Transcripts For CSPAN3 CSIS Forum On U.S.-South Korea Relations 20240714

Officials tell you what they believe you need to know. So they undermine your popularity. Part of russian president Vladimir Putins callin program. You can watch that online at cspan. Org. Search putin. We take you back to the allday forum on u. S. south korea relations hosted by the center for strategic and International Studies. They are getting back underway. Live coverage here on cspan3. Thank you for all the jobs that you have done over the past decade now. Probably seems like its going quickly. But for us journalists, i am a reporter at the Washington Post. Victor and the korea chair have been a valuable, valuable resource both, obviously, in the past few years, but before that. I was bugging victor and others in the program quite often. Maybe many times you didnt necessarily want to be bugged. But for terrific analysis and to help sort of walk me through whats happening. I wanted to take time out to thank the korea chair for that and congratulate you for such a successful ten years. I am a reporter with the Washington Post and i cover the white house. And i have been doing that for about seven or eight years. First under the obama administration. Now the past two and a half with President Trump. It has been quite an experience shifting between the two. One thing i focused on the entire time thats kind of a through line is asia policy because its so important, starting with president obamas pivot to asia. So its my great honor to be hosting this panel. I wanted to say that we will be discussing i know there are three panels today. We will be discussing the u. S. Rok lines. As a journalist, i like to be very topical. Let me introduce the panel and we will have a healthy discussion about where we are. Its an auspicious week, of course, because President Trump is headed to osaka for the g20, and then to seoul for an important summit with monsoon. We will ask the panelists about that. Victor here to my left. He founded the korea chair in 2009. He served after having served as the director of Asian Affairs in the National Security council in the Bush Administration from 2004 to 2007. He was very involved with the sixparty talks and other negotiations with north korea that have predated where we are today. He authored five books, including the impossible state north korea, past and future, and i believe victor youll see him quite a bit on nbc and msnbc as an analyst. We have of course right next to victor is ambassador joseph jung. Thank you for joining. He probably needs little introduction. He is a Senior Advisor to the asia program at the u. S. Institute of peace. Before that he served 33 years as a diplomat and for two years you well know was from 2016 to 2018 was a u. S. Special enjoy to north korea. He was a key player in reestablishing communications with pyongyang through the new york travel and then of course traveling to North Carolina to help secure the release and ultimately secure the release of otto warmbier. And so thank you, joe, for all your service. I think joe is also a regular contributor to cnn, if im not mistaken. We will have a little faceoff here. I think next to ambassador yen is dr. Kim. He is a professor at Hong Kong University university of International Studies. Research on the rok alliance and the enter korean relationship on the peninsula. And he spent time prior to that as a visiting full bright scholar at george mason university. Not far from where i grew up in northern virginia. So thank you, dr. Kim. We have next of course another diplomat. Joy yamamoto who last fall took over as the director of the korea desk at the state department. A job she assumed after serving as the minister for the u. S. Embassy in seoul. Joy is obviously very much involved in all the things we will be talking about today. Before that she was a dip nat in indonesia, china and other locations around the world and close to my heart was a former newspaper reporter. So she knows all my tricks. Joy, you are on the record today because this is a big crowd and being broadcast. And finally we have dr. Son yung lee from korea, the president of the Korean Nuclear policy society. Served at the director general for policy panel. Minister of foreign apires from twefb two 2013. Authored numerous paper and an alleys includi alle analyses. So thank you to our panelists. We are going to jump into a dialogue rather than opening presentations which i think sometimes slows things down. As a journalist, we are interested in whats happening. No better time to have this panel than the president s trip. I wanted to sort of get right at it. I think there is a lot of interest now after what seemed to be a dark period in our diplomacy, our dialogue after the collapse of the hanoi summit, which i was at, about whats gonna happen, how to get the talks back on track. We see what tends to be the path of this president , this administration, which is a leader to leader engagement. If you see the exchange of the socalled love let as President Trump may call them. You know, first kim jong un apparently sent a letter to the president. And then you saw around his birthday and then you saw a reciprocal letter reported over the weekend which kim jong un received apparently from President Trump. The white house has confirmed that letter was sent. And that that letter contained, according to the state news agency, excellent content and that the chairman is considering. So that raises a lot of intriguing possibilities. I know there has been a lot of discussion about what to make of this summit between moon and President Trump coming up. But maybe i could start with victor and well go down the line a little bit about what we think about a third summit. Do we see now that these exchanges have sort of renewed that idea and President Trump we dont know what was in the letter. Do we see a third summit and what does that mean and what would it take for us to get to that place. Sure. Well, thanks for the question. The other thing you should all know before we get started, david didnt properly introduce himself. Because what he is most known for in the korea policy expert is he is the only journalist we know that has asked a question of kim jong un at a press conference and gotten an answer. I joke now on my tombstone that will say he shouted a question at the most ruthless dictator and lived for a while to tell about it. I wrote a story about it. I was in the press pool in han soy. I had been to singapore. A small group of 13 reporters were allowed into the photoops. Everybody cannot get in. That pool, television, radio and print, me, writes a summary and sends it out of what happens. So thats i was very disappointed not to be in the pool for the singapore summit. I had to sort of remain in the hotel and home e hope for some briefings. I went to kim jong uns hotel when he arrived. I waited four hours with ordinary folks on the streets off the shopping corridor to get a glimpse of the motorcade and body cards. I wrote a scene piece about why we wait on the Street Corner with our kids playing ipad to see this ruthless dictator and get a glimpse. That was as close as i came to seeing him then. And so i was thrilled that we were, the Washington Post was the Pool Reporter for hanoi and so when we went if, we had sort of as a group said we need to shout something to kim. And President Trump engages so much. After the quick photo op reporters shouted to President Trump and he answered. Then i positioned myself closer to kim and was keeping an eye on him, trying to make eye contact. When i heard trump stop talking i said, chairman kim, do you feel good about a deal . He did this. As i wrote in the subsequent piece, now, you know, you get taken to task if you write something about being chummy with a dictator. My point this is a universal sign you feel good, you feel good. I didnt know what would happen. Its like time slows down, nur the moment. If you look at the replay, trumps interpreter leans over. Trumps interpreter leans over afternoon indicates its for him. And then he responds. So i was thrilled. In the moment at the end. Piece i said i didnt realize no one had ever done that or gotten a response. We were ushered out. They didnt want to keep letting us have a chance. Rushed back to have the pool report out. I saw on twitter that this had make big news. He said i feel hopeful, but, you know, we feel hopeful but we are not there yet. At the time we assumed there would be an interim deal, all signs sort of led to that. In reality, he went there yet. My colleague used the quote at the end of her book on kim jong un, the hopeful feeling. Well see. But that was the experience. Id love to see if my colleague on this trip or subsequent may have another chance because it seems certainly that another summit doesnt seem like we are close when we should be close to that. This is a president who does things differently. We are coming up on a campaign. I would love to go down the line briefly. So i feel like and i want to echo what rich said in the beginning. There is something in the air, right . I think there is something in the air. After that hanoi summit, there was basically no dialogue taking place. All the efforts at the working level to make contact were not were just going into a black hole. Then all of a sudden this birthday card letter comes from kmarn k chairman kim to trump, which he then responded to. And then xi jinping goes to pyongyang, right . And so whenever you see highlevel letter and then the chinese and the North Koreans meeting, thats kind of like the setup for a third meeting. Now, i have no inside information on this, but those pieces are pieces that we would we generally see before there is another highlevel meeting. In addition to that, based on my experience as a staffer setting up trips by the president , its quite unusual, i feel, this time for President Trump to be spending two nights in korea off of the g20 summit in osaka. Usually, when we do these trips, and many in the audience know this well, usually its an rr. O. N. In japan and then early in the morning a trip to korea, do the troops, and you move on. So this is a lot of time in korea. I think there is doubt that the president will go to the dmz because he has never been there. And the last