Transcripts For CSPAN3 Security Threats In North Africa 20171204

Chronic civil war. You have aqap saying lets not beat up the tribes to try and maintain our safe haven. They just couldnt bring themselves to do it. They still use these oppressive measures on the local population. So i think that is going to be the key if they can hold remote territory where maybe there arent Major Population Centers for a little bit rebuilding, then maybe you might see Something Like irraqqa but its not raqqa a major population like mosul. Right now they arent going to be able to do that. That doesnt mean they arent going to be able to do it in five years, which is a concern. Dr. Ayari, i would be remiss if i didnt ask about events in libya on tunisia. Im curious if you could give us a sense in terms of what are some of the dynamics you see imminently threatening tunisia and what are some of the ones you think we should be thinking about longterm given that porous border between libya and tunisia. You mean the problem, deterioration of living situation . Thats right. Yes. Of course, in a sense, that main problem is economic, economic, because we know the border population thanks to smuggling and all that stuff. The borders have been closed during the 80s, Something Like that. Lots of misery at this moment. It was very difficult. So the first thing. After the possibility of migrations, of poor libyans in tunisia. If they are rich, theres no problem because society can take them. If they dont have money, maybe immigrations and maybe a problem. And there is the problem of controlling this border, because its very difficult. You can close it. So people can enter. So its the main thing. After the fact is that if there is not an improvement at the same time of external Intelligence Service in libya, tunisia, its very difficult to trust the informations that come from libya. If the situation grows harsher and harsher between all the camps, there will be less credibility and information. So its a direct threat. Is there a Tipping Point youre looking at in terms of when the dynamic in libya fundamentally changed, the security situation in tunisia . From my observation, i could be wrong, we havent seen that yet. Are there metrics youre looking at specifically that fundamentally change the balance in tunisia . It might. It might. It might. Its regional. Even jihadis themselves different nationality, algerian, moroccan, they see things, the state of caliphate, tunisia its nothing important and same thing. But i mean what is its lots of peoples way to signal. The signal, its a regional crisis not just a national one. So reasonable institutions are to be strengthened but in a good manner. And then dr. Masbah, appeals to my journalistic, given how quickly they become radicalized, are they equally able to be unradicalized as quickly. If one becomes years becoming radicalized, much harder to bring back, if you will. Is there a potential with someone who is radicalized in a few months in terms of how the international community, how local government brings them back . Is it enough to bring Economic Development or a sense of protection to unradicalize someone given how quickly they radicalize to begin with . Yeah. I think in many cases, this radicalization story are prisons. Some of them who travel to syria went and after a few months they returned back and preferred to surround themselves to authorities and spend the prison sentence instead of staying there and die in syria. Have no ideological component or affinity. They went to syria because of the psychology after seeing a lot of syrians dead. When they went there and saw the conflict among the different jihadi groups, et cetera. So they decided to return. So in that case, there is few works to be done. Just to work on some psychological counseling, advise, reintegrate into society afterwards, i dont know how many of them can. This is a very easy job for this category of people who has been on an early stage. They saw on tv whats going on. Simply they decided to go with three or four of their friends. The question is how to deal with hard line or people who started to be convinced with jihadi. I think its complex. Here authorities need to develop a kind of filter or system to see the different categories of jihadis who are idealogically involved or indoctrinated at deep level, there will definitely need an ideological dialogue. I disagree maybe with the current approach in morocco that only who want to have a dialogue to discuss only discuss with who voluntarily want to participate in the program. Actually you need to have a dialogue with everybody including the hard line jihadi and then try to enter in a fast, rigorous, internal religious discussion among scholars between the radical and moderate and then try to convince them. I know its not easy. I know its not for sure it will have consequences, but dialogue is a very important component. Because part of the problem of radicalization is the absence of dialogue. If they have dialogue in their family, in their communities, they couldnt they wouldnt go, even at the beginning. Actually it reveals a bigger problem that has to do with the values, et cetera. But sticking on the issue, its a variety of profiles. Its really very difficult to come up with one or two categories. We have he said each case on its own but there should be a policy, a comprehensive and inclusive policy that deals with all this different categories. I just want to ask everyone on the panel one last question before you open up to questions. Weve heard about Islamic State, al qaeda, al sharia, even hezbollah. Weve heard about radicalization, financing, Money Laundering, youth radicalization. Im curious just for the audience if you can give us a sense, the primary threat as you see it foreign fighters, the primary threat to the region as you see it if you were to list it or how you think about it, can you give us a sense and maybe dr. Masbah ill ask you to start off how do you see the threat . How do you pressure threats . What do you see as the primary threat . What when were thinking about it, is there one that dominates one over the others. What again . Weve talked about radicalization, youth, economic, weve talked about various groups trying to make their way into the maghreb, im curious, what for you are the one youre watching first and foremost, what is the most important to you above all else . They are different in nature but i think employment and sociofragility is the most important issue to address. Then the question of democratization and Good Government. If you dont have these two elements, Good Government friend social socioequality, it will spread all kinds of problems not only radicalization but criminality, illegal immigration, and all different kinds of problems. So i think the two main challenges for the next ten years in north african countries is unemployment for young people and good and good democratization. In two words, might be i think economic inclusivivity, the most important thing in the region because were a system, lots of corruption and regulations and lots of people are discriminated from inside the countries that cannot access to business or to credit. Its fundamental. Its the first thing relative deprivation and frustrations. Its the economy, lack of inclusivivity and afterward the crisis of succession. The third its the fact that regional powers, project rivalries in libya. Its dangerous, very, very dangerous. I mean, i think you could come up with a lot of social and local political issues but i think as a National Security and counterterrorism professional if i was responsible for that in those countries, outside of my own country i would be worried about the dynamics in libya and sinai. I dont think you can disaggregate sinai. Inside my country i would be worried about the prison population. The deradicalization are nascent. So as you have people coming out of prison and normal criminals in prison and normal criminals interacted with jihadis while there, thats what i would be worried about. Id like to open it up to questions. If you are chosen to ask a question, if you would give your name and organization that youre affiliated with. Ill start with you. If you can please wait for the microphone. George washington university. Excellent panel. I really enjoyed it. Obviously you cant cover everything in a panel but i just wanted to point out two things and get reactions. One was and this is particularly to masbah. Your argument about jihadi fastfood jihadis is almost argued against by three or four other things you said about incubation of grievance. So i would argue that, recently came up with 65 reasons people join isis and im looking forward to looking at the list because youll be able to group. But, you know, most of it deep anecdotal an other types of Research Show that humiliation and humiliation triggers are often a thing. Those humiliations can happen much younger than three months before, which gets me to a point about structural arguments. The structural problems and structural responses are important, but dont become terrorists. You know, what are the issues of the less than 1 of socioeconomic youth who have become terrorists. There are many, many aspects of this that have to be addressed. Number one, neighborhood intervention. Most terrorists come from the same neighborhoods. You can pick four or five in morocco and four or five in tunisia. There are socioeconomic problems throughout the region. What is the distinction . It almost has to be individual level profiling and interventions. I agree with everything that was said