office of the undersecretary of deps for personnel and readiness and mr. joe etheridge, chief criminal intelligence division, u.s. army criminal investigation command and mr. christopher mcmahon, national security director rat, the naval criminal investigateive services and mr. robert grabolski of afsoi, u.s. air force, office of special investigations. mr. reid, we'll begin with you. >> thank you madam chair and ranking member. on behalf of the entire team here i would like to convey our appreciation for your time and interest and the committee's support for the department. if you would allow, madam chair, i represent the background investigation piece of this process and i would like ms. miller to begin and i'll come back. it's the front end and then we'll go through the military departments. thank you. >> that's appropriate. ms. miller? >> good afternoon, madam chair, ranking member kelly and members of the subcommittee. i'm stephanie miller. i'm director under the secretary of defense. i'm pleased to provide testimony on this important issue and i want to thank the members of the first panel for their knowledge and expertise. i'm responsible for the oversight of all matters of officers and enlisted personnel. i'm responsible for policy and recruitment matters, providing oversight of resources, managing the process and other matters of the all volunteer force. each year we recruit approximately 400, 000 applicants for military service. we remain committed the recruiting high quality applicant represents. while today's economy has brought challenges to military recruiting, the department has been steadfast that we only enlist only candidates that actually meet our high standard standards. the life cycle for military personnel is a complex process which is constantly evolving. the beginning of the life cycle starts with each new member whether enlisted or officer undergoing a thorough screening process. this multi-tiered screening process has a review of each applicant. we believe we've been successful in screening individuals, but we continually review our practices and methods for improvement. we launched a program that vets all applicants. this new process has proven successful over the summer. not only available solely from the standardized background form. recruiters play a critical role in assessing the intent of the applicant. each applicant is interviewed by a recruiter. at our military process station applicants undergo a full physical and background searches of law enforcement and other records. they answer questions about involvement with law enforcement agencies including arrests, citations, parole. furthermore all applicants undergo an advanced finger print check. subsequent background checks screen recruits for extremist ties ties, fbi checks, local law enforcement agency checks and a review of the gang trial. the department, the military services and individuals share a responsibility to ensure members are afforded the opportunity to serve with dignity and respect. the departments overreaching guidance is clear that military personnel must not advocate supremacist or gang-affiliated doctrines, including those that participate in discrimination or those that advocate the use of force, violence or criminal activity. beyond its guidance the department works to provide commanders and senior military leaders the tools they need. commanders working with key stake holders are swift to take appropriate action when warranted. we are gaining additional insights on service members through the deployment of new technologies and have employed screening techniques to identify applicants that fit with the military's culture of treating all with dignity and respect. these tools can be utilized as a whole-person applicant screening process and can tell us a great deal about the ability of that individual to adapt to the rules and regulations of military culture. d. o. d. remains committed to ensuring all personnel are treated with dignity and respect. this is accomplished while keeping each person's civil liberties intact. while it's not always easy, it's critical to protect our service members throughout the country. madam chair woman, i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, ms. miller. mr. reid? >> thank you madam chair. again, i thank you for the opportunity to testify on my oversight of personnel security policy and the steps we take in the department of defense to develop and sustain a workforce that embodies our values as americans. i will focus my opening remarks on background investigations, insider threat programs and continuous evaluation as these are the primary authorities and capabilities we employ to identify persons with extremist ideologies and deny them the opportunity to serve in the department of defense. where indicated we also ensure they are investigated for any policy violations or criminal behaviors and are held accountable for their actions. once a person has been selected for military service the department initiates a comprehensive background investigation. all applicants must complete the questionnaire for national security positions publish by the office of personnel management or the sf-86. all military applicants must pass a rigorous background examination that exceeds to many nonmilitary persons. this is a choice made by the defendant of defense in recognition that there's a high level of public trust in our military that necessitates a strong commitment to ensuring persons with criminal, extremist or other undesirable characteristics are not allowed to serve in our ranks. applicants are asked probing and detailed questions about personal conduct, job