Get that information. And that is the overarching order that goes to the company. And complied with taskings. That asked my colleagues. The statutory term. And operational term to refer to Something Like an email or phone number, Legal Process, tasking being internal government terms for how you started the collection on a particular sector. Building on that what is the rationale for collections . If the target is the email account or the phone number, what is the justification for gathering communications between two persons who were discussing the phone number or email address, there is no to or from their email address or phone number. Why is that targeting permissible under the statute . The conclusion in a typical case, if you are targeting bad guy google. Com, you are targeting that persons account, their communications. It is not necessarily communication to or from that bad guy but that selector and so what the court has concluded is when the statute uses the term targeting a person overseas, targeting that selector qualifies under the statute for targeting nonu. S. Person overseas so it doesnt have to be targeting to or from but can target communication about that particular selector. The meeting of target earlier where you are focusing on an account and now you are discussing targeting discussion about that account to that is that selector. Is always focused on that account. The key is the misperceptions some may have that about collection, somehow about a keyword or persons that may be behind that account but all collection, section 702 whether it is upstream, a balance which is a subset of upstream or prism, based on the selectors of issue. My time is expired. Following your own rules. Just a followup on that, a good lighting query to make sure everyone understands, so you are saying if someone is emailing about rachel brand or explosives, that would not be a permissible about query under your explanation . I would like you could perhaps get it about rachel brand this is an issue all of us, clarify query in from collection, we are discussing now the collection of information, the collection of information, all collection of information is based, focused on selectors, not keywords like terrorist or a a generic name along those lines. And the same selectors used for the Prison Program are used for collection. Just a different way to effectuate the collection. Part of a large part of the function of these hearings is public education, function, i thought david ask questions were great, meaning different terms and i am glad you are willing to bear with us asking about questions we have already discussed in private but it is hopeful for everyone to understand why we are talking about and along those lines there was some discussion about purging data that doesnt turn out to be for an intelligence information. Can you explain how on the front end you implement the requirement that the target, nonu. S. Person reasonably believed to be abroad that you get for an intelligence information through the collection, a separate statutory requirement. How do you go about collecting that type of information . In our early discussion we switched to foreign determination that that is a seconds that. Has to be a reason one actually wants to collect intelligence in the first place and then have to get to this type of question permitted in the statute so it has to be about 4 intelligence to be in that collection but beyond that it has to be about 4 intelligence within one of the certifications approved annually. Certifications on things like counterterrorism, encountering wm ds, weapons of mass destruction. When an analyst needs to make a determination as to be valid for intelligence purpose for which they want to effectuate collection they have to document that. That is documented in a targeting rationale document, those are also reviewed by the Justice Department and director of National Intelligence every 60 days. An important point for non u. S. Persons, think about once you conclude a nonu. S. Person overseas and you collect everyone, that is not the case. Is targeted not only based on the identity of the person and the location of the person but that you are trying to get foreign intelligence sell it is an important protection in the statute designed for non u. S. Purchases. And not blanket collection for nonu. S. Persons overseas the only people on foreign intelligence targets. Growing up in that account, that will give you back information that is foreign intelligence like terrorism or proliferation or whatever it might be. What can you tell us in an unclassified setting about documentation of foreign intelligence or oversight . We talked a little bit about that. Can you give us anything more specific. They have to document that at nsa and essentially, tasking sheet and on that sheet they are documenting for intelligence purposes that they are trying to pursue by going after a party and a target and those are reviewed with foreign determination by the department of justice. For every selector. A review that rajesh de mentioned is under 30 days under these decisions you should say, foreign intelligence and foreign determination. The broader context, if the question is getting at the process within which that happened even before that happened we had training for analysts as to how they should document this material, we have audits in our databases, comprehensive compliance program, spot check within nsa prior to the 60 day review by the department of justice and quarterly reports about compliance to the program, semiannual reports to congress and annual Inspector General assessment, annual certification process. Those decisions are granular aspect of the program and conducted in the context of this broader regime. I see that my time just ran out. I wanted to ask one additional