Khrushchev. And we might save that for a later discussion but i really enjoyed that conversation. Vlad is a professor of International History at the London School of economics, an expert on the cold war and soviet russian history and particularly intellectual history. Among the books is particularly related to our topic of this conference, a failed empire, the soviet union and the cold war from stalin to gorbachev and i also noted among his books zhivagos children and having just watched the movie yet again, i was drawn, of course, to that topic. Jeremi suri is a longtime friend of the Miller Center. We are always happy to welcome him back. As we did recently for an American Forum on his latest book, the impossible presidency which in light of the incumbent might be called the impossible president. But it is called the impossible presidency and it is about whether anyone now can be a successful president. Jeremi is the mac brown distinguished chair for leadership and Global Affairs at university of texas and hes based in both the department of history and the Lyndon Johnson school of public affairs. So im going to turn to vlad first who will speak to us about his essay on brezhnev and the lessons of detente. All right. Should i go there . You may go wherever you are comfortable. Maybe ill ill stay. Everybody says ill be brief so ill try to be brief. [ laughter ] in reality. Which doesnt mean when we think about brezhnev, of course, were struck by the fact that such an individual, a threadbare education, no ability to conceptualize international relations, all of a sudden came up with an idea of detente and, you know, succeeded for at least for awhile in that enterprise. Its useful actually to compare khrushchev to brezhnev. Khrushchev is the last person we heard so much from tim, the person who represents heroic bolshevic tradition. That is thats take by the existing capitalist system and believes in revolution and all that. Bill wrote a beautiful biography of him. He was a true believer. But if you ask yourself why there was only one khrushchev truly in the history of the cold war, there were no imitators of khrushchevs before him and certainly no willing imitators of khrushchev after him which is easier to understand. You come up with a more sort of normative picture of soviet Foreign Policy where most of people, even stalin at many points of his career, and certainly people after stalins death, begin to search for some kind of soviet american detente or some kind of a conceptual system structurally structure that would accommodate both soviet and american interests. So that makes khrushchev a colorful but only an episode, heroic episode, in this search for accommodation between the two great powers. And for brezhnev personally, whatever khrushchev did was quite awful, especially in Foreign Policy and just in as a reaction sometimes purely visceral reaction to risk taking that brezhnev supported something opposite and repeated that guide that brought us to the brink of the war. So brezhnevs idea of detente wont go all through this all. Was very simple. It wasnt a pepper the peace. But a deeply held idea that if you have two great powers, big, with Nuclear Weapons, can destroy each other what prevents them from actually reaching some kind of agreement to stabilize to billed a stable world order . So brez nef its absolutely logical that sooner or later that should happen. The only problem is that some people in the United States some military industrial complex, brez nef doesnt understand. Something prevents on the american side this idea from being realize ds. And then all of a sudden he finds a partner with whom he can negotiate reach results and also very importantly negotiate from a position of strength because he does believe in strength. Thats Richard Nixon. Richard nixon comes to power in 1969, good year more brez nef because he dealt with soeskia. He is a falling domino man he says had we not invaded czechoslovakia. He put it dinly saved czechoslovakia. Then soon troops would end up on our borders that resonate was putins thinking. He is a more normal soviet man to me than kruschev. Chews chef is unique if you think about it. So, however, when you look at brez nefs and his detente hit limitations very soon in a few years. Definitely by 1975 everyone understands something went wrong. This is not only jackson venny commandment this is many things piling up. My argument is simple. His idea, not only his idea but the idea of huge number of soviet gnomen clarity communists wsh officials russians but also ukrainians and others but that there could be a conceptual framework that the two powers could form a stable world order was based on delusion and what america is base. And how america warranted to billed the world with u. S. Leadership and only u. S. Leadership. So when brez nef meets nixon who is already half drunk in the water gate stage and crimea he raises a toast to the doctrine of lasting and universal peace, the nixon brez nef doctrine. Right. Thats a joke. But there is something deeper. So i would argue that the russian leader could never realize that the u. S. Soviet world order is a ox i moran. American elites never wanted to create such a world order. They wanted to prevail in the cold war. And the United States did offer strategic i lines to a big communist country. But it was china. Not the soviet union. And they offered that alliance to china