Have a lot of article two people in this room. Even though the title as i understand this is the imperial presidency. Understand that republicans have always sort of deferred to the administration, to the executive branch for Foreign Policy issues. I agree with some of the speakers that on the other Hand Congress has its appropriate roam. Well, administrations have negotiated the u. N. Security Council Sanctions and its my bleach that the administration does have the ability on your own accord to deal with those sanctions. The executive branching also has their own executive sanctions that they put in place against iran and i believe obviously they have the right to dole deal with those as they choose. On the other hand, there are congressionally mandated sanctions that congress put in place. As a matter of fact, Congress Puts them in place with the administration in essence kicking and screaming all along the way, saying that somehow or another this was going to be damaging with our relationship with iran. I think most of you would believe that its those sanctions that actually brought iran to the table. So i crafted a piece of legislation with significant bipartisan support which basically says if the administration comes to a final deal were by the way, the final deal would not happen until the end of june. Thats when you have all the details and annexes. We would just ask them to let that agreement lay before us for 60 days. Let us read all the classified annexes. Let us have the classified briefings that we would need to have and then let congress on the congressionally mandated sanctions, the one we put in place. Have the right to either approve, disapprove or take no action. Now, if i was the white house, i would embrace that. I would say i Want Congress to be with me. I want this agreement to stand the test of time. As a matter of fact, i would say instead of all this back and forth that youre seeing right now, if they said look, we agree. We agree that since you brought them to the table and since you proved provided us with a National Security waiver that we thought they would use, i think you know they plan to suspend those sanctions until way beyond the time theyre in office. So were saying we would like to be able to weigh in theyre pushing back, some of my senator fans. Many of them are being lobbied heavily but the administration. Again, i look at this and say this is in fact, the kind of role that congress ought to play, especially on the mandated sanctions that we put in place. I believe, in spite of some of the drama that weve had over the last two weeks internally. I believe ultimately we will have a vetoproof majority to make that happen and to the previous speakers, i believe thats exactly the kind of role that Congress Needs to play. I want to close with this. I really do believe that we have an opportunity in congress especially in the United States senate, to move ourselves more closely to the place that people originally thought congress was going to play in our governance system. I have to say bob menendez, who has been the democratic leader was chairman up until we won this last election. Hes done an outstanding job, in my opinion, of elevating the Foreign Relations committee. Im trying to build on that. I believe the Foreign Relations committee in the senate has been the place, if you, will through decades, where respect has been given because of the sober thoughtful way that we went about our business and i just want to tell you its a huge huge privilege. I was at an event last week and with a lot of my old friends from college and you know how those things go. It was a lot of fun. Im glad there were no tweets. But they kept coming up to me. They kept coming up to me and saying thank you. Thank you so much. For what you do. They heard all weekend the things that were going back and forth between the white house and other senators and they just kept coming up and saying thank you. And i want to say to all of you and especially to john and linda and those from tennessee, thank you. What a privilege it is to serve in the United States senate. To find myself after eight years and three months as chairman of the Foreign Relations committee. And all i can say to all of you who put so much time and effort into making sure theres integrity in what we as a Republican Party do across our country, i wake up every day trying to make those kinds of decisions and conduct myself in a manner that will cause the respect that should be shown to the Foreign Relations committee but also to the United States in general to be there and to cause our citizens to have faith in the system that each of you wakes up each day and tries to defend so thank you and i look forward to your questions. [applause] thank you. Jim bob from indiana. This president has been notorious in recent years in their willingness to enforce only those laws that they actually agreed with and not enforce those that they disagreed with. And it would be apparent that the legislation legislation that youre pursuing, as meritorious as it is, may very well fall into that category so even if it were passed and even if it were passed over the vote of the president , he can be expected, regretfully, to not enforce those that he simply doesnt agree with. What do you think congresss role then is in making sure that the president actually obeys the law . Senator corker yeah, so first of all, i dont want to get i dont want to be counting our chickens before they hatch. My first job is to have a successful mark up and to get 67 votes and to get the house to pass it. This is something that theres time to make happen. Final deal again will not occur until at least the end of june. My guest is that this week, one of the reasons we moved our markup back until the first part of april, im pretty sure the administration, theyre already sending out signals is going to say we really didnt meanwhile march 24th, we meant the end of march. We have work to do but look, i cannot calculate our actions based on them not ware carrying out the laws that we create. We have to create the laws. As far as what we do on a host of issues, one of the things our base, if you will, to use a term thats thrown around here a lot. They expect us to somehow, if the president doesnt do things that we believe lawfully should be doing, they expect us to do things on the senate floor to affect that and especially when were in the minority thats quite a problem. If you raise an issue on the senate floor, especially being in the minority that says we disapprove of this action and then were voted down because there are more democrats than republicans, you basically have built a case for them doing it. Theyll say the senate was on our side. So we had that problem. Now, of course, we can vote again look, the real way of dealing with this is through the court system, right . So you find an aggrieved party some place in the country, you figure out a way to support that aggrieved party, wherever they are in the country. You cause a case to come up through the system, which is exactly whats happening right now on the health care bill, right . Its actually whats happening right now on the immigration issue and its slow and its very unsatisfactory to the base, but theres really no other way to deal with it. If you have a suggestion, tell me but its that old, slow rule of law way that you deal with things. Its not very satisfying to the American People but it works. If you have some suggestion id love to hear it. Apparently you dont. Senator, i have a client and friend who recently toured the kurdish areas of iraq and has come back to say that theyre in desperate need of arms so this can defend helps from i issues. Do you think thats going to move forward within the senate . Senator corker i was just in kurdistan with the president. Theyre wonderful friends of the United States. Have been from the very beginning and lets face it, theyre the people right now on the ground that we can most depend upon. When the oil field of occur kirk were taken and the iraqi army fled, it was the peshmerga that came in and took it back. They now control a big part of the oil that used to be the iraqis. Were going to debate over that. I dont think its quite as bad as this gentleman laid out, just for what its worth. They come see us often and when they came to see me here in washington, i was pretty upset about the delivery schedule of arms and equipment to them. As ive gotten there on the ground dealing with generals that i know well, ok. And generals who i know have an affinity towards talking to guys like me and telling us the truth, i dont think its quite as bad as people say it is. I think the deliveries are going into baghdad there were stories it was taking a month or so for that equipment to get to kurdistan. Im its not that way at all. Theres a movement to over time supply them directly. My guess is that will be the case. I will say we have to be a little concerned about things getting out of balance. When i say getting out of balance i think we still want iraq to be one country and a big part of our friends, the kurds lobbying for the things that theyre lobbying for is they potentially could be building a case for separation, as you well know, which is problematic on the turkish side too. We have to be pretty judicious and thoughtful about the way we go about this ill Say Something a little more provocative, though. I stayed in our billiondollar embassy there because its the only place you can stay thats safe and i met with a body who certainly is a breath of fresh air from maliki, who was so terrible as a Prime Minister. By the way, maliki was a Prime Minister that we helped put in place. We need to be honest about that. He was a terrible Prime Minister but every single thing that we are doing right now in iraq, everything, is to irans benefit. Everything. And its and i support obviously what were doing to try to route isis out but every day we wake up in iraq with our 3,100 folks that are there. Were making the country a better place for iran. The parliament is infiltrated. Salamani is truly a celebrity. Hes out with the shiah militia. Theyre doing the things theyre going to push out against isis. Its a pretty sad thing to know of all the limbs that were dismembered, the lives that were lost, people today that are dealing with the psychological issues they are. The huge amounts of treasury that were spent. Its sad to be there today and to understand that were again doing things that need to be done but were making the country every single day a better place for iran. Yes . Mr. Chairman, how can foreign states in our union turn red like tennessee . We need some good counsel here. Senator corker im sorry, what did you say . Tennessee is a wonderful red state. What can other states do to [inaudible] senator corker yeah. I dont i mean, thats more in your line