on that level. But its really complicated stuff. But you have to get into like the triggering mechanisms that force people and often those arent in that threemonth period. It goes back deeper. Theres a whole sort of psychological side of this. Theres the whole cult deprogramming literature which needs to be worked into this because indoctrination involves there are techniques do you think its something almost individual in terms of approach . If so, thats a daunting prospect for any government. To understand radicalization there are three layers. The first is the structural level which is all the economic, political environment. And also the political opportunity, the security vacuum that occurred in Different Countries provided an opportunity. And also some government turn a blind eye on people who want to travel at a certain point. Also the second level is ideology. Its very important also to understand the process of radicalization because its the software. The hardware is the infrastructure. But the software is ideology. Its very important to understand it. But its not the main driver. The main driver the third level actually is the individual level. On a broader level, the academics try to analyze through either the structure level or the ideology. The islamization of radicalization of islam, this is a long debate. Actually they dont give much importance to the agency to why the specific people among millions of muslims across the globe choose to join. And the third level is the individual motives. It also should not be neglected, because people have their own mow ttiv motives. There are millions of people who have been marginalized, humiliated. In the same family, sometimes you see one joining. I think its very important to look at the specific individual choices and to the agency and how people try to justify and rationalize their choices. Sometimes its not really its not a linear channel that you can say, for example, a well educated should not be affected by this ideology. Moroccan professor of philosophy who was known for his posts on facebook against islamists and all kind of religious ideologies, last week he traveled to or he traveled last month to join. This was a case that you could say only poor people join jihadi. But this is a counter example and there are other counter examples but the pattern is people under the age of 25, living in big to medium cities on the shanty towns are more exposed to this ideology. I just want to take 20 seconds to answer this. If i put my academic hat on, what youre basically saying is theres no control group. That is we have all these people who are joining but we dont know why people dont join. About five years ago i did a series of studies on why individuals do not become terrorists, which is your control group factor. We did surveys and focus groups in the palestinian west bank. There are no barriers to becoming a terrorist in the palestinian west bank. You want to join, you know somebody who knows somebody. So we looked at why people dont join. Then we did yemen. We finished up the yemen study in 2015 and we looked at why people are not participating in violence in yemen. I recommend them to you. Google my name. Theyre the only ones out there who answered the control group question. The fast food jihadi issue, i just want to say i dont want to underplay because its rapid i dont think thats true. The earlier panel talked about the importance of social media and the internet and how the role that it is playing in radicalization i think is important as not the only explanation for the quick increase in radicalization but its a huge part of it. The example i use when i talk about this is my daughter who has a facetime relationship with people and she will play games with people on facetime for two hours. And its a very real relationship. She views them as somebody whos in her life just like somebody who has a physical relationship in her life. As individuals develop relationships through social media online, we dont see it as much because its not face to face and its hard to intervene. But this is a real relationship that helps radicalize people. So i dont want to diminish that important role, because its very, very hard to deal with from a policy perspective. Sir. If youll just wait for the microphone. Dave from the wilson center. One of the distinguishing features is the importance of soofism. A lot of Government People and academics are beginning to equate moderate islam with soofism. Is it your feeling that soofism is playing a role as a barrier to the radicalization of the youth or society in general . I was just in morocco and they were talking about 2 million moroccans out of employment and out of school, which is a huge category from which to recruit your jihadis. But is soofism significant as a barrier to the attraction of extremism in islam . In fact, it has been used to the soofism has been used by algerian during the 90s. We know the problem, the fact of promoting soofism is successful when the are not seen by the population too close from the state. At the same time, the state must have enough credibility. If there is not that, it doesnt work because people know that these people are representative of the state and of the police and things like that. But it can be done. I wont say deradicalization. Its an alternative. It depends on the tribal balance and things like that. But it might work. In tunisia they have some debate about that. And maybe to add something about that, the deradicalization, the way we frame the problem of radicalization, i think is in favor of whth there are some differences but its very minor. Its the best way to deradicalize people in a sense. It means that people can think to speak with jihadis because they have a common doctrinal base. But at the end its much more complicated. I think that the best way of what we say deradicalization, its must be offered to people in these countries the possibility to have antisystemic ideas but to express them peacefully. And if there is not that, you can radicalize everything. At the end, well always a utopia and things like that and people ready to die. Right here. Two related questions. A recent study on showed that state sponsored established Islamic Organization was effective against radicalization. And i wondered if theres a comment on this. Second of all, in morocco, how does islam fit into the al qaeda relationship. Would you tackle the second question first, please . Actually, the question whether the religious reforms or this kind of discussion that include soofism and promoting whether islam is effective. I can say yes and no at the same time. A broader level, yes, it might infuse moderate ideas within society if you do it with changing of but radical actually does not get radicalized in the mosques or in areas where this kind of discourse is spread. Actually they are radicalized outside those areas and especially on the internet. I totally agree that the internet is a very important vehicle. Not the written internet. Its the video component of it. I totally agree that the facetime and all this new media has accelerated the process of radicalization. If we want to we have to understand how it facilitated the contacts. In many cases the people who traveled to syria was done through the internet, but actually they didnt just took the decision to go but it was actually contacts with their peers or friends or families who was there and then they facilitated the process of traveling. That turn into the question whether the state sponsored islam is effective. I think it has its own limits. It can work at some places but not all the levels. What about the as a tool to fight radicalization . [ inaudible ] it is a political opposition with ideology background. Its a opposition group. It might be an antidote to radical ideas because they totally disagree with daish ideology. They are a challenge of the Kings Authority as a commander of the faithful. But i dont think they are promoting radical ideas. I mean, that leads to violent extremism, in my opinion. Go right here. Thank you. Marilyn with mercy corps. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about how the migration from the Central African republican up to places like tunisia or libya might have on future Security Issues including radicalization. Thank you. Yeah. I mean, i think if i was the previous question on what am i worried about. You know, if i was given more than two or three, that would definitely be on my list. I really focused on north africa, but i think if you broadened it geographically, then the issue of what i talked to about regional foreign fighters thats taking place around there. Especially as you go into countries which have i mean, it was mentioned previously that the border with libya is difficult. But go down to mali and look at those borders and it gets so much worse. As you go further south, the issue of regional foreign fighters becomes a bigger concern. Then the issue of monitoring, assessing, information sharing, all of the things we said were hard with north africa become exponentially more hard as you go south. Thank you. My question is to dabout foreig fighters. In libya there is no shortage of groups to absorb these foreign fighters. Do you see any group playing that role in morocco, for example, any group thats going to absorb these foreign fighters and pose a threat to morocco . Thats the first question. A quick question to dr. Craig. You said 120 attacks related to foreign fighters as of october. Can you break down these attacks . As far as we know they are not in morocco. Im assuming