testimony, documents and nazi and allied films to chronicle the rise of nazi germany. it's annexation of neighboring countries, military invasions, war crimes and death camps. that's what's coming toi am very pleased introduce our last speaker for the afternoon. of the texasector military forces museum. adjunct professor of history at austin community college. he is an author and a contributor to essential civil war curriculum. his last work as a trilogy covering the civil war in gettysburg and lee, which is and due for publication next year. let's give him a welcome. [applause] thank you. it is a real pleasure to be here. it is always fun to stand in a group of people that have the same passion. you don't get looked at as strangely when you talk to other people. i am going to break precedent today and have a powerpoint demonstration. i am doing that for several reasons. spent a lot of money to put this system in. you will not have to guarantee -- it a new puppy at the end of my presentation. in the storyrested of what happens in the virginia theater after the battle of following a conversation i had with one of my favorite professors and my mentor at the university of texas at austin. he taught a war on the american civil war and reconstruction. i became his teaching assistant and graduate assistant. we were always having conversations about the war and various issues. one they we were talking about gettysburg and what lee was trying to do by going into pennsylvania. he suggested to me that maybe gettysburg was not the end all and be all of the war, the great turning point that historiography up to the early 1980's, when i was an undergraduate, indicated that it was. that was intriguing. it was completely opposite of everything i had ever read. i became curious. i wanted to answer that question one way or another. if gettysburg is this great momentous turning point, concurrent with vicksburg which occurs at the same time, then the war in virginia ought to look different after gettysburg them before gettysburg. let me go find out what was going on in virginia following the battle of gettysburg. when i went to find secondary literature on it, i drew a blank, because there isn't any to speak of on what happens in andinia between gettysburg the overlaying campaign. you can find a paragraph here or there and it will get mentioned in a biography for a few pages or a regimental history now and again. i was forced to go to the official record. i started reading regimental newspapers, archives to find the answer i wanted. contraryscovered was to the way history is treated, which is to say nothing of , meade andappened lee maneuvered around each other but it was essentially a stalemate after the armies lick their wounds following gettysburg. though historiography hit the fast-forward button from ofdle july to early may 1864. if you pay attention to anything going on during that time, you have to pay attention to chattanooga and chickamauga. military historians like to follow the big battles. that is where the smoke and the drama are. the easiest way to sell books is to write about big battles. there is a lot that happens. this is not a quiet time. a great deal of maneuvering and fighting. there are enormous consequences for what will happen in 1864. stage for the the 1864 campaigns. it is a very important bridge because if you read about those first few days in july and the great victories at gettysburg and vicksburg. there are a lot of northerners at the time who feel like this is it. it is almost over. we just have to push a little harder and victory is at hand. you hear phrases like the confederacy is a tottering cause. this is almost over. you fast-forward a year and you get to the end of the summer of 1864. the north seems to be facing it's awful hour. the federal failure in the red river campaign. the confederates having reasonable hope that if they can hold out for a few more weeks, lincoln will go down in defeat in the election. whether that is right or not, that is what southerners believed. how do you get from early july when it seems like the great turning point had happened in the north was inevitably going to win to a year later, they north is on the verge of going down to defeat and the south is on the verge of establishing its independence? there has to be something that bridges that time. it is the six months between lee's crossing of the potomac and december of 1863. it also marks the only interval in which meade is in solitary command of the army of the potomac. he commands that army until the end of the war. grant is dictating what meade is doing. if you want to get a handle on how good a general meade was, you have to look here. if you are judging him as a military commander. where mostegins people into the gettysburg story, and that is lee's retreat across the potomac. folks aboute most the gettysburg campaign come to an end. missed hisay, meade chance. the northern press is furious. the great chance to turn gettysburg into the winning victory has been lost. if you go to the volumes on the essential records that talk about gettysburg, you will notice something very interesting. they do not conclude the story until the first day of august of 1863. two weeks later. that is because the gettysburg story does not end of the -- on the banks of the potomac. there was a continuous flow of operations following lee's retreat across the potomac. it is important to understand how we get from here ultimately to the end of november. you will not get one small battle. that haveet a fistful a cumulative effect that is incredibly important on the way the war will unfold in 18 624. 1864. lee hovers in the shenandoah valley for a wild to see what meade is going to do. he would really like to follow the example of george mcclellan and sit down for a month or so and recover from the battle of gettysburg. he writes to his wife that the president ought to be satisfied with getting lee out of maryland. appoint new generals, get ourselves reorganized, and we have a reasonable chance of going out and fighting another battle and winning the victory. meade knows that is not in the cards. after his failure to attack lee at williamsport, whether that was the good decision or wrong decision, he is in trouble with the administration's. expressed his dissatisfaction. that really stuck in meade's craw. he tried to decline the command. he was told he could not. now he fights and wins this great big battle. he has done everything anybody should be asked to do. but now the president is dissatisfied. as far as meade is concerned, that is a censure. i never wanted this command. i want out. i want you to replace me. you cannot replace the victor of the battle of gettysburg two weeks after the great triumph. with whom would you replace him? dissatisfaction- just that i changes to disappointment. knows he cannot linger north of the potomac. that is a good strategic move. it puts him on the strategic flank of lee. if meade plays his cards right, he might trap lee in the shenandoah valley. perhaps create the opportunity to do on the south bank of the shenandoah river -- potomac river what he just missed a chance to do on the north bank of the potomac. we get a week and a half long chess match, a game of cat and with the blue ridge mountains separating them and a flooded shenandoah river. the whole thing hinges on control of the mountain passes. whatinally figures out meade is doing. he says he has to get himself back into culpeper county. lee begins to move. just at the moment when if meade pushed things, there might be a great