question about, can you do about collection through prism . No. Is limited to upstream. Prism is a collection to or from. To a separate topic, one of the things i have found concerning and frustrating through the process of our evaluation of programs is how do those articulate the advocacy of these programs, you had begun speaking about this in your prepared remarks. I would like to ask a couple of questions. One, how do you assess the advocacy of a particular program . How do you think we should be affecting the advocacy of a particular program . And it is not really a question but a comment which is please dont give me series of Success Stories and say that is how you advocate advocacy because that is an initial response from the government often in response to a question either from a body like ours or from the media. How do you assess the advocacy of the program . How periodically do you do so . How would you encourage us to assess the advocacy . Let me start on that and i will start by saying i completely agree with you that sort of individual Success Stories are not the way to evaluate Collection Program and utility. They way you evaluate Collection Programs is going to depend in part on what the particular program is for. Insists case we have, in fact, the director of National Intelligence has attempted part of our job is to try to determine resources are effectively allocated in the Intelligence Community budget so we have done studies to try to look at okay, what are our collection priorities, how much reporting is generated on these priorities and where do those reports come from . What collections force can we identify . And that is one of the ways we determine sections 702 is relevant. Another is by looking at the sheer nature of the information that we get and its utility to a whole variety of national priorities, that is a more impressionistic approach and yet you can see time and again, important intelligence reports provided to policymakers derived from section 702 so those are two ways that i would look at estimating the value of a particular collection. With respect to this program or any program i think intelligence professionals will tell you any tool must be evaluated in the context of the other tools for which it is utilized. All intelligence tools are used in a complementary fashion to isolate one particular tool and evaluate the second in isolation doesnt do us justice for what is valuable or what is not. It also depends on the type of tool. Different intelligence programs are used for different purposes. A program like section 702 is used for difficult purposes and the metadata program, one may be a discovery tool to provide more specific collection and others may be used as in fact the specific election that follows that. I think you really in order to understand whether its effective and useful you have to think about what your goals are with respect to this particular program and the goals for this program like many other programs are to obtain i think timely, accurate, informative, foreign intelligence information about the capabilities, plans, intentions of foreign powers, agents, actors and so on and so forth. Really what your talking about is i think developing a good metric to understand whether this program is worth all of the costs associated with it. So i think you would want to look at the amount of information that we acquire but also then the quality of it, how good it is. I think you can slice that a lot of different ways at my colleagues have suggested. I think thats what i would recommend you be focused on but because this is a broadbased foreign intelligence Collection Program you have to look at not only, you to look at counterterrorism but look more broadly than that because this program is not limited just to counterterrorism. I agree. I think the one point i should e behind having some clauses of there is programs is that when the statutory provisions expire, after the two the king program twice in the last two years as well as 702, congress undertakes anybody wishing of the effectiveness ofthe programs. I fully agree that it is an effective and Important Program and i really want to emphasize the last point you made, this program should not be considered still with the counterterrorist program. The program has significant and exceedingly important utility in areas outside of counterterrorism. Trying to clear up another issue. In terms of the participation of service providers, the awareness of service providers, the 702 implementation, is 702 implemented, all seven of the invitation is done with the full knowledge and assistance of any company from which information is attained, is that correct . Yes. The answer to that is yes. So early on in the debate, there were some statements by companies who may or may not have been involved in the program say we never heard of prism, but whether they ever heard of prism, any company that was from whom information was being obtained under 702 knew that he was being obtained. Spent correct the prison is just an interim government term that is result of the leaks became a public term but collection under this program was done consume a pursuant to Legal Process. And so they know that their data is being obtained . They would receive Legal Process in order to assess assist the government. One thing i read in one of the statements is under 702, you could target entire countries or regions are is that correct . So all collection under 702 is based on specific selectors, things like phone numbers or email addresses. It is not a bulk Collection Program. A selector would not be an entire area code . Correct. Going down to the constitutional oh, one other set of questions. Even ive lost track now of what youve already said youre versus what you said elsewhere, but in terms of where you make a