because its explicitly and strategically directed against the soviet union. Now moving to our putin. Putin is a very different person than kruschev but also very different person in comparison to brez nef. There are similarities and differences for those who didnt have to chance a read the paper. Putin like brez nef is ill liberal supports sfroers, veterans great fatherland warily brez nef. He reduce put ton kgb man is a primativism. He had a steep learning curve. He learned a lot what does it mean when the state is destroyed . And russia was flooded by highly unpleasant realities linked to economic and political liberalization. So he accepted fundamental failure of communism as doctrine. He does not want to rebuild a territorial soviet empire. His project is to improve russias place in the existing world order not create a new one. And here comes the rub. If you think about it and if you talk to you know very knowledgeable russian i just had an exchange with one over email recently even they dont understand why russia cannot find a proper model, place for its seven elf in the. Sometimes it acts a as a superpower but everyone understands it cant be a superpower for economic and other reasons, doesnt have enough umphp but then russia refuses to act as Regional Power because its allegedly something selfdiminishing and drerogator process np the existing rishl order in russia is not easy to establish. And just in terms of provoking a discussion i would argue that its highly polar. On the one hand on the one side of putins state or regime. Depends on macroeconomic stability and export import recommendation with the global world order. Nothing that russia can billed or aspire to. The past years proved how good this order was for russia, considering limitations of economy and wealth of its raw materials. Its a wonderful system. But not enough. Because you come to the idea of bad neighborhood. You come to the idea of constant the forces coming from the east and of course from china as well threatening to chip away what you consider to be your backyard, what you consider to be your own buffer zone. And so on. And you are the leader. In the patry moenl of the retiring system where putin is a king its up everything is absolutely interdependent. If you yield on the foreign front all your rivals and opponents domestically see, ewe you are o you are weak. Putin cant afford to be weak. When he has to show flexibility, for instance he contake northern russia petition took crimea. He to stop for obvious reasons. But he must compensate for that sign of weakness by something else. He goes to syria. He cant just stay idle and not respond to western sanctions. He must produce countersanctions. Thats part of the regime that he is as hostage of as the creator of. So what does it leave us with . I do think that still if we go beyond this complexity, dealing with the system itself, structural limitations and putins own psyche, this is the country again that is fundamentally different from the soviet union. Putin has some weaknesses but some strengths in comparison to brezhnev he was responsible for the sprawling empire. Vietnam angola and all that. Putin can choose more or less where to interven and how far to go. Also in terms of economic flexibility, yes, russian economy is smaller than the soviet economy. But putin at least did not inherit a completely failed economic model. He still employs new liberal economist that is provide efficiently macroeconomic stability when the pie is shrinking even under the conditions of sanctions ifs this a flexibility breznev couldnt dream of. The he was very conservative and cautious with the control of the budge and state bank. But the politburo had no idea how to deal with falling oil ices, all that. Putin knows not he personally but other people he employs knows how to react to volatility. And thats strength. In terms of propaganda, breznev it was a joke. And it was for us. Inside. The propaganda means that everything the soviet says you have to turn upside down and this is the truth. Russian propaganda today is, again something that et cetera the former soviet union couldnt dream of. With all my respect respect. Rt sell very successful. And Russian Operations in negotiable Networks Using american platforms like twitter and facebook and others is phenomenal. I know if it stay this way. But its phenomenal achievement to our overestimate putins strength, no, of course. We know that russia is weak and getting weaker. But underestimate putin is also a wrong thing. And saying, well let it go down. And the United States can ignore it. Its you know, we cant. We cant ignore it. Finally, let me conclude with an optimistic note. Crimea is an exception. Its one its a oneoff thing. Putin does not need more territory. If only because more people come with the territory have to feed them and give pensions and so forth. He doesnt like it. Putins strategy was and is not a confrontation with the west but a bargain. We will know it. The problem is that the american side does not want to provide that opportunity. Perhaps for putin it was as much of a grand delusion or grand illusion as detente was for brezhnev. Well done. Thank you. [ applause ] and turn to jeremi who is on nixon on did he ten. I will say ou drited i am to be up here with barbara and vlad. I view so much of the work at president the studies project at the Miller Center. Its one of the important