Transcripts For CSPAN3 National Security Officials On U.S.-Iran Tensions 20240713

Thank you all for coming today and staying for the full day and for this final panel. Im brian catoulus for the center for American Progress. Every day it seems like president Trumps National security approach seems like a daily train wreck across the board and on iran, in particular, it feels like a train wreck. But lets be clear. We are where we are today on iran by no accident. What President Trump is implementing right now is an approach which is erratic, its confused but its the product of a very concerted effort to undermine what i thought was important work under the Obama Administration. Many people in the room were part of that inside the government or outside. And we have a great panel which john has introduced and im not going to go through the bios and things like that. What were going to do today is have a bit of a conversation for a few minutes, talking about where are we and where do we go from here. Thats the main thrust, but then were going to draw you in. Theres so much expertise and its such an important issue. 2020 has started with i think a very negative, and in fact frightening note for most folks, and the centers for American Progress for years has been at the core of this. Many years ago, we released a strategy called contain and engage, and i think i saw joe here earlier, and an drink gr grotto, were authors of that. As larry said, these ideas were templates. These were ideas that offered thoughts about where to go, and i think in some ways, this informed where things went in a constructive way. But what were going to do today is assess the category 5 hurricane that were experiencing right now, try to gauge where were going to be a year from now, if we can, and talk about where do we go from here. Let me first start with anne from from rand. Lets start where we should start with iran in the region and the implications of whats happened, not just in the past week or ten days but of the trump strategy. Take us through that, and well talk about how we got here with policy, and where do we go from here. Sglf thank you for having me, and for this timely conversation. So because, i guess, weve had basically one new cycle per hour since the beginning of 2020, i thought i would start with a bit of an overview of what is going on domestically in iran as we speak, a lot going on, and then talk a little bit about the renal, and because thats region, and because thats not enough, wrap it up with the Nuclear Issue. In november, in iran, there were a lot of protests. People in the United States were wondering if the regime was about to collapse any second. The regime was very effective and efficient in tracking down and more so than it had been in the past. Over the course of 72 hours, they shot down the internet, killed several hundred people, and essentially managed to get the protests under control. Then, of course the president allowed, authorized the killing of soleimani, and it seemed like everything changed overnight where people in iran were no longer protesting corruption, mismanagement, incompetence from their own government, and they had turned their attention to supporting and rallying around and essentially protesting the u. S. Action and decision to kill soleimani. So the conversation changed massively, and of course then the irgc came out and took responsibility, kind of shockingly, its not something they typically do. Theyre not an organization that is known for accountability, taking responsibility, and they did that for a change, saying that, you know, they had down the airliner accidentally, and they tried to take responsibility for that, and tha that of course started the protests all over again, and have been ongoing since. They have been going on for three days. This as were all wondering, whats going on in iran. What do we make of it. How does it feed into u. S. Policy. As a political scientist, and someone whos been alive over the past few years, and has watched public oven kind of go up and down in this rnt ccountr think its really important we recognize how fragile and how unpredictable and unreliable Public Opinion can be and to hold two ideas in our heads that it is possible for the iranian people at the same time be frustrated with their government, believe it is incompetent, corruption, and it has put them where they are today, while at the same time, wanting to prevent a conflict with the United States just bearing in mind that for the majority of iranians today, iran iraq war is not something they read about in the history books. Its something they grew up with, their families have experienced. For them, the concept of a conflict with a superior adversary is essentially reminding them of their cities getting bombed and people having to go down to shelters to make sure they dont end up dead. So you know, they can have these two ideas at the same time. They can be opposed and frustrated to their own government but they can also want to make sure that things dont escalate and show unity and rally mind their government in the face of a foreign add verify adversary. In my view, something the administration is not doing well enough and something to bear in mind, its fine to wish for the regimes collapse and hope for a liberal democracy in iran, that is fantastic, and not to plan for it. Not to make policy based on this notion that the regime is about to collapse this year or even in a decade, and we should be really thinking about our National Security and interests and put those at the forefront, rather than hoping for something to happen. So that brings me actually to the question of the region and the maximum Pressure Campaign, and how thats been playing out. I think if were generous with the administrations maximum Pressure Campaign, we can say that it has had some tactical successes here and