As your book very eloquently lays out the history of isis and that what we want to try to understand because many people focus so much on the brutality, but your book goes much further and much deeper than just talking about the violence. You talk about the ideology, you talk about the religious dimension, which are so important for English Speaking audienced to understand. But just as starting point i wanted to just talk about the first chapter as a beginning, and you mentioned many factors for the rise of isis, and we know there have been many radical groups that have evolved over the lost 30 to 40 years, and isis is just the most violent that has evolved, and you mentioned some of the causes. U. S. Invasion of iraq, for example. You mentioned the failure of arab states, particularly after the arab uprising, the fraying of state institutions. The economic collapse of arab states and, you also mention something that is very interesting, is how isis is able to provide services for sunni populations in the same way they Muslim Brotherhood did in egypt. I was wondering we can delve into the first chapter so you can explain to the audience, how would you prioritize these factors . What would you say is the most compelling factor as opposed to other one ive just sort of listed. If you can walk us through how you would rank these different conditions and factors that led to the rise of isis. Guest thank you for hosting me. Im delighted. Nothing mysterious of the rise of isis. We know its drivers. We know the most important factors behind its spectacular surge. We know its world view, ideology, motivation. Its recruitment techniques. We also know, i think, its apparent strengths and weaknesses. Talking points about isis, isis is a different name for al qaeda in iraq. Two sides of the same coin. Al qaeda in iraq was born an direct result of the u. S. Led invasion and occupation of iraq. You ask me, of all the reasons you have mentioned, what is the most significant variable in the rise of al qaeda and iraq, would say the u. S. Led invasion. Why . Destroyed state institutions, it disbanned the army and the security forces. It was seen by sunni arabs in the iraq were a minority, as the invasion and occupation as political emass cue layings of the Sunni Community because saddam was a sunni arab. The adopt National Narrative that iraq was off erred on a silver platter to iran and the new ruling elite they were brought by the americans. So all these factors contributed to the u. S. Invasion of iraq open the gates of hell. If you ask me i know you are a second tear yapous it basically opened the gates of hell in terms of deepening and widen the rivet between sunniesi shia. Here comes sarcar we with fewer than 100 isis in 2003, he was in iraq almost before the u. S. Invasion, between 2003 and 2006, when he was killed, by the americans, thousands thousands s because many sunni arabs in iraq weld zarkawi because they believed iraq was an ally in the fight against the americans and the iran and the shea. So this is the rise of al qaeda, and the question becomes that al qaeda in iraq was defeated between 2006 and 2008 by sunni iraqis who turned against him because it was to plunge them into a fight between the sunni and shia. Most of the attacks by zarqawi were not against in the American Forces but against the shia. So if al qaeda and iraq was defeated by the sons of iraq or the awakening council between 2006 ask 2008, what does it explain . The rise of isis. Eye did al quite mutate to isis in and to come back to your question, we have to take other variables, and here comes the deepening sectarianism in iraq of 2010. The president , the arab spring uprising and derailment of the uprising, the civil war in syria, and basically al qaeda in iraq was able to basically imbed and blend itself with a rebellious Sunni Community in iraq and syria, to have a security vacuum, you have sunni rebellions against the shiite dominated and allied dominated orders in iraq and syria. So the spectacular surge of isis was a direct result of the creeping sectarianism, the deachening sectarianism, the civil wars in al nusra, the security vacuum that exists in iraq, syria, and other states and the perception that the arab spring, the peaceful collective action could not change the existing order. That is the albaghdadi, the leader of isis replaced zarqawi, thought that change would not come by the electoral box but through the barrel of a gun, and this is the motive of isis because it tried to hijack the agency of collective peaceful information. Host i want to delve into these issues in a moment. I want to sort of push back on one of the explanations you gave because i think that this is often a media sort of error or misleading part of the Media Coverage of isis, and that is the economic dimension. You do mention this, but i think that as we both know, having worked on political islamist movements for so long, the economic theory has been somewhat discredited. I know that we all know from the media that people that isis is paying their fighters and in the territories they control theyre paying people and providing services. Dont you think this is much lessigent of a factor than the ones you mentioned . I want to go into the ones you mentioned the next topic, ideology. Guest i think we cannot understand the rise not only of isis but the various al qaeda affiliate, all part of what we call the jihaddist movement, host before you good