replacement of nuclear components. this makes clear that nuclear components will only be used on previously tested designs and will not support new nuclear missions or provide new nuclear capabilities. finally, any decision to proceed to the engineering phase, the u.s. will give a strong preference to refurbishment or reuse. this makes clear that the replacement of nuclear components would only be undertaken only if critical management program goals cannot be otherwise met and it specifically authorized -- and is specifically authorized by the president. these are the principles which -- with which we intend to maintain the president's position. this review goes further than that. it provides an outline of the resources that we will need to get the job done. the review calls for the modernization of nuclear weapon and the structure and sustainment of the science and technology base which is required to support the full range of nuclear security missions. this is reflected in the president's budget request which requires a 13.4% increase in funding for the nsa. this investment is critical for addressing our aging and the structure and enhancing our efforts against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. it will also allow the u.s. to reduce many non-deployed warheads currently kept as a technical hedge. we know the human capital in the dod and doe for the nuclear mission and reposes on building on current government levels. if we are to succeed, we need to be able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals. our people are our greatest assets. the people that work so hard to complete this review, i look forward to for -- to working with congress to implement this. thank you. >> thank you for your leadership in this tremendous effort and leading in a way with the process was very collaborative and really the strength of the interagency which produced a great product. the chiefs and i support the findings of this review because we believe it provides us and our field commanders the opportunity to better shape our nuclear weapons posture, policies, and structure to meet an ever changing security environment. we appreciated the opportunity to inform it and be informed by it as the process went forward. even though it produces a reduction, a reduction i endorsed, it reaffirms our commitment to defend the vital interests of the u.s. and to those of our partners and allies with a more balanced mix of nuclear and non-nuclear means that we have -- then we have at our disposal today. we will retain the strategic triad that has served us so well, the review further strengthens the united states command and control and works to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation and suggests a new dialogue through which we improve transparency with russia and china. it includes the development of new warheads, it bolsters regional deterrence by improving counter weapons of mass destruction capability and revitalizing infrastructure. as secretary gates made clear, we must invest more generously and wisely to preserve the life span and the effectiveness of our existing arsenal. we must hold ourselves accountable to audit the jubilee -- to high standards of management and we must recruit and retain the scientific expertise to advance our technological edge in nuclear weaponry. i am encouraged to see these so promptly addressed in the posture review but i am also mindful of the challenge. without such improvements, and aging force supported by and neglected infrastructure only invites any misbehavior and miscalculation. thank you. >> the review says that the it administration possible goal is the only purpose of a weapon is to deter an attack. what will it take to get to that state and why cannot go there now? would you comment on the russian minister's comments in moscow that russia would reserve the right to withdraw from the start treaty if it felt the u.s. missile defense became a strategic threat to the russian to turn around and will the u.s. have a unilateral statement about the treaty? >> the review is very explicit and referring to the fundamental of nuclear weapons being for deterrence. i know that there has been a lot of speculation outside of the government about how to frame that and describe it, whether it would be the sole purpose, whether we would forgo first used and so on. there was agreement within the administration that we did not think we for far enough along the road toward getting control toward nuclear weapons around the world to limit ourselves so explicitly. there was general agreement that the term fundamental purpose basically made clear that this is obviously a weapon of last resort and we are also explicit about that. we recognize that we need to make progress moving in the direction that the president has set but we also recognize the real world we continue to live in. >> i am not aware of the statement but it is no surprise that the russians remain concerned about our missile defense program. we have persistently sought to explain to them the purpose for missile defense, the role that we believe can and should play in preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism and we have consistently offered the russians the opportunity to cooperate with us. the start treaty is not about missile defense, as you know. it is about cutting the size of our arsenals. we will continue our conversations with the russians. we have made it clear that we look forward to the ratification of start and another round of discussions with the russians about further reductions and we will also be working with them to try to find common ground around this. >> tactical nuclear weapons did not enter your discussion. what is the review say about nukes and europe? what will be required of the russians as part of this process? >> the review is very explicit that any decision with respect to nato's nuclear capabilities will be handled within nato according to the consensus principle and that as long as there are nuclear weapons that threaten nato, nato will need to maintain nuclear capability. this is clearly one of the issues that will be addressed and the strategic concept that data is undertaking. -- that nato is undertaking. what the review does is draw attention to the number of tactical nuclear weapons and also to the number of non- deployed weapons that we are looking at and of these clearly should be a part of the arms control agenda as we move forward. >> there is a section and the review for those of you who have not had a chance to review it, including a picture of the russian minister, it