. They love the joy of their and complemented each other the way baker and bush complement each other in other ways. When bush was head of the Republican National committee before he was ambassador to the un and they got to know each other in meetings and stuff and worked closely when ms. Bush was liaison to china in 7475 and he was Henry Kissingers deputy but you have to remember he is Henry Kissingers National Security adviser but from september of 1973 on when Henry Kissinger become secretary of state scowcroft is National Security adviser. He is deferential to Henry Kissinger was still often leading in Foreign Policy but in terms of making the government run in figuring out what policies would kick, this was to quickly scowcroft, a partnership there. On the left side of the table. Larry altman. I believe you said scowcroft was in the Nixon Administration head of military operations including the medical office. Did he have anything to say about nixons health or drinking . He did say that nixon was not a heavy drinker and more reclusive as watergate worsened and hold up by himself and invite kissinger late at night he would give scowcroft bizarre quarters that scowcroft would ignore the next morning. There was a little bit. He came to see this in the book a little bit. There was a dr. Jekyll side to nixon but when he was not tendered and secure, there were occasions he wasnt. There were other stories that ordered a newing sending out the new expanded defense secretary said he wouldnt take the calls but would take some next morning. They put out, to take orders from the president. Did you questions about cheney, did you get into serious as to how you change personality . I dont know the exact reason but i am convinced it is not just conservatism. Has always been a believer of strong executive power. It is a federal judge or Supreme Court justice, in the absolute position, on the other hand another theory is we know that heart surgery and artifacts can affect peoples personality. There is a name for it. It is a slightly different person. What prompted this discussion is two thing this. This intelligence review which was just before 9 11 and continued on afterwards made some recommendations to cheney and cheney is dismissing him out of hand and not being intellectually honest or practical in a way that he was defense secretary, not as he was as minority leader in congress but was trained to be at ph. D. Always with some integrity, they had a view of reforming the intelligence community, doing very well over the clinton years, and was arranged for the cold war which was now over. That was one incident. The lead up to the gulf war, half that was handled. Information about yellowcake and the w and 90s, a bad lawyer trying to get whatever facts he could to make his case. This was unlike his earlier behavior. I dont know what the explanation is but it wasnt as conservatism or his decision to act. The up proximate cause is common but to hit the arabs between the eyes. Sometimes you want to use force and make sure people know there are serious consequences to actions but did think this is a policy prescription that cheney was repeating, seems to be kind of racist and unhelpful. Right down there. Lets go to the comment you made about the cold war, the new world and its disorder. Could you talk a little bit about what you learn about his feelings toward europe . The conversations i had with him, when the europeans were pushing for air greater unification, they were working on a treaty and starting to set up a European Defense organization, he was opposed to all of that. You deal with a country individually, you dont deal with the e. U. Etc. So that would seem to be an attitude from the cold war that carried over and didnt change. That is exactly right. Wireless giant german unification under nato, german unification, College German unification under nato because that was the key point. In all candor, the western European Union or francogerman alliance nato, at the United States had dominant influence and this is what they wanted and this is an impotence for nafta, knowing that germany would unify in fear of a european trade group. He also said this in other ways. Philosophic and Cultural Roots since the seventeenth century and these were in some ways the United States is the National Leader of the worlds and europe would be a partner in this. The United States for them to have a dominant influence. On the table up here. At Wilson Center. Do you discuss talking about the nfc system, the National Security adviser, any viewers of the people. I wonder about that part of it. The undersea system. Do you discuss how he does that . Any views his views of them. A large part of the book. Why would a scientists the writing a biography . From the general, is antithetical to social science. One thing i realize in answer to this question is this gave me a handle on issues of exploring is how do we organize National Security or how does interagency process work, and white house and media relations, economics of the things that factor into National Security and how this can vary dramatically, and allowed me leverage on this. The nfc system and taking over from nixon as National Security adviser the weight he changes things. And giving white house privileges, with regular meetings with them. You can get a lot more out of people if you are nice to them rather than yelling out at the mall the time. There was this different style he had a certain style for management which meant delegate in and using what talent he could and have a lot of academics some people with other agencies, and gates was very close, mentor to hadley and a bunch of others. There is a continuation of Henry Kissinger and scowcroft and top officials. And one thing, at what level, how is that going to work. Micromanaging, at the nfc. And what other agencies should be doing. And there is this camaraderie and pretty good trust between baker and scowcroft 11. And for unification of germany and despite that they were able to a Lean Organization working directly for agencies. If you dont do that the state department are disaffected or crosscutting policies, something that was important that i spend a lot of time on. Remember historians at the end of the cold war, critical, as they see it, longer be period, bush i trying to figure out how to approach all that that is going on in your. Is Jonathan Horn is scowcroft clear to that . Why this pause lasted so long. And in the deliberation. A big part of it. There are several problems. Like many administrations they are intent on seeing themselves from their predecessors. With meetings in reykjavik and this new detente that gorbachev seemed to be having a thought this was going down the wrong direction. They were not sure what the end game was and worried that okay, there is that better relations and gorbachev is saying the right thing supporting cuba. There are lots of places around the world. To overthrow capitalism, hadnt done anything to reform its economy. There was a talk of perestroika. So you think about conventional and nuclear forces, what makes the cold war the ideology and military forces and Foreign Policy none of this. And when it started there, there is credit to the Reagan Administration. You realize they hadnt done anything about things they care about which was the possibility of Nuclear Warfare and having a new kind of regime in Eastern Europe and the soviet union so they developed in that period a series of six different talks, they gave a couple in the boston area at the Coast Guard Academy that they won in germany, laid out the steps they want to take, decided they wanted to meet and have a summit with gorbachev only when they are ready and have a vision in place and say here is gorbachevs speeches about reforming soviet society and he believes in democracy and doesnt believe doesnt has nothing to do with that solution to protests how do we actually affect these in ways that matter and do this in a way that doesnt provoke a crackdown against gorbachev and his advisers in the soviet union or provoke other kinds of conflicts in Eastern Europe and that is why it took a long time to work this out. Right up here . Did you discuss with him anything about the pacific our relationship, our alliance with japan, our relationship with china . I spent three chapters on china. 