further can you define what is jihaddism . That how you chains ideology your book, which is very important for people to understand. This is new. We have jihaddists and guest the narrative between selaism which is a radical element, its ultra conservative radical ideology and it belongs to the olden days. The first Islamic State. The state of muhammad. It wants to impose its the marriage between an ultra conservative, utopian idea, and jihaddism, which is a radical egyptian ideology, and for your own viewer its really this particular modern ideology, because the ideology goes back to 1950s and of 60s. Jihaddism in its current form was born in afghanistan during the struggles, the u. S. Struggle against the soviet union in afghanistan. It was the marriage between Osama Bin Laden and this ideology, all of the various al qaeda in iraq and isis and other affiliates of either in the Arabian Peninsula and part of the family pool, the gene pool of jihaddism. To come back to the question about the economic theory, this is a very important question. Im not suggesting i would not suggest that economic drivers are the most significant factors behind the rise of other al qaeda central or al qaeda in iraq or isis. What i would say is that you cannot understand the spectacular surge of isis without understanding what call the massive developmental failure, and the massive developmental failure in particular in the arab world is a state failure. The failure of the state to provide bread and butter. Its the failure of the state to provide hope for the young people. Its a blockage in the system. Its abject poverty, of average we estimate there are 30 or 40 of the people in the arab world who live either in poverty or below the poverty line, and employment among the sunni educated youth is between 30 and 40 so you have a blockage in the system, political vulnerabilities and economic vulnerabilities the arab spring was about what . About the climb of political vulnerabilities, and economic vulnerabilities. A lack of hope, blockage, unemployment, abject poverty. These two factors, political victories and economic vulnerabilities created a institutionsal vacuum. Security vac call, a vacuum of idea that have allowed what we call nonstate actors, and groups to offer an alternative. An alternative, whats the big idea that isis offers . Islam county state or the caliphate. So economics on the open, economic theory does not explain why isis has surged but economic vulnerabilities are critical component. Host i want to touch on something that you mentioned about the Younger Generation. Because, of course, a lot of isis recruits and fighters are from the Younger Generation, and as we see from the tragedy in orlando, even though the u. S. Intelligence has distanced this young man, the suspect, from isis, he was certainly probably influenced by isis, if not other radical groups, and i want to quote what you wrote in the book, which is very prophetic, especially in light of today residents eventses. Any talk about the preachers and you talk about the Younger Generation. You wrote in the first chapter the movements prop gappists and preachers openly boast that the tide of hoyt has shifted in their favor and i think this is a very important point. Whether it is on the cusp of victory, not the ideology is their stay and the challenges is to shine light on it and make sense of it, and then you write that baghdadi and his cohorts represent a new generation of jihaddists or revolutionary religious activists, and on that point about religion, as we talk about the ideology in the next few minutes, i wanted to ask you, because i think you raise a very good point later in the book when you say that isis is trying to redefine how islamists practice and thats a very important point. Its not only isis but other Islamist Groups that have made the same claim after the arab uprisings, its time to redefine our islamists practice. Can you elaborate on that in the context of isis ideology. Guest the reason why i take isis not because isis has a miniarmy, between 30,000 and 100,000 fighters, give or take. The reason why i take isis seriously, not because it uses savagery and barbarism. Remember, al qaeda in iraq pioneered many of the tools, the savage tools that isis uses. Beheadings. Zarqawi. The savage. The reason i take isis seriously is because isis presents itself as an alternative to the failed order. Point one. It presents itself as a Islamic State. It tries to construct a kind of utopia, a myth, and the myth is based on the idea the sunni identity. Telling the muslims, look, the state system has failed. The religious establishment failed you. Theyre an extension of the state system. Come and join the Islamic State. We construct an alternative, based on the myth or utopia of islamism. In fact the rope why isis is a threat to the system because it challenges the very logic of the nation state, the westphalia system up to 1648 and thats why this is very important. The first video ever released, first, after the capture of muslim the second largest iraqi city, captured by isis in june 2014 it released a video, isis, called in demolishing borders in which isis in very direct, blunt langes, prom. Promised sunni muss imlazy to destroy the borders set up by the colonial powers between 1916 and 1920 and establish a new order based on identity. Sunni identity, and thats why isis has been in the video, destroying the borders between iraq and syria, how