there. For example, if we take the administrations word at face value, you know, brian hook says this quite frequently, secretary pompeo has alluded to this. Iran may have less cash to be spending to nonstate groups in syria, lebanon, and iraq, and thats that good thing, right. But to me, the point of the maximum Pressure Campaign, again, if we take the administrations own stated objectives at face value is not to have some tactical successes here and there, its to seek a fundamental change in behavior along the 12 points that secretary pompeo has laid out. And there i think it is quite clear today that as of right now, that has been essentially a failure, that iran has not changed its behavior, in fact, it has doubled down on a lot of behavior that we find so problematic, and it has pushed the envelope in a way that it hadnt in recent years, and it has done so very visually. You know, the fact that you had the strikes against bases in iraq, directly trying to target u. S. Interests and presence in iraq is something that i think we can attribute to how, to the cycle of escalation that has brought us to where we are today. Were seeing a similar situation with the nuclear file. Iran of course announced last week in the middle of all this that it was taking the 5th and theyve said final step to dial down compliance with the jcpoa. We dont really know what that entails quite yet, and contrast to some of the previous steps that they had announced which were very practical, quite concrete. This time around, this was more of a political statement. They said that they were going to see themselves as no longer bound by the limits that were imposed under enrichment program, but they havent said exactly what theyre going to do next. We have to stay tuned and see how that plays out. What actions they actually take concretely, concretely,ny, and at least from my perspective, and a u. S. National security perspective its good news theyre continuing to work with the ieaa, not doing anything to dial down the access of the agency, and inspectors to iranian facilities and the Nuclear Program but certainly in the next few months, we will find out what they intend to do, the europeans having triggered the dispute resolution mechanism today may add more to their c l calculus, and lead them to take more action. Here too, we have seen iran doubling down and pushing the envelope on the Nuclear Program rather than scaling it back as the administration had hoped, so, you know, in general, you asked me to sort of give you my assessment. Its quite bleak. I think weve actually taken quite a few steps backwards instead of taking steps forward in terms of changing all the behavior and actions and policies that we find so troubling with iran. The risks are increased, the outcomes are close to nil. I want to turn to bill because you were of course involved with burns that led to the jcpoa ultimately. From a policy perspective, how did we get here . I mean, i think we all understand it, but then where do we go from here next, and later on in the conversation, as hard as it will be, well try to imagine where we might be in a year, but if you were advising today, how do you reel things back and get things back on track, what would you do . I think most people, first of all, that was just a phenomenal lay down and incredibly efficient as well in capturing the totality of this, so i wont go in detail through how we got here. I will just make an observation which is that the maximum Pressure Campaign three residentical is about producing the deal, the pressure is the point because the administrations view is that as long as theyre putting pressure on iran, something good is going to happen. Maybe just maybe the regime will collapse. But even if it doesnt collapse, maybe theyll come out with their hands up and agree to the 12 points or something close to them. If they dont come out and put their hands up and accept the 12 points, at least were squeezing them in ways that weaken them, distract them, make their lives more difficult both in the region and at home. So as far as the administration is concerned, leave aside their stated objective of the better deal and look at their actual objective. They feel like this is working. Theyve just got iran in a world in which its feeling pressure, feeling squeezed. Now, i think they also believe that a free iran is just around the corner, which is a dangerous assumption for them to be making right now. But thats basically the reason that we are where we are, because the Trump Administration essentially said we can impose all of this pressure and i think what they forgot was that iran wasnt just going to fold. It had cards to play too. And it had three cards. Moving the Nuclear Program forward, attacking shipping and Oil Infrastructure in the gulf, and then making life worse for the United States in terms of its presence across the region. It was the third of those and the attack, the proxy attack that killed American Contractor that led to the Soleimani Killing, but even if we set the Soleimani Killing aside, iran still has those three tools and still over the course of the coming months is likely to exercise those tools in various ways, to keep moving its program forward. To keep threatening at least the supply of energy through the gulf even if they dont take further action and to keep putting pressure on the u. S. Presence in iraq and other places. Now, the europeans came out today and basically said we see where youre going, especially on this Nuclear Issue, and we dont like it, so were triggering the dispute resolution mechanism under the jcpoa. I think theyre doing so not to kill the jcpoa but rather to try to deter iran, and to get iran back into some modest form of compliance. So its very difficult to predict where we will be on january 20th, 2021. Its hard to predict where we will be on january 20th, 2020. And