time he went he couldnt go. General brooks was there at the time, and there was a lot of it was like really bad weather that day. Really bad fog that day. So he couldnt make that trip. I think every u. S. President thats going to say anything about korea has to difficult the dmz to see, you know, the actual division and how armed it is. So im pretty certain he is going to do that. And then the question is, is he going to make a big statement at the dmz . Is he going to do it himself . Is he going to do it with president moon . There there be other surprises . This president likes surprises. So i feel like there is something going on. We are not sure what. It looks like there is an effort to reset after hanoi. And maybe not a third summit immediately, but at least a reset that will allow the working level to reengage. The problem is, is that as long as both sides dont put a lot of or dont empower the working level to make agreements, we are going to fall into the same trap that we fell in in hanoi, which is working level meetings, everything but the most important issue. That is left to the two leaders and the two leaders cant make a deal. And i feel like right now it looks like we are headed down that road. And what the president did on iran in terms of pulling back at the last minute with regard to retaliatory military strike for the downing of the drone only reinforces the view in north korea that youve got to talk to your leader. And so that means that the working level are not going to be able to make agreements that can then set up a successful summit. So thats what i worry about. Joe, what do you think would put us on a path to a summit that makes more sense than maybe a rushed meeting certainly this trip . What kind of timeframe do you see as more sensible . I think fundamentally there is something to the relationship between donald trump and kim jong un. And its kind of a mixture of both admiration for each other, but the Information Set is quite a symmetry. Kim jong un knows everything there is to know about donald trump. He knows texactly how the u. S. Government operates, what his key staffers, whether its pompeo, bolton, are like. Now, donald trump doesnt know anything about what what is going on in pyongyang. There is the mismatch. And so i think, you know, in my experience North Koreans study washington like anything. When i was in government, i think it was in november of 2016, i was talking with north korea and i was trying to set up a meeting for my then boss tennyson to go to pyongyang. They said, no, we really dont want tennyson. We think he is going to get fired, you know . And, you know, of course they were completely right. He did get fired about four months later. But the underlying, the underlying rationale is, of course, we all know, historically its true, that north korean side have been wanting summits. Now the difference is the u. S. Side, or donald trump, wants one. So i have no doubt there will be a third summit. There will be a third summit probably sooner rather than later. And what will make it a success . Of course, victor is right. It has to be worked on at a working level so that there are no surprises. But i am relatively optimistic. If you look at what was on the table in hanoi, there was quite a bit on the table. From north korean side, giving up young byeong. They both had agreed to open liaison offices. So the key issues like definition of denuclearization, how much denuclearization, for how much sanctions, what were left out. But i do think you can reach a next level of a deal relatively quickly. So, in that sense, he its in their interests to have a summit. Put this to a place where its sustainable at least for a while. Donald trumps main goal is, of course, to win the 2020 november election. So get through that. I mean, you know, fortunately for kim jong un, he doesnt face an election. So i think you are looking at a shortterm, mediumterm path that puts you on a stable route. Dr. Kim, can you give us a sense our the south korean government has been trying to work with both sides to try to reengage them . Because we know that there had been very little communication after hanoi between washington and pyongyang. And then what is the view in seoul about moving forward with that leadertoleader dialogue and how important that is . The south korean government has no choice but to be a part of it. Thats true. And actually, you know, after four months, its like you dont move. No change of animosities. Something is going on. It looks like something is going on. Xis state visit to north korea. And kim jong un, you know, visit. And happened to be oneyear anniversary of singapore. But to me its not really any of it is not a game changer because and of course south koreas offered to come out and meet south korean president just like happened in last may. Its actually 20 hours before the second, you know, meeting. Actually, they couldnt meet i think on may 26th. So south korea, oh, it happened again. But the thinking of the situation right now for north koreas perspective, they are still angry. They were devastated. Pretty much they recoop themselves, but they are not ready to come out. And their perception is like this. This is not our turn to give away. This is the turn that either, you know, the u. S. Change the calculation, or south korea try to persuade america to their perspective. Definitely they are going to be, i think, a summit. But to me its not in like sooner. So i think its more like a second half because they think, even if they are decided to come out to negotiate, they need to rebuild the position to have a better deal. They dont want a repeat of what we had . Exactly. And regarding these love letters, you know, beautiful letter, excellent letter, actually this is actually what i heard from a reliable source. During the six months last year, there was there were five unknown secret personal letters between these, actually from kim jong un to trump. I think this is in a way special communication method. So i dont think there is a really a gamechanging, some kind of proposal even though they think its interesting. They try to maintain this. Not in this kind of letter to put, you know, special, you know, some kind of concession or a deal. I want to skip joy briefly only as you can understand she is in a very sensitive position right in the middle of all this, and some limitations on what she can say about north korea. Were going to get right back, though, come right back to her about the u. S. Rok lines, i wanted to skip to dr. Lee to build off of that. What do we think about these letter, and victor will give a better sense of this. These letters are formulaic. President trump released one letter last summer that he got from kim jong un, very flowery, but didnt say a whole lot, as you say. We doubt that there is a lot of detailed, you know, information necessarily, but i wanted to see if dr. Lee had some thoughts about, you know, what we think about what could be accomplished with this kind of letters between the leaders and, you know, the President Trump he brings reporters into the oval office and hell have staff bring on hand, and let reporters read them, which we saw in the Time Magazine interview late last week in which i think the reporter attempted to take a photo. I dont know if you saw that in the transcript take a photo of one of the letters the president got so upset, he said, you know, you can read it but you cant take a picture of it. And at one point suggested the reporter could be put in prison if he violated that rule. The reporter said are you threatening me with prison time. The letters are important, he clearly wants them to get out but clearly not violate kim jong uns confidence. Can you tell us more about what you think is trying to be accomplished, other than just praise for each other, unless thats it . I would say that, and this is a good sign because both sides want to continue the model dialogue. And it is one thing but i dont know what the actual content inside that letters but at the same time, this is contrary to many peoples concern whether this title, at least we have some momentum to continue this dialogue. So i think thats already a good sign, but its one thing, and perhaps if actual physical promise is not made in the coming days or months, then perhaps done much actual research, it will be difficult to round up just a single gesture that both sides want to follow, but eventually the actual progress or actual steps, what kind of step, actual step theyll take in the coming days. And tell us the truth about whether or not there is success in these denuclearization talks in north korea. I want to come back what we know about and what we can infer about some of the changes that have been reported about north koreas negotiating team, President Trump contradicting john bolton at times on north korea, what that tells us about where this might be headed. First, joy, im wondering, since were on the precipice of this trip, i know its tricky to not talk about direct dealings with north korea. Im wonndering if you can set te stage about the trip in the relationship between President Trump, president moon. I think we have seen a lot of work by Prime Minister abe for the whole 2 1 2 years, more recently with the state visit and the g20 summit. Hes in the spotlight and has, you know, continued this diplomacy can President Trump to try to flatter him and work his relationship and try to stay his sort of bestie in asia, and you know, certainly has a different view about how they should proceed with this dialogue with north korea, more skeptical of it. Im wondering if you can give us a sense of what this trip entails for president moon and President Trumps relationship, a little bit beyond maybe even talking about north korea, are there other things theyre going to talk about, and maybe a little bit about why he is maybe spending more than one night on the agenda. Hes spending one night. Is it still one night . Theres no question that the priority is the negotiated denuclearization of north korea. Theres no question that this is the most important issue thats facing both the rok and the United States, and theres no question that this will be the number one topic for meetings with President Trump, but what we should also remember is that what