opportunity, meade halts his infantry for 35 hours because he has read in southern newspapers that lee has been massively reinforced. the would make sense if confederacy had anybody to reinforce lee with. meade has been perplexed by the fact thatlee hung around in the lower valley. meade is trying to understand why lee has stayed where he is. now it all makes sense. he is waiting for these reinforcements and he will go back over. this is the moral dominance that robert e lee has over the army of the potomac's general. he might resume the offensive. of the potomac -- army potomac off from washington dc. disaster will ensue. meade is not 100% that this will happen. the western end of the shenandoah valley seems to indicate that a rebel offensive is a real opportunity. stalls until he can really figure out what is going on. when he figures that out 35 hours later, it is already too late. five hours. don't give lee 35 hours. lee is sending most of his army to chester's gap. at the same time, meade belatedly is trying to shove his forces through another gap with the idea of taking this area and cutting off the confederate retreat. lee believes that other cores are still in the valley. he could potentially destroy 2 4 3rds of the army of northern virginia. meade intelligence is all messed up. it is actually hill and long street who are already going through chester's gap. off byries to cut it sending the third corps backed up by the second and fifth. this leads to the first of our important small battles, and that is the fight at wapping heights. 600 guys holding back a federal corps. it is helped by the rugged terrain. general french is very cautious. he does not like coming into these mountain passes. he has seen too many of those old 1950's westerns where the indians show up on the horizon. he is really afraid of a confederate ambush. little trail coming down from the mountains has to be defended. he does not want to move until them fth corps get behind -- gets behind him. very dramatic attack that becomes known as the battle of wapping heights. it has taken them so long that the rest of the other corps has shown up to block the exit. hase, still believing he this great opportunity, masses 35,000 troops in manassas cap -- gap. he says he will punch his way through and trap a good portion of the army of northern virginia and destroy it. here is how to be a decisive victory. during the night, they fade away. as meade advances, the rebels are gone. he will not catch them. his army is almost out of supplies. he has to pivot to the east where he can reconnect with a railroad and the supplies around washington dc. southeastaded to the and reoccupied a position in the culpeper v. this river flows east to west and the two converge before it goes down to fredericksburg. here butsting his army he is not certain this is where he is going to stay. rivers is a problematic military riddle for both sides. it is a good place to attack into but a horrible place to defend. there is no real good defensive terrain. it is beautiful countryside. it is pretty an open and slightly rolling. there is no real anchor for a defensive position. this is a narrow counties. the railroad turns south and crosses into orange county. that is only 23 miles. the distance as you go east is much more narrow. if an army fights a battle here and gets beaten, it gets shoved back across or against the rapidan river. it is not wide. there are lots of fords. but that can change in the blink of an eye. its name comes because it can rapidly expand. weather, a follrord is a funnel. it is a recipe for disaster. the curious thing about culpeper county is the land inside it is lower. ford, get control of the attacking columns out of sight and then struck across it with very little warning. if lee loses control of the fords, he will be blind to what the army of the potomac can do. he has been in this position before. this is where he was when fredericksburg started. he had used the high ground to shield his army and rapidly filled to the southeast. if the pontoon boats had showed up on time, then he is across the river before meade can react. lee remembers all of that. provides noeper field for battle. he is lingering here for a while but he will probably go back across the rapidan. meade has every intention of forcing lee to do that. he takes a couple of days to resupply. then he informs the lincoln administration, i am about to try to push across the rappahannock river. i will seize the fords and hopefully lee will retreat. not just out of culpeper but from the rapidan as well. lee's army is very beaten up. he is unlikely to make a stand. , youu push against him might leap to river barriers without much of a fight. the one thing meade does not is backing up because his army is weak or if it is strategy. for meade, one of the most important things he has to do is take control of rappahannock station, where the railroad crosses into culpepper county across a 500 foot long railroad bridge. the federals burned the bridge as part of their opening gambit at the fredericksburg campaign. down this pursue lee line. he has to have this bridge rebuilt. is preparing to launch this push. from following my orders two weeks ago. pursue the rebel army and cut it up wherever it has gone. if he does not retreat, there will be a big battle. i would like to be reinforced. neither one of these armies has begun to recover from that contest. at that point, the rug is pulled out from under meade. passed on to lincoln and he reads it and says, wait a minute. i am not telling you to push across the rappahannock river. if you want to do it, it is ok, but don't you dare do it because i am insisting that you do it. basically, lincoln cannot help but take a swipe at meade. he said if it was not safe for him to attack at williamsport, how will it be safe in culpepper county? that infuriates meade. he thinks it is grossly unfair. lincoln is being realistic. ability to maneuver again. don't push a battle if the odds are not in your favor. there are congressional elections in october and november. if use in the army of the potomac into a battle and it say weits commanders can thought that because lincoln pushed us to before we were ready. giveis handy ammunition to to the democratic party during a critical electoral cycle. , don't do it meade because i'm telling you to. now meade is in a little bit of a quandary. technically the pressure has been lifted off of him. the government would still like them to go out and destroy the army of virginia. just as he is preparing orders, that says,a message about that reinforcement stuff. not going to happen. we are going to start taking troops away from you. remember the new york draft riots. there has been draft resistance and other places that led the administration to suspend the draft. the war is in serious man troubled power -- manpower trouble. up.uiting has dried conscription is extremely unpopular. it is unwieldy. the first batches of recruits it is creating our deserting in droves. you have the advent of the jumper. a lot of the guys coming into the army are physically unfit. some are former soldiers that have been discharged for physical disability who relisted -- reenlisted to make some money. meade believes this whole draft thing is a disaster. there is no way the draft will give him the kinds of soldiers he needs are the numbers of soldiers that he needs. onlythat said, the draft is the way you're going to strengthen the union army. you cannot leave the draft suspended. they will take 6000 troops from his army. they will reinforce