determination that a person is, a nonu. S. Person outside, and then you later discover that that was good faith, wrong, the person was in the United States, or the person was a u. S. Person, and do you track that quacks and what do you do when you discover that, and how often do you discover im not saying about bashing im talking just about we thought he was outside the United States and that was just wrong. Or you thought he was a nonu. S. Person and that was just wrong. How often does that occur . Ill defer to brad on the sort of overarching review but if i could make a point about what happens. Yes, we keep track of every time the information comes to our attention to suggest that a prior intelligence evaluation was incorrect even if it had met the legal stupid every such instance is a matter of compliance matter that has to be reported to the disk and ultimately semiannual reports reported to the congress. And third disc. That such an progress encouraging progress by which information they should not have been collected it had not met ththe legal standards needed for some nsa systems. I think brad can speak to the level of accuracy. The item is the past and the information is perched. Suggested us to begin between two different types of blinds compliance issues. One is the rome example you mentioned to lets say were up on a cell phone that we believe belongs to a bad guy was outside United States, a foreign person. Then that person shows up in chicago. When that happens we ask the cell phone, that means we no longer collect communications at the complaint its that thats reported but its not an erroneous determination based on the movement of the individual. So putting those cases aside, in ca get it wrong, we think the email account with a focus located overseas but it turns out thats wrong or it turns out we think its a nonu. S. Person but it is a u. S. Person, we review every single one. Our review, as i mentioned, we think it is less than one in 1000 cases where they make that determination erroneously. It probably bears repeating, its not a one thing done so there is an obligation for analysts to reaffirm the foreign determination on a periodic basis, which contribute to the ability to make sure that determination is, in fact, fresh and current which, of course, introduce the accuracy of that determination. Going to the constitutional issues, the fisa court has determined, and they must determine every year that the program is being emulated consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the 31st time they determined that, there was an opinion the very first time they determined that, and i write, not yet public . I think thats correct. Isnt that a good candidate for declassification . We have a lot of good candidates for declassification. In all seriousness, we are there are a lot of documents that we have that we are reviewing for declassification that includes not only fisa Court Opinion but whole variety of other documents. Fisa court in 2008 when the less considered the constitutionality of the program, the predecessor to 702, the court issued a redacted but largely unclassified opinion conducting a relatively full Fourth Amendment analysis. And theres been some Fourth Amendment analysis conducted in this situation. And if youre sort of talking about, you know, the Rosetta Stone kind of document, then the very first Court Opinion should have been the most fulsome explanation of the constitutionality of the program. And i think, i mean i hear bob saying theres a lot of opinions out there, but to me this one seems to be one that would explicate at least one courts judgment on this because its been the basis of all, i assume all the rest of said nothing has changed that would merit us to reconsider our very first judgment . I think its among the opinions we are committed to reviewing all of the opinions on the fisa court to determine which ones can be declassified in redacted form to imagine this would be among those that are reviewed. So absolutely. It will be among the opinions that will be reviewed. I dont want to leave folks with any mysterious impression. I think the board has access to anything so should have to assume anything about subsequent opinions. The board in fact has reviewed everything. I just dont want what i can be an unfortunate consequence would be for folks to take weight impression that theres a mysterious opinion that its a secret analysis. And i dont think thats the case but i dont think you suggest that. The board has access but i think the question, the public should have access is part of the debate. Just one other thing to add on that. 702 collection is now been challenged by a number of criminal defendants. 702 information is being used against some of the cases so we will be filing public breeze and we can expect samore decisions in that area as well. Public briefs. Thats the way the cost and jolly of 702 will be on the Public Record, the opinions on it and the breeze and everything will now be in that record. Judge wald. My hope and under what substantive criteria is the initial decision to use a u. S. Person selector for searching the prism base, who decides lets do that, whats the substantive criteria on which they make it quick you dont have to go into the review process. I know the decision will be reviewed up and down. How does that get made . Whats the substantive basis . I can speak for nsa, particulates be just to clarify, that means if it goes to one of the other agencies, not nsa or cia or fbi, they make their own substantive decisions for query speak with yes. The 702 program is one that all agencies operate on their own and have their own minimization procedures which would address topics like searches. Nsa procedures in this regard, in his element have been made public. And so the standard in such a query needs to