powerful this propaganda, even many muslims who do not take seriously the idea of the agreement, the failed system, the institutional fragility, the economic collapse. In this particular sense isis has done as well also it has because it connects on this particular intrinsic level, the level of state failure, of the religious establishment failure and what have you. Host i think that your point about the failure of state sponsored religion is very important because we have seen this with statesanctioned religious institutions, but the states dont control the religious message any longer and although this has been an ongoing struggle, egypt is a perfect example of this in the 1990s when former president mubarak tried to license the mosque. What happened is as the message as slipped away from the state, other nonstate actors have come in to kidnap the message, and i think that is a very, very important point. And i also wanted to ask you, though, when baghdadi wants to redefine how islam is practiced, what does this look like in isis occupied territories in terms of the minute day, daytoday existence . Guest first of all i want to come back to the question of the redefinition of what islam is. Isis is a against the state system but a revolt against the islam as islam is practiced, and also as formal islam. Seen as an extension of the states. What in fact we i make this point, i spend a lot of time many people dont realize that the brutality and the savagery and the cultural cleansing that isis practices in syria and iraq is part of this particular ideology. Isis is trying to distinguish itself from other jihaddist groups like al qaeda. Its saying to its base to the young jihaddists, look, we are the real authentic jihaddist group. We want to clear the land. Want to purify the land. We want to good back to seventh century arabia. The ideal the utopia is seventh center arabia, and to do you have to cleanse the land of all kind of alien influences, decadent influence, so the savagery, the ethnic cleansing is part of this construction what you call this identity. Thats really framed and anchored in seventh century arabia, expects why in fact isis has really taken leadership of the global jihaddist movement. Many young jihaddists dish call isis is a youth movement. Think about it. Of the height of it power on 9 11 2001, al qaeda never numbered more than 1,500. Al qaeda. Isis now numbers between 30,000 and 40,000 fighters. As a state, has built a state, you ask me about the institution basis of isis. Its as big as the united kingdomy i live, and between six million and eight Million People and has been trying to establish rudimentary institution, education, based on jihaddism, the most extreme in terms of bread and butter, in terms of clinics in terms of hospitals. Of course, now, its now bleeding financially, dot not have resource buff isis is just trying to construct the utopia political, and islamic utopia and establish rudimentary institutions and basically get rid of the various institutions that exist in the region, and just to remind our audience, today i mean, this is june, 2016. Isis now has been with us for two years, Islamic State is two years old. It has been trying to imbed itself, entrench itself and create its open put its own signature on the citizens in iraq and syria, and despite everything that the United States and the u. S. Led coalition has thrown at isis, it continues to exist and it is spreading. Spreading beyond syria and iraq, into egypt, into lebanon, yemen, libya, somalia. So the idea was we need to tell our audience is not about defeating isis in iraq and syria. This is very important. What they do with the idea. The idea of jihaddism that is really expanding expanding and. Host on that point i want to just read a quote that you cited in the book by baghdadi which is shocking and people arent aware of this, where he said oh, muslim, islam was never for a day the religion of peace. Islam is the religion of war. Your prophet dispatched with the sword. I think that obviously every time an attack happens, whether its in the west i want to get to the whole notion of the far enemy versus the close enemy next but whenever theres an attack, theres always a big problem for muslims everywhere because of course isis doesnt speak for billions 1. 6 billion muslims, but nevertheless, as this quote indicates, there are some, very small minority, who believe that violence is justified, but do you think this is a recruiting point for people who join isis . They actually believe that islam condones vie his or this is baghdadi propaganda. Guest youre asking very critical questions, several questions in one. Go back to your initial question about the redefining what islam is all about. Le baghdadi and his second in commend and the various associates, they try to get rid of centuries of islamic participation, isis is islamic. Isis i mean host thats a very controversial point. Guest isis or the socalled Islamic State or daesh, aside from the scripture, uses some ideas but in a very narrow, selective, ultra conservative hard way. It tries to cancel 14 centuries of islamic hoyt. What also is trying to do is to hijack agency, the agency as millions, 1. 