the effort against charleston. the 11th corps is in very ill repute after gettysburg. its first division is seen to be a problem child. are talking about breaking it up and being done with it. but they take a good chunk of it and they send it as far away from virginia as they can conveniently get it. he has manpower problems. they will be first in his mind for the rest of the year. he also has an interesting order from halleck, no advance, no battle, do not do anything rash. but keep up the threatening attitude. [laughter] looks scary but do not do anything. says seizing bridge heads is the best way to look scary. he crosses the rappahannock and that leads to a battle. buford's calvary division crosses the potomac and drives all the way toward culpepper courthouse. brigadehes hamptons almost back to the railroad. they throw the federals into reverse. this is your second battle of brandy station. it is a nasty little flight. heat indexes were in the 100. a lot of the horses are so weak that they collapse when their writers get on them. them.ers get on nonetheless, it is a fight that the confederates technically win. but the federals maintain control of the south bank of the rappahannock river. they are able to rebuild the railroad bridge. onceade wants to advance washington unshackled him, he has this critical link. the o&a.he thing about he does not want to advance down it. southwest, thee opposite direction of richmond. that is 70 miles away. the worst part about operating is from the rappahannock to washington is about 30 miles. single track railroad goes to confederate territory. only way to ensure the railroad lines days and constant operation is to guard every single foot of it. infantry detach 5000 to do that job. army that has already been shot up at that is buried. -- at gettysburg. look at how many men we had on the poland -- peninsula. 120,000 that were taken into chancellorsville. i take 80,000 into gettysburg. i lost more than 23,000 of them. if i go and have another battle e, the rebels will probably dig in. lose, my army will be vastly weaker after. retreats forced into id i follow him down the o&a, detach more and more troops to defend it. my combat power gets weaker. lee is apt to start playing that game until he can turn around and get superior numbers. meade would rather abandon the o&a completely. he wants to take the army of the potomac back. that would give him a new supply. he won't lose any troops defending it. he will have to abandon the rapidan. i will get across the river before lee gets there. then i can go down the richmond and vertex berg railroad and lee will have to fall back to the north or south in order to fight me. gain this enormous advantage without spending a drop of blood. meade thinks this is common sense. and he is right. is a civil war. they are inherently political. veto thisd halleck proposal. you cannot take the army of the potomac back to fredericksburg .fter that disaster this seems to indicate that richmond is his objective. beenln and halleck have saying for almost a year, richmond is not the objective. it does not matter where you fight lee's army, start to grind it up. that is wonderful theoretically but if you are a general you have to plan a campaign. it is not as simple as that. this thoroughly irritates him. the relationship between meade isleck and and lincoln incredibly dysfunctional. they do not trust each other. will forgivealleck meade for failing to strike at williamsport, but they will never forget. hear meade talk intelligently and logically about the difficulties of supply and fighting my way across rivers and virginias geography, the administration will see that that is all true, but what they are really hearing is george mcclellan in their ear and all the excuses he had for not getting anything done. he can make whatever operational moves he wants. there will not be any great shift. he believes if they are not going to sanction him, they need to tell him what they want done. vagueon't tell him beyond ness. -- force leeck back. meade's letters have been published. they are heavily edited. not all of his letters are in that book. there was one letter i found that he rode around this time to his wife, who is a very close confidant. he says the administration would love for me to go fight and win a battle. but they are keeping their fingerprints off of any defeat. they set me up to be a scapegoat if there is a disaster. that is what they did to burnside and hooker and pope and mcclelland. and they are not going to do it to me. it is a very dysfunctional relationship. august 1, they lunged toward culpepper but then they are pushed back. culpepper is no place to leave and infantry. he will take it back behind the if meadeock river county, he can come get it. lee is behind the rapidan. meade is above the rappahannock. under orders from washington to not do anything. for about six weeks, you will l.t a lulk they both deal with desertion problems. lee offers to resign because of gettysburg. says,son davis politely no way. they fully recover their strength from gettysburg. the army of northern virginia is up to 73,000 men. to army of the potomac is up 88,000. the wound of gettysburg heels numerically -- heals numerically. it is mostly due to returning.ts e's army regains its strength, lee regains his combativeness. he wishes to strike meade. gettysburg has invoked no tactical epiphany. he still believes aggressive action in defeating the enemy as rapidly as possible is the only way the south will keep superior numbers and hopefully wreck union morale. there is no way you can win, you might as well give up the effort. this six weeks is very important to both armies. it is not the only thing that is going on. rosecrans issee, on the move. burnside is advancing toward knoxville. thosenfederates defending two points are grossly outnumbered. it is clear that a crisis is looming. dawns,y september the confederate high command finds itself in the same spot that it was in may 1863. southwest --isis out west. how do we respond? the options in september were the same they were in may. armyke troops fromlee's and send them west to try to redeem the situation. offensive -- wan ts and offensive in virginia. we know what happened in may of 1863. lee said, we cannot get men to the west and time. -- in time. so the smart thing to do is an offensive in virginia. he once exactly the same thing - - wants exactly the same thing. just as soon as lee issues the orders, chattanooga and knoxville fall. davis changes his mind. ongstreet's corps be sent to georgia. hisc corps will go west. began to arrive in the federal capital very quickly. that makes the yankees very nervous. meade cannot tell if lee has sent troops west. halleck says, you need to find out. on september 13, the federal cavalry corps watches a full -- launches a full strength drive into culpepper county. you get the very dramatic battle of culpepper courthouse. the federals reach the rapidan on september 14. is gone.t where he has gone, nobody is saying. but he is not here. meade has to decide what to do. he asks washington, do you want me to advance to the rapidan? they say it is up to you. he finally enters the culpepper v, which makes them very nervous. the rebel armys behind the rapidan. this will be his problem for the rest of the year. how do i get at the rebels at the other side of the river? every ford is heavily defended. the ground on the others of the river is higher than the ground on my side. i either have to go east or west . the union army has operated to the east before during chancellorsville campaign. it has never operated toward the west. despite being at war in virginia for two years, there are still huge swaths of the old dominion that the federals have only the biggest idea of the roads, fords, topography. 