of work. First of all, i think i will get back to my line of work. I think for us to continue to be successful, we have to show that we can legislate responsibly and conduct ourselves in an appropriate way. I think it is our responsibility as people elected to positions of great responsibility to carry ourselves in a manner that causes the nation to look to us in a manner that says they would like to have more people like us. As far as states turning in that direction, i will leave it to all of you who are on a daily basis more evolved in evolved involved in that. Senator, ann gruner from virginia. Im wondering if you could shed any insight into the administrations refusal to provide weapons to the ukrainians. Im going to say this one more time. We passed a bill to do that unanimously in the senate. Unanimously. I think that that first of all first of all, i wake up every day not with the thought that im going to get a piece of hide of this administration. I dont. That is not my thought. My thought is they act differently. They think differently, but the executive branch, lets face it, carries out Foreign Policy. What can i do to move in a positive direction . I dont say this to throw out names, but i talked yesterday with the vice president. I talked yesterday with their secretary of state who is in the midst of negotiations taking place in europe. My point is i try to work with i them. I understand they are in charge today. Im disappointed often. Every now and then i have to send an email to the chief of staff, who i deal with a great deal, and just say you guys are just so hard to help. They just are. To your question, i think this president has never ever been comfortable being commanderinchief. Hes just not comfortable. I know the decisions you make as commanderinchief are heavy and more complicated than meets the eye. Theres a lot of things going on in the background. He has made decision memo after decision memo after decision memo sitting on the desk. I know they are there. I know they are there. And he just cannot bring himself to do it. In his mind and a few people around him, youve got to understand, his body of advisors is very small. It is not the people that the that have the titles, you understand. Very small group of people. What they have been concerned about since day one is if they take actions like that, you will cause russia to move ahead more forcefully when its just the opposite. It is psychology. By the way, thereve been some stories about how theyve been embarrassed that putin continues to do what they do because they keep talking nicely to him. [laughter] but it is just silly. They have such difficulties, such difficulties number one making a decision. And when they make a decision, it is very difficult to carry it out. I know we were going to deliver trucks to a general in syria that we decided would be the leader of the Free Syrian Army that we were going to support. It took months and months just to get trucks. They have great difficulty in making decisions and after they make them and try to execute, it is like a gang that cannot shoot straight. They cannot make it happen. It is very disappointing and hurts our credibility tremendously. Look, i dont think any of us that ukraine, that if russia decides to take ukraine forcefully, they can decide to take ukraine. At least raise the price. At least show there is a degree of support. To me its something very important. Weve been unwilling to do it. Yesterday they finally shook loose a decision they agree to a long time ago and that is to train the National Guard finally, finally. So many times this administration makes decisions after that point in time when it would have been effective. You understand . That window is closed. I will give you another one. The other day we had chairman of the joint chiefs, ash carter and secretary kerry in. They sent over an authorization to use military force scribble syria. You all know we have a train and syrians outside of the country and we will bring them back to tackle isis. We are going to train 5000 over time, which is a pittance. One of the things they are not going to do yet, assad is barrelbombing. 220,000 people are dead in syria, partially. Some of the things we didnt do what we made a difference. A lot of dead people. So many millions displaced. You know what they have not asked for . They have not asked for the authorization when those people coming to come into syria after they have been trained they do not have the authorization to protect them from the sods assads barrel bombs. Again, they are worried that his provocative and ill go back to the issue of fresh again. They dont be provocative. Can you address yemen . There is another bombing come a 120 dead in a mosque. Senator corker one of the things we had this agreement right now with the ron at is a shortterm agreement. We have alleviated some of the sanctions on iran as weve been going through this interim agreement, which allows them to get 770 million a month of their own money that is trapped overseas. In other words, they sell their oil, it stays in the country is selling to, and it has hurt their economy. They could do some kind of trade. Again, they have been relieved of a little bit of money. Theyve got a little bit of money coming in. There is 130 billion of distilled stuff. And so, the concern that many people like me have if we fail in these negotiations, in other words we dont do some things that keeps iran from getting a Nuclear Weapon by the way you all understand what the real premises, right . We are going to do an agreement with iran that we hope holds them in abeyance. A great concern about covert activities, grave concern about research and development. A lot of concerns. As a matter of fact, our negotiators have told us their negotiators in iran can pass a Lie Detector Test that you were no previous military dimensions to Irans Nuclear activities which we all know is not true. We know they were involved in moving towards a Nuclear Weapon and up until 2003 when they became nervous about what were doing in iraq and maybe would do the same thing to them. Think about that. The negotiators we are negotiating with were totally unaware of the efforts because they were taking place through the rmg. Again, this is what make people nervous. I get back to the yemen issue. Not only have a continuing to develop missile Delivery Systems, some of the most sophisticated in the world not covered by this agreement, but they are the biggest exporter of terrorism. What we are concerned about is we get a bad deal. Either way, the deal is predicated on the fact that they will change their ways. We were hoping that during that 10year period, it will change the way they operate. It is my believe that they think in the next 10 years, they may catch up in a weakened state they can carry on activities. To me that is bs and put the negotiation is all about. Back to the point of yemen. They obviously support of the newsies supported the huzis. They obviously supported hamas. They support hezbollah. They are destabilizing the region. So with being a screwdriver turn away from the Nuclear Weapon obviously proliferation by saudi arabia and other places that wont develop their own. They will bite off the shelf or another country that is willing to sell to them and so then youve created this proliferation. Let me get back to yemen. You have also released wondered 30 billion that is available to them for them to continue doing the destabilizing terrorist activities they are carrying out in the region. That is why the stakes are so high. If i was president of the United States and i was negotiating an agreement with iran that at this type of geopolitical impact, far more important, candidly, that what is happening right now with isis, far more important, i would certainly want to make sure that i negotiated a deal that passed muster with congress, which is what they sit on the front end, and send it instead of stiff arming congress and keeping them out the way they are. Thank you very much. [applause] of next on cspan, a conversation on Nuclear Weapons. Who here from the author on the history and strategy in the atomic age. Then the dedication ceremony of the Edward Kennedy institute for the United States senate. This weekend, the cspan cities to work has partnered to learn about the history and literary life of tulsa oklahoma. Is most famous for in the writing of this land is your land, but it was more than that. He was born in 1912 in oklahoma and we are proud to have his work back in oklahoma where we think it belongs. He was an advocate for those who were disenfranchised. For those people who were Migrant Workers in from oklahoma, kansas and texas. They found themselves in california starving. He saw the vast difference between those who were the halves and to have nots. He became the spokesman. Woody recorded very few songs of his own. We have a listening station that teachers 46 of his songs in his own voice. Thats what makes the recordings he did make so significant and important. This land is your land this land is my land watch it saturday on cspan at 2 00. Tuesday night is the deadline for a nuclear deal with iran. Next a conversation on Nuclear Weapons and National Security. The tower center for Political Studies hosted this panel discussion. Good evening. Welcome to smu and the special forum on Nuclear Weapons. Welcome also to the security and Strategy Program here at smu. The new initiative we started about a year ago which combines the study of National Security with the study of grand strategy and strategy in war time. It features events that have scholars and practitioners in the same room to flesh out the discussion of really important and Critical Issues for interNational Security. Thanks first to our Board Members patrocinioerson and ambassador jordan. Thank you for being with us tonight. Nuclear weapons are in the news. You cant avoid them. If you turn on the tv, read the newspaper, youll see stories, ominous stories about Nuclear Weapons. A few weeks ago i opened the New York Times and i found an oped ominously titled north Koreas Nuclear expansion. And the story said, it quoted an Administration Official warning about north koreas reckless pursuit of a larger and larger nuclear program, but the oped went on to criticize the administration for doing too little to stop it. Obviously the ongoing debate about iran and its Nuclear Ambitions is tied to a broader fear of proliferation in the middle east. Time magazine this week, this monday had an article called the middle east nuclear race is already under way. These stories arent just about nuclear proliferation, the spread of nuclear arms. Theyre also about strategies as in how might the countries use Nuclear Weapons to achieve their political objectives . Reuters for instance on sunday had a scary story with the title Russia Threatens