things that the historical profession has done in the last decade or so. I want to applaud the Miller Center and hope the president ial studies projects prospers in the come year. My graduate students will benefit as many of us will. And i want to just tell everyone how influenced ive been by vlads work, in many ways because vlad does what almost no other historian of the period of detente which is not to simply tell the story of detente but contextualize within the broader framework. Writing about the role of soviet leaders and citizens like himself. Zhivagos children as barbara referred to the book before backup thats my point of departure because i think one of the problems in studying detente and one of the big problems in teaching detente to undergraduates is first of all i dont know what it is. Hard to define. And there is a tendency we have to describe it in hyperelitest the terms and he can focusing on individuals and not understanding the context in which it takes shape and the reason it fails to be enduring transformation. The closest ive been able to come in nixons words in describing what he thought about detente is the speech i quote in the paper from the u. S. Naval academy in june of 74. Im ill just read it. I want to read that quote to give us a framework for what we are talking about so we know the subject were discussing. Nixon explained this is at the height of watergate. A blend of the idea o ideal and the practicing mat iic in our Foreign Policy has been especially critical in our approach to the soviet union. The differences between our two systems and life and government are sharp and fundamental. But even as we oppose totalarianism. Its interesting he use that is phrase we must also keep sight of the hard, cold facts of life in the nuclear age. Ever since the soviet union achieved equality in strategic weapons systems, each confrontation has meant a brush with potential Nuclear Devastation to all civilized nations. And mark and tim gave us a wonderful soft drinks of the moment that becomes clear. Reduction of engss therefore has become the foremost requirement of american Foreign Policy nixon and kissinger they came to this independently they both believed that the global order that it benefitted the United States so much since world war ii was diminishing in its benefits to the United States. I think it overstates it to believe to say they thought it was krulking. But they thought the trends in the global world system, economic, political, military, were moving against american predominance. They saw a isis of the old order. And nixon acutely felt it at home. This is the story of the nixons election aurl clear in the 60s and the story of what got him elaboratinged was in large part the crisis of american politics in 1968. Its not just the 2016 where the candidate draws inside straight to get elected that happened in 19968. If you ran that election five more times nixon wouldnt win more than one or two times. That vrjts election could go different ways pap thanks to the research in the Miller Center perhaps a little less interference in the negotiations over vietnam and perhaps that election comes out differently. Another week and it comes out differently. Nixon was acutely conscious as i think our president is today of how precarious his power was at home. And he believed, i think and this comes through in all of his writings about detente that establishing stability overseas was crucial for political longevity at home. These are deeply interconnected. I wrote a whole book on this and i find more evidence to reinforce that. What nixon placed the most emphasis on, showing up before his president , in his notes about Foreign Policy, is the role of the individual and the personal role which he and those around him di. E. Henry kissing earn oer and others in control the decline, in holding back. Kissinger gives it pedantic terms. Fors nixon its pedestrian that the silent majority has been silenced. The elites are taking us in the wrong direction, and i must stand up against these elites and push things in the direction that they should go. And perhaps that the leaders of the soviet union and china themselves not respected by perhaps their own elites in their own societies might follow along as well. This is a hyperpersonalization of the understanding of diplomacy and Foreign Policy by nixon and those around him. The centralization of power in the white house, the use of secrecy. The writing out of the state department. Thats not just domestic politics thats the mirror image at home of the view of the international system. They are deeply interconnected. Its not one or the other for them. And Richard Nixon is acutely conscious of the fact that the last president to manage stable relations with the soviet union was Franklin Roosevelt and that Franklin Roosevelt did it in a personalistic way. I think many things that are written out nixon recognized himself. If eisenhower was to some extent his first model for tlomcy roosevelt was his model. And from the beginning nixon places emphasis on doing what president s in the cold war hadnt done before. Seeking to meet with the soviets even when there isnt agreed agenda. The most extreme example is the nixon president to china pptd. The only president ial interest trip i know of where there isnt an agenda. He doesnt when or if he is going to meet with mao or whats going to happen. No one would staff