Good morning class and welcome back to history 3290, modern American Military history. Today, we are going to continue our conversation about the second world war. And, specifically we will look at an aspect of the war through what we call the lens of industrial mobilization. And, industrial mobilization is often understood as the key to allied victories in this ward. It is often said that the allies win because they out produce the axis powers. Im sure many of us have heard this before and perhaps encountered it or read it. But, one of the problems with that line of reasoning is that if it is simply an amount of stuff that produces victory. But at the beginning of this war the axis powers possessed more. So that cannot absolutely establish ultimately the trajectory of allied victory. Because, the allies for a long time are deficient in that quantity of stuff. The other aspect of the material argument, if you will that the allies out reduced and overstated and under simplified. In a almost all literature related to the war is that we have no clear sense of how the stuff is built. Now, there are historians of technology who write about particular kinds of technology. But, most of the discussions of war assume that technology is built. The arrival of Weapons Systems on saline, the aircraft that flight over, or the Landing Craft that arrive on shore. We just assume they are built and we have very little intricate understanding of these processes that would ultimately, as i would ask translate strategic requirements in battlefield weaponry. A much more elaborate process and we have considered. Today, our goal is to look at an aspect of industrial mobilization. Specifically through a case study that i have investigated white extensively in navy, and marine corps archives and other collections. To understand how one particular vehicle, which you see on screen, the amphibian tractor, and how it was built. For the purpose of fighting and winning not only world war ii, but specifically world war ii in the pacific. This is one particular model, and in the backdrop you see a battle lazing away as troops are being conveyed ultimately to japanese held chores on iwo jima. Near the end of the war in the pacific. It is my argument that this amphibian tractor and the little box that it was ultimately presented victory in the pacific. It is the singular vehicle that could actually deliver american troops ashore along many coral fringed islands that the japanese possessed in world war ii. If you could get them ashore, you can fight and win. If you are a soldier or american strategic planner, i want us to examine this particular case study. I would argue the amtrak is the pivot around which allied victory turned in the pacific. We will consider this and to borrow from this notion of the hobbit a little bit, or there and back again. We will look at what we can call from the factory to the front lines. This process whereby folks in the home front, in the Navy Department and the headquarters marine corps would be working in concert with industry to actually build more specific materials. And then, to figure out how it works and to translate those challenges and problems, deficiencies and possibilities into revised Vehicle Designs, revised operational concepts and ultimately, we will see there is a dialogue between the folks at home and the folks overseas. By way of historiography, a term we are already familiar with, but to reiterate briefly for our purposes we could consider historiography the writing of history. And, what i would characterize much of the writing about were to is establishing what we call a tyranny of the Assembly Line. What i mean by that is, we almost always when we see pictures of Assembly Lines assume that is where everything is built. We have seen many pictures like this im sure, where there are Assembly Lines for aircraft being built, heavy bombers for example, or tanks, or in this case Landing Craft on the left of the screen. The buys for presuming that everything that is important in terms of industrial mobilization really happens there on the factory floor. I want to complicate that a bit today. The other part of this historiographical omission, or this lens toward simplification is that we assume that things are built. We see pictures of them and we know they were built. So often, we read war back as inevitable. We read the process of construction as logical, as necessary, and we often assume that things will be billed. The next model will be better than the previous model. It is just obvious it would be that way. But, in reality we will find that in our case study today, there is nothing inevitable whatsoever about the military construction of an amphibian tractor. Nothing whatsoever. In other words, it is up to a variety of factors contingent forces, and what historians like to call agents. Individuals involved in these processes. Lets consider how and where the amtrak would be billed. I have given you a handout already and on the top flight it indicates basically these questions here. These are some of the questions that illuminate this process of what i find we are missing in this story of industrial mobilization. Often, what we overlooked are the people involved in these processes that make critical decisions. To build or not to build, when to build, what to build, as well as the organizations charged with determining such issues as where to build, what to build, and how to build it. One of the Big Questions that start this process is simply who envisioned the strategic requirements . Such as, in the war in the pacific. We all know already that american war planners, especially in the navy and marine corps were long anticipating a war with japan. From the early 20th century. So what do you need in order to accomplish your strategy . What technologies might you require . Whether it be ships or transports or Landing Craft, or in this particular case an amphibian tractor. Who determines what is needed . It is dependent on part on what their imagination and creativity is, and what the realm of possibilities are. Another question is involved in what we call opportunity cost. We could reconcile what economists often call opportunity costs. Is awkward as a phrase as opportunity cost is, we also are familiar with the basic premise. That is if you choose to do something, you forgo the opportunity to do Something Else by virtue of being in class today, you are not out snowboarding. And, whether that is a good decision, i cant say. But nonetheless, in military terms i can say that planning for world war ii and in during the war itself, there are a host of decisions made. If you build this, you might not be able to build Something Else. So, we have to figure out who makes those decisions of what to build and when not too. Related to this process of industrial construction, and that the Assembly Line that was a picture of a moment ago. The Assembly Line is invariably what the navy called the prime contractor. That is the final assembly center. The Assembly Line where things are already built in other locations, such as the transmission, the radiator, the brakes, the machine guns are manufactured in other plants. By whom . The contractors. And in the case of the amphibian tractor, there