be briefly likely to return foreign intelligence information speak and who isnt made by initial . Made by the analyst. The analyst is working on that particular case, okay. My other question is, the president did, i understand did direct that there be some changes in the treatment of nonu. S. Persons asked to the limits on and retention of the data to bring them more in line with those of u. S. Persons, incidentally. Where there is no foreign intelligence value. Can you tell us a little more specifically, if anything has been done in that regard, or it is being contemplated, the city, 702 . So i think first of all its important to understand the point that somebody may have been bred made earlier, which is that there are already protections to some degree built into the system, protections for nonu. S. Persons are not as great as those for u. S. Persons because u. S. Persons are protected by the Fourth Amendment. But there is a requirement that we can target a selector unless we have reason to believe its a foreign intelligence value. And theyre sort of a general principle that intelligence agencies, their job is to collect, analyze and disseminate foreign intelligence information, not random information. I think what the president has directed us to go back and look at our procedures, not only with respect to 702 but with intelligence in general, assess whether the extent to which its possible to provide limitations on collection, retention and dissemination that more closely track those for u. S. Persons. For example, executive order 12333 provide specific categories of personal information about u. S. Persons again appropriate be retained and disseminated. Theres a list of them in executive order 12333 and the president has asked that we assess whether we can apply the same sorts of rules to personal identifiable information of nonu. S. Persons. Right now if you get incidental information about a foreign person in the course of targeting another foreign person, and you look at it, do you use the same criteria and look at the same review and say, well, you know, he was talking to his grandmother or something, there isnt any foreign intelligence their and you purge it . Anytime theres not foreign intelligence value to collecti collection, by definition, it would be purged. I think an important point to be made, as you articulate, judge, incidental collection just to explain the term a little bit, all communications have to end. One is the target and the other is presumably not a target. We dont know. One doesnt know exante. And so by definition there would be incidental collection of nonu. S. Persons as was the u. S. Person. Historically constitutional protections have only applied to u. S. Persons. Can i make a comment about that . Quickly. I found a very provocative when youre answering elisebeth question but if youre going to assess the efficacy of the program, you look at it in terms of the efficacy and the holistic view of all of the programs. I guess its inevitable that i would ask the question but how can anybody except you people do that . Because so many other programs, i think, are just unknown even to the fisa court. They are not all fisa supervis supervised. And serving the outside world doesnt know about many of them. So, you know, how in effect outside assessment be made . If i could address in response to my comment. Certainly i think i would not suggest there should be a public violation of all intelligence programs. I think, for example, this board has access to information about counterterrorism programs and so i would expect any if i wish will be in the context of the other cd programs. With congress as i mentioned they read by the programs that are periodically and i think the Public Record that indicates that there is a fairly Robust Exchange between the executive branch and the legislative branch on a variety of programs. And so i think thats where traditionally the violation has occurred. I was just going to say that weve managed, weve set the balance between Public Disclosure and the need for secrecy by empowering the congressional intelligence committees. We are required by statute to keep them informed of intelligence activities, and we do. They know about these programs, and they have the opportunity to evaluate them. And they do. In fact, they pass an intelligence authorization act that includes a lengthy classified annex that is a prescriptive with respect both reports that requires of us and direction as to what, where we should be spending our money. So that is the external oversight and the way we said okay, we need a oversight of these but they still need remain classified. Did you want to finish a vieu on foreign intelligence because i had several points but i think even in addition to congress having oversight, the course in certain circumstances, and then also the president and all executive branch officials. We have an obligation to make sure that in addition to adhering to the law, taking to the laws, to spend our time and our money on programs that are effective and not be wasting our time of things that are not. That flows from the president to the dni, attorney general, director of the nsa and so. We should be focused on things that are useful and collecting information that produces the kind of intelligence information i was talking about before. The other, i want to make was with respect to fbi. Our personal only have access to the databases when they would have received the proper training with appropriate oversight. And operating consistent with the approved Standard Administration procedures when theyre doing their query activity. I wanted to shift to a different subject, attorneyclient privilege. There was some press reports a couple weeks ago about collection information that may involve attorneyclient communications. I want