they will do is and what they will commit to is the enduring strong bilateral relationship, the alliance, and that alliance is more than just the dprk issues. It is about showing the world that together these two countries, these two governments can do extraordinary things, whatever they want, and, you know, north korea is of course one great example of the fact that were working together to engage north korea, but beyond that we have also shown that we can work on Economic Issues together. We negotiated changes to the korea u. S. Free trade agreement that were difficult, but we managed to come up with amendments that are mutually beneficial to both countries and weve also made a deep commitment to Work Together in the endo Pacific Region under president moons new southern policy and under President Trumps endo pacific strategy. Were finding that there are synergies between these two efforts and based on the fact that we have very common values and a common approach to Development Assistance in south asia and southeast asia, based on wanting a free and open endoPacific Region, based on a notion that we want to allow countries and enable countries to preserve their sovereignty to develop in ways that they want to and not because theyre being coerced into doing so. So i guess what im trying to emphasize is that this relationship is, yes, the dprk, but please dont forget that this relationship is much more and we should make a commitment to improve the alliance in so many ways across the board. Ambassador, congressman barry also mentioned this that we cooperate on health, science and technology, energy, so i fully expect that this commitment to bilateral alliance to these kinds of aspects of our alliance will be very much part of the conversation. Is there anything you can tell us about efforts to, you know, i dont think president moon plays golf. You know, we saw i mean, you know, this is President Trump who puts a lot of faith in sort of that interpersonal relationship, it seems like. Whether its with our allies or other leaders, even xi jinping. Is there any on a trip like this, its fairly quick, theres not a lot of time. I dont know if theres any kind of Relationship Building beyond the bilateral meetings, even one on one, even if you cant fully tell us what it is. Do they have efforts to try to do that with president moon . So the trip isnt fully set in terms of i know it feels like its only a few days away, but believe me, they havent fully settled on the schedule for this trip. Theres no question that there will be bilateral meetings, but there will be other activities, hopefully something related to distance economics, something related to the alliance, so to speak, again, nothing set but the intent is president moons intent is to be with the President Trump virtually every minute of this trip. I wanted to sort of hinted at this a little bit but since dr. Lee talked a little bit about the limits of leadertoleader negotiating and i think we have seen the limits over time, im wondering, like i said, there have been plenty of reports about what happened with the uncertain fate of kim jong uns negotiating team. I think some of it may have been overblown, and some may have been authentic in that he seems to have wanted to start anew. Im wondering, even though we dont know exactly what those things are or the ultimate result, i think some of the report is accurate that he has made some changes. People say theres only one sda Decision Maker in north korea, and thats kim jong un. I wonder if hes changing his team if thats changes to their potential position or as analysts have said, the u. S. Trying to make some sort of significant concession or what looks like some sort of movement and what that could be, and maybe we could start with victor and go down the line again. I think there clearly has been a change. Kim young cho, and kim clearly it was the first time that anybody had probably ever said no to chairman kim jong un, and then these poor guys had to ride on the train for 60 hours with kim jong un back from hanoi, vietnam, north korea, they were probably in the last car in the bathroom for the entire 60 hours. Couldnt have been an easy train ride back, and kim young choe, the second in command, he was one of the junior members of the six party delegate. Speaks very good english. The papers are saying, and i think thats a good thing. I mean if thats the case, it will lend to much more Fort Lauderdale fluid conversations, yong ho, was formerly the dkrm ambassador. He gave the exposition about why north korea needs Nuclear Weapons. It was almost persuasive. And joe knows as well, he probably has the most experience as a working level person on this because shes been involved in the negotiations and very intimately involved in the sixparty negotiations. If theres anybody who understands somewhat the Technical Details because at some point we have to get to the Technical Details of this, she is probably the best equipped but even i would say even in her case, she is not fully equipped to manage that sort of conversation. And the North Koreans have not yet brought to the table, you know, their doe counter parts. They have not brought those sorts of people back to the table, so i think overall, the change is probably for the better. What was the second part of your question . No, and what how is it better in that, you know, it sounds like from what i understood is that the u. S. Team would Say Something even in the lead up to hanoi with a short timetable, got to get stuff done, and everything would have to be sent back to pyongyang and get clearance and guidance. Everything was coming from kim jong un. Is that going to continue . I think that will probably still continue but at least with people like ian, it can at least sound a little bit more fluid in terms of the negotiation. It would be much easier to have side conversations. Both of them are fluent in english. I think it will give our negotiators a better feel of the situation, and i think thats important. I think it was i mean, i dont know, but my guess is it was very stilted with Kim Yong Chol and, you know, theyre not diplomats, theyre not Foreign Ministry people. They have not spent a lot of time outside the country. Given what we know about the ultimate positions of both sides in hanoi that led to the stalemate and quick collapse of the talks, i was the reporter there, waiting in the lunchroom, we could see the placards laid out, and we didnt know how quickly it would be over but we got the surprise news. Joe, what would be, what dr. Lee was saying that kim felt, you know, still upset and angry about where that ended and doesnt want a repeat of this, i think, which dr. Kim was saying as well, what is the step that the u. S. Could take to restore some sort of confidence that this thing could move forward. Open question but i wonder if you have thoughts about where the u. S. Might move to just sort of offer them enough to get them back to some sort of serious dialogue . I think at this point, really the north korean insistence is for sanctions relief. And so the question has to be were the u. S. To offer sanctions, what is it that north korea can offer . So this is what hanoi, whats on the table plus means. Plus for the u. S. Means some kind of sanctions relief. Plus for north korea means something on denuclearization. But a question about, i mean, if you think, you know, interagency fights in washington are bad. Its a lot worse, you know, at least here if you lose, you end up in a nice place like csis. There youre going to end up in a minimal reeducation camp, and thats not very pleasant. I do believe that and i agree with victor that the whole Negotiation Team was discredited, this is a uft, United Front Department team was discredited and now its moving back with, essentially, you know, foreign handling mfa. I mean, thats bad news and good news. They know the history. They know what uf will and will not do, and so the negotiations, i believe, are going to be more civil but tougher. A lot tougher, because they know exactly how far they can go without really theres a fairly open debate on whether kim jong un or north korea should be negotiating this at all or rely on more traditional build our own defense. To me it indicates that it isnt the complete control that you would expect from the leader, and so that has some legs, i think, and then it is critically important for them, for kim jong un right now, that he save face. And whether u. S. Can do anything to save that face, i dont know what its going to take at this point, and thats why they need to have working groups, there were meetings to probe each other, so they get at least a minimal package that satisfies both sides. Dr. Kim and dr. Lee, im wondering if you can address a little bit. I think we saw from president moon, head of hanoi, hoping moving toward interim press, we saw the stanford speech that seemed to suggest that the u. S. Was entertaining the idea of middle ground, reports of, you know, smaller steps on sanctions, you know, theyll allow the south to kind of engage the north on joint projects and tourism. Im wondering if you could give us a sense from seoul how moon jaein hopes to convince trump to move in that direction, offer something in the form of sanctions relief. Is that a viable plan, how might moon try to make that case . Yes, i think its actually in south korea government, the feeling that the president moon has is there was some kind of a twist. Without it, it couldnt have been made. Because actually, one hour after trump walked away from hanoi and on the plane calling president moon eight times, you know, please talk to the chairman kim and find out what he thinks. He had some kind of regret or things like this. So i think his thinking framework is if he makes to meet again, that this time it will work. Thats the pretty much basic thing. As investor joe said, because many things are on the menu, so probably better if we have third but i have a little different opinion because now is more like a pride fight, and go to the small deal, then means north korea is winning and u. S. Is losing. If we go to the big deal, that means north korea is losing, so i think we need to add up a little bit more, maybe essentially some kind of reason, security issues, but anyways i