3 billion muslims and say, we are the real to come back to the question of the quote. I start the book by saying, easy to dismiss isis as savages and killers but there is a small, small, tiny, soon constituency that subscribes to its ideology, its brutal technique and we have to take this particular constituency seriously. Let me go further and provoke our audience itch dont think isis would have done as well also it has without having a social base of support. Sunnis who feel angry, feel outraged by what is happening in iraq and syria. Sunnis who are fed up with the brutal tactic of Bashar Alassad in syria, the sectarian dealings in iraq and feel that somehow isis is the vanguard, the protecter. What disbaghdadi say . We are your protectors. We are your defender. We are the vanguard of the Sunni Community. So, yes, there is a small, tiny, but critical community, constituency, that subscribes to the idea that islam has come by the sword and will come to. The sword and expand by the sword but this does not represent other muslims. Its an Important Community that has allowed isis to do as well also it has in the past two years. Host and that brings us very logically to the whole subject of sectarianism, because of course part of this appeal and part of the isis agenda is to define who is a muslim and who is not a muslim, and as we know, isis, and other groups before it, have declared shia nonmuslim, and i think that obviously for all the reasons that you have pointed out earlier, the reason this had such resonance in a country like iraq is because there was a sectarian government. There was the maliki government that you write very extensively and eloquently in the book and great detail how the maliki government actually institutionalized sectarianism against sunni muslims and its important for people to understand that the rope this created such a shockwave in a country like iraq or the region in general, it has had a Ripple Effect in bahrain and other countries. What happened in iraq didnt stay in iraq but the reason this created such a shockwave is that it changed the whole balance of power in the middle east. The sunnis always ruled and then suddenly, you mentioned earlier with the iraq invasion, shialed government came to power in part because of the United States, and so this sense i think it made the shia sunni tension a threat for survival. Each side believing its a threat to their faith and it wasnt just a matter of territory, which you also write about. Take us through how does isis instrumentallize its knowings of the shia notions of the shia to game the support, not about the brutality but how does it instrumentallize its notion that the shia are not real muslims . Guest as you said, i spent a great deal of space host talking about that. Guest maliki. It was really a shift in basically the way that maliki ruled iraq. He institutionalized, formalized, sectarianism in iraq in 2010 it presented really a watershed in the mutation of al qaeda in iraq that has become isis. Very important point to keep in mind. I have a chapter on iraq and on syria and derail. Ment of the derailment of the arab spring upriding to show the inspiration behind the rise of isis. Another critical point before i dom your really crux of your question. There is a conceptual difference between al qaeda central and isis. Al qaeda central, even though its used the shias as in ininfidels it used the shias as a fifth column in the heart of islam, yet al qaeda central never prioritized the fight against the shia. Al qaeda central has always been against the United States and its close european allies, where al qaeda and iraq and isis have prioritized the fight against the shia, in particular. In fact they have a genocide ideology. Its the one to get rid of all the shia who represent muslims, 90 sunni and 10 shea. And in iraq, began this particular targeting the shia against the wishes and the pleas by zawahri and Osama Bin Laden, believe the shia are more dangerous this the americans, believe that. The shias are basically infidels. Theyre upper state. They basically allowed the americans to come in and they believed they are a the weakest link within islam. 2003, until the present, since al qaeda in iraq and then isis, prioritize the fight against the shia . Why . To come back to your central question about the redefinition of the identity. The only way in almost eave single pronouncement, isis says the only way we have to do it is to create a planed sunni identity. We have to mobilize the sunnis, and how do we mobilize the sunnis . By saying she shear trying to subjugate you, trying to dominate you, trying to infill trait the heart of sunniism. The shia are basically manipulating islam for their own reasons and what have you. So, this particular antishiite vision allows isis to construct a planned Sunni Community, and only by focusing on the shiite, isis believes an identity could be constructed. Heres a good note inch fact it was the sunnis sunni iraqis who revolted against the world view, against al star are so caw wow. They wanted to maximize their interest. Thats why they believe that al qaeda in iraq was not their friend. They revolted against it and defeated al qaeda in iraq. Still believe, even though isis has a good social base of support i dont believe sunnis in iraq and the arab polled view the shiite as the end of history as somehow the ultimate enemy. So in this particular sense this is an unfolding struggle before our eyes. Isis is trying to really milk and exploit and manipulate this creeping sectarian struggle in the middle east. Final point. Keep saying final point. The strategic struggle in the middle east, the war between saudi ajane and shiite document