to focus particularly on the minimization procedures which i understand you exclude attorneyclient communication only in a very narrow context where the client is under criminal indictment in the United States. I guess they saw federal, indictment. That seems like a very narrow interpretation of attorneyclient privilege. I want to see if that is the interpretation you apply. And if it is, what impact they will be it was expanded to more normally accepted definition of attorneyclient privilege which is basically lawyers and clients consulting with each other. We written a letter to the aba and i commend the to the court and to the public. I think the public letter now but i think one fundamental premise is that analysts are under an obligation to identify for the office of general counsel anytime they encounter something that may be potentially privilege. And i think all of us who are lawyers think that encompasses everyone up on the stage knows, just because a committee patient is with cable or does not means it is, in fact, a privileged to mutation. So its helpful to have a lawyer to determine that. While i cant speak to any particular instance thats been written and the press, i think theres a couple of big picture points that are worth making. One is our office has historically provided a range of advice to minimize the extent possible the collection of attorney privilege material. Privilege just whether its a criminal indictment or beyond the criminal. The point im trying to make is that while there may be a specific provision in the 702 procedure that addresses the criminal context, there is a reason why we ask analysts to consult counsel because the vice can often be carried to the specifics of the circumstance. Far outside the criminal realm. Recognizing the import of attorneyclient College Material iencountered even outside of the criminal content. I want to talk about reverse targeting where you target someone overseas, potentially with the view of collecting information about the u. S. Person in the United States. May be somewhat technical point but there seems to be a quirk in the statute. It says that you can target people reasonably to be outside the United States. You cannot reverse a target some outside the United States for the purpose to target a particular known person reasonably believed to be in the United States your does that permit targeting of persons outside the United States with the intent of getting information about u. S. Persons not in the United States . No. Why not . Theres a separate provision that bars targeting u. S. Persons outside the United States. So if you were doing that, you were trying to target a u. S. Person outside the United States, you couldnt do that spin reverse targeting procedure i dont know if youd call that reverse targeting. There is another statutory provision under 702. Spent on the talking, i agree, you can target a u. S. Person outside attorney. But what if i find a nonu. S. Person i know is intimidation with the u. S. Person is also outside the United States . Is that permissible . No. Because . Because you would be targeting, if your real purpose is to target u. S. Person come your targeting that person. Reverse targeting is in your do the same as targeting . Well, i mean, i think reverse targeting is a geographic issue essentially when your targeting lets see of a legitimate target overseas but you really want communications of u. S. Person or nonu. S. Person inside the United States by the statute says you cant do that right. I was explaining, if you have come together to his person your interest in overseas, you can use 702 to targeting either and you know that u. S. Person is intimidation with a nonu. S. Person both of whom are overseas. Could you target the nonu. S. Person to get the u. S. Persons communicate and . You coul couldnt for that pe but if that person is a target your interest in the to mutation, sure, you can target that person. Thats okay. I would consider that reverse targeting but you dont have that legitimate target. I dont know if that answered your question. David, i dont want to take the time but take a look at section 704 and that made kind of address the concern youre focused on. Or hats but perhaps not. I want to get back to the efficacy as a an art charge absolute about putting National Security and privacy and civil liberties. Followinfalling upon ms. Cooks question, sorry, ill hold out for the next round. Wanted to go back to upstream collection a little bit. Ive seen some statements in the Public Domain about the volume of upstream collection, visavis the volume of prison collection. What can you tell us in a public setting about that . I think the best publicly available information is from the october 11201 11th 2011 opin that is now been declassified in which it was a rough estimate their, ma forgive me for not precise but about 10 of collection is upstream. On the order of magnitude. Okay. So you said in an earlier round of questioning that upstream collection from upstream is held for a short time than prison. He said the reason for the distinction is potentially greater Privacy Concern with respect to upstream collection. Can you elaborate on why, what are the additional Privacy Concerns that pertain to a chip . A lot of this is laid out in this Court Opinion that is now public. This is from the fall 2011. I think because of the nature of a balanced collection which we have discussed it is potentially a greater likelihood of implicating into the u. S. Person, or inadvertently collecting holy domestic indications that differ must be purged. For a variety of circumstances, the court the valley would the minimization procedures we have in place and as a consequence of that evaluation, government put forth a shorter retention period to ensure that the court could reach cover with