22, two divisions are assented to madison county immediately to the west of culpepper with orders to scout the roads, the fords. that leads to, on the 23rd, the dramatic cavalry action. this is really cavalry time in virginia. the two rival cavalry forces fight three major actions against each other in a seven-week period of time. the yankees are chased back out of culpepper. the reconnaissance gives general meade only the information he needs, which as you do not want to go west. that is not the way to get at the rebels. at the same time this is happening in madison county, the battle of chickamauga and 's divisions have arrived at the nick of time. now the crisis is on the other foot. thearly september, it with -- it was the rebels desperately figuring out how to stay in chattanooga. now it is the federals. they order all reinforcements in the west to go to the threat point. grant is plucked out of cooling his heels and doing virtually nothing after his vicksburg told to go to chattanooga. he really wants to fire rosecrans and is happy to do it. it seems like more needs to be done. the federals have to make the same kind of decision that davis and lee were making a few weeks ago. do we do what secretary of war stanton and chase and wells are suggesting and take troops to the area of the potomac and send them west to reinforce chattanooga? or do what lincoln and halleck prefer and launch an offensive in virginia? lee is weaker than he has ever been. here is a great opportunity. we should take advantage of it. stanton, chase, and well say, you know you have to be kidding. they are not going to take advantage of this. lincoln is not going to be rushed. he has halleck send a message for an meade about plans immediate offensive. meade says you've heard is just just getting back from his reconnaissance. lincoln says, not good enough. are11th and 12th corps detached from the army of the potomac to go to save the situation in chattanooga. this changes the strength of the army of the potomac not at all. all of the guys who had been sent north to enforce the draft back.ath -- men.s down to 55,000 is outnumbered by 35,000. the odds have shifted badly against him. all meade can see is he is lost two of his seven corps and he still has to send 5000 men to guard the railroad. and i do not go down this railroad line anyway. i know we are capable of offensive action. meade was not going to take advantage of the circumstances. lee's army is as biggest his own. he is not going to go over to the offensive. lee is of a different mindset. he goes over to the offensive. on october 9, he swings his county,ut of orange trying to get around the flank union army. federals pick up hints but the information is not specific enough. there is a possibility that the rebels might be retreating. that would make sense. backing up closer to richmond would be logical. meade does not really know, is lee retreating or advancing? he decides to prepare for both possibilities. he throws both of his armies into a defensive position to the west. he sensed the larger part down to the rapidan to cross the river for an offensive. they have orders to go up the south bank of the river and uncover the ford so they can cross the river and pursue the rebels if they are retreating. of hows very conscious he lit lee getaway. leeill look really bad if is retreating and the union army is not in hot pursuit. meade, who is extremely confident, a smart guy, does not go with his gut. washington is looking over his shoulder. all of the back and the administration and halleck have basically put him on edge. we have all been there. we are really good at something until someone says, i want to it.h you be good at you are going to mess it up. this is what meade is doing. it. he finally figures out what the rebels are up to. he orders a general retreat and begins to pull his army out of the culpepper v. it is a cautious but prudent move. that is a bad place to fight. his troops are ready to tangle with the rebels again. but it makes sense. don't be in the vulnerable position. get yourself north of the river. meade? is worried that the rebels are trying to get at him with a wider march to cut him off from washington. if you are north of the rappahannock, you are prepared for either possibility. north, he loses sight of the confederate infantry. the yankee cavalry cannot tell meade anything about where lee's cavalry is. lee could be doing one of two things. he has gone to culpepper or he is outflanking me and trying to cut me off from washington. divisionloys a cavalry along the north of the rappahannock. going this way, he will run into that cavalry. nothing comes from it from half a day. bad luck for the federals. they don't see lee moving in their direction. gets nervous.ade lee is not trying to cut me off. that will look bad in the papers. in the administration. maybe i should go fight him. corps witho buford's cavalry in front. all that is there is a cavalry brigade. tryinga bad half a day to hold back a union avalanche. lee is not here. lee is not in culpepper . officers say, we know what they are doing. they are pulling back closer to richmond. armyght, he leaves his where it is, half of it north of the rappahannock and half of itself. lee startsr meade, slamming its way across the upper rappahannock. nightfall, lee is suddenly lank and on meade's f closer to the orange and alexandria than the army of the potomac is itself. meade does not find that out until 10:00 that night when a messenger finally arrives in the upper rappahannock with the horrible news. meade has to order his troops county and putr his troops in rapid retreat toward centerville. , that railroad bridge goes up in flames. railroadity for builders, they will always have bridges to be rebuilt. are moving parallel to each other. there will be some interesting action around auburn. no time to talk about that. i have 100 pages on it in my second book. a scare for the federal second corps at auburn but it manages to get away. most of the federal army is going to get out of their way. , he sees comes down the tail end of the federal debt corps and thinks it is the union rearguard. comes up fromps the south. it is a very fluid situation. the leading brigade commanders say there is something dangerous to our right. we ought to pay attention to it. hill says stop everything. let's try to figure out what is going on. he pauses for 10 minutes. he sees anderson's division coming up. he says go ahead. thee 10 minutes allow federals to get behind the railroad. the confederates make an impromptu attack. just a response to the tactical situation. they get shot to pieces. lee tries to concentrate his army before dark to attack the isolated second corps, but it doesn't happen. the federals managed to get away. meade has escaped. that his campaign has done what it can do. it is late in the year. quit fors are going to the winter campaign. again, helanked meade will just call back into the defenses of washington, d.c.. northern virginia is a wasteland. lee orders a retreat. as he retreats, he destroys the orange and alexandria railroad. he does a sherman job on it. burns the ties, melts the rails, chops down the telephone poles. he literally obliterates the railroad all the way back to the rappahannock. without it, meade cannot follow him. any pursuit happens at the pace of