would literally be hundreds of subcontractors for this particular vehicle. And frankly, it is no different for the tank or any variety of tank or aircraft. There is a prime contractor that assembles the things together, ultimately for use eventually. But, there are dozens if not hundreds of subcontractors building the constituent parts and relaying them, usually on rail to the final assembly center. And before the subcontractors even build things, they need Raw Materials. Where do you get the copper, the still . And all of these essential ingredients to manufacture these brake pads, or the boxes, or the steel frame for the amphibian tractor . Where does it come from . Know that ultimately this question of sourcing and supply and the process or steps to build it is a vastly elaborate and intricate system. And how much harder in an era without the conveniences of say, computing technology. People had to make phone calls and right letters. By way of example, the navys bureau of ships, which was the Agency Responsible for building the amphibian tractor, for every week of the war, every week of the war there is a folder, a jacket of more than one inch of written correspondence back and forth between the navy and its ancillary organizations. Between contractors and subcontractors, and all sorts of interested parties. That is for every week of the word. You can imagine this vast sea of communications required to build something in one sense, relatively simple, a vehicle. You would think it would be simple. But, it is being built at the cicely the same time as a host of other more urgent materials and programs are competing for priorities also. You might imagine battleship construction or Aircraft Carrier construction necessitates certain material that the amtrak could make use of. Or aircraft or tanks. Who determines what gets what and in what priority . Those are essential questions we rarely consider. With respect to this notion of procurement, of acquiring things, one of the key terms in this era was bottlenecks. Bottleneck, bottleneck, bottleneck. There are all these chokepoints in which construction could be derailed for want of a nail, you could say. Or for want of a ball bearing or a critical component. If certain points do not receive certain components, that vehicle doesnt get built. Maybe you could complete 90 of it, but if you dont have the other essential components because maybe a factory wasnt able to provide it for want of enough labor, skilled labor, or enough Machine Tools or Raw Materials, or any of those reasons, or all of them this particular contraption might not actually roll off the Assembly Line and reach forces in the field. Those challenges were ones that all of the war services and all of the pieces would have to recognize. Some did it other than others. The United States will do it quite well, as complex as it is. Part of the reason it is able to do it a little better than other countries is because the homeland is not being blasted to smithereens, as in the case of parts of britain, or certainly german, or japan, or russia. The image in the upper right is a small screenshot of correspondence from the chief of the bureau of ships, this agency challenged with Building Navy material, warships and such small things as this tractor. It is informing its constituent parts that basically, ultimately through the machinery corporation, which will be introduced to shortly the contractor is charged with constructing en masse and it will not deliver according to schedule. A problem is a foot and they need to resolve it. Time and time again, this question of bottlenecks appears as contractors were unable to meet the voracious appetites of the Armed Services for various specialized equipment. Another kind of question that is related to the building of a tank or an airplane or a Landing Craft or vehicle, is who determines how is it going to be used . Which structure does it fit . What is the doctrine that animates its use . How do the services, in the case of maybe a marine corps craft, how does the navy understand its use . Are the navy and marine corps relationships going to be formed in ways that you could actually make optimal use of this contraption, rather than have problems that create great inefficiencies and maybe death on the battlefield . There is a host of people at work trying to resolve these questions. How do you train somebody to drive a tank or an airplane, or an amphibian tractor . What does that involve . What kind of manuals do you need . Drivers manuals, if you will . Who takes the pictures of the arrangement of the consul, the dash, where the gauges are . Such simple things as photographing and building Operations Manuals is part of this process of industrial mobilization. Because, if you dont have trained crews, they dont know how to work these things. And so, from the minutia of such things as a manual to the greater complexity of building and mass, all of these questions come into bear when we are considering industrial mobilization. And of course, if there are problems, who resolves them, and at what pace . Can they be resolved . Are they decisions that need to be made at the highest level . Are they made at lower levels . Who is responsible . All of these questions surface in the arena of mobilization. So, thinking about that lets take a big picture approach and we will consider first a series of requirements, and then we will work into a series of what we can call production challenges or the production puzzle and we will examine certain things in what we call deployment. Starting first with requirements. The big picture, part of the puzzle is that ultimately, the u. S. Navy and marine corps identified that they would have to cross the Pacific Ocean in event of war with japan. The expectation as we have identified in previous classes was that the American Service fleet would engage the Japanese Navy and hopefully destroy it. Of course, we call that workplan orange, ultimately. Part and parcel to this big picture of crossing the pacific is something the u. S. Marine corps studied intensely and this is the problem of basing for structure. How do you defend basis . Like midway, the philippines when you expect the Japanese Forces are probably going to conquer them . How do you defend them . The marines studied this problem of advanced base defense for the early part of the 20th century, especially up to the teens. Then, they really start to reorient towards what we call amphibian assaults. Not simply defending your own base, which you probably lost, but fighting to get it back to conquer new territory. That process of Amphibious Assault is a critical one that the marines will elaborate on. We talked about a pivotal figure in the early 1920s. But one of the critical problems was, how do you get your forces to shore . From chip to shore . With combat power, i might add. We are not talking about a leisure cruise or a pleasure cruise. You have to fight your way to shore in the age of the machine gun. And the british had already discovered in world war i the problems with confronting a heavily fortified beach. In this particular case, a battle called gallipoli led the british to discover to their display dismay that rowboats dont work well in the age of the