a lot of us have made predictions, some of which have born out, and others which havent quite born out, but just for the sake of argument, lets assume that the jcpoa is terminal but not entirely blown up. It exists on life support, basically a year from now, that theres instability in the region but not outright war. And democratic president is elected and comes into office. I think that there are two fundamental projects that need to be undertaken simultaneously, and theyre connected to one another. The first is figuring out how you reestablish Nuclear Diplomacy in a way that isnt just going straight back into the jcpoa, calling it a day and walking away but is reentering an arrangement with the iranians on the nuclear file that also seeks to secure longer term guarantees with respect to Nuclear Restrictions. And sequencing that diplomacy at a moment when the iranians will be heading into their own president ial election later that spring will be very complicated and it will require deep consultations with our allies and partners who will have their own ideas for what to do about it, and then the second is how to think about the regional file in connection with the nuclear file. In the Obama Administration, we essentially said were going to do the Nuclear Issue and then not tie our hands one way or the other in terms of our ability to deal with irans regional activities. The trump argument is you have to do this all together as a single negotiation. I dont think the trump argument makes a whole lot of sense. The United States sitting across the table with iran, and negotiating the role in iraq or syria or lebanon, doesnt actually compute, like how do we work that out. That requires a regional negotiation that the United States can participate in or underwrite or play a role in and that should be connected to but on a parallel track from the nuclear file, and coming up with a way to sequence and engage conversations among the regional actors about what a longterm deescalation looks like at the same time that were executing a nuclear play. That is immensely complicated but i think necessary for whoever the next president is, ill and just close by saying i dont know whether to see a Silver Lining in the cloud that the saudis and the em remirates have looked at that period of instability, and put out feelers across the gulf to say hey, maybe we should find a different way forward here. That may or may not be the case a year from now, but i think we have to try to take advantage of the fact that there seems to have been a sobering up to a certain extent of the various players in the region about what a longer term outcome might look like, and we should lean into that, and not immediately assume that there is no possibility. There is no space for regional diplomacy, and i would just say, we shouldnt hold the nuclear file hostage to regional diplomacy, but nor should we see them as completely distinct. We have to some how see the text between the two and how you get into the specifics of that will be one of the big pieces of business Going Forward. Thanks, jake. Arian gave us a great picture of where we are now with iran and the region, and jake started us down the path of how we got theory, and where we go from here. I want to hit the pause button because this is an important issue i want to ask you about, and its one thats still very present right now in the congress, and its related to not just soleimani strike but strikes all around the world. As you know, you know, theres a big debate that were having in this country, and many in the room here take part in it with their expertise and thoughts and a lot of our colleagues do about who has the authority to go to war, and its a debate within our system here, in our democracy, but its also got International Legal implications. So i thought wed hit pause and say where are we on that debate. Where do you see sort of the action in congress, how do you see importantly also the International Dimension of how the United States has been conducting strikes like these, like the one against soleimani, but then if not too ambitious, more broadly, where are we in terms of constraining executive and you sat on it on the other side as the deputy National Security adviser and someone who served in the administration, and you were on the hill before too. So give us your thoughts on that, simple topic. Yeah, exactly. In two minutes or less. Right, exactly. All right. Well, let me start with the International Legal piece because i think thats worthwhile and it really connects in many represents to the policy pictures of both aryan and jake have identified. From a u. S. Perspective, the way we have interpreted International Law prvovides a basis for taking a, like the action against soleimani, only in three really circumstances. One is when you have a Un Security Council resolution that actually allows for that action, authorizes it, or in selfdefense or collective selfdefense. Right . And ill come back to that in a moment. Or when you have the consent of the country in which you are operating and the action that youre taking is otherwise lawful. Right, we know that number three is not an option here because iraq was very clear about the fact that they did not provide consent for this action, right, so we end up coming back to the second criteria, the sort of selfdefense, right, and recognizing that there are a lot of conflicting statements that have come out of the Administration Since the strike. It did seem at least at first as if they were claiming they were acting on an imminent threat in that circumstance, and under International Law the United States has taken the view that you can in fact take action against an imminent threat under International Law as well you have to do so in a necessary and proportionate way and so all three of those things are terms that people spend a fair