the compliance of this prestigious with the Fourth Amendment. So two years as one element of the revised procedures that are now public. From what you just said, if using a legitimately tasked about term, a holy domestic communication is collected, it has to be purchased . If one recognizes that yes, yes. Spent even if it has that are specific and awful top my head i can expand on the particular exceptions in the minimization procedures but there are and elaborate set of detailed procedures that are now public that discuss how upstream collection must be treated in order to account for this concern. It has things like data must be segregated in certain ways where the risk of collecting the collection is not. Theres a shorter retention period. Holy domestic indications are not permitted under the statute so, therefore, the default role, yes, must be purged. I wanted to use the word collection there again. Your definition earlier seem to be that by incidental you mean come by incidental u. S. Person collection, you mean that the person on the other end of the phone from the nonu. S. Person abroad is a u. S. Person. Thats your definition . Is there another definition you are aware . I think theres been some frustration with the use of the term incidental in that context. Because its not accidental. Its intentional. Its unavoidable. So i just want to make sure that were all on the same page, by incidental you mean not accidental, not unintentional but this is actually what were doing . It is incidental to the collection on the target. It is not accidental. It is not inadvertent. Incidental is the appropriate term for it. I would say that term is been used far beyond this program and historically so thats a judgment intended. Its just a term that is used. Okay, okay. Ill hold questions for another round. Following up on davids question. I think it goes to a broader point which is theres a perception that this statute is fairly complicated. Theres got to be loopholes or idiosyncrasies in there somewhere but let me just ask you, would it be the view of the United States government that it is appropriate to use 702 to intentionally target u. S. Persons whether directly or through reverse targeting, whether theyre inside the United States are outside the United States . No. That is not permissible. I wanted to also follow up on a question about the about. And i apologize. Again, just for folks understanding, we spent six and half hours talking with folks about just the oversight mechanisms in place and were unable to get through that entire conversation. So i apologize if you have said this before or today. The collection methods, procedures that you use with respect to about, those procedures, are the approved by the fisa court . Yes. Are those transparent to congress . Yes. I think we havent necessarily started to allude to this but can you talk a little bit about how, your impression of how the Intel Committee in particular view their obligations with respect to oversight of your programs and whether you have found that to be pro forma or in any way lacking . And let the record reflect, not quite i roll but i think the response was no, they have not found this to be pro forma in anyway. Ive been on this job now getting on towards five years, and i have done nothing about my interaction or our institutional interaction with the intelligence committees to be pro forma. They have fairly substantial staffs which have a lot of experience. Some of them come from the community. They know that they dig very deeply into what we do. The dni occasionally using the term wire brushing, the interaction we have with the committee. So its not a pro forma interaction in anyway. On programs like 702 that were talking about today, for example, we all lived through the reauthorization of section 702 in 2012. That process was not simply in connection with intelligence committees, but i can remember briefings where we would go up, for all member briefings being held in communities, committees would host before the congress. I dont want to leave the impression that its only with this committee. Particularly for program like 702 that needs be voted on by all members of congress on the basis of the contact clause. I want to make sure my colleagues have time for their last round of questions so i will save time. Going back to the minimization question, and specifically, the incidental collection question, am i right that the rule is that whether the information is inadvertently collected, that is, you were tasking other wrong selector or some mistake was made, you got something that you didnt intend to get, thats inadvertent, or you were critically targeting the right account and you collected communications to or from a u. S. Person, thats incidental. The procedures say minimization rules say that if you never discovered that it was inadvertent and never discovered that it was incidental, you never realize it was a u. S. Person collection, its deleted after five years. The basic rule is you keep it for five years, you give everything for five years. Two years on upstream, five years on prism and then gets deleted. Thats the basic rule, right . Bright . Correct. And then top of that the rule is that you discover through analysis, through reviewing it, that it was inadvertent or incidental collection on a u. S. Person, you Must Immediately purge dashing bob is shaking his head no. Theres a difference in the way, as youre using those terms, are very different concepts. Inadvertent refers to a collection that was not authorized by law. That is purged your incidental purged unless and less rajesh mentioned there are certain exceptions to absorb and not able to recite them but they do exist. They are fairly narrow. Incidental is collection that is authorized by law. And at that point the rules relating to