think this is like north koreas process of moving up, and i want to Pay Attention to it, and i want you to Pay Attention to this. After hanoi, three arguments, especially in washington, are getting louder. Number one is sanction is working, so this is the time not to stop. The second one is finally we found out that the nuclearization of chairman kim, that means he has no intention to denuclearize. Third. The limitation of top down approach. We have to go back to working level negotiation, and actually north korea is well aware of this, and actually they are building up in these three area. Number one, for essential issues. They said april speech by kim jong un say we are ready to tighten our belt and survive. Regarding too genuineness, try to appeal toward russia and china and international organizations. I think number three is most important part. Thats why he tried to reaffirm the top down approach is still useful because he believes, some people, people who support this working level negotiator meals. Actually dont want this top down approach as successful, so and same thing happened to President Trump and president moon when they met in washington, april 11th. They reconfirmed that this top down approach, of course. It has to be somehow negotiating into the working level negotiation. But has to be led by this top down. Can i say just say, this idea that theres a zero sum tradeoff between a small deal and a big deal. I think some may frame it that way, but i think in reality, i dont know why they cant do both. Right. I mean, a small deal is only a problem if its not in the context of an agreement between the leaders on the big deal, big deal being everything for everything, all the weapons for all the sanctions. If they can get agreement on the big deal at least in principle and in writing, that opens the space for the first step, small deal for some sanction suspension. I think theres a lot of room there. I think theres a deal that could be made but the working level is important because somebodys got to set up the leaders so that they can say in advance, that looks good to me. So when they meet, and thats why working i mean, were not just saying this because were all working level stiffs, but it practically is the only way, any field of business, in any place, the leaders need the working level people so set up the meeting. That would be an interesting dynamic of how the white house would cast some sort of double deal. Maybe thats the wrong way to term it. I think there is the truth that the media reporters would be judging this against the complete collapse in hanoi with the idea that any kind of move to a smaller deal would be concession by the u. S. And a bigger deal on the table. S in outer, you know, longer frame, unless that was very specific it would be hard to know or have confidence that they reached that. Dr. Lee, i wanted to see if you had a thought on this. Looking back on the time of hanoi summit, i would say say was quite festive or too optimistic about the outcome, but actually it turned out that no agreement, so given that actually, there was a report that president moon jaein was preparing a big announcement on march 1st. Its a big day in korea. And according to the report, 30 announcement contained a player to engage in those both politically and unpolitically. Kind of an obstacle to a very ambitious friend. Nevertheless, after hanoi, understanding the korean government is optimistic, peddling a long ambitious player to engage korea. And the plan includes many interkorean joint ventures. Eventually how much south korea governments can influence depends on the actual progress of denuclearization. And about the hanoi summit. The future between the u. S. , i would say the one is the at least hanoi summit very clearly indicated that once their bottom line, the full sized demands. Just point. That was one thing, and also clearly meant it lifting sanctions. And second point, some kind of a review is necessary for top down report. Top down approach may be a good way to open the channel for dialogue but at the same time he seems to me at that lack of coordination, made at even level mark was quite important. We must think about so if theres a summit between the u. S. Is possible, then perhaps preparation and working on agenda setting, it should be much more important than previous summit. If possibility, you know those careers are very beautiful to assist in. And the only person that could decide a policy, and the only person that can tell some issue in nerk is at home. Even though there were many willful contests between the u. S. And north korea officers before the summit, we only at the final about how to denuclearize and also how to offer some kind of a give and take. So keeping that prayer determined to be successful, i would say level of preparation must be an important factor. Joy i wanted to come to you. With a little step back, a little broader for the g20. Not to weigh in on all the things the president is going to do but he has a pretty quick trip to the g20 as well, thats two nights, originally was going to be one but i think the president was going to arrive and hit the ground running. I think hes going to now come a night earlier and sort of get maybe some adjustment to the time difference, and what struck me, and this is a difficult sort of question but you know having covered the obama administration, significant sort of work done to try to have the United States broker a little bit better working relationship between seoul and tokyo. The three leaders, at the time relationships were struggling. I think at the g20, the president is going to have a trilateral, if im not mistaken with japan and india. As part of their sort of alliance or frame work has therein be any thought of doing a trilateral with tokyo and seoul, not necessarily on this trip but in general. Can you talk at all about how important it is toch the three allies on the same page because we get a lot of sense theres quite a bit of friction between japan and south korea generally. Certainly you see the two leaders, you know, working their relationships with President Trump to get across different message sg message. These are extremely important alliances for the United States and given these alliances right and having the okay in japan cooperate with each other is essential. Were not going to be successful in negotiating with north korea unless those alliances are strong and that lasts, that relationship between japan and iraq is good. Unfortunately at this particular moment, its not good between those two countries and i think the u. S. Government would love to be involved and bring them together, but i think, but we recognize that there isnt doing anything frankly can be entrein that by helping one side we encourage both sides to work out these historical issues, these sensitive issues. The current forced labor cases that theyre now disputing and if anyone has a suggestion on where the u. S. Government could be useful and helpful, i think were really open because these are important relationships and theres nothing we could do to help japan and korea resolve them, we would. I wondered also on g20, the president made quite a bit of effort in 2017, especially on a trip to asia to talk about north korea and the importance. I wondered if the president in osaka, if you have a sense, in your role that is limited. If you know, how much the korea issue will be. Part of the discussions with other order leaders. Hes meeting with xi jinping. That mostly seems to be focus oed on trade. If you have any sense of that . I dont make predictions. Youre right. And so i wont make predictions, so i think you could assume that it would be natural, and curiosity about what messages were there, and what any ideas that xi jinping has on engagement with north korea. This is a priority for the United States. So i would not be surprised if that was on the agenda. On xi jinpings visit, may have talked to you about this story, did a piece a month or two ago about whether trumps escalating trade fight with beijing could bleed over in his efforts to keep china on board with the sanctions and pressure on pyongyang on the nuclear question. And at the time i sort of, analysts told me at that time, they didnt see evidence that the two issues were necessarily affecting one another. Im wondering now what you read into the cheese visit to pyongyang. You know, was he sending trump any signals, did they have any sense of whether that connects to the trade issue and puts more pressure on trump to resolve that. I dont think so. I think that i certainly dont think that she went to pyongyang to try to help broker a deal for the United States. I just dont see the chinese doing that for the United States. You know, for me, the significance of that visit, what it means more broadly for chinas longterm strategy on the Korean Peninsula, visavis the United States. Today, china has twice as many railroads connecting northern korea to china than the south has with the north. They have for over a decade extracted all the Mineral Resources out of north korea. And its only a matter of time before they start financing one belt, one road, Energy Infrastructure and highway projects in north korea, so china is slowingly growing its influence in north korea. When she goes to pyongyang and says, i know you want to reform. Let me te tell you about the lat Face Recognition Technology we use. That is something the North Koreans would be interested in in terms of reform and development. Where that relationship is going aside from the u. S. And china, u. S. china trade friction, and so, you know, i think, it is one of the Big Questions about engagement with north korea. We were talking about this at dinner last night that, you know, from particularly from the south korea viewpoint, the argument to americans about engagement has always been about north korea is insecure, its weak, it wants attention. Incentives work better than pressure. If you want to make the argument to american hawks about engagement with north korea, it should really be nin the contex of if we dont engage, china is going to take over the northern part of the peninsula, and unification if it ever happens is going to be much more complicated. Thats from a south korean u. S. Effect, and i think from