amount of time trying to unpack what they mean, how broadly do discussed really do not necessarily add up to imminence, from my perspectiperspective, ea fairly broad interpretation by the Obama Administration. The attorney general gave a speech where he talked about the factors that you laook at for imnents ai imminence and talked about there being a window of opportunity you have to act, that if you dont act in that window of opportunity that otherwise there will be harm, essentially, there will be killing of your citizens or otherwise. And, third, the likelihood that the action that you take actually reduces the chances of further attacks coming forward. And i would say that the case hasnt been made publicly for those considerations. And so then you get to this question of even if we were acting in selfdefense in another country without their consent, is that lawful under International Law . And, again, the United States has taken the perspective that, yes, that can be lawful when you judge that that country is unwilling or unable to address the threat. So, why does this matter . I mean, i think thats one of the critical questions that people ask themselves in this context, and it matters from my perspective on a whole series of levels. One is, i actually believe in International Law. And i think International Law serves the United States in a range of ways that if we just start saying that we dont care about it or not making the case for it or all of those things that we basically deteriorate or denigrate International Law in ways and i say that this whole issue around imminence and the way in which were approaching it is one aspect of the problem. Things like tweets act the fact you could target culture sites which is a clear war crime, or you could take actions that disproportionate, also not acceptable under the law of war, you know, doing things like not giving a visa, unfortunately, to zarif, if you dont have a valid basis for doing it, all those things add up to the United States sort of disregarding International Law in ways that i think is, honestly, challenging then for our partners and allies who want to be able to stand with us and say some of these are you know, the iranian actions that are being taken are unacceptab unacceptable, are illegitimate, all those things when they have challenges with the position that the United States and the president of the United States is taking, and its also concerning for iraq, which vee l is relying on us in effect to respect its sovereignty territory. And its also deeply depressing, frankly, think for Many Service Members who are around the world trying to train other militaries on how to obey International Law when they see these kinds of things, so it matters in a whole series of different ways but i think it also makes it more challenging if were not making the case on an International Legal basis for doing this, frankly, again, to basically promote the policy that jake was identifying which is, you know, about coming back to the table, about saying that we, in fact, do respect the commitments that we sign ourselves up to, that this is something that we want to pursue seriously and do so on an international basis. So i think thats sort of a broad piece. It does, obviously, come back also to the domestic Legal Authority and there i think thats been particularly challenging as well. I mean, we know how difficult it has been, i think, for congress to assert itself and some of that blame i put on congress and some of that blame i put on essentially the way the executive branch ultimately over, frankly, decades, has sort of increased its authority and power in this space in the context of the war powers, but the way the analysis would go is essentially you would look at the action, so take the strike, for example, against soleimani, and you would say, is this action something that constitutes a war from a constitutional sense or is it something less than that . And the executive branch has set up a structure for essentially evaluating what constitutes a war from a constitutional perspective, and they say, basically, it has to do with what you anticipate to be the nature, the scope, and the duration of the conflict that is effectively planned as a consequence of this action. And if you end up in the space of its a war from a constitutional perspective then the department of justice is recognized that there is a limitation, in other words, under the declaration of war clause, the president of the United States is not allowed to act unless congress has declared war. However, there is the exception in the context of selfdefense. Right . So you have sort of that structure and there is some at least, you know, arguments over how you would define selfdefense in that particular frame. Right . Then you get to below a war in a constitutional sense, which is, frankly, every military intervention that weve seen for the last many decades, right, and what the department of justice has said is that there is a constitution that basically the president has the authority under the constitution to take action in a military operation that goes below this level, right, where its serving an Important National interest and can do so without congressional authorization in advance and then essentially will make generally war powers resolution report and then congress has 60 days, if you remain in hostilities, to determine whether or not theyre going to approve that action, continued use of force in that scenario or whether or not your troops are going it have to come back in a sense. Then, of course, there are all sorts of questions of wlorhether not you remain in hostilities. A great overview. Important to remind folks that the process we take could have more legitimacy and currently were on very, very shaky grounds. Thats the debate congress is having. Jake, you mentioned something earlier