the president that way today. He doesnt go quite that extent with soviets. But there is a similar desire in what he thinks are roosevelt yan terms to meet with the other side. So sit down as he said and talk things through man to man, and that phrase turns up time and again. The perception that the elites are the efeet femennized and the men will figure it out. Nixon meets with the soviet counterpart more times in his relatively short presidency than throughout the entire decade before. Right, kennedy and johnson each have one meeting with the soviet counterpart with. Nixon has three High Pressure his meetings are more extensive. Much more focused on personal sbrs relations. More secretive also. There is emphasis on making the relationships nimble. And there is emphasis, veriperson importantly on floerks and what nixon sees at rooseveltien terms. And that everything is negotiable. You can make tradeoffs. Kissinger gives it fancy terminology process linkage but anyone who studies negotiations this the horse trading that goes on in serious negotiation. This drives the arms control experts batty. They have figured out systemically the way to talk about the throw was and abms was the Nixon A Kissinger it doesnt matter, its all politics. Th they intentionally disregard gerard smith and others. Its a belief that its all politics, all about making trade offs. Thats what sachl of l. T. P. , the a. B. M. Treatment and the presentation of the nuclear war treaty. The there is efforts to use the personal relationships and negotiations to build a structure for stability. Not the other way around. Not the other way around. There is a distrust in the structural factors and the trends and the desire to use the individuals to redefine those trends. And again kissinger gives in a german romantic sense ability that you are standing out and redefining, the ziet geist. Its about trying to redefine the pressuring and rebuild the personal recommendations around for a new foundation for the agreements. Thats why you have the agreement on basic principal principles in 19. Thats why you have things occupying their time about what a stable world order system should look like. I think at the base, nixons insight is that many of the problems of the cold war can be managed better if you have more here i use thomas shelling phrase, more Common Knowledge. That they know what they know and we know what they know. And we respect each other and recognize what with he know on both signed. Common knowledge, understandings, understandings. Years ago i did a word search on some of the documents and the word understanding comes up more than anything else. We have to build understandings. We must understand each other. Understand by not talking to experts but talking direct facetoface. To understand intentions, understand the rules of the game, to create a stability based upon a Common Knowledge set for operating as a society. I would argue that to some extent what inixon does is actually successful. Im with many scholars like matt evangelicalist irand others who think the 70s are enduring change. You dont think you can understand gorbachev. You kaund understand the new thinkers without understanding this period and the way the personal releases broke down bar years and some of the ideological barriers between contact between societies. The exchanges that arise. Scientific exchange allen lynch has written about this in the field of internationals relations. The ways that east and west due to personal relationships, not to fundamental agreements on ideologies, the but the personal relationships of the leaders open space, give legislate macy to give cover to those who long wanted to kmupgt across societies. We do have a more stable world. Wouldnt its nice if the president if we had some sense what have his Common Knowledge about Nuclear Weapons was wouldnt that make it more stable . There is something about building Common Knowledge for strategic stability. We take it for granted as collars we think we know what we know and policies makers should know it. But off often thats not the case. So there is a sense of strategic stability and a new communicative connection that i think is built in this period that has enormous enduring value. I put out and i read bills biographiy goesh chof. I think no detente no gorbachev . Where else is where else is going to sen time in the United States and and see democracy in the canada and the United States and scanned i have knaven. Those Connections Matter enormously and matter for american is the society as well. The quality of our study of the soviet you know anden the quality of advice that people like regan and others get is much improved in the 80s because of the exchanges that arise in the 70s. That said, those successes i think come with failures. Many failures that actually have to do less with individuals. The strength of nixonen a kissinger as policy makers the overwhelming energy, deep thought and ability to pursue risky but important initiatives. Their weaknesses are all the same thing. They do not know how to operate effectively in institutions. They are not institution builders. I would call hem institution disrupters at times. And they systematically undermine conconsensus for everything they do everything they do every step. What way of thinking about it is kissinger is a brilliant bull in the china shop. We wins over people on one side and angers