independent iran pours gasoline on the raging fire. This strategic struggle has played a key fundmental part in this spectacular reabout of isis because its playing out on arab streets in syria, iran, bahrain, yemen, and elsewhere. Host absolutely. And i think that also the point that you raise about the difference in the support among sunnis. You mention in your book you interviewed sunni tribal leaders, and irinterviewed sunni tribal leaders in jordan who all said, we dont support isis violence. We dont support the isis ideology but we had to support isis because it was the option of last resort, and i think that very important. So, goes to your failed state, points to the sectarian the sectarian government. You distinguish how there was a shift, a sunni revolt against al qaeda, and their sectarian policies and then sunni support, once isis arose in iraq i think thats very important and on that note i want to take a little side detour because you quote ryan crocker in your book at in terms over United States and their involvement, we cant sort of leave this topic of isis and the invasion without talking about the United States, and as you point out in your book, it was clear that the almaliki government was sectarian. It was clear it was driving a lot of the violence. Why although your book is not about focus is not focused on u. S. Policy but i just want to ask you briefly, can you explain to the audience why didnt the United States stop this government that existed for so many years and it was actually, im told maybe you were told differently im told it was actually eye to ya khomeini who says this person is finished and that was the only way he wasnt allowed to continue as prime minister, so can you just tell us briefly. Mention ryan crocker. Why didnt the United States do something when they knew that the sectarianism was escalating violence . Guest as you said, really, we cannot talk about isis or iraq or syria without talking about American Foreign policy. The u. S. , led invasion of iraq. Even if we take into account the state failure, developmental failure, but it was the u. S. Invasion that basically unleashed these forces and it was barack obama who acknowledged the fact that isis is the unintended consequence of american invasion. Point two it was the american who had chosen maliki in order to they believed that he was okay during the first term. But almaliki wanted basically he had a monopoly on the use of power. Literally he controlled everything. Military, security forces, the central bank, the judiciary. And the americans did not exercise neither power nor influence. Of course they were unhappy with maliki. Barack obama kept sending joe biden in. Maliki did not care. He didnt even listen, and this tells you about the lack of will on the part of the United States and also the limits of influence. Barack obama was unwilling to exercise power in the same way that the previous administration. He want it out. Thats the reality. And when the Iraqi Government said no, we cannot give you basically any kind of legal immunity for your soldiers, barack obama and the u. S. Government said, okay, good luck. Well leave in 2011. So the reality is there was no will no desire, no investment by the United States in iraq and thats why maliki was able to do what he did between 2010 and 2014 and yet without basically the Supreme Leader of iran, maliki would be with us. It was maliki said the man is done, for good. Because iraq realized that maliki became a liability even though he was he was their man, would not say he was taking orders directly from the iranian leadership, but nouri maliki made sure that the iranian influence was preserved. It was the Supreme Leader who basically said thats when he decided when nouri maliki was gone for good. Host i guess its up fortunate it took Ayatollah Khomeini so long to declare he was over. Guest and this really points to basically the strategic miscalculation that has been made by iran. Not just in iraq and but also by syria. Think when you talk about the United States, think of how hard the Islamic Republic has been fighting to preserve the Islamic Republic opposed to the revolutionary state, fighting tooth and nile preserve assad and the terrible tactics by iran and iraq, particularly the second tear yap militias doing a great deal of damage and deepening the sectarian divide. So the blame to go around, not just the United States but also the regional powers. Think of syria. Look, yes, al qaeda and iraq was a direct product of the u invasion of iraq, but surely isis was a direct product or is a direct product of the geostrategic region rivalries over syria and iraq, whether youre talking about saudi arabia, qatar, and turkey, and iran on the other hand. Basically the geostrategic rivalry that has allowed both al qaeda central and al nusra in syria which the official arm of al qaeda and isis to do as well as they have done in particular in terms of foreign fighter and resources and money. All organizations need resources. Not just armies. And the resources come as a result of these strategic in the region. Host i think in the context of iran, i think that we should also be sure to mention that there are shia militias which are important but people dont read that much about, and thats also sort of a result of isis. It was ayatollah sistani, the highest authority in iraq for shia, and really for other shia in beau rain, other areas bahrain, who issued a fatwah