to aim Nuclear Missiles at denmark if it joins the nato shield. U. P. I. On tuesday, russia demands removal of u. S. Nuclear missiles from europe. Meanwhile, u. S. Analysts, some u. S. Analysts are calling for returning tactical Nuclear Weapons to europe ala 1980. All of this might feel a little peculiar and seem strange. After all, it wasnt long ago that Foreign Policy luminaries and National Security luminaries were speaking openly about a World Without Nuclear Weapons. It was only in 2007 that in the pages of the wall street journal an oped by george schultz, henry kissinger, sam nunn none of them starryeyed pacifists called openly for global disarmament. Two years later the president gave a very stirring speech in prague in which he ek owed echoed their call and americas commitment to seek the peace and security of a World Without Nuclear Weapons. Seems to be a bipartisan ks Aggressive Movement toward getting rid of these things. And yet that doesnt seem to be happening. If you read the news youre seeing stories of new Nuclear Powers, north korea, potentially iran. Youre also seeing stories about the traditional great powers who are modernizing their arsenals, china, russia and the United States. The United States Nuclear Modernization program is particularly interesting for our purposes tonight. Its not going to be cheap. The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that its going to be on the order of 350 billion over the next decade alone. The economist magazine also had a big story, big special issue on Nuclear Weapons a couple weeks ago. They summed it all up. Quote, 25 years after the soviet collapse the world is entering a new nuclear age. Nuclear strategy has become the cockpit of foes jostling with the fave original Nuclear Weapons powers whose own dealings are infected by suspicion and rivalry. Scary stuff. Why are new Nuclear Powers acquiring weapons . Why are traditional great powers modernizing their forces despite all the calls for disarmament and proliferation . Put another way what is the value of Nuclear Weapons . What is the Strategic Logic of acquiring and deploying these forces . How have leaders from the past thought about the relationship between Nuclear Weapons and National Security . And how does it fit in today with our broader Foreign Policy programs . I cant think of many better people to answer these questions than the two gentlemen seated with us today. Professor francis gavin, the Frank Stanton share in Nuclear Facility policy it at m. I. T. Before going to m. I. T. For a long time he was the professor of International Affairs and director of the Strauss Center for interNational Security and law at the university of texas. He writes widely on diplomatic history, Foreign Policy, and Nuclear Weapons and his latest book is called the Nuclear State craft history and strategy in americas atomic age. To his right is general c. Robert keeler of the air force who until recently was commander of the United States Strategic Command. In that role he was directly responsible to the secretary of defense and the president s of the plans and operations of all u. S. Forces conducting global strategic deterrents, nuclear alert, space, cyber Space Associated operations. After leaving the air force and leaving Strategic Command he went to Stanford University where he is currently the lead lecturer at the center for interNational Security and cooperation. Well have professor gavin speak for about 20 to 25 minutes, turn over the floor to the general, and then open the floor to q a. Im sure there will be many questions. Well, it is a real honor to return to one of my favorite places, the tower center, at smu. And to be on a panel with such a distinguished Public Servant and it is also a real pleasure to be here with my old friend and colleague josh rogner who has done an amazing job here as you all know with the security and Strategy Program here at smu and i think has really turned smu and the tower center into a goto place for these conversations. I think we should all thank josh for his amazing job. [applause] the history of the nuclear age is marked by a puzzle. ThermoNuclear Weapons are monstrous, potentially civilization ending weapons whose use would be not only immoral and senseless but increasingly unthinkable. Yet, we intuit it is the very destructiveness of the weapons that prevented the recurrence of great power wars since 1945. Why . Great power land wars have been the scurege of ewer asia for 31 years before the United States dropped atomic weapons on hiroshima and nagasaki, wars that killed tens of millions on the battlefield and tens of millions more through disease and political upheaval. 70 years ago most responsible people expected a third world war to follow the first and the second with consequences far worse than the first two. Thankfully that war never came and to misuse the title from a famous book it has led many people to proclaim, thank god for the atom bomb. Did Nuclear Weapons prevent World War Three and do these weapons have the intended effect of stabilizing World Politics by making great power war unthinkable. This is the foundation of what weve come to call to terms and our whole way of thinking about newscast leer weapons is centered on this concept. Much of United States National Security policy has been driven for well over half a century by the idea that an attack upon the United States or i should add its allies might elicit a Nuclear Response even if our adversaries did not use Nuclear Weapons. And weve come to take this posture so for granted that weve long since forgotten how novel it is. Or how unusual given American History such as strategy is. Think about it for a moment. From the founding until 1950 the United States had entered no permanent alliances, was almost completely demobilized during peace time, pursued strategies that allowed it to be hit first and mobilize slowly and massively to win wars of attrition. That is how the United States fought war and planned strategy up until 1950. This strategy allowed for powerful civilian control over the military and strong legislative oversight over the executive branch in matters of war and peace while paving the way to relative isolation from World Affairs. The Nuclear Revolution and the strategies the United States adopted to deal with it demanded something quite different. Permanent alliances forward military deployment, and an often preemptive military strategy that left enormous discretion in the hands of battle field commanders and permanently shifted the power to make war away from congress to the president. Again, this strategy is premised on the idea that deterrence the promise of awful retribution if attacked kept the United States relatively safe and the world relatively stable for decades. Most importantly, its widely believed it prevented thermonuclear war. But do we know this to be true . How can we be sure that thermoNuclear Weapons and the deterrence that flowed from them actually kept peace and stability . In fact, we cannot. The problem is that were trying to understand something that thank god, never happened, and we hope will never happen. A thermonuclear war. We have an almost impossible time understanding the causes for things that did happen. As many unresolved arguments over what caused the First World War demonstrate. Trying to understand why something didnt happen, why we did not have a thermal nuclear war, is a methodological nightmare that eludes answer from even our most powerful and sophisticated social science methods. While the idea of Nuclear Deterrence is intuitively compelling one can imagine other explanations to the peace and stability of World Affairs after 1945. The scholar john mueller once argued Nuclear Weapons were unneeded to keep the peace. That the world had tired of war after two global con flag rations, that the overwhelming conventional might of the United States was enough to scare any possible rival and that great power war like slavery or dueling was a Cultural Practice that was increasingly seen as repulsive and not to be pursued. There are other explanations for the socalled long peace. For centuries, land for example had been the source of state power. But a variety of factors from massively increasing agricultural yields we arguably have too much food in the world, not too little which is historically unprecedented, to flatening demographic trends, to the development of post industrial technologically driven economies has made conquests too expensive. In other words, who needs land when its far better to be singapore than the ukraine . Which may not have been true in 1920. My point here is theres lots of other explanations from norms and taboos to military factors to explain the absence of great power wars since 1945. The simple fact is we dont know what caused peace. Now, for myself, i strongly believe Nuclear Deterrence made an enormous difference but i cant prove it. People will tell you they can but certainty on this question is impossible. Now, why does this matter . There are two crucial trends as josh mentioned this introduction shaping the nuclear world, pulling in Different Directions and how you assess them depends on how you think about the question of deterrence. The first is the socalled Global Zero Movement which josh explained. The idea that the world should move toward eliminating Nuclear Weapons all together. This is actually officially an american aspiration laid out by president obama in his 2009 prague speech though president s as diverse as jimmy carter and Ronald Reagan also shared this goal. The other strand reveals that Nuclear Weapons are playing an increasing role in World Politics. We all know about the current tense negotiation over Irans Nuclear program. Less well known is the significant expansion and modernization of the Nuclear Programs of russia china and pakistan. The United States is also going through a multi billion dollar Modernization Program as josh mentioned. So one strand moves the world toward delegitimizing and eventually eliminating Nuclear Weapons. The other strand pulls in the opposite direction highlighting the importance to states of Nuclear Weapons for achieving their National Security and Foreign Policy objectives. Which is correct . These world views and the policies that flow from them are enormously consequential and we need to vigorously argue and debate over them. The debate must recognize however, that the answer to the most important question, the one that matters more than any policy question in the world today, how to avoid a nuclear war, will never be known with certainty. We must be both rigorous and humble as we explore these issues. Of course the right course also turns on a number of other important questions from the past. Questions as elusive as they are consequential. Im a historian and historians love to deal in puzzles. I want