the majority are in libya unless you have another breakdown. Thank you. The question has attracted less public depabate in morocco than in tunisia. People maybe trust their government in that level. But to assess how it has been dealt with, i think its very interesting. There is now at least 250 moroccans who have returned and mo all of them has been jailed for between two to ten years. And after the change of the antiterrorism law in 2014 that includes provisions on people who travel to syria or outside i mean, many people actually are hesitant to return for that. But there is something that we should take in consideration that after the crackdown in syria in iraq, there is a lot of moroccans who want to return, but they are stuck there. They cant return because of the difficult security situation in syria. They are afraid to be killed by a militant group. We dont know yet whether they have been deradicalized or disillusions and they want to return or not. But there are some people who are in between neither fighters or returning, but this situation i think has not been addressed how to deal with those people who want to surrender themselves but they cannot do that. This is undebated subject. I dont know, but there is many of returnees who return because they were disillusioned and they prefer to surround themselves in the Moroccan Embassy in turkey and then they return to morocco. What else. There are some people who really are planning to do something. We dont know. We dont know the rate of recidivism after they leave. So its a very difficult answer. Quickly, i do have it broken down by country. I dont have it right here. So if you want to send me an email, im happy to give it to you. My data includes attacks and plots. Then the plots become difficult because some countries will arrest somebody because they were exchanging emails with somebody else but theres no actual real plot there. For me, an explosive device has to have been built, so there has to have been real action taken towards the plot. In my head, the bulk are libya, egypt. So i think your gut instinct is correct. Yeah. I told her youve been trying for a long time to get a question in. Looking at the region in general and the different political systems that actually govern these places you have mono mo monarchy i dont know what to call libya. Is there an influence on the presence of these terrorist groups or radicalization in the region is there anyone of these systems that have been more effective in dealing with whether its dealing with the presence of terrorists or the prevention of radicalization . If there is an influence of the political system on radicalization . In terrorism, you mean. Yes, yes, of course, there is. We see egypt alsisi, we see the difference. It depends on the context, you know. Yes, there is a direct influence. The fact is that in libya there is no Political Center we can call the state. There is the north and the central bank, of course. It gives lots of latitude to jihadist group. In tunisia there has been a polarization between what we call the secular as you wish, of course, it will not be a civil war but lots of people who might have died. I think its a good choice to do that. In algeria they have their own capacities because they knew the problem for years and years and the problem is the lasting and the durability of their regime. Thats it. Im afraid weve run out of time. I just want to thank our panelists for not only delving into the nuance of some of the very complicated issues, but also allowing us to deal with the broad themes and topics we should be thinking about and also what applies to each specific country. I hope youll join me in thanking our panelists for a very illuminating conversation. [ applause ]. Taking a break here at the center for strategic and International Studies and it conversation about security threats in north africa. About a 15minute break here. Expect this forum to run most of the day today. We already heard opening remarks and an overview and also got an idea of the flow of recruits in the region to isis. The majority of our youth has the feeling of being convinced and they are convinced that there is no hope, that their situation will ever change pause of an unemployment, absence of prospectives and so on. Two, the reaction of oppression of political islam. Since october 2011 after the fall of gaddafis regime, the country leaving a week Central Government that continues to struggle. Libya now is very insecure and almost failed state murdered by continuous fighting, political violence, criminality and terrorism. There is no national police. The rise of tribal conflicts, Central Government liability on militia and Security Forces. Libya has become safe haven to terrorists, criminals and smugglers. In part of this situation on tunisia, the existence of multiple Training Camps not far away from our borders with libya, the infiltration of subversive elements in liby the creation of National Intelligence agency or center and we promote cooperation with intelligence, information sharing, exchange of experience and expertise. By the Law Enforcement you adopt Counter Terrorism law in august 2015 instead of the last low of 2003. We have the creation of National Commission against islam and r terrori terrorism, the adoption of Counter Terrorism in november 2016 and National Security and border in november 2017. We have adopted some temporary restrictive measures with a tailor made. Approach. The travel ban, contact ban, area ban, duty to report and Deradicalization Program in the prisons. I want because of the time we dont have enough time just to return back to our Counter Terrorism strategy. Four principles was adopted. The first one is human rights. The first one ensuring the rule of law. The third, the enforcing. International cooperation, legal assistance, technical assistance, information sharing and exchange. The fourth pillar is military and security means are not sufficient to Counter Terrorism. Having in mind that the most important drivers to lead to the spread of terrorism are social media, internet and cyberspace. Conclusion, a considerable improvement of security situation in tunisia despite a tense and fragile regional situation. Tunisia was better ranked than turkey, france and great britain. Thank you for listening. Thank you, mr. Moderator. Mr. President and ceo of s. E. I. Excellences. First of all, i would like to thank the director and the team of the csis for the invitation extended to take part in this important gathering dedicated to the issue of security in our region. I have been asked to present the major security challenges facing the country and the region in the wake of the ongoing effort of daesh in iraq and syria. They include the persistence by the terrorist groups in the region. Second, the foreign fighters and their families. Third, the financing of terrorism and its connection with transnational organized crime. Fourth, the prevention of radicalization and the urgent need for deradicalization. Fifth, the growing torrent of isl islamophobia in some countries. And finally, the Foreign Military intervention in countries in violation of international law. I will concentrate my contribution on the first one and leave the others for the debate. The third by the terrorist groups is an issue of consent to the area of north africa as well as to the west, east and central africa. In north africa and the developing their activities and their common umbrellas and organizations. Financing is and to the strong connection between terrorism and transnational organized crime. Prevention of radicalization became a top priority in increasing number of countries who are discovering that it could also be home grown threat. Islamophobia is also on the rise for the benefit of extremist groups on both sides. And finally foreign intervention in countries in violation of International Legality proven to be the best recipe for in algeria we are still fighting what is left from the National Tragedy the country went through in the 90s. These are small groups that do not represent a threat neither to the economy nor to the normal functioning of the institution. The number of terrorists acts registered is very limited with little casualties. The military and social pressure on these groups is very high all over the national territory. Wi terrorism was defeated in algeria through the combination through military, political, economic, religious, and educational policies and strategies. Those implementation needed a deep and permanent involvement of all kinds of actors including the private sector, the Civil Society, the citizens. I thought it would be used to go through the main aspect of our dealing with terrorism at the time were the number of countries that feel the need to prepare themselves to deal with this scourge that is unfortunately growing. I was at a meeting lately and countries like sierra leon, liberia are preparing themselves to face terrorism. At the military and security level, three factors. First, the fight against terrorism was done since the appearance of terrorism in 1992 in full compliance with the laws of the countries and in full respect of International Covenant on human rights. Second, it is the moratorium suspending the Death Penalty was put in place in february 1993. At the time when the system was expected to pronounce more death penalties against terrorists responsible for increasing number of killings. The first concern of the authorities at that time was to protect human lives. Even if the Death Penalty was legal and provided for by the constitution and the laws. The moratorium is still in force. As today, there is no plan to remove it. Third, very quickly, it was understood that the way out will not be through only use of arms and military forces, but through isolation of the terrorist groups and their extremist ideology within the society and the reinforcement of the peoples confidence in the state and its various institutions. Policies and strategies were gradually implements to achieve this objective. These are the policies of National Reconciliation, the promotion of democracy as an antidote to violent extremism and terrorism. And a multisector deradicalization policy. It will briefly go through each of them. First, the National Reconciliation policy, it went through three faces. 