in 2014 calling for that was ton the eve, i guess, of the takeover of mosul. Isis takeover of mosul. He called on the shearch called on all muslims, but in arabic, that was the official language but those who answered were shia, and now, again, we have seen that what began as a sort of a call to fight isis has evolved with iranian support, encouragement and funding, into shia violent militias that have displaced sunni communities in iraq, from their homes and they cant go back. Guest you know very well as well as i do Human Rights Organization and host they did a fantastic report. Guest the violations of the dignity, the killings by the sectarian position is the tragedy. You might end up with a scenario where isis is defeated militarily in iraq but iraq is lost for good because of the expansion of the sunnishiite divide. Many sunnis given the choice township isis and sectarian many sunnis are pressed between a rock and a hard place, and many sunnis have chosen to stay with isis not because they like the ideology. Many soons in the are fighting with isis dont believe in the ideology but because of the civil war, the anger against the sectarian based regime, the sun anies are pressed between a wrong, which is iraq, and, and hard place. The fatwah, both in iraq and syria and other places, the state cannot protect itself anymore. The state cannot defend itself anymore. The notification that the state would have a monopoly on the use of force is turned upsid down. The state is calling on the militias to support the state and this tells you about state failure, the fragility of the state system. Allows all the militias, kurds and others to rise up and try to fill the vacuum that exists in the region. Host yes and that really important point. I was i spent some time in nusra for the become on the new sectarianism which comps not november, and there is deep frustration among the clerical establishment because they feel that the Iraqi Government is not functioning and they dont support irans intervention in iraq and a lot of people are always under the notion because these are complicated topics that all the should ya are the same but the arab shear different from the persian shia and theyre arabs. Thats their primary identity and their primary religious identity. Their reference point, the religious refer rinse is knock khomeini, its sistani, but theyre so frustrated because they are very discourage evidence by the violence of the shia militias because its not the way they intend to practice the faith and also they feel theres too much iranian intervening but their only government, as you mentioned, cant do anything about it. Guest we need to keep reminding our audience the situation is very complex. Not all the shias and gee not the same. Guest not at all. Many, many more proud shiite iraqis of their own National Identity as they are many xixi ya are ang griff with their government. They want to have a successful stay. Host an arab state. Guest absolutely. Brings us to the question of iran. I dont know what iran wants. Understand if iran wants to maximize its influence but what dont understand really i have thought a great deal i dont understand this monstrous miscalculation, this counterproductive measures that basically are carried oust by iran, both in iraq and syria and the neighborhood, and to me, as a person born in that part of the world, i feel very strongly, and im worried about the Shia Community in the arab world, in particular as the struggle unfolds as sectarianism deepens and widens and you have written a book on this. This worries me a great deep. Talking about the majority of the sunni countries, 90 . When the dust settles, the very future of shia arab state and thats why im hoping that shiite arabs would take basically would construct a different kind of world view, would challenge this kind of iranian push, and basically try to bridge the divide that basically now is widening and deepening in the region. Host the problem for some of the shia in the arab world i want to use bahrain as an example because also you mentioned the geopolitical struggle so we have the geopolitical struggle on the high plane and the societal struggle on hello plane and they feed each other. Bahrain started a as shia sunni upriding. Then evolved into only a shia uprising ball the government convinced the majority the minority sunni population that iran was behind the uprising, and as time has gone on, there are some new groups now, bahrain groups that are taking funding indirectly or directly from iran. So, because theres no recourse. There is no arab system to help them. Theres no government to help them. And so iran is a very easy, easy recourse. Guest some of the great really putting on the table. Not only you have civil wars, you have this fierce geostruggle between sunni saudi arain and some you have beau bahrain and all of them. The question is this strategic struggle is complicating internal strife. Where is the United States . Wherees the European Community . The international discommunity you need intervention and im not talking about military intervention. International intervention. Diplomatic. Guest you need to put athlete fire and find the solution to the civil mars iraq, and yemen and syria, begin the process of reconstruction, state and society, and these are you know how difficult they are. Neither the United States nor the European Union or the International Community seems to be interested. Short term. The focus now on military means to dislodge isis from iraq and syria. How about the morning after . What do do with a failed state system in how too you give hope to millions of young men and women who have no future. 