is in there somewhere, page 19, in the chapter called strengthening regional to terence and reassuring u.s. allies and partners, -- deterrence and reassuring u.s. allies and partners, action should only be taken after a thorough discussion with the alliance. those discussions have begun with connection to the new strategic concept being worked on that will hopefully be ready for consensus discussions at the nato conference in lisbon. >> your concerns about iran and did those play any role in formulating this review? the president said he is concerned that iran is still on a track for nuclear capability. your current assessment of the time frame, what that means, what message you are sending to iran. >> i actually think the review has a very strong message before both iran and north korea. whether it is in declaratory policy or other elements of the review, we essentially carve out states like north korea and iran that not in compliance and all options are on the table when it comes to countries in that category, along with non- state actors who may acquire nuclear weapons. if there is a message for iran and north korea, it is if you are going to play by the rules and join the international community, we will undertake certain obligations to you. if you are not going to play by the rules, if you are going to be a proliferate hr, all options are on the table. >> one of the goals of an enhanced regional architecture is to ensure that any attempts to protect u.s. forces or allies will be planted with a -- and enhanced ability. if iran talks -- if a brand attacks israel, would the u.s. attack? >> i would not go down the hypothetical road. >> the alert status, what does that remain on changed? did you tell us a bit more about how the presidential decision making process will be changed under the review? >> there are some changes that we made in command and control that tighten things up and give the president more time for decision. what was the first part? >> military alert. >> frankly, we feel like the situation is a satisfactory one at the current one. we have no armed bombers sitting at the end of runways any longer. we have our icbm's are all targeted right now on the oceans it. if there were an accidental launch, or a problem, it would put a missile right into the middle of the ocean. we have taken a number of steps to ensure that the president has additional time for decisions and the forces on alert are not subject to some sort of disaster. thank you very much. >> we have a number of policy in subject matter experts that are here to address your questions in greater detail. the format for this will be we start off with a brief presentation by jim miller, the principal deputy undersecretary for policy in the defense department and he will share that briefing with general cartwright we will invite and their colleagues to address any questions that you might have from the other departments. with that, jim. >> can we pull up the charts, please? we will go to these relatively quickly. i know that people want to get to the questions and hear the answers. this is the third comprehensive review by the illustration and as secateurs clinton noted, this is the first one to have entirely unclassified product. you have heard about the collaboration that went on between the departments in addition to the extensive involvement of the intelligence agency and all members of the national security council. this review built on the general defense review and its ballistic missile review. when the general talks about regional security architecture for deterrence, we will see those. there was something over 80 meetings that took place over the posture review. started with an assessment of the strategic security environment and noted it was substantially changed from the cold war. this review focused extensively on the challenges of nuclear proliferation and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. we do see terrorist groups continuing to try to seek weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and materials. we see states pursuing nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community. understood is the requirement to reinforce and enhance regional security architecture to strengthen deterrence and regional aggression. this includes not just the nuclear umbrella but also considering how to strengthen the nuclear defense system and combating weapons of mass destruction capability. third, understanding that with the u.s. and russia continuing to have 90% of the nuclear weapons in the world, that reinforces strategic relationships with china at -- with russia are imperative. this is a key step in this effort. the general talk about that more. -- the general will talk about that more. this shows the policy framework we used. >the first topic is the prevention of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. this review plays out additional steps that it will take to lead international efforts to bolster that regime as we look forward to compliance, the conference is a critical next step. as we conducted the review, we looked at what budgetary steps' were appropriate. other agencies have increased their funding. the president has committed to a global lockdown to secure all of honorable nuclear material within four years. -- all vulnerable to nuclear material within four years. part of the review looked at what types of investments are needed to have better capabilities to interject smuggled materials. we have increased investments and those areas, as well. we will also be sending up a joint task force for wdm elimination. disarming was a fundamental principle. this review started with and looked at how to implement the president possible of a world free of nuclear weapons in the long term. some of the steps that we intend to take are listed there, including negotiations and a comprehensive program on contributions. the secretary spoke about renewing the u.s. commitment to hold accountable as you see in the chart. this is one where i want to take the bulk of my time before i turn it over to the general. that is u.s. territory policy. you can think about two different types of states. this comprises the vast majority of countries in the world. what we look to do in the territory policy is to strengthen the u.s. security assurance strengthened by the treaty. i will not repeated but you can quote it if you have a look at it and i remind you that these states, if any of the states that are compliant use chemical or biological weapons, we stated very clearly they face the prospect of a devastating military