1995. 1999, civil concord policy. And 2005 as a chapter for peace and reconciliation. Also strongly approved in the new referendum. The objective of this policy was to end the violence by peaceful means and avoid further loss of lives. It was based on four main principal which are first, respect by everyone of the constitution, the National Laws and the democratic and republican system. Second, National Solidarity toward all victims of National Tragedy without any exception or discrimination. Third, recognition of the state institutions and the role in protecting the country against the cost planned by its enemies. Fourth, on the condition of repentance and republican for the republican order, give the persons who choose the path of violence a chance to return to their families. What excluded from the benefit of this policy, the terrorist who committed massacres, rapes or used explosives in public places. All the terrorists who surren r surrendered themselves to the authorities inside and outside the country for legally accountable for their acts. The penalties were either reduced of suppressed following the conclusion. Compensations were paid to the families of all victims of terrorists on the basis that all of them were considered as victims of the National Tragedy. This policy allowed thousands of terrorists to renounce violence and return to their family. In a very short time it brought peace, security and stability to the country. In 2017, global law and order reports, Gallup Institute ranks nigeria in the seventh position of the safest countries in the world. Second, democracy as an antidote to terrorism. The algerian people as well as its strong moral value provided them with the needed resource to defend itself against the threats of violent extremism and terrorism. This was done through the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, good governance, independence of the judiciary, fight against social timely and fascinating conference bringing together so many vital perspectives both from the region and from here in washington. Im very honored to moderate this panel with the president and director for the center for mediterranean and International Studies and the editor of the north africa journal. Well be talking about government approaches to countering terrorism in the region. To frame the discussion, im also interested in drawing out my fellow panelists on this sort of impact, pitfalls, considerations inherent in u. S. Strategies toward countering terrorism in this very complicated arena. Im interested in their perspectives on what has worked, ha hasn what hasnt, what needs to be taken into account in the future. The u. S. Approach to countering terrorism in north africa involves multiple lines of efforts. In libya it includes direct military action. In other countries we see a Security Assistance and cooperation approach aimed at building the capacity of partner forces, partner militaries, which includes extensive military sales and grants in some countries, training and other types of support with varying levels of engagement depending on which country were talking about. We also see the u. S. Obviously engaging in sanctions programs and terrorist watch lists to limit terrorist financing and mobility as in other regions of the world as well as programs designed to counter violent extremist ideology which have been particularly prominent with regard to u. S. Partnering with morocco. But we also see similar efforts in the region. Morocco, algeria and tunisia participate in a regional Counter Terrorism Assistance Program in north africa. But tsct has largely focused on the poorer countries. And much of the u. S. Security assistance relationship runs through bilateral channels. The state department has historically led these kind of efforts but over the last 15, 16 years we see an increasing role for the department of defense. As congress and the executive branch have worked in some ways together to increase the scope and level of resources and authorities available for d. O. D. Activities available in this space. And that may have implications, political implications for our own government as well as for the region. As we saw in the aftermath of the recent deadly attack on u. S. Soldiers in niger, the expansion of these kind of programs is not without risk and raises policy concerns and considerations both for u. S. And regional actors. From where i sit in the u. S. Congress on the Congressional Research service where i work is a legislative Branch Support agency, there continues to be a debate within our government over the appropriate legal and policy framework for u. S. Counter terrorism in regions of the world affected by threats that may be primarily local and regional in scope, but which have the capacity to affect u. S. Interests and personnel. I look forward as i mentioned to exploring perspectives from the region and on the region with my esteemed panelists. More broadly, im interested in discussing sort of some of the unintended consequences that may be possible or some of the considerations that may not be front and center but perhaps should be. With that, i will turn it over the you know, we didnt discuss order. Good morning. First of all, thank you very much to the center for strategic and International Studies for the invitation for having me here. Well, when i saw the program and the order i felt myself uncomfortable because i have to spe speak. So i also have to deal with that and be careful what i am also saying. So speaking about the tunisian strategy, strategies in plural to Counter Terrorism, to counter radicalization, i think three keywords have to be in the light. The first one is reforming. The second one is restructuring. And the third one is vision building or vision making. Which is also innovating now in tunisia. On the first point, reforming, reforming what . You know, after the uprising, tunisia have a new constitution adopted in 2014. And since that, everything should be in accordance to the constitution. So that means that also our legislation have to be amended in order to be not in contradiction with the new constitution. The new constitution one on the military, the other one on the Security Forces. Both of them are republican, which mean that maybe in the past were not republican or serving other things than the republic and other things than the people, which mean that all effort made by the Security Forces and by the military have to only be driven by that concept, serving the people. And in accordance to that, the law or the new law against terrorism and the repression of Money Laundering was adopted in august 2015. And this law, the new one replaces the former one adopted in 2003 immediately after the 9 11 attack. And the title of the former law was law on the seaport of the International Effort to support of the International Effort to combat terrorism. As if the terrorism is only out of the country and tunisia have to support only the effort to combat it internationally. So now we have this new law which is more precise to define not terrorism, because all the time we have a problem to define terrorism and our legislator also faced the same problem and hes not able to define the word terrorism or the concept terrorism. So we have a list of acts considered as terrorist acts and this can be used to define what is terrorism. So terrorism is linked to it is precise and clearly underlined in this law. The law is also more respectful of the rule of law, which is very important because one of the objective also in the strategy is to be very respectful to the rule of law. I will explain later why, because we have to also create ownership by people. And if we are not in accordance to the rule of law, people will not consider as serving them. A new element in this law which is very, very important i think, is a chapter on special investigations tools. This was not at all present in the former law, so the new law precise the role of the instructor and how to investigate. And this is very new and also very respectful to the rule of law because everything had to be allowed or with the permission of the judiciary which is also very important. And the last new point in this law is the creation of the National Commission for the fight against terrorism. Now there is this commission to also analyze to make research et cetera and to also adopt strategy to fight against terrorism. So this is reforming the legislative framework. The second idea is about restructuring. Restructuring what . Restructuring the services. And it is now we have a we can qualify it as a complete and very detailed frame or services frame. It start since 2014 immediately after the election of the current president , which seems that all the effort to restructure the services is also linked to that and also the presence behind the president. So