machinegun. Well into the 1930s, the marine corp. Pretty much has rowboats. Realizing that the technology that they possessed would not permit them to actually accomplish their mission. This was a glaring source of concern to all of the marines studying these problems in the pacific in the early 20th century. I have focused a little inset here of an cluster of islands. In the bottom left corner is a little tiny island. This little tiny island would prove absolutely important for the testing of Amphibious Assault techniques and to the progression of American Forces across the pacific. In anticipation of that, how do you cross the coral reef at low tide, if there is a low tide . You have both that are going to run afoul of the coral. And the coral will probably in many places is 400800 yards wide. Can you imagine the challenge of finding that you have to climb out of a Landing Craft onto a coral reef which will still have some water on it with ocean currents. And having to lumber across the coral reef, dropped into the lagoon, which might actually be around eight feet deep, right off the reef. Dropped into that with the pack and rifle . And somehow managed to hold your breath while you are waiting ashore. And as you wade ashore with the water as it is receding, you are getting shot at by machine guns, by mortars and other kinds of weaponry. It is a recipe for disaster. And so, aware of this tactical challenge, to cross coral reefs the marines tried to study this problem. The challenge for them was that they were unable to convince the navy that this was a problem. So, we will see how that works. We could post this question, how would the navy and marine corps reconcile their opportunity cost and the resource constraints to meet these requirements . For mechanized Amphibious Assault . After world war i concluded, we talked about the washington conference and how the u. S. Navy was restricted by treaty regulations or prohibitions on how big the surface could really be. In the midst of that budget terribly austere environment, while the navy is appreciating how much is evaporating out of their hands in terms of worship tonnage, the marine corps was approached by an industrial designer is highlighted in another class, named walter christie. He built this amphibian tank on his own dime with the hopes of securing work contracts. There, you see a marine testing it in the caribbean in the early 1920s. The marine corps would have loved to buy one, but for want of a nail, for want of a dollar. The navy at this precise moment was not inclined to spend any money whatsoever on the marine corps, especially on an innovative, unproven box, ultimately. So, the marines had to tear down this opportunity to build what they thought might actually provide them the means of defense, as well as to create the firepower to roll their forces ashore. They had great forces for it. Note, they were not building it themselves. The industrial designer on his own dime had come up with it. But, the navy would rather die ships build ships like the arizona. You better. In that era, very much marine corps appropriations, budgetary programs, and new types of programs were subjected to ultimately navy wims. Just like walter christie, another industrial designer, an innovator who is actually not looking to make a buck, because he is already rich. His name was donald rutland. We can see him in the middle. He has the dark pants on and is close to the fellow in the white. But, here we have a couple different designs that he built. Types of what he considered to be a swamp rescue vehicle. Where is he living at the time . He was living on the gulf coast of florida, close to tampa. And he lived in a town called clearwater. The reason he is wealthy has to do a lot with his engineering inclinations and aptitude. Roebling had a family who had already constructed the brooklyn bridge. They were engineers, inventors, they built still cable suspension systems and pioneered construction. He retired in florida. And in the midst of the Great Depression in 1930, in the midst of hurricanes that displaced people and stranded them in the middle of swans, and what roebling came to appreciate is that it was difficult for rescuers to drive a truck through swampy terrain, or to get a boat through some of the mangrove roots. As a result, people died that didnt necessarily need to die for want of a rescue amphibious machine. He took his own money and invested in building this contraption. An earlier model in the backdrop and later models that he would cannibalize and improve continuing designs. Ultimately, this vehicle is built for saving people in the everglades, or saving people in lake okeechobee. It is not for military purpose. That is not his vision. It so happens that life magazine or trade several pages of roeblings contraptions. Diving off the seawall into tampa bay. Of climbing up into the swamps and around the rugged terrain. Low and behold, a navy admiral in san diego saw it. And he had been working with the marine corps for some years on landing processes, on amphibious operations. It was possible the marines could make use of this. What does he do . He posits his copy of life over to a marine corps general and he said, this might be what you are looking for. What the general little do . He sent it to the marine corps in washington, dc. He said, we need to investigate this roebling design. It could be the alternative for the vehicle we never built. So, life magazine opened a new door. Ultimately, know that at precisely the same time that life magazine would publish this exposi, the Japanese Forces were in the midst of conquering shanghai, invading china in a bid to conquer it. So in the sense of an acute sensitivity in the process of war in asia was flamed at the very moment japan is invading china and the marines understand there might be a technical solution to this ongoing, unresolved problem. How do you cross a coral reef at low tide . The challenge of course, was how do you convince somebody to make war machine . If they hadnt made it for that purpose . The team that actually arrived at roeblings estate in clearwater, florida was that he was happy to talk to the marine corps. He was very cordial, but he didnt want to turn his want t machine into a war machine, and a year later as war clouds continued to darken into 1938 to 39 and it was obvious war had engulfed europe and had already engulfed parts of africa, was stretching across china, robeling consented to allow the navy and marine corp to use his design with the goal of massproducing it. The challenge was, hed built one. Yeah, hed built several prototypes but hed just built one. And when the navy approached him and said why is it 910 wide, because the navy is always concerned about the dimensions of craft and whether they can fit into the hold of cargo ships, whether they have cranes that can support the weight of a particular vehicle or craft or if theres an elevator big enough to help it to basically put it into the sea. Robeling answered that question fairly simply. Because the gates outside my estate are 10 feet, and the gate of my garage opening is 10 feet wide, so ive got to drive in it there. I need a little inch on each side, so hes serious. In that sense robelings understanding