others. The problem for the u. S. On the detente side is is its not a process process in the american policy system. Its not brought into the american policy system and the pentagon and state department are pursuing different policies as at the same time the white house is pursuing focused detente policy. Thats by destine and never reconciled. Henry jackson takes advantages of that. He is not a policy entrepreneur he just sees it and stakes advantage. The staffing is poor and dependent upon few people when the people leave the scene as happens in 1974 its hard to continue and keep it going. This is the roosevelt to truman problem as well. Prespicily the problem there. And most deeply of all and perhaps most important to us today it is not the it the petition dent policy is not connected to american values. Its actually marketed, discussed, pursued as an alternative to american values. In fact there is a deep selfcriticism built into the uns of for all the discussion of the silent majority. Nixonen a kissinger believe americans dont understand the world and let them do it. Thats unsalable in the United States policy as a log in run. What effective policy needs. Now im speaking to the prept world i dont have much to offer in how to understand Vladimir Putin. Were making this up, right. But i think what understand shall understanding the process of american policy making from this period can offer today is actually a point that phil zelliko made reemt i said to build on, the importance of staffing, having institutional gravity behind what you do. Too much of our approach to russia and other major powers have batted back and fofgt from administration to energies administration and within administrations and this point has been made before. Other dhrgss rebuke divided and uncertain and are uncertain. Did we pivot to asia or not . Did we reset with russia or not . I think building a staffing structure and set of institutional priorities that can back up the policies you are pursuing is absolutely essential. The point of my recent bock on the impossible presidency is that president s tag take on policy making and implementing themselves and it never works. So we are doing exactly the wrong things today. I want to be on record on that. Without saying a word about donald trump we are doing the wrong things today. We need more kplomts, not less tp. We no more dplots not less, more area experts, not rest. And we need to talking more, not less. I dont mean at the president ial or white house level. Let me make it as clear as i can. White house policy making is doomed to failure. Foreign policy must be made in an interagency framework. Must involve the state department and defense time to pay o department as well as the nsc and there is no substitute for that that for longterm effective policy. Detente failed on the american side because it lacked that. And anything were doing with russia now is going to fail regardless of what Vladimir Putin does until we actually build that interagency structure. Everything i see us doing is the opposite. Before we talk about putin lets get our ohouse in order. As historians we have a lot to offer on how to think about that. Thank you. Vlad, did you want to respond or you were busily making notes. Anything to say before we open up to questions. No, no lets open. Alfred, we have one in the mid. And then svetlana after that. Thank you. Thanks for very interesting and stimulating discussion. The soviet russian leaders have longevity in office that the american counterparts northerly dont have. When you look at breznev its johnson and nixon and carter. And our focus is on nixon. Carter and johnson got lost in our story. And my question is about the fate and the failure of detente. And to what degree the arrival of carter and very new american policy and breznevs stroke contributed to that. So the question base the importance of personalities in that story. How much how much emphasis you would put on personalities in the end of detente. Well i would say when i wrote about breznevel i was struck about how much it was his personality and his set of believes, how lucky he was. And that brings us to structural factors and functional factors. He will the politics, and nixon was an an ideal american president in soviet imagination. Everything is run through kissinger. Everything is secretive. Everything is a decided through back channel. Were u. S. Conceived rogers doesnt know about that back channel. Its perfect way how you can run business in soviet imagination. So that luck couldnt last obviously. And b e. R. Znev ran out of luck before he had a stroke or whatever he had. Right after vladivostok. In slaved stosk he meets with ford who we never mention almost. But ford is the first president to say politely and listens to breznev and has no imagination, power or energy to do anything with did he ten and says no, im no longer using the word detente, by the way. So breznev own health deteriorated rapidly. But also as i interviewed soviet participants who knew him, they said breznev reacted quickly to opportunities. He was astute politician in defect and foreign setting. If he saw there is something to do with west germany, he would go there as long as success is almost assured. And that way he was absolutely opposite to kruschev. He was not a risk taker. He was close to stalin in a strange way. Stalin liked it all prepared and assured. He wouldnt take