the washington swamp, that is a more persuasive argument for engagement than to say lets buy the horse for the fourth time. Let me jump to our panelist from korea. Okay to have questions from the audience . Sure. Quick lightning round here. Were going to 1 45. Two panelists from korean, i was thinking maybe we should do a story at some point over which companies are looking and hoping for a donald trump reelection in 20, and one of the ones that came to mind was south korea because the president has done this engagement with the north, and im wondering if you can give a sense politically how the moon government, how invested they are in campaign 2020. Are they hoping, do you think for a donald trump reelection and i say that at the blue house, and i dont know if the broader, you know, south korean public, and thousand they viwe Vice President bidens foreign policy. Is there a contingency plan in case this ends that way. The if he failed, you know, since the opinion some people say, trump, he is doing a very good job in north korea, the tweets and everything. But at the same time, he is kind of unsure of himself because of his leadership style and also because of a lot of uncertainty arising and that overcomes the typical policy making processes. If hes reelected, he can do some heavily in those kind of nations and if he fails, what happens, perhaps a democrat will take a more vigorous and more complicated porch. So whether or not trump really will be electable or not. So of course, personal. I dont know if you had any thoug thought. Actually. As a liberal, as a aggressive, i dont agree with him in any sense except his process. So having said that, naturally, if he does some irreversible, then it doesnt matter whether hes elected or not. If he can not do anything, then, you know, democratic government will, you know, reverse everything so, well be more in trouble. So this is where i feel like, and i said this recently at kathys form up. I feel like we are now in the post engagement versus containment phase of the debate on north korea because we have just heard one of the most prominent progressives in south korea saying that donald trump would be good for the north korea problem, but my question is donald trump good for the alliance, and unfortunately i would say hes not good for the alliance, right, and so i think we are now in a completely new area of conversation that dont fit with any of sort of the standard established guidelines of where people thought on certain issues. Joe, i dont know if you feel that way. This is a very tough question because for american voters, even if you want to look at foreign policy, you have to look at totality. Iran, venezuela, trade, immigration, mexico. Iran. And so all those things, and you have to wait. Tu ease tunisia is no question. You look the folks in korea and the usa there is a sort of conventional wisdom no longer holds and in that sense, were looking at really shaken up political spectrum, and bwhat, you know, my friend professor kim said, it doesnt make sense if youre korean. Thats the only thing that matters. But for americans, theres going to be many other shoes. Its complicated. Complicated yes. I have one more wild card for joe. Maybe we can ep to questions. I dont want to lose so much time. Is everybody familiar. Can we have the mics. Just following on victors comments, what are the biggest risk to the alliance. We know the alliance is strong, but what is the risk. Is it potential daylight on north korea. Is it trumps America First orientation and protectionist policy. What should we be worried about and since joey could not answer that question, where we are on border transfer. Do you want to go first. Im sorry, i cant answer your broader question, but on burden sharing, the administration is reviewing its policy on burden sharing worldwide. I think the president has made it very clear that he wants our allies and partners to pay a fair share, a greater share of the cost of protecting ourselfings, so korea comes under that. Once this review is over, were hoping its sool. It will begin wen, negotiate hoping its soon. We will be asking for more of korean contribution. Risk to the alliance, one of our ghosts from seoul . Either dr. Kim or dr. Lee. As you said, alliance in crisis is for tough. Frequent manual for conservative to criticize president moon, as you said, as strong as ever and if he has no choice, no, exclusive choice between the lions and north korea. Sure he bikd the alliance. Biggest risk is trump again. People are in a way, because we are in 2017, friends, alliance, we are in trouble, but trump was taking advantage of our situation to sell weapons and things like that for me in the future, its a good chance for as a progressive, good chance for it because korean, South Koreans think this alliance is almost like a myth. I think, you know what, in a way its a good way the second they realize this myth. If progressive is making Alliance Trouble its going to be a problem but on the other side, if trump kind of you know, secularizes this alliance, its a good chance for south korea more realistically. I say that as a fundamental between a relationship, peopletopeople. Just below the surface, we have many uncertainties and perhaps the future, whats the and what about the commanding Korean Peninsula. That is one thing, and also look at whats thahappening these da. Its a big use of Korean Companies as well. We have a so in our case perhaps impact maybe a much administer energy, spg liome like that. And also, think about what the koreas position is. Enhancing that discussion but largely look at a brighter spot in bed. So one of each, baby had a second challenge for korea, the u. S. Relation in the coming days. What i would like to see in terms of the alliance is really sure north korea is the number one issue but really a focus on all the other things the United States and north korea are doing. When we were doing this in the Bush Administration, of course we had a progressive government. We had to talk a lot about north korea but at the same time the South Koreans were sending troops to iraq, a pft in afghanistan, we did visa waiver. We had the work english study program. A whole variety of things and also i would direct you to a speech that mark lippard when he was ambassador, everything from Development Assistance to outer space together. This is the proactive agenda of the alliance that i would like to see more of in the public narrative of the alliance. Right now its all about north korea or 232 or about burden sharing and then coming is our transition, so these are all very difficult issues. Theres a very positive proactive agenda to the alliance. It was our morning speaker, Richard Armitage or gentlemen recei joseph said, alliances are like tending a garden, if you dont take care of it, weeds will continue to grow. Im sure joe and her team are doing a lot of these things. I would like to see it in the public narrative of the alliance, especially since the president is going to see moon. If i could just add, i think we are doing a good enough job of publicizing some of the things were doing. Under the southern policy of south korea, and endo pacific strategy we have projects that we are working on including a Water Project in the lower initiative, womens empowerment in laos, so again, i think we havent done enough talking about the things that we are doing and that we are planning to work on. I would love to see President Trump talk about u. S. Cooperation on womens empowerment. For some reason i dont see that happening. A couple more questions back there. Thank you, Mike Bullington with the executive intelligence review in the shilder institute. Ambassador, you referenced on the trump question, the venezuela, iran, north korea, so forth, but i think really that all of those should be sub sooned under the question over whether President Trump is going to be successful in his fundamental commitment that he wants to establish close relations with russia and china, and this next week is crucial because of these extremely personal operations in which he has a chance to get out from under the antichina, antirussia hysteria where the british, the congress, from the press, from his own cabinet, and i would like you to comment on that, the question of that personal diplomacy which were going to see with xi and putin this week. For me . My own assessment is that in any of these areas, he has yet to hit a home run. You know, maybe the exception of mexico or i think he got some result, and then mexicans were coming around to it. The problem, the area that were all intimately familiar with north korea is that tensions are down but the underlying reason for tensions, which is Nuclear Weapons in north korea have not been addressed. Rather they have been stockpiling more and more. So you can see that, i mean, if you were to, you know, blow the final whistle now, obviously in north korea its been a failure. But final whistle has not been blown yet. I think i saw a hand up way back there. That woman back there, maybe . Hi im sue young kim, so recently special envoy for north korea expressed a biggest frustration and a challenge when he had a negotiation with his counter parts. He said that because i think davie mentioned it briefly, because their counter parts dont have any authorization to make a decision, so he couldnt really move forward with the negotiation, and we dont really see that nature, natural structure on change any soon, so whats the so my question is we all know that the importance of having that working level negotiation talks, but whats the what can be practical best come from those working mobile negotiations, if they dont really have any power to make a decision. Thank you. Victor . I think thats a common question from people who really worry about the limitation of the approach, and before i answer that directly, i want to, you know, raise up, you know, the arguments that raised by two panelists, one is by victor, he talked about we shouldnt have this dichotomy of relations between the small and the big, and actually, another one is working negotiations you talking about because right now, we think its realistically yes, we need to kind of bend a little bit to accommodate, entering a relay but the official position right now is trump