40 of the young arab men and women would like to end the this tells you about the organic crisis that exist, the refugee crisis and terrorism are symptoms of an organic crisis in the region. To neither the United States nor the interchannel community as the desire or will to help, and thats why the geostrategic struggle is pouring gas on the raging fire in the region. Host yes, and it is very unfortunate. If you look at countries such as egypt and lebanon, the Younger Generation wants to leave, and many have left. Theres a huge brain drain and these are the educated young people that could carry the country to another place. Guest and im going to Say Something might shock you and i hope it does seriously. I am pleasantly surprised, given the dismal conditions in the region, the lack of hope, the massive developmental failure, that only 30,000 or 40,000 fighters have joined isis. Host thats not shocking at all. Guest expected hundreds of thousands of young men, desperate young men, and women to join isis, and why not . Because isis fortunately suspends politics all together. Too radical for al qaeda. To have a civil war taking place between al nusra front in syria, the official arm of al qaeda and isis and also isis has themasterred the art of making enemies so the lack of vision has basically because most young men and women this is a even the unemployed young men and women believe that isis represents a threat to Islamic Society and Islamic Culture and islamic value. Even though its an important movement, we should not exaggerate the appeal to the millions the tens of millions of young men and women are basically looking for a way out of the situation. Host that brings us to i think a topic we cant leave the conversation without addressing and that is you have written for us in many of your books this whole idea of the close enemy and the far enemy, and i want to ask you, because you write about this a lot in your book. That isis i mean, in the early days, isis declared that the enemy was the enemy at home. And they even it was written in their publication that was made very clear, say a year ago two years ago when it first started publishing and we have seen, of course, thats not the case. How many indents have there been in europe, in california, now well, at least theres an isis london and now an isis influence incident yet, attack yesterday. Why did they change their strategy . Because although, as you meninged and we just sort of the anniversary of the agreement, you mention in the beginning they wanted to change borders. They still want to change border. They want to get rid of the nation state. So the focus in the beginning was very much in the middle east internally, the enemy at home. Why did to their strategy expand to the far enemy . Guest i wish we had the answer. Host you have written so much about this topic. Guest al qaeda central, al qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, zawahri has never changed. The far enemy has been consistent. The far enemy meaning the United States and america and european allies. Strategic goal of isis continues to be the near enemy. What the near enemy means is establishing Islamic State in iraq and syria and saudi arabia. This is the strategical, the major conceptual difference between al qaeda central and isis. What has changed in the past year is that isis has devoted more and more resources to the far enemy, attacks in paris, attacks in belgium, attacks in california, now in orlando. In fact, just ten days ago the second command of isis, is a very powerful figure. He is as powerful as baghdadi, the leader of isis. He has called on isis followers worldwide to attack westerners in particular civilians and in particular children. The yesterday is to bleed is to terrorize, and the reason who i you might say way the far enemy . Isis is losing in iraq and syria, losing bigtime, even though its not the beginning of the end, and these attacks are think about it. Theyre powerful attacks. All of us now are talking about the orlando massacre in which 50 innocent americans were killed, and another 50, almost 50 were injured. In fact the orlando killer, basically pledged allegiance to isis while he was doing the killing. So even though we have evidence about the orlando his name is omar mateen he was not directly, according to president obama and the Intelligence Service not directed by isis, directly, he basically was homegrown radicalize it, selfradicalized, accepting the ideology, and this is a very important point. So isis is not just one monolith the goal is on iraq and syria and neighboring countries and uns now designing attacks against western targets because the attacks are force must pied avert attention from iraq and syria. Appeals to recruiters. But baghdadi are saying we are not losing. We are standing um, and saddlely young men and women who you talk about belgium or france or california and orlando, buy into this ideology. Them of omar mateen, the killer in orlando. He i mean, think of his portfolio. Tormented man, deluded man, a troubled soul, racist, xenophobe. Against his wife, even his father disowned him. So this kind of ideology, these young troubled souls are looking for an anchor and what isis says, comp