risk. So when he was sick he also couldnt see any opportunities for himself. If he had one under carter, he would have grabbed them. Unfortunately carters ideas we know in 1977 was a little bit misguided about renegotiate s. A. L. T. We the went through numerous discussions. It was unfortunate americans changed that position. Russians couldnt interize. Every u. S. Administration starts from scratch. Its a mess. You have to wait a year. Abprobably at the end of the second year the First Administration have a good chance. He would they would understand something about arms control and other issues. Then you use this very, very narrow window of opportunity to do something with americans. And then the next president ial campaign starts. And its hopeless. So i very much hear the pain of soviet diplomats when the first ambassador to the United States said that famous comparison he made the famous comparison. Japan was like a chamber orchestrate you knew every slielslie violin and cello. But United States is the unruly orchestrate. That is a good analogy. There is so many things baffling with american Foreign Policy. We know cannon denied american ability to do Foreign Policy whatsoever. Jeremi. Svetlana. My question is closely related. I found it very interesting and thought provoking of the comparison vlad made between when he said was b e. R. Znevs illusion or delusion about a possibility of the u. S. soviet cooperative world order. And then you compared it to putins illusion or delusion in the beginning of first putins administration. Well with, i never thought about it this way. But can i this is really interesting. Bus maybe putin also sincerely believed that a truly cooperative order was possible, world order. Now, can i push you just a little more to the moment where that illusion or delusion starts to dissipate and why, and try to make the same comparison between breznev and putin . And this is not a question about personalities. This is a question about their vision of how world order might work, that it would be cooperative and why it does not work in way . Is there any similarities . Well we all know in history after 9 11 when putin calls bush and offers all kinds of things, the Strategic Partnership of sorts. And he definitely acts at the time when there is already dsh how strong i dont know when there is are already antiamerican consensus in moscow with political elites and even among diplomats. And putin overlies that. Thats the role of individual. Over rules it that in that heroic factor is important. As long as i reach out to american leader, our friendship would become the basis for future Partnership Im quoting from your paper svetlana, like between clinton and yeltsin. If yeah friends thats the business basis for partnership and it never happens in soviet American Relations its a grand delusion. Because there are other Structural Forces that are soviets and russians are incapable of understanding. Even scholars are incapable of understanding those impediments and obstacles. It could happen but didnt. And for some reason they didnt. Then the whole path of failures and you still ask the question, why this failure and why that failure . Maybe the conclusion should be like in a good science, it was not a failure. It was, you know, a pattern. It was almost a law. So then of course i think it was iraq. I think it was iraq when instead of doing what instead of instead of listening to the russian concerns, the Bush Administration walks out of a. B. M. Treaty and invading iraq. And those two things had huge impact on the on moscow Foreign Policy elite, huge impact. Oh okay. Im sorry. Yes, by all means. On the american side there is an interesting pattern of also delusion and disillusionment many president s. President s have a tendency to overstate their ability to persuade a foreign leader theyve gotten to power by persuading people in the country. They overstate their ability to do that. H. W. Was popped modest but that process but from kennedy forward and but and eisen hour perhaps. Roosevelt as well. They believe they can persuade foreign adversen as do what they want. This comes back to tims point about now not see whag were doing is seen as threatening by others. I can do what i do in other parts of the world that undernine russian interests. And we can manage all these things. The problem is that of course foreign leaders are not persuadesly as easily as we think. They pay close attention to what we do outside of personal relationships. It takes a will long time for president s to learn that. Alfred, phillip. You have a question . I think the very good discussion is actually not generous enough to soviet Foreign Policy. In this period jeremi made the point how we would do better to build up institutions and did high quality policy work. I know of no period in which in which almost any government in the post war era did a better job of institutional high quality policy staff work than the soviet government in the 1970s. This is not so much about brezhnev huss this is more the diplomats. You look at the skill taking for example. We havent talked much about vietnam. The americans during this period are totally hamstrung by their position on vietnam and their need in every negotiation to try to get the soviets to try to help them manage the vietnam problem. And do brchlt inon and his team manage that issue about dsh could they have madding it better . If