to present three of them very briefly. And depending on how you think about these puzzles how you answer them, how you understand the past will help shape how you think about contemporary future Nuclear Dilemmas and choices. They should also get the fundamental questions surrounding Nuclear Weapons deterrence, peace, and stability. The first important question, how close did we come to thermonuclear war during the cold war . Now, theres at least three ways to look at this. First, through the course of the cold war did Nuclear Weapons and the strategies the super powers employed make great power war in a Nuclear Exchange more or less likely . Second how did Nuclear Weapons affect their behavior and the risk of nuclear war during sharp political crises . In other words, did Nuclear Weapons make crises more or less likely . Was it harder or easier to exit without the risk of war . How high were the risks of an Accidental Nuclear launch or accident . Now, on this question Nuclear Weapons clearly had contradictory effects. The fears and horrors of thermonuclear war no doubt gave leaders pause during stable times and during crises. One cant read this history without some feeling of terror. The recent book command and control joins others in highlighting the mistakes, accidents, and near misses that plagued Nuclear Management on both sides of the cold war. Reading documents from both sides of the cold war from 1958 to 1961 berlin crisis 1962 cuban missile crisis, or the set of challenges during the 1983 nato archer exercise give one pause. Perhaps more importantly, the most important and dangerous crises of the cold war were generated by the very existence of Nuclear Weapons. In other words if one tried the counterfactual of a World Without Nuclear Weapons for example the cuban missile crisis makes no sense. Even the crisis over west berlin from 1958 to 1961 if it were as we now believe initiated by the soviet unions anger over the United States moving to arm west germany with Nuclear Weapons, is newscast leer to the core. The crisis of the euro missiles in the 1970s. The soviet fear of a nato first strike in the early 1980s. It is hard to create a counterfactual where these occur in a nonnuclear world. Could it be that in a nonnuclear cold war the United States and the soviet union and nato in the warsaw pact balance each other perfectly grudgingly accepting each others fear of influence and avoiding major crises . Who knows . But its a scenario at least worth thinking about. The second important question why do states pursue Nuclear Weapons and why have far fewer pursued them than anyone predicted in, say, 1965 or 1995 . Is the less nuclearized world than we expected a product of the 1968 newscast leer nonproliferation treaty . Remember the 1960s people predicted 20 30, 40 Nuclear Weapons states by the start of the 21st century. Is this low number or relatively low number because of an emerging norm even taboo against the use of and possession of Nuclear Weapons . Is it because of a demand of being an open, politically liberal capitalistic state conflict with the goals of acquiring Nuclear Weapons as a scholar has claimed . Or has it been American Nuclear nonproliferation efforts everything from norms to treaties to threats to sanctions to even considering preventative military strikes to sprawling alliances and security agreements around the world . Has that been the key factor keeping the number of Nuclear Weapons states in the Single Digits . Again, we dont know. We cant be sure. But theres lots of argument. The one interesting surprise that will point out in the historical record is the United States went to great lengths, greater lengths than we perhaps realized in the past, to keep its friends and allies nonnuclear than it did even its enemies. Countries ranging from west germany to japan to south korea and australia and italy and sweden the list goes on and on. In fact it showed a willingness to work with its adversary the soviet union against its allies to accomplish the same. The third important question is an ageold one. How much is enough . In other words, what are the force and strategy requirements for Nuclear Deterrence . Are they different than the requirements for assuring allies . And can state achieve meaningful Nuclear Superiority . If so, what are the benefits of achieving such primacy . This is a complex question but during the cold war there were two leading views. Many of the academic and think tank analysts, renowned thinkers like Bernard Brody robert jere vice, and ken waltz, believed once the state possessed surviveable Nuclear Forces, enough Nuclear Weapons that even an attack upon them allowed them to unleash unacceptable damage on the enemy, that once you achieved that state there was really no point in building more forces. Strategic stability was then achieved. And building more, larger or more accurate Strategic Nuclear forces or spending money on things like Missile Defense was a waste of potentially a way to potentially destable ayes. Many americans did not seem to accept this and the United States continued after the 1972 strategic arms treaty and antiBallistic Missile treaty to seek faster, more accurate, stealthier Nuclear Forces. Multi billion dollar programs like the exeeper, b 1 and b 2, cruz missiles, per shalling 2, upgrades Missile Defense and massive investments in antisubmarine warfare, all systems by the way oriented toward counterforce and if one follows the logic of such systems potential first use revealed the United States sought Nuclear Superiority. What did they think they were getting for this massive investment, for these systems that arguably at least according to some analysts undermine strategic stability . And did they get what they sought . There is by the way a limited but quite revealing bit of evidence that the soviet side understood that the americans were trying to acquire meaningful superiority in the 1970s and 1980s based upon capabilities russia neither had the technology nor the Economic Resources to match and it worried them quite a bit. Which is an interesting contrast by the way to what appears to be a much different attitude in china today where despite an increasingly vigorous Foreign Policy and military expansion, based upon an impressive economic and technological base, the peoples republic of china seems relatively sanguine about being on the shortened of the nuclear blavents United States. Answering these three questions would go a long way toward helping us navigate the Nuclear Choices we have in front of us that josh so eloquently laid out. Now i wish i could provide you with concrete answers to these and other important puzzles but historians traffic in uncertainty and context and they are far better at asking hard questions and throwing cold water on those that would provide easy answers. Which is probably why i dont get invited to more terrific events like this. Its hard to get excited by a speaker whose conclusions are, its complicated, or it all depends, or we cant really know. That said, i do look forward to discussing these and any other questions you have and hearing from my distinguished fellow panelists. Thank you very much. Gen. Kehler im going paperless tonight. My screen has gone blank so give me a moment. Let me see if i can make this do something it was supposed to do. There we go. I can Say Something now. Thanks for inviting me to the tower center. This is a big honor for me. I always enjoy coming to Panel Discussions like this, particularly when the audience is filled with a mixture of people like tonight. Including a fair number of undergraduates. Im gratified to see so many undergraduates because i think these issues in particular, well it used to get discussed in many places through the cold war, at the end there was a tendency to not talk about these issues. The conversations we have now are long overdue. It is the first time i have visited smu. It is a very beautiful campus. I walked around today. I wish i could spend more time here. I promise i will come back at some point and walk around and get to see some of the things you guys have told me about. Im pleased to be on stage with the professor. Im fascinated by his review of the u. S. Arsenal and the questions that he posed and the puzzles that he talked about are spot on. The a very interesting conversations and necessary. I might yield a little bit of a bucket of cold water myself because i will speak with a little more certainty but i will say i think he raises fair points about how certain we can be about some of our tried and true assumptions related to nuclear waepaoeapons and deterrents. As you heard, i served for almost 39 years in uniform. Much associated with the Strategic Forces so the opinions you would hear from me are mine and they will have a military flavor to them. As you heard i will take a minute and i will piggyback on what professor gavin said. I think his points bear repeating. Let me do it with a little bit of my own military slant. No question about it Nuclear Weapons have occupied a unique space since august of 1945. I would assert while Nuclear Weapons were conceived to win a war, shortly after their use the became a critical tool to prevent a war. In my humble view, that was there great value and remains that value today. We can debate how certain we can be that is what had happened, but i think there is some evidence that would suggest that, in fact, Nuclear Weapons have been war preventing weapons. Why . Obviously, Nuclear Weapons are unprecedented with their potential to inflict enormous disruption over a very short time with longterm physical and psychological. They were woven into the fabric of our National Security strategy and is the ultimate guarantor of our security and our allies. Nuclear superiority became an affordable mean to compensate for conventional inferiority for the United States and its allies in during the cold war, if you recall. Many of you dont. More on that later. But, if you ever read anything about the cold war, there was a large conventional inferiority on the part of nato visa be the worst all packed visavis the warsaw pact. The Ground Forces in particular. Deterrent was the objective of having Nuclear Weapons. The policies, strategies and employment plans were designed to convince adversaries and they would not achieve their goals by attacking us. That is the benefit of deterrence. Or they would pay too high of a price. Nuclear deterrence fit with the cold war strategy of containment. To be sure, Nuclear Weapons the not eliminate all conflicts or will they ever, but the threat of nuclear war imposed limits, compelled caution and forced leaders to stop and ponder the consequences of escalation before they acted. I think the evidence of this is clear in korea berlin, vietnam the middle east and elsewhere. The notion of war between the major powers change in august