is holding is big deal, and its a list for now, and it is for them is actually bringing this time clock to presingapore era, because the thing is singapore is the turning point, so new kind of relation of trust, so before somehow u. S. You know, make them sure about the change of positions so they think its just talking about working solutions, talking about this big deal, theyre not going to come to the table. The biggest, you know, purpose of our alliance actually to bring him to come to the table, so right now, talking about this working lever is not going to help at this moment. Im sure, i totally agree with it, and it is important, but directly to your question actually, much better person and people, and they know the failure now, experience pure failure, they will come in different position if they can be sure about the trust. So you know, to understand better the working level preparation, we must think about whats the eventual deliverable in this summit, and in there, there should be some fixed basket, ideally north korea should come up with a little bit of a progressed declaration about their capabilities. Trump may prepare partially lifting sanctions. One more question i think right here. Thank you. Steve lee korea defense veterans association. So when i was on active duty i worked as a secretary in military armistice commission. One of my jobs was to actually communicate with my north korean counter part there in the joint security area, and we were always looking for creative ways to actually try to engage, always trying to deescalate situations, so we know that right now the engagement is at the top between the two. So if that sort of bogs down, can you see other ways of trying to move things forward, any creati creative ways, any thoughts that you might have about that . So, you know, the fourth track coming out of singapore as you know well was the p. O. W. M. I. A. Returns. That is essentially a way to directly engage the kpa. You know, so that may be certainly something. And President Trump likes that, and so that may be something. But i think, you know, at this point, its not about creativity, about new tracks, it is, you know, as we get closer to a third summit, and i think everybody agrees theres going to be a third summit, what this really comes down to is the internal battles in both governments. Clearly they know the United States wants the uranium program, and on the u. S. Side its going to be a knock down dragout interagency into we have been there, it is ugly. Its as ugly as anything about how much sanctions suspension, and sanctions lifting versus sanctions suspension, you know, how many sanctions should we suspend and whats the snap back, right, thats in the end, the brass tax, thats what its going to come down to to facilitate a successful third meeting. The one thing good about a third meeting is both leaders know it cant fail. Both leaders are going to direct that we want an agreement this time, so maybe thats perhaps the best way to connect the leadership with the working level. Right. It strikes me, i was going to say, if you have a third summit, i cant imagine it not going into them thinking theyre going to get some sort of deal. You see john bolton on the ropes. He played a strong role in hanoi. Maybe to some surprise. Final, quick, pabdo we think th panlists that were going to see some sort of deal before the end of the year, heading into Donald Trumps reelection deal. I wont say what it is but some sort of deal struck in some sort of third summit. Does everybody think thats going to nap . So the donald trump who as president would probably want a deal. The donald trump campaigning in 2020 may prefer not to have a deal because it becomes a big target for biden and whoever else. Small deal or medium deal, we dont know. The moment of truth will come. The question is can we make the best out of it. Lets say i hope there will be. I hope. Implementation big or small. And joy if you have any final thoughts, since i did skip you there, if you have any final thoughts. Theres a lot of optimism that we have a good comfort, good deal. Thank you all and thank you to the panelists and thank you to the korea chair for a wonderful ten years. Thank you all. Thanks. [ applause ] please join us in the reception hall for some coffee and refreshments. Well reconvene at 2 00 p. M. This all day discussion at the center for strategic and International Studies will resume in about 15 minutes or so and our live coverage will as well. Well show you some of the comments from congressman ami barra who spoke to the group earlier. Thats what the plan was. So okay. So i thought i would open with a few remarks and then we would get straight into conversation. Can you guys turn your light on . Ill just stand and do what i did as a College Professor. So one of the Dangerous Things is when youre in a room of folks that are smarter that are smarter than you and have more knowledge on the subject matter, you have to be really careful. So i thought i would give you the congressional perspective of how were looking at the Korean Peninsula and looking at longterm strategic decisions. When youre talking about congress, you set the bar kind of low and then well exceed it. So i think a couple things. First off, i do want to thank csis and john and the Korea Foundation for pulling this together. But also for your exceptional work. And creating a body of knowledge that we use on congress but also being a resource for those of us on the hill. So thank you for that work and that sustained effort. Let me touch on a couple areas. One, i do have the privilege of being the cochair the democratic cochair on the Congressional Study group for korea. Now we have four study groups in congress, japan, germany, europe and korea is the fourth study group. Folks have said, well, why ko a korea . The reason why i think we formed this fourth study group, when we think about the peninsula and that path forward we know its going to take a longterm level of sustained engagement. The reason i think thats so important with congress, when you think about a president youre thinking four years or eight years. And if were to take a realistic view of finding peace on the peninsula, it wont happen in four or eight years or a single fiveyear term. Itll require strategic longterm engagement and the goal, thank you for the Korea Foundation for being an integral part of forming the group allows members of congress to get to know their korean counter parts in the assembly and build those longterm relationships as well as the thought leaders. Because for me this is my seventh year in congress, my fourth term. It is conceivable i will be there for a while. The best piece of advice i received when i first got elected to congress is you cant know everything and know every region of the world but find a few key areas where you can do a deep dive and become expert and build those i think about the peninsula, were thinking about longterm if the ultimate goal is peace on the peninsula and denuclearization, it wont happen by the end of the trump and Moon Administrations. But its conceivable a decade from now, a decade and a half from now youve achieved that goal. Thats where congress is important and where the study group i think gives us a vehicle by which to take members of congress to korea as well as welcome members of the Korean Parliament to the United States and build those deeper relationships. Thats one longterm sustained engagement. A second piece is, lets be realistic here. I dont think any of us sees, as an immediate next step, chairman kim saying, okay, im going to get rid of all my Nuclear Weapons. I also dont see, as an immediate next step, President Trump saying, were going to lift all sanctions. But can we frame a longterm goal of that is the longterm outcome, the longterm goal. Its going to take multiple steps to get there. What is that first immediate next step that starts to build a little bit of trust . A little bit of goodwill . If we think about post hanoi, i dont believe we can have a third summit dialogue between the United States and north korea and walk away without some sort of victory. So and that could be a small victory. It could be a small first step. But failure and having another hanoilike collapse, i think would actually put the dialogue in a deep freeze and really maybe not permanently damage the relationship but probably set the relationship and dialogue back for several years. Probably until the next administration. So, you know, that would be the second thing. Lets not focus on the end goal. Thats agree on what that end goal is and, you know, victor choi and i had the privilege of writing an oped, some in the korean press. But lets think about what that first step is to at least get some forward momentum. A third piece is when we think about President Trump and chairman kim, the dialogue gets complicated, because in most of the dialogue you have folks at the staff level working out most of the arrangements getting to 95 agreement and having the grail wo framework of what that agreement is and then the principals would enter and finalize. With chairman kim and President Trump we have two folks that want to be the negotiators. That adds an element. On our side we have to have that sustained engagement from the staff level from our special envoy, et cetera. And thats a level of complexity on the north korean side, who is empowered to speak for chairman kim and lay things out . Youre seeing some of that turnover in their negotiating team. But that probably has to be a prerequisite at the staff level getting pretty close to a place where if we go into a third dialog dialogue, there arent going to be any surprises and both the principals, President Trump and chairman kim can come away with that victory. So that would be the third piece that were looking at here. And then the fourth piece pertains not so much just to the north south dialogue but to the regional politics. The fourth piece that were thinking a lot about is, you know, our two close allies in the region. Korea and japan. And i was just there five, six weeks ago, and i would say that relationship, from my perspective, was at a low point. At one of the low points that ive seen in my time in congress. We have to think about how do we get these two key strategic