railroad construction. that might take the rest of the campaigning season. meade slows down. lee willar that outflank him and try to get to washington. meade does not resume his pursuit. the federal cavalry eventually pursues. that leads to the fight at buckland mills. custer saves the day because he had lingered in the rear. missonfederates managed to a chance to destroy the third cavalry division of the union army. they routed all the way back. this becomes known as the buckland races. this is the counterbalance to the debacle at bristoe station. kilpatrick has been embarrassed. he has to explain what happens. will not explain it in a way that makes him look bad. they both say, they got beat at buckland because they were supported by a line of infantry two miles long. says thank god, at last, i know where the rebel infantry is. i can go and fight them. he goes storming down to new baltimore. there is no one there. meade has landed a mighty punch into the clouds. the railroad is destroyed. he figures that is it. the campaign is over. i cannot do anything else. even lincoln agrees with them. this hurts his reputation. he things he has done the right thing. the smart thing. but the papers are lambasting it. is a modest fellow. he has no vanity. but he cared deeply about his reputation. to see that reputation trashed by people who did not understand what happens, that wounds deep ly. so, as his men rebuild the railroad he creeps south. by the end of october he is around basically on this line. the confederates are behind rappahannock. and at the end of the first week of november, you're right where you were at the end of july. culpepper.rates in meade to the north. this time lee has decided to defend the culpepper v. he learned something about meade . he's not daring. a daring up with strategist. he's going to stay in the culpepper v. how do you counteract the problem with the higher ground above the rappahannock? he is going to seize a bridgehead at rappahannock station, which is a springboard for a potential offensive. down and sees that bridgehead, he realized that lee could attack and o&antially sever the railroad. to push south, he will have to send the rest of his army where high ground makes. it very easy for the federals to get across and lee's willing to let him do that. lee would love for him to do that. if he keeps half of his army and anppahannock station, i c throw my entire army against that portion of the aop and shove it against the river and destroy it. this is a very clever trap. when meade gets to the river he recognizes a very clever trap. he tells lincoln, i should not walk into that trap. andhould take the arming ross the river at fredericksburg. i am issuing orders. i am going to do it. he very quickly says, no, you're not. i thought we had this conversation, mister. so, against his better judgment and with great anxiety, meade walks into lee's trap. and so, on the morning of november 7, 1863 he has let third -- has the third and second corps storm across the river at kelly's ford. there is the ford down there. the advantage they have. y-- the advantage they have. they get across the river. what happens at rappahannock station is one of the greatest feats of the arms in the entire war, courtesy of david russell who organizes a daring dusk attack on the confederate entrenchment. and this is sort of where the third book starts. we don't have time to talk about it here is but it is one of those stunning small battle. thatthe confederate loses bridge had -- head,. the louisiana tigers are lost here. lee's plan of defense and call culpeppernty -- in county is shattered. he is asked to order a rapid retreat into orange county. ofwe get to the middle november, and we are where we were at the middle of september. meade rebuilds the railroad bridge. brings the railroad into culpepper. but now he's under enormous pressure. he knows time is running out. winter's coming on. elections have already happened. doesn't have to worry about that anymore. and so, there's an expectation of offensive. and meade, having studied this problem two months ago in september, is ready to make a decision. he can't go around reaves' left. he is going to go right. he's going to cross the river at jacobs ford through culpepper mine ford. he's going to swing around to the west. he's going to bring his columns and tried to destroy yule's corps before ap hills' corps which is 20 miles away can come over to reinforce. a chance to destroy the rebel army in detail. you have to move fast. speed her eie is of the essence. unfortunately for meade, he tries to launch the offensive but there's rain. and the roads becomes muddy. and he has to call the whole thing off. enough of his troops had gotten close enough that stewart calvary had seen them. and lee has been anticipating that meade's going to go around. he's going to cross the river here. not anticipating he will turn west to attack the army of northern version. he anticipates -- of northern virginia. he anticipates a march south into spotsylvania county in an attempt to get between lee and richmond. lee's answer to that is the same answer he will have in may, march down the orange plank road the federal columns and stop them in their tracks. for the federal's when they finally get their advance going, things are not going to go well. so, the movement finally is launched on the 26th of november, thanksgiving take. the federals begin to move. -- the rapid dam: is stil is still up. but the real problem comes on the federal right flank, which is the third and the sixth corps. are on strongest corps that side of the advance, and leading advances major general william f. french, who has commanded the third corps since the aftermath of gettysburg. tobrought the division in reinforce it after gettysburg and he gets the job by seniority. 1837., west point good mexican war record. artilleryte an manual way to general henry hunt in charge of the aop's artillery. at the beginning of the war, he was commanding troops in texas. he refused to surrender his garrison. marched it all the way down the rio grande. put it on boats and took it to key west. impressive stuff. he gests a for date. -- a brigade. he gets a division. he gets to attack the sunken road at antietam and the stonewall at fredericksburg. and chancellorsville. none of this goes well, as you can imagine. and it has an impact on the man. and this is something we always forget when we are examining civil war history. we tend to look at most of its characters as static. what they are at the end and the beginning of the war. we fail to take into account how what they are experiencing is affecting them. a lot of generals are drunks. there is no aspirin. any pain is a bottle. and ptsd was a real thing in the civil war, too. if you have ordered your troops to attack the stone wall at fredericksburg, isn't that going to have an effect on you? some differently than others. it's injected caution into french's character, led him too heavily to the bottle. nonetheless, he is in charge of the right wing of the union army. fs corps moves late that morning and when he gets to jacobs ford, that is on private land. as most of you are seeing it for the first time. this is to the north. over that ridge. you come down to the river. this was taken last december. there's the ford itself. this is a horse ford. you can wade horses but not wagons. two army corps have a lot of wagons and artillery pieces. the real problem is even once you build the trestle to complete the bridge, you have to get up the opposite bank, and federal troops said that