restructuring of the Services Start in november 2014 but establishing a new body, a new administrative public body, which gave the autonomy to this body. Because before 2014 it was the generally direct to military security as part of the defense ministry. And this general directorate was responsible for military intelligence within the defense ministry. Since 2014, its replacing the former directorate of military intelligence by a new body called agency for defense, intelligence and security. But still related only to different services, not to cover all the Intelligence Services but only to protect agent equipment and secrets of the department of National Defense only. But its a new body and its a new its a public administrative body. And also this agent had to contribute to the prevention and fight against terrorism. In 2016, a decree established a center for military which is also very new. Now there is the vision, autonomy of the new body and then the center for military research to conduct research in military areas related to National Defense policy. So another step to restructure the services. And the last one in generally 2017 by the creation, the National Intelligence center. So the National Intelligence center is considered that theres a new step in restructuring the services because something really new in the past was only the difference intelligence created. But now we have the National Intelligence center which is the main focus of that center is the coordination between the various National Intelligence organizations. With this indication in article two of the decree that this is the role of the Intelligence Center it answer to a tunisia suffered a lot from the miscoordination between the services. This was the main obstacle to fight terrorism, but also and mainly to face any of the threats that tunisia was facing since 2011, absence of coordination or very very difficult coordination and this was one of the main demand during the three, four years to establish a pod in ordbody in o coordinate between the services. This was established since january of this year, 2017. And also the other objective is the development of the National Intelligence plan. That means there is a new vision in order to have a plan and to monitor the execution of that plan, which is also a new element. And yeah. Its supposed to have a power point presentation but i am using for myself only. And also in january 2017 the same date, same day, 19 of january 2017, there is the reformulation about the National Security council. National Security Council as this morning it was indicated that now the permanent secretary of it. Lets say that this council was established in 1990. 1990 by the former president. And i dont see any difference between the objective of this National Security council in 90 or today. The same article one, its the same. The National Security council would within the framework of a Strategic Vision aimed at the preservation of the sovereignty of the state, its independence and to guarantee the spintegrit of the territory, security of the people. Its article one of the decree of 1990. So its the same purposes or the same object tiives for what the National Security council was established. But what is is new now in this decree that this council is also responsible of the National Strategy to fight against radicalism and terrorism. And to update periodically this strategy in coordination with the National Commission for the fight against terrorism created by the law of 2015. So the link with the new law is established there. And also the link with the commission to establish the National Strategy against terrorism. So the national this body, the National Security council have to work in this way today. Thats it. And also the presence of the new director of the new body created the center of intelligence created have the replace the director of the Different Agency in the composition of this national cast. Which is new today. Decision taken by the president by 13 of october, last october, 2017, creating 15 commission within this council. One of them is also intelligence. But hes present in the other also 15 commissions. There is the permanent secretary of the council so he has to be present everywhere. Also, the minister of defense and interior have to be present, also everywhere, or at least one of them in the 15 commissions. But it is curious that 15 commissions cover all the domain of the exhibitors. Not only intelligence, defense, interior affairs, et cetera, but also education, health, energy, and elimination of security energy, security, so everything is related to the domain of the executive, plus security, which is also creating a lot of trouble now in tunisia. Is this concept replacing the government in some way . But this question has to be also, its legitimate to answer to this question because one of the maybe risks is the descensions of the institutions. We have each minister is responsible for the committee, and each minister is behind, there is a minister of defense, a minister of interior, the security general of the national council. A Security Council. And okay. So what the head of the government would do with that. And this can create a sort of dysfunction and it creates risk of descension between the institutions. We can discuss it later. Yes, one minute. And the last minute, about the strategies. And here, i am quoting admiral in one of the declarations he made in december 2016. So the objective of this strategy, prevention, protection, prosecution, and responsiveness. So yeah. Prevention, protection, prosecution, responsiveness. I can say for the protection, prosecution, the strategy can be because of the frame, the logistic frame, because of the operational capacities, empowered now in tunisia since the last three years, so tunisia is more able to respond now than before to the threat. But one remains problematic for me is the prevention. Because prevention, Prevention Needs transversal strategies and were only building a vertical strategy. This is problematic why . Because we are not able to take all the aspects link ed to this and to offer them as a threat or answer them as related to terrorism and counterterrorism. Frask, correction. Correction, its not one element of the National Strategy because its only vertical, not transversal. If you would transform it, transversal vatagies, then we can include the fight against corruption and coordinate more with those who are fighting against corruption now, mainly the head of the government. Yeah. So the last thing, the last thing is about vision, about innovating. I think that between november and early this year, november 2016 and early this year, it was announced by the minister of defense, the launch of the white book. The white book is an innovation in tunisia. And it does explain that its an innovation because modern armies use this technique to think about these strategies, to think about how to build armies in a new way. So now its also time to have in tunisia a white book, and i think it was launched in november 2016. Several goals, but i have no time to explain or, yeah, to speak about the goals of this white book, but lets say this is a very important element now to understand the vision in tunisia. But, and again, i have a remark here, the white book is supposed only to create ownership. Ownership between the structures, between the of course military structures and people. We have to create confidence between people and those structures because without people, you cannot fight. You cannot fight. Because terrorism is not coming from abroad. Terrorism is there on the ground. And living in our cities, and people are there. And the new generation of the generation of jihadis in two weeks, you have jihadis because you have to face not only jihadi but also salafi. And the world was not news of this this morning, terrorists, and we have a lot of terrorists in our country. And in one moment, salafis will cross the border between being nonviolent and violent. In order to be prepared, you have to invoke all of the components of the societies, and we have to work on one thing which is now problematic. This is how to deal with outrageous behavior and outrageous discourse. We have to learn how to not use the concept of haram in our society. Haram, what is permitted, what is forbidden. And we are in our houses using it all the day, this is also we can be considered as part of the movement because tomorrow, we are creating those who are defending the haram or the halat, so be careful on that. We have to involve society on that, and we have to make the societies learning how a way to avoid that. This is also part of the innovation. We have to deal with that. And not only to speak about ourselves and between experts or between those who are in this society, no, we have to speak to all together. And involve them all together. Thank you very much. Thank you. Well move on. Thank you. Good morning, everyone. Thank you, csis for inviting me. I have been tasked or asked to discuss the not so easy topic of counterterror strategies for morocco and algeria, and i will do my best. Right from the start, its very clear that the two countries share many, many similarities that include population, culture, religious profile. That includes also level of Economic Development and to a certain extent, deeply centralized governance that we see sometimes could be a root cause of some of the problems that we see develop in the region. The two countries usually have different attributes and characteristics when it comes to deploying or drafting, deploying counterterror