u. S. Persons kick in, and if you determine that it has no foreign intelligence value, or you purge it. I mean, whats your response to the argument, well, fine, that just means that if you think its valuable you keep it, if you dont think its valuable, then you purge it. I mean, its like that its lawfully collected. Fair enough. But you do, if it is of interest to you, you to keep it . If its a potential foreign intelligence value if it can be useful to providing the intelligence that policymakers need or to protecting the nation against threat, then yes, we keep it for the required period. To make a more concrete, if its a terrorist overseas, hes going to number in the United States that unlocks the u. S. Person, we want to get the information to its incidental in fact were getting the u. S. Persons number, but he is calling minneapolis at we want to keep that, that communication. It is of high interest to us. Spent one point i would add is just the minimization refers to steps in the process. Everything from collection to review the dissemination. And so i think were talking about one element, retention. So theyre different stages of process. To disseminate that information with a certain threshold would have to be met. I wish there were some way, i know its embedded both in law and guideline and practice, but minimization means Different Things. And minimization means keep it for five years and then delete it. Minimization means dont disseminate, identifying information. Minimization means delete it unless its intelligence information. Those are very different spent they all fall and the statutory definition of minimization essentially. Ill mangle it a little bit but its procedures that are designed to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information about unconsenting United States persons, consistent with the need to produce foreign intelligence information. And so youre going to have different minimization rules based on the particular missions of the agency. Youre going to different minimization rules depending on the nature of the activity. You will have different minimization rules depending upon the nature of the information, but minimization is that an entire category of rules spent but it is a little bit of a circular definition. Which means Different Things in different context but sometimes it means i was it means Different Things in different content. Its a balance. If i could real quick emphasized, as bob was alluding to, the fbi does have its own standard minimization procedures with respect to the type of activity. I assume you have had access to those. Anyway, theres a lot on the table we just talked about with respect to minimization but i would direct you to those in terms of understanding the fbis role. Judge wald . When u. S. Person information thats been quote incidentally acquired, kept for legitimate reasons or whatever in the base, is disseminated to Foreign Governments as permitted under certain circumstances, its said that its usually massed. I think would be useful for public consumption to no what the masking process entails and in what circumstances it isnt masked and whether or not the different agencies can use different criteria for masking or its all centralized by the injustice or the attorney generals supervision . Well, i can speak just for masking and general at nsa. Abstracting from the second part issue for a moment is substituting a generic phrase like u. S. Person for the name of the u. S. Person that is collected. That is a legal term. That is an individual or use company or firm. I dont think theres a centralized process. Thats how we do it at nsa. I think thats the other agencies do it as well. Different agencies decide how to interpret . Again, asked what should be massed and what shouldnt . In the 70 to context is part of the minimization procedures. So what does that tell me . Specifically as to whether or not and what circumstances its not massed, thats up to each agency or not . Its done on an agency by agency bases. Generally speaking i think the minimization rules of each agency generally would not permit you to disseminate u. S. Person information where that is not a to foreign intelligence or necessary to understand that foreign intelligence. So in other words, or evidence of a crime for fbi, so in other words, if its joe smith and his name is necessary, if im passing it to the Foreign Government and its key vendors and that it is joe smith because thats relevant to understanding what the threat is or what information is complexities a cyber hacker or whatever and this kid is information than you might attach his name. If it was not, if antidote it was in the communicate but it is not pertinent to the information are trying to convey, then that would be deleted and which is a u. S. Person. It would be blocked out. It which is the u. S. Persons. Thats essentially how it works more or less in all the agencies. Isnt that a fair description . The basic parameter is articulate in the statute that his message to understand for intelligence or evidence of a crime and that is effectuated through the procedures. Thats a 12333 collection. With the last subpart, with those, just take this as an example, with those masked criterium also include foreigners, nonu. S. Persons information . I mean, suppose the government of romania asks some question which might require a romanian nontargeted person that is in your prism basis. With the masking procedures, et cetera, apply there, too, or are they just for u. S. Persons . In todays world masking procedures are for u. S. Persons because they are derivatives of the constitutional requirements, the minimization procedures they need to conform with the constitutional requirements. So it would be up to the agency decide whether they thought it was right or wrong to give that