was the worst possible place they had ever seen. this river. and pictures never do elevation any justice, but this gives you some idea. this is almost a shear cliff down to the bottom. it's muddy, because it has been raining and the more troops that gets.r it, the muddier it you probably have to cross to the right. we went up and down that in an atv. the federalthat artillery is trying to double and triple its teams to get up. it's barely managing to do it. so, this is taking a long time. french has fallen behind schedule. when he hears that, he is serious. but, because he's behind schedule, he not only sends were to french demanding to know, why are you behind schedule, which seems unhelpful at the moment. he orders the other two columns to suspend crossing the river. for me, this is meade's great blunder in the campaign. in a campaign were speed matters more than anything. the two columns crossing furthest from the rebels are told to stop crossing the river till french can get across the river. guy who once he made his plan wanted to execute his plan. and, moreover, he is absolutely convinced if he's got to suffer the casualties of a big battle, the battle has to pay off. the only way the battle pays off is if i land one massive blow with the entire army. and the goal is to get across the river, swing west, get the army centered on robinson tavern and move the force against lee and hit hard. and so, there is a pause. night.t pause lasts till at the end of november 26, only the third corps has cross the river. has got warren across not all of the first corps has gotten across. your half a day behind schedule. of course, lee knows what's going on and he is shifting yules ford down to block the federal dance. -- the federal advance. he still believes they are going to try to go towards richmond. and hill is coming up from the south, but he is going to be almost a day behind what yule c an do. now, for the federals, the real problem is truly just beginning, because they are in the wilderness. and this area is virtually in penetrable. there aren't any roads between the plank and the turnpike and french is moving along trail and his orders are every intersection, they are to the left. when a guide is sent to french. nhenry prince is talking to a southerner. the southern union's. ebenezer mcgee, who is one of the spies for george sharp, in charge of the federal intelligence service for the army of the potomac. mcgee knows that route. but that is all he knows. he scouted it. prince says, where does this road go? mcgee can't tell him. i know how to get to my house. i never go there. prince says, you're no guide at all. get out of here. he goes blundering into the wilderness. great. uncertainty every intersection becomes a quandary. and, as a result, he is going to eventually blunder into confederates. and you're going to get a better in a place where there was never a battle intended. the rest of the federals are going to run into rebels around robinson's tavern. sykes is going to run into gordon's calvary. then the lead element of hill's corps which is hess's division and far earlier than meade intended, his columns are in action. that slows everything down. the chance to hit the rebel army while divided has been lost. the biggest spite -- fight is going to be the battle of payne's farm. five between the third corps and allegany johnson's division. and this is an. accidental battle so, this is prince coming down on the wrong road. he should be going this way. he is coming down toward the road that links robinson tavern and raccoon ford. the is got calgary in front of him who blunder into johnson and open fire. that leads johnson to halt his troops and form a liene of battle along the road. and the federals begin to deploy to counter that. it takes a long time to do this in these dense woods. lines of battle. so, this is going to burn up even more daylight. and, eventually, the federals who are deploying in an l shape are attacked by johnson. johnson does not know what is in front of him. but your line of battle is longer than whatever is in front of you. for allegheny johnson that is good enough. unlike the federals the rebels are willing to attack at the first opportunity. payne'sthey attack at farm. this open field is the top of a hill. this is lower ground. this is on the same plain. and the confederate swing into the open field to try and break the union line. they are shot to pieces in the attempt. then the federals try to cross field and the confederates shoot them to pieces. you get a stalemate and they blaze away at each other for the rest of the night. flank,re on the left maryland stewarts brigade launches an attack that breaks the federal line and drives deep down that road before it runs into ward's division and yankee artillery and they are forced pullback. farm goese of payne's on well into the night. it cost the federals about 940 casualties and the confederates 545. although after the battle was over, if the confederates are going to leave the field, this is the decisive check for the federals. a confederate division has basically stole two federal corps for most of the day. and when the rebels pull back, meade, who now is getting very nervous about what has happened and decided to consolidate his army. so, he brings the first corps up and he orders frederick over from his right. he gets his army in line. then he advances toward the confederates on the morning of the 28th, expecting the rebels to still be in front of new hope church. he's pointed hit them. but during the night lee has pulled back behind mine run, which he considers to be a temporary position. he intends to pull back even further, but it takes him a while to get his troops here. he's going to pause. meade advances the entire army of the potomac through the wilderness in a very cold rain. a front's come through. the roads are disappearing. it has got to be 28 degrees that night. water's going to freeze in canteens. moving the batteries becomes exceptionally difficult work. and, by the time that meade gets his army into position, confronting the rebels, daylight's just about gone. but the federals come up fast enough to dissuade lee from retreat because he considers that to dangerouso. -- too dangerous. he puts his men to digging in. he saw some of it a few weeks earlier after the retreat fall in rappahannock station. for the first time in the war, you get the phenomenon of an entire army entrenching. this is going to become the dominant theme of the war going forward. when the federals get up on the morning of the 29th, the confederate positions behind mine run look impenetrable. overnight. the one soldier said bridge works rose as if by magic. the terrain was more open than it is now. and the federals are going to spend the day reconnoitering. they are going to come to the conclusion that this is worse than fredericksburg. we can't attack here. but meade's determined we are going to attack somewhere. we are not turning around and going home. so, gentlemen, you need to figure out some options. and the guide comes up with the o ofon -- warren, her little round top. warren who administer that sharp rap to lee's knuckles at bristow station. they are very close friends and awrren says-- warren says, let me pull my corps out of line, and i'll go down and i will threaten lee's flank. i'll threaten lee's flank. he'll pull out. we won't have to attack this position. warren's not suggesting outflanking lee. he, in fact, as he makes his march, makes it often tasers like. -- makes it ostentatiously. let's let he rebels know we are