you ask what are their purposes and how did they want to skiflfully manage this and get to what outcomes be, could they have done any better than they did. And if you could go from region to region to region again according to the obltives they had in the 70s and their logic its really quite a remark lk pormds from an institutional point of view. And some sometimes you could notice that beneath putin and maybe including putin russian Foreign Policy over the last few years has actually developed and implemented rather skiflfully composed plans, the obtain the Strategic Initiative and outmaneuvered rivals in way he we may not like but that Say Something about somebody doing staff work. Like the moving into syria there is months of sophisticated staff work involved with both the southeasterns and iranians that is a prelude to americans in 2015. More did the stuff with crimea and ukraine happen on a 24hour impulse with no advance planning . So i invite you a little bit, vlad, to its not so much an attack on nixonen and kissinger per se though i agree with jeremi, as to step back appear actually observe moscow Foreign Policy in a light more flattering than you get from focusing on the supreme leader. Well, there were at least as far as i can see three approaches to the United States from the end of the 50s to the end of the 70s. One was a bad sociology approach that was surprisingly present, even, lets say in the early 80s, considered to be completely ob s outdated. There is a pyramid of power consisting of wall street and all kinds of groups and influence that fight for power around it. And groups of sociologists writes about it in the soviet inclination of it. And it was very much present. So i guess the opposite the opposite viewpoint and quite linked to what jeremi and i have discussed about individuals was the point that i discovered in our institute, is arbotov and all his younger proteges my mind was clouded by the bad sociology when i came and said throw out all the rubbish everything is about vitds, everything is about personal diplomatic and cultural relations. We need to have more exchanges and exhibitions american soef exhibitions and more schools dealing with stereotypes be, the whole panoply of detente era how to reduce tensions and how to provide understanding that jeremi mentions that we completely ignored today our discussion, the enormous gamut of practices that had been invented, tried, applied, they succeeded in tactical way. They didnt succeed in a strategic way but thats another story. But they should be mentioned. Its all about the arbotov school. And i think between the two opposite approaches was the midForeign Policy approach of good professionals. Sometimes indeed which agree with you were too harsh on them. We sort of buy the criticism of the group of people that emen eighted actually from the kgb and gru who felt more free and entrepreneurle and called them slightly dumbed by gromiko. Its not true. I agree that was a very, very structural school that maybe didnt allow some and that was a good reason. They didnt allow a room for heroic Foreign Policy of kruscheven style and later gorbachev style. But they were fair proof rules that they followed that provided slow and gradual advance in chosen directions. So thats why gorbachev and cherednodzy wanted something quick. With you the professionals predictable frowned at the amateurism and warned of possible dire consequences. Well they were crowing into the void. Arty, and then tim. Fascinating session on, im reminded of why i i might call this chapter in the new bock on this era for the age of brez nef. My students really hate that when they see it. But this session has pointed to me how a lot is right np on the discussion of staffs and leader mishap. Soviet Foreign Policy during the 70ss stands out as a game of two halves. People do not change certainly in terms of the staffing aspects. Very professional and good. Capable of a lot of very good thinking. What changes is in terms of the leadership. So the leadership weakens very dramatically. This goes back to sarah a point with has to do with aging and health. And a lot of things that happen at the top. And thats the period in the late 1970s when at least i see some definite examples of soviet overstretch in terms of International Air force. Angoly o a, ethiopia, afrgens which the best stafrg in the world couldnt have dealt with. Because there is a vacuum at the top. An inability to translates of the abilities and in diplomatic terms or for that matter in military terms to a strategic longterm set of action which can only be created by good and strategic leadership. Just a fun point of information this is a great panel we do have one taped summit. There is only one u. S. Soviet summit that for which we have a recording. Thats the 1973 summit. And i would you both both vlad and jeremi probably know this but many others dont. But you want to to hear breznev talking and listen to nixon and him talk to each other. Five years ago the Nixon Library released it. Its very interesting. I think it shows breznnev intelligently extraordinarily weak and youll also find that the memcons of the meetings are different from the tapes. If you really its the only taped summit we have. There is no tape of that we of of vienna, no no tapes of glass boro. We have one taped summit. Its worth listening to if you want to get a sense of the superpower relationship