of 1945. While i do not believe we entered a long time of peace that is what we have seen certainly the world has not seen a hot war between the major powers since august of 1945. It would be speculation for sure just that i completely agree with professor gavin on that point. It is speculation to say because of Nuclear Weapons but i look prior to 1945 when conventional deterrence was attempted by the great powers, whether that was the great white fleet, battleship building, whatever the form it took never lasted. The world found itself in large global conflicts that were increasingly violent and deadly as time passed. But, i would argue from my perspective Nuclear Deterrence worked. But, there are some interesting questions about that and today some people would say well, ok, it worked then, that was then. The conditions no longer exist today. The weapons create more risk than benefit to our National Security. I dont think that is true. Let me take a couple of minutes to explain why i think that is true. For those of us that served in the cold war, it does not seem like very much time has passed. Yet, an entire generation of men and women have served in the u. S. Armed forces since the cold war ended. Some have completed an entire 20 year career. Actually, 24 years if you count 1991 as the end of the cold war. For the last 10 to 15 years or so while i was still on active duty, i would occasionally use a cold war example to describe something to the younger troops. I would get a blank stare in return. An army friend of mine is part of this recent return some u. S. Ground forces the europe as a demonstration of the fact we could reinforce nato if we had to. Those were famous examples of that during the cold war they were called reforger exercises. A colleague of mine said he was talking to his troops just like it was reforging and they looked at him like a grandma. Pa. The cold war has been over for a long time. I believe we know it. Todays men and women often use weapons designed and built during the cold war but their experiences shaped by iraq and afghanistan and libya and kosovo and against violent extremists, not a faceoff between the iron curtain and Central Europe with the threat of a largescale nuclear war. For me the war ended in september of 1991. I was in command of a unit on the day when president george h. W. Bush ordered all of our Nuclear Bombers and their supporting tankers and half of our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles off of cold war alert status. In short order, he implemented other initiatives that have dramatic effects on u. S. Posture and stockpile as well. Yes, we still retained a Nuclear Deterrent force, Ballistic Missiles and intercontinental missiles on alert. For those of us in the field, the cold war was over. While we had hoped for long periods of peace dividend the 21st century has brought new challenges. Todays threats are more complex than the existential threat posed by the soviet union in the 20th century. Todays threat include hybrid combinations of Strategy Tactics and capabilities. They included Nuclear Weapons cyber weapons, longrange Ballistic Missiles, traditional conventional and nonconventional weapons that can be wielded by state and nonstate actors alike. Uncertainty and complexity dominate the Global Security landscape today. Violent extremism is the most likely threat the u. S. Faces. The most dire threat is an extremist with a Nuclear Weapon. But, that is not the only threat we face. Adversaries and potential adversaries continue to pursue capabilities conduct strategic attacks against the u. S. And the allies as a main component of their security strategies. Such attacks are defined by their affect and not the weapon used. It could involve nuclear or conventional kinetic or nonkinetic weapons. Such attacks could arrive at our doorsteps through space or cyberspace or even in a nontraditional way. I would argue the attacks of 9 11 were strategic attacks on the United States. While the likelihood of a Massive Nuclear attack on the u. S. Has receded thankfully, russia, china and north korea all have the capability to inflict terrible casualties and damage on the u. S. And our allies over the course of several hours with Nuclear Weapons. Russia and china are pursuing a group thats aggressive modern it pursuing aggressive modernization. Senior russian leaders have recently restated their commitment to their own Nuclear Deterrence. I have been a bit surprised by the amount of Nuclear Saber rattling the russians have been doing. Nuclear weapons formed the basis of deterrence in india and pakistan. North korea openly advertises its possession of Nuclear Weapons and works on Ballistic Missiles that will deliver them against the regional allies and the United States itself and overtly threatened to use them as a most famously did back in 2013. As you see in the press, negotiations continue with iran and the outcome remains to be seen. Others to include some of our allies can acquire Nuclear Weapons depending on the behavior of their neighbors. There is a simple reason why many of our adversaries and potential adversaries see Nuclear Weapons as essential to their security. After watching the u. S. Project power along the globe for the last 20 years, these and other potential adversaries are looking to compel the u. S. To restrain its action or in a crisis or conflict, to restrict our options and intimidate our allies and partners through the threat of escalation, possibly to nuclear use. It is the cold war in reverse. Other threatening nuclear use for u. S. Superiority. I dont see a World Without Nuclear Weapons on the horizon anytime soon, something president Obama Technology acknowledged. While strategic attack the 21st century could take many forms, a Nuclear Attack on the u. S. Or our allies remains absolutely the worst case scenario. Therefore, deterring strategic attack, including Nuclear Attack must remain the number one priority for the department of defense. 21st century deterrence concepts still sound familiar. Deny benefits and impose costs and a range of options for the president to use as needed in a conflict. The commitment to insure our allies and partners by extending our umbrella to them. How they apply those concerts in the 21st century is very different. 21st century deterrence must be tailored to a wide variety of actors and scenarios. One size can no longer fit all. 21st century determines demands the flexible application of the full range of complementary military capability. Strong conventional forces, Missile Defenses, brazilian space and cyberspace capabilities, effective command and control and the ultimate possibility of a u. S. Nuclear response in extreme circumstances for Vital National interests. We no longer have to threaten nuclear used to compensate for conventional inferiority, but no combination of conventional, kinetic or Cyber Capabilities can hold of that risk. No combination with the same risks of longterm and shortterm effects of Nuclear Weapons. In a future conflict, Nuclear Options will provide the president with the ability to hold the enemys most critical assets at risk, compel the enemy to consider the consequences of his actions in ways no conventional weapon can do and prevent the enemy from escalating by threatening us with Nuclear Attack. Our allies and partners will rely on the security guarantee our Nuclear Forces provide as well. From my point of view, absent some unforeseen change or until a suitable replacement comes along, Nuclear Weapons will contribute to our National Security and the security of our allies for quite some time and they will do that by providing the president with options. Underwriting our freedom of actions and compelling the adversary. They may be fewer in numbers they certainly need to be focused on her highest Strategic Deterrence needs. They need to be woven into a doctrine that contemplates their use in extreme circumstances where our vital National Security interests are at stake. It must be seen as a tool in an expanded kit of options that include conventional and nonkinetic weapons. They must be under the strictest possible control of the president of the United States. They must be modern and sustainable. This is the dilemma i used to get asked this question while testifying on the hill and i would say we happened to be in the worst place added thatt a bad time. We find ourselves in need of modernization of our Nuclear Arsenal at the very time budgets are declining. We have weapons of that still play a vital role in our National Security. Others are modernizing their arsenals. Our deterrent to include the stockpile of Delivery Systems and Communication Systems has reached a critical point in sustainment and modernization. Many of the weapons and other industrialbased things that we have today were really acquired during the Reagan Defense buildup and are over 30 years old. The newest b52s were built in the 1960s. I flew in a tanker some years ago. Two youngsters, two captains in the front. They were youngsters compared to everybody else on the airplane. I said to them we were doing that thing that generals do. We were flying somewhere over the world in the middle of the night and it was quiet and cold. I went forward into the cockpit and chatted. I was chatting them up and they were doing what young crew members do pretending like they were interested. [laughter] gen. Kehler i asked one of them when did you come to active duty to make a long story short, the airplane we were flying in was made long before he was born. I didnt feel it didnt bother me a whole lot. You get the some point where the system has to be modernized and upgraded and we are there. I think it was really well outlined in 2010 where it was clear about our need to sustain and modernize our deterrent systems, including the weapons and delivery platforms and command and control support. We ought to retain the triad of Nuclear Forces. Im happy to talk about that in the questions and answers. We should maintain a modern infrastructure and maintain a highly capable workforce. Some of you need to be become a part of that workforce whether you are working on policies or associated with it or the engineering we need you. We need to pursue a viable hedge strategy that reduces the overall number of weapons while assuring the reliability of the individual weapons are high. Clarity, consensus and visual commitment are needed from the top down and need to be aligned with the relevance and assurance of 21st century concepts. So, let me say in conclusion, i think our Nuclear Deterrent has served us very well since august of 1945 and i think it will continue to play a vital role in our National Security for a long time. Thank you again for inviting me and a look forward to your questions. Thank you. [applause] mr. Avey we will do the q a. I will do the privilege of asking