about the pathway forward. Im going to try to take us there and start with you and eye guys can jump in on it. You saw the need to bring in the regional partners and link these discussions in a sense. I think president obama tried to do this in inviting some of the leaders of the region to camp david in 2015 and talk about measures on security front, but they werent part of the nuclear deal conversation. My question is sort of i think a difficult one, policy wise, but then also politically, for progressives. How do you bring these partners along when theyre so flawed . When in their own actions, whether its in yemen war or their own support for terror with some of the countries or you see in iraq its very fragmented and theres divisions we saw on display in this vote in their Parliament Just in the past week. How do you actually execute that in this moment . How do you make sure that youre also reassuring those partners about their very legitimate security concerns without doing what trump has done, which is give them a blank check . Whether its saudi arabia or most of the gulf countries. You know, i know its a bit hypothetical where were moving from imaginary world where donald trump is to longer in the white house. How would you actually set a coherent policy process that links them in . Well, first, i do think that, for example, the u. S. saudi relationship is going to have to undergo a serious reexamination, whoevers elected, as long as its not trump. Whoever the president is is going to take a hard look at that relationship and rebalance some of the elements of it. Thats to the good. We heard halt major democratic president ial candidates speak about that in a way on the campaign trail like we have not heard essentially since the foundation of the kingdom of saudi arabia. And and that is an important and legitimate thing to do from both a values and an interest perspecti perspective. The case that i would make is that a pure kind of throwing the baby out with the bathwater with saudi and just saying, all your houses over there and forget it, it ultimately not going to be instru for u. S. Interests. Even as we hold them accountable for the ill legitimaegitimate a theyve taken. This is the ingredient we havent had the opportunity for the wherewithal or the bandwidth to pursue, we need to have an honest conversation about what the regional outcome actually could look like. Yeah. At 30,000 feet. Yeah. And be real about it. Yeah. Okay. So on the one hand you have pompeos 12 points which is im sure the saudis and the emiratis and others would say, great, the iranians o ut of lebanon cut ties with hezbollah out of syria, stop everywhere, great, perfect, but, okay, come on. Yeah. Lets have a real conversation about the fact that iran is a regional actor, will play a role in this region, and what is a role that is consistent with Regional Security architecture that can work . And that means pushing our partners not just to fall back on bromide about iranian influence, things we all agree with, saying this is how i see it working out in a way where each side is deescalating, were taking steps in places like yeppmen, theyre taking sts in syria, what have you. Thats, unfortunately, for the u. S. , part of the reason why i think that requires a regionaltoregional conversation, we cant broker this for them. Yeah. We cant improoez themimpose. We can push them, the iranians, too, to come to the table together. Yeah. Its kind of the getreal n doctrine in a way. This isnt going to happen overnight. I think wed be making a mistake if we say were going to put that on the shelf, deal with the Nuclear Program and see when happens there. I think we want to be moving both of these at the same time while not holding the nuclear file hostage to the region. Thats great. We had a panel, you participated at c. A. P. Two months ago and it was deescalation in the middle east and one of my friends joked with me about hows that working out for you . Didnt work out very well. On the panel we talked with farook from carnegie. We were talking about some of these things jake had mentioned also in his preechvious about t outreach from saudi arabia, u , uae,. Oman is constantly doing outreach, which is great, i think, and important. How do you see iran responding to this . You know, this increased tension then this outreach from some of the gulf countries. Is there an opportunity to deescalate in the region and start there first or no . I think so. Part of the iranian strategy since may 2019 has been to obviously raise the cost of the maximum Pressure Campaign for the United States, but part of it has also been to drag other parties into this tension because what had happened since essentially the beginning of this administration was that the United States was imposing costs on iran and iran was the only one that was suffering, essentially, right . And the european, of course, were upset, but, you know, it wasnt really affecting them that much. The gulf arabs were not unhappy, some of them. Oman, qatar, being sort of the emiratis were not unhappy. They had pushed for this sort of policy for a while. And i think where the iranians have actually been quite successful over the past few months is to show that, you know, this is going to have implications for the region. And thats what were seeing. Thats what jake was describing earlier on, that now were seeing them actually try to take action and try to return to the table. The iranians had been wanting to get the saudis to come and negotiate with them. And, of course, they wanted that because they felt like they were in a position of strength in the region, so lets not kid ourselves that, you know, the iranians are not doing it because theyre being nice. Its because they feel like theyre doing well in the region. But regardless, the saudis were not really reciprocating and now there is this overture, and