information to Foreign Governments . Two points to mention. One, know a fresh would be disseminate unless it had foreign intelligence value. But having made that decision spent if i may continue to the second point is i think what the president directed us to examine is what protection could be extended to nonu. S. Persons and thats the study. And thats what youre working on . Thats the issue. One quick comment if im not mistaken, if you look at title one of fisa but i think also applies to section 702, it says you dont think it restricts it with respect to u. S. Person or nonu. S. Person, that no federal officer or employee can disclose continued or disclose information at all except for a lawful purpose pics of information could only only be disclosed for a lawful purpose. And i believe that cuts across the board. I dont have anything further. I wanted to make sure i understood judge walds question and response. I understood her to be asking what, under what circumstances this omission could be made to a Foreign Government. Are there separate agreements and procedures might govern in that instance, or our analysts able to so we decided they would like to provide foreign intelligence information to Foreign Governments . At least our procedures are publicly available procedures have provisions that address sharing with second party partners. I dont have the details but i can sort we get back to you on that but they are now public and articulate the circumstances under which information can be shared with second party partners. Those are proved by the fisc. I think the critical point is that these are part of the minimization procedures that have to be approved by the fisa court. To the extent were talking again about section 702. The minimization procedures are only for u. S. Persons, arent they . Yes, thats right. I was talking but there are general rules about what you can share vice information. Fisa information. I want to thank the panel for spending a fair amount of time for us today. We appreciate it, it will take a short break and resume at 11 00 with our second panel. Thank you. [inaudible conversations] a couple of live events to tell you about this morning. The center for strategic and International Studies looks at the state of the european union, and president obamas trip to europe next week on cspan2 at 9 00 a. M. In stern. At 9 30 a. M. On cspan3, the Atlantic Council host john sopko, a special id for afghanistan reconstruction. Mr. Speaker, just a few weeks ago, this house voted against funding for the contras. We decided against contra funding because we felt it is against american tradition to goala private army whose it is to overthrow another government. We felt it is against american tradition to foster killing of civilians. We felt it is against american tradition to abandon the strength of our ideas and replace them only with the strength of our arsenal. Now just a few weeks later, we are against a single contra vote. Why . Ohis because Daniel Ortega went to moscow. I am not happy about any nation turning to the soviets for economic help, but that does not change the contra issue. The president , our president , called the contras freedom fighters. Who are these contras . Vast majority of former somoza men who never believed in freedom, who give socalled humanitarian aid to an inhumane army is a perversion of american morality. Americas watch reports, and i have the report here, that and im going to give you an this woman for months pregnant was killed at a state. Wned copy farm by the contras she was wounded first. Her face shattered by a grenade. A defense knife one inner side with the unborn fetus perturbing. Many other people were slaughtered by the contras with their throats cut. Ugly, yes, but we must face this. Sure, there is violence on the watchtoo, which americas documents is decreasing, but violence on the left and violence on the right must stop, and the way to stop it is not by supporting a private brutal army who wants to overthrow a government of a country the size of iowa, but by doing what america does best negotiating a peaceful settlement with the democratic nations taking the lead. The way to stop this violence is to support the amendment, the gephardt amendment, the hamilton amendment. Let us not have the blood of the innocent on our hands, and let us not escalate the involvement of american troops in central america. I say vote against the michael amendment. Like scifi more highlights from 35 years of house for covers on our facebook page. We are cspan created by the cable tv industry 35 years ago and brought to you as a Public Service by your local cable or satellite provider. In a few moments, todays headlines and your calls live on washington journal. At noon eastern, wisconsin governor rebecca kl the economys on and jobs. Rent obama talks about women and the economy had 2 40 p. M. Eastern. In about 45 minutes, we look at the role of nato with Mark Jacobson of the german marshall fund. He was formerly with the nato interNational Security force. That 830nox joined us a. M. Eastern to discuss Foreign Policy and how american president s have reached out to other World Leaders during times of crisis. And we will focus on Janet Yellens plans for the federal john hilsenrath. Washington journal is next, and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. Host good morning. The president had heads to florida to meet with College Students and workers and to participate in advance in even. He took to local television to talk about coverage and what is going on in the missing malaysia airline. Latest this morning Australian Authorities are searching for floating objects in a remote part of the indian ocean. That took place in the early part of this morning. We will read a story about t
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