the first question. I think we have a microphone going around. If you have a question. I would like to ask a question to both of you. First, professor gavin you make a clean for humility. A hard question to answer. We have a room full of people want to know so how do you approach this subject . You do this for a living. You studied this issue deeply. How did you start to answer what is essentially an unanswerable question . For general kehler, i was taken with your description of the changes from the cold war and the present security environment. The world has seemed to become more complex a greater variety of threats and instruments. You also said Nuclear Weapons would only be used in extreme circumstances against military style targets when they are a vital National Security interest. That suggests to me that Nuclear Weapons are still reserved for great powers who can do the United States grave danger. If i am right and the conditions for use are that narrowly constrained then why dont we look for the cold war for lessons rather than trying to craft new strategies of deterrence . Mr. Gavin that is a terrific question. I certainly humility should not necessarily discourage somebody from curiosity. That is the first thing i say to all my students. My attitude towards this developed because as i started learning about these questions when i was their age i was an undergraduate at the university of chicago taking classes called things like strategies and armed control. The sort of very learned materials we read were from great scholars and thinkers that come from places like rand and important universities. Used incredibly sophisticated methods like game. To sort of explained what they thought should have happened given the consequences of the Nuclear Revolution. As i became a historian and look at records, i was surprised and stunned and humbled to find the gap between what the theorists thought should have happened and what policymakers actually did and how they wrestled with these questions. You take an extreme example someone like thomas schellings perhaps one of the most brilliant strategists of the nuclear age, the father of nuclear strategy. Someone whose writings were at the core of our understanding of deterrence the manipulation of risk. The way he described how policymakers should think about it in terms of how they should assess risks seemed completely different than the way policymakers thought about it. There was an example of a paper he wrote about during the berlin crisis where he essentially suggested the problem with Nuclear Weapons, you need to credibly show you can use them so one thing a president can do in a crisis was the fire one shot somewhere in the middle of the ukraine or russia to show the soviets we meant business. You get the impression this document was circulated around. No person in the right mind would ever think this way. The logic of Nuclear Weapons the level of response onsibility of using them you will not do a demonstration shot. What struck me was there is this gap between the way strategists and intellectuals thought about this question and the way many daytoday diplomacy and crises and management of International Relations intersected. They were much different. In fact, a few things became clear there was not one president with the possible exception of the who nixonof nixon. They found the burden of responseability terrible. They understood the deterrence. This palpable sense of responsibility but that it didwas beyond the thinking. That is not the way we learn about this. There were a series of things like that that may be realize it was one thing to talk about these things theoretically. It is quite another to talk about them as the president is thinking about using them. One of the best places you can get is listening to the president ial tapes, the kennedy tapes during the cuban missile crisis and afterwards. One gets the sense of the loneliness of president kennedy having to make this decision and how underhelpful much of the information he was getting. That is not the same they are not smart things that cannot be helpful. I think many people that write on the subject bomb iran, dont bomb iran, speak with a certainty that has no justification in historical record. That is not mean they were necessarily right but i think more humility would lead to a little more new wants to thinking nuanced thinking on questions of extraordinary importance. Gen. Kehler before i answer the question, let me piggyback with professor gavin here. Military people do not like them either. I think this is not about liking the weapons. This is about, at least, it has always been for me it is not about liking them, it is about understanding the world we live in has them and they have National Security implications for us. Therefore, weve learned how to do with them which does lead to the question so what does that mean now . I think it is a bit of the chicken and the egg discussion to say the cold war shaped Nuclear Weapons and vice versa. That is the old somebody used as a good hitting defeats good pitching and vice versa. There is something to that here as well. I do believe that the way we talk about them, the way our employment policies were written and disclosed i think the evolution of massive retaliation to flexible response. All of those things happened were uniquely suited to the cold war. And, as i tried to make the point, this is no longer a cold war world. So, im always a little bit leery when we tried to make it like the cold war. So, i think and understanding an understanding of what deterrence means in the 21st century is how we should use Nuclear Weapons a friend of mine says that i have read military friends that say we have never used them and in others you say we use it everyday. I come down on that side of the fence. I believe we use our weapons every single day. But, when we had the cold war with the soviet union, we viewed that as a monolith. We believe we understood how they made decisions. We believe we understood who made those decisions. Therefore, when we were trying to construct deterrence strategies, we thought we knew who we were trying to influence and what mattered to them. We need that kind of understanding for a far broader range of adversaries now or potential adversaries who. Who makes decisions in some of the places with the greatest unrest is . How do you deter them . What combination of things would deter them and how would Nuclear Weapons play in that combination . I think that is a different way of approaching our Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st century. It plays great difficulty with the Intelligence Community because if you go to the Intelligence Community and say i need to know who makes decisions in this place over here and how they make them and what they value the most, that is a tough problem. Entegris a long time to figure that out with the soviet union it took us a long time to figure that out with the soviet union. Be careful about talking with any certainty on any of these subjects. I believe that we have got to understand the world we are in now. This is a very different interNational Security environment that we have faced in the last century. In fact, the compelling Security Problems of the last century imperialism, fascism communism have largely been relegated to the history books. Some of it echoes a little bit but largely that is relegated to the history books. We have a different world today. To assume that we would be structuring our Nuclear Deterrent the same way we did during the cold war, i think it is a big mistake. Understanding this notion of tailored deterrence, what combination of factors will be the most effective in deterring any given country and then understanding that yes, u. S. Policy is that we will only consider using Nuclear Weapons in extreme circumstances when vital National Security interests are a stake. Does that limit the other Nuclear Powers provided in the Nuclear Posture review of 2010 . But, by the way, i think that is a worthy goal deterring nuclear use by those who have them. I think that is a worthy goal because we are sometimes sometimes we talk about the an enormous destructive potential in any individual one of our individual listed summaries Ballistic Missile submarines, unleashing the equivalent of world war ii out of one platform. That is only half of the description. The other half is you can do it in 30 minutes. These weapons are unlike any other weapons we have. As long as we have them, my view is we better understand how they fit in a grand strategy of deterrence that has to be tailored to individual actors in todays world. Mr. Avey we have time for q a. We have the microphone going out. You guest thank you, i really enjoyed the presentation, and general kehler, would you accept pretty much the same thing for a Rocks National interest of standpoint and how would you evaluate the Nuclear Posturing of the potential usage of the weapons, assuming that they would want to launch a strike against israel and the fallout that would inevitably follow . Gen. Kehler well, that is a complicated question, mr. Ambassador, i demand easier questions. [laughter] first of all, i dont know if i can speculate on what the iranians would say, but i think i read in the press that they basically said that they have considered acquiring them for their own National Security interests. And i dont know if they have made that decision, whether or not to acquire them. When i left the insight conversations a little over a year ago, i thought that they hadnt made their decision at the time. I can tell you what others would say, the russians have been pretty clear recently, and they see their Nuclear Deterrence as offsetting, not only our Nuclear Arsenal, but our conventional capabilities as well. They have been very concerned they have written about it since desert storm, as to what you can do conventionally, and they have got a name for it, and it is a marriage of satellite and aircraft which results in these strikes. So, i think these countries will pursue these weapons for their own National Security interests. And i think that is part of our deterrence, as being able to understand what those reasons are, and i not sure it is all very clear as to what those reasons are. Thank you, thank you very much for coming, this is a very stimulating panel. I am very interested in what you are saying, and one thing that is really concerning to me as a person who was born at the beginning of world war ii, is the terrorism content now that we have. We have had ask of terror all throughout civilization, but the kinds of terror that we see and the question that we always thought that no one would get on a plane and blow it up now is a that that blow it up, but now we see that that is not alwa ys true. Gen. Kehler i think that is a great question and it gets to the