i think its jake is exactly right that we can build on it, that we can use this opportunity and get the two sides to talk to each other because ultimately were not, you know, were not going to put a map of the middle east on the table and divide it up between the u. S. And iran. Right . This has to be a regional process and i think that this is a bit of a side effect of the maximum Pressure Campaign, but it has actually theres a Silver Lining that the region, the saudis, emiratis, are realizing that, you know, you cant kick iran out of the rere region as they did in the past. You need to sit down and have a conversation about where the region goes next. Yeah. I wish we had more time. I need to pause here and alert folks that have questions. Were going to have about 10 or 15 minutes for questions in a dialogue. I think were going run until about 5 00. So start thinking of your questions. Ive got so many more i want to pick up on in terms of policy because its such a rich topic in a short period of time, but i dont want to avoid this question, too, in terms of where are we in our National Conversation on iran and the politics and what donald trump does every day. And the question, in essence, is this. We have a lot of expertise in the room and many of which are trying to advise different candidates about how to talk about this. How do we avoid the trap of simply reacting to Donald Trumps atrocious, reckless, actions or things like his what i think is a racist tweet about the house the speaker of the house and the senate leader. How do we do this in a way that isnt just in a critical of him . We need to criticize, but how do we make this pivot and connect to some of these issues that we talked about earlier in this conference of connecting and communicating with the American Public . Because the formulas youve outlined, jake, and weve talked about, agree with, i think its smart policy but its a bit more of a political question in how do we not get caught in that trap that i think democrats were before c. A. P. Was founded back in 2002, 2003, of simply reacting to this global war on terror frame and trying to fit within that box. How do we do it also by not sounding like the status quo . Lets just go back to 2015 and thats it. I think some of your comments have all indicated we need a better Legal Framework here. We need better diplomacy and more connection with what iranian people are talking about. But how do we avoid that type of conversation where were just reacting . Im going to start i mean, i think, you know, you asked about the deescalation. Right . Hows it going, right . Here we are. Yeah. The irony, i think, to that, and very much building on arianas points, is that i think trump doesnt want the situation to escalate, even though i think there are member the of the Trump Administration that have different views on how things should evolve. Right . And yet actually by taking the maximum pressure route and not providing a diplomatic outlet, in effect, the only response, as has been identified by iran, taking, responding to economic warfare, was to do the kind of detableizing activities that we typically see them engage in which has caused us to have to escalate. Right . Because now weve sent thousands of troops to the region to try to protect our assets, our people, our, all of these things. In fact, theres a way to have a conversation about this that is both relevant to the democratic progressive base as well as to the right, in a sense, which is to say that, you know, actually, we need to have a measured approach in this space, we need to have a comprehensive policy and a real strategy that brings in allies and partners and folks in the region and so on in order to manage this situation so that were not going down this road that forced us to send thousands of troops into harms way, that actually escalates the challenge that were facing, and that means we end up spending more of our time and money and effort in this part of the world while were dealing with a whole series of really important, broad, geopolitical strategies, visavis china, other things, in this space. I think thats a that may be a way, you know, a space within which to sort of drive the conversation to indicate that theres real value in the approach that weve been describing. Just just to build on that, in terms of the how we kind of make the case to the American People because trumps argument basically is, i killed a really bad guy with american blood on his hands and people said there were going to be a lot of consequences and there really werent, its all good, its all good. People would be like okay, all right, that makes sense. I thnk our response to that has to focus on interest in the region that people can get. We dont want iran to get a Nuclear Weapon. We want to continue to take the fight to isis and dont want to get dragged further militarily into a region that brought us nothing but military heartache. How are we doing on those three things . Iran is closer to a Nuclear Weapon than before and continue to make announcements in the wake, as ariana was saying, in the wake of the soleimani strike. We suspended our counterisis operations because we got to be protecting our embassies thanks to donald trump deciding to take us down this road and by the way, iraq is talking about kicking us out, whether they do or dont, theyre going to put pressure on us to reduce our ability to go against terrorists. And in the last year, iran the United States has sent 18,000 more troops to the middle east. How is that thats all donald trump deciding to tear up the Iran Nuclear Agreement and make life worse for us on three core things that should matter to the American People. Whats his plan for any of that . For me, that gets us out of the toing and froing of what will ir iraq do next, what will trump do next . Focus people in on those interests and the