strategies. For example, algeria does require a broader contribution of all the Security Services, whether they are military, the border patrol, the minister of defense or the police leading to the pminister of the interior. Considering the country and the risk zones along the tunisia libya, mali borders. In contrast, morocco has been relying heavily on a centralizicentralized fbilike agency, which i will refer to from now on as the bureau. So as we get close to the end of the year, how did the region do in 2017, and what do we expect to see Going Forward . Let me start with a quick status check for the year thats closing, first. Its clear looking at the research that we do, so this is not government data. This is private data. We continuously track whats going on in the region, but 2017 could be considered by the moroccans and the algerian authorities surprisingly as actually a stabilizing year. This is not a stable year, but clearly a stabilizing year. Well share with you some of the numbers. Being directly exposed to the crisis in mali, libya, and niger, algeria is closing the year with much bigger numbers in terms of incidents and counterterror operations, but in general, when you take sort of the broad maghreb region as a whole, minus libya due to its complex set of circumstances, the number of terrorrelated incidents, again, surprisingly, fell by nearly 45 compared to 2016. Were talking about numbers up to pretty much today. And if you compare them versus 2016, the numbers of Critical Incidents dropped by 45 . For the three countries of algeria, morocco, and tunisia, we recorded 65 terror related incidents this year, down from 118. So these actually are hard facts. The trend is indeed remarkable considering that morocco, for instance, did not record one single instance. So what you have left is divide them by algeria and tunisia. Thats roughly the type of number of incidents that we have seen. One of the reasons that led to this drop in militant action can be attributed to both the deradicalization efforts undertaken by algeria and morocco, and the work being done on the enforcement side to prevent attacks. The ability of Security Services to adjust has clearly led the actual Law Enforcement units and even the military on the ground to actually work a little less than in the previous couple of years. When we have seen peaks, in 2015 and 16. In fact, the number of Security Operations in the three maghreb countries dropped by 56 . A pretty big drop as well, to settle at less than 1,400, no major security intervention so this is what the military and the security agencies have been doing. But clearly, you know, that doesnt mean that Security Services are taking a back seat. They have been extremely busy with a number of arrests we have recorded reaching over 5,200. So a little over 5,000 people have been picked up as part of the various sweeps we have been tracking. That was still a 17 decrease from 2016, but if you compare it to the previous year, 2015, theres been a rampup, a 34 increase compared to 2015, which was a very busy year. So this is not necessarily good news because this figure that i shared with you over 5,000 extends to the arrests of Civil Society stakeholders in addition to suspected terrorists and criminal elements as well. So let me focus a couple minutes on morocco, then ill move to algeria. How does morocco counter the rise of extremism and terrorism . It clearly used a multidimensional approach that involved adjusting its legal tools, reforming the religious environment, closely tracking and monitoring existing and emerging militant groups. Theres been a severe crackdown on networks of militant recruitment and financing, and obviously, theres been enhanced Security Cooperation particularly with europe, but around the world as well. In an effort to control the narrative of clerics and preachers and to remove the extremist elements from mosques, morocco created at least a couple institutions specialized in teaching and educating imams and sermons are tightly controlled and the topic s directed by religious collars employed by the government. Any deviation from the allowed speech would cause an imam a great deal of hardship. The terror attacks since 2003 have been a major starting point for morocco in terms of creating and adjusting its counterterror strategy. Several years later, authorities even released some of the salafis who were arrested in the aftermath of 2003 attacks. Some of whom have pledged allegiance to the king of the country and are now playing a key role in securing marks against extremist elements. On the enforcement and intelligence fronts, the bureau has been instrumental in monitoring and neutralizing all sorts of networks and arresting suspects. The bureau has a lot of resources. And it is part of a domestic Intelligence Agency which i think is the equivalent of equivalent security here, and it collaborates with the investigating branch of the national police. We have heard some numbers today. I think from 2002 to 2016, morocco says it dismantled about 170 suspected terrorist cells. They also report that over 3,000 suspects, exactly 3,145 suspects have been arrested. We hear numbers from morocco that say 344 planned attacks have been stopped as well. And obviously, the moroccans are keeping a very close eye on their nationals who left or are leaving the country, particularly who end up in conflict zones, for instance, estimates from the bureau say, and we have heard those numbers earlier, 1600 moroccan nationals went to fight in iraq, syria, and libya. Mostly with daesh. But also with other organizations. One of the biggest challenges, again, this is a theme we have heard earlier this morning, is sort of the role of the social networks playing in terms of recruitment and financing and funding. Data from morocco suggested 80 of active moroccan i. S. Fighters have been recruited through social networks, they mention twitter, facebook, other social media sites. In may 2017, the authorities have removed almost 400 facebook and twitter accounts. A move that has accelerated since then, but official clearly acknowledge there are individuals and groups who use encrypted networks and the socalled dark net, therefore are very hard to monitor. This is a phenomenon theyre facing there. For its part, algerias war against insurgencies didnt start in 2003. I grew up in algeria in the late 1980s, and the proliferation of religious leaning descent was absolutely substantial. Even the most liberal prowestern individuals were often attracted by the religious antigovernment narrative that authorities tolerated after the independence in the 60s. The mosques being the only tolerated centers, political meetings and discourse. The clash between them, that is the mosque and the government, became inevitable, and obviously, almost permanent. It was in the early to mid2006 that the government started drafting the reconciliation process to allow the more moderate elements of militant islam to distance themselves from the more radical ones. And distance themselves against also the ones that are considered irredeemable. The reconciliation charter included controversial clemency options and reinsertion into society, a process that is still practiced for those willing to surrender. There were also economic incentives with jobs and allowing candidates to own their own businesses. Just like morocco, algeria also tightened the control of mosques. Starting with the centralized process of training preachers and the inclusion of women in providing religious guidance to the community. One outcome of the change has been the banning of the political discourse in mosques and the exclusive focus on theology and religion. The Education System there spearheaded by a female minister, also underwent transformation at the curriculum level, but clearly introduding modern views has been a major challenge and continues to see extreme redistance from the conservative movement. Its a very conservative society, and theres a lot of people who are resisting any changes in the syllabus and other educational elements. Arguably, some of the strategy has paid off. Tunisia, for instance, which has some 2,400 nationals fighting with daesh in the middle east, algeria reports about 200 nationals who left for combat in the middle east and elsewhere. The algerian figure is apparently far less than those of france, britain, belgium, and other western countries individually. So the strategy appears to be working. On the enforcement front, how are the algerians executing on their counterterror campaign . Firstly, just like morocco, the algerian militant risk is largely homegrown. There are rarely foreign nationals captured to speak of a Global Jihad Movement in general. Its mostly a domestic phenomenon, and its spearheaded by the likes of organizations with a domestic focus, although they themicisms are offshoots of these global jihadi movements. The algerian and moroccan authorities have had zero tolerance policy towards the networks which they often treat as if they were the actual militants themselves. Both targets support and recruitment networks with an aggressive stance, with networks comprising of both sympathizers of the jihadi cause, and also civilian populations that are caught in the process and have been forced by local militants to provide support or risk retaliation. And thats particularly the case in rural and isolated areas. The second category should be considered as extremely vulnerable and treated accordingly, given that they are sort of stuck between a rock and a hard place. Given its lengthy borders, algeria