allies on the same page with us so as we look at this longterm sustained engagement, were all speaking with one voice. So thats a little bit of how were thinking about this from the congressional side. Were encouraging the Trump Administration to take a bigger role in trying to find a path forward with japan and korea. But this is also a place where congress has a role in trying to figure out how we smooth that relationship or bring it to a better place than it is right now. So i will stop with that. And mark promised to keep it easy for me. What me might need to do is bring out grigsby, the bassett hound. Because everyone knows that bassett hounds speak korean and at 150 characters on twitter. Thank you for that. You can tell your College Professor roots. You know the issue well. And thank you for your engagement and your many, many trips to the region. You make the point about having worked as a staff member in congress, you maybe the point about congress being there for the long game but i argue it takes strong engagement from congress and your leadership there is to be commended. So thank you. So one followup to start on your oped entitled a small deal within a big deal. You outlined it a little bit at the top. You say basically libya style deal isnt feasible. You then basically say, in the first instance we should get a deal on the goal, right . Disarmament for sanctions relief. And then take some tangible steps in terms of trying to generate some momentum. In other words the North Koreans give up some part of their program and we get into this conversation. Thats the crux of it. Just to followup a little bit about how you are thinking in congress to get the two sides to start this process that you outline. I think the next real tangible step, and ive shared this with my counterparts in korea, i think this is a time for the republic, president moon to step in and continue a dialogue and keep that going. Outside of the platitudes that President Trump and chairman kim have been sharing, my sense is there isnt a conversation taking place right now between the United States and north korea. In the shortterm i think this is where the South Koreans can really step up and try to keep that some dialogue going. And i think timing is of the essence because i dont think we can go past the end of this calendar year without having a third dialogue if were going to have a third dialogue. I think our politics get too complicated going into an election year. But the republic also will be entering an election cycle fairly shortly as well. So i think the korean politics also get complicated. So given that time frame, thats six months, and i think to jump start this and start moving it forward, at least to get the conversation started again, i think this is a place where the Moon Administration can really take the lead and be helpful. Let me pick up on a thread you just identified in your last answer, very interesting one ambassador to myanmar and malaysia. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome all of you to this second session of todays conference. Were forecasting over the peace building process on the Korean Peninsula. Actually, the session one was supposed to cover the alliance and the denuclearization issue. And the second session we were supposed to discuss the peace operating process. We have i think another very, very active leadership of david no cakamura. Has covered almost all of the issues related to denuclearization. And current ones, particularly the presidency kim jongun and President Trumps upcoming visit t to osaka and the following visit to seoul and the issues that might come from that visit. For me to ask how we can diff differentiate this session 2 from session 1, ill ask that we ask experts here to put the peace building process in the context more rather than on specific issue by issue but, you know, more broader context in the sense that to see what happen, particularly after the hanoi summit and where we are now. In view of these upcoming events, the last few weeks, President Trumps tour to osaka and seoul and what we can expect from these events. So with this in mind, lets try to see what happen, where we are and what we can expect for the upcoming several weeks time. So we have for this panel discussion, we have four prominent experts. To my left we have dr. Huxer, hes currently leading the research institute. And hes one of the most prominent north korean specialists in korea, he studied in seoul, of course, but he has got his ph. D. At the university of pennsylvania. Next to him we have su mitari, shes been here with us since 2017. And before that she was with the Central Intelligence agency as a korea analyst. And also she has been working at the nsa reporting quite extensively on japan and korea and so on. So specialist on north korea. And we have very special panelist here, dr. Ramon pachenko. He is a korea chair at institute of European Studies at Free Institute of beijing. Actually, Korea Foundation has three korea chairs. Now this one is the first one first korea chair, set up in 2009, as you know. And Korea Foundation is going to have another one in the United States in los angeles very soon. And outside of the United States, they have one in belgium. That means thats what dr dr. Pachenko has. Also hes teaching. So we can expect that on our discussion of denuclearization and the issue of peace on the Korean Peninsula, some input from the European Union perspective. And lastly we have dr. Young. Again, very special input for this discussion. She is now currently Senior Researcher at the policy institute in seoul. Very interestingly she is a nuclear scientist. She studied the nuclear engineering. And has got ph. D. At the university of michigan. Currently shes handling the policy issues as related to nuclear affairs, but her major is nuclear engineering. So shes a real expert on this nuclear issue. So thats our panel. And then first i think we will give to each expert about five or ten minutes to make a presentation on their own. What happens, particularly after the hanoi summit and where we are now, and where we are expecting to be going, focussing on these questions about five or ten minutes. Not more than ten minutes. After that, then there will be some exchanges, questions and answer sessions. So we can start. Thank you. Okay. You go ahead, please. I feel privilege to be here with you to share with you some of my thoughts on what we are going to what we are trying to achieve in the Korean Peninsula. Peace settlement and denuclearization, two of the most difficult things of our time. We have a very frustrating period since hanoi, not having any resumption of working level negotiations between the United States and north korea. But we have very exciting week ahead. Fully expecting some good thing could happen, and so, you know but before i go before i proceed, let me show you what we we are really trying to achieve at this critical juncture of history in the Korean Peninsula. I ask you to recall what happened in 2017, particularly the second half of that year. And also in the first days of 2018. There was heightened threat of war. Not a simple threat of war, but a heightened threat of war, nuclear war in a sense. And both leaders of the United States and north korea, of course, kim jongun initiated first saying i have a Nuclear Button on my desk. And donald trump responded by saying i have a bigger one and powerful one more powerful one and it works. At that moment, particularly those People Living in the Korean Peninsula, you know, were totally frustrated and those remarks by the leaders who just treat Nuclear Weapons like play things, you know, Children Play with, and there formed an instantaneously and dramatically consensus among people that this never again, enough is enough. So we tried to deal with the fundamental question of how to make it how to make it not happen again. So we were almost resolved to deal with the root cause of the problem. Okay, how to dismantle cold war structure, long overdue. Cold war structure seven decade long on the Korean Peninsula. Otherwise it will repeat again and again. So thats what we are trying to achieve. But how . Of course, through peace settlement denuclearization. And we i want to make a few points. Number one, we have to have a third summit, United States and north korea. But the third summit should absolutely be a success. Otherwise, there will be, you know, serious setbacks and backlashes which we dont want to see again. And another point im trying to make is that we have to we have to be very careful about policies and strategies basically based on psychological calculation and structure. We had, you know, in those days of, you know, the soviet United States rivalry in the cold war era, we had the m80 mutual destruction. But it was based on schuemann psychology and we were not totally assured of our safety so we tried to have a physical protection of yourselves against threats from coming the other side. So we had, you know, star wars, sdi and now missile defense. And so, you know, for instance questions like what if north korea decides to lift this selfimposed moratorium on nuclear and Ballistic Missile testing when we think of maximum pressure on north korea as the most effective, even to the point where we, you know, unconscious regard it as the objective of our policy like it or not. And down north koreas what if north korea resides to lift the sanctions, lift the moth moratorium. Another point im trying to share with you is that south korea should not be sidelined too much. As we know, south korea played a brilliant role in mediating and facilitating process of the direct talks between the United States and north korea. And south korea is sidelined to a significant extent. And, you know, United States is our ally and north korea is our you know, our korean brethren. And so, you know, both sides should not, should not sideline us, south korea. Which initiated this whole process of peace after the totally unforgivable heightened threat of war on the Korean Peninsula as i mentioned in 2017. Another concern i have in the United States white house is that to what extent President Trump overrides the opposition from the hard line advisers or to what extent he is overridden by hard liner advisers. We heard