before and afters. Before these werent problems. Now theyre problems because trump made them problems and he has no plan with how to deal with it Going Forward. And, frankly, i have to say i have been real i impressed with the democratic candidate response to this. Essentially across the board. I know theres been a little bit of back and forth among different campaigns, but if you think about 2004 or even 2008, to a certain extent, in 2004 everyone attacked howard dean for saying that capturie inineim didnt make america safer. Democratic candidates did. 2008 while president obama was strongly against the iraq war, of course, he felt he had to be really allin on the Afghanistan War almost to compensate because we were still in this kind of war on terror frame, as a candidate. The Democratic Candidates this time around were like, uhuh, this is crazy, lets not do this. None of them felt, i think, obliged to kind of say, you know, i dont know, maybe we have to get behind the president in what hes doing. Yeah. And i think that that shows you, first of all, where we are in a kind of postpost9 11 world, postwar on terror frame. It also shows you the Democratic Party is not going to take any guff from donald trump when it comes to trying to push them around on these issues. Yeah. Do you have anything else on this . I mean, i would highlight before we turn to questions the polling which we talked about we did last year demonstrates what both of you just said. That theres actually more consensus between sort of the more progressive what we call them global activist camp and those traditional internationalists on these issues, that its important, i think, in the fight against arguing against trumps conservative nationalism to remember what sort of the common ties there are and the common arguments even in the midst of a very sort of tough primary fight for folks. So lets open it up. We got a few questions. Time for questions here. Raise your hand. Tell us who you are and your affiliation, and if you want to direct your questions to a particular panelist. Hi, my name is kathleen kennedytownsend. I would love to hear what you think is going on with iraq. Are we going to pull troops out . Are we going to stay there . Iraq. You want me to start . I mean, i ill start with i think its very hard for me to imagine that were able to stay at the presence we are right now or in the way, in the frame, that we are right now. I mean, i think the domestic politics are really challenging, obviously. The Council Representatives have passed, you know, this vote that basically says u. S. Troops have to leave. The Prime Minister is in a particularly weak scenario, you know, as anning aing ca ing act essentially, of the government and so on, you know, he asked for a delegation of folks to come over to talk about the reducti reducti reduction and evacuation of troops in a sense, and i think, you know, so there is going to have to be some version, essentially, some appropriate, you know, work done on what a new presence might look like, if at all, and, you know, that is somehow satisfactory to the domestic politics that theyre managing right now. Even though i think there are people in the Iraqi Government that would like us to remain in some form. I think its also, you know, this situation is, again, ironic in the sense that soleimanis greatest wish, right, with respect to iraq, was to get us out. And, yet, thats exactly what this situation is ultimately leading to in some form. And moreover, you know, there are other forces at work here whereby we certainly saw the russians try to move in, essentially, in terms of their influence in this space and i suspect theyre looking at this as an opportunity to do some more of that. The Nato Training Mission has been suspended. You know, so effectively, our fight against isil is now, you know, significantly affected, if not at a standstill. So i think, you know, and that affects iraq and their security and their ability to manage the situation within their own threat. So none of this i think has been good for iraq or our relationship with iraq and i think were going to face a fair number. Anyone else . If i could adjust an endorsement of our colleague, daniels, analysis on iraq. Its terrific. Hes written a number of articles. Its terrific. It shows you sort of the investments, though many of us were against the iraq war, the Obama Administration, those who went in, theres a deep understanding of the complexi complexities there, and then the second thing id just say is, you know, you saw the reporting this morning, but just we were minutes away from apparently from independent reporting from americans actually being killed tuesday night and that would have been a horrific moment. Horrific. So this fiction of training versus combat troops that the formulation, which ive used before in the past, that incident demonstrates how slippery and difficult it is for those thousands of soldiers who are out there. Rob . Hi. Im rob from the future diplomacy project at the belforsebelfor center at harvard. Yoil speak up a little bit . Sure. Ariana, you explained how the Regional Response recently in the last few months has been to seek a modus with iran of sorts. Paradoxically, that came about as a result of what was perceived to be a nonu. S. Response after uptake in saudi arabia and other attacks on u. S. Shipping. In response, the killing of soleimani was an overcorrection of what had been seen as an underresponse. So, jake, you kind of mentioned in a future administration the need to return to diplomacy, but while we were busy watching soleimani, trump aggregated 40 years of bipartisan policy first in, you know, as the Carter Doctrine which was to protect the flow of shipping in the gulf. Do you see the democratic response to be to reestablish the carter docket ratrine and he gulf be of vital interest to u. S. Policy