also appears more vulnerable to weapons trafficking and smuggling. The military has been active in discovering arms caches along the borders with mali, tunisia, and libya in addition to ones in the northern provinces. The phenomenon of contraband and Human Trafficking also tend to feed into the militant networks by providing resources, mostly benefitting al qaeda and the maghr maghreb, as we have seen before. These activities mean that the algerian military and paramilitary troops have been extremely busy and possibly stretched to their limit. Specifically the need to insure Border Security with libya, securing all facilities as well as urban centers and rural areas requires substantial resources and a massive share of the state budget. Manpower remains a concern, and therefore, algeria has been pursuing the modernization of its military capabilities with the acquisition of Weapons Systems that the military leadership deems adequate to fight the current level of insurgency. In both countries, most of the insurgent groups appear to be small scale, as we have heard before, that are inspired by a Central Organization that is more idealogical in its purpose and a lot less as a provider of resources. This may be a reason why we have not seen major attacks. However, the proliferation makes it very hard for authorities to catch them all. Like the attacks we saw in the west, the region does not boast similar lone wolf types. The attackers in the west also target the most population as well. Theyre different in terms of religion, culture, et cetera, so there is a different impact. The vast majority of support takes place within algeria and morocco proper, but algeria is also confronted with an influx of militant resources from the tunisia and libyan borders have it focused on Border Control as well. These support groups outside of its borders are obviously tied to the Islamic State in al qaeda, considering the organizations have a mandate as apoised to a localized mandate, but local groups tend to have a greater degree of autonomy. While it is necessary for these countries to pursue an aggressive antiterror campaign, there are several shortcomings and concerns that could fuel tension in the future, and some of them were mentioned earlier. For instance, the socioeconomic demands of the populations in both countries are often met with repression instead of normal channels of conflict resolution. The unrest in morocco and the ongoing labor, social, and economic protests against alg algeria are examples of strain and they have not seen response from their political leaders. A continuation of such tensions in the absence of a comprehensive political strategy, militant groups will absolutely continue to tap into public anger for recruitment purposes. The year ahead looks also challenging. Not only algeria, morocco, and the entire region will struggle economically, but there has not been a substantial political progress in the region to advance stability. The libyan crisis continues to poison security in the region. Mali aremains highly destabilized. The end of the Syrian Crisis has been debated earlier and also adds another wild card in terms of the security Going Forward with the return of thousands, potentially thousands of fighters. Facing these uncertain issues of escalating uncertainty measures and poorly managed economies that are fueling discontent and further threatening stability. So including we do expect to see 2018 as a continuation of this year and to be slightly more challenging as we contemplate the return of some of the jihadis into the region. With that, ill send it back to you. Thank you very much. A lot of things on the table that you both have raised. As i mentioned in my introductory remarks, United States but also europe, european powers, and other external actors, continue to speak viable partners in this region, to pursue shared security objectives. That kind of approach may be the best of many possible options, some of which would be more destabilizing, perhaps, or have greater negative implications for domestic politics in some of the western countries. But those kinds of approaches are contingent on having Sustainable Partners who share both a similar perception of the threat and prioritization of actions, but also who share ground rules about appropriate tactics and mechanisms for countering some of these groups. I wonder if you could both touch on the ways that algeria and tunisia in particular as border countries to libya have approached this partnership question with regards to libya, because libya is certainly a country where the level of chaos and political disunity have proved serious stumbling blocks to u. S. Efforts to speak viable, Sustainable Partners for counterterrorism. So im interested in sort of how tunisia and algeria have approached the libya situation over time, how those approaches have changed maybe since the initial libyan uprising in 2011, how tunisias approach might have changed under successive governments. And im interested also in drawing you both out a little bit on how external actors, priorities may have shaped the counterterrorism approach of countries in the region. And you can sort of select which countries to talk about if you would like. And then well turn to q a, although we have relatively little time, so please be brief. I can give you my point of view on sort of where broadly algeria and tunisia stand, the impact of libya. Obviously, libya is not only a wild card. Its a wild place. You know, there were hopes that a better political process in the north would stabilize the country. There were several attempts to bring the various feuding parties together. It really didnt work. It still is, you know, a country that is causing an enormous amount of tension in the region. The jihadis, Islamic State that were at some point in benghazi, tripoli, went south. Theyre penetrating into tunisia. Theyre going into algeria, and so an enormous amount of resources that countries like tunisia and algeria are spending is really to insure that these infiltrations are limited to as much as possible, very hard to achieve when you have massive borders. But still, its an effort thats ongoing. Whats the longterm whats going to happen longer term remains to be questioned. I think, as i stated in my conclusion, i think were going to continue to see what we have seen in the past year or two, three years, continue happening in libya, and therefore, the border areas will remain a major issue. Now, algeria and tunisia might have different approaches to security. Algeria has been insisting on having an internal libyan conflict resolution process. Its a political process. That involves mostly libyans, so its a libyan solution. Obviously, the presence of western troops in libya is cause of alarm for the algerian military and the algerians in general. I think tunisia has taken more advantage of that by having the americans, for instance, helping with drone surveillance and Border Control. So each of them has different takes. But its very dangerous to limit the discussion with these two countries alone. Theres obviously egypt on the other side. Theres the issue of the sahel. Theres migration issues to europe. Its a very, very hard conflict, and when it started, i think we predicted it would take at least 20 years to sort out. And i still stick with that number. I think its going to take a long, long time for libya to get its act together. Meanwhile, a great deal of the budget, you know, the budgets that the neighboring countries are going to put aside for military is going to increase over time. And its going to create a lot of tension, short of a political solution on the short term. Yeah. Algeria is all the time the same issue. You know, all the time theyre saying we are brothers, but dont forget that we are the big brother. And of course, that can be this can be sort of useful link with algeria because we are profiting, their expede ynls and coordination with them is very important for tunisia. So on the side of our borders with algeria, the cooperation is perfect. But since algeria is against interference or against any role of International Actor in the region, then i agree that the approach is very different. And tunisia, as a small player, cannot play a lot. Tunisia needs to be present and have to say something, but at the same time, tunisia needs to be supported by others, by International Actors. And this is not really acceptable by the algerians. Anyway, on the libyan case, for example, tunisia tried to have its own position, but at the same time, a very difficult position because with whom can tunisia discuss libya . Those along the border, there is a real idealogical conflict, lets say, between those who are in power in the western part of libya and the current actors, political actors in power in tunisia. So this is a very fragile situation. And tunisia has to have the support of algeria because without algeria, we cannot go further. In the same time, we balance the need to have support from International Players or actors. And on this land, tunisia has a lot of partnerships with International Actors. They have a partnership with europe in particular, tunisia is part of the socalled European Security and differenefense pol also consider it as one of the most important countries in the region since with morocco, both are partners with europe. Tunisia is taking part of the 5 plus 5 dialogue, which is also different, important because minister of defense makes and discusses informally, but it is very important for tunisia. Tunisia has bilateral relations, strong relations with france, with france we have even a different agreement, but its a very old defense agreement. We dont know if its still on the table or not. And of course, last year was a very Important Partnership with also u. S. But the problem now in tunisia is that of course we are in democracy, like was said. But at least we have several political actors present and free to command and have their own views on the relations between tunisia and other International Actors. It is very difficult today to take this possibility and say we are a partner with them. We have the support of u. N. And we endorse the support, and this is very problematic, because how to fight the society when you have no courage to say, yes, we have the support of u. S. We have the support of france. So all the time we are trying to dissolve the reality and the sort of political correct discourse. Yeah. Very interesting. All right, well move to audience q a. And i think maybe well take two questions, given the short time. Looking for people who havent already asked questions. Since we just have two hands, well go bill and then havet. Another excellent panel. Congratulations, csis, for putting this together today. It seems to me most of the discussion, perhaps the most interesting part of the discussion on this panel was about vision. And i would argue that for all of the discussions we need to have about vision and all the vision building we need to do, algeria and tunisia have huge capacity issues. If you compare algeria and tunisia to the moroccan case, i got the sense, and knowing the moroccan case, that theyre a little ahead on the vision aspect, and theyre considerably ahead on the capacity, the ability to change policy and then implement those policies. If you study tunisia closely, there are huge capacity issues stemming from the revolution. And algeria has a different problem, sort of hollowed out ministries from the 90s and forced early retirements in security, so you have this sort of were bellshaped curve and missing confidence in in algeria too. My question to both panelists is about capacity. You can have a great vision, work out a great vision, but if you cant implement that with the leadership that is required and the tools that are required, youll always come out sorry. One more. Well combine answers. Mohammed with the tunisia american young professionals. Very related question, in fact, to what bill was talking about. But theres this perception or at least maybe its a reality that, you know, radical movements are always one step ahead. You know, in terms of their use of technology, in terms of theres been a lot of discussion about use of social media, of encrypted networks, of encrypted emails. My question is very much related in the sense that, are we prepared in tunisia and algeria and morocco to face the threats that are coming our way in terms of cybersecurity, in terms of digital currencies, money flows, tracing all these, and what kind of support we need from our friends in the u. S. , the european union, to face those things. Very brief question to my friend, dr. Driss, from tunisia, related to the National Security council, which he sort of portrayed as a very integrated structure which is needed in tunisia but that may perhaps, you know, cause a problem in terms of roles and responsibility of the president versus the head of government. President is elected in tunisia. Has specific roles per the constitution, head of government is appointed by the assembly but after proposition of the president. Do you feel like the tunisia democratic model is sort of structured the right way . Would you like to lead us off . I think to the first question, i agree with you. Theres certainly a perception, perhaps, of capacity issues. If you look at the three countries that were talking about, geographically, theyre vastly different. When you talk about the challenges facing the central country of algeria in this case, the borders are extremely lengthy. And the bordering countries are all crisis countries. Algeria being itself a crisis country as well. Whereas if you look at morocco, clearly, its northwest presence or location with a couple of borders, one heavily militarized of the algerian moroccan side, suggests that the types of issues that theyre facing have to be different. In the case of morocco, its a lot of it is homegrown. When you talk about the presence of militant groups, a lot of it is homegrown. A lot is driven by some of the issues that were talked about earlier, economic, social, political issues. In the case of algeria, its that plus the issue of controlling the borders as well. So i do agree with you that theres, you know, when you look at these countries, you get discussion around capacity, but capacities are driven by the realities on the ground. Tunisia specifically, you know, its proximity to libya, thats the primary cause number one, but we know of all the social issues that the tunisias are facing in rural areas, in border towns, in cities where basically employment or unemployment is a big problem. The rule of law is a big problem. The abuses that some of the kids have been facing there are key contributors. And these social factors, you could argue that theyre common denominators in the entire region. And probably beyond. Certainly, you do have common factors. And you have factors that are specific to each region. I would argue that Border Control is probably one of the biggest as far as i am concerned. Yeah, vision building is very important, however capacity. The discussion on the capacity of our, in tunisia for example, and its sure we dependent on International Support and International Actor hesitating, supporting tunisia in a capacity of absorption. I think tunisia is able to absorb any support that tunisia can have. And the problem why the actors are hesitating. I think it also depends on not the capacity of absorption of the tunisia government, but the capacity to convince the International Actors that they are able to also play in the correct way. And this is problematic because also its due to the political system that we have. Another impact of the political system. Of course, the tunisia model of democracy, is it the right one . So we can imagine that those who designed the current political system designed it in order to have more balance of power between the but looking for balance of power can also lead to the absence, the total absence of responsibility. When you have an absence of responsibility, you have no actors that you can deal with because all of them are absorbed by other than to serve the National Interest. And when the National Interest is not clear, is absent, maybe, International Actors cannot be confident in what youre doing, and they cannot support you. So we have to convince our politicians that they have to be careful on that. And to Work Together in order to serve the National Interests. But anyway, the system is now two years after the adoption of the constitution, so we have no clear idea whether the system is delivering what it is supposed to deliver. But let me say that in a partnership with the tunisia institute for strategic studies related to the presidency, we will Work Together on the sort of diagnostics of the system in order to see where is the dysfunction in the system and also in order to be able to advance not solutions but vision for the future. If you dont mind, i would like to address one of the questions the gentleman asked earlier about technology and controlling all of that. I think its a slippery slope in terms of trying to control all this. Its legitimate for government to try to do something about it. But legislating, controlling, and repressing is, in my mind, not the right move, and clearly, we have seen some disastrous examples. I think this past, last school season, i think algeria has blocked the internet for a week because there were leaks in the baccalaureate exam. I would argue thats not the right way to do it. Theres absolutely there is a right argument to say we have the control of all of these inputs into the Salafi Movement and the jihadi movement. That makes sense, but the approach that is kind of being proposed by many with governments under pressure to implement such drastic measures, not the right way to go. In terms of international cooperation, i think i was asked the same question about ten years ago. You know, is it is the u. S. In a better position than the western europe to support whats going on in the region . And the answer is a little more nuanced than that. First of all, its really a domestic issue. Really, you have to bring as much support to the local government and the militaries in terms of knowledge and counterterror strategies, et cetera, but its a fight that locals have to fight first. First and foremost. And secondly, obviously, there are some elements that could be outside of their pay grade in terms of Border Control, technology controls, that would require the skill sets and the technologies of the u. S. Or western europe. But in general, im an advocate of its your internal issues, you have to fix it, fix the politics of it. You have to work with the regional governments, tunisia and algeria are doing it, a pretty good job jrb some of their militaries are able to cross the borders, to help each other, and that works well with morocco, you know, its never ending Western Sahara crisis that caused big hardships for the region. I think its a domestic issue. Providing capacity for the local governments, making sure that also they abide by the rule of law, that there is a parallel political and social process that enhances,