of design was very much what we could call a silicone valley builder. Hes tested it in his swimming pool, off his beachfront estate. He doesnt even have blueprints. Does he have the parts or talent to build it . He has some of it himself but he orders some of it out of automotive catalogs, he contracts with local firm, he hires a team of engineers and spends a lot of money in the Great Depression i myth add. Now with respect to this vehicle robelings built one, and ive highlighted in the bottom of the slide that once war explodes in europe shortly after poland is congered by nazi forces, by the soviets, too, bury chips allocates money for the marine corp to acquire one, one vehicle. Thats it, one. Over the next year as things darken even more, the bureau ships and robeling will agree to build 200. The challenge is he has no clue how to build them. The challenge then for the navy and for robeling is to actually deliver on the contract. Will 200 be enough . Probably not. So this pathway of mass production was initiated in part to the observation of one officer of something in life magazine. Was it inevitable that the marine corp would actually have an amphibian tractor, by no means. You could call it chance or providence. Ultimately we need to figure out this dynamic of why the navy would choose to invest in the m amphibian tractor. By the time of 1941, by the time of 1941 nazi forces controlled the continent of europe, and it was clearly evident to the navy at this point if they were going to find their way in europe again, the American Forces will have to fight their way ashore. So the navy comes to aappreciate the need for specialized Landing Craft and landing vehicles and the needs of projecting power ashore. Its a lot more acute at this moment, and it so happens that at precisely this moment the budget sky rockets. Defense appropriations in the United States go from hovering around about billion to more than 6 billion virtually overnight. So the navy has money to spend and it has the awareness that it needs to provide its amphibious forces the means to get ashore. But how do you massproduce something, especially when the one design that you have has been scratch built in the garage . Enter a Food Machinery corporation or fmc, and this map here depicts basically fmcs operations, its various industrial plants and facilities at about this very time. Donald robeling had worked with fmc in the 1930s to scratch build some of these parts for his prototypes. Now, what is fmc . Food machinery i might add with headquarters and operations in citrus grove, rich places such as florida and Southern California especially. Also what it builds is pesticide sprayers, irrigation equipment, machines to harvest and pick fruit and to package them. But robeling has a preexisting relationship with fmc. They have a small facility in florida which is really close to clear water, and so he and the navy approach fmc. You have corporation, you have factories, you produce things, could you retool perhaps and build four machines . To his credit paul davies the then president of fmc depicted on the left, he had an opportunity to serve the nation and to serve fmcs interests as well, shareholders. And so paul davies said, sure, we can build this thing. Well partner with robeling and the navy, well massproduce the landing vehicle tract, the amtrack as it came to be called. Davies appreciated fmc had no experience in building vehicles. He has a few key people that worked up in the industrial belt and facilities such as in lancing, michigan, but hell hire people to build war machinery. But one of the key misconceptions about war production is usually you can only do one of two things. Its this or that, either or. You can do guns or butter. In the case of fmc in one sense its involved in the butter industry, involved in agriculture. Whats striking about the way in which fmc mobilized for amphibian Tractor Construction is that it did want stop its agriculture production business whatsoever. It did both, and this is how. One of its new factories it would build in lakeland, florida, specifically to build an amphibian tractor designs. And in the clearest cases, in california, the fmc factory would build an entirely new factory for amphibian production on exactly the opposite side of the rail line that ran right up to the back of the Food Machinery corporation warehouse. So in other words fmc had always bimt its factories close to a rail line so it could simply offline equipment it mafred, put them in rail cars and ship them away. In this case when it got its work contracts from the navy it built new factories just on the opposite side and expanded its operations and was able to actually do both. In fact, from the federal government it received tax breaks. They had to file what are called certificates of necessity and such. And these would facilitate industrial mobilization for war purposes where companies that did not necessarily make war machines could entertain the costs and minimize the costs of starting a war machines business. And thats just what fmc will do. Now, with respect to this elaborate network of just fmc production, the navy appreciated fmc to its best interests could never build all of the vehicles envisioned. And so they found other prime contractors like the saint louis car corporation, among others. Fmc was always the primary lead in this field of development, but there were other major manufacturers that would build amphibian tractors. Of course, theres hundreds and hundreds of subcontractors that filled these specialized parts needs, transmissions, radiators, clutches and the like. And of course a whole elaborate network of Raw Materials providers, too. It was really up to the navy, however, to figure out how to ensure this system of supply and procurement actually worked well. Now, with respect to Production One of the challenges in the midst of all of this is could the navy and marine corp actually get what they want in the time that they needed in anticipation of future operations . One of the challenges for all industrial operations in world war ii for the United States and other warring powers was providing the necessary workplaces to create the talented work force, the specialized workers that can r could do the work. To allocate the appropriate Machine Tools because if you dont have certain laves and other equipment for casting and such, you cant make enough equipment. And so finding the Critical Resources human and otherwise to actually construct specialized machines was of the utmost importance but a challenge for the government as a whole. The u. S. Government as well as every other war government was to identify which people to conscript and not. Which people to allow to volunteer in the armed forces and not. And in the case of myograph there in the middle and his brother tommy, just before the war theyre working at an automotive shop, the mechanics, and they choose to join the marine corp. But the question their very lives suggest is would they have been better served working in an fmc plant perhaps than serving in the marine corp . All in government had to make those decisions about who not to let serve in uniform. Whether you work in a creamery, whether you worked in a lumber mill, there