credibility of your deterrent. And one of the reasons that we have taken the position that says Nuclear Weapons need to be only one tool in a deterrent toolkit is because in some cases, i would argue our Nuclear Deterrent would not be a credible deterrent to deter certain acts. So how does our Nuclear Deterrent work today in the context of those kinds of threats, and the emergence, if you will of a very sophisticated and cultivated capabilities, how do we put all of those pieces together to put together an effective strategy . Once again, i would cite professor gavins point, there is not certainty, there is uncertainty. I will say that the threat of violence and violent extremists with Nuclear Weapons has been taken very seriously, and we can look at other policy documents not only from this administration, but from several administrations, that move that to the top of the agenda. That drives the nonproliferation efforts, which i think are worthy efforts. I think arms control is at least attached to that in some way, in terms of securing Nuclear Material, and we take that challenge seriously. How do we get the right mixture of deterrence factors together and capabilities and that is a very good question, and it is one has caused a lot of my colleagues a lot of grief. I would like to piggyback off of that question and ask you both to comment on the likelihood of a nonstate actor or terrorists actually getting a hold of Nuclear Material and how they might do that and if that is likely, i guess my question would be, can you talk about some of the regimes regimes and how they would act with that kind of material . Where might we be worried that nonstate actors and terrorists could obtain this . Prof. Gavin it strikes me, and what general kehler says is absolutely right, and is is from the outside as an absolute success, and it is a great concern, particularly after the september 11 attacks, and it is striking, at least to an outsider, how many in National Security initiatives, how much cooperation there has been on the International Front to deal with this absolutely critical issue. I do think there was a. Of time i do think there was a period of time after 9 11 when perhaps the threat was overstated, and i think partially the threat was overstated, and partially there has been a policy in the Intelligence International cooperation that clearly has to be the most important thing that you have to worry about. The obvious places and problems that you would worry about would be korea selling things, pakistan collapsing, and it is scary the kind of things we think about, and none of the initiatives seem to have done a very good job at making this far less than problem, but certainly i imagine this would be a priority of any administration. Gen. Kehler and i agree with that completely. This is probably a double negative. This will never not be a concern. [laughter] [indiscernible] gen. Kehler this is one of the things that the academic policy divide is at its greatest because moderator prof. Gavin this is one of the things of the things that the academic policy divide is at its greatest. If you talk to any policymaker there are few that you run into that dont say this is on the top of their list of things to worry about. If you go to an academic conference, most of my colleagues and josh bosch colleagues says this is not a likely event, and certainly the risks are lower than they were during the cold war, but i have come to the conclusion that that is not really helping very much if you are a policymaker, even if it is a low probability, the catastrophic consequences still mean you have to spend and a normal amount an abnormal amount of time thinking about it. Gen. Kehler the risk is so great that we cannot ever take that from its right place, and that is from the top of the agenda. A lot of work has been done and a lot of work is going on now there are a lot of people who get up every day and get up every night and worry about this problem, and rightfully so. It is one that i dont believe we can ever take our focus off of for a minute. Audience member it seems like in the conversation, there seems to be discussion of russias threats, and how likely is it that they would use Nuclear Weapons, and [indiscernible] weapons of mass destruction. [indiscernible] gen. Kehler it definitely factors in, it definitely factors in. If you go back to, 2002, i think i might have the date wrong, every president has talked about deploying Nuclear Weapons for our safetyss sake. Safetys sake. There was this one gift to congress as a result of president obamas Nuclear Deployment plans and it specifically, in the unclassified realm it specifically mentions this possibility and potential for a small and limited use of part of a regional conflict, and so it is a planning problem that the military has to deal with, it is one that also occupies a lot of deterrence thinking, certainly in my former command and Strategic Command and certainly in the regional combatant commands as well, there is a lot of thought that goes into how we would make sure that we would never get to that point, how would we make sure that we could manage a crisis so that eventuality does not come attractive, and at the end of the day this is really about deterring a kind of use and making sure, as i said earlier understanding what would compel an adversary to do that, who would make these decisions, how would we use the right competition of deterrence tools to make sure that that could not happen, but yes it is a planning problem for us, something again, that the report from Congress Said that the possibility that the likelihood of a massive exchange had preceded, so we still have to be prepared for that as well because the deterrence aspects of that, but i think there is a recognition that we have listened to the russians to talk about their new doctrine and part of their doctrine is that perhaps we should use of Nuclear Weapons early instead of rather than late. [indiscernible] gen. Kehler no i would not want to go speculate on that. Other than i would say, i think my job certainly as a head of a Strategic Command is to make should the president has all the options. I was wondering if [indiscernible] you could mention [indiscernible] and you said so much on the war on terror, and [indiscernible] how close we are to terrorist attacks, we are spending more on the war on terror than anything else . Gen. Kehler you have asked in another asked another very difficult question, and it is about priorities. You know again the statistics of whether or not he will be the subject of a terrorist attack is only part of the story. The issue is that when it occurs we have people who are killed or injured and we look at the Boston Marathon as an example. As a terrible event in a terrible tragedy. And so doing everything that we can possibly do to make sure that that does not happen, i think belongs in the top priority where it is. I do think, though, and as i said in my talk, it is not the only priority that we have to worry about, and it is not the only National Security priority that we have to be can earn about. That balance is going on every day in the pentagon and certainly we have seen in the press room over the last couple of days were congress is debating this very issue in the budget debate that they are having about the budget of defense and whether to exceed the budget cap amounts, that is the ongoing question right now the need to do many things at once and the question is, how do we pay for that . Why do we still maintain our economic strength, which is part of National Security as well . Audience member i would like to pose a question to [indiscernible] , and it seems that we should just worry about the position of Nuclear Weapons, and how do we respond to the argument of the use of Nuclear Weapons when we dont have to worry about [indiscernible] . Prof. Gavin that is a very interesting question, because most of our Academic Studies focus on proliferation once these weapons are out, and who wants them and very rarely, it is the question of what people will do when they have them. As you know, there is a lot of argument about this, and how you as a that question depends very much on how you think about Nuclear Weapons. There is a large body of thought that things that Nuclear Weapons are not very good at getting defense. You cant take territory with them. They are very bad offensive weapons. They are good defensive weapons. When a state wants them, so the argument goes, it would be to prevent others from interfering in their lives. If that were the argument, then one might say, well i dont really have to worry about them all that much. Some states might want them to prevent the United States from interfering in their business, and i inc. That some i think that some analysts say that that is one way of looking at this and others say no, Nuclear Weapons might embolden leaders they might encourage them to engage in blackmail, to manipulate the inherent uncertainty of the situation. One of the things as i look act to khrushchev of the late 50s, he had far less Nuclear Weapons than the United States, yet he was willing to engage in a incredibly risky behavior, and if one looks closely, you can see one making the calculation that the United States would be responsible and back down, because it using Nuclear Weapons is so terrifying. Leaving Nuclear Weapons in certain hands, you can exploit peoples responsibility to get what you want. This is something that congress shelley did congressman shelley did point out. He thought that they would get the United States to back down and get berlin, and then his advisor said, what if they dont . That is absolutely terrifying. There is to completely different arguments are. And how you arguments here. And how you answer that seems fairly clear, that if you are a state like france with a status quo power, you got your weapons, and you probably want them for your own deterrent purposes, that is why sweden wanted them, that is why australia wanted them, and there are other countries like north korea where it is not clear if they just want them for these deterrent purposes. Now this Debate Centers around iran. If you think iran just want them for deterrent purposes, well we would prefer them not to have it but it is not the end of the world. If they have them, with a behavior like wish you have would they behave more like khrushchev or like north korea . I am of the belief that they would have the more for deterrent purposes, again, one cant know. But that is how the argument divides. You are absolutely right though i take these things are used even when they are not used, and how they are used and how they are threatened, whether used for blackmail, coercion, is what makes them so terrifying. High, i have a couple of questions, hi, i have a couple of questions, in regards to the boston bombing. How would