coming. and if we get down there and maybe there is a chance to watch -- to launch the attack, then we launch it. what isery aware of going on. stewarts calvary does a great job of giving lee intelligence. warrens has been reinforced with the sixth corps. rebelcomes down on the flank, although this is taken them a long time, there is an opportunity. does got troops, but he not have a lot and they are not heavily entrenched. as warren approaches the road that would allow them to turn into the confederate flank, there is a railroad -- and old railroad that had never been built. can see it there through the woods. cavalrynfederate skirmishers in front of it and warren sees that. my god, entrenchments. those are rebel entrenchments. they knew i was coming. i don't know how many rebels are behind it but i have -- i bet a lot. he used railroad embankment to hurt lee. now reverend embankment at mine run is going to hurt meade, because there are not any rebels there. hours deploying the division to attack the railroad embankment. calvary scampers away, fires a few shot and then warren's men are on top of the embankment. there's nobody here. that's. awkward. warren gets above mine run. they are entrenched but nothing like further north. and so, warren sends back word to meade, i'm beyond the confederate flanks. reinforce me. and tomorrow morning, i will land a blow. that will perhaps destroy the army of northern virginia. meade had already decided that on the morning of november 30, he was going to send the entire army forward in a frontal attack. now he's got a better option. daring for meade. he denudes his centers. he settles the fifth corps and division offps to his right. he gives two divisions to warren. 26,000 men. warren has 2/3 of the army of the potomac's infantry to loss this -- to launch this massive attack at dawn on november 30 of 1863. warrenr -- an hour after this attack had been launched it would be the le largest attack against the army up atomic. -- fo the potomac. grant will never come close to pulling off something like this. overnight, the confederates have shifted in front of warren the troops often once again the confederates pull off their magic and they dig in like beavers. the next morning when the federal troops wake up and they are cold and hungry, meade had left his supply wakens north of the river to speed it up. carried 8 days rations. no campfires because that will give away our position. so, even though the temperatures are freezing, nobody has got coffee, or hot food. everybody is getting hundred. and they wake up -- getting hungry. they look across the valley of mine run, and the rebels are there. they are there. you've got almost a half a mile to a quarter-mile of open ground. you're going to have to come over the hill, cross the creek, climb the next hill. the rebel position is such that they can take you under fire every single step of the way. in a a lot of places there are in front.es even the skirmishers are entrenched. the confederates were so confident, there were sitting on top of their earthworks daring them. come on, yank. come on over. all the federal troops to sneak forwarding get a look at this say this is going to be worse than fredericksburg. in fact, the only thing we can hope for is the first waves will be enough of a moving earthwork that us getting shot down will allow the follow-up to get close. and now the men begin to write their names on their pieces of eirer and pin them to th uniforms so their bodies can be identified. this is ais certain disaster, but the disaster does not happen because warren, looking at this understanding his reputation is at stake, does an incredible thing. said, i can't do it. i can't waste these men. this is suicide. so, he sends word back to meade. i'm not going to attack. just as the courier heads towards headquarters, the bombardment has begun.everybody along the union line is tense. here it comes and then nothing. nothing. warren'smeade gets message, he cries, my god he has got 2/3 of my army. races down to warren furious but when he looks where warren has looked he's forced to concede, you're right. we cannot do this. for my money, this is perhaps after gettysburg, the greatest contribution that george meade makes to the union cause. he could have launched that attack. even though he would have been being, he would've gotten credit for two for being brave enough to launch the attack. his standing in the administration would've gone up and in the press, too. but he would have killed or wounded 10,000 federal troops for no gain.after another fredericksburg and mayacle, when april show up in those three-year enlistment are running out, the men who have just been through a repeat of fredericksburg reenlist. and i think the answer is most of them probably say to hell with it. no way. and they go home. you have a very different army going into 1864, than you got going into 1863. so, meade hopes to find some way to redeem this but try as he might there is no answer. he shifts his troops back around. lee, however, his actions to attack. here are the yankees. i so badly want to hit them. his officers say, no, no. another fredericksburg. think about it. wouldn't that be nice? let the enemy come to us. after meade's army digs in, throughout december 1, lee says, ok, they are not going to do another fredericksburg. i'm going to do another chancellorsville. and so, he shifts two divisions, anderson and will cox, down below the federal flank. division has's refused, they are still beyond the federal line. morning ofon the december 2 with all of the daylight available he is going to replicate what jackson did at chancellorsville in may. it doesn't happen, because during the night, while lee is shifting into position, meade is going backwards. there is a very stiff wind. the federals aren't heard. lee's own movements help to a skier what they are doing. when the confederates go forward on the morning of december 2, the enemy is gone. lee lanza below on -- lands a blow on thin air. and the federals managed to get across the rappahannock river. the consequences of the six months are monumental. first off, there is a real chance that after mine run meade 's going to get fired. friren says if i him, who will i replace it with? meade keeps his job because lincoln knows he can hand that problem off to somebody else. the guy being talked about as a replacement for hallock and that is ulysses s. grant. what do these six months mean? they rob gettysburg of all of the strategic fruit whatsoever. gettysburg becomes one more big battle that inflicted massive carriages -- massive casualties, full of drama, but takes you back to the stalemate in virginia you have had since the peninsula campaign. because of gettysburg certain things that might have happened did not happen. can we not say that of fredericksburg, of chancellor's words, of second manassas, of gains mill? it is a negative not a positive, right? so, the failure of meade's army to land a blow at williamsport and manassas, and at warrenton run,and at blow at mine mean the second half of the year has passed away. you still have a stalemate in virginia. littlefederates at very cost, the six months, 4000 casualties per side. the confederates have held the line in virginia without the casualties of a big battle. they maintain this daily. -- the stalemate. the stalemate will be and the same place when the campaigns of 1864 start. for the confederates this is a huge victory even if tactically they are the ones who twice come off on the short end, strategically, this is a success. it also