history, encounters with law enforcement, drug use, credit, foreign travel and associations with organizations dedicated to terrorism, use of violence to overthrow the u.s. government and the commission of acts of force or violence to discourage others from exercising their constitutional rights. background investigators supplement and enrich this data on the sf-86 with information provided by former educators, employers, co-workers and neighbors of the applicants. investigators check federal and state law enforcement data history and review public records, credit reports and others where needed. this information is aggregated in a reportive investigation. against the 13 federal adjudicated guidelines, of the guidelines personal conduct, criminal conduct and allegiance to the united states are the primary criteria used to vet personnel that exhibit any extremist behaviors. while cases with allegiance are uncommon, overall the three guidelines combine for almost half of the denials for military personnel. keeping in mind the prior screening ms. miller described happens in front of this. applicants with favorable background investigation results are subject to two sets of monitoring procedures throughout their military service. each of our military departments manage their own insider threat programs that serve as a conduit for reporting behaviors of concern that are observable in the workplace. all d. o. d. personnel are mandated to report such behaviors that are similar, but not identical to the federal adjudicative guidelines. the d. o. d. component insider threat hubs provide reporting to a d. o. d. center led by our defense counter intelligence and security agency. all d. o. d. are covered by one of the 43 insider threat hubs distributed across the department and reporting of suspicious or alerting behavior is increasing. any behavior that crosses the threshold is assessed by insider threat hubs, the chain of command or security managers. in addition to monitoring for insider threat behaviors at the component level, the department also conducts a continuous evaluation program at the d. o. d. level. presently 1. 9 million d. o. d. personnel are enrolled in our continuous evaluation system. the department has plans to enroll the full population by october 2021. continuous evaluation provides data by outside the department with monitoring of commercial and public data services for behavior that violates the standard of conduct. when alerts indicate unacceptable behavior, an incident report is submitted that is reviewed by the chain of command and the d.o.d central adjudications department. if appropriate, the incident can be referred to law enforcement. if indicated the subject can be removed from eligibility to hold a position and processed for separation from military service. madam chair, i'll close by saying this is an evolving process always subject to imporvement. we beliefriefed here that the government is adding additional controls moving to a continuous vetting model across the entire government. everything i described will continue to be refined and enriched to where we have the greatest degree of awareness of where threats are across the department, including those imposed by those with extremist attitudes. thank you for your time, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you mr. reid. >> mr. ethridge? >> good afternoon chair woman speier, ranking member kelly. i'm joe ethridge. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to provide testimony on the important issue of racially motivated extremist threat. as the chief of cid's intelligence division i'm in charge of the cid identifies soldiers suspected of participating in extremist activities to include public police, media, social media searches, tip line reports and fbi domestic terrorism investigative reporting. we evaluate these reports to identify supporting facts. the majority of the soldiers identified as participating to some extent in extremist activities are not subjects of criminal investigations. the more common scenario is participation in an online forum that might be expressing supremist or extremist views. in these instances cid notifies commanders by an information report for action in accordance with army policy. commanders have the authority to counsel, train and take disciplinary action. additionally cid notifies the d. o. d. addjudication facility and the command for personnel security adjudication. the cid initiates investigations when indications or allegations of a crime are present. in early 2019 cid observed a small increase in criminal investigations initiated with soldier participation in extremist activities as a component. specifically, there were 7 criminal investigations initiated with an extremist activity component in 2019, in comparison to an average of 2. 