about snap back idea proposed by donald trump in hanoi, as exposed by the north korean side. And we have iranian case, most recently of a few days ago, and United States decided to use military option to iran but president cancelled it at the last moment. So whats happening here. Thats one of the great concern. I dont know how many minutes you have four more minutes. Four more minutes. In order to make, you know, third summit a total success, absolute success, i think we have to deal with the outstanding mismatches we experience in hanoi. One of the most, you know, difficult problems we deal with north korea is sanction understanding the concept of sanction and understanding effective of sanction as policy tool. North korea regards consistently has regarded sanction not as a give and take item in negotiation. They regard it as precondition for beginning a real give and take deal because sanction is regarded as something that reveals true intention of the United States towards north korea. Sanction is regarded by North Koreans as a symbol of trust. Symbol of an accepting socalled peaceful coexistence of the United States with north korea. You know, that is not counted in the use of continuing negotiations. Thats something North Koreans always have said. And so thats something. The one important, you know, thing we can do is to bring sanction into the category of give and take deal. Make it a give and take item, not a precondition. What can be done about this . I think there are to be there has to be sanction relief as an expression of americas goodwill and lack of hostility toward north korea accepting a peaceful coexistence with north korea. We dont know exactly to what extent we have to relieve sanction, suspend sanction, exempt sanction. With that, i think north korea, you know, would be giving us a very hard time. Another point with regard to reasoning the third summit has to be also has to do with what happened in hanoi. We do not have full account of exactly what happened over there. We are getting, you know, pieces and bits and pieces of information from the United States and from north korea. But even that, i dont think we saw a government with a full account in exactly happened. Why and what why and how did the summit stall that way . Because of what process . What path they had in hanoi, for instance. And finally, let me share with you the photo of kim jongun reading President Trumps letter sent to him. Many people, particularly those reporters in the press, wanted to read as much as possible out of the photo which appeared on the front page on 23rd. And they zoom in on the, you know, backside of the letter and identifying how many paragraphs are there, how many what line. How many are thick lettered and just before thicklettered signature of the president. But i pay more attention to the working conference table kim jongun is sitting at. At least there was indication there were six at least six people sitting together. Maybe the photo was taken before, you know, the discussion among the six, or after the six. After the discussion session among the six. And so we all know that you know, theres preseason and reports from the u. S. Government officials involved in the hanoi negotiation, and also reporters from various press that north korean negotiators trusted with all other issues except for denuclearization, which they did not try to get into because it belongs to the authority of the final decision of the Supreme Leader himself. But north korea has, as long as i know, the u. S. Exposed publicly that kim jongun has his own version of National Security council and the photo we saw definitely is an indication of discussion of how to interpret Donald Trumps letter and how to respond to that. Let me close by saying that the people he must have in there, you know, i dont think its official, ns nsc meeting, and a committee have to deal with the United States. So United States must have them. Thank you dr. Paik. Basically says we are still not very we have not had a full account of what happened in hanoi. And as far as the concept or meaning of sanction is concerned, thats still an issue between the two sides. And the south korean government is much more needed. After that we have dr. Ramon pachenko. Ill keep my remarks brief. Thank you for the invitation to the celebration of the 10 anniversary. When we launched the chair in europe, we say this is something we cannot do. And we decided to focus more on the european component. This is how i want to frame my remarks. Korea specialist, i would consider myself working now a little bit more on europe korea and what can europe, if anything, provide to the korean processes were looking at. We have two processes, one denuclearization and the second one reconciliation. Process within both koreas. And president moon, you might know, he was in europe in the nordics a couple weeks ago. And he was talking about european models of reconciliation. And i stress the yes in reconciliation because what we see is in the balkanbalkans, ge these processes took years not decades to bring a satisfactory conclusion. In balkans were still discussing it and the wars go back to the 1990. The Korean Peninsula process will be longer in terms of reconciliation. So going back to your question about hanoi, the fact that hanoi produced no agreement, even though it surprised many of us, i dont think its an obstacle that cannot be surmounted at some point. We have seen process of reconciliation in many places at which point they thought it was going to break down. You had leaders on both sides not want to continue the process. And what were seeing now, possibly the commitment of the three main leaders, north korea, south korea, and the u. S. But the second point missing that i think is quite relevant for the discussion were having today that any piece in the Korean Peninsula as mentioned in previous panels, will need a working level process. Will need a twopeople process. Thats something we see missing currently. I think in the interkorean level we see this starting with military confidence Building Measures that talk about more people, two people exchanges between the u. S. And north korea thats currently missing. I think thats the greatest risk that we have at this point, not the commitment from the leaders. But the fact that we dont have this process, if at some point one of the two parties decides to defect, north korean and the u. S. , and they decide not to continue the process, this will be to have reviewed maybe with a new leader in the u. S. The point being that this process, we need the success ive leaders to make sure the commitment stays in place to have the working level process among those who need to be elected, for example, in the u. S. Or south korea. Theres a second component which is the more material component. If north korea is going to ever denuclearization, and i sit on the camp who thinks that why would kim jongun denuclearization, i dont think he will, but if he kind of takes the steps towards denuclearization or meaningful steps towards denuclearization we can have sanctions relief. What is important is the Economic Cooperation process. When it comes to Economic Cooperation, i think the ideas you siee coming out from different places, including the south korean government are good. So they talk about a community, which the president , president moon, has actually linked to the european colonist Community Set up in the 1950s. This is how we reconciled in europe. It was good to have this working level process. It was good to have the leaders committed to the process. But once we had Economic Cooperation, then it became very difficult for any leader to have a war, violent relationship with any other country, i think what were trying to achieve with north korea, which is to engage north korea in different economic flows, is the right approach. What we have seen when the u. S. Has come to europe, for example, met with european leaders, this is something he has stressed, what can europe contribute to the economic rebuilding or the Economic Development of north korea in terms of money but also in terms of expertise. I think this is a key if were going to see a successful process of moving towards denuclearization, reconciliation between both koreas and north korea becoming a socalled more normal country. The last point i wanted to make for my opening remarks is that what we are looking at in the Korean Peninsula, i think we can all agree is a lack of trust. Theres a lack of trust between both koreas, between the u. S. And north korea, i think this is clear for four decades. But the International Community itself has a lack of trust in north korea. I think this is key as well. Because one thing that you see when you try to discuss these types of features in europe, peace building in the Korean Peninsula, from policy makers what you get is how do you trust kim jongun . North korean has already signed. Similar agreements in the past. He obviously wants to keep the Nuclear Weapons for his own security. How can you trust him . I think what we have to see here, going back to your question about hanoi and the process moving forward is that we have to build trust on the north korean regime. I think on this particular issue, north koreas leader has to change his behavior but it has to start with the u. S. And south korea try to understand a better north korea. I think this is something that might be again missing so far from the process because the top down approach and the trust bild building process i have mentioned before, but also might involve ones we have a third summit, subsequent meetings between the different leaders trying to understand each other a little bit better. And this is something that i think in europe we successfully have been doing over the decades but i think its something missing in the Korean Peninsula and between the u. S. And north korea. I will leave it there for my opening remarks. Okay. Thank you with the experience of European Union, it seems that maybe you are going back to the comparison of the two different approaches of one peace through denuclearization. So putting the emphasis on denuclearization and then through which you can have the peace approach. And the other one is, denuclearization through peace potentially. So promoting peace or