are a hosts of specialized civilian fields that necessitated continuing production and fmcs very experience of doing both, guns and butter suggests how the u. S. Government tried to balance military need with ongoing domestic priorities also. Farm tractors will always be one of the top ten programs during world war ii domestic Farm Tractors out of appreciation you need to feed your own people to keep the war effort functioning. And historians such as richard one of the reasons is they bett better formulated their economies for endurance, longterm affairs so that theres wellfed people, theres abundant resources. The challenge is ultimately it takes a long time to do well both. And the pictures of the amphibian tractor theres donald robeling near the front of his vehicle in tampa bay. But the challenge is how do you take that one design and turn it into a vehicle for war . Those are other complexities to this production puzzle. How do you know what youre building is the best thing that you can build . This particular backdrop photo is actually of another amphibian design. Its not a tractor, its a wheeled amphibian designed by a new orleans shipbuilder. The higgins boat would become one of the mainstays of americas amphibious forces. Tom hanks would charge off the german held beaches in saving private ryan. More successful than christy but interested if anything in patriotic as well as profitbased motivations. Christys not looking or robelings not looking to make a but. But then a captain in the marines but ultimately would become a general. But crulack, the suspension was problematic, they were prone to overheating these vehicles were, they broke down too quickly. In other words, there were a hosts of deficiencies with robelings early designs. So when crulack was discussing these with higgins in new orleans he said well maybe instead of a tractor design because theres so many moving parks in which sand can if filtrate and jam up the roller bearings and such, could you build a wheeled vehicle, and higgins on his own dime does that. He builds several prototypes. And the photograph up here depicts ultimately some of the trials the higgins industry agents and members of the armed forces were investigating the vehicle. The challenge for higgins at this moment, hes got a design and by all reports the navy and the marine corp identify his design as superior. Superior to donald roblingss can you switch gears and the navy decided it could not. By 1942 it had already invested too much, in the blueprints, in the processes for industrial moebization, mass production of robelings and higgins tractor. This is what i would call standardizing. You know its deficient, you know its got problems. Youre not going to solve all of them in model 1. 0, but in order to have any cooperatequantity o you need to start building. Crulack explained to me years ago the reason being as much as i hoped higgins design could replace this one, we couldnt make this ship in design philosophy, we couldnt switch gears that much. One of the complexities also is not just building final product but how many spare parts do you need inultimately the navy concludes for every 25 amphibian tractors you need basically another one full of spares to cannibalize and replenishish things that are breaking. Its also a question of how many spare parts, how much training, how much investment have you paid into this particular industrial program. And the navy concluded, no higgins amphibian. Who in the navy makes these decisions . Id like to introduce you to a fellow. He fell into an interesting position as an individual called a supervisor of ship building. Now, we dont hear about supervisors of ship building in the grand tales of naval history in world war ii. We hear about battles such as midway or the coral sea or such. But he was ultimately cast to a desk job, state side where he worked for the duration of the war. And what his job was ultimately to be the liaison between the bureau of ships and fmc and other contractors to actually build the amphibian tractor. His job was literally to translate the strategic requirements such as we anticipate that we need 5,000 of these or 10,000 of these vehicles in anticipation of the next Campaign Season where were going to rip into the Central Pacific or march from the southwest pacific forward. We need a certain quantity. And he would articulate that, work with fmc and its designers, its corporate bosses to adjudicate their concerns and massproduce such things. Prifold just by way of illustration, i found him by looking through bureau of ships records and seeing his name come up again and again and again and was intrigue bide how influential he was, so i reached out and found his daughter who provided me this photograph here. And this photograph was signed by his boss and what it is a picture of a particular island. And what it says here is dear george you may enjoy sharing with me the certification of these marines at your most outstanding contribution of developing the alligator and its progeny were the most important factor in putting them on pacific island. North dakota, if it wasnt for you, we dont win. If its not for the home front and this harmony of translating strategic requirements into Industrial Production the United States doesnt win war in the pacific. Its up to individuals reconciling, negotiating, providing the Liaison Services between industry and the armed forces to ensure that things were built according to the needs that the services identified. And there are a few other kinds of jobs. One called inspector of material. These would be often Navy Personnel assigned to factories. Sometimes they had their offices in these factories and they would work in concert with engineers and draftsman and others literally designing these vehicles to identify what the defects were and more over what they should do about them. Guess what the inpresumption is that Lessons Learned in the field actually made a difference in Vehicle Design back home. And you would home that that would be the case, that if you identified if troops in the field detected problems with these vehicles or any vehicle or Weapon System that their reports would find satisfaction and answers by factory designers that would make better models. Truth be known in the case of the amphibian tractor and i suspect its the case with most Vehicle Designs, the individuals who best appreciated its weaknesses were the designers. They knew their inadequacies keenly. But in the interest of mass production they had to table their advances they could resolve quite yet. Well work on that but for the moment were going to produce this line for the vehicle. And so the designers were already anticipating the service needs. And the folks in the field would say this week breaks down, its prone to this, it has this problem. And theyd file detailed reports after most major operations. You know, we need more armor, more armament, more lifespan and reliabilities, we need all of these things. And lo and behold the people building these have already put those improvements into motion in a subsequent design. Theres another group of institutions we could call Training Centers. One built right by donald robelings estate in florida where the navy and marine