and join the Islamic State. The Islamic State has already taken responsibility for the attack in orlando, even though the Islamic State itself or daesh or isis did not directly order omar mateen to carry out the attack in orlando, so there are multiple, multiple ray units, multiple groups, multiple factions, and sadly, if you ask me, we should basically have resilience. My take on it ing this is not about scaring the audience the more isis loses in iraq and syria, the more attacks we should expect overseas. The question is not if isis will try to attack western targets. The question is capacity. Does it have the capacity, as was seep in orlando, you have some troubled individual, some deluded souls who buy into this ideology and take action into their own hands. This is the kind of lonewolf or basically self radicalized home grown terrorist. Host we pant forget how many foreign fighters are there in eye and is the attraction isis has to people in the west and not just muslims. Nonmuslims and i think the thing that is very confusing about the foreign fighters in particular is that theyre educated. These arent young people who are impoverished. The profiles indicate theyre very, very educated. They come from middle class families. So what draws people i think that this is probably the last issue we have time for but what draws people i was wondering if you could address two issues. One is, as howlight point out, its not about baghdadi. In america particularly were always so the cult of personality defines everything in our view of the world. Always about Osama Bin Laden and then when he died, al qaeda didnt go away. Its not about baghdadi. So, obviously as you point out, particularly in the west, there are cells, independent units. Guest limited host limited, homegrown independent. How does this work in the sort of infrastructure of isis . If its not about baghdadi, and if there are these autonomous units in the west, how does this operate . So when there is a planned attack, who gives the order . Is it swan someone in the west . Its not baghdadi. How are thieves attacked carried out. Guest can we have another hour . Host i know. We only have a few minutes left. Guest in the time you are asking i would say there is no single variable. Nothing no button you can press and explain these. As you said theyre about 30,000 and 40,000 foreign fighters. There are about 4,000 between 4,000 and 6,000 westerners that have basically joined isis. 20 of them are women. Think but it. Young girls and young women. So this is a very complexion phenomenon. I you ask me how do you summarize and explain, one term. I would say its a utopia. Isis is offering young men and women worldwide a mythology. Its the utopia. Some join the islamists reconstructive identity. If you succeed youll be part of this resurrection of the caliphate of the Islamic State. You die you going to be rewarded after life. Its a utopia, and other utopias in the past, fascism, maoism, marxism, ultraleftism, ultra right these movements appeal to a particular con it con state toupe sis. Mos of these young men and women are in search of an identity, search of an anchor, and isis provide them with a potent identity. Gives them a purpose in life. Adventure, recklessness. Take omar mateen the alleged killer in orlando. What saddens me deeply when i listened to his father. His father said i have given him the best education in in america. And this tells you a great deal. He is middle class. Host most of them are guest middle class, disadvantaged areas issue indicated. Its a complex phenomenon. If there is one particular shared fact between the its the idea of a utopia. The idea they want to belong to a movement that gives them purpose in life and this has allowed isis to not only for isis, think about the attacks in paris and belgium. The unit, foreign unit, alleged i he is responsible for the external operation. Yet the attack in california and the attack in orlando are homegrown, radicalized individuals who basically are radicalized through social media and the rhetoric of isil. Its a complex phenomenon. There is no single factor for the flow of young men and women to this movement called isis. Host thank you so much, and i want to congratulate you on your book isis a hoyt and this book is the best book ever written about isis so far are because it goes far beyond its strategy, its military strategy, it talks about its ideology in great depth, about the Historical Context in the middle east that led to isis with a very important which few people understand. It talks about to some degree the u. S. Responsibility. Talked about baghdadi and we didnt get to cover that. But theres a lot of material about who he is and the conflicting stories about him and how theres no real information about him. So, thank you so much. Guest any pleasure. Thank you for having me. And congratulations on your into can. Guest thank you. Cspan, create bid americas Cable Television companies and brought to you as a Public Service with you cable or satellite provider. Is it booktv on cspan2. Television for serious readers. Heres a look at our primetime lineup for tonight begins 8 00 eastern, the whatle for the future of energy and the environment. On our after words program, historian pamela haig provides a history of guns in america. And then at 10 00 eastern, alaska the stalesy stacy dash discusses her life in conservative. An
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