shows us that lee has not change because of gettysburg. he still wants to fight the same way. he still believes in the same strategy. it shows is that george meade is not ulysses s grant but he is not joe booker or ambrose burnside. he's clearly the best general the union has had, even if he is prudent and cautious, lee said it, he will not make a mistake. make athough meade does few, he does not make a catastrophic mistake whatsoever. bigger picture. what happens in september and october of 1863? and november and december? set the stage for what is going to happen in 1864. in the tactical operation sense literally because when grant comes in to supervise the army of the potomac in the spring of 1864. its two armies are where they were when the mine run campaign had taken place. meade tells grant if we cross the rappadan. goinge cross there, lee's to play the same game and back up to miene run. what we should do is get out of the wilderness and then turn up and attack them, and grant says, that is our plan. so, grant's plan of campaign at the beginning of overland operation is to re-fight mine run better. lee's plan of campaign is to do exactly in the spring what he did in the winter. let the federals cross the river, we're going straight up this road, hit them as hard as they can. they did to the battle of the wilderness. the consequences of that battle are such as they are because grant's there. why is grant there? because in september the confederates, unintentionally, and quite reasonably made huge mistake. and that mistake was sending long street to georgia. at the time, it made perfect sense. shifting troops is to west is a lot of something -- is something that confederate leaders and generals have been saying we should have done all along time ago, instead of going into pennsylvania and fighting gettysburg. so, that decision was bold and daring. it bore fruit at chickamauga. but what kind of fuirt? not the kind the confederates wanted. to go tong street left georgia, he met with lee. it was a very emotional parting between those two men. as long street got on his horse, lee said, you must be those people out west. and long street said, if i live but i will not give a single man in my command for a fruitless victory. and chickamauga was a fruitless victory. perhaps it need not have been is they had done things differently afterwards. let's take it at face value what actually happened. of chattanooga. who was -- sent? grant. who was basically unemployed. one of the things i found in researching this is that hallock writes to rosencrantz and meade in september any says the reason the rebels are concentrating against rosencrantz is they know if meade and rosencrantz can hold their ground in virginia and tennessee, while bvanks and grant clean out the trans-mississippi, the rebel cause is doomed. 's nextock's mind, grant job was in the mississippi. if not it would be an advance on mobile. nobody is talking about making grant general in chief until after chattanooga. after that victory, suddenly let's make grant general in chief. so, chattanooga elevates grant. puts in looking over meade's shoulder and gives you overland. rosencrantz fired and sherman in charge of all of the army's heading towards atlanta. if there is no confederate chickamauga, which then would not have been if long should had not gone west, there is no see -- siege of chattanooga. that means in 1864, one of the rosencrantz takes on the drive towards atlantic. -- atlanta. meade is left alone to assume the offensive in virginia. and grant is either in arkansas louisiana are moving against mobile. and, ultimately what does that mean? we don't know. we can't know. because it does not happen, right? a counterfactual history is fun. the first step you take is on solid ground, but everything after that is quicksand. but we do know things would have been different, right? day,e end of the counterintuitively, and it is easy to understand why the south did what they did. i would have made the same decision. but, if you look back now, and probably would have been far better to leave long street in the hands of lee and let lee assuming offensive in virginia. where that takes you nobody knows, but it certainly wouldn't have wound up with you resist s grant and william sherman running the union were effort -- 1864.ort-- war effort in it is not a boring six months. and a lot happens. it does not deserve the dark hole of history has been shoved into, which is why was happy to write the book and continue to write the books to shed light on this important passage. thank you for your attention. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> learn more about the people and events that shaped the civil war every saturday at 6 p.m. eastern only on american history tv here and c-span3. >> american history tv products are now available at the new c-span online store. go to c-span store.org to see what is new for american history tv, and check out all of the c-span products. this sunday at 4 p.m. on real america, nuremberg. army documentary of the war crimes trial that uses nazi films documents and testimony to chronicle the rise germany, its annexation of neighboring countries, military invasions, war crimes, and death camps. here is a preview. >> in the name of the united states of america, justice jackson delivers his summation. >> according to the testimony of each defendant, these men saw no evil, spoke none and non-was under in -- uttered in their presence. if we combine only the stories from the front bench, this is ridiculous composite picture of hitler's government that emerges. composed of a number two man who wishr expected the je extermination program, although he signed over a score of anti-semitic degrees. -- decrees. a number three man in innocent hitler's transmitting orders without reading them like a post man. or delivery board. a foreign minister who knew little of foreign affairs and nothing a foreign policy. fiuel marshall -- field marshal who issued ordered to the arms forces but had no idea of the results in practice. thecurity chief who was of impression the policing conscience of the gestapo and s. d. was somewhat on the lines of directing traffic. a party philosopher, who had no idea of the violence which his philosophy was inciting the 20th century. a governor general of poland who reigned but did not rule. whose- of franconia occupation was to pour forth filthy writings about jews, but had any i -- no idea anybody would read them. a minister of the interior who not even whatnew went on at his own office, much less the into your of his own department and nothing at all about the interior of germany. president who was totally ignorant of what went in and out of the vaults of his bank. theyy of these men that are not guilty, it would be is true to say there had been no war, there are no slang, there has been no crime -- there are no slain. >> learn more about the rising crimes of nazi germany this sunday on american history tv. annual meeting of the american historical association in new york city, professor thomas balcerski talks about the theidence of drinking in political and social life before the civil war. host: joining us from the new york is a professor in eastern connecticut state university, the author of the book "bossom friends, the internet world of the canon and king." thanks for joining us. begin with researcher conducted on the congressional temperance society back in the mid-1800s. exactly what was that and why is it significant? dr. balcerski: yes. th
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