corp established its first amphibian tractors to teach officers and crew how to operate these things and operate them well. And its at these training schools, kinds of like drivers training and you can imagine the transmission and brakes are ruined on account of immature drivers. And the Training Centers also are these experimental laboratories for beating the tot out of the amphibian tract and discovering what works well and what doesnt. So collectively the home front, the training schools as well as the factories themselves had already identified practically every material problem with the amphibian tractor and were already working towards solutions when they received the requests from the troops in the field that said could you do this, please, it might save some lives. Tarawa was a particular battle in 1943, just a three day batch. When i say just it was intense and ferocious but it represented americas first Amphibious Assault in the Central Pacific against heavily defended Japanese Garrison numbering almost 5,000 troops. The reason to take this island was to build a runway to pepper and weaken the next island chain calls the marshals. Its here the marines have a grand total of 125 of these vehicles theyve scratched together. And there they discovered its not enough, the margin of survivability was grim. 90 or so of these 125 vehicles were damaged or knocked out by enemy action. What they did, though, they carried the first three waves of assault troops ashore. And so at that moment the amphibian tractor had shifted basically in the minds of the truck to carry supplies and yeah you could carry troops but not as an assault vehicle. And it worked quite well, across the coral reef at low tide, delivered the marines to the sea wall and there they ultimately fought to overcome the Japanese Garrison. But at tarawa the war has always been as a result of these after action reports from the amphibian tractor there and such, that ultimately the navy would massproduce these and deliver newer models like the one im standing there for, we could really use more armor, we could use a lot more amtracks, hundreds more. And three days later the marines have exactly that afforded to them. They have hundreds more amtraks, new models like this one, and they get exactly what they requested and theyre thrilled. People listened to their complaints and uncle sam responded. But as i started to investigate that as a possibility i thought is it plausibility that at the end of november 1943 that reports from the Central Pacific could reach washington, d. C. And spread out to the designers in these various locations such as in florida . It produced a change in their Vehicle Design, retool them, make new ones and actually package them on ships and send them back into the Central Pacific within three months, training crews how to use these and the answer was no. Truth be known the armor requested were already built, already at the landing depots or the supply depots on the west coast of the United States. Theyre all packaged ready to go for the next invasion. Its just they werent available for this one. But that notion of cause and effect in battle one we dont have them in and we asked for them in battle two. It must have been because we said something. And it had nothing to do with that whatsoever. It had to do with the fact these vehicles will often take at least a year to design and build, at least. About 18 months or more. So you couldnt do it in a three month interval. Lets shift from production to issues of deployment. One of the challenges throughout this process of designing an entirely new and innovative vehicle is could you actually make it work, who would determine if it does work nat ways in which you want it to work . And here we can see in the upper left again this fellow named victor crulack, a young marine, Naval Academy graduate who got assigned to test the earliest model alligator in the caribbean off the coast of puerto rico. Hes one of the first to validate this could actually float, it could work in the sea and maybe deliver marines ashore. And he and the sergeants below him were those who tooled around in this and understand that it could be useful. And their reports would have an influence in helping the navy to determine to massproduce it. But one of the unanswered challenges was could this vehicle really work in heavy pacific surf, like the kinds you might see in those surfing competitions off the coast of hawaii or what have you where massive, massive waves could be generated slamming into coral reeves . And the challenge for am renes looking at the Central Pacific in early 1943 and envisioning what the complexities might entail, they wanted to ensure this particular vehicle could actually withstand the batter and damage of heavy waves and real coral reefs. And so he was reassigned to test this vehicle. And basically his orders were destroy your vehicle, drive it to the point it breaks apart. See what the limits of it see what its limits are, how sursivable it really is. And he writes about this in his biography and a few other places. But i had the opportunity to ask him what was it like. I tested it in the heavy surf, and he said i was scared to death. Afraid hed drown, tossed around inside the crew compartment, and he and his cargo mates or crew mates or black and blue with bruises and beaten to smith renes but they validated this thing could actually navigate heavy surf, smashing into coral and survive. But that report never made it to the forces getting ready for tarawa. And so the forces getting ready for tarawa conducted their own trials in fiji where they basically went through the exact same process. So somewhere along the lines these reports dont always make it to where they ought to go, but collectively to marine corp would validate the idea this truck idea could actually be upgraded to an assault amphibian. Why make it an assault vehicle . Because you dont know with any predictability what the tidal depths will be. You could study them all you want, but on any given day american Intelligence Officers could not conclude with any distinct determination, any definitive answer whether the tides would be sufficient for the higgins boats to cross or not. And if theyre not, youre going to be stuck at the reefs edge and good luck, your assault will fail, american strategy in the pacific will fall apart. And so validating the idea that this vehicle could then be upgraded, armored and ultimately designed to fight its way ashore was one that individuals that crulack and others would establish. But as much as individuals were determining the operational parameters, the Tactical Utility and usefulness of certain amphibian tractors was really up to the schools, these Training Centers established in hotels like the one in the upper right in florida, not far from donald robelings estate. Once the navy chooses to massproduce this vehicle, the marines had to establish a training regimen, a program and a battalion. And from that kernel, that seedbed in which a fellow, one of the most influential historians of this era, but victor was part of the initial battalion, and that battalion would get other battalions and they would transmit what they had learned to these newer units. But its at these