Nuclear Weapons deter acts such as the Boston Marathon bombing, that would be my first question, and the second question is you are speaking about the importance of holding up our Nuclear Arsenal and are we modernizing its, and how can we compete and arms race . Gen. Kehler i will take a stab at both of those. There is a question whether Nuclear Weapons would deter someone from doing the Boston Marathon bombing, and i think that gets to my point, and my point is in the 21st century with a variety of security situations that we are as, i think understanding how Nuclear Weapons play in our overall deterrence calculation is very important, and there is a lot of work that still needs to be done in that regard, i think because we find ourselves in this very interesting and very challenging and very unique time in World History regarding National Security. I think it is hard to know, though sometimes, who is deterred from doing what by what . I think that its hard to know, perhaps, lets put it that way taking a play from professor gavin from earlier, it is hard to know where theyre these Nuclear Weapons do play a factor. There are some places where they probably do, in this new security environment beyond just the traditional sense that we have had. I think that requires a lot of academic work, to tell you the truth. I have made that appeal before at academic institutions like this, and i think that is one of the reasons that i have wanted to come, is to stimulate conversation in places like this and you will take this and have these conversations and look at this with an academic sense and it is very valuable and i think very necessary. In the second question regarding the arms race, i did we are in a different position. It does not mean you cannot have another Nuclear Arms Race somehow, and i am disturbed when parties say they are going to walk away from treaties. I think the inf treaty, in my view, this is my personal view i think the arms control treaties because they have been done in a mutual way and they have been largely verifiable, i think they have enhanced our security. And so i am in favor of enhancing our security in whatever way we can do and i think arms control has a piece of that, and so i think it is a little bit of a different environment today than we were in the cold war, but modernization, in and of itself, does not, in my view, stimulate a new arms race. We are doing that modernization within a box these days. We have a policy box that we are operating in that needs to be selfimposed, and that policy box describes how we will go about doing life extensions on our existing weapons, not build new weapons, but rely on existing weapons, and i think because we are in the new start era, we have a box in which we have limits and numbers that we cant exceed, and i think that puts a number puts another layer of control, if you will, in the arms race. I have inc. The economic limiters i think the economic limiters could factor into what we do, but in the three points of the strategic triad, we can see that a Nuclear Submarine would not be saved to put in the ocean. Submarine tubes can only go up so many times and then you have to build a new tube. That is the way it works. I am not a navy guy and i am not a tech guy, but i believe that when they say that. When we look for a replacement bomber, it is actually more of a dual capable platform. So the kind of platform that we would use in the conventional sense, like we would use the be52 b52s, we used them as a conventional bomber, and that is how we see the conventional world out there, and that just a need for a long range, penetrating platform. We would need that bomber even if for some reason we said it was not going to be nuclear we would need that bomber because the range, the payload the distance, we would be concerned about these things. I think we still get great benefit out of the icbm force and doing the appropriate and modern upgrades their is important, and we find ourselves needing to invest while you have a chance of declining budgets. Honestly, i am glad i am not in a decisionmaking process anymore. [laughter] even though i was there, i am no longer a part of it. Audience member i wanted to know, keeping in mind that, can you see me . Gen. Kehler i can see you now. [laughter] audience member in terms of modern terrorism, and recruiting a lot of the guys that want to attack and some were thinking about the u. S. As being one of the largest arms transporters and where these stockpiles are taken, and then, i start thinking about, you know, how much does corporatism influence policy . To an increasing amount, i would say . I would like to know either or both of your reactions, and if it is feasible to limit our exporting as far as getting these corporations to get these out here, and as far as the frustration and experience of the members of a critically larger construct, what is your response to that, and we can take it which other whichever way. Prof. Gavin that is such a great question gen. Kehler that is such a great question for a professor. [laughter] prof. Gavin and i would say that is a great question for a general. [laughter] there is the first part, and that is the discussion of corporate interest in u. S. National policy, and this is one of the subjects that i think i find almost no evidence that any major National Security decision was influenced by the desire to make money or to satisfy a corporation, and i think this is one of the great mythologies of Foreign Policy, so i would be open to it if i saw one of the documents, but i think i have been struck, and i does not it does not mean that mistakes cant be made or even things that get downright morally problematic, but i have had very little example of National Security leaders of saying well, in an ideal world we would not do this, that Lockheed Martin wants us to do this, so we had better. I have never seen documents about this, so it is kind of you know, a pleasant trotsky esque trope, but i dont think it exists. I think that one of the many tools regarding National Security decisionmakers is to have and provide arms and weapons and support to their allies and at times, those arms have gotten and been used, perhaps not for the test purposes or have fallen into the bad hands of others. This is a completely rigid the this is a completely legitimate critique as to whether these export policies have been ineffective and wise. There have been cases where it has been, and there have been cases where it has not been, and someti very deep understanding of who they are who decides, all of those things. We did not know that in the cold war. This is an equal challenge today although they have some tremendous tools to try to understand these things. I think one of the interesting things is what is available in open source. The vanilla twitter is. I dont even know what twitter is. There is a tremendous we are awash of information out there that nobody had to go collect covertly. There is a lot of information out there. How do we use it, understand what is in it . All of those things are big challenges for everyone in the Intelligence Community. I think they do a remarkable job. And, i do think this need to approach something called tailored insurance is putting even greater demand single on them that requires them to establish priorities just like everyone else. We cant do everything at once all the time, unfortunately but we cant. The United States brings to bear on these things it is about priorities and choices. I was pretty confident we were getting a handle on a number of these tailored deterrence ideas in various places. I thought we were not starting at zero. Like any military commander, i always wanted more intelligence. Then we put it pretty big demand signal on them. I have two questions. [indiscernible] are there any citizens that are antinuclear . That can neutralize [indiscernible] or can accelerate the rate of [indiscernible] 100 years to the effort. Im not aware of anything to provide a defense against a Nuclear Armed missile, for example, other than missiledefense. Im not aware of any other that doesnt mean there is not somebody doing something somewhere but i am not aware of anything that would would a nuclear bb to deal with Nuclear Weapons. China does not have a large arsenal. The arsenal they have, which they have always shriveled the public shropshire the public doctrine, they would never have first used. I have not been paying a great deal of attention to that part of china over the last six months or so. So, my view is they have a capable force in terms of size. It is not a huge force. They are modernizing their force. They are taking their missiles and theyre making them mobile. That combined with the very expensive fixed thenexte nsive underground movement makes that a very difficult problem because i think they have looked atto be survivable in a think they can survive. They have taken some, what they believe, steps that they need to take. They are going to feel the Ballistic Missile submarine. That will be interesting how they operate that. Will always be at sea . How did they intend to use that platform . I think that will open a lot of questions. Before i retired, we were trying to work through Pacific Command and other engagements that were begining held to make sure we can understand better. I would like to see more transparency with the chinese and a Nuclear Force because i think one thing that arms control data between the United States and the soviet union and russia was, it allowed us to do a have a good feel of how they operate, secure their weapons, what their safeguards were. All these kinds of things that is a military commander made me more comfortable if i knew those things about the chinese. I believe, in listening to my colleagues, that is still the request, they would like to know more about them so that we could share information and not have a lot of uncertainty between us. I think that helps with stability. I have one question. The reason we have the cold war was economics. How does that play a factorin for nuclear with china, they are developing their nuclear arms. They may be could overtake us in 10 or 20 years so if they fall the soviet union fell because their economics were not working. How does play economics play a factor . The second question we know Nuclear Weapons what is the minimum structural Nuclear Weapons . 14,000 in the world. What is the minimum threshold for the u. S. . It is to live it turned but it is met deterrent but it is still maintained. Gov. Prof. Gavin internet economic opponent but at a strong geopolitical competition over the future of both western europe and east asia and also any ideological competition. Nuclear weapons are in this competition. I think, as you pointed out there are many areas of competition, but there are also many areas of interdependence. Written large