9 at is pretty important. For the first time the administration visits before a visit europe in february of 1989. As for japan, he doesnt have because u. S. japan relationships were so established it was what was most difficult things in terms of understanding the japanese, very different world views and views of hierarchy and democracy but he also said it was a very Good Relationship and it wouldnt matter for him the strategic side in cooperating on intelligence and Nuclear Weapons and so forth and he wasnt concerned about the threat of hollywood being taken over or the value of real estate or all the things that were happening that you may remember in the late beens and 39s. This didnt bother him at all because he saw the security thing as most important and that was falling. The other were shote develop they went to lower levels of the state department or commerce so he didnt spend a lot of time handling japan. In terms of china we talked a good bit about china because there was a time you had a huge rage on college campuses. Many of you remember in washington, a round the country, in congress about what had gone on and how the administration was reacting. Their view was we cannot wreck this relationship. We have to keep going and they bend over backwards, they went the extra mile not to alienate china and later on they were able to use that relationship to have china at not veto the u. N. Resolutions for the war against iraq and they are aware of china, they were very viewed democracy and reform in china as an indirect product, that if there is Economic Growth and with that more openness and globalization, more involved chinese economy that political reform wilma come and the United States or other countries to be more more to be lauder on these issues would be counterproductive. They are also aware there is a future market there too. There is an element of it could lose to japan and europe and they didnt want another cultural revolution. They didnt want a new bamboo curtain or something so they were concerned about how things could go south if they didnt keep things open to china and realize china had good historical reasons to resent the west and the United States. The picture that emerges in your talk is that of a man who is patriotic, hardworking, disciplined e efficient and decent. You also use a phrase moral clarity of the cold war. It wasnt this period that scowcroft thrived the most. In the weeds is it is a little mckyer. You mention the family jewels in the mid70ss, west forward to the 1918s you mentioned the irancontra situation. As you look at the cold war in Central America and africa, the cuban debris is massive. Where does he stand on the . How does he reflect . Is this just Collateral Damage because this is about right and wrong . Does he have thought about these things . And if so what is his take . In that sense it is that strategists, if need be he was prepared to be ruthless. He signs off on east timor and the haitian government and supports vietnam and does a lot of things that is kind of silicon a priority of the u. S. soviet rivalry but also awareness that there are limits to american power. A very cautious, you have to be very careful about where the United States intervenes and when it acts. He is inclined to be a little more he would act on occasion. The iraq example there are other occasions. He is kind of modest and differs from neo conservatives or some of the people now who are clamoring for troops on the ground and so forth. The National History center. You talk a lot about scowcrofts personal qualities. One way to gauge his effectiveness as a statesman is to act if he was influential as a will model in encouraging other people to be willing to listen, evaluate and was he able to encourage those behavior is . In the community more generally . To the extent with at the end gates for sure i think also he has been very active in programs with students and interns at his own firm and especially at the Atlanta Council but also the Aspen Strategy Group and established fellowships at the school of diplomacy there is certainly that. What affect that has had so far is hard to know and i dont explore that but i know he feels very fortunate to have lived the life he has in feels that he has to pass these down. He has one daughter, one granddaughter it is intent on trying to nurture especially at the Aspen Strategy Group in the Atlantic Council in getting people and mentoring them. Mostly people still, the 40s topps with the exception of the hades dan gaetzes but there is some of that. May be that is the answer. Last question in the back against the wall. You talked a little bit about conditions that he thought extremism in terrorism come about, i forget the word. Could you talk a little bit about his thoughts on extremism or how it comes about . I didnt really talk to him about that we didnt talk about the roots of that. I came to that in one of my concluding comments because of his belief in tackling these problems in directly. I think he would see if theres a great problem out there he would want a multiple from traffic and want to have force but also clear repercussions and find ways to have Potable Water and create jobs and do those things too because a lot of these things we know our conflicts that get to conflict over resources. They are just not about people and cultures so that is extrapolating a little bit. He would look holistically at this and realize you have to make the population, among whom extremists or terrorists are residing to make that less hospitable land less of a viable option. I have to bring this to a close now but you can join us afterwards for conversation at a reception outside this room. The book is available for pictures and i suspect signing as well. I would invite you all to come back next week when Heather Richardson will be speaking on march 2nd on her new book to make men free a history of the republican party. I thanks to our audience and thanks to professor bartholemew sparrow for a very engaging talk. [applause] booktv live this weekend from the tucson festival of books starting at 1 00 p. M. Eastern 10 00 a. M. Pacific, several lauder panels on topics like race politics, Supreme Court, environment, immigration and more. All this live from the university of arizona, the site of the seventh annual tucson festival of books. Heres a look at some books being published this week. Look for these titles in bookstores this coming week and watch for the authors in the near future on booktv. Jonathan horn is next on booktv. He recounts robbery e. Lees decision to join the Confederate Army after being sought by the north and south. It is about an hour. It is night pleasure to introduce Jonathan Horn, a former president ial speech maker who spent years researching and writing his new writing his new biography the man who would not be washington robert e. Lees civil war and his decision that changed american history. Jonathan horn has appeared as a commentator on m snbc, his writing has appeared in the new