schools where they would really test these concepts and figure out how to work these particular vehicles. By way of branding one of the things robeling does and he has a Critical Role in this still. It doesnt mean he doesnt retain an interest, because he does. And theyll figure out ways of improving subsequent models and that was one of the memories crozack had for the rest of his life trying to figure out solutions you could say with chalk on the floor but robeling took the cal pillar tractor logo and adapted it to his own with more of a floridian theme. Ultimately when these forces are deployed these battalions that would get established at such places, how would the marine corp Work Together to ensure they would not have to have the necessary units in place, properly staffed, properly equipped when they would need it . It was a real challenge to orchestrate production, in part as we mentioned a while ago fmc discovered often it couldnt provide enough vehicles at any given time. And so collectively there was an effort to shift and reallocate resources such as to pull amtraks from one region and move them to another, to combine units together in the case of battlefield attrition, there were too many losses and so they would form new battalions. And so as a whole the Senior Leadership tried to find the best way of trying to find the best combat power. One of the innovations that amphibian tractor crew and officers developed throughout the war was one of these was to discover that it could be wellused as an assault vehicle, lead the charge. Another if youre leading troops in you could probably take them out. The challenge with evacuating troops on these is there going to be a ship with a hospital bay waiting off the coast for you or not . And in some of the early operations where the navy and marines hadnt firmly established these relationships, the ships had moved on and they would search around for a ship that wasnt there. They would work to harmonize that, and another role the amphibian tractor played that was somewhat accepted was in muddy terrain or in okinawa when mud prevented the use of wheeled vehicles, track vehicles such as the amtrak play a vital role in carrying and distributing supplies. And so the individuals responsible for defeating the p Japanese Garrisons identify the amphibian tractor useful inland. Another model well see in a moment would provide indirect fire support through basically functions as a piece of artillery. But that was up to the individual initiative of the commander of that unit to say, well, i think i could incline my barrel in such a way it could function like artillery, but i havent been trained as an artilleriest or have my crew and so this cross training purpose was particularly useful. Certain iwlnd campaigns and certain battles, well, the crew would be allocated. Theyre all trained as infantry and they would harvest what they could from these vehicles to augment and enhance the firepower to withstand human waves of assaults by Japanese Forces here. And so in a whole variety of ways on land and at sea amphibian tractors proved extraordinarily useful. So i would argue that this vehicle would provide what we would call a means to an end. It very much would permit American Forces to fulfill their strategic ambition which was to cross the pacific in a timely fashion to defeat the empire of japan. It allowed American Forces to cross coral reefs, allowed them to do other things on islands themselves and minimize the losses the forces incurred and just by way of refreshing in january of 1940, about two years before pearl harbor the navy had contracted to build just one of these designs. February of 1941, a year later bury ships was envisioning 200. But that suggests a limit to its imagination. Because shortly thereafter contract after contract after contract would be signed between fmc and a host of other providers and construction firms. Such that more than 18,000 of these would be built basically between 1942 truly and 1945. Of a variety of different designs and models, and heres the one with the short barrelled artillery piece. Collectively that production would suggest the diversity and the richness of American Industrial mobilization. To scratch build something, massproduce it and harness its potential for combat power for forces deploying in difficult terrain. Robeling for his accomplishments and contribution would be the recipient of an award by president truman at the end of world war ii for his indispensable contributions to victory in the pacific. Subsequently the marine corp has acknowledged roeblling by giving an acquisitions award. So robeling remains an icon in many ways but a we often see these vehicles and see pictures of things in battlefield use, but i suggest rarely do we think about how they get there and the concepts for their use, their organization, opmizitimizing th battlefield effectiveness are actually developed. And this is just the tip of spear in many ways. Why dont i close now and open up to questions . Weve got about ten minutes or so. Trey . What role did tech logical superiority play when it came to the combat operations from tarawa onward . Did it play a significant role because it doesnt seem to be the case we were ever repulsed as the japanese would have hoped. Its a great question. In many ways the amphibious forces of the United States whether it be marine or army would demonstrate increased proficiency throughout it war. And tarawa provided a lot of you could say lessons about how to do that job better of Amphibious Assault. But the japanese recalibrate, too. The japanese would discover that if you leave your troops along the beach in concentration the americans are going to blast them into smith renes. And so what well see is that as American Forces become correspondingly more lethal and proficient in part because of Better Technology but also in part because of better training and prowess and familiarity with how all of these moving parts fit together better, the japanese also change their tactics, too, to move inland and dig deeper and wait for americans to come to them. And so its much more a dialogue than demonstrating absolute superiority. Although, of course, the japanese would fight to the point where theyre extinguished on practically all of these. Yes . How early were they armoring these vehicles . Like the models used in tarawa, like how up armored were those . Not very well. The ones allocated to tarawa, that initial 125, once it became obvious theyre going to be used in this assault role marines in new zealand where they were staging searched for anything that could be strapped on or attached or welded onto the front of the hulls. So they had just about a halfinch of armor, but it wasnt designed to be sort of integrated in that way. And so it was the best that they could do. But theres already a design, the one with the 37 mill meter tank turrant, innayoar barrel and other models of passenger amtraks that had already incorporated armor on them and they were much more reliable and the passengers could arrive in better array. Question in the back. With the higgins design for the wield amphibious vehicle, did they because i know there was something called a duck that was used mostly in europe, was that