and want to assess brezhnev. Thank you. There are questions yessing with dale. After dale is next to mel in the second row middle. Just a very quick question. Because i largely agree with the idea that the more understanding between leaders and between bureaucracies is good for internationals relations im a big believer in that. But there is always this tension at least from where i come from, the study of Political Science and international relations, the problem of deception. And that is that you can pofbly want to communicate. You can communicate with the smile and that friendship, build the personal relationships. But if the person is trying to deceive you you have to be very wary of that. Of course the ultimate example is when bush dsh be second bush said i looked into putins soul, paraphrase. Looked into putins soul and liked what i saw. I understand the man. And obviously that was a pure deception. It reminds me of woody allen jokes he failed philosophy because he looked into the soul of the person next to him on the final exam. Thats the problem. You cant look into the other person and see true intentions. And you might be deceived. Im wondering how you as historians would grapple with this age old problem in my field of how do you deal with the tension of trying to understand another and also deal with the problem of deception . So this is a greet question. It connects to arna and tims points as well. I think that the policy makers who get their adversary and and i lies and the other side process they come to it through a combination of two roots. One from the personal impressions. But they also come it it from having a rig rouse process around them that is providing contextual knowledge and forcing them to think that through. Thats a good process. You dont just read the cia psychological profile. You combine it with your experience. Its not just more information. Its how you process tp i do think Franklin Roosevelt is a master at this. He spends time with stalin and churchill and has multiple people working with him and bringing him information and he is using the information as he plans moment to moment. The problem with roosevelts process is that it takes enormous energy by him, the president. Thats one of the reasons he dies so much younger than churchill and stalin. By the way, frank didnt say this. One of the most important insights for any paper was was franks insight that this roosevelt lived as long as cannon he would have been alive during able arch ner 83. Thats hard to imagine in part because of the way he managed leadership. I dont know, well, well i do think that this is the limit of for a limit there is a limit for how much we can understand about our interlock uter. And what kicks in is perceptions of him or her. Is he a partner . Do i need him for my policy in a certain policy framework . Or is he an adversary . So if this is stalin of 1945, as sergei wrote in his book, roosevelt needed him. He hoped to use stalin as a postwar partner in a postwar war order. He knows stalin is capable of infinity deception but that doesnt matter as much as as to truman when you see him as a adversary. Then the optic flips. Then the deception becomes justification for a complete mistrust. And this is the its really striking how in particularly in u. S. Foreign policy, both particularly during the cold war, how much more tolerant are american diplomats and policy makers towards people whom they perceive to be allies or useful category conversion adversary. So compromise stops at the door at the border of the soviet union. Understanding stops. Empathy stops at the border at the doorstep of the kremlin. And so on. There are some remarkable exceptions. And there is one remarkable exception is breznev nixon meeting. Nobody could predict it. As as nixon it taken aside over with the group. And they begin to feel like theyre both intensely insecure individuals. Both have enormous power. And yet they can trust each other. Right, right. Its a miracle. I think that i just wanted to add if i could say one more thing to build on vlads nailed it here. Whats important here is for a leader to develop a complex portrait of the interlow cuter. And educate the american public. The rhetoric at home has been simplistic but become more even more simplistic. This happened as much to obama as others. You get locked in the political rhetoric at home more. Thats extraordinary about ronald regan he would o could walk past that. He could create the evil empire image but sell another image of gorbachev. That might be more important that Strategic Thinking that ability to sell that image. We understate the importance that have in policy making but i include that phillips staffing. When you staff the Foreign Policy its how you sell the Foreign Policy at home, right. We must draw this wonderful panel to an end. Thank you so much. Lets give a big round of applause to our panelists. [ applause ] and now a short portion of the real america series. Well look at 1980s c. I. A. Briefings on the soviet union. Soviet internal pg. A 15 minute fame from 1985 details detail attention the vast system of indoctrination and which dischurj individualism and encourage kremlin rule. The soviet communist party has not face add serious internal threat to its political rule since the 1920s. Yet after years of forced san franciscos by the population,
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