4 per year in 2014 to 2018 period. this includes soldiers from all components, active duty, national guard and army reserve. during the same time period the fbi notified cid of an increase in domestic terrorism investigations with soldiers or former soldiers as suspects. the fbi reporting also clearly stated that extremist organizations were actively seeking veteran skills. in may 2019 the provost marshal general of the army and i briefed the vice chief of staff of the army and members of the cid on the fbi observations. the army chief of staff ordered the formation of a working group to review this. the working group offered up several adjustments stated in chapter 4-12 of army regulation 600-20, that's army command policy. the revision is scheduled for release in the second quarter of this year. internally cid expanded its liaison relationship with the fbi, traditionally centered on the national joint terrorism task force and the national gang intelligence center into the fbi's domestic terrorism investigation operations unit. in summary, over the past year cid has increased collection events, informed our leadership of observations, participated in the review and changes to army policy, expanded our relationship with law enforcement partners and made notification to commanders. additionally, cid has formulated a request to the army inspector general to add unit implementation of extremist activity policy as a focus area for the next inspection cycle for army-wide inspection inspections. the army is identifying extremist behavior in the ranks. madam chair woman, i'm happy to answer any questions you or any members may have at this time. >> thank you. mr. mcmahon? good afternoon chair woman speier, ranking member kelley and distinguished members of the subcommittee. thank you for the opportunity to testify today on extremism in the military. i am pleased to have the opportunity this afternoon to appear before you and provide testimony on this topic. as executive assistant director of the national security directorate, i lead investigations confronting the intelligence and terrorism threats posed to the navy personnel, assets and technologies. we investigate all force protection issues to include force engagements, ship visits and static forces support. the naval criminal investigative service is investigating racially motivated extremism. these investigations receive immediate priority attention. our highly skilled civilian federal law enforcement professionals use all available resources to address these matters working closely with the fbi and additional federal and local partners to address these threats. over the course of fiscal year 2018 the naval ciminal investigative service experienced an increase in the number of domestic extremism related reports from the fbi involving department of defense affiliated personnel. in response to these referrals and to more accurately reflect the scope of these incidents ncis established the case category of domestic terrorism for investigative and operational reporting purposes. ncis generally defines domestic terrorism as terrorism perpetrated by individuals and groups inspired by or associated with u.s. based movements that espouse extremist ideologies of a political, social, religious, racial or environmental nature. we investigate crimes associated with domestic extremist organizations when there's a federal violation, identified violent extremist ideology in an active service member or current civilian employee who has expressed an aspiration to further the violent ideology by threats, acts of violence or other enabling criminal activity. for instances in which a crime is suspected, a general crimes investigation with an ncis is initiated. ncis does not pursue investigations of the department of the navy individuals who make statements they share the beliefs or a subset of the beliefs held by domestic extremist groups unless information exists indicating it meets this threshold. where crimes are not evident, information is passed to appropriate commands deemed appropriate. in conclusion, the predication for domestic terrorism investigations typically comes from command complaints, other investigative agency referrals or tips. for example, ncis maintains information sharing agreements with the fbi on terrorism matters. these same channels serve as the primary matter of information sharing on domestic terrorism matters involving members or navy employees. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> all right, thank you. mr. gorowski? >> chair woman, ranking member and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you. as the department director for law enforcement air forces special investigations, i oversee policy, training and resources necessary to guide major criminal investigations impacting department of the air force. osi has agents assigned to over 250 locations around the world to include 22 locations with the joint terrorism task force engaged in collaborative efforts with other federal law enforcement offices on matters of mutual concern such as matters involving domestic extremism. pertaining to the topic of possible white supremacists, we're concerned with early identification and timely resolution affecting good order and discipline withiun our air and space forces. in fact, the department of the air force has the written policy pertaining specifically to participation in extremist activities. the policy states military personnel must reject active participation in criminal gangs and other organizations that facilitate extremism or causes. military members who violate this policy are subject to disciplinary action under article 92 or failure to obey a lawful order under the uniform code of military justice. it's important to note that the air force policy dictates mere membership in the organization is not prohibited. osi has investigative responsibility to investigate these matters where members are suspected of active participation in extremist or supremacy groups prohibited by the air force instructions. since september 30, 2019 osi received about nine reported incidents involving possible supremacy activity by air force members. these incidents came to our attention in various ways. out of the nine reported reports we opened eight investigations and referred one to security forces for additional investigation. one incident was disproven and the remaining six were inappropriate or racially
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