based on the designs or no, but you could say not directly. But theyre closely interrelated. Theres a host of differing industrial positions to the problem of flotation and crossing a beach. One of these was called a duck, which was this wheeled amphibian, almost elongated, looks like a boat with wheels. And some of you may have opportunities as you go to San Francisco or other port cities to take a ride on a duck. The challenge for the duck with coral reefs specifically was the idea that the reef would puncture and rip apart the wheels. Whereas the metal drummed wheels hissens was using would not be able to be punctured or thered be sufficient buoyancy to let the vehicle keep churning along. So the duck was one of these vehicles. Its used in the pacific too, but often as a truck, if you will, rather than as an assault vehicle. It didnt have the defensive capabilities that a lot of the amtraks possessed. Trey . How maybe not easy but what was the process like if say they needed to switch contractors . Say for instance in world war i when colt was asked to provide weapons and they ended up for a significant period of time not producing anything, so they had to find other methods, was the process still the same . How would they go about doing that if the contractor did notroid . Well, and this is constant and ever going problem that as best as you could some of these companies couldnt provide what they pledged to, what they had arranged to by contract the way the navy accommodated that is by securing basically half a dozen prime contractors that could potentially enlarge their production should another fall short. And in truth, none of them could really change what they were doing on the cuff. And so as a whole if somebody fell behind, it just meant that months production quoteo was less than ideal. And correspondingly you got fewer in the field. Other questions . Yes . So for a case of logistics, how did they find kind of the rough number of projected ships that they might need for assault, for supply logistics. I know its kind of a new technology and new field, what were they using as kinds of their base . Initially they dont have any firm numbers whatsoever. On average of amphibian design instructor would have about 95 to 100 vehicles or thereabouts and that could carry a good portion of the assault infantry from a particular division ashore. It wouldnt necessarily be able to carry it all. And so it was recognized that ultimately in order to carry, say, one or two division or three divisions worth of assault infantry, the fellows you need ashore first in an assault, that really you need somewhere in the realm of no less than 500 amtraks or up wards of five different battalion structures. And so realizing that not only do you need lots of numbers but you need lots of replacements, too, because there are going to be inevitably be losses. Thats where suddenly in 1943 you see contracts for more than 3,000 let and that number is doubled and doubled gep. And as a result thats where you get that 18,000 figure. Is out of that sort of learning process that theyre going to take losses. More over, you cant allocate all production to the field. You need a certain amount in these training schools and there are other reasons you might need them as well. There are a few allocated to the european theater but by and large the production of was focused in the pacific chiefly because of that coral reef complexity. Yes, hunter . So with the amphibious tanks and tractors going on, i know like the marine corp also had shermans in the pacific theater, so which one did the marine corp prefer . The marine corp in the question of would you prefer a tank as an tank or amphibian as amphibian, the challenge with the abamphibian tractor its not good as a boat or and it couldnt have as much armor, it wasnt quite configured the same way a land vehicle could be often designed nor as a boat. But the two qualities blenlded together. So on land operations where the amtraks do serve in fire support missions and to help the infantry ashore they do take s disproportionate casualties because theyre higher than they ought to be. But the challenge in part with the tank is could you get the tank ashore at that moment the amphibian tractors leading the van and the ones with the tank turrets would lead the assaults. They would use these to soften up the defensive on the beach but when the assault is over they just go back to the boat . Ideally so. Although a lot of what they call the and well have to conclude our questions for the sake of time, but a lot of these models would stay on land. In part because theyre not carrying troops around. They would provide that organic indirect fire support artillery role, and the challenge with this particular model ipits iffantry in contrast its not giroscoply stabilized. It has a very powerful round like the Marine Corp Medium tank would, and so it could destroy just about anything it encountered especially in the form of japanese tanks. So on that note, thank you very much. I will see you on thursday. All week were featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan 3, lectures in history, american artifacts, real america, the civil war, oral histories, the president danes, and special event coverage about our nations history. Enjoy American History tv now and every weekend on cspan 3. Weeknights this month were featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan 3. This week a look at our weekly lectures in histories series can takes you into College Classrooms around the country. On thursday programs on drugs in u. S. History including one examining marijuana regulation in america. See American History tv thursday at 8 00 p. M. Eastern and every saturday and sunday on cspan 3. Labor day weekend on American History tv, saturday at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on lectures in history, a discussion about Abraham Lincoln and nativeamericans. Sunday at 4 00 p. M. On real america, the 1950 army film invasion of southern france. And monday, labor day at 8 00 p. M. Eastern the commemoration of the 400th anniversary of virginias first General Assembly held at jamestown. Explore our nations past on American History tv every weekend on cspan 3. In the wake of the recent shootings in el paso, texas, and dayton, ohio, the House Judiciary Committee will return early from the summer recess to markup three gun violence prevention bills which include banning high capacity ammunition magazines, restricting firearms from those deemed by a court to be a risk to themselves and preventing individuals convicted of misdemeanor hate crimes from purchasing a gun. Live coverage begins september 4th at 10 00 a. M. Eastern on cspan and cspan. Org. And listen to our live coverage using the free cspan radio app. And now on American History tv, a look at the ways american women contributed to the war effort during world war ii. We hear about the expectations for women on the home front to write letters to soldiers, plant Victory Gardens and work in factories as well as what options were available to women for military service. This is 90 minutes. Well, its good to see everybody today. I appreciate you coming to our space here. Today wergo
comparemela.com © 2020. All Rights Reserved.