or it would seem to me easy to slip into, in a sense, a continuity with what trump has actually started which was, if you will, more consistent with what could be framed as a retreat from the region or a pivot away from it. Look, i think there is a general sense on the democratic side across the candidates that the United States needs to really followthrough on the concept of rebalance and put more emphasis on a Great Power Competition with china and russia on climate change, on global corruption efforts, on a whole series of things that dont implicate the security situation in the middle east. And so there will be a gravitational pull away from the United States kind of making the flagship kind of Foreign Policy and National Security initiative of the new administration be some major play in the middle east. However, i also believe that all of the democrats are deeply invested in the diplomacy that led to the iran deal and in reviving the basic bargain of Nuclear Restrictions for sanctions relief that lay at the heart of that deal, in stopping iran from getting a Nuclear Weapon through peaceful means, and that the situation they will confront in trying to disentangle militarily from the region actually presents opportunities for diplomacy that, again, are not should not be held hostage to but can be connected to that nuclear engagement that i think are pretty pretty appealing type of diplomacy can come out of this where its not just the United States, i mean, many other actors, not just the regional players among themselves, obviously the russians are a factor in the region and other countries, too. So i think in a funny way even though there will be this kind of psychological shift away from the middle east toward other things, there will also people will see the genuine opportunity for oldfashioned american diplomacy to play a real role in not just securing a Nuclear Agreement Going Forward but also in dealing with this set of issues around the region that if we dont have some answer for, well find a way as they did at the end of the Obama Administration of pulling us back in. The only thing standing between us and drinks is kelly. The hour reached us at 5 00 p. M. You have final remarks . Katrina mulligan. Katrina mulligan. Ive been known to make mistakes before. So please join me in thanking the panel first. [ applause ] oops. And welcoming katrina mulligan. Thank you. Thank you, guys. On that theme, as the person with the responsibility to stand between you and drinks and knowing better than that given that we all could use a drink after the year we just had, im just going to get a few thank yous out of the way. Events like these, as you guys know, dont plan themselves and we had a tremendous team here at c. A. P. That helped to put this together. I want to first thank all our speakers and panelists for taking the time out of their day. The c. A. P. National Security Team and in particular alex schmidt who did a lot of the laboring or making this event happen. [ applause ] thank you. C. A. P. s leadership team, in particular, gordon gray and n r neera tandon. Last but certainly not least i wanted to just thank kelly magsemen whose leadership [ applause ] yes. Kellys leadership and vision is what we all execute against every day and so were just really grateful to have that. But also id be remiss if i didnt express some thanks to all of you because the progressive National Security Community Today really came together with a lot of enthusiasm and willingness to lock arms and to contribute ideas toward a more stable and prosperous world. And im glad that most of you have stayed all the way until the end and i dont even think it was just because we had National Security cookies on the way into this panel. And so this is just the beginning. We are going to be having this conversation over the next coming weeks and months as we head into 2020 in earnest and there will be further opportunities to engage with us as we start to put pen to paper around some of the ideas that were generated today. So with that, i would like to invite all of you guys to head upstairs for the reception which is being cohosted by out and National Security, and thank you very much for being here today. [ applause ] the impeachment of President Trump. Watch unfiltered coverage of the senate trial on cspan2 live as it happens and sameday reairs. Follow the process on demand at cspan. Org impeachment and listen on the go using the free cspan radio app. Over the next two weeks on q a were focusing on the New Hampshire president ial primary and the iowa caucuses. Sunday night longtime New Hampshire Union Leader Publisher and noweditor at large Joseph Mcquaide talks about this states president ial primary history and current state of politics in New Hampshire. New hampshires always different. I think it appreciates being first and people turn out. Its one of the highest turnout states, at least in primaries, in the country, and if it was o so, you know, too white, not representative of the country, then with the exception of bloomberg who has not cited that as a reason, but why are all these other candidates coming to New Hampshire . Watch sunday night at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspans q a. Were asking students to tell us the issue they want the president ial candidates to address in the 2020 campaign. And with the january 20th deadline for this years student cam competition approaching, students from across the country are putting the final touches on their entries. 100,000 in total cash prizes plus a 5,000 grand prize. For more information, go to studentcam. Org. Next, idaho governor brad little. He gives his state of the state address from the State Capitol in boise. The governor talks about his administrations efforts to cut regulations, bring more transprnsy to the budgeting process, education, and infrastructure. Mr