response. as the secretary noted, we reserve the right to adjust this in the future if the biological weapons threat grows significantly and we cannot cope with it correspondingly. this policy is intended to give incentives and going and it here to the nonproliferation treaty and to reduce the steps and not increase the threat of biological weapons. states that are not compliant with their obligations, a different rules set. we still say that the u.s. would not use nuclear weapons project would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances. we specify that for the states where nuclear weapons could play a role in deterrence. as long as nuclear weapons exist, we have the fundamental goal of u.s. nuclear weapons to deter attack on us or our allies and partners. we will look to strengthen traditional -- conventional capabilities in order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons with the objective of making the sole purpose of u.s. nuclear weapons being to deter nuclear attacks on the u.s. or our allies and partners. with that, i would like to turn it over to general cartwright. >> as i understand the rules, i am going to give you a couple more slots and try not to say things that were already said. and this page reflect start. we expect the president to sign with the russian president, the start treaty. when you look at start in the numbers associated with the reductions that will occur, they represent 65% reduction and operationally deployed nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war put up 75% reduction in deployed and on deployed -- and non-deployed. pretty substantial reductions since the end of the cold war 1550 is the floor for deploy strategic nuclear warheads. 704 nuclear delivery vehicles. that is a combination of launchers and vehicles. a submarine that has multiple tubes counts as multiple vehicles. a bomber counts as one. an icbm with one warhead counts as one. just to give you a sense of this. we have seven years to get to these targets that are deployed appear. the 800 number for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is an additional 100 that are not deployed. the submarine that is refueling or has come back and had missiles removed does not count actively and that allows you to have the spares. it allows you to switch the ones coming out and going in -- and bring the new ones and without a period of vulnerability. it was in that constructive we added this additional number of a hundred. we will retain throughout the life of the treaty the nuclear triad which is the bombers and submarines and icbm's. we will reduce the number of warheads and associated with icbm's over the life of the treaty. there are no constraints in this treaty associated with miss self-defense or our global strike capabilities. we to make substantial new investments and study efforts associated with command and control and decision times. if you have all this activity over the years, one of the issues has been a concern about hair trigger alert statuses and the secretary walked the what we have done with the bombers. we have done about as much as we can do with the physical capabilities and architectures of the existing weapons and platforms. as we go into modernization, we are studying what we can do in that area to ensure that we have the maximum amount of decision time for national leaders before they would enter any decision to use a nuclear weapon. that could happen in better sensors, better command in control mats and also in the architecture of the weapons themselves. the secretary described one of the activities with what is called ocean open -- open ocean targeting. that study begins for the command and control for about three years ago. we will be looking at what we can do. the studies will start in the fiscal year 2011. we also talked significantly about high-level dialogues and establishing them with the russians and chinese. this is in an effort to get more transparency and confidence and understand the intent of the other and understand where modernization programs are going to reduce the potential for misinterpretations. we endeavor to have these dialogues. strengthening regional deterrence. we have done a lot of work here. a lot of work is in the early stages. it is the missile defense capabilities at the theater level that allow us to have that be an element of our deterrence. in addition, our forces are second to none. that capability and maintaining it and having a posture that is consistent with the threat to deter but not overwhelmed, working those and tailoring those for the regions around the world, these are critical activities that we must be able to do. we will and fact continue to have a capability on the tactical side. whether that is applied with a bomb or a next generation aircraft but having that capability out there to ensure that we can move forward and face forward in a tactical sense where it is appropriate to do that. we are going to retire one of our weapons that has been in the arsenal for a long time. this is the tomahawk. it has been on the sidelines and not deployed for several years. we are going to officially retire that weapon. we will also spend time at the regional level working with our allies to have a discussion about the credibility and effectiveness of what has been called extended deterrent. the secretary talked about our nato responsibilities. those also extend into the pacific and into the middle east. sustaining the safe, secure, and effective arsenal. this has been an area of a lot of discussion and i am sure we will have several questions here. no new testing, no new warheads. the secretary went to the criteria associated with that. no new missions or capabilities. life extension programs will focus on existing, tested designs. there are three principal categories of weapons, those that we refurbished, those that we reuse and those that we replace. and the case of refurbishment, these are designs that were previously produced. we have not changed anything associated with what we would call the physics package. the nuclear part of this thing. that will not be touched. in a refurbishment, you are working around the components that have become obsolete or those that by replacing them, would substantially reproved -- improve the safety or effectiveness